COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 1
COMM 610: SEMINAR IN
ADVANCED COMMUNICATION THEORY
(FALL 2013)
“I think you should be a bit more explicit
here in step two.”
BRIAN H. SPITZBERG, Ph.D.
Senate Distinguished Professor, San Diego State University
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 2
COMM 610: COMMUNICATION THEORY
Professor
Dr. Brian H. Spitzberg
Semester
Fall 2013
Office
COMM BLDG 201
Schedule #
31824
Office Hours
Tu &Th 10-11, Th 1-2, by Appt.
Classroom
COMM BLDG 209
Office Phone
619.594.7097 (email preferred)
Mailbox
COMM BLDG 237
E-mail
spitz@mail.sdsu.edu
Class Time
Th 4-6:40
Text 1
Readings: A single set of hard-copy readings will be briefly checked out to the
class, and the class will decide how to obtain their own personal copies.
Syllabus Packet: Enormous work has gone into this packet with the intent
that it serve as an ongoing resource to you in this course and beyond. The
assignments and readings in it evolve over time, and there are occasional
oversights or mistakes. It is therefore important that you: (a) print it out, (b)
bring it to each class, (c) read through it at the beginning of the course and
review it during the course, and (d) bring to the instructor’s attention any
inconsistencies, confusions, or questions that arise.
Axiom I: How we think about (theorize) the world has as much to do with
what we (think we) know, as the methods we use to observe the
world.
Axiom II: The methods we use to observe the world are integrally related to
the theories we use to think about the world.
Axiom III: Theories are as much a tool (i.e., methodology) as are our
observational procedures.
Text 2
Objectives
This course critically examines the role of theories and meta-theories in the
progress of social science generally, and of communication theory specifically.
It examines scholarly inquiry in light of (a) theory construction and evaluation,
(b) evolution, social construction and accumulation of knowledge, and (c)
influences of cultural, reflexive and anthropocentric biases (i.e., creating the
world in our image).

To obtain an advanced understanding of the nature and function of
theories in the endeavors of communication as a social science and the
investigation of the empirical world;

To achieve an advanced comprehension of the tenets and comparative
characteristics of communication-relevant theories and meta-theoretical
perspectives;

To demonstrate ability to analyze, synthesize, compare, contrast and
create relevant theoretical literature and ideas.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 3
COMM 610 SCHEDULE (SPRING 2013)
Week
1
Date
SP: ‘13
08-29
Topic
Readings
Course Orientation: A synoptic view of
scholarship/science
From Whence We Came: A Synoptic View of
Scholarship
Beauty in the eye of the beholder: What
Theories Are, and What Makes Them Good
After Theory: The Nature and Uses of MetaTheory
“No Risk, No Gain?”: Justification, Verification,
& Falsification of Theory
Lewin's dictum: There is Nothing So Practical as
a Good Theory (or is there?)
Brother can you paradigm?: Paradigms and
paradigm change
Submit model papers
Syllabus—read through prior to
1st class
#1-5: Miller; Fuchs; HoyningenHuene; Berger; Craig
#6-8: Sutton & Staw; Gregor;
Spitzberg* (*: in syllabus)
#9-11: Turner (x2); Wallis
Assignments
2
09-05
3
09-12
4
09-19
5
09-26
6
10-03
7
10-10
8
10-17
9
10-24
10
10-31
11
11-07
12
11-14
Rose Colored Glasses: Traditional, Perceptual,
Constructive, Postmodern
Peeking at the Postmodern: Theory As
Postmodern Process
Deconstructing Theoretical Constructions:
Scholarship as Text
NCA: NO CLASS
13
11-21
THANKSGIVING: NO CLASS
14
11-28
15
12-05
16
12-12
Law of the Hammer?: Objective vs.
Hermeneutic Empiricism
Rescuing Realism: Patches & Parables VS.
Life Is But a Game: The Politics of Scholarship
Final Examination; Tuesday, 1900-2100 **
*
These are recommended, but not required readings.
**
NOTE: This is the final exam date! Tell your family, friends, and the people whose wedding you have to be
in you cannot travel during this time on this date because it is scheduled as of the first day of class!
JuxPo#1
#12-14: Popper (x 3)
JuxPo#2
#15-17: Cohen; Sandelands;
Alxeander & Colomy
#18-20: Craig (x2); Anderson &
Baym
*: Spitzberg & Chagnon
JuxPo#3
#21-22: Kuhn; Laudan et al.
JuxPo#4
#23-24: Feyerabend; Lloyd
#25-28: Gergen (x3); Ritzer et
al.
Model
Synopsis
#29-31: Greewald; Wallach &
Wallach; Jost et al.
#32-34: Bostrom & Donohew;
Gilman; Chow
JuxPo#5
Proposition
Paper
Final Exam
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 4
Assignment
Overview
Grade Scale
Late Work
Incompletes

Juxtaposition Essays—Formulate juxtapositions of ideas, concepts,
arguments, contradictions, quotes, or theoretical implications from five
sets of readings during the semester. The schedule indicates the dates by
which a minimum of these juxtapositions must have been completed.
The specific requirements of this assignment in this syllabus packet, along
with the grading rubric. (2 juxtapositions at 25 points each = 50 points).
You get to choose which five weeks of the semester you will present on,
but the instructor will solicit a distribution of presenters so that every
week should have at least a few presenters. The juxtapositions will be
presented as oral presentations toward the beginning of the class as a
stimulus to conversation and debate. You are expected to treat these as
oral presentations; thus, clarity and persuasiveness of presentation is
taken into account. In other words, “wing it at your own risk!” [50 points]
 Model Synopsis—This paper will be no more than 5 pages, doublespaced, not including the model diagram, title page or references. The
purpose of the paper is to present a first draft of a model that will be
integrated into the final “Model and Proposition” paper. Text will explain
the model, with supporting references. [50 points]
 Model and Proposition Paper—Develop a visual model of a process or
phenomenon in which human communication plays a central role, and
codify the theoretical knowledge claims that extend from that model in
the form of axioms, theorems, hypotheses, and/or propositions. Length:
20-25 pages (not including title page, abstract, references, model, or
tables. [100 points]
 Final Exam: Essay Examination—A take-home examination about the
nature, function, scope, evolution, and utility of (1) theory; (2)
paradigms; (3) meta-theory; and (4) alternatives to regnant paradigms
and theories. [100 points] *
Grades are based on a total point system, in which ‘a point is a point, is a
point’. Letter grades are assigned based on .60, .70, .80, .90 main cuts, with
.x3, and .x7 mid-grade cuts. There is no normative curving.
A = 282-300
B+ = 261-269
C = 000-239
A - = 270-281
B = 249-260
B- = 240-248
Any paper turned in late will be reduced 10 points per weekday that passes
beyond the scheduled due date, excepted only for university or professor
recognized excuses. The credibility of excuse will depend in part on diligence in
apprising the instructor of the situation. In all instances in which an assignment
is late, an email should be sent to the instructor as soon as possible, with a
Word version of the assignment attached.
An “I” grade is assigned when a student cannot meet a clearly identifiable
portion of course requirements within the academic term for unforeseen
reasons. An incomplete is not provided because a course or schedule is too
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 5
difficult or because time was not managed sufficiently.
Overview
SDSU
Definitions
THE ACADEMIC DISHONESTY POLICY OF
THE SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION
In any case in which an instructor identifies evidence for charging a student
with violation of academic conduct standards or plagiarism, the presumption
will be with that instructor’s determination. The instructor(s) will confer with
the School Director to confirm the evidence. Once confirmed, the student will
be informed and presented with the evidence. Some conditions and terms
below clarify the School policy and procedure.
“Cheating: Cheating is defined as the act of obtaining or attempting to obtain
credit for academic work by the use of dishonest, deceptive, or fraud- ulent
means. Examples of cheating include, but are not limited to
 copying, in part or in whole, from another's test or other examination;
discussing answers or ideas relating to the answers on a test or other
examination without the permission of the instructor;
 obtaining copies of a test, an examination, or other course material
without the permission of the instructor;
 using notes, cheat sheets, or other devices considered inappropriate
under the prescribed testing condition;
 collaborating with another or others in work to be presented without the
permission of the instructor;
 falsifying records, laboratory work, or other course data;
 submitting work previously presented in another course, if contrary to the
rules of the course;
 altering or interfering with the grading procedures;
 plagiarizing, as defined; and
 knowingly and intentionally assisting another student in any of the above.
Plagiarism:
Plagiarism is defined as the act of incorporating ideas, words, or specific
substance of another, whether purchased, borrowed, or otherwise obtained,
and submitting same to the university as one's own work to fulfill academic
requirements without giving credit to the appropriate source. Plagiarism shall
include but not be limited to:
 submitting work, either in part or in whole, completed by another;
 omitting footnotes for ideas, statements, facts, or conclusions that belong
to another;
 omitting quotation marks when quoting directly from another, whether it
be a paragraph, sentence, or part thereof;
 close and lengthy paraphrasing of the writings of another;
 submitting another person's artistic works, such as musical compositions,
photographs, paintings, drawings, or sculptures; and
 submitting as one's own work papers purchased from research
companies.” (source: http://www.sa.sdsu.edu/srr/cheating-plagiarism.html)
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 6
Intellectual
contents
Intellectual contents include all forms of ‘text’ produced by another person or
persons. It includes: writings, course syllabi, course lectures and recordings of
lectures, visual information such as models, videos, lyrics, software, etc.
Intellectual
The syllabus, lectures and lecture outlines are personally-copyrighted
Property
intellectual property of the instructor, which means that any organized
recording for anything other than personal use, duplication, distribution, or
profit is a violation of copyright and fair use laws.
Proper source Proper attribution occurs by specifying the source of content or ideas. This is
attribution
done by (a) providing quotation marks around text, when directly quoted, and
(b) clearly designating the source of the text or information relied upon in an
assignment.
Self-plagiarism Students often practice some form of ‘double-dipping,’ in which they write on
a given topic across more than one course assignment. In general, there is
nothing wrong with double-dipping topics or sources, but there is a problem
with double-dipping exact and redundant text. It is common for scholars to
write on the same topic across many publication outlets; this is part of
developing expertise and the reputation of being a scholar on a topic.
Scholars, however, are not permitted to repeat exact text across papers or
publications except when noted and attributed, as this wastes precious
intellectual space with repetition and does a disservice to the particular
source of original presentation by ‘diluting’ the value of the original
presentation. Any time that a writer simply ‘cuts-and-pastes’ exact text from
former papers into a new paper without proper attribution, it is a form of selfplagiarism. Consequently, a given paper should never be turned in to multiple
classes. Entire paragraphs, or even sentences, should not be repeated wordfor-word across course assignments. Each new writing assignment is precisely
that, a new writing assignment, requiring new composition on the student’s
part.
Solicitation for Any student who solicits any third party to write any portion of an assignment
ghost writing
for this class (whether for pay or not) violates the standards of academic
honesty. The penalty for solicitation (regardless of whether it can be
demonstrated the individual solicited wrote any sections of the assignment) is
F in the course and the student will be reported to Student Rights and
Responsibilities.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 7
Secondary
citations
Useful Aides
Secondary citation is not strictly a form of plagiarism, but in blatant forms, it
can present similar ethical challenges. A secondary citation is citing source A,
which in turn cites source B, but it is source B’s ideas or content that provide
the unique basis for the claims the student intends to make in the
assignment. For example, assume there is an article by Jones (2006) in the
student’s hands, in which there is a discussion or quotation of an article by
Smith (1998). Assume further that what Smith seems to be saying is very
important to the student’s analysis. In such a situation, the student should
always try to locate the original Smith source. In general, if an idea is
important enough to discuss in an assignment, it is important enough to
locate and cite the original source for that idea. There are several reasons for
these policies: (a) Authors sometimes commit citation errors, which might be
replicated without knowing it; (b) Authors sometimes make interpretation
errors, which might be ignorantly reinforced (c) Therefore, reliability of
scholarly activity is made more difficult to assure and enforce; (d) By relying
on only a few sources of review, the learning process is short-circuited, and
the student’s own research competencies are diminished, which are integral
to any liberal education; (e) By masking the actual sources of ideas, readers
must second guess which sources come from which citations, making the
readers’ own research more difficult; (f) By masking the origin of the
information, the actual source of ideas is misrepresented. Some suggestions
that assist with this principle:
 When the ideas Jones discusses are clearly attributed to, or unique to,
Smith, then find the Smith source and citation.
 When the ideas Jones is discussing are historically associated more with
Smith than with Jones, then find the Smith source and citation.
 In contrast, Jones is sometimes merely using Smith to back up what Jones
is saying and believes, and is independently qualified to claim, whether or
not Smith would have also said it; in such a case, citing Jones is sufficient.
 Never simply copy a series of citations at the end of a statement by Jones,
and reproduce the reference list without actually going to look up what
those references report—the only guarantee that claims are valid is for a
student to read the original sources of those claims.
A good place to learn about plagiarism is the tutorial on academic integrity at
http://plagiarism.org/plagiarism-101/overview/; and at
http://www.yorku.ca/tutorial/academic_integrity/caseintro.html
A good place to learn about APA writing and citation style is:
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/01/
A good place to learn about making better arguments is:
http://www.readwritethink.org/files/resources/interactives/persuasion_map/
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 8
TurnItIn.com
The papers in this course will be submitted electronically in Word (preferably
2007, .docx) on the due dates assigned, and will require verification of
submission to Turnitin.com.
“Students agree that by taking this course all required papers may be subject
to submission for textual similarity review to TurnItIn.com for the detection
of plagiarism. All submitted papers will be included as source documents in
the TurnItIn.com reference database solely for the purpose of detecting
plagiarism of such papers. You may submit your papers in such a way that no
identifying information about you is included. Another option is that you may
request, in writing, that your papers not be submitted to TurnItIn.com.
However, if you choose this option you will be required to provide
documentation to substantiate that the papers are your original work and do
not include any plagiarized material” (source: language suggested by the CSU
General Counsel and approved by the Center for Student’s Rights and
Responsibilities at SDSU).
Consequences
 Course failure: Soliciting or reproducing a whole paper, paragraph, or
of Plagiarism or
large portions of unattributed materials without proper attribution,
Cheating
whether represented by: (a) multiple sentences, images, or portions of
images; or (b) by percentage of assignment length, will result in
assignment of an “F” in the course in which the infraction occurred, and a
report to the Center for Student Rights and Responsibilities (CSRR2).
 Assignment failure: Reproducing a sentence or sentence fragment with no
quotation marks, but with source citation, or subsets of images without
source attribution, will minimally result in an “F” on the assignment, and
may result in greater penalty, including a report to the CSRR, depending
factors noted below. In this instance, an “F” may mean anything between
a zero (0) and 50%, depending on the extent of infraction.
 Exacerbating conditions—Amount: Evidence of infraction, even if
fragmentary, is increased with a greater: (a) number of infractions; (b)
distribution of infractions across an assignment; or (c) proportion of the
assignment consisting of infractions.
 Exacerbating conditions—Intent: Evidence of foreknowledge and intent
to deceive magnifies the seriousness of the offense and the grounds for
official response. Plagiarism, whether ‘by accident’ or ‘by ignorance,’ still
qualifies as plagiarism—it is all students’ responsibility to make sure their
assignments are not committing the offense.
 Assistance: Evidence that the student was not the original author of the
work, due to soliciting the assistance or composition of another person or
persons.
 Exceptions: Any exceptions to these policies will be considered on a caseby-case basis, and only under exceptional circumstances.
HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO EXCUSES ALLOWED BASED ON IGNORANCE OF
WHAT CONSTITUTES PLAGIARISM, OR OF WHAT THIS POLICY IS
The School of Communication, as a representative of SDSU and higher education,
Comportment
expects students to engage in behavior that enhances the classroom learning
environment. The Instructor is responsible not only to the individual student, but to
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 9
the collective group of students who constitute a class. This means that behavior
disruptive to the classroom instruction is not tolerated. For the sake of the other
students, the instructor may be required to intervene under various circumstances.
Among the actions that are considered disruptive to the learning environment are:
 The use of cellphones and/or computers/laptops/tablets, whether for
conversation, correspondence, emailing, texting, tweeting, or other activities
(e.g., social media/Facebook), and when not directly related to the course and
its instructional objectives, materials, or contents;
 Side conversations or discussion in a manner distracting to the instructor or
fellow students;
 Ongoing or unrestricted interruption of instructor or fellow students, or
otherwise attempting to monopolize classroom time or discussion;
 Reading, sleeping, snoring, moving about, yelling, harassing, bullying, or
otherwise engaging in activities disrespectful of the instructor or students, or
unrelated to the course, materials, or contents;
 Entering late, leaving early, or leaving often during lecture, especially when in a
disruptive manner;
 Activity that in any way could be considered grossly inappropriate, threatening
or dangerous.
Certain other activities may be acceptable, but only with permission or by direction
of the Instructor, who retains the authority to specify relevant restrictions. Such
activities include:
 Filming, taping, or otherwise recording the class;
 Accessing the Internet during class;
 Use of computers/laptops/tablets may be permitted, but only if the students
are seated in the front row(s) of the classroom.
The Instructor reserves the right to establish additional reasonable expectations
deemed necessary to maintain optimal learning conduct in the classroom. Each
faculty member is the primary arbiter of classroom comportment. The faculty
member has the authority to enforce this policy in a manner deemed suitable to the
particular class in question. For example
 a student texting in class may be requested to turn the phone in to the
instructor for the remainder of the class, or
 a student using a laptop or IPAD to access Facebook may be asked to close and
shut down the technology for the remainder of the period.
Should repeat offenses occur, with fair warning, each faculty member will
determine fair and appropriate consequences for these behaviors. Should an
emergency occur or require monitoring, or if students observe violations of this
policy, they are encouraged to inform the instructor as soon as possible.
Finally, all students are governed by the SDSU policy on cheating and plagiarism. See
their coda at: http://csrr.sdsu.edu/cheating-plagiarism.html
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 10
THIS IS
SERIOUS!
PLAGIARISM IS A CRIME OF CONDUCT, NOT OF INTENT.
THIS COURSE WILL HAVE ZERO-TOLERANCE FOR PLAGIARISM!
WHY? BECAUSE:
1. A PLAGIARISM POLICY IS PUBLISHED IN THE UNIVERSITY CATALOG;
2. THE SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION PLAGIARISM POLICY, COMPLETE
WITH ELABORATED EXAMPLES, DEFINITIONS, AND CONSEQUENCES
FOR TYPES OF PLAGIARISM, IS:
a. ON THE SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION BLACKBOARD SITE,
b. ON THE SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION WEBSITE, AND
c. IN THE COURSE SYLLABUS;
3. A POWERPOINT LECTURE PRESENTED IN THIS COURSE ON “THE
ESSENTIALS” FURTHER SPECIFIES THE NATURE OF PLAGIARISM;
4. YOU CAN TURN IN YOUR PAPER BEFORE IT IS DUE, SEE ITS
ORIGINALITY RATING, FIX IT, AND TURN IT IN AGAIN BY
SUBMISSION DEADLINE;
5. FINALLY, YOU SHOULD SIMPLY KNOW THAT IT IS UNETHICAL AND A
‘HIGH CRIME’ IN ACADEME TO MISREPRESENT ANYONE’S WORDS
OR IDEAS, THROUGH IMPLICATION, WHETHER INTENDED OR NOT,
a. THAT THEY ARE YOUR OWN, OR
b. THEY ARE SOMEONE ELSE’S WHEN THEY ARE NOT.
A final analogy:
If you are taking a driving test to get a license,
And you run a stop sign while the instructor is in the car,
You fail the test then and there,
and must wait for an opportunity to re-take the exam another time.
So it is with plagiarism.
THEREFORE, THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR PLAGIARISM,
AND NO EXCUSE WILL BE ACCEPTED.
YOU ARE FOREWARNED.
IF YOU PLAGIARIZE, YOU WILL FAIL THIS COURSE.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 11
Source: http://plagiarism.org/plagiarism-101/overview
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 12
A FEW TIDBITS ABOUT SCIENCE AND THEORY
“Both science and art have to do with ordered complexity.”
Lancelot Law White, The Griffin, 1957 (in Kaplan: Science says)
“The aims of scientific thought are to see the general in the particular
and the eternal in the transitory.”
A. N. Whitehead, Dictionary of scientific quotations (Mackay)
“Common sense provides a kind of ultimate validation after science has completed its work;
it seldom anticipates what science is going to discover”
R. L. Ackoff, Decision making in national science policy, 1968 (in Kaplan: Science says)
“It would be interesting to inquire how many times essential advances in science
have first been made possible by the fact that the boundaries of special disciplines
were not respected….Trespassing is one of the most successful techniques in science.”
W. Köhler, Dynamics in psychology, 1940 (in Kaplan: Science says)
“Beware of the problem of testing too many hypotheses;
the more you torture the data, the more likely they are to confess,
but confessions obtained under duress may not be admissible in the course of scientific opinion.”
S. M. Stigler, in Nitecki & Hoffman, Neutral models in biology, (in Kaplan: Science says)
“No one believes an hypothesis except its originator,
but everyone believes an experiment except the experimenter.”
W. I. B. Beveridge, The art of scientific investigation, (in Kaplan: Science says)
Q: “Do you feel that scientists correct themselves as often as they should?”
“More often than politicians, but not as often as they should.”
Stephen Hawking (D. Solomon, New York Times Syndicate, SDU-T, Wed., 1.12.05.F10)
“there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns;
that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know….
It is the latter category that tend[s] to be the difficult one”
A political Haiku by Donald Rumsfeld, Economist, Dec. 6, 2003, p. 28
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 13
“Ideas and theories become popular or unpopular at a certain time
not because they are more or less ‘true’ but because the value systems that support them are
activated or suppressed by ecological and institutional developments”
(Hofstede, 1980, p. 323)
“Admissions of ignorance and temporary mystifications are vital to good science”
(Dawkins, The God delusion, 2006, p. 126)
“Theories become clear and ‘reasonable’ only after incoherent parts of them have been used
for a long time. Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodological foreplay thus turns out to be
an unavoidable precondition of clarity and empirical success. …
Without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery and any progress”
(Feyerabend, Against method, p. 25)
“Science is organized knowledge”
Herbert Spencer
“Science is built upon facts, as a house is built of stones;
but an accumulation of facts is no more science than a heap of stones is a house”
Henri Poincare
“The aim of science is not to open the door to infinite wisdom,
But to set a limit to infinite error”
Bertolt Brecht
“It is the customary fate of new truths to begin as heresies and to end as superstitions”
Aldous Huxley
“ignorance is never better than knowledge”
Enrico Fermi
“The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr.
Mohammed (570-632)
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 14
BACKGROUND APPETIZERS
Professor’s note: For the ambitious—the following are nice overviews of some of the basic issues
we will eventually get to in this course, from a perspective of philosophy of science (as opposed
to the perspective of the communication discipline per se). These are not required readings, but if
you feel the need or desire for “background” readings, these would be good to find.





Klemke, E. D., Hollinger, R., & Kline, A. D. (1980). What is philosophy of science? In E. D.
Klemke, R. Hollinger, & A. D. Kline (Eds.), Introductory readings in the philosophy of
science (pp. 1-18). Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
Knorr Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic cultures. London: Oxford University Press.
Lakatos, I., & Feyerabend, P. (1999). For and against method (M. Motterlini, Ed.). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Machlup, F. (1994). Are the social sciences really inferior? In M. Martin & L. C. McIntyre (Eds.),
Readings in the philosophy of social science (pp. 5-19). Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT
Press. [originally: Machlup, F. (1961). Are the social sciences really inferior? Southern
Economic Journal, 17, 173-184]
Tauber, A. I. (Ed.). (1997). Science and the quest for reality. Washington Square, NY: New York
University Press.
"Scientists make their fame on variance explained,
but it's error variance that keeps careers sustained."
B. Spitzberg (2007)
“Science is a subtle and ongoing dance between an empirical world,
and the ideas and symbols we use to comprehend that world;
theory is the music, and methodology the choreography, by which the dance proceeds”
B. H. Spitzberg, 2010
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 15
WEEK I: ORIENTATION
A SYNOPTIC VIEW OF SCHOLARSHIP/SCIENCE
“Granting the existence of a discernible regularity in the phenomena being studied,
it is conceivable, too, that some day the gravitational formula would have been discovered
even if it had escaped Newton. None of this can be said of a sonata of Beethoven’s or a play of
Shakespeare’s, or for that matter, of a history of Thucydides.
These possess a uniqueness not characteristics of the discoveries of science”
(Prior, Science and the humanities).
“scientific truth has always contained an overwhelming difference from theological truth:
it is provisional. …
Science, unlike orthodox theology, has been capable of continuous, evolutionary growth.
As Phaedrus had written on one of his slips, ‘The pencil is mightier than the pen.’”
Robert A. Pirsig, Lila: An inquiry into morals, p. 222.
“A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing opponents and making them see the light,
but rather because its opponents eventually die,
and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”
Max Planck, A scientific autobiography and other papers, 1949
Recommended:
Altman, I., & Rogoff, B. (1987). World views in psychology: Trait, interactional, organismic, and
transactional perspectives. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), Handbook of environmental
psychology (pp. 7-40). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Bochner, A. P. (2008, Oct.). Perspectives on theory and theorizing (colloquy). Spectra, 44 (9), 3-4,
10.
Cronen, V. E. & Davis, L. K. (1978). Alternative approaches for the communication theorist:
Problems in the laws-rules-systems trichotomy. Human Communication Research, 4, 120-128.
Cushman, D. P. & Pearce, W. B. (1977). Generality and necessity in three types of theory about
human communication, with special attention to rules theory. Human Communication
Research, 3, 344-353.
Gergen, K. J. & Morawski, J. (1980). An alternative metatheory for social psychology. In L.
Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 326-352). Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage.
Nass, C. I., & Reeves, B. (1991). Combining, distinguishing, and generating theories in
communication: A domains of analysis framework. Communication Research, 18, 240-261.
Rosengren, K. E. (1989). Paradigms lost and regained. In B. Dervin, L. Grossberg, B. J. O'Keefe, & E.
Wartella (Eds.), Rethinking communication (Vol. 1: Paradigm issues, pp. 21-39). Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Smith, T. J., III (1988). Diversity and order in communication theory: The uses of philosophical
analysis. Communication Quarterly, 36, 28-40.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 16
WEEK II: FROM WHENCE WE CAME:
A SYNOPTIC VIEW OF SCHOLARSHIP
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to fulfill it."
G. Santayana
"Some education in meta-theoretic thinking can be prophylactic for all of us."
Meehl, 1993, p.720
“Our city of intellectual possibilities includes many mansions,
and restriction to one great house will keep us walled off from much of nature’s truth”
Stephen Jay Gould, Lying stones of Marrakech, 2000, p. 163
“Fields of learning are surrounded ultimately only by illusory boundaries—
like the “rooms” in a hall of mirrors.
It is when the illusion is penetrated that progress takes place.”
W. S. Beck, Modern science and the nature of life, 1957, (in Kaplan: Science says)
Differentiating Science, Humanities, and Religion as Ways of Knowing:
(1) Miller, G. R. (1975). Humanistic and scientific approaches to speech communication inquiry:
Rivalry, redundancy, or rapprochement. Western Speech Communication, 39, 230-239.
(2) Fuchs, S. (2001). What makes sciences “scientific”? In J. H. Turner (Ed.), Handbook of
sociological theory (pp. 21-35). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
(3) Hoyningen-Huene, P. (2008). Systematicity: The nature of science. Philosophia, 36, 167-180.
Assessing the Theoretical Status of the Communication Discipline
(4) Berger, C. R. (1991). Communication theories and other curios. Communication
Monographs, 58, 101-113.
(5) Craig, R. T. (1993). Why are there so many communication theories? Journal of
Communication, 43, 26-33.
*Spitzberg—“Islands of Inquiry” (see end of syllabus for manuscript)
Also (highly) recommended:
Berger, C. R. (1992). Curiouser and curiouser curios. Communication Monographs, 59, 101-107.
Bowman, J. P., & Targowski, S. S. (1987). Modeling the communication process: The map is not
the territory. Journal of Business Communication, 24, 21-34.
Burleson, B. R. (1992). Taking communication seriously. Communication Monographs, 59, 79-86.
Donsbach, W. (2006). The identity of communication research. Journal of Communication, 56,
437-448.
Eadie, W. F. (2009). Communication as a field and as a discipline. In W. F. Eadie (Ed.), 21st century
communication: A reference handbook (pp. 12-21). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Jiménez, L. G., & Guillem, S. M. (2009). Does communication studies have an identity? Setting the
bases for contemporary research. Catalan Journal of Communication & Cultural Studies, 1, 1527.
Powers, J. H. (1995). On the intellectual structure of the human communication discipline.
Communication Education, 44, 191-222.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 17
Proctor, R. (1992). Preserving the tie that binds: A response to Berger's essay. Communication
Monographs, 59, 98-100.
Purcell, B. (1992). Are there so few communication theories? Communication Monographs, 59,
94-97.
Redding, C. (1992). Response to Professor Berger's Essay: Its meaning for organizational
communication. Communication Monographs, 59, 87-93.
Shields, D. C., & Cragan, J. F. (1998). Are there really so few communication theories? The joys of
hindsight and the benefit of foresight. Paper presented at the Central States Communication
Association Conference, Chicago, IL.
Stanfill, M. (2012). Finding birds of a feather: Multiple memberships and diversity without
divisiveness in communication research. Communication Theory, 22, 1-24.
Also Recommend:
Cohen, H. (1985). The development of research in speech communication: A historical
perspective. In W. T. Benson (Ed.), Speech communication in the 20th century (pp. 282-298).
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University.
Delia, J. G. (1987). Communication research: A history. In C. R. Berger & S. H. Chaffee (Eds.),
Handbook of communication science (pp. 20-98). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Farrell, T. B. (1987). Beyond science: Humanities contributions to communication theory. In C. R.
Berger & S. H. Chaffee (Eds.), Handbook of communication science (pp. 123-139). Newbury
Park: Sage.
Geertz, C. (1980). Blurred genres: The refiguration of social thought. American Scholar, 49, 165182.
Golden, J. L. (1987). Contemporary trends and historical roots in communication. A personal view.
Central States Speech Journal, 38, 262-270.
Leff, M. C., & Procario, M. O. (1985). Rhetorical theory in speech communication. In T. W. Benson
(Ed.), Speech communication in the 20th century (pp. 3-27). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University.
Littlejohn, S. W. (1982). An overview of contributions to human communication theory from
other disciplines. In F.E.X. Dance (Ed.), Human communication theory: Comparative essays
(pp. 243-285). New York: Harper & Row.
Pearce, W. B. (1985). Scientific research methods in communication studies and their implications
for theory and research. In T. W. Benson (Ed.), Speech communication in the 20th century (pp.
255-281). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University.
Focus Questions:
1. What, if anything, differentiates a "school," a "discipline," a “perspective,” an "invisible
college," and a paradigm?
2. What is the utility of academic disciplines?
3. Defend the position that "communication" either should be, or should not be, a discipline on
the same level of prestige as psychology, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, etc.
4. What, if anything, in our history differentiates the discipline of communication from other
more recognized disciplines?
5. What makes something scientific, and what makes something humanistic? Are these useful
distinctions, and why or why not?
6. Are the “questions asked” really different from, and better than, “the methods used” in
differentiating the sciences from the humanities? Why or why not?
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 18
Rhetorical Criticism as Theoretical
“too many rhetorical critics in the past have forthrightly, but perhaps unwisely,
rejected their obligations to tease theory from their research…
the field of speech communication is, to that extent, the poorer. I … argue three points:
(1)
that a pronounced concern for theory could redirect some of our typical approaches
to rhetorical criticism, (2) that properly conceived generic criticism must, by its nature,
(2)
fully respond to this call for theory-building, and (3) that rhetorical critics should
encourage the work of desriptivists as well as that of judgmentalists.”
Hart, R. P. (1976). CSSJ, 27, 70-77)
Turtles & Theories:
Dimitri:
Tasso:
Dimitri:
Tasso:
Dimitri:
Tasso:
If Atlas holds up the world, what hold up Atlas?
Atlas stands on the back of a turtle.
But what does the turtle stand on?
Another turtle.
And what does that turtle stand on?
My dear Dimitri, it’s turtles all the way down!
Rationality:
“There is no such thing as absolute rationality; there are different rationalities colored by different
culturally influenced values, and your rationality differs from mine; while there is no standard to
determine which of the two is more ‘rational’”
(Hofstede, 1980, p. 323)
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 19
WEEK III: BEAUTY IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER:
IDENTIFYING & EVALUATING THEORIES
"Still the most satisfactory way of appraising the status ...
of any science, is in terms of an inventory of its theories"
D. Martindale
“the mark of a high quality theory.
It doesn’t just answer the question in some complex round-about way.
It dissolves the question, so you wonder why you ever asked it”
R. A. Pirsig, Lila: An inquiry into morals, p. 161.
(6)
(7)
(8)
Sutton, R. I., & Staw, B. M. (1995). What theory is not. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40
(3), 371-384.
Gregor, S. (2006). The nature of theory in information systems. MIS Quarterly, 30(3), 611642.
Spitzberg, B. H. (2000). “In theory”: On defining and evaluating theory. Abstracted, adapted
and expanded from: Spitzberg, B. H. (2001). The status of attribution theory qua theory
in personal relationships. In V. Manusov & J. H. Harvey (Eds.), Attribution,
communication behavior, and close relationships (pp. 353-371). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Also recommended:
Cornelissen, J. P. (2006). Making sense of theory construction: Metaphor and disciplined
imagination.
Organization
Studies
(01708406),
27(11),
1579-1597.
doi:10.1177/0170840606068333
Pavitt, C. (2000). Answering questions requesting scientific explanations for communication.
Communication Theory, 10, 379-404.
Penman, R. (1992). Good theory and good practice: An argument in progress. Communication
Theory, 2, 234-250.
Witkin, S. L., & Gottschalk, S. (1988). Alternative criteria for theory evaluation. Social Service
Review, 62, 211-224.
Guetzkow, J., Lamont, M., & Mallad, G. (2004). What is originality in the humanities and the social
sciences? American Sociological Review, 69, 190-212.
Focus Questions:
1. Develop and defend a set of criteria for the evaluation of theory quality.
2. To what extent is theory evaluation and development a rational or social enterprise?
Elaborate.
3. Make specific suggestions to enhance the comparative evaluation of theories.
“Science is preeminently a rational activity,
even though some irrational elements play a role.”
Cohen (2003, p. 6)
“Theorizing is only a semirational activity” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 323)
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 20
WEEK IV: MYTHS, MODELS, AND VISUALIZING THE WORLD
AS (WE THINK) IT IS
"Historically speaking all – or very nearly all – scientific theories originate from myths."
K. Popper
“The ultimate question in the evaluation of any theory is: What can I do with it?”
J. A. Anderson, Communication theory: Epistemological foundations, p. 220.
“all exciting science must be obsolescent from inception”
S. J. Gould, 1995, Dinosaur in a haystack, p. 387.
(9) Turner, J.H. (1985). In defense of positivism. Sociological Theory, 3, 24-30.
(10) Turner, J.H. (1990). The misuse and use of metatheory. Sociological Forum, 5, 37-53.
(11) Wallis, S. E. (2010). Toward a science of metatheory. Integral Review, 6, 73-120.
Also recommended:
Eysenck, H. J. (1987). "There is nothing more practical than a good theory" (Kurt Lewin)—True or
false? In W. J. Baker, M. E. Hyland, H. Van Rappard, & A. W. Staats (Eds.), Current issues in
theoretical psychology (pp. 49-64). North Holland: Elsevier Science.
Stamp, G. H. (1999). A qualitatively constructed interpersonal communication model: A grounded
theory analysis. Human Communication Research, 25, 531-547.
Deetz, S. (2008). Engagement as co-generative theorizing. Journal of Applied Communication
Research, 36, 289-297.
Shields, D. C. (2000). Symbolic convergence and special communication theories: Sensing and
examining dis/enchantment with the theoretical robustness of critical autoethnography.
Communication Monographs, 67, 392-421.
Soulliere, D., Britt, D. W., & Maines, D. R. (2001). Conceptual modeling as a toolbox for grounded
theorists. Sociological Quarterly, 42, 253-269.
Focus Questions:
1. Discuss the value of "grand" theorizing (i.e., the effort to develop more and more
encompassing theories), as opposed to more midrange or "grounded" theoretical endeavors.
2. What could Sandelands mean by: “Causation cannot be explained, it must simply be
understood. Causes do not have reasons” (p. 242)?
3. What are the possibilities for developing practical theory in communication?
4. Discuss the implications of the pejorative phrase "the ivory tower." Why has it been attached
to academic work and to what extent is it deserved?
Do you really believe that the sciences would ever have originated and grown
if the way had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers and witches
whose promises and pretensions first had to create a thirst,
a hunger, a taste for hidden and forbidden powers?
Indeed, infinitely more had to be promised than could ever be fulfilled
in order that anything at all might be fulfilled in the realms of knowledge.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 21
Friedrich Nietzsche (in Thiessen, A sociobiology compendium, 1998)
WEEK V: “NO RISK, NO GAIN”:
JUSTIFICATION, VERIFICATION, & FALSIFICATION OF THEORY
“The great tragedy of science—the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.”
T. H. Huxley. Biogenesis and asiogenesis. Collected essays. 1893.
"It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory –
if we look for confirmations."
K. Popper
“Science is a long history of learning how not to fool ourselves.”
R. Feynman (in Kaplan: Science says)
(12) Popper, K. (1974). The problem of demarcation. In D. Miller (Ed.), Popper selections (pp.
118-130). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
(13) Popper (1960). The growth of scientific knowledge. In D. Miller (Ed.), Popper selections (pp.
171-180). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.
(14) Popper, K. (1980). Science: Conjectures and refutations. In E. D. Klemke, R. Hollinger, & A. D.
Kline (Eds.), Introductory readings in the philosophy of science (pp. 19-34). Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus.
“it is always possible to save a theory even in the face of disconfirmation
Or to question a theory even in the face of supporting observational evidence…
As a consequence, we are unable to argue that our theories are true,
Or even that they have not been falsified”
Cohen, 2003, p. 10
Science, from a Popperian perspective, is not about the process of confirmation through
observation, because no amount of observation (i.e., induction, inference) can legitimately
confirm a proposition (because there can never be enough observations of every instance of
something, and the as yet unobserved instances might not conform to the proposition).
Furthermore, propositions phrased in so vague, ambivalent, or general manner as to make the
possibility of disconfirmation impossible are also not scientific. Such approaches are “pseudoscientific.” However, propositions phrased in such ways that they can be disconfirmed through
observation are scientific (Spitzberg, 2002). The statement “Competent communicators are more
satisfying conversationalists” cannot be proven because not competent communicators or
conversations can be observed. It can, however, be disproven by a single observation of a
competent communicator producing a dissatisfying conversation.
Also recommended:
Avgelis, N. (1989). Lakatos on the evaluation of scientific theories. In K. Gavroglu, Y. Goudaroulis,
& P. Nicolacopoulos (Eds.), Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific change (pp. 157-167).
Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Chow, S.L. (1990). In defense of Popperian falsification. Psychological Inquiry, 1, 147-149.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 22
Conway, L. G., III, & Schaller, M. (2002). On the verifiability of evolutionary psychological theories:
An analysis of the psychology of scientific persuasion. Personality and Social Psychology
Review, 6, 152-166.
Ding, D. D. (2002). The passive voice and social values in science. Journal of Technical Writing and
Communication, 32, 137-154.
Frentz, T. S. (1983). Falsification procedures for behavioral research in communication. Southern
Speech Communication Journal, 48, 269-282.
Greenwald, A.G. & Pratkanis, A.R. (1988). On the use of "theory" and the usefulness of theory.
Psychological Review, 95, 575-579.
Ketelaar, T., & Ellis, B. J. (2000). Are evolutionary explanations unfalsifiable? Evolutionary
psychology and the Lakatosian philosophy of science. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 1-21.
Lustig, M. W. (1986). Theorizing about human communication. Communication Quarterly, 34,
451-459.
MacKay, D.G. (1988). Under what conditions can theoretical psychology survive and prosper?
Integrating the rational and empirical epistemologies. Psychological Review, 95, 559-565.
Moser, K., Gadenne, V., & Schroder, J. (1988). Under what conditions does confirmation seeking
obstruct scientific progress? Psychological Review, 95, 572-574.
Papineau, D. (1989). Has Popper been a good thing? In K. Gavroglu, Y. Goudaroulis, & P.
Nicolacopoulos (Eds.), Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific change (Vol. 111, Boston Studies
in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 431-440). Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Phillips, D. L. (1977). Ch. 7: The demarcation problem in science. Wittgenstein and scientific
knowledge: A sociological perspective (pp. 142-168). London: Macmillan.
Taylor, C. A. (1991). Defining the scientific community: A rhetorical perspective on demarcation.
Communication Monographs, 58, 402-420.
Wójcicki, R. (1995/96). Theories, theoretical models, truth: Part I: Popperian and non-Popperian
theories in science. Foundations of Science, 3, 337-406.
Focus Questions:
1. Identify the major tenets and counter-arguments of the Greenwald et al. thesis. What, if any,
internal inconsistencies are there in their thesis? Discuss the implications of the
disconfirmation dilemma for Popper's thesis of falsification.
2. What are the prospects and implications for a condition-seeking science? How would it relate
to Sandelands' concerns about the practicality of theory?
3. What the heck is the modus tollens, and why does it seem so important to Popper?
4. Deconstruct or defend Popper's criterion of demarcation.
5. Given the social nature of theory development suggested in previous readings, what impact
does Popperian falsification have in the actual development of theory? Elaborate.
6. What are the alternatives, and their implications, to abandoning a falsificationist scientific
logic?
7. To some extent, the difference between falsification and verification is as follows:
Verification:
If p, then q; p observed; therefore q deduced as true
Falsification:
If p, then q; not q; therefore, p deduced as false
To what extent, and in what ways, are these really distinct logics?
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 23
POPPER SELECTIONS

“it is … boldness, together with the readiness to look out for tests and refutations, which
distinguishes ‘empirical’ science from non-science, and especially from pre-scientific myths and
metaphysics. I will call this proposal (D): (D) for ‘demarcation’. (Selections, p. 122)

“a theory is scientific to the degree to which it is testable.” (Selections, p. 123)

“The attribution or non-attribution of responsibility for [a theory test’s] failure is conjectural,
like everything in science; and what matters is the proposal of a new alternative and
competing conjectural system that is able to pass the falsifying test.” (Selections, p. 124)

“As always, science is conjecture” (Selections, p. 126)

“we must be constantly critical; self-critical with respect to our own theories, and self-critical
with respect to our own criticism; we must never evade an issue” (Selections, p. 126)

“the empirical content of a theory could be measured by the number of possibilities which it
excluded” (Selections, p. 128)

“If any of our conjectures goes wrong…then we have to change the theory. But there are …
two kinds of changes; conservative and revolutionary. And among the conservative changes
there are again two: ad hoc hypotheses and auxiliary hypotheses. (Selections, p. 128-9)

“it is the aim of science to find satisfactory explanations…. By an explanation (or a causal
explanation) is meant a set of statements of which one describes the state of affairs to be
explained (the explicandum) while the others, the explanatory statements, form the
‘explanation’ in the narrower sense of the word (the explicans of the explicandum)”
(Selections, p. 162)

“an explanation …[consisting] of testable and falsifiable universal laws and initial conditions. …
will be the more satisfactory the more highly testable these laws are and the better they have
been tested” (Selections, p. 164)

“every explanation may be further explained, by a theory or conjecture of a higher degree of
universality. There can be no explanation which is not in need of a further explanation”
(Selections, p. 165)

“falsifications … teach us the unexpected; and they reassure us that, although our theories
are made by ourselves, although they are our own inventions, they are none the less genuine
assertions about the world; for the can clash with something we never made.” (Selections, p.
167)

“the ‘depth’ of a scientific theory seems to be most closely related to its simplicity and so to
the wealth of its content….Two ingredients seem to be required: a rich content, and a certain
coherence or compactness (or ‘organicity’) of the state of affairs described” (Selections, p.
167)

“the idea of independent evidence—can hardly be understood without the idea of discovery,
of progressing to deeper layers of explanation: without the idea that there is something for us
to discover, and something to discuss critically” (Selections, p. 169)
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 24

“The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a history of irresponsible dreams,
of obstinacy, and of error. But science is one of the very few human activities—perhaps the
only one—in which errors are systematically criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected”
(Selections, p. 172)

“in most fields we do not even know how to evaluate change” (Selections, p. 172)

“we have a criterion of relative potential satisfactoriness, or of potential progressiveness….
This criterion … is extremely simple and intuitive. It characterizes as preferable the theory
which tells us more; that is to say, the theory which contains the greater amount of empirical
information or content; which is logically stronger; which has the greater explanatory and
predictive power; and which can therefore be more severely tested by comparing predicted
facts with observations.” (Selections, p. 173)

“with increasing content, probability decreases, and vice versa; or in other words, … content
increases with increasing improbability….This trivial fact has the following inescapable
consequence: if growth of knowledge means that we operate with theories of increasing
content, it must also mean that we operate with theories of decreasing probability”
(Selections, p. 174)

“The criterion of potential satisfactoriness is thus testability, or improbability: only a highly
testable or improbable theory is worth testing, and is actually (and not merely potentially)
satisfactory if it withstands severe tests” (Selections, p. 176)

“It is in the rational choice of the new theory that the rationality of science lies, rather than in
the deductive development of the theory” (Selections, p. 178)

“science should be visualized as progressing from problems to problems—to problems of ever
increasing depth. For a scientific theory—an explanatory theory—is, if anything, an attempt
to solve a scientific problem….it is only through a problem that we become conscious of
holding a theory” (Selections, p. 179)

“Wittgenstein’s criterion of demarcation--…is verifiability, or deducibility from observation
statements. But this criterion is too narrow (and too wide): it excludes from science practically
everything that is, in fact, characteristic of it (while failing in effect to exclude astrology). No
scientific theory can ever be deduced from observation statements, or be described as a
truth-function of observation statements.” (Conjectures & refutations, p. 25-6)

“the method of science is criticism, i.e., attempted falsification” (Conjectures & refutations, p.
26)

“‘valid induction” is not even metaphysical: it simply does not exist. No rule can ever
guarantee that a generalization inferred from true observations, however often repeated, is
true” (Conjectures & refutations, p. 27) [Note: the claim “All ravens are black” can never be
validly proven by observing ravens, however, it can be validly disproven—i.e., falsified—by
observing a single non-black raven]

“Only the falsity of the theory can be inferred from empirical evidence, and this inference is a
purely deductive one.” (Conjectures & refutations, p. 29)

“we do not prefer every non-falsified theory—only one which, in the light of criticism, appears
to be better than its competitors: which solves our problems, which is well tested, and of
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 25
which we think, or rather conjecture or hope (considering other provisionally accepted
theories), that it will stand up to further tests.” (Conjectures & refutations, p. 30)

“every interesting and powerful statement must have a low probability; and vice versa: a
statement with a high probability will be scientifically uninteresting, because it says little and
has no explanatory power.” (Conjectures & refutations, p. 32)
 “It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look for
confirmations.
 Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions;…
 Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a
theory forbids, the better it is.
 A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific. Irrefutability is not a
virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice.
 Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it. Testability is
falsifiability;…
 Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test of the
theory;…
 Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers—
for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by re-interpreting the theory
ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation….
 One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.” (Conjectures & refutations, pp. 22-3)
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 26
WEEK VI: LEWIN'S DICTUM:
NOTHING SO PRACTICAL AS A GOOD THEORY (OR IS THERE?)
“A science without generalization is no science at all . . .
Data without generalization is just gossip.”
R. A. Pirsig, Lila: An inquiry into morals, p. 55.
How seldom it is that theories stand the wear and tear of practice.”
Anthony Trollope. Thackeray. 1879.
“The quick harvest of applied science is the useable process,
the medicine, the machine. The shy fruit of pure science is Understanding.
L. Barnett, on Einstein’s completion of an equation for Unified Field Theory,
Life, Jan. 9, 1950 (in Kaplan: Science says)
“we can only legitimately stop where our facts stop”
Charles Darwin
(15) Cohen, B. P. (2003). Creating, testing, and applying social psychological theories. Social
Psychological Quarterly, 66, 5-16.
(16) Sandelands, L.E. (1991). What is so practical about theory? Lewin revisited. Journal for the
Theory of Social Behavior, 20, 235-262.
(17) Alexander, J. C., & Colomy, P. (1992). Traditions and competition: Preface to a postpositivist
approach to knowledge cumulation. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), Metatheorizing (pp. 27-52).
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Recommended:
Laudan, L. (1981). A problem-solving approach to scientific progress. In I. Hacking (Ed.), Scientific
revolutions (pp. 144-155). Oxford: Oxford University.
McKaughan, D. J. (2008). From ugly duckling to swan: C. S. Peirce, abduction, and the pursuit of
scientific theories. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 44, 446-468.
Nass, C. I., & Reeves, B. (1991). Combining, distinguishing, and generating theories in
communication: A domains of analysis framework. Communication Research, 18, 240-261.
Focus Questions:
1. Develop a case for theory and defend it.
2. Develop a case against theory and defend it.
3. What obligations do "science" in general, and theory-development in particular, have to
"bettering humanity" or making a difference? Why?
4. How respectable is the communication discipline in terms of theory development? Defend
your answer with examples and arguments.
5. Discuss the value of theoretical pluralism and diversity? Does it diffuse the identity of a
discipline, or indicate its health? Why?
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 27
WEEK VII: ROSE COLORED GLASSES:
TRADITIONAL, PERCEPTUAL, CONSTRUCTIVE, POSTMODERN
"All social science is ideology."
D. Martindale
"In view of all the violent forces against it, scientific objectivity, when it is in fact realized,
may be seen to have man of the characteristics of the moment of calm at the eye of a hurricane"
D. Martindale
“while scientists can be venal, science cannot. Science in pursuit of the true is self-correcting.”
J. A. Andersen, Communication theory, p. 118
“something deep in the human psyche leads us to impose simple taxonomic schemes of distinct
categories upon the world’s truly complex continual… the true basis for this propensity lies in
our clear (and probably universal) preferences for dichotomous divisions. Division by four may
denote an ultimate and completed dichotomization—a dichotomy of dichotomies”
Stephen Jay Gould, Lying stones of Marrakech, 2000, p. 285
(18) Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication Theory, 9, 119-161.
(19) Craig, R. T. (2007). Pragmatism in the field of communication theory. Communication
Theory, 17, 125-145.
(20) Anderson, J. A., & Baym, G. (2004). Philosophies and philosophic issues in communication,
1995-2004. Journal of Communication, 54, 589-615.
Also recommended:
Altman, I., & Rogoff, B. (1987). World views in psychology: Trait, interactional, organismic, and
transactional perspectives. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), Handbook of environmental
psychology (pp. 7-40). New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Gergen, K. J. & Morawski, J. (1980). An alternative metatheory for social psychology. In L.
Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 326-352). Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage.
Cushman, D. P. & Pearce, W. B. (1977). Generality and necessity in three types of theory about
human communication, with special attention to rules theory. Human Communication
Research, 3, 344-353.
Cronen, V. E. & Davis, L. K. (1978). Alternative approaches for the communication theorist:
Problems in the laws-rules-systems trichotomy. Human Communication Research, 4, 120-128.
Rosengren, K. E. (1989). Paradigms lost and regained. In B. Dervin, L. Grossberg, B.J. O'Keefe, & E.
Wartella (Eds.), Rethinking communication (Vol. 1: Paradigm issues, pp. 21-39). Newbury
Park, CA: Sage.
Smith, T. J., III (1988). Diversity and order in communication theory: The uses of philosophical
analysis. Communication Quarterly, 36, 28-40.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 28
WEEK IX: BROTHER CAN YOU PARADIGM?:
PARADIGMS AND PARADIGM CHANGE
"Thought paradigms - Kuhn calls them simply 'paradigms' - are conglomerations of exemplary
thoughts. They include various fairy tales about what the 'real world' might be like all bound up
in cover stories about how it may be known. They consist of thoughts wrapped up in thoughts
about thoughts. And these devices serve as patterns both for knowledge itself, and for the
acquisition of knowledge ... the methods of reality construction, the paradigms of thought,
employed by modern scientists are formally synonymous with those used ... by most
philosophers, theologians, and magicians, and by ordinary people in their everyday lives."
Julienne Ford, Paradigms and fairy tales
"Trying to predict precisely what new paradigm will emerge
is almost as foolish as trying to control it."
W.J. McGuire
“the famous statement by Freud …’The most important scientific revolutions all include,
as their only common feature, the dethronement of human arrogance from one pedestal after
another of previous convictions about our centrality in the cosmos’”
S. J. Gould, 1995, Dinosaur in a haystack, p. 234
“The important thing in science is not so much to obtain new facts
as to discover new ways of thinking about them.”
W. L. Bragg, in Koestler & Smithies, Beyond reductionism (in Kaplan: Science says)
(21) Kuhn, T. S. (1970). Postscript-1969. The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago:
University of Chicago.
(22) Laudan, L., Donovan, A., Laudan, R., Barker, P., Brown, H., Leplin, J., Thagard, P., & Wykstra,
S. (1986). Scientific change: Philosophical models and historical research. Synthese, 69,
141-223.
Also recommended:
Charland, M. (2003). The incommensurability thesis and the status of knowledge. Philosophy and
Rhetoric, 36, 248-263.
Guntau, M., & Laitko, H. (1991). On the origin and nature of scientific disciplines. In W.R.
Woodward & R. S. Cohen (Eds.), World views and scientific discipline formation (Vol. 134,
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 17-28). Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Irzik, G., & Grünberg, T. (1995). Carnap and Kuhn: Arch enemies or close allies? British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 46, 285-307.
Koutougos, A. (1989). Research programmes and paradigms as dialogue structures. In K.
Gavroglu, Y. Goudaroulis, & P. Nicolacopoulos (Eds.), Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific
change (Vol. 111, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 361-374). Boston: Kluwer
Academic.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 29
Martindale, D. (1979). Ideologies, paradigms, and theories. In W. E. Snizek, E. R. Fuhrman, & M. K.
Miller (Eds.), Contemporary issues in theory and research: A metasociological perspective (pp.
7-24). Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Masterman, M. (1970). The nature of a paradigm. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and
the growth of knowledge (Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of
Science, Vol. 4, pp. 59-89). Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Mayo, D. G. (1996). Ducks, rabbits, and normal science: Recasting the Kuhn’s-eye view of
Popper’s demarcation of science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 271-290.
Sarkar, H. (1983). A theory of method. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Seidman, S. S. (1987-88). Models of scientific development in sociology. Humboldt Journal of
Social Relations, 15, 119-139.
Focus Questions:
1. To what extent, and in what ways, is observation inherently "theory-laden"?
2. To what extent, and in what ways, does theory-laden observation affect the possibility of an
objective science?
3. Discuss the implications of reflexivity for theory development and validation.
4. Discuss Chow's empiricist thesis, and its implications for a the typical "constructionist" attack
on positivism.
“the historical record reveals case after case
where even the most ardent proponents are forced to relent on the basis of very local,
but very powerful experimental tests.
The Kuhn of normal science can explain this consensus quite naturally;
the Kuhn of revolutionary science cannot.
Mayo, 1996, p. 288
“The real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes”
Marcel Proust
** Bowman, J. P., & Targowski, A. S. (1987). Modeling the communication process: The map is not
the territory. Journal of Business Communication, 24, 21-34.
**Spitzberg, B. H., & Chagnon, G. (2009). Conceptualizing intercultural communication
competence. In D. K. Deardorff (Ed.), The SAGE handbook of intercultural competence
(pp. 2-52). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 30
Focus Questions:
1. Identify, elaborate, and defend a paradigmatic taxonomy for the social sciences.
2. Discuss the role of generality and necessity in theory development and paradgimatic
classification.
3. Compare and contrast two or more paradigmatic taxonomies, their strengths and weaknesses,
and potential for conceptual hegemony.
4. Do people from different paradigms see the world differently (i. e., do ethnographers ‘see’
ducks, and scientists ‘see’ rabbits), or do they simply look for different things (i.e., do
ethnographers look for ducks while scientists look for rabbits out of all the things they could
look for)?
“What we see of the real world is not the unvarnished real world
but a model of the real world, regulated and adjusted by sense data—
a model that is constructed so that it is useful for dealing with the real world.”
R. Dawkins, The God delusion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, p. 371
“A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing opponents and making them see the light,
but rather because its opponents eventually die,
and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”
Max Planck, A scientific autobiography and other papers, 1949
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 31
WEEK X: PEEKING AT THE POSTMODERN:
THEORY AS A POSTMODERN PROCESS
“How can anyone not see that all observation must be for or against some view
if it is to be of any service”
Darwin, quoted by Stephen Jay Gould, Lying stones of Marrakech, 2000, p. 172
“Theory-free science makes about as much sense as value-free politics.
Both terms are oxymoronic.
All thinking about the natural world must be informed by theory,
whether or not we articulate our preferred structure of explanation to ourselves.
S. J. Gould, 1995, Dinosaur in a haystack, p. 419
"the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge."
D. T. Campbell
“How wonderful that we have met with a paradox.
Now we have some hope of making progress.”
Niels Bohr, The quantum dice, by L. I. Ponomarev, 1993
“the confirmation of even an observation sentence can never be complete in the sense that,
no matter how large is the number of confirming observations, it may be false.
Because observation sentences are fallible, they are naturally revisable;
sometimes their revision may be affected by theoretical considerations.
Therefore, all observational sentences are theory-dependent
in the sense that they can be revised by theory.
This means that Carnap’s mature philosophy rejects the idea of
science based on the unshakeable, certain foundations of observation or sense-experience”
(Irzik & Grünberg, 1995, p. 293)
(23) Feyerabend, P. (1980). How to defend society against science. In E. D. Klemke, R. Hollinger,
& A. D. Kline (Eds.), Introductory readings in the philosophy of science (pp. 55-65).
Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
(24) Lloyd, E. A. (1996). The anachronistic anarchist. Philosophical Studies, 81, 247-261.
Also recommended:
Blalock, H. M. (1979). Dilemmas and strategies of theory construction. In W. E. Snizek, E. R.
Fuhrman, & M. K. Miller (Eds.), Contemporary issues in theory and research: A
metasociological perspective (pp. 119-135). Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Tsou, J. Y. (2003). Reconsidering Feyerabend’s “anarchism.” Perspectives on Science, 11, 208-235.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 32
WEEK XI: ECONSTRUCTING THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTIONS:
SCHOLARSHIP AS TEXT
"In his Micromegas Voltaire has an immensely wise alien come to visit earth.
He has dozens of senses and can thus perceive much more of reality than humans can.
He comes from a race devoted to the acquisition of wisdom and that lives thousands of years.
On leaving earth, he leaves philosophers there a book containing all the knowledge
that can ever be gained about the pure and ultimate nature of things.
It has only blank pages."
L. LeShan & H. Margenau, Einstein’s Space and Van Gogh’s Sky
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (5.6)
“The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language
which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world” (5.62)
“We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either” (5.61)
L. Wittgenstein (1961, Tractatus)
(25) Gergen, K. J. (2001). Psychological science in a postmodern context. American Psychologist,
56, 803-813.
(26) Gergen, K. J. (2001). Construction in contention: Toward consequential resolutions. Theory
& Psychology, 11, 419-432.
(27) Gergen, K. J., & Zielke, B. (2006). Theory in action. Theory & Psychology, 16, 299-309.
(28) Ritzer, G., Zhao, S., & Murphy, J. (2001). Metatheorizing in sociology: The basic parameters
and the potential contributions of postmodernism. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), Handbook of
sociological theory (pp. 113-131). New York: Kluwer/Plenum.
Also recommended:
Gergen, K. J. (1978). Toward generative theory. Journal of Personality And Social Psychology,
36(11), 1344-1360. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.36.11.1344.
Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 26,
309-320.Gergen, K. J. (1978). Toward generative theory. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 36, 1344-1360.
Gergen, K. J. (1979). The positivist image in social psychological theory. In A. R. Buss (Ed.),
Psychology in social context (pp. 193-212). New York: Irvington.
Gergen, K. J. (1991). Emerging challenges for theory and psychology. Theory & Psychology, 1, 1335.
Gergen, K. J. (2002). Beyond the empiricist/constructionist divide in social psychology. Personality
and Social Psychology Review, 6(3), 188-191. doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0603_2
Gergen, K. J., & Morawski, J. (1980). An alternative metatheory for social psychology. In L.
Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 326-352). Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage.
Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good management practices.
Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4, 75-91.
Shotter, J. (1987). The rhetoric of theory in psychology. In W. J. Baker, M. E. Hyland, H. V.
Rappard, & A. W. Staats (Eds.), Current issues in theoretical psychology (pp. 283-296). NorthHolland: Elsevier Science.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 33
WEEK XIV: LAW OF THE HAMMER:
OBJECTIVE VS. HERMENEUTIC EMPIRICISM
“Many commentators have rightly implored us to make certain that young people
encounter the ‘thrill’ of discovery. While this is undeniably desirable,
it is arguably even more crucial that they experience the agony (if only on a modest scale)
of having a pet hypotheses demolished by facts”
T. W. Martin, Scientific literacy and the habit of discourse. Seed, (Sept/Oct 2007, p. 77)
(29) Greenwald, A.G., Pratkanis, A.R., Leippe, M.R., & Baumgardner, M.H. (1986). Under what
conditions does theory obstruct research progress? Psychological Review, 93, 216-229.
(30) Wallach, L., & Wallach, M. A. (1994). Gergen versus the mainstream: Are hypotheses in
social psychology subject to empirical test? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
67, 233-242.
(31) Jost, J. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). The estrangement of social constructionism and
experimental social psychology: History of the rift and prospects for reconciliation.
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 168-187.
Also recommended:
Krueger, J. I. (2002). Postmodern parlor games. American Psychologist, 57, 461-462.
McClintock, C. G. (1985). The metatheoretical bases of social psychological theory. Behavioral
Science, 30, 155-173.
Schlenker, B. R. (1974). Social psychology and science. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 29, 1-15.
Wallach, L., & Wallach, M. A. (1994). Gergen versus the mainstream: Are hypotheses in social
psychology subject to empirical test? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 233242.
Focus Questions:
1. Identify the principal points of contention between Gergen and Schlenker.
2. Compare and contrast Gergen's "historical" and "hermeneutic" theses to the earlier empiricist
theses of Berger, Chow, and Turner. Defend one "side."
3. What implications does Gergen's "historical" and "hermeneutic" theses have for the (a)
paradigmatic (Kuhn) view of communication, and (b) the credibility and vitality of the
discipline of communication.
4. Is there hope for "traditional" social science, as traditionally envisioned? Defend your
answer.
5. Summarize a postmodern deconstructive view of traditional social science.
6. Identify the five most important flaws or challenges of theory development. Elaborate their
nature and significance.
7. Identify the five most important flaws or challenges of metatheory. Elaborate their nature
and significance.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 34
WEEK XII: RESCUING REALISM:
PATCHES AND PARABLES
"Science is corrosive of all values
which are based exclusively on simple epistemological processes"
McClintock
"Einstein's space is no closer to reality than Van Gogh's sky.
The glory of science is not in a truth more absolute than the truth of Bach or Tolstoy,
but in the act of creation itself. The scientist's discoveries impose his own order on chaos,
as the composer or painter imposes his; an order that always refers to limited aspects of reality,
and is based on the observer's frame of reference,
which differs from period to period as a Rembrandt nude differs from a nude by Manet."
A. Koestler (quoted by LeShan & Margenau, Einstein’s Space and Van Gogh’s Sky)
"Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling,
of the rationality of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order."
A. Einstein
“Unless our theories about the world are in significant parts true or approximately true,
our scientific, and especially our linguistic success, cannot be explained”
Sarkar, 1983, p. 12
(32) Bostrom, R. & Donohew, L. (1992). The case for empiricism: Clarifying fundamental issues in
communication theory. Communication Monographs, 59, 109-129
(33) Gilman, D. (1992). What's a theory to do...with seeing? or some empirical considerations for
observation and theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43, 287-309.
(34) Chow, S.L. (1992). Acceptance of a theory: Justification or rhetoric? Journal for the Theory of
Social Behaviour, 22, 447-474.
Focus Questions:
1. Define "paradigm" and provide a defense or attack of the theoretical and/or pragmatic utility
of such a concept.
2. Return to the first set of readings, and overlay and discuss the possible nexus of the notion of
paradigms on the history of the discipline of communication.
3. Critique the Kuhnian model of paradigm change.
4. Compare and contrast the Kuhnian notion of paradigms with the empiricist thesis of neopositivists such as Berger, Chow, and Turner.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 35
WEEK XIII: LIFE IS BUT A GAME:
THE POLITICS OF SCHOLARSHIP
"The following sentence is false. The preceding sentence is true."
D. R. Hofstadter
"There are trivial truths and great truths. The opposite of a trivial truth is plainly false.
The opposite of a great truth is also true."
N. Bohr.
**Publication Games Colloquy:
Zanna, M. P. (1992). My life as a dog (I mean editor). Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 18, 485-488.
Higgins, E. T. (1992). Increasingly complex but less interesting articles: Scientific progress or
regulatory problem? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 489-492.
Funder, D. C. (1992). Psychology from the other side of the line: Editorial processes and
publication trends at JPSP. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 493-497.
Schneider, D. J. (1992). Publication games: Reflections on Reis and Stiller. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 498-503.
Also Recommended:
Agnew, N. M., & Pyke, S. W. (1969). The science game: An introduction to research in the
behavioral sciences. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Andreski, S. (1972). Social sciences as sorcery. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Anonymous. (1987). The publication game: Beyond quality in the search for a lengthy vitae.
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 2, 3-12.
Anonymous. (1991). The publication game II: Editorial confrontation, or how to browbeat editors.
Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 6, 1-6.
Ford, J. (1975). Paradigms & fairy tales: An introduction to the science of meanings (Vol. 1).
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Ford, J. (1975). Paradigms & fairy tales: An introduction to the science of meanings (Vol. 2).
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Lyotard, J-F. (1985). Just gaming (Theory and History of Literature, Vol. 20). Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minneapolis Press.
McCain, G., & Segal, E. M. (1969). The game of science. Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole.
O’Neill, J. (1972). Sociology as a skin trade: Essays toward a reflexive sociology. New York: Harper
& Row.
Paul, J. (1980). Laws of behavior: Fact or artifact? American Psychologist, 35, 1081-1083.
Reis, H. T., & Stiller, J. (1992). Publication trends in JPSP: A three-decade review. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 465-472.
Sindermann, C. J. (1982). Winning the games scientists play. New York: Plenum Press.
West, S. G., Newsom, J. T., & Fenaughty, A. M. (1992). Publication trends in JPSP: Stability and
change in topics, methods, and theories across two decades. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 18, 473-484.
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 36
JUXTAPOSITION EXEMPLAR & TEMPLATE
Name: Brian H. Spitzberg
E-mail: spitz@mail.sdsu.edu
COMM 610: Advanced Comm Theory
Date: 09/11/2012
Jux #1
1st Claim(s)/Concept(s):
Miller (1975) explicitly claims that the
division of rhetorical and communication
science is based on the questions asked,
and not the methods they use.
2nd Claim(s)/Concept(s):
Berger (1991) claims that a fundamental cause
of the deficit of theories in the field of
communication is the aversion to risk-taking in
theoretical predictions.
Juxtaposition(s):
Asking questions doth not a discipline make! A question may be the beginning of a theory, but
it is incapable of specifying the methodology by which it could be answered. The fundamental
feature of “science” is not that it asks questions differently from rhetoric, but that it answers
them differently.
Rhetoric may address questions of “grand theory” and empirical nature (e.g., Fisher’s claim that
some narratives are more likely to be effective [i.e., persuasive] than others, or Burke’s claim
that scape-goating can effectively energize a rhetorical audience). The difference is that science
does not hide behind historicism or ideographic presumptions regarding the generalizability of
knowledge claims. Instead, science it makes predictions that run the risk of failure and provides
a methodology for ascertaining success or failure, whereas rhetoric and humanities do not.
Such falsifiable questions may indeed take different form than those in rhetoric or the
humanities, but such a difference is meaningless unless the methods of falsification are
presumed to permit the testing of such questions with an eye toward their truth-value or
verisimilitude, which requires risk-taking.
References (if any citations from non-syllabus sources):
COMM 610 (Fall 2013): ACT: p. 37
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 38
JUXTAPOSITION EXEMPLAR & TEMPLATE
Name: Brian H. Spitzberg
E-mail: spitz@mail.sdsu.edu
COMM 610: Advanced Comm Theory
Date: 09/11/2012
Jux #1
1st Claim(s)/Concept(s):
O’Boyle and Aguinis (2012) demonstrate in
several populations that outstanding
“performance outcomes are attributable to a
small group of elite performers” or superstars
(p. 106).
2nd Claim(s)/Concept(s):
Burke and Harrod (2005) compare positive and
negative partner evaluations, and find that “the
greater the discrepancy in terms of being either
over- or underevaluated, the greater the
likelihood that the person will leave the
relationship through separation or divorce” (p.
.371).
Ehrlinger et al. (2008) produce evidence that
“poor performers are overconfident in
estimates of how well they performed relative
to others because they have little insight into
the quality of their own performance,”
whereas “top performers’ mistakenly modest
relative estimates were produced by
erroneous impressions of both their own
objective performance and that of their peers”
(p. 117).
Juxtaposition(s):
Superstars are overly modest, whereas incompetents are overly optimistic, in their self-evaluation.
The overevaluations, however, work to the detriment to the incompetents, whereas the modesty
bias has little or no negative consequence for top performers and superstars. Indeed, modesty may
be part of what sustains the positive evaluations that others would have of superstars, and
unmerited narcissism or halo-bias may be part of what restricts the performance of underperformers, and help explain why most people are under-performers.
Yet, the Burke and Harrod (2005) research suggests that these under- and over-performers
all are likely to prefer partners who verify their self-perceptions. This calibration would mean that
superstars prefer partners who affirm the superstar’s more modest achievement, whereas underperformers would prefer partners who confirm the under-performer’s inflated self-evaluation. Again,
this would suggest that superstars are kept humble by their intimate relationships, whereas underperformers would function best intimately with partners who sustain the under-performer’s selfdeception, even though the effect would be to make that person less capable of performing well for
lack of an ability to accurately perceive self’s ability and other’s estimations of that ability.
The implication is a triangulated self-reinforcing tendency for superstars to get better in
social evaluations both within and without their intimate relationships, whereas the less competent
performers get increasingly stuck by failed relationships that fail in part because the incompetent
persons promote and seek confirmation for their own biased and inaccurate self-evaluations. The
possibility of this social amplification process is not recognized by O’Boyle and Aguinis (2012) or
Ehrlinger et al. (2008), illustrating the importance of theorizing beyond the individual or dyadic unit
of analysis.
References (if any citations from non-syllabus sources):
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 39
REASONED JUXTAPOSITION OF READINGS
For the weeks specified, all students will be expected to produce a reasoned juxtaposition of some concept(s) from at
least two of the readings for that seminar, and turn it into the professor. It is recommended both as a reading
heuristic for students, as well as an indication of the level at which students are critically reading the assigned
readings. The materials must fit on one page, and must derive at least in part from the readings for that day’s
readings (and may include in addition materials from other readings in the course). The entire assignment must fit on
a single sheet of paper, and have font no smaller than 10-point Arial, 10-point Calibri or 11-point Times Roman (1-inch
margins). Exemplary student juxtapositions should serve as bases for student lines of questions and oral argument
during class discussions throughout the semester. Juxtapositions will be graded on a simple scale as follows:
Assessment Rubric
Either no assignment is turned in on time, or the materials are either not logically
interconnected, or represent the most surface extraction of meanings from the
readings, indicating a shallow or hurried reading of the course materials.
Points
0
3
Relevant concepts are mentioned but are defined in a shallow manner; linkages
among concepts are loose or strained; implications lack credibility or import.
5
8
Relevant concepts are formulated and connected, but the links are somewhat
obvious and lacking in depth of intellectual challenge.
10
13
At least one substantive juxtaposition is identified, leading to a contradiction,
paradox, or theoretical principle. The result is a single reasonable claim that furthers
the content of the readings considered individually, but integrates or suggests little
else beyond this single concept.
15
18
The contradiction, paradox or theoretical principle is unfolded into several directions,
but the import or implications are inconsistent in quality or implications are left
without explication.
20
23
Multiple implications are derived from the juxtaposition(s) of concepts identified in
the readings. The implications are extended into multiple directions of analysis or
synthesis with other concepts identified in the course.
25
“The reason science does manage to be astonishingly effective is
not because large groups are automatically wiser or less prone to self-deception
than individuals. History adequately demonstrates that, if anything,
the opposite is more nearly the case. Science works because its core dynamics—
not its methods or techniques per se—are rooted in pitting intellects against one another. Science eventually yields
impressive answers because it compels smart people
to incessantly try to disprove the ideas generated by other smart people.
Martin, T. W. (2007). Scientific literacy and the habit of discourse. Seed (Sept/Oct), 76-77.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 40
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PROPOSITION/MODEL PAPER
An Hypothetical Parable
D: Daddy, what is an instinct?
F: An instinct, my dear, is an explanatory principle.
D: But what does it explain?
F: Anything – almost anything at all. Anything you want it to explain.
D: Don't be silly. It doesn't explain gravity.
F: No. But that is because nobody wants "instinct" to explain gravity. If they did, it would
explain it. We could simply say that the moon has an instinct whose strength
varies inversely as the square of the distance . . .
D: But that's nonsense, Daddy.
F: Yes, surely. But it was you who mentioned "instinct," not I.
D: All right – but then what does explain gravity?
F: Nothing my dear, because gravity is an explanatory principle.
D: Oh. Do you mean that you cannot use one explanatory principle to explain another?
F: Hmm . . . hardly ever. That is what Newton meant when he said, "hypotheses non
fingo."
D: And what does that mean? Please.
F: Well, you know what "hypotheses" are. Any statement linking together two descriptive
statements is an hypothesis. If you say that there was a full moon on February 1st
and another on March 1st; and then you link these two observations together in
any way, the statement that links them is an hypothesis.
D: Yes – and I know what 'non' means. But what's 'fingo.'
F: Well, 'fingo' is a late Latin word for 'make.' It forms a verbal noun 'fictio' from which we
get the word 'fiction.'
D: Daddy, do you mean that Sir Issac Newton thought that all hypotheses were just made
up like stories?
F: Yes – precisely that.
D: But didn't he discover gravity? With the apple?
F: No, dear. He invented it.
D: Oh.
Adapted from: Heinz Von Foerster (1981).
Rigor & Imagination: Essays from the Legacy of Gregory Bateson.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 41
DON'T PANIC
“Hypotheses are the scaffolds which are erected in front of a building
and removed when the building is completed. They are indispensable to the worker;
but he must not mistake the scaffolding for the building.
J. W. von Goethe, Maxims and reflections, 1893 (in Kaplan: Science says)
“For every fact there is an infinity of hypotheses. The more you look, the more you see.
R. M. Pirsig, Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance, 1974.
“Hypothesis, where successful, is a two-way street,
extending back to explain the past and forward to predict the future.
What we try to do in framing hypotheses is to explain some otherwise unexplained happenings by
inventing a plausible story, a plausible description or history of relevant portions of the world”
(Quine & Ullian, 1980, “Hypothesis,” p. 197)
“The purpose of models is not to fit the data but to sharpen the questions”
S. Karlin, 11th R. A. Fisher Memorial Lecture, Royal Society, April 20, 1983
(in Kaplan: Science says)
“Being able to examine our models, critically evaluate them, and even discard them is far more
scientifically literate than being able to regurgitate facts for a standardized test. … Ultimately, our
models and descriptions of reality must be subject to two overriding criteria. How useful is this
model, and how much does this model resemble our observations? Scientific literacy requires an
understanding that science is only a model. We have to be able to jettison our models when our
critical thinking leads us to that conclusion.
Saus, S. (2007). Camelot is only a model: Scientific literacy in the 21st century.
Seed, (Sept/Oct), 77-78.
“Without a sense, or without the thought,
a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing.”
Wittgenstein, Blue and Brown Books, 1958, p. 4
“The meaning of exactness best founded in intellectual history
is the possibility of constructing a theoretical system of idealized models
containing abstract constructs of variables and of relations between variables,
from which most or all propositions concerning particular connections can be deduced.”
Machlup, 2004, Readings in the philosophy of social science p. 11
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 42
General Instructions
The purpose of a hypothesis paper is to develop a conceptual model, and a number of theoretical
propositions deriving from that model, concerning communication. The paper in some ways is a
review of literature to develop a rationale on a given communication concept or theory. It is
different from typical literature reviews in a few important ways. Most reviews just summarize
literature to provide a sense of ‘what is known’ in an area. In contrast, the model and hypothesis
papers attempt to analyze the literature in ways that support a particular configuration of
concepts or variables; the relationships of this configuration can then be formalized as
hypotheses.
Submission
The paper will be turned in electronically, in Word 2007, through SafeAssign in
Blackboard. The due date requires a time-stamp on the submission by the beginning of the
seminar on the date specified in the syllabus schedule.
Form, Organization and Style
Sections. There should be seven basic parts to the paper. All pages should be paginated
with a running head in the upper right of each page. The running head is a brief title (2-5 words).
(1) Title page: The first part of the paper is a title page, with a title that indicates something
about the topic of the paper, name, the class, semester and year.
(2) Visual model: The second page is the visual model.
(3) Proposition list: The third page of the paper is a proposition list, under the title of the
paper (from the first page). The proposition list is a simple listing of the numbered
propositions developed in the paper. There should be at least a space between each
proposition. The proposition list reproduces the propositions, and only the propositions,
in the order they are presented in the paper.
(4) Introduction: Fourth, beginning on the fourth page, with the title of the paper reproduced
at the top, some form of introduction should be presented. An introduction may do a
number of things, such as briefly examining the history and importance of the concepts
selected for analysis, discussing the relevance of these concepts to the course subject,
introducing relevant theories, and/or explaining any basic terms, assumptions, or
limitations that may be important. Assume this class as the audience, which means that
the writing should be clear enough for them to comprehend fully the content, and intent,
of the paper. The introduction should consist of approximately 2-5 paragraphs (or 1-2
pages).
(5) Body: Fifth, the body of the paper consists of the propositions and the arguments for each
proposition. This section of the paper proceeds by presenting a proposition and then
developing a paragraph or two of explanation and support. The propositions should be
numbered and set off from the text (e.g., bolded, italicized). The typical paper will develop
between 8 and 10 propositions. Propositions are never prima facie; that is, they never
stand on their own. Propositions always require some degree of explanation. This section
of the paper should constitute the lion's share of the paper (approximately 70-80%).
(6) Conclusion: Sixth, the conclusion section develops any number of points, such as
providing a brief summary of the paper, a consideration of the limitations of the analysis,
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 43
a critical conjecture about the status of the theory and/or research associated with the
construct(s) examined, future implications of the analysis, or the importance of the
analysis.
(7) References: Seventh, the references section will provide the complete citations in most
current A.P.A. style.
(8) Model(s)/Diagram(s): Eighth, the figures or models used to integrate the model. It is
often easiest to draw these in PowerPoint (or similar graphics program) and save as a .pdf,
and then cut-and-paste into the paper.
Length. Papers should be between 20 and 25 pages, not including title page, proposition
list, tables, figures, or references.
Spacing. Everything is double-spaced, except tables or figures, if such are included. Thus,
the title page, abstract (if provided), text, headings, and reference list are all double-spaced.
Miscellaneous. Use A.P.A. throughout. Do not leave big blank spaces between sections or
hypotheses. The text should run continuously. Cite as often as desired, but quote very judiciously.
In general, no quote should be longer than five lines long, and there should be no more than five
quotes in the entire paper. I want to see your ideas and writing, not someone else’s ideas and
writing. Make a copy of the paper before handing it in, as the original belongs to the professor. All
the propositions will be reflected in the model in some way, but the model may be larger, more
inclusive than represented by the propositions alone (i.e., all of the propositions are in the model,
but all the model may not be in the propositions).
Modeling
Modeling is one of the zeniths of scientific reasoning. It incorporates analytic reasoning
(i.e., breaking wholes into parts), synthetic reasoning (i.e., [re]assembling parts into wholes),
and abstract reasoning (i.e., recognizing similar things across levels of abstraction and
concreteness). It also is fundamental to theoretical reasoning (i.e., explaining how and why
phenomena happen the way they do), and methodology (i.e., specifying hypotheses to be
tested qualitatively or quantitatively, the results of which inform the validity of the underlying
theory).
Models serve various functions in science as in everyday life. A model is a visual
simplification of concepts that exist in both a hypothesized conceptual form and an actual or
potential observed form. For example, if you believe that as social skills decrease a person’s
ability to meet others and develop satisfying relationships decreases, and that this in turn
increases the person’s loneliness, and that increases in loneliness lead to increased interaction
anxiety, then three conceptual components each potentially can be measured by a
questionnaire or survey. Thus, you would have a very basic model that looks something like the
following:
Social Skills
Loneliness
Social Anxiety
Notice that this model could have been formulated entirely differently. Some have
argued that people develop anxiety through early learning experiences, which leads to a deficit
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 44
of social skills, which thereby make the development of social relationships more difficult,
leading to loneliness. These represent alternative models of reality, and either one can be
reasonably argued and justified. Which one is “true” is irrelevant for the sake of formulating the
model—the question is whether a good set of arguments can be developed in support of the
model ultimately produced.
Once you have a basic model, it is then relatively simple to start asking additional
questions, such as how biology (e.g., sex, age, etc.), culture (e.g., ethnicity, regional
identification, etc.), context (e.g., socio-economic status, intact family status, etc.), personal
background (e.g., attachment disorder, relational history, etc.) or dispositions (e.g., self-esteem,
attribution style, etc.) influence various components or relationships of the model.
Most models follow simple rules: (1) Components on the left precede, at some point,
the components to the right in real time. (2) Every conceptual component should have a
measurement component. (3) Every arrow represents a direct effect of one concept on
another. This effect does not have to be a causal relationship, but it usually implies such an
influence. (4) Every component must have an arrow headed to at least one other component,
and may have arrows to multiple other components. (5) The spatially closer two components
are to one another, the more closely they are associated with one another than to components
further away from one another. (6) Components can be grouped according to larger
components (i.e., multiple indicators of a single concept; e.g., social skills above might be
further indicated by coordination, expressiveness, attentiveness, and composure skills). (7)
Every arrow is a potentially testable hypothesis (or proposition). The nature of these
hypotheses is discussed next.
Hypothesizing
A hypothesis is a verbal or symbolic statement of relationship between two or more
variables (e.g., Self-esteem is positively related to self-disclosure). A variable is any construct or
concept that can be observed to take on different values (e.g., anxiety, self-disclosure,
assertiveness, etc.). It takes the form of X = fY. A definition (e.g., self-esteem is the degree to
which self is perceived positively) characterizes the nature of a variable, but not its relationship to
other variables. It takes the form of X = Y.
All of this is just a fancy way of saying that the hypothesis paper attempts to develop,
through review and personal argument, a series of hypotheses on a given topic. Many of these
hypotheses may be articulated in the existing research literature, they may be derived from
conceptual models, or the products of creativity and imagination. There are two keys to this
assignment: (1) Developing well-conceived and well-worded hypotheses, and (2) developing
reasonable arguments for each hypothesis. Like any argument, it is made credible through the
use of causal analysis, evidence, example, strong reasons, and scholarly support. The most
important thing is that every hypothesis should be carefully worded (read all these instructions to
understand this warning) and arguments should answer two “why” questions: (1) Why are the
variables related this way? (2) Why is the hypothesis likely to be true? The word “because” should
figure prominently in the explanations.
To explain a hypothesis means to make sensible how and why things are related the way
they are. Theories are basically sets of conceptual links among hypotheses. For example, a person
may want to explain the hypothesis: “As jealousy increases, the likelihood of relational violence
increases.” Guided by an understanding of argument (e.g., see recommendations for writing that
follow later in these instructions), this hypothesis could be argued thusly: Jealousy is a complex
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 45
blend of emotions based on the perception that a person’s valued relationship is threatened by a
third party or rival. [backing] Retzinger (1991) has reviewed evidence [grounds] that violence is
likely to result from a combination of anger and shame, but neither alone [backing]. Because
[warrant] anger creates an inner sense of expressive frustration and arousal, and shame provides
a target for this expression (i.e., the partner and/or the rival), the jealous person is much more
likely to engage in violence than non-jealous persons. [claim] This hypothesis may not apply to
contexts in which strong moral, religious, or public restraints are in place (e.g., even jealous
persons tend not to be overtly violent in public places). [rebuttal] The rebuttal is not necessary,
but sometimes illustrates relative objectivity and openness of the author.
In this explanation, other concepts (i.e., the theory of rage as proposed by Retzinger, with
its components of anger and rage) are used to make the link between jealousy and violence
sensible. More explanation could be provided for these concepts, more evidence reviewed in
favor of Retzinger’s hypothesis, and so forth, but the basic elements of explanation and argument
are there. The point is that explanation is neither mere restatement nor mere review of research
or expert opinion. And please note, there is no quotation, and no need for quotation. Quotations
should be used extremely sparingly—I want to see your writing, not someone else’s.
Types of Hypotheses
Below is a series of hypotheses to illustrate how they can differ. These hypotheses may seem
overly sophisticated or technical right now. However, research of a topic has begun, hypothetical
relations will begin to emerge either stated directly (i.e., in the form of hypotheses being tested)
or indirectly (i.e., implied by the explanation and discussion of the concepts).
The simplest, and weakest, form of hypothesis is a "non-directional" statement of relationship.
For example:
H1:
Self-esteem is related to communication competence.
While this is a hypothesis, it provides minimal information regarding the precise nature of the
relationship. Avoid such statements in the paper. A more precise form is:
H2: Self-esteem is positively related to interpersonal communication competence. (Note: This
can be reworded as: “Persons high in self-esteem are significantly higher in communication
competence than persons low in self-esteem”).
Hypotheses can also vary by the form (or shape) of the relationship:
H3: Motivation, knowledge and skills are curvilinear to perceived communication competence.
(That is, they are positively related up to a moderately high range of competence, after which
higher values lead to lower perceived competence).
Finally, deductive construction allows the development of stronger, and more tightly controlled,
theoretical arguments. For example,
H4:
H5:
As [TV exposure] increases, [verbal skills] decrease.
[A]
[B]
As [verbal skills] decrease, use of [physical violence] in conflict increases.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 46
H6:
[B]
[C]
As [TV exposure] increases, use of [physical violence] in conflict increases.
[A]
[C]
On the Art of Explanation
“We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.1361)
Explanation implies the identification of some “bridge” (i.e., warrant, “because...,” etc.) that
serves as an account of why one concept is related to another concept. It is an “animating
mechanism,” that gives life to a concept. For example, one popular concept is that exposure to
violence in the media causes violence in society. The natural question is why. Answering the
“why” question gets at the concept of explanation. Even though seeing or hearing the equation:
“media violence causes societal violence” seems like an explanation, it is not. It is missing the
bridge, or animating mechanism.
To illustrate, consider a few “non-explanations.” It is not an explanation to say media
violence causes societal violence because: (1) media depictions of violence are increasing; (2)
societal violence is increasing; (3) some people have engaged in crimes they saw on TV (“copy
cat crimes”); (4) people believe what they see on TV; (5) research shows media violence
increases societal violence. Each of these merely suggests correlation (rather than causation),
repeats the original assertion, or simply provides backing for an explanation that is itself
missing.
To illustrate legitimate explanations, consider the following:
Cultivation: Social learning theory claims that people learn both by direct experience
(e.g., touching a hot stove) or observation of others (e.g., observing one’s sister touch a hot
stove). Since we cannot or do not always directly experience things (e.g., robbing a bank), we
look to real and imaginative role models (e.g., media figures and narratives). Thus, the crime
and violence in the media provide models, and rewarding ones at that, for us we otherwise
would not have had.
Cognitive Availability: Our brain can be viewed as a library. If 90% of this library is filled
with science fiction, and we are asked to respond to someone’s question for information, we
are most likely to give them a fanciful piece of information, because that is what is most
represented in our mind’s library. If, in watching media, most of the acts or ways of dealing with
conflict we observe are violent in nature, it simply supplies more acts of violence to store in our
mental repertoires, and thus, when we find ourselves in a conflict, violent acts are the most
“available” to draw upon.
Disinhibition: Growing up in a culture is largely about learning what one cannot or is not
supposed to do. The very nature of culture is conformity and normative action within a given
body of beliefs and behaviors. Exposure to violence in the media may make violence appear
more normative than it is, and thus, make engaging in violence seem less deviant. In essence, it
is not making violence seem more rewarding (cultivation) or available, but merely makes the
violence within a person more acceptable.
Fantasy Fulfillment: Freud and others might argue that daily life, as well as the normal
tortures of growing up, fill us with tensions that are constantly repressed. These tensions
struggle to “get out,” managing to manifest themselves mainly in the form of fantasy. Media
violence may give form to these fantasies, making them more vivid and “real,” thereby
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 47
stimulating the enactment of fantasies in life (e.g., who has not “fantasized” about hitting
someone in the face—seeing it done may both “suggest” it, but stimulate the enactment of it).
Desensitization: One of the reasons people avoid violence is that it hurts others.
However, when violence is everywhere in the media, it can numb one’s sensibilities, and lower
one’s ability to empathize. Further, the more cartoonish the violence, the more it seems it does
not really hurt anyone. Such exposure to violence may take the “brakes” off using by making
violence seem less hurtful, and thus, less costly to use.
Excitation: Violence is a thrill. Through 5 million years of evolution, we have come to
find violence a potential threat, a potential path to victory, and therefore, arousing. Thus,
seeing violence in the media is itself, arousing, and this arousal stimulates our own arousal. Our
arousal (adrenaline, muscular tension, etc.) needs to find an outlet, and is expressed in
violence.
Peer Group Mediation: Research on sexual violence indicates that people who engage
in sexual violence are much more likely to have friends who approve of, and have engaged in,
sexual violence. The suggestion is that peer groups mediate the transfer of violence. That is, if a
peer group watches violence in the media, this peer group may then become self-reinforcing
through its interaction, thereby serving as the proximal stimulus to its members’ violence.
Spillover: Violence in the media provides models of behavior in certain contexts that are
then available for generalization to contexts experienced in everyday life, both directly
comparable to those observed in the media, as well as contexts largely unrelated. Thus, for
example, a person may “copycat” behaviors witnessed in the media, but may also extend the
function of the behaviors observed in one context (e.g., a drop kick in a professional wrestling
program) to another context (e.g., a dispute with one’s brother).
Cultural Chaos: Violence in the media may reflect the very breakdown of society, norms,
and culture. If everyone is violent to everyone in the media, then this communicates a sense of
despair, hopelessness, alienation and angst to the viewing public. This has the effects of both
(1) inciting some to exploit the lawlessness (e.g., looting during natural disasters), (2) join the
crowd (e.g., mob violence during the L.A. riots), (3) bystander apathy providing a permissive
environment for violence.
Each of these explanations offers slightly and sometimes substantively distinct sources
of causation. For example, fantasy fulfillment, excitation and disinhibition tend to assume that
we are by nature violent, and all that is needed is something in the media to take the restraints
of society away. Cultivation and availability argue media instills violence in us. Peer-group
mediation and cultural chaos tend to view media as having an effect on society at large, which
only then affects our individual behavior.
In all these examples concepts are elaborated to make sensible the link between
violence in the media and in society. Co-occurrence makes no sense without an explanation,
and it matters which explanation is offered. Do all of the explanations above seem equally
believable? Were a politician to make a speech on fantasy fulfillment would it seem as
reasonable as the cultivation explanation? Why? The “theory” cannot be evaluated until its
explanatory rationale has been specified, and the brief examples above illustrate how
significant, and distinct, such explanations can be.
Finally, use theories, use concepts discussed in class, use concepts, rather than personal
experience, anecdotes, examples, or intuitive explanations. The concepts and theories
discussed in class represent an attempt to provide explanatory frameworks specifically to
explain hypotheses. So use theories when possible to help explain the hypotheses.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 48
SELECTED EXAMPLES OF PUBLISHED HYPOTHESIS PAPERS
Berelson, B., & Steiner, G. A. (1973). Human behavior: An inventory of scientific findings. New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World.
Berger, C. R., & Calabrese, R. J. (1975). Some explorations in initial interaction and beyond: Toward a
developmental theory of interpersonal communication. Human Communication Research, 1, 99-112.
Burgoon, J. K., & Jones, S. B. (1976). Toward a theory of personal space expectations and their violations.
Human Communication Research, 2, 131-146.
Burr, W.R., Leigh, G. K., Day, R. D., & Constantine, J. (1979). Symbolic interaction and the family. In W. R.
Burr, R. Hill, F. I. Nye, & I. L. Reiss (Eds.), Contemporary theories about the family (pp. 42-111). New
York: Free Press.
Deutsch, M. (1949). A theory of co-operation and competition. Human Relations, 2, 129-152.
Fincham, F. D. (1992). The account episode in close relationships. In M. L. McLaughlin, M. J. Cody, & S.J.
Read (Eds.), Explaining one’s self to others: Reason-giving in social context (pp. 225-244). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Fisher, R. J. (1990). Chapter 5: An eclectic model of intergroup conflict. The social psychology of intergroup
and international conflict resolution (pp. 87-115). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Greene, J. (1984). A cognitive approach to human communication: An action assembly theory.
Communication Monographs, 51, 289-306.
Kaplowitz, S. A. (1978). Towards a systematic theory of power attribution. Social Psychology, 41, 131-148.
Keyton, J., Ford, D. J., & Smith, F. L. (2008). A mesolevel communicative model of collaboration.
Communication Theory, 18, 376-406.
Liden, R. C., & Mitchell, T. R. (1988). Ingratiatory behaviors in organizational settings. Academy of
Management Review, 13, 572-587.
Mack, R. W., & Snyder, R. C. (1957). The analysis of social conflict—Toward an overview and synthesis.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1, 221-248.
Millar, F. E., & Rogers, L. E. (1988). Power dynamics in marital relationships. In P. Noller & M. A. Fitzpatrick
(Eds.), Perspectives on marital interaction (pp. 98-120). Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
Phillips, A. P., & Dipboye, R. L. (1989). Correlational tests of predictions from a process model of the
interview. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74, 41-52.
Rodgers, R. H. (1987). Postmarital reorganization of family relationships: A propositional theory. In D.
Perlman & S. Duck (Eds.), Intimate relationships: Development, dynamics, and deterioration (pp. 239268). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Sclenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Social anxiety and self-presentation: A conceptualization and model.
Psychological Review, 92, 641-669.
Seibold, D. R., & Spitzberg, B. H. (1982). Attribution theory and research: Formalization, critique, and
implications for communication. In B. Dervin & M. J. Voight (Eds.), Progress in communication sciences
(Vol. 3, pp. 85-125). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Spitzberg, B. H. (1994). Intercultural effectiveness. In L. A. Samovar, & R. E. Porter (Eds.), Intercultural
communication: A reader (7th ed., pp. 347-359). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Stech, E. L. (1979). A grammar of conversation with a quantitative empirical test. Human Communication
Research, 5, 158-170.
Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1980). The acquisition and use of social knowledge: Basic postulates and representative
research. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 6, 558-573.
Wyer, R. S., Jr., & Srull, T. K. (1986). Human cognition in its social context. Psychological Review, 93, 322359.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 49
SELECTIONS FROM SPITZBERG'S "CHAMBER OF HORRORS"
Try to avoid the following pitfalls: (1) avoid statements of non-relationship (e.g., 'X is not related
to Y'); (2) avoid including explanations in the hypothesis itself (e.g., "X is positively related to Y
because of theory Z's rationale that..."); (3) avoid using prescriptive (e.g., "S's should do X when Y
occurs") or purely descriptive non-probablistic (e.g., "X may/can be related to Y") wording; (4)
avoid introducing terms into the hypothesis that have not been adequately explained, narrowed,
or defined yet; and (5) avoid introducing categorical variables that distort the form of the
relationship (e.g., "LOW X is positively related to HIGH Y's"); (6) avoid introducing set/subset
redundancies in multiple hypotheses (e.g., P1: Females disclose more than males; P2:
Androgynous females disclose more than androgynous males). Below are some of the "best of
the worst" that have crossed my tired eyes.
H1?: Knowledge also relates to mindlessness in an inverse parabolic function, in that they are
positively related to each other until the mindlessness ceases to be mindless.
H2?: Empathizing with co-workers strengths, weaknesses, and working style relates negatively
towards escalating conflict resulting in an inability to see another's view.
H3?: Equity restoring to a relationship is negatively related to low self-esteem individuals.
H4?: Reactions in adolescents relate back to anxious, neurotogenic, disparging, masochistic, and
manic depressive parents.
H5?: Individual’s interaction with a caregiver as a child affects their relationship bondage with a
potential partner as an adult.
H6?: The purpose of negotiation is to resolve a disagreement between two or more parties.
H7?: In certain negotiation circumstances nonverbal aspects of communication assume a greater
significance than does verbal language.
H8?: Levels of immediate physical and psychological trauma suffered by victims will vary.
H9?: Child abuse is determined by the factors involved.
H10?: The use of threats as an influence tactic does not exacerbate conflicts in general, but is
limited to the occasions on which they are used.
H11?: Conflicts are likely to be influenced by power.
H12?: Sex differences are loosely related to relationship goals.
H13?: Attraction is positively related and influential in choice of sexual partners.
H14?: Males are negatively related to female interviewers of equal status; whereas females are
not affected significantly to status and the sex of the interviewer.
H15?: Mindlessness is negatively related to information processing in interactions.
H16?: Deception is negatively related to the truth.
H17?: Proximity increases physical closeness.
H18?: Viewing the mediator’s role as folkloric trickster is positively related to their job title.
H19?: Guests of a television talk show depend on the reaction of the audience for support of their
heinous actions, therefore after the show is over whether or not they take the advice of the
audience and change their way, depends on the reaction they received.
H20?: Family hour will need to be changed back to true family hour.
H21?: Hip hop is a response to conditions of property and disempowerment.
H22?: Media coverage of the violent topics in Rap music helps alert people to the possible
problems.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 50
ANYONE CAN FORMULATE THEORETICAL AXIOMS AND PROPOSITIONS
Laws of Biological Inconvenience:
1. Law of Mechanical Repair: After your hands become coated with grease, your nose will begin
to itch and you'll have to pee.
2. Law of Bio-Mechanics: The severity of the itch is inversely proportional to the reach.
3. Law of the Bath: When the body is fully immersed in water, the telephone rings.
4. Law of Gravity: Any tool, nut, bolt, screw, when dropped, will roll to the least accessible place
in the universe.
Laws of Social Activity and Impressions
5. Law of Probability: The probability of being watched is directly proportional to the stupidity
of your act.
6. Law of Close Encounters: The probability of meeting someone you know INCREASES
dramatically when you are with someone you don't want to be seen with.
7. Law of Random Numbers: If you dial a wrong number, you never get a busy signal - and
someone always answers.
Laws of (Bad) Luck & Self-Selection:
8. Law of Physical Surfaces: The chances of an open-faced jelly sandwich landing face down on a
floor are directly correlated to the newness and cost of the carpet or rug.
9. Line Variation Law: If you change lines (or traffic lanes), the one you were in will always move
faster than the one you are in now (works every time).
10. Seat Selection Corollary: At any event, the people whose seats are furthest from the aisle,
always arrive last. They are the ones who will leave their seats several times to go for food,
beer, or the toilet and who leave early before the end of the performance or the game is
over. The folks in the aisle seats come early, never move once, have long gangly legs or big
bellies and stay to the bitter end of the performance. The aisle people also are very surly folk.
11. Murphy's Law of Lockers: If there are only 2 people in a locker room, they will have adjacent
lockers.
12. Wilson's Law of Commercial Marketing Strategy: As soon as you find a product that you
really like, they will stop making it.
Law of (Dis)Proof:
13. Law of the Result: When you try to prove to someone that a machine won't work, IT WILL!!!
14. Doctors' Corollary: If you don't feel well, make an appointment to go to the doctor, by the
time you get there you'll feel better. But don't make an appointment, and you'll stay sick.
15. Law of Logical Argument: Anything is possible IF you don't know what you are talking about.
Source: indeterminate—adapted from an extensively forwarded email.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 51
SOME OBJECT LESSONS ABOUT HYPOTHESES
What follows are examples of flawed hypotheses taken from previous hypothesis papers. Each
hypothesis is analyzed to illustrate common mistakes observed in the conceptualization and
verbalization of hypotheses. It is your responsibility to study these examples, and thereby avoid
the types of mistakes indicated. If you have questions about any of the issues raised, please raise
them at the appropriate time in class. Otherwise, you are now considered forewarned.
Recall that a hypothesis is any statement of relationship between or among variables. A variable
is a concept that takes on different values. The entire function of science is to make the nature of
the relationships among things understandable. The more precise the statement of relationship,
the more understandable the hypothesis is. What follows is an effort to assist in making the
hypotheses more precise.
1. MOOD IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO SEXUAL INITIATION.
Overly generic variables: "Mood" may be positive or negative. Since mood is not specified, the
hypothesis, as worded, implies that any increase in mood state will correspond to an increase in
sexual initiation. Thus, as worded, an increase in depression increases sexual initiation, as would
sadness anger, and so forth. The key is to understand that the term "mood" is a concept that can
take on different values or levels (e.g., low to high, negative to neutral to positive, etc.). A
hypothesis is an attempt to specify how their values or levels correspond to the values or levels of
another concept, in this case, the occurrence of sexual initiation. The hypothesis intends to say
"the experience of positively valenced or labeled states are positively related to the likelihood of
sexual initiation."
2. LOW SELF-ESTEEM IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO INTERPERSONAL HOSTILITY.
Mixing variable labels: Herein is one of the most common, insidious, yet subtle problems in
writing hypotheses. By concerning itself with "low" self-esteem, this hypothesis effectively
ignores "medium" and "high" self-esteem. When two-thirds of a variable's possible values are
removed, its ability to "relate" to anything is eliminated because there is no real opportunity for
the variable to vary beyond a very narrow range of values. The above statement intends to say
simply: "Self-esteem is negatively related to interpersonal hostility" or "Low self-esteem persons
are significantly more interpersonally hostile than high self-esteem persons." Think about what
the terminology means! If something is categorized as "low" it needs to be compared to
something that is "high." As an additional note, it is unclear if self-esteem relates to the frequency
with which all hostile actions occur, the intensity of hostile actions, the duration of hostile
actions, all three, some combination, or some other aspect of hostility. Hostility is likely to take on
many different features. It assists the hypothesis to make these features clear in the hypothesis.
Thus, "Self-esteem is negatively related to the frequency and breadth of interpersonally hostile
behaviors."
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 52
3. FRIENDSHIPS ARE HIGHLY VALUABLE TO OLDER MALES AND FEMALES.
Overly definitional: This is overly definitional in form. First, does it imply the friendships are more
valuable to older persons than younger person? (e.g., "The value of friendships for males and
females increases as age increases"). Second, if a relationship is being identified that holds for all
members of a set (i.e., persons), there is no need to specify all categories of that set (i.e., "males
and females"). Thus, "The value of friendships increases as age increases." Third, to what is
friendship "valuable"? Valuable in psychological health, physical health, social health, etc.? Thus,
for example, "As age increases, the perceived value of friendship in preventing depression and
loneliness increases."
4. MALES ARE POSITIVELY CORRELATED TO APPRECIATION OF OBSCENE HUMOR.
Concepts not variable: "People" are not variables; their characteristics are. This hypothesis
intends to compare 'maleness" to "femaleness. It makes the mistake of correlating categories.
Categories are nominal level variables, whereas correlation requires ordinal level variables (recall
COMM 350?). Gender, religion, ethnic group, etc. are categorical variables, and as such, should be
framed as "difference" hypotheses rather than correlational hypotheses. Thus, "Males appreciate
obscene humor significantly more than females."
5. SELF-DISCLOSURE IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO INTIMACY.
Overly unidimensional concepts: On the face of it, this is sensible, right? Yet, this hypothesis is
deeply flawed. First, anyone looking into the two concepts involved here, self-disclosure and
intimacy, should soon find that they are multidimensional. This means that a valid use of the term
actually implies many distinct but related concepts. For example, self-disclosure has been found
to vary importantly in terms of breadth (number of topics), depth (intimacy of topics), reciprocity
(degree to which partner discloses in response), honesty, and valence (positive or negative).
Similarly, intimacy can be viewed in terms of domain (e.g., recreation I, sexual, social, emotional,
etc.) or type (e.g., caring, commitment, interdependence, physical, etc.). The point is not that
student papers have to agree with "the" view with which I am familiar, but that any responsible
research effort will uncover the complexity (i.e., multidimensionality) of the concepts. In this case,
the hypothesis implies that all forms of self-disclosure are equally related to all forms of intimacy.
Is this sensible? It seems unlikely that as disclosure of negative information increases that sexual
intimacy increases, yet this is exactly what the hypothesis implies until it is specified. Second, this
is a perfect candidate for a curvilinear relationship. That is, extremely low or extremely high
amounts of disclosure are likely to impede or inhibit intimacy respectively. Yet, this hypothesis
implies that even at extremely high levels of disclosiveness that intimacy will also be extremely
high. Third, would this hypothesis apply reasonably to all contexts? For example, does it apply to
task-oriented groups, or superior-subordinate, or disengaging, relationships? Unlikely.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 53
6. ADULTERY, ALCOHOL ABUSE, AND FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES ARE POSITIVELY RELATED TO
DIVORCE.
‘NS’ hypothesis: This qualifies in the realm of an “NS” hypothesis (“No Shit!”). Technically there is
nothing wrong with this hypothesis. However, it is about as unsurprising, and therefore,
uninformative, as a statement can be. It’s a little like saying “Oxygen is important to human life.”
Science has a healthy respect for demonstrating what is supposed to be true actually is true. But
come on! Put a little imagination into the paper and come up with a statement that allows
parents to think their children are learning something not already known without the degree.
7. AS MISUNDERSTANDINGS INCREASE, POOR COMMUNICATION INCREASES.
Tautology: It is a little like saying that “X is true because it is X” (i.e., something is taken to be true
because of the way in which it is defined). In this hypothesis, the question arises because for most
commonsense notions, “misunderstanding” would be viewed as a form or subset of “poor
communication.” Thus, if X “includes” Y, then it tends to make little logical sense to say that with
more X, there will be more Y, since this is virtually true by definition of X.
8. A COWORKER WILL USE MORE INDIRECT COMPLIANCE-GAINING STRATEGIES WHEN
ADDRESSING A SUBORDINATE.
Lacking comparative condition: This sounds sensible. However, it is incomplete. Whenever the
words “more” or “less” are used, the question arises “less (or more) than what?” In this case, it is
not entirely clear which of the following phrases should be added to the end of the hypothesis:
“...THAN WHEN ADDRESSING A SUPERIOR,” “...THAN DIRECT STRATEGIES,” or “THAN A
COWORKER.” Complete the comparison implied by “more” or “less.”
9. SCHOLARS BELIEVE THAT ALCOHOLISM IS A DISEASE, WHILE OTHERS BELIEVE IT TO BE A BAD
HABIT.
Descriptive, not relational: This fails in three important senses. First, although it sounds like it is
saying something substantive about the nature of alcoholism, it really is only saying something
about what certain people believe about alcoholism, which was not the point of the paper.
Second, it is not about communication, and therefore is not very topical to the assignment or
major. Third, the hypothesis is definitional in content, not a hypothesis. There is no “relationship
between variables” being described here. This hypothesis is stating something about what
alcoholism is rather than what it is related to and how it is related.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 54
MODELS AND MODELING: A FUNDAMENTAL SCIENTIFIC LITERACY
“Understanding that our scientific knowledge is ‘only’ a model
is the key to true scientific literacy.
Knowing this tells us that our science has built-in limitations,
but that it does resemble reality in very fundamental ways.
More importantly, that understanding gives us permission
to use our models when they are useful—
and permission to discard them when they no longer meet our needs. …
Ultimately, our models and descriptions of reality
must be subject to two overriding criteria:
How useful is this model, and how much does this model resemble our observations.
Scientific literacy requires an understanding that science is only a model.”
Martin, T. W. (2007, Sept/Oct). Scientific literacy and the habit of discourse. Seed, pp. 77-78.
Modeling is one of the zeniths of scientific reasoning. It incorporates analytic reasoning
(i.e., breaking wholes into parts), synthetic reasoning (i.e., [re]assembling parts into wholes), and
abstract reasoning (i.e., recognizing similar things across levels of abstraction and concreteness).
It also is fundamental to theoretical reasoning (i.e., explaining how and why phenomena happen
the way they do), and methodology (i.e., specifying hypotheses to be tested qualitatively or
quantitatively, the results of which inform the validity of the underlying theory).
Modeling involves developing a visual “map” of a “territory.” The territory is rarely known
entirely, and in fact, sometimes it is only vaguely understood. The territory may have been
observed in various ways, but seldom has it been observed in its entirety. Thus, a map is needed
to navigate our way through this territory, and to guide the conduct of research into that
territory, to see to what extent our map does a good job of representing that territory.
Every territory, however, has a potentially infinite number of potential maps. Consider
San Diego County. There are topographical, weather, road, tectonic activity, and photographic
maps of the territory. Every one of these maps represents San Diego, but does so from a different
point of view. A tectonic history map of San Diego is not likely to be very useful to someone
seeking how to get from a house address in Ramona to a destination in the Gaslamp. Likewise, a
road map is not likely to be very useful to a person seeking to predict where the next earthquake
will occur.
Furthermore, “the map is not the territory.” That is, the map is never the exact same thing
as the territory. A map that completely represented a territory would be the territory. Thus, maps
are abstractions. They are intended to be abstract representations. They are generally intended
to have some degree of abstract generality as well. A map that only represents an extremely
small and detailed event or place, and only represents a “snapshot” has limited value. Maps may
change as the territory changes (this is why roadmaps are updated frequently), but they are
usually intended to have some validity and value over time and space.
This assignment involves the development of a type of map, which is here referred to as a
model. Specifically, a model will be developed and arguments in defense of the model will be
developed. The model will be developed to represent some communication process directly
relevant to the course.
Models vary by a number of various dimensions, any or all of which may be useful to
consider as you ponder what kind of model to create. A partial list of such dimensions is explained
below:
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 55
(1) Abstraction Level: Models vary by the scope or level of abstraction they seek to represent.
Marx’s theory of capitalist systems and social conflict was a very broad-based macro
model of how societies evolve when property is privately owned. Janis’s mezzo model of
groupthink attempts to explain why and how highly cohesive groups tend to reach
premature consensus. Andersen’s cognitive valence model was developed to represent at
a micro level how minute changes in intimacy behavior by one partner influences the
response behaviors of the other partner.
(2) Complexity: Some models are relatively simple, and hypothesize only a few relationships.
For example, Spitzberg, Canary and Cupach predicted that the use of conflict strategies
influences competence judgments, which then influence relationship quality. These three
concepts produce a relatively small number of specific predictions. In contrast, Turner
synthesized numerous theories and propositions to develop a model of social conflict that
involves over 20 concepts and dozens of hypotheses.
(3) Testability: Some models are relatively difficult to observe or test, and are therefore
conjectural. Freud’s theories of the id, ego, and superego are highly conjectural because
by definition, the unconscious is difficult to observe or test. In contrast, Cupach and Metts
developed a model of how face-saving strategies are used to disengage from a
relationship, which is relatively easy to test through surveys, narratives, or other
techniques. A relatively easy litmus test for this dimension is to see how other scholars
have “observed” (tested, measured, rated, scaled, coded, interviewed, etc.) the concepts
in your model, if at all. If a concept has been previously studied by other scholars, then it
can be tested or observed. If it is still a “hypothetical” concept, then it may be more
conjectural in nature.
(4) Recursiveness: Some models are strictly linear. That is, they progress from cause to effect.
Other models are more processual, such that at various steps a given result may “feed
back” into the process and influence prior processes. For example, a linear model might
propose that lonely people are more likely to seek out parasocial relationships in the
media than non-lonely people. In this case, loneliness causes media consumption
behavior in a linear manner. In contrast, a model might propose that as lonely people
consume more media, they are spending less time in social contexts, and therefore lose
their social skills and confidence in their social abilities. In this model, then, the loneliness
causes media behavior, which causes more loneliness, which causes more media
behavior, and so forth.
(5) Modeling Topoi: In general, all models have the potential for five basic types of concepts
(variables, components, factors):
a. Causes (also often referred to as antecedents, or “independent variables”): These are
factors that influence subsequent events. As causes change, subsequent events
change. Causes typically are further distinguished in two forms: distal and proximal.
Distal causes are causes that occur “deep” in the process, typically meaning “far back”
in time. Proximal causes are “closer” to the events or process being explained. So, for
example, in modeling relationship aggression, distal causes might include whether a
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 56
person grew up observing parent-to-parent aggression, and being the recipient of
parental aggression. In contrast, proximal causes might include the amount of stress a
person is experiencing in a job or school, and whether or not alcohol has been
recently consumed.
b. Context: The context is all those factors that influence how the situation is defined by
those participating in a communicative process. Spitzberg, for example, has argued
that contexts typically involve issues of culture, relationship type, physical situation,
and goal or function of the communicative process. Related types of contextual
factors might include time (e.g., slow cultures vs. fast cultures, early in a relationship
vs. later in a relationship, etc.), activity level (e.g., a party vs. a classroom), or other
such features.
c. Individual Characteristics: These are features of the individuals involved that may
influence how a process of communication unfolds. These features sometimes can be
classified as causes or context factors, but may also be treated separately. For
example, Spitzberg proposes that a person’s motivation, knowledge and skills increase
the likelihood of engaging in communication that is perceived as competent by self
and others. The motivation, knowledge, and skills themselves can be accounted for in
part by the individual’s proximal and distal experiences (e.g., a person who received
bad parenting growing up—i.e., a distal factor—may be least motivated to
communicate competently in situations involving a partner who is behaving in ways
similar to those parents—i.e., a more proximal factor). Traditionally, psychology has
distinguished these as “traits” (i.e., stable predispositions to experience and react to
the world in certain ways—e.g., low IQ) and “states” (i.e., temporary ways of
experiencing a situation—e.g., situational shyness).
d. Process: What are the communicative behaviors or processes being explained by the
model? What do the causes and context influence a person or persons to do? For
example, exposure to media violence and coming from a violent family background
may intersect contexts of personal conflict to produce violent behavior as a process.
e. Outcomes: What results from the confluence of these various components? For
example, Spitzberg’s model proposes that as motivation, knowledge, and skills of
interactants increase, they are more likely to engage in communication that is
perceived to be appropriate and effective. These perceptions of appropriateness and
effectiveness, in turn, are likely to result in greater attraction, persuasion, and
relationship satisfaction and development. Thus, there are outcomes of competent
interaction.
(6) Component Functions: The various components described above can generally play a
moderating or a mediating role. A moderating role means that the relationship between X
and Z is significantly altered by the introduction or consideration of the variable Y. In
contrast, a mediating role means that the relationship between X and Z disappears when
the variable Y is introduced or considered. For example, a person who experienced
parental violence as a child is more likely to engage in violence against a current romantic
partner. However, if that person who experienced violence as a child is also consuming
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 57
alcohol, that significantly increases the likelihood of engaging in violence against a current
partner. Thus, alcohol moderates the relationship between childhood abuse and adult
abuse. In contrast, the relationship between race and violent crime (Whites engage in
less, Blacks engage in more) tends to disappear when controlling for socioeconomic status
(SES), and thus, SES is a mediating variable.
(7) Directionality: Some models represent relationships in indeterminate form, whereas other
models specify the exact type of relationships anticipated. For example, a model might
represent a link (or line) connecting “exposure to media violence” and “viewer’s violent
behavior.” This link can be viewed as bi-directional (e.g., as a person’s exposure to
violence increases, this person’s likelihood of engaging in violence increases, but also, as a
person’s violent behavior increases, the more this person seeks out media content that
reflects such violence). This link can also be specified as a particular type of relationship
(e.g., consuming violent media increases the likelihood of behaving violently, but the
reverse is not true—once a person engages in violence, consumption of violent media
does not necessarily increase or decrease). Generally speaking, models consist of
components and connections. The components represent some variable or process, and
the connections consist of arrows or lines. A directional arrow indicates that a given
variable causes or directly influences another variable. Thus, X  Y means that X causes
or influences Y. If the arrow is reversed (i.e., X  Y), it means that Y causes or influences
X. A double-sided arrow means that the relationship is reciprocal. If a sign is provided for
an arrow (i.e., - or +), this indicates the type of relationship involved. A positive (or direct)
relationship means that as X increases, Y increases, and as X decreases, Y decreases. A
negative relationship means that as X increases, Y decreases, and as X decreases, Y
increases. There is a third type of relationship that often describes communication
processes—curvilinear. Although there are many types of curved lines that could
represent the relationship between concepts, one of the most common is that as X
increases, Y increases, to a point, beyond which, more X results in less Y. For example, as a
person talks more and more, generally speaking, we tend to find this person more
attractive and competent. However, as a person begins to talk during 80 or 90% of the
time in a conversation, the more we tend to view this person as egotistical and
narcissistic. Thus, talk time in a conversation is curvilinear to perceived competence (i.e.,
as talk time increases, perceived competence increases, to a point, beyond which,
perceptions of competence decrease).
(8) Formality: There are many potential ways of defining formality in a model, but for the
purposes of this assignment, formality is the extent to which the model can be translated
into hypotheses or specific propositions. For the most part, the more that the connectors
of a model have directional and sign-specific connectors, the more formal the model will
be. Informal models simply illustrate variables that affect one another, but do not specify
how or in what specific ways each of the components is related to the other components
of the model. Formal models specify not only which components affect which other
components (and by implication, what components are not related to one another), they
specify the exact predicted type of relationship among components of the model.
(9) Spatial Logic: Most (but not all) models follow relatively simple rules: (1) Components on
the left precede, at some point, the components to the right in real time (except when
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 58
there are feedback loops or arrows). (2) Every arrow represents a direct effect of one
concept on another. This effect does not have to be a causal relationship, but it usually
implies such an influence. (3) Every component must have an arrow headed to at least
one other component, and may have arrows to multiple other components. (4) The
spatially closer two components are to one another, the more closely they are associated
with one another than to components further away from one another. (5) Components
can be hierarchically grouped according to larger components (i.e., multiple indicators of a
single concept; e.g., social skills above might be further indicated by coordination,
expressiveness, attentiveness, and composure skills). (6) Every arrow is a potentially
testable hypothesis (or proposition).
This assignment requires that a model of some communicative process be developed,
explained, and defended. The following minimum requirements apply:
(1)
(2)
The model must be in some central way directly related to communication.
There must be at least five components with at least one component each representing
cause, context, individual factor, process, and outcome. More components can be
provided, but there must be at least one component that fits each of these component
types.
(3) There must be at least five directional arrows. There can be far more, but at least five
must be provided.
(4) At least 10 formal propositions emerging from the model must be formally stated as
hypotheses. More propositions can be articulated, but there must be at least five.
(5) Each component must have at least one scholarly journal article that provides backing
for arguments related to that component.
(6) The complete model must be capable of being summarized in an abstract 500 words or
less.
(7) The model must be rendered in a visual form (preferably using the drawing tools in
Word, or PowerPoint, which is subsequently saved as an image and imported into
Word).
(8) The paper, and the reference list, must be in A.P.A. (5th ed.) format, with 1-inch margins,
double-spaced, and either 11-point Arial (normal) or 12-point Times Roman font. The
pages of the paper should have a running head, which includes serial pagination.
(9) The entire paper cannot be more than 7 pages in length (not including appended article
‘first-page prints’), such that:
a. Title page (= 1 page; which includes student name, red id#, class #, class title,
semester/year, and of course, a title that represents the topic of the model).
b. Model visual figure (= 1 page)
c. Proposition list (= 1 page)
d. Abstract (= 1-2 pages)
e. Reference list (= 1-2 pages)
(10) The abstract provides both explanation and argument in support of the model. The idea
is to explain the overall model (i.e., “make sense” of it), and provide key arguments
along the way for as many of the key links or relationships as possible within the space
allotted. Arguments will typically consist of backing (i.e., sources, evidence, citations,
quotations, statistics), claim (i.e., the arrow or proposition), and warrant(s) (i.e., the
reason why the claim is sensible or valid).
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 59
Sample models will be displayed in class, illustrating some of the many ways in which
communication theories, processes, and concepts can be visually modeled and explained.
Students may adapt already existing models, but when doing so, must cite the existing model,
and explain how the student model differs from, or advances, the existing model. As an exemplar
of different types of models and their theoretical value and comparison, see: Spitzberg, B. H., &
Chagnon, G. (2009). Conceptualizing intercultural communication competence. In D. K.
Deardorff (Ed.), The SAGE Handbook of intercultural competence (pp. 2-52). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 60
THINKING IN TOULMANESQUE TERMS
DATA
CLAIM
WARRANT
DISCOVERY METHODS
N hrs exposure
media violence/
hrs viewing
+
Experimental
exposure/
no exposure
Pos. r of
violence
exposure
& violent
behavior
Given that exposure provides
social learning models …
Therefore, violence in
the media reinforces
violence in society
INTERPRETIVE METHODS
Most TV
interpersonal
violence is
men against
women
Therefore, media portray
violence in gender
exploitative & harmful ways
Thereby, normalizing
violence against women…
CRITICAL METHODS
Parental involvement
In children’s media
habits decreases
exposure to violence
Therefore, congress should
adopt parental control
technology mandates
Therefore, technological
fixes exist that protect
freedom of speech…
“There are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering
experience, of constructing reality. The two (though complementary) are irreducible to one another. Efforts to
reduce one mode to the other or to ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich
diversity of thought. Each of the ways of knowing, moreover, has operating principles of its own and its own
criteria of well-formedness. They differ radically in their procedures for verification. A good story and a wellformed argument are different natural kinds. Both can be used as means for convincing another. Yet what they
convince of is fundamentally different: arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelikeness. The one
verifies by eventual appeal to procedures for establishing formal and empirical proof. The other establishes not
truth but verisimilitude. … The types of causality implied in the two modes are palpably different. The term then
functions differently in the logical proposition ‘if x, then y’ and in the narrative recit ‘The king died, and then the
queen died.’ One leads to a search for universal truth conditions, the other for likely particular connections
between two events—mortal grief, suicide, foul play. … a story … is judged for its goodness as a story by criteria
that are of a different kind from those used to judge a logical argument as adequate or correct.”
Brunner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 61
PROPOSITION/MODEL PAPER EVALUATION SHEET
Name:
E-mail:
Brief Title:
0
1
Red ID:
Email:
2
3
4
Form displays: multiple types & instances
within type of writing or grammatical errors
in expositional text, &/or displays
inconsistency in rule application; frequent reediting or rephrasing to achieve more
professional voice is suggested.
0
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
Model concepts involve partially incomplete,
occasionally unclear or unarticulated
interrelationships among the components;
&/or some paths through the model are
vague; &/or some component labeling is
inconsistent or uninformative.
-3
SUBSTANCE—RESEARCH
5
6
7
Some key claims of the source(s) are
articulated or delineated, but there are some
inconsistencies in the detail, gravity, or
evidentiary basis provided in explicating the
claims.
4
Model is mostly a typology or list of concepts,
with incomplete, unclear or unarticulated
interrelationships among the components;
&/or overall paths through the model are
vague; &/or component labeling is
inconsistent or uninformative.
-1
-2
COMMENTS:
Only minor or one or two propositions need
editing for sake of clarity.
4
The key claims of the source(s) are not clearly
articulated or delineated. Specific reference
to passages in the book(s) is not consistently
provided, or not provided in sufficient detail
or accuracy to test the claims.
0
Form displays: few types & instances within
type of writing or grammatical errors in
expositional text, &/or inconsistency in rule
application;
occasional
re-editing
or
rephrasing to achieve more professional
voice is suggested.
8
SUBSTANCE—MODEL
5
6
7
Model concepts involve partially incomplete,
occasionally unclear or unarticulated
interrelationships among the components;
&/or some paths through the model are
vague; &/or some component labeling is
inconsistent or uninformative.
-4
APA STYLE
-5
-6
-7
9
10
Writing
displays
professional
composition, and grammatical form.
8
9
voice,
10
Propositions are both logically sound, but
sophisticated in their thematic connection
&/or articulation of complex relationships.
SUBSTANCE—ARGUMENTATION
4
5
6
7
8
Model is mostly a typology or list of concepts,
with incomplete, unclear or unarticulated
interrelationships among the components;
&/or overall paths through the model are
vague; &/or component labeling is
inconsistent or uninformative.
0
FORM—WRITING
5
6
7
SUBSTANCE—PROPOSITIONS
4
5
6
7
The key claims are not clearly articulated or
delineated. Propositions fail by level of
scaling, relationship, or syllogistic entailment.
“Object lessons” or “list of horrors” are
repeated.
0
Date:
Course:
9
10
Model is typologically innovative &/or
comprehensive, with clear and articulated
interrelationships among the components; &
overall paths through the model are easy to
follow; & component labeling is consistent
and informative.
8
9
10
Several key claims are clearly identified,
articulated, and the evidentiary basis of them
in the source(s) is elaborated.
8
9
10
Model is typologically innovative &/or
comprehensive, with clear and articulated
interrelationships among the components; &
overall paths through the model are easy to
follow; & component labeling is consistent
and informative.
-8
-9
-10
Grade:
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 62
ANTHROPOCENTRISMS
"Many different root metaphors have been put forth to represent the essential nature of human beings:
Homo faber, Homo economicus, Homo politicus, Homo sociologicus, "psychological man," "ecclesiastical
man," Homo sapiens, and of course, "rational man." I propose that Homo narrans be added to the
list....The Homo narrans metaphor is thus an incorporation and extension of Burke's definition of "man" as
the "symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animals....It holds that symbols are created and
communicated ultimately as stories meant to give order to human experience and to induce others to
dwell in them in order to establish ways of living in common, in intellectual and spiritual communities in
which there is confirmation for the story that constitutes one's life." Fisher, W.R. (1987). Human
communication as narration. Columbia: U. of S. Carolina. pp. 62-3.
"What kind of man would homo rhetoricus be?... rhetorical man must have felt an overpowering selfconsciousness about language..... Rhetorical man is an actor; his reality public, dramatic.... The lowest
common denominator of his life is a social situation. And his motivations must be characteristically ludic,
agonistic. He thinks first of winning, of mastering the rules the current game enforces. He assumes a
natural agility in changing orientations.... Rhetorical man is trained not to discover reality but to
manipulate it.... Homo rhetoricus cannot, to sum up, be serious. He is not pledged to a single set of values
and the cosmic orchestration they adumbrate." Lanham, R.A. (1976). The motives of eloquence: Literary
rhetoric in the renaissance (pp. 3-5). New Haven: Yale.
"Man is above everything else the talking animal—homo loquens. The overwhelming majority of human
beings spend a great deal of their time talking an listening to each other." (p.3). "Homo loquens has
received the gift of speech which marks him off from all other creatures that we know about and is
undoubtedly responsible for his development up to the point which he has now reached." (p. 167).
Fry, D. (1977). Homo loquens: Man as a talking animal. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
"In a rhetorical masterstroke, Turner (1986, p. 81) subversively redefined the fundamental terms of
discussion in ethnography by defining humankind as homo performans, humanity as performer, a cultureinventing, social performing, self-making and self-transforming creature." Conquergood,
D.
(1991).
Rethinking ethnography: Towards a critical cultural politics. Communication Monographs, 58, 187.
"We do not need to settle the philosopher's question of what is the essential condition for the existence of
intentionality, nor buy Brentano's famous criterion that intentionality is the distinctive mark of the mental,
to recognize that human beings think and plan and intend, that if rats do so they do it at a much lower
level, that sunflowers probably do not, and that stones certainly do not.... [These] systems do not possess
the capacity to think worry, regret, plan, and intend... There are a number of other things that human
beings do that no infrahuman animal does, so far as we know. Only man speculates about nonpractical,
theoretical matters; only man worships; only man systematically goes about seeking revenge, years later,
for an injury done to him; only man carries on discussions about how to make decisions; ..." Meehl, P.E.
(1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46, 806-834.
“For heuristic purposes, let’s invent a new species designation: Homo symbolicus. . . . More than any other
group of species, hominids’ behavioral adaptations have determined the course of their physical evolution,
rather than vice versa. . . . The origin of ‘humanness’ can be defined as that point in our evolution where
these tools became the principle source of selection on our bodies and brains. It is the diagnostic trait of
Homo symbolicus.” Deacon, T. (1997). The symbolic species: The co-evolution of language and the human
brain. London: AllenLane, Penguin Press. 341, 345.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 63
STATUS SCENARIOS OF THE COMMUNICATION DISCIPLINE
(Spitzberg, 1999)
I. Communication as “discipline”: “Merely one among many”
Literary
Criticism
Psychology
COMMUNICATION
Sociology
Anthropology
Philosophy
II. Communication as “Inter-discipline”: a “crossroads” or “intersection” (ala Littlejohn)
COMMUNICATION
Psychology
Sociology
Miscellaneous
Anthropology
Literary
Criticism
Philosophy
III. Communication as “Pan-discipline”: a topic domain cutting across disciplines.
Psychology
Sociology
Anthropology
Philosophy
Literary
Criticism
COMMUNICATION
IV. Communication as “Meta-discipline”: a “McKeonesque” architectonic
COMMUNICATION
Psychology
Sociology
Anthropology
Philosophy
Literary
Criticism
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 64
Educational
Sports
Medical
Group
Communication
Business
Social Interaction
Theories
Public
Comm.
Individual
Theories
Legal
Tier 4
Tier 3
Tier 2
Message
Related
Theories
Tier 1
Representative
continua used to
distinguish levels
Public
Number of people
Agent controlling
communication event
Interpersonal
Cultural
Comm.
Family
Theories
Communicator
Centered
Situation
Centered
Context
Centered
Message- Centered
Levels of Communication
Group
Interpersonal
Dyadic/Triadic
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Large (> 10)
Mod. (> 3, < 9)
Dyadic/Triadic
One to many
can contribute
Degree of formality
expected in event
Religious
High
Leader with
agenda, but all
contribution(s)
Mutual control
of course &
Determined by
agenda but some
Low
Intermediate,
when relevant
Moderately
high
informality expected
Degree of personal
information exchanged
Low
Adapted from Powers, J. H. (1995). On the intellectual structure of the human communication
discipline. Communication Education, 44, 11-22.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 65
DISTINGUISHING THE SCIENCES FROM THE HUMANITIES
Science: The systematic application of method and observation in the pursuit of discovery and testing of
reasoned conjectures regarding the description and explanation of worldly phenomena. Or, the
systematic search for explicable and replicable pattern(s)?
Humanities: The textual exploration of the myriad meanings and implications of personal and human
existence and possibilities?
Traditional dualities:
HUMANITIES
SCIENCES
PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
Imaginative (mentalistic)
The possible (the imaginable)
Bricolage (using whatever is available)
Progressively distinctive
Empirical (inter-observability)
The testable & observable (predictable)
Systematic (deduction, induction, probability)
Progressively corrective
ETHICAL CONCERNS
Private (audience of the self)
Openness to experience & experiencable
Self-examining/reflective
Adopting critical stance
Public (audience of the peers & the world)
Skeptical of experience & the known
Self-correcting
Eschews critical standpoint
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS
Embrace self-reflexivity
Reflexively interdependent
Idiosyncratic
Ideological (theological, axiological)
Celebration of ineffability
Control self-reflexivity
Reflexively independent
Generalizable
Theoretical
Reduction of ineffability
“hermeneuticists and positivists share more than reciprocal insults. They share that idealized, and
perhaps outmoded, conception of objective science in which there is no place for a science of
subjectivity. That conception can be crudely reiterated by reference to what I shall call ‘the standard
dichotomies,” a parallel series of oppositions beginning with the opposition between the objective
versus the subjective and ending with the opposition between the natural sciences versus the
humanities. The series runs as follows: objective versus private, controlled versus free, reliable versus
unreliable, systematic versus unsystematic, automatic (mechanical) versus willed (purposive),
explanation versus understanding, prediction versus understanding, explained-by-reference-to-causallaw versus understood-by-reference-to-intentions, general versus context-specific, regular versus
irregular, discovered versus constructed, value-free versus value-saturated, formal versus informal,
materialist versus idealist, one versus many, instrumental versus symbolic, motion versus action, science
versus humanity” (Shweder, 1986, p. 177)
Notice what dualities are not considered part of the distinction (e.g., creativity? artistry, etc.) Science
“seeks” to account for the enduring patterns of variation of human and nonhuman form, function, and
process. But the form, function and process(es) of seeking are themselves deeply “human” and thus,
intrinsically humanistic.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 66
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
“Recent developments in the philosophy of science and related areas of philosophy, and in the
philosophies of the various special sciences, have progressed to a point where a new ‘postpositivist’ consensus has emerged….there has evolved a consensus about which more specific
philosophical and scientific matters any adequate general philosophical conception of science
must account for, along with a consensus about the broad outlines of the relevant philosophical
positions, options, and argumentative strategies. Roughly, the recent developments that have led
to the new consensus are:
1. The emergence of sophisticated realist and neo-Kantian alternatives to traditional empiricist
conceptions of science, and of more sophisticated post-positivist version of empiricism in
response to them.
2. The development of ‘naturalistic’ or ‘causal’ conceptions of reference and of the definitions of
natural kind (magnitude, property,…) terms as alternatives to the standard empiricist
conceptions of such matters.
3. Corresponding naturalistic developments in epistemology.
4. Critiques (and consequent reformulations) of the Humean conception of causal relations and
of the associated covering-law account of explanation.
5. A greatly increased emphasis on the relevance of the history of science for work in the
philosophy of science and a consequent de-emphasis of the alleged distinction between
‘context of invention (or discovery)’ and ‘context of confirmation (or justification).’
6. The emergence of a distinct and philosophically important post-positivist literature in the
philosophies of the various ‘special sciences’ (especially biology, psychology, and history),
particularly the emergence of a nonreductionist account of the relation between the special
sciences and the more basic physical sciences.
7. A similar post-positivist reevaluation of issues in the philosophy of physics.
The resulting picture of scientific knowledge, of scientific language, and of causation and
explanation is vastly more complex than the simple account dictated by traditional logical
positivism and, consequently, is philosophically much richer. The newly emerging consensus
resulting from this picture appears to have roughly the following components:
a. Scientific methodology is ineliminably theory-dependent, and the depth of its theorydependence rules out any simple verificationist conception of science. The serious contenders
among general positions in the philosophy of science are scientific realism and neo-Kantian
constructivism—both of which arose as responses to the apparent theory-dependence of
scientific methods—and sophisticated post-positivist versions of empiricism that arose as
responses to these positions.
b. Foundationalist conceptions of knowledge in general, and of scientific knowledge in
particular, are untenable in many of the ways suggested by defenders of causal or naturalistic
conceptions of knowledge, both because of the theory-dependence of scientific methods and for
independent reasons arising from causal theories of perception. Any account of scientific
knowledge must embody at least some naturalistic elements, whatever its author’s ultimate
position on epistemological matters.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 67
c. For similar reasons, we must acknowledge that the definitions of scientific concepts and
of terms in scientific language are theory-dependent; any adequate account of the semantics of
scientific knowledge must reflect this fact and must—whatever its author’s ultimate position on
semantic matters—reflect some of the insights of causal or naturalistic conceptions of definition
and of reference.
d. Because of the importance of ‘naturalistic’ considerations in the philosophy of science, the
‘natural history’ of scientific theorizing—the history of science—provides a very important
constraint on theories in the philosophy of science. The distinction between context of discovery
and context of confirmation is correspondingly less important than positivists imagined.
e. The Humean conception of causation and the associated covering-law conception of
explanation are by no means obviously correct; they must compete with both constructivist and
naturalistic alternatives.
f. Materialist conceptions of both biological and psychological matters are well confirmed,
but materialism within a special science does not require the sort of syntactic reducibility to
physics anticipated by logical positivists. The biological and social sciences can be ‘autonomous’
from the physical sciences even on the assumption of materialism. A reductionist approach in a
special science requires a defense in terms of the special features of that science rather than in
terms of an appeal to a generally reductionist analysis of materialism.
g. Because they are arguably autonomous, the various special sciences (and their histories)
are as relevant for the philosopher of science as are the physical sciences.
h. Because of the importance of naturalistic approaches in the philosophy of science, and
because many methodological disputes within the various special sciences have a heavily
philosophical component, there is an important and appropriate dialectical interaction between
research in the philosophy of science and research in the various special sciences.”
Boyd, R., Gasper, P., & Trout, J. D. (1991). In R. Boyd, P. Gasper, & J. D. Trout (Eds.), The
philosophy of science (xi-xiii). Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 68
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THEORIES
(Spitzberg, 2013)
“Standards compete just as theories compete
and we choose the standards most appropriate to the historical situation
in which the choice occurs”
Feyerabend (1980, “How to defend…”, p. 59)
I. NECESSARY CONDITIONS:
1. Explanatory Power: The theory must provide a sensible account of the phenomena of
concern
2. Construct and Conditionship Specification: The theory must indicate the nature of the
constructs and the relationships among these constructs (i.e., necessity, sufficiency,
parameters, function form, generality, etc.)
3. Boundary Specification: The theory must indicate the domain of its legitimate scope and
relevance
4. Intra-Boundary Generality: The theory must provide statements of relationship that hold
across all phenomena of concern
5. Internal Consistency: The theory must maintain logical consistency of all statements of
conditionship, assumptions, and units
6. External consistency: The theory must avoid contradiction of "known" data
7. Verifiability: The theory must be potentially verifiable, such that it is:
A) Operational: A sufficient number of the theoretical units must be capable of being
measured/observed
B) Falsifiable: It must be possible to establish conditions under which statements of the
theory can be observed to be true/untrue
II. DESIRABLE CONDITIONS:
1. Precision: The more the theory allows prediction of phenomena, the better the theory:
A) End State Prediction: Prediction of some identifiable "outcome" of the phenomena
behavior
B) Phase State Prediction: Prediction of various stages or evolving states of behavior
toward an end state
2. Parsimony: The more elegant and simple the theory, the better the theory
3. Correspondence with Observables: The more of the theory units that are observable, the
better the theory
4. Breadth: The broader the scope or range of the theory, the better the theory; i.e.,
verisimilitude
5. Control: The greater the potential for strategic manipulation of the phenomena, the better
the theory
6. Heurism/Novelty/Progressiveness: The more novel content, and the more the theory
suggests in the way of new scientific endeavors, the better the theory. The more the
theory explains new facts or counterintuitive facts, the better the theory.
7. Synthesis: The more the theory facilitates the organization and inclusion of ideas and
information, the better the theory
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 69
III. RELATIVE CONDITIONS:
1. Competition Principle: Theories should compete favorably vis-à-vis their rivals (Colomy,
1991); “theory evaluation is primarily a comparative affair” (Laudan, 1981, p. 145); “There
is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 119).
2. Money in the Bank Principle: “We are warranted in continuing to conjecture that a theory
has high verisimilitude when it has accumulated ‘money in the bank’ by passing several
stiff tests” (Meehl, 1990, p. 115)
3. Damn Strange Coincidences Principle: “The main way a theory gets money in the bank is
by predicting facts that, absent the theory, would be antecedently improbable” (Meehl,
1990, p. 115).
4. Aesthetics: “A good theory is a plausible theory, and a theory is judged to be more
plausible and of higher quality if it is interesting rather than obvious, irrelevant or absurd,
obvious in novel ways, a source of unexpected connections, high in narrative rationality,
aesthetically pleasing, or correspondent with presumed realities” (Weick, 1989, p. 517).
IV. CRITICAL CONDITIONS:
5. Generative capacity: “the capacity to challenge the guiding assumptions of the culture, to
raise fundamental questions regarding contemporary social life, to foster reconsideration
of that which is ‘taken for granted,’ and thereby to generate fresh alternatives for social
action” (Gergen, 1994, Toward transformation…, p. 109)
6. Counter-suggestiveness: “What we need here is an education that makes people
contrary, counter-suggestive, without making them incapable of devoting themselves to
the elaboration of any single view” (Feyerabend, 1980, p. 63)
IV. DEFINITION:
"A theory is a verifiable conceptual system of interrelated formal or informal propositions
explaining conditionship among a set of phenomena, which is generalizable within a
defined domain, and is internally consistent and externally sensible." (Spitzberg, 1998)
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 70
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING ETHNOGRAPHIC WORK
Ethnographic writing is higher quality when it reveals the following characteristics:
1. Multi-voiced text: Captures diverse, competing voices—it questions realism and raise
contradictions. It raises as many voices as possible, and these voices
often contradict one another.
2. Critical text:
Exposes the politics of how values, race, class, and gender work their
way into our interactions and have consequences.
3. Catalytic text:
Awakens moral sensibilities of the reader, becoming a catalyst, moving
us or those participating to action.
4. Dialogic text:
Captures dialogue within the scene in ways that we identify or become
identified with the characters.
5. Processual text: Explicates a process of communicating.
6. Reflexive text:
Reveals author’s positioning—physically, ideologically, and
emotionally. Minimizes distance between reader and author.
7. Embodied text: Describes the scene, thickly, lushly, utilizing all the senses in ways that
engages reader and brings them close. Thick description, feeling like
you were there.
8. Temporal text:
Indicates the passage of time in its multiple forms, not necessarily
sequentially, representing the elapsing of time. Also, don’t be a
“weekend ethnographer.”
Adapted from:
Scarduzio, J. A., Giannini, G. A., & Geist-Martin, P. (2011). Crafting an architectural blueprint:
Principles of design for ethnographic research. Symbolic Interaction, 34(4), 447-470.
doi:10.1525/si.2011.34.4.447
.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 71
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY EVALUATION
“Examples of the heuristic statements of currently competing methods are:
(1)
Popper’s heuristic advice: Adopt the theory that is best corroborated [Note: i.e., has
withstood the most severe attempts at falsification].
(2)
Lakatos’ heuristic advice: Adopt the theory that exhibits an empirically progressive problemshift. “a series of theories is theoretically progressive (or ‘constituted a theoretically
progressive problem-shift’) if each new theory has some excess empirical content over its
predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact. Let us say that a
theoretically progressive series of theories is also empirically progressive (Or ‘constitutes an
empirically progressive problemshift’) if some of this excess empirical content is also
corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads us to the actual discovery of some new
fact…Finally, let us call a problemshift progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically
progressive, and degenerating if it is not” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 118)
(3)
Kuhn’s heuristic advice: Adopt the theory that is simple, consistent, fecund, and so on, and
that most responds to the scientists’ tutored and practiced intuitions.
(4)
Laudan’s heuristic advice: Adopt the theory that exhibits the highest rate of problem-solving
effectiveness, in which “problems” represent claims about the world that have yet to be
satisfactorily explained. [Note 1: verisimilitude—truth—is relatively irrelevant to this
criterion. Note 2: “the problem-solving effectiveness of a theory is determined by the
number of problems solved minus the number of anomalies” (p. 114)].
TMT1 (Theoretical Merit)
=
((Neps + Ncps ) – (Neap x Ieap) + (Ncpp x Ccps, ))/TM2
Where: T1
=
Theory 1
Neps =
N of empirical problems solved
Neap =
N of empirical anomalies produced
Ncps =
N of conceptual problems solved
Ieap
=
Importance of anomalies
Ncpp =
N of conceptual problems produced
Ccps
=
Centrality of conceptual problems
(5)
Feyerabend’s heuristic advice: Adopt any theory [Note: because the more alternative
conceptualizations, the more likely they will compete and converge, or that the best will
emerge].” (Sarkar, 1983, p. 162; “Notes” reflect Spitzberg’s interpretative additions)
(6)
Penman’s “good theoretic” paradigm: Adopt the theory that conceptualizes human
behavior as voluntary, knowledge as socially constituted and historically embedded, is selfreflective about agency and intervention, and can serve as a basis for moral evaluation.
“Good communication theory and good communication practice would be those that enrich
our experience and increase our options and opportunities for actions. Bad communication,
conversely, restricts or negates our experiences and options” (Penman, 1992, p. 241)
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 72
(7)
Czubaroff’s “deliberative” advice: Adopt the theory/paradigm that receives the most
credible prima facie case in the fabric of scientific rhetoric. Thus, (1) it identifies a need for a
change, (2) it details a plan to meet the need, and (3) it argues the relative benefits of the
proposed plan. In the matrix of disciplinary debate surrounding competing paradigms, “The
rhetorically astute scientific advocate will take into account four dimensions of the
communication situation. First, the advocate will, as far as possible, respect situational rules
of communication procedure and proof….Second, the rhetorically sensitive scientific
advocate will systematically analyze the dispute….Third, the effective scientific advocate will
distinguish and take into account the goals of the scientific advocacy situation and the goals
of the individual scientific advocates….Finally, the effective scientific advocate will identify
and analyze the audience which is to judge the advocacy” (Czubaroff, 1989, pp. 34-35).
(7)
Alexander & Colomy’s “competitive” advice: “The primary motor of social scientific change is
conflict and competition between and within traditions” (p. 39). “Most schools contain two
or more tradition segments….the longer a school persists the more segments it will create.…
Relations among tradition segments are always competitive, but the competition ranges
from the friendly…to more divisive forms” (pp. 42-43). “Competition is hardly an infallible
mechanism for advancing knowledge. Competition between and within schools is as much a
sociological process as an epistemological one, and the dynamics that propel it can impede
genuine knowledge cumulation. Plainly put, the traditions or tradition segments that win in
the social sciences do not always have the best arguments” (Alexander & Colomy, 1992, p.
44).
(8)
Social constructionist advice: Adopt the theory that meets the following criteria best: “(1)
The theory should be explicitly critical….(2) The theory should recognize that humans are
active agents….(3) The theory should account for the life experiences of the client….(4) The
theory should promote social justice” (Witkin & Gottschalk, 1988, pp. 219-220).
(9)
Power ratio: “The power of a theory can be measured by the amount it explains divided by
the amount that must be assumed for that explanation. A theory that needs to make
hundreds of assumptions Is not much better than a description of what you observe. A
powerful theory is one that can explain lots and lots of observations while hardly making
any assumptions” (Richard Dawkins: interview: San Diego Union-Tribune, Monday, April 20,
2009, p. E-1).
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 73
ELABORATIONS ON
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THEORY EVALUATION
“Some attack methods as pandering to mob psychology (so says Lakatos about Kuhn), some
maintain that their opponents have missed the main point of scientific activity (so says Kuhn
about Popper), some charge that the empirical facts that methods bring forward in support of
their methodological claims are irrelevant (so says Popper about Kuhn), some argue that the
problem of demarcation others pursue is a pseudoproblem (so says Laudan about Popper), and,
finally, some maintain that the whole enterprise of methodology rests on a mistake (so says
Feyerabend)” (Sarkar, 1983, p. 7)
According to Lakatos, “A series of theories is an empirically progressive problem-shift if, and only
if, (1) each subsequent theory contains the unrefuted content of an earlier theory and is itself the
result of adding an auxiliary hypothesis to the previous theory in order to accommodate an
anomaly; (2) some novel consequences are theoretically derived from any member of the series
that could not have been derived from an earlier member; and (3) at least some of these novel
consequences have been empirically tested and found to be corroborated” (Sarkar, 1983, p. 9)
[Note: thus, Popper would view adoption of ad hoc’ed theories as irrational—i.e., pseudoscientific—whereas Lakatos views adoption of ad hoc theories as rational if they are substantively
progressive, p. 11]
“For the dogmatic falsificationist, … empirical counterevidence is the one and only arbiter which
may judge a theory “ (p. 96). “Dogmatic falsificationism, however, is untenable. It rests on two
false assumptions …. The first assumption is that there is a natural, psychological borderline
between theoretical or speculative propositions on the one hand and factual or observational (or
basic) propositions on the other….The second assumption is that if a proposition satisfies the
psychological criterion of being factual or observational (or basic) then it is true; .… These
assumptions are complemented by a demarcation criterion: only those theories are ‘scientific’
which forbid certain observable states of affairs and therefore are factually disprovable. Or, a
theory is ‘scientific’ if it has an empirical basis” (pp. 97-98) “The methodological falsificationist
separates rejection and disproof …. a new demarcation criterion: only those theories—that is non‘observational’ propositions –which forbid certain ‘observable’ states of affairs, and therefore may
be ‘falsified’ and rejected, are ‘scientific’: or, briefly, a theory is ‘scientific’ (or ‘acceptable’) if it has
an empirical basis’….probabilistic theories may qualify now as ‘scientific’ [through the
specification of statistical ‘rejection rules’] (Lakatos, 1970).
“it is not difficult to see at least two crucial characteristics common to both dogmatic and our
methodological falsificationism which are clearly dissonant with the actual history of science: that
(1) a test is—or must be made—a two-cornered fight between theory and experiment so that in
the final confrontation only these two face each other; and (2) the only interesting outcome of
such confrontation is (conclusive) falsification: …However, history of science suggests that (1’)
tests are—at least—three-cornered fights between rival theories and experiment and (2’) some
of the most interesting experiments result, prima facie, in confirmation rather than falsification”
(Lakatos, 1970, p. 115)
“Coherentists stress the need for appropriate types of conceptual linkages between our beliefs,
while correspondentists emphasize the grounding of beliefs in the world….The problem-solving
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 74
model, on the other hand, explicitly acknowledges that both concerns are co-present….the
problem-solving model argues that the elimination of conceptual difficulties is as much
constitutive of progress as increasing empirical support. Indeed, on this model, it is possible that a
change from an empirically well-supported theory to a less well-supported one could be
progressive, provided that the latter resolved significant conceptual difficulties confronting the
former” (Laudan, 1981, p. 147)
The Myth of Confirmation: “The confirmation of theories empirically occurs through its
predictions, which take the form: if H is true, then P is true….But … the observation of the
consequent, P, allows no conclusion about the existence or truth value of H. … The alternative is
to deny the consequent. Again elementary logic tells us that the absence of the consequent, notP, entails the absence of the antecedent, not-H. …Unfortunately, this method produces a
paradoxical result in which all kinds of irrelevant evidence must be accepted as confirmatory. For
example, the claim that all humans have DNA can, on logical (but unreasonable) grounds, be
confirmed by observing things without DNA such as coffee cups, Toyota Corollas, antique
washboards, spandex, and so on, all of which are nonhuman” (Capella, 1997, p. 60)
"We don't know until we try, and then we still won't know. This is, in fact, the whole point of
science, it's simple elegant heuristic: trying and having some 'danger of refutation'"
(McClintock, '85, 169)
"the pathos of science is contained in the disciplined acceptance of findings, however
inconvenient, awkward, embarrassing, or dismaying they may be" (Martindale, '79, 22)
"as long as a concept is vague and beset by many meanings, it remains indestructible"
(Proshansky, '81, 108)
"When the researcher's faith in the theory cannot be shaken by disconfirming data, it is
inappropriate to describe the research strategy as theory testing" (Greenwald et al., '86,
220)
“Data adjudicates theory, but theory also drives and inspires data” (Gould, 1995, p. 149)
“All observation is a partnership between mind and nature, and all good partnerships require
compromise” (Gould, 1995, p. 214).
“It is our job to stay whole, not to be swallowed, in compromise, . . . . We are small, though our
ideas may be powerful. If we merge without maintaining our distinctiveness, we are lost”
(Gould, 1995, p. 234)
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 75
CONDITIONSHIP
“There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened.
The only necessity that exists is logical necessity”
L. Wittgenstein (1961, Tractatus)
“Conditionship” in this usage refers to specification of the type of relationship. In social
sciences, relationships take on many forms, and reveal many potential features. For example, we
often refer to concepts being “positively related,” “negatively related,” “curvilinearly related,” or
merely “significantly different” (e.g., higher or lower than something else). For our immediate
purposes, however, we are interested in the features of “necessity” and “sufficiency.”
Relationships can be necessary, sufficient, both, or neither. A necessary relationship means
that when X occurs, Y necessarily occurs (i.e., Y “must” occur). A sufficient relationship means that
when X occurs, it is sufficient to produce Y (i.e., nothing else is needed for Y to occur). Thus for
example, in examining why a person contracted a disease, one could make arguments such as: (1)
Necessary but not sufficient (“He was exposed to people who were already infected with AIDS”).
In this instance, in order to contract AIDS, a person necessarily has to come into contact with
others, or their bodily substances, that are HIV positive. However, mere exposure does not
always lead to infection, and therefore is not a sufficient cause in every case. (2) Sufficient but not
necessary (“He shot up with an HIV-infected needle”). In this instance, he might have contracted
AIDS any number of other ways (intercourse, blood transfusion, etc.), so no single way is
“necessary.” Any one of these ways, however, is sufficient to cause infection. (3) Necessary and
sufficient (“She hemorrhaged giving birth and had to be given an immediate transfusion, which
turned out to be HIV contaminated blood”). In this instance, a person who under all reasonable
circumstances would never have come into contact with contaminated blood “had” to be so
exposed, and this exposure was sufficient to give her an infection. (4) Neither necessary nor
sufficient (“The dentist got AIDS from working with infected clients”). In this instance, the dentist
could have taken any number of effective precautions, he might have contracted it from any
number of other activities, and so forth.
These concepts can also be useful in the process of defining and distinguishing concepts.
Consider a recent example of such relations by Cupach & Spitzberg (in press): “Although some
authors collapse lust and other elements of sexuality under a more general rubric, lust is
usefully distinguished from sexual arousal (e.g., erect penis, swollen clitoris) and sexual
behavior (e.g., intercourse, oral copulation). The awareness of one’s own physical stimulation
does not necessarily entail desire for sexual union, although arousal can be either a precursor
to or a consequence of lust. One can experience lustful desire without concomitant physical
arousal. Similarly, sexual activity can occur with or without lust. The experience of lust may
motivate sexual activity, or sexual activity may breed lust that leads to further sexual activity.
However, sometimes the lust object does not desire sexual activity with the lustful person and
sexual union is thwarted, which suggests the possibility of unrequited lust.” Now, a question
might arise, is “sexual arousal” necessary for erection? Similarly, Sternberg’s theory of love
claims that “passion” is a necessary component of lust, and a sufficient component of lust only
when unaccompanied by either intimacy or commitment.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 76
Once you master these concepts, they provide powerful parameters for analyzing
theories. The greater the “necessity” implied by the propositions of a theory, the more causal it
tends to be, and the more open the theory is to formal propositional formulation.
The current zeitgeist of the social sciences is that human behavior is rarely motivated in
necessary ways (i.e., we almost never “have to” end up doing one action versus another; we
instead have “choice”). Thus, when theories are referred to as being more “action-based”
theories, the notion of “action” typically implies that “choice” and free will are integral to the
theory. However, once such choice is built into the propositions, they no longer cohere to
traditional deductive formulations.
For example, consider the traditional form of a deductive syllogism: If X, then Y. If Y, then
Z. Therefore, if X, then Z. This syllogism only works if the “if-then” conditions are “necessary.” If
instead, there is only a probability or sufficiency in the “if-then” relations, the conclusion does not
deductively follow: If X, then probably Y. If Y, then probably Z. Therefore, if X, then Z? Maybe,
maybe not. Furthermore, in the context of more “action” based or “pragmatic” theories of
human behavior, the conditionship becomes one of choice-based necessity (which would be
considered an oxymoron by many classical theorists): If I desire X, and I believe Y is an action that
will obtain X, I will choose to perform Y. Such conditional statements represent a “rule-based”
logic of conditionship, and one in which the future can cause the present, rather than locating the
efficient cause in exclusively in the past.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 77
FALSIFICATION VS. VERIFICATION
1. One way of thinking about the difference:
Verification:
If p, then q; p observed; therefore q deduced as true
Falsification:
If p, then q; not q; therefore, p deduced as false
2. Another way: Theories must suggest “counterfactual conditionals” (Meehl, p. 719):
A. e.g., Hooke’s law states that “stress is proportional to strain.” This necessarily implies the
counterfactual conditional that “if strain increases 5 units, and stress does not increase 5
units proportionally, then Hooke’s law is falsified.
B. e.g., Spitzberg: “the perception of a person’s communication competence a probabilistic
function the person’s motivation, knowledge, and skills.” This portrays no necessary
relationship, and instead is based on a probabilistic relationship. It cannot be falsified in a
strict sense, but it can be verified if a statistically significant relationship is found between
competence perceptions and each of the other three variables.
3. Meehl also uses the following illustration:
A. All crows are black:
1. To confirm: Crow1 is black, crow2 is black, etc., therefore, (A) is probably true
2. To disconfirm: Crown is non-black; therefore (A) is false
B. No non-white birds are crows [the logical converse of (A)]:
1. To confirm: Non-white bird1 is a crow, non-white bird2 is a crow, etc., therefore, (B) is
probably true
2. To disconfirm: This parrot is non-white and not a crow, therefore, (B) is false and (A) is
made more probably true?
4. Much of the falsification debate, as suggested in the examples or approaches above, hinge on
the concept of “necessity.” Necessity has to do with the formal requirements of a theory’s
propositions. That is, does a theoretical proposition take a necessary form (e.g., “If X, Y must
occur”), a rule-governed/systemic form (e.g., “If X, Y probably occurs”), or a merely possibility
form (e.g., “If X, Y may occur”). Anything less than a necessary relationship is not likely to be
falsifiable. Furthermore, necessary relationships tend to imply causal relationships, and
thereby entail all the logical and epistemic assumptions that attend such reasoning (e.g.,
reductionism, positivism, etc.).
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 78
SHERMER’S SCIENTIFIC BOUNDARY DETECTION KIT
The “boundary detection kit” is Shermer’s (2001) attempt to provide a basis for differentiating
“normal science” from “borderlands science” (i.e., potential or nascent science) from
“nonscience.” He claims it is best applied by beginning with the following question: “If I were to
ask the holders of the claim if they feel that they and their beliefs were fairly treated, how would
they respond?” (p. 17)
1. “How reliable is the source of the claim?” Do the claimants make mistakes or have their
other claims been shown to be in error?
2. “Does this source often make similar claims?” Do the claimants go beyond the facts of the
case in other domains or on other topics?
3. “Have the claims been verified by another source?” Have experts or scholars outside of the
inner group of claimants made or confirmed similar claims?
4. “How does this fit with what we know about the world and how it works?” How does the
claim fit in the context of current knowledge?
5. “Has anyone, including and especially the claimant, gone out of the way to disprove the
claim, or has only confirmatory evidence been sought?” Has there been a legitimate
consideration or search for disconfirming evidence?
6. “In the absence of clearly defined proof, does the preponderance of evidence converge to
the claimant’s conclusion, or a different one?” Has evidence from a broad variety of
domains been brought to bear on the validity of the claim?
7. “Is the claimant employing the accepted rules of reason and tools of research, or have these
been abandoned in favor of others that lead to the desired conclusion?” Are normatively
accepted methodologies applied, or are the methods exotic or unique to the claim?
8. “Has the claimant provided a different explanation for the observed phenomena, or is it
strictly a process of denying the existing phenomena? Is the explanation an outgrowth of
current or prior explanations, or is it tethered to entirely novel concepts and/or
assumptions?
9. “If the claimant has proffered a new explanation, does it account for as many phenomena as
the old explanation?” Occam’s razor, or the preference for parsimony, asks that when two
explanations account equally for the same phenomena, the simpler explanation is
preferred.
10. Do the claimants’ personal beliefs and biases drive the conclusions, or vice versa?
Adapted from:
Shermer, M. (2001). The borderlands of science: Where science meets nonsense. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 17-25.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 79
DEMARCATION (ALA FUCHS)
“here is a hypothetical list of empirical features that distinguish science from metaphysics and
religion:
1. Religion/non-sciences thrive in mystification; sciences thrive in demystification.
2. Religion & metaphysics look backward; “science looks forward and expects to make
further progress in the future.” (p. 34)
3. Metaphysics prefers its sages; science has little interest in sages or cults of personality.
4. “Religions offer and deliver salvation, not knowledge or expertise. Religions do not do
‘research.’ …. The truth of a religion … is already known…. In sharp contrast, the truth of a
science is in its future, not past. Part of what that which makes a science scientific is, then,
the discarding and overcoming of its past. The past appears as an incomplete version and
prehistory of the present.” (p. 29)
5. Non-sciences generate perspectives toward reality; sciences externalize reality.
6. Non-sciences debate their foundations (i.e., what they are and what they should do),
whereas “science forgets is origins and brackets its foundations or presuppositions.” (p.
34)
7. “A science is organized into specialized research professions making continuous advances
in highly restricted areas of expertise.” (p. 34)
8. “Research is done in more or less circumscribed programs or projects for which function
can be obtained.” (p. 34)
9. “The previous results of a science are the conditions for the current work which generates
future results.” (p. 34)
10. “A science goes to work on relations, not essences.” (p. 34)
11. “At the uncertain and intensely competitive frontiers of a science, rapid discoveries and
innovations are being made. These form the backbone of the reputational structure. High
reputations go to discoverers, not sages, priests, or guardians of traditions.
12. Laboratories and equipment allow a science to perform experiments on a select
arrangement of variables under controlled conditions.
13. A science institutionalizes nonideological modes of observing, or “objectivity.”” (p. 34)
14. “In fact, the truths of science are rather shallow and superficial, as opposed to, say, the
Truth in a metaphysics or religion, which is deeper, more profound, and longer lasting
than mere facts of the matter” (p. 31)
15. “Science cannot even ask the sorts of questions metaphysics or religion ask” (p. 31)
16. “what makes science scientific ultimately is its technical success in bringing about
predictable and observable effects. Science works because it is true, and we know it to be
true since it works” (p. 32)
17. “Religion and metaphysics do not ‘cumulate’ or make ‘advances.’…. What makes a science
scientific then also is its high instrumental and experimental capacity for progress” (p. 33)
Source:
Fuchs, S. (2001). What makes sciences “scientific”? In J. H. Turner (Ed.), Handbook of sociological
theory (pp. 21-35). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 80
GOING REFLEXIVE ON GERGEN
Gergen’s argument tends toward the following structure and logic:
1. Theories are language systems
2. Language systems are symbolic in nature.
3. Symbols are referentially arbitrary (due to indexicality, contextuality, cultural
embeddedness, locality, etc.)
4. Arbitrary referentiality invalidates verificationism and falsificationism, which are
discourses predicated on strict operational assumptions of referentiality among
symbols, operations, practices, and “reality”
5. The social sciences are fundamentally different from physical sciences: The human
action of greatest interest to social scientists is linguistic, and language has no
nonarbitrary (fixed) spatiotemporal referential existence,
6. Language instead operates in locally situated and constructionist forms.
7. Therefore, linguistically liberating, deconstructionist, constructionist, and ethnographic
interpretive methods are appropriately suited to the study of language behavior;
8. In addition, language is constitutive, and scientific discourses operate as privileged and
colonializing discourses, which constrain human action
9. Therefore, social scientific methods should be yoked to a study of the social good
(“Rather than searching for means of cleansing scientific discourse from prescriptive
implication….[scientists] should improve their skills in creating ‘images of the good’
rather than seeking escape” Gergen, “Correspondence versus autonomy” 1986, p. 154).
Among the problems with his psychosis are:
1. The argument fails by its logical inconsistency: it fails to the extent his own use of words
and arguments are presupposed to have generalized argumentative coherence and
credibility—if you believe him, it is because his words in a generalized context had a
generalized impact on a generalized other, which of course, contradicts the
presumption that language cannot work this way.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 81
2. The argument fails empirically:
a. Research indicates that scientific uses of words and symbols employs them in
more constrained ways, such that the words are more ‘indexical’ of specifiable
referents than everyday lay usage (Clark & Paivio, 1989). This demonstrates that
“arbitrariness” is not a dichotomy, but a continuum, and therefore, science as a
practice, can approach nonarbitrariness—it does not have to achieve it in toto in
order to engage it in practice in ways that reveal a substrate of reality. That is,
we can employ language in constrained enough ways so as to get a better
picture of social action—as better telescopes give us better pictures of distant
objects, but never give us “complete” images of these objects.
b. Research indicates that social science is not fundamentally different from the
physical sciences. Meta-analyses of social scientific research demonstrate that its
findings compare favorably, or at least equally, with the ‘hard sciences’ (Hedges,
1987).
c. Research indicates that even laypersons “perceive the world and can label the
world as it is.” Research, for example, demonstrates that people locate colors
on a color wheel closer to color labels prototypical of those colors, even when
linguistically primed to “construct” the colors differently (see Sternberg color
experiments, reviewed by Chow).
3. The argument fails on the presupposition of linguistic and social contextuality: Just
because meanings and behaviors vary by contexts does not mean they are not subject
to lawful explanation and prediction. Again, Darwin’s theory is a theoretical law of
variation across contexts (indeed, because of contexts).
4. The argument fails on ethics: If language is indeed “constructive” and “contextual,” then
the claim that we should be especially disinclined to recommend scientists to improve at
creating “images of the good” (e.g., Oppenheimer vs. Bethe). Either creating images of
the good is just as useless as creating linguistic theoretical accounts (i.e., arbitrariness),
or creating images of the good give scientists undue colonializing constructionist power.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 82
AN ACTION-THEORETIC PARADIGM FOR ASSESSING THE
FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE*
I. A framework for inquiry into and assessment of alternative types of scientific work:
A. Inquiry re: The forms of social science (How does one learn about disciplinary resources?)
1. What are the properties of each form? What is it good for? What is it bad for?
2. How does it relate to other forms? To what extent is it independently variable? What elective
affinities/incompatibilities does it have with forms of other features?
B. Inquiry re: The relationships among different forms
1. Mutually irrelevant (wholly different problem)
2. Cross-cutting (different definitions of the problem)
3. Competitive (similar problem, different solutions)
4. Collaborative (same problem, different parts)
5. Complementary (same problem, different aspects)
6. Architectonic (different tasks, hierarchically or sequentially integrated)
C. Inquiry re: The functions of social science (How does one produce non-alienated social knowledge?)
1. What are the defensible objectives of social scientific inquiry? How are they defended?
2. What are the most appropriate features and forms for each function?
D. The critical assessment of features and forms (How does one identify excellent, decent, wasteful,
alienated, or harmful social science?)
1. Criteria of validity: a) accuracy; b) logical consistency; c) clarity; d) completeness or scope
2. Criteria of significance: a) heuristic value; b) appropriateness to content of inquiry; c)
appropriateness to purpose of inquiry; d) quality of relevant purposes and values
3. Criteria of quality of execution:
a) extent to which forms are properly or elegantly realized
b) extent to which forms remain linked to defensible purposes
II. Toward a critical inventory of the forms of disciplined social knowledge
A. Categorical frameworks (How does one conceptualize the units and organization of social phenomena?)
B. Empirical procedures (How does one make observations?)
1. Unobtrusive-noninduced (direct observation, content analysis)
2. Unobtrusive-induced (questionnaires, concealed experiments)
3. Intrusive-noninduced (participant observation)
4. Intrusive-induced (depth interviews, lab experiment)
D. Explanatory logics (How does one relate sets of variables?)
1. Genetic (explaining Y as a consequence of some antecedent process or event)
2. Compositional (explaining Y as a consequence of the properties of its constitutive elements)
3. Structural (explaining Y as a consequence of its position in a set of ordered relationships)
4. Functional (explaining Y with reference to the needs of X that it fulfills)
E. Epistemic methods (Where does one start, toward what does one move, and how does one proceed?)
F. Interpretations (How does one relate observations of phenomena to notions of what is real?)
1. Ontological: reality is transcendent, appearances are imperfect manifestations thereof
2. Entitative: reality is underlying nature, appearances are secondary derivatives thereof
3. Essentialist: reality is phenomena, properties and causes
4. Existentialist: (reality is phenomenal, socially constructed
G. Epistemic products (How does one organize and present findings?)
*Abstracted and adapted from:
Levine, D. N. (1986). The forms and functions of social knowledge. In D. W. Fiske & R. A. Shweder (Eds.),
Metatheory in social science: Pluralisms and subjectivities (pp. 271-283). Chicago: University of
Chicago.
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 83
IS THEORY USEFUL AND/OR APPLICABLE
The rationale:
The premise of most traditional science is that theory is the essential vehicle of scientific progress,
providing the context and explanation of discovery, application, and understanding. This premise is summarized
pithily by Lewin’s famous dictum: “There is nothing so practical as a good theory.”
Sandelands takes issue with this basic premise, arguing that practicality is a function of understanding, not
explanation. This claim requires the explication of the underlying nature of understanding and explanation as they
apply to practical application.
The distinction:
Explanation is:
Involves knowing “that”
Literal/Linguistic
Intellectual
Generalized
Concerns new ideas
Derivative
Secondary
Abstractive
Analytical
Based on conceptual analysis
Explicable
Linguistically precise
Outcome-oriented
Understanding is:
Involves knowing “how”
Experiential
Behavioral
Particularistic
Concerns existing ideas
Original
Primary
Extractive
Synthetic
Based on behavioral refinement
Inexplicable
Linguistically evocative
Process-oriented
The argument:
I.
Analysis destroys unity and wholeness of the phenomenon (“we murder to dissect”)
II.
Hume: no basis for inferring effects from causes. Causation cannot be explained, only understood (there are
no a priori reasons, only those connections we attribute)
III.
There are always multiple explanations, each of which depends on one’s perspective—seeing presupposes a
perspective—Wittgenstein’s rabbit. (Implication: no one theory can claim exclusive jurisdiction over a
phenomenon)
IV.
The whole is not understandable through parsing, but rather by gestalt (as evidenced by attempts to
“explain” vs. “understand” visual illusions)
V.
Explanation is linguistic, precise, and denotative, rather than evocative
The conclusion:
In general, all knowledge (including explanation) presupposes and begins with understanding (p. 241). Implication:
theory itself is not practical. It is understanding that is practical, not theory.
Conceptual
Analysis
Application
Explanation
Understanding
Paradox?
Is Sandelands trapped by the fact that he is attempting to evoke our understanding through the use of
literal language (i.e., a “theoretical explanation” of the concept of understanding?). If so, is he disproving the utility
of theory by his very theory of theory?
“theory being the knowledge that explains things, and practices being the knowledge that get(s) things done” (p. 235)
“It is one thing to know the rules or laws of social behavior, and another to act according to those rules or laws” (p. 236)
“The reason why explanations cannot lead to understanding is because words denote rather than evoke” (p. 246)
COMM 610 (Spring 2013): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 84
Adapted from: Sandelands, L. E. (1990). What is so practical about theory? Lewin revisited. Journal for the Theory
of Social Behavior, 20, 235-262.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 85
A theory is
‘born’
A theory
matures
e.g.:
A theory is
‘dies’?
e.g.:
Creative nomenclature
Theft
Discovery/
Ingenuity
Loan
Eclectic
Bricolage
e.g.:
Conceptual
heurism
Empirical
heurism
Measurement
proliferation
Contextual
branching
Advisee
Inbreeding
Falsifi-cation
Editorial
gulag
Creative nomenclature
Ennui &
disinterest
Progenitors
die
Continuing theoretical threats and issues:
1. Wobegon effect: We live in a field where (we think? we hope?) all theories are better than average. How do we
ascertain relative or comparative utility of theories or programs of research?
2. There is a general lack of (training in and application of) meta-theoretical reflexivity: formalization, falsification
standards, integration & comparative differentiation, etc.
3. Relative few theories seek to delineate their scope & domain parameters: identifying the contextual parameters of
the theory’s applicability. What are the degrees of incommensurability across research programs?
4. Functional ambivalence: Under what conditions does the theory backfire, under what conditions are the
hypothesized relationships curvilinear, and are such possibilities even envisioned as possible?
5. How can body-snatcher theories (i.e., theories that are merely relabled or massaged reconfigurations of previous
theories) and zombie theories (i.e., theories that just won’t die) be identified (and put to rest)?
6. What is the yardstick of “progress” in a given theoretical arena: (a) progressiveness (Lakatos?), (b) revolution
(Kuhn), (c) elimination of false knowledge claims & theories (Popper), (d) results engineering (Greenwald et al.), (e)
number of publications, or (f) tenure and a regular academic salary?
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 86
A ‘Kuhnian’ View of Paradigmatic Effects
On Perception and Interpretation
(Spitzberg, 2003)
Phenomenal World
Sensation
Perception
Paradigms
Interpretation
Theories
Symbolic
‘Translation’
O
B
S
E
R
V
A
T
I
O
N
Expectations
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 87
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #1
NATURE OF
REALITY &
KNOWLEDGE
KNOWERKNOWN
RELATIONSHIP
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUE
(1) To what extent is
knowledge a priori?
WORLDVIEW I
Knowledge is discovered. It is in no way a
priori.
(2) To what extent is reality
universal?
(3) To what extent is
knowledge explicit?
(4) Where is the locus of
reality?
(5) By what process is
knowledge achieved?
Reality is absolute and immutable, to be
received or discovered.
Knowledge is explicit.
WORLDVIEW II
Part of knowledge is a priori. What we
know emerges from structures that are
part of human existence.
Reality results from human interpretation.
Reality is in flux and …[contextual]
Most knowledge is implicit or tacit.
Reality is in the world, outside the person.
Reality is in personal experience.
Knowledge arises from sensory
experience…. Reality is thus discovered
systematically by controlled observation…
Knowledge is a perceptual process, shaped
by individual … interpretation. Knowledge
is a construction, … a transaction between
knower and known.
Knowledge is constructed by symbolic
interaction…
Humans act with purpose and are therefore
entirely different from non-human objects.
(6) To what extent is
Knowledge is discovered by the observer
knowledge social?
alone.
(7) How are humans different
Humans are basically objects, controlled by
from or the same as
the same features and operations.
nonhuman objects?
STRUCTURE OF
(8) Does knowledge consist of
Reality is best understood via analysis, or
Reality is process [consisting of] relations
REALITY
understanding parts or
knowledge of parts.
and functions…. Its structure is imposed.
wholes?
(9) What is the structure of
Objects in reality have discernible structure Events are part of goal-seeking processes.
reality?
and predictable, machine-like operations.
(10) Why do events happen? Events are caused.
Adapted from: Littlejohn, S.W. (1982). An overview of contributions to human communication theory from other disciplines. In F.E.X. Dance (Ed.),
Human communication theory: Comparative essays (pp. 243-285). New York: Harper & Row.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 88
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #2
A SYSTEMATIZATION OF THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES
SYSTEMS VIEW
REDUCTIONIST VIEW
LEVEL 1: SPECIFICATION
OF MOLAR OR
MOLECULAR PERSPECTIVE
LEVEL 1(a): Specification
of system type
LEVEL 2: SPECIFICATION
OF TYPE(S) OF NECESSITY
OPERATING
Open
Entails logical necessity;
can entail practical,
and/or nomic necessity
Closed
Entails logical necessity;
may result in discovery of
Nomological relationships
Nomic necessity
Practical necessity
LEVEL 3: SPECIFRICATION Various mechanisms may Various models and
Various mechanisms may be postulated for the
OF METCHANISMS
be postulated for the
calculi; various logics
expression of nomic or practical necessity
THROUGH WHICH
expression of all three
NECESSITY OPERATES
types of necessity
Adapted from: Cronen, V. E. & Davis, L. K. (1978). Alternative approaches for the communication theorist: Problems in the laws-rules-systems
trichotomy. Human Communication Research, 4, 120-128.
Note: In response to article by Cushman & Pearce (1977; HCR, 3, pp. 344-353):
 “Nomic necessity depends on locating a causal relationship between two classes of objects. Nomic necessity carries deterministic force.”
 “Logical necessity depends on definitional force and applies to systems of relationships defined as internally consistent.”
 “Practical necessity depends on the type and amount of normative force an actor feels to perform (or not perform) a given activity in a
specified way” (Cushman & Pearce, 1977, p. 345)
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 89
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #3
SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE
Radical Humanism
Radical structuralism
French
Existentialism
S
U
B
J
E
C
T
I
V
E
Mediterranean
Marxism
Russian
social theory
Critical
Theory
Conflict theory
Solipsism
Phenomenology
Hermeneutics
Integrative
theory
Systems
theory
Phenomenological
Sociology
Ethnomethodology
& Ethnography
O
B
J
E
C
T
I
V
E
Objectivism
Interactionism
& social action
theory
Interpretive Sociology
Micro-sociology
& conversation
analysis
Functionalist Sociology
SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION
Adapted from: Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and organizational analysis. Aldershot, England: Gower. p. 29.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 90
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #4
APPROACH
TOWARD
DISTIN-GUISH
SCIENTIFIC
GOOD vs. BAD
DEMARSCIENCE
CATION
SKEPTICISM
No
DEMARCATION Yes
Relativism
Statute
ELITISM
Case
LEGAL ANALOGY
CHARACTERISTICS OF APPROACH
PROGRESSIVE?
SCIENTIFIC
EXEMPLAR
CHANGE
Revolutionary
Progressive
Yes
Yes
Kuhn; Polyani;
Yes
Toulmin
Adapted from Phillips, D. L. (1977). Wittgenstein and scientific knowledge: A sociological perspective. London: Macmillan.
Yes
Revolutionary
Feyerabend
Popper; Lakatos
ELITIST?
Yes
No
Yes
No: ignores past
Yes: consistent
with past
Yes: ignores past
CHANGE IS
‘VIOLENT’?
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #5
CHARACTERISTIC
OBJECTIVE
LOCATION OF OPERATION
COMPONENT ELEMENTS
CRITERIA
MISTAKE ORIENTATION
IDEOLOGY
SCIENTIFIC THEORY
Prescriptive
Descriptive/Explanatory
World of action
World of thought
Values  Axiology
Laws  Explanation/Prediction
Good vs. Bad
True vs. False
Explaining mistakes away or deforming them to be
“Correcting” existing knowledge claims in light of new
consistent with premises
evidence
KEYSTONE EVIDENCE
There is no “fact” that could topple ideology
There are many “facts” that could topple ideology
Adapted from: Martindale, D. (1979). Ideologies, paradigms, and theories. In W. E. Snizek, E. R. Fuhrman, & M. K. Miller (Eds.), Contemporary issues
in theory and research: A metasociological perspective (pp. 7-24). Westport, CT: Greenwood.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 91
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #6
Element
Ontology
Epistemology
Common Methodologies
Paradigm
Constructivism
Multiple local and specific
‘constructed’
[symbolically negotiated]
realities
Realism
Reality is ‘real’ but only
imperfectly &
probabilistically
apprehensible
Positivism
Reality is real and
apprehensible
Modified objectivist:
findings probably true
Objectivist: findings are
true
Subjectivist: findings are
created through
negotiated
interpretations of actors
and observers
Hermeneutic, dialectical,
engagement by
researcher/observer with
the world
Criticism
‘Virtual’ reality shaped by
social, economic, ethnic,
political, cultural, and
gender values, crystallized
over time
Subjectivist: findings are
value-mediated
Case studies, convergent
Experiment, surveys,
Dialogical, dialectical
interviews, triangulation, verification or falsification
engagement by
interpretation of research of hypotheses, primarily
researcher as
by qualitative &
through quantitative
transformative agent of
quantitative methods
methods
change
Adapted from: Healy, M., & Perry, C. (2000). Comprehensive criteria to judge validity and reliability of qualitative research within the realism
paradigm. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 3(3), 118-126.
Note: “Ontology is ‘reality,’ epistemology is the relationship between that reality and the researcher, and methodology is the technique used by
the researcher to investigate that reality; adapted from Perry et al. (1997, p. 547) based on Guba and Lincoln (1994)” (p .119)
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 92
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #7
Type of Philosophical
orientations
Positivism
Type of first-order
sociological theories
Nomological
Type of metatheoretical reflections on sociological theorizing
Purpose
Process
Criterion Products
To discover universal
Methodological
Theoretical accumulation
social laws
codification
Hermeneutics
Interpretive
To understand
Fusion of existential
Enlightenment
intersubjective meanings
horizons
Critical Postmodernism
Normative
To seek social justice
Social praxis
Human emancipation
Postmodernism
Relativistic
To construct local
Deconstruction
Delegitimation
narratives
(decentering, establish
and maintain dialogue,
reject grand narratives
and principle of progress)
Adapted from: Ritzer, G., Zhao, S., & Murphy, J. (2001). Metatheorizing in sociology: The basic parameters and the potential contributions of
postmodernism. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), Handbook of sociological theory (pp. 113-131). New York: Kluwer/Plenum.
.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 93
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #8
Questions:
Sign recognition
Sign interpretation
Traditional
Empiricism
Adequate stimulus
Hard wired
Meaning maker
Site of interpretation
Semiosis
Semiosis engaged
Aurhorial intent
Semiotic product
Interpretation conclusion
Sensory system
Individual
Sensory engagement
Liminal engagement
Directs interpretation
Isomorphic representation
Moment of sensation
Perceptual
Empiricism
Adequate stimulus
Hardware & software
combo
Perceiving subject
Socialized individual
Perceived stimulus
Cognition initiated
Directs interpretation
Perceived representation
Cognitive recognition
Constructive
Empiricism
Difference boundaries
Practical accomplishment
Postmodern
Empiricism
Difference boundaries
Actional accomplishment
Situated subject
Ideological collective
Ideological engagement
Collectively managed
Point of comparison
Positioned interpretation
Enactment of subjectivity
Acting subject
Social action
Action engagement
As initiated as action
As required by action
Contingent interpretation
Enactment of acting
subject
Adapted from: Anderson, J. A. (1996). Communication theory. NY: Guilford, p. 60.
See theory list and levels at: http://www.utwente.nl/cw/theorieenoverzicht/Alphabetic%20list%20of%20theories/
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 94
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #9
UNITS OF ANALYSIS
TIME & CHANGE
TRAIT
Person, psychological
qualities of persons.
Assumes stability; change
infrequent in present
operation; change occurs
according to pre-established
rules.
INTERACTIONAL
Psychological qualities of
person & social or physical
environment treated as
separate underlying entities
with interaction between
parts
Change results from
interaction of separate
person & environment
entities; change often occurs
in accord with underlying
regulatory mechanisms (e.g.,
homeostasis); time & change
not intrinsic to phenomena
ORGANISMIC
Holistic entities composed of
separate person &
environment components,
elements or parts whose
relations & interactions yield
nonsummative qualities of
the whole
TRANSACTIONAL
Holistic entities composed of
“aspects,” not separate parts
or elements; aspects are
mutually defining; temporal
qualities are intrinsic features
of wholes.
Change results from
interaction of person &
environment entities. Change
occurs in accord with
underlying regulatory
mechanisms (e.g.,
homeostasis, equifinality).
Assumes stability & control.
Stability/change are intrinsic
& defining features of human
phenomena; change occurs
continuously; directions of
change are emergent & not
pre-established.
Adapted from: Altman & Rogoff, 1987; Handbook of Environmental Psychology
Selected Goals and Philosophy of Science
CAUSATION
OBSERVERS
OTHER
Emphasizes material causes,
Separate, objective, &
Focus on universal laws of
i.e., cause internal to
detached from phenomena;
functioning according to few
phenomena
equivalent observations by
principles associated with
different observers.
person qualities; study
predictions & trait
manifestations
Emphasizes efficient causes,
Separate, objective, &
Focus on elements &
i.e., antecedent-consequent
detached from phenomena;
relations between elements;
relations, “push” ideas of
equivalent observations by
seeks laws of relations
causation
different observers
between variables & parts of
system; understand system
by prediction & control & by
cumulative additive
information regarding
relations among elements
Emphasizes final causes, i.e.,
Separate, objective, &
Focus on principles that
teleology, “pull” toward ideal detached from phenomena;
govern the whole;
state.
equivalent observations by
emphasizes unity of
different observers.
knowledge, principles of
holistic systems & hierarchy
of subsystems; Identify
principles & laws of whole
system.
Emphasizes formal causes,
Relative: observers are
Focus on event, i.e.,
i.e., description &
aspects of phenomena;
confluence of persons, space,
understanding of patterns,
observers in different
& time; describe &
shapes, & form of
‘locations’ (physical &
understand patterning &
phenomena.
psychological) yield different
form of events; open to
information about
principles but more so in
phenomena.
accounting for event;
pragmatic application of
rules/laws to situations.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 95
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #10
Phenomenal
Operational
STYLES
Naturalistic
Communication Focus:
Primary focus
Experience is:
Meaning is:
Knowledge is:
Prime faculty:
General method:
Methodological ideal:
Ultimate Truth Criterion:
Mode of Argument:
Process/Channel
Things
The experienced
Caused
Discovered
Sensation
Science/Observation
Objectivity
Replication
Falsification
Source/Receiver
Thoughts
The experience
Created
Created
Imagination
Rationality/Logic
Formal perfection
Consistency
Demonstration
Effects
Actions/Rules
Experiencing
Produced
Produced
Emotion
Technology
Practical efficacy
Success
Justification
Necessity:
Reduction style:
Exemplar:
Philosophical exemplar:
Empirical-logical
Causal process
B.F. Skinner?
Newtonian physics?
Practical
Mental creations
Shannon & Weaver?
Mathematical physics?
Practical
Practices
Mead; Garfinkel?
Deweys’ functionalism
DIMENSIONS
Phenomenological
Postmodern?
Message/Feedback
Words
The experienceable
Shared
Articulated
Reason
Hermeneutics
Transcendence
Consensus
Dialogic
communication
Rationality
Language games
Habermas?
Schutz’s
phenomenology
Text?
Meanings?
Experiencing?
Manifold?
Evoked?
Play?
Deconstruction?
Emancipation?
Individuality
Criticism?
*Smith, T. J., III. (1988). Diversity and order in communication theory: The uses of philosophical analysis. Communication Quarterly, 36, 28-40
Intentional?
Empistemes/Memes?
Giddens?
Lyotard; Barthes
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 96
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL DOMAIN: #11
RATIONAL
EMPIRICISM
WHAT COUNTS AS DATA
UNIT OF ANALYSIS
UNIT OF
OBSERVATION
The pure product of
Irrelevant or
cognition
unspecified
Reductionistic, theory
Individual
neutral
MECHANISTIC
EMPIRICISM
Reductionistic, theory
neutral
Individual ‘atoms’
related by oneway causal forces
SKEPTICAL
EMPIRICISM
Reductionistic, but
perceptually distorted
POSITIVISM
Reductionistic:
observations are not
theory-laden
Individual events
manifest in
perception
The smallest
individual unit is
preferred
RATIONALISM
TYPE OF DATA
HOW DO DATA COUNT?
DATA & CAUSATION
DATA & THEORY
Qualitative
Unspecified
Qualitative/no
minal
Data reflect telic forces
manifest in objects
Quantitative,
preferably at
interval or ratio
level
unspecified
Data reflect nomic force
manifest in corpuscles of mass
Quantitative,
preferably
interval or
ratio-level
Qualitative or
quantitative
Data & theory are
isomorphic
Exemplification: data
exemplify logically
necessary relationships
Data accumulate to
create theory
Causation cannot be
unspecified
determined—only associations
among observations
Statistical associations are
Knowledge ‘seepts up’
surrogates for causation
from particular
findings, organized as
covering laws
Statistical associations reflect
Data support or fail to
cognitive processes postulated support
by theorist
Statistical associations may
Data support or fail to
reflect nomic, logical, or
support aspects of
practical forces, and reflexive
theorist’s model.
relations.
CONSTRUCTIVISM Variable, depending on
Individual knower
epistemology invoked by is the basic unit
theory
HUMAN SYSTEMS Holonic, reductionism is
Variety of levels
Quantitative or
rejected. The whole is not and units of
qualitative
assumed to be an
analysis are
aggregation of parts.
employed.
Data are theory-laden.
Adapted from: Dance, F. E. X. (1982). Human communication theory. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 97
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #12
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
INTERACTIONAL
SOCIOLINGUISTICS
CRITICAL DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS
DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGY
ACTION-IMPLICATIVE
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
META-THEORETICAL
APPROACH
Empirical
Interpretive
Critical
Interpretive
Interpretive/critical
THEORETICAL FOCUS
Location and nature of
social structuring
processes
How linguistic action and
sense-making is shaped by
culture
Role of talk/text in
maintaining power
relationships and
accomplishing resistance
Rhetorical and
linguistically constructive
nature of basic
psychological processes
Problems, conversational
techniques, and situated
ideals of communicative
practices
KINDS OF CONTEXTUAL
INFORMATION
Strictly within text
(context = immediately
prior talk)
Interviews with focal
cultural members to check
proposed interpretations
Historical, social, political
conditions at time of text
Description of rhetorical
situation (likely speaker
goals, audience, situation)
Description of rhetorical
situation (gained through
interviews and
observation)
DOMINANT TEXT TYPE
Informal everyday
exchanges
Institutional and
interpersonal exchanges
between culturally
different persons
Public texts (e.g.,
newspapers, radio,
reports), interviews about
social controversies (e.g.,
racism)
Talk situations in which
persons experience
conflict either within self
or with another (e.g.,
couple’s therapy)
Routine institutional
occasions in which actors
experience problems
(interviews with actors
and talk from the
occasion)
Source: Tracy, K. (1995). Action-implicative discourse analysis. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 14, 195-215.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 98
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #13
Seven Traditions of Communication Theory
PHENOMEN- CYBERNETIC SOCIOOLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL
RHETORICAL
SEMIOTIC
Communication
theorized as:
The practical art
of discourse
Intersubjective
mediation by signs
Experience of
otherness;
dialogue
Information
processing
Problems of
communication
theorized as:
Social exigency
requiring
collective
deliberation and
judgment
Art, method,
communicator,
audience,
strategy,
commonplace,
logic, emotion
Misunderstanding
of gap between
subjective
viewpoints
Absence of, or
failure to sustain,
authentic human
relationship
Sign, symbol, icon,
index, meaning,
reference, code,
language, medium,
(mis)understanding
Power of words;
value of informed
judgment;
improvability of
practice
Understanding
requires common
language;
omnipresent
danger of
miscommunication
Meta-discursive
vocabulary such
as:
Plausible when
appeals to
meta-discursive
commonplaces
such as:
SOCIOCULTURAL
CRITICAL
PRAGMATIC
Expression, interaction,
& influence
(Re)production of
social order
Discursive
reflection
Noise; overload;
underload; a
malfunction or
‘bug’ in a system
Situation requiring
manipulation of causes
of behavior to achieve
specified outcomes
Experience, self &
other, dialogue,
genuineness,
supportiveness,
openness
Source, receiver,
signal,
information,
noise, feedback,
redundancy,
network, function
Behavior, variable,
effect, personality,
emotion, perception,
cognition, attitude,
interaction
Conflict;
alienation;
misalignment;
failure of
coordination
Society, structure,
practice, ritual,
rule, socialization,
culture, identity,
co-construction
Hegemonic
ideology;
systematically
distorted speech
situation
Ideology, dialectic,
oppression,
consciousnessraising, resistance,
emancipation
All need human
contact, should
treat others as
persons, respect
differences, seek
common ground
Identity of mind
and brain; value of
information and
logic; complex
systems can be
unpredictable
Communication reflects
personality; beliefs &
feelings bias judgments;
people in groups affect
one another
The individual is a
product of society;
every society has
a distinct culture;
social actions have
unintended
effects
Self-perpetuation
of power &
wealth; values of
freedom, equality
& reason;
discussion
produces
awareness, insight
Naturalness &
rationality of
traditional social
order; objectivity
of science &
technology
Pluralistic
community;
coordination of
practical activities
through discourse &
reflexive activity
Incommensurabiolity,
nonparticipation,
nonreflexivity or
dogmatism, defective
discourse practices
Community,
pluralism,
interdependence,
interests,
consequences, the
real meaning of
anything is the
practical difference it
makes.
We need to
cooperate despite
our differences;
everyone has a view
deserving equal
hearing
Mere words are
Words have
Communication is
Humans and
Humans are rational
Individual agency
Certain truths cannot
Interesting
not actions;
correct meanings
skill; the word is
machines differ;
beings; we know our
& responsibility;
be denied, some
when
appearance is not
& stand for
not the thing;
emotion is not
own minds; we know
absolute identity
differences are too
reality; style is not
thoughts; codes &
facts are objective
logical; linear
what we see
of self;
fundamental to be
challenges
substance;
media
are
neutral
and
values
order
of
cause
&
naturalness
of
the
overcome, there can
meta-discursive
opinion is not
channels
subjective
effect
social order
be no cooperation
commonplaces
truth
with evil or falsehood
such as:
Adapted from: Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication as a field. Communication Theory, 9, 119-161.
Craig, R. T. (2007). Pragmatism in the field of communication theory. Communication Theory, 17, 125-145.MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN:
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 99
#13, cont.
Topoi for Argumentation Across Traditions
RHETORICAL
SEMIOTIC
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
CYBERNETIC
SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL
SOCIOCULTURAL
CRITICAL
PRAGMATISM
RHETORIC
The art of rhetoric
can be learned only
by practice
We do not use
signs; rather they
use us
Langue is a fiction;
meaning &
intersubjectivity
are indeterminate
Rhetoric reflects
traditionalist,
instrumentalist, &
individualist
ideologies
Meaning is not fixed
by a code; it is a site
of social conflict
PHENOMEN-OLOGICAL
Authenticity is a
dangerous myth;
communication
must be artful,
hence strategic
Practical reason
cannot (or should
not) be reduced to
formal calculation
Effects are
situational and
cannot be precisely
predicted
Self & other are
semiotically
determined subject
positions & exist
only in/as signs
Functionalist
explanations ignore
subtleties of sign
systems
Socio-psychological
“effects” are
internal properties
of sign systems
Rhetorical theory is
culture bound &
overemphasizes
individual agency vs.
social structure
Sign systems aren’t
autonomous; they
exist only in the
shared practices of
actual communities
Intersubjectivity is
produced by social
processes that
phenomenology fails
to explain
Cybernetic models
fail to explain how
meaning emerges in
social interaction
Socio-psychological
“laws” are culture
bound & biased by
individualism
Rhetoric relies on
traditional
commonplaces, defeats
reflexivity
All use of signs is
rhetorical
Intervention in
complex systems
involved technical
problems rhetoric
fails to grasp
“Meaning” consists
of functional
relationships within
dynamic information
systems
Phenomenological
“experience” must
occur in the brain as
information
processing
The observer must
be included in the
system, rendering it
indeterminate
Communication
involved circular
causation, not linear
causation
Rhetoric lacks good
empirical evidence that is
persuasive techniques
actually work as intended
SEMIOTICS
Strategic
communication is
inherently
inauthentic & often
counter-productive
Langue-parole &
signifier-signified are
false distinctions.
Languaging
constitutes world
Other’s experience is
not experienced
directly but only as
constituted in ego’s
consciousness
Functionalism fails to
explain meaning as
embodied &
conscious
The subject-object
dichotomy of sociopsychology must be
transcended
SOCIO-CULTURAL
Sociocultural rules,
etc., are contexts &
resources for
rhetorical discourse
Sociocultural rules,
etc., are all systems
of signs
The social life-world
has a
phenomenological
foundation
The functional
organization of any
social system can be
modeled formally
Practical reason is
based in particular
situations, not
universal principles
There is nothing
outside of the text
Critique is immanent
in every authentic
encounter with
tradition
Self-organizing
systems models
account for social
conflict & Change
Sociocultural order is
particular & locally
negotiated but
theory must be
abstract & general
Critical theory
imposes an
interpretive frame,
fails to appreciate
local meanings
Sociocultural theory
privileges consensus
over conflict &
change
CRITICAL
Sociocultural theory is
vague, untestable, ignores
psychological processes
that underlie all social
order
Critical theory confuses
facts & values, imposes a
dogmatic ideology
PRAGMATISM
Lacks specificity of
an art; pluralistc
community is merely
an intellectual ideal
Coordination
depends on a
shared code;
community is
constituted
symbolically
Experience of the
other with an eye to
consequences is not
a genuine experience
of the other
Overestimates
agency,
underestimates
degree to which
determinism of
complex systems can
be captured by
formal models
Pragmatic consequences
are not most usefully
assessed through rigorous
empirical procedures;
“there is nothing so
practical as a good theory”
Overestimates
agency,
underestimates the
influence and
persistence of
cultural patterns and
social structures
Inadequately
accounts for power
relations, systematic
distortion; differences negotiated in
political struggle;
praxis seeks
reclaiming of conflict
AGAINST…
CYBERNETICS
SOCIO-PHYSIOLOGICAL
Adapted from: Craig, R. T. (1999, 2007) [see above]
Semiotics fails to explain
factors that influence the
production &
interpretation of messages
Phenomenological
introspection falsely
assumes self-awareness of
cognitive processes
Cybernetics is too
rationalistic; e.g., it
underestimates the role of
emotion
Socio-psychological
theories have limited
predictive power, even in
laboratory
Individual
consciousness is
socially constituted,
thus ideologically
distorted
Cybernetics reflects
the dominance of
instrumental reason
Socio-psychology
reflects ideologies of
individualism,
instrumentalism
Critical theory is
elitist & without real
influence on social
change
Intersubjective
mediation occurs in
coordinated practical
activities, not through
signs alone;…
Experience of the other
means taking the
perspective of the other
in interaction; I-Thou
depends on Us-Them
“Contingency goes all
the way down” (Russill,
2004, p. 173), …
Given contingency,
consequences for
practical action cannot
be reduced to
predictable effects
Sociocultural theory
underestimates agency
of social actors and
negotiability of cultural
patterns/structures
All normative principles
are contingent; diverse
identities and structural
power differences do
not preclude pluralistic
community
Dilemma of reflexivity:
inquiry, when instituted
(routinized/ritualized) as
social practices becomes
nonreflexive. Paradox of
pluralism: A standpoint
that can take no
particular standpoint
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 100
MAPPING THE META-THEORETICAL TERRAIN: #14
EMPIRICAL:
Privileges observation, measurement, presence, experience
Privileges postmodernism, erasur
REFLEXIVE
FOUNDATIONAL:
Privileges modernism, certainty, causality, closure
Privileges theory, frameworks, concepts, values
ANALYTICAL:
Adapted from: Anderson, J. A., & Baym, G. (2004). Philosophies and philosophic issues in communication, 1995-2004. Journal of
Communication, 54, 589-615.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 101
RELATIONS AMONG PARADIGMS BASED ON INTER-CITATIONS
Los Alamos National Laboratory (http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/mapofscience/)
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 102
http://www.eigenfactor.org/map/maps.htm
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 103
http://scimaps.org/maps/map/illuminated_diagram__134/: The science base map was created using more than 7.5 million papers published in
16,000 separate journals between 2001 and 2005 in Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science and Elsevier’s Scopus databases. Exactly 554
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 104
subdisciplines of science—groups of journals—and their interrelations were identified and placed on the surface of a sphere. The spherical
layout was then flattened using a Mercator projection to create a two-dimensional version of the map. Disciplines are further aggregated into
13 broad disciplines that are color-coded and labeled. Overlaid on this map are five million paper records from MEDLINE published in mostly
biomedical areas between 2000 and 2009 associated with 554 subdisciplines based on the titles of the journals in which they appear.
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 105
•
•
Comprised of 7,121 journals from 2000: each dot is a journal; Journals grouped by discipline; Larger fonts = more major areas of science;
Smaller labels = disciplinary topics of nearby large clusters of journals
Source: http://scimaps.org/static/docs/meeting-doc/06-08-30-slides/data-borner.pdf
COMM 610 (Spring 2012): Advanced Communication Theory: p. 106
http://metamodern.com/2009/05/20/a-map-of-science/
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 107
PARADIGMS
Definition
"In his seminal work on paradigms and scientific revolutions, Kuhn (1970) gave the word 'paradigm' more than 20 different
meanings. For our purposes, ... a paradigm is 'the complete constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, etc., shared by the
members of a scientific community.' We add Morgan's (1980) clarification that a paradigm 'denotes an implicit or explicit view of
reality' and that 'it contains [a discipline's] core assumptions that characterize and define [its] worldview.' (p. 129).
Value of Paradigms
"A discipline, as well as the theory(ies) which constitute a discipline, needs a paradigm for the following reasons:
(1) A paradigm constitutes "the essence" of the discipline.
(2) A paradigm constitutes "the worldview" of its adherents.
(3) Scientists in the discipline use the statement of the paradigm to establish the problems which it has to solve.
(4) The scientific establishment works usually in the direction of the prevailing paradigm, i.e., its rules and procedures are
directed by the currently accepted paradigm...
(5) The paradigm is directly implicated in the design of the instruments, apparatus, and methodologies used to solve the
problems of the discipline...
(6) A paradigm is essential to discover (a) anomalies [unresolved questions inconsistent with paradigmatically predicted
results] ... and (b) 'dilemmas [epistemological or methodological debates pitting disciplinary groups against one another].'
(p. 130)
Level of a Paradigm
"a paradigm must be a 'metatheory' which embodies all the concepts needed to express the ideas of the discipline....It is clear that
a paradigm has to be a metatheory, i.e., a theory that lends direction to other theories. It has to be 'general,' 'universal,' and
'comprehensive' enough to contain all other theories. (p. 131)
Criteria for Paradigm
"A paradigm should help to provide answers to at least the following six fundamental questions.
(1) What are the main sources of knowledge of the discipline?
(2) What constitutes the object of study of the discipline?
(3) What are the main schools of thought underlying the discipline?
(4) What are the main purposes of the discipline?
(5) What are the significant instrumentalities (methodologies) used by the discipline and, by derivation, its main activities?
(6) What are the anomalies and unresolved problems which are facing the discipline?
Source: van Gigch, J. P., & Le Moigne, J. L. (1989). A paradigmatic approach to the discipline of information systems. Behavioral
Science, 34, 128-150.
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PARADIGM CONFLICTS
When deciding among paradigms (in this instance, between qualitative and quantitative), there are several possible strategies
available. Among them are the following:
Type 1: DENIAL: Technically, not a solution, in that it refuses to admit to a conflict. Instead, three denial tactics are available: (1)
Differences among paradigms are more imaginary or thematic than substantive; (2) differences are only due to paradigms
attacking "straw men" ideological positions; (3) the "semanticist response" in which the differences are viewed as linguistic in
nature (see Levine, 1986), and subject to disambiguation.
Type 2: APATHY: Views paradigm conflicts as relatively unimportant to the accomplishment of science, or to individual scholarly
endeavors.
Type 3: SKEPTICISM (RELATIVISM, NIHILISM): Certain knowledge is certainly unknowable (note contradiction).
Type 4: SOLIPSISM: Only personal views of reality matter. Paradigms are arbitrated on the basis of personal relevance or reality.
Type 5: METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN: Differences among paradigms can be resolved through design of specific “crucial”
experiments and studies that will validate one or another paradigm.
Type 6: METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM: Attempt to apply different methodologies to pursue thematic truths or principles (Booth,
as reviewed in Levine, 1986). Compared to DESIGN above, this approach accept multiple methodologies. Compared to
ANARCHISM below, this approach accepts the validity or usefulness of methods but not rhetoric per se.
Type 7: ANARCHISM: Ala Feyerabend's counterinduction, or "anything goes." Similar to Booth's "Polemicist Response" of letting
everyone 'get out there and fight' (see Levine, 1986). The counterinduction occurs in many arenas, including rhetorical, rather
than just methodological.
Type 8: ECLECTICISM: The validity claims of different perspectives all make legitimate claims, and a discipline copes with
differences by integrating and patching over, and patching together, various components; similar to generalizing theoretical
approaches.
Type 9: DOMAIN-BASED CRITERIA: Determine the values to which different paradigms cater, those the researcher concurs, and
select the most appropriate.
Type 10: COMPLEMENTARITY: Differences exist, but will disappear when it is recognized that paradigms are complementary (either
sequentially or processually) in either completing one another or fine-tuning one another.
Type 11: REPLACEMENT/SUBSUMPTION: An attempt to resolve differences between/among extant paradigms by developing a
new, encompassing, synthesizing paradigm.
Type 12: NORMATIVE: Normative practice establishes a pragmatic set of solutions to extant theory.
Adapted liberally from:
Levine, D. N. (1986). In D. W. Fiske & R. A. Shweder (Eds.), Metatheory in social science (pp. 271-284). Chicago: University of
Chicago.
Rossiter, C. M. (1977). Models of paradigmatic change. Communication Quarterly, 25, 69-73.
Schwandt, T. A. (1989). Solutions to the paradigm conflict: Coping with uncertainty. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 17, 379407.
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 109
PARADIGMS & DATA-OBSERVER INTERACTION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
All communication is behavioral (and thus, empirical)
, all communication is observable.
, all communication is potential data.
, all communication is interpretable.
All interpretation is a function of:
a. Sensationperception
b. Beliefstheories
c. Methodology
6. So, can methodology ‘constrain’ interpretation? (We know they can to some degree—
otherwise, we could not demonstrate the existence of perceptual illusions, coordinate
pragmatic features of our world such as language and collective activity, etc.)
7. The question then becomes: Are some methods (or logics) better at constraining
(tethering?):
a. Senses/perceptions
b. Interpretations
c. Theories?
8. Qualitative and quantitative scholars trust their data observations (with understood
limitations), but they differ in the kinds of explanations they offer.
Methodologies
Data
Paradigm
Observer
Biases/
Beliefs
(35) Bostrom, R. N. (2003). Theories, data, and communication research. Communication
Monographs, 70, 275-294.
(36) Pavitt, C. (2004). Theory-data interaction from the standpoint of scientific realism: A
reaction to Bostrom. Communication Monographs, 71, 333-342.
Bostrom, R. N. (2004). Empiricism, paradigms, and data. Communication Monographs, 71,
343-341.
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 110
POSTMODERNISM
I. The Traditional Era (400 B.C. to 1900s A.D.)
A. Rationalism vs. Empiricism
1. Plato vs. Aristotle
2. Descarte, Kant & Hegel
3. Francis Bacon & Inductivism
B. Husserl & Phenomenology
II. The Modern Era (early 1900s to 1960s)
A. The Linguistic Turn
1. Wittgenstein & Language Games
2. Sassure & Structuralism
B. The Relativity Turn
1. Impressionism/Cubism/Abstract Expressionism
2. Jazz
3. Physics, Heisenberg & Schrodinger's Cat
4. New Literary forms (short stories, nonrhyming poetry)
C. The Critical Turn
1. Marxist Critique & the Frankfurt School
2. Feminist Critique
D. The Scientific/Artistic Axis: Despite the revolutions in form, epistemologically most artists and scientists still presumed "a
reality" and the prospect of a transcendent or supraordinate or "grand narrative" perspective from which to judge the
relativity of multiple perspectives
III. The Post-Modern Era
A. Emphasis on the "Local": Reaction against "grand narratives" (e.g., Marxism, Science, a single "privileged" history, etc.)
B. Loss of the Past: We can no longer hold onto our past, as it represents as many different histories as we choose to read
into it
C. Heterogeny of Perspective: fragmentation, a cannibalization of the Past, Being no longer bound by the past, we can
choose to use it (in terms of styles, topics, agendas, etc.)
D. Unfocused Present: "we seem increasingly incapable of fashioning representations of our current experience" (Sarup,
1993, p.181).
E. Replacement of Metaphors: Modernity was characterized by metaphors of time and memory; whereas post-modernity
seems more dominated by the metaphor of space: the alienated masses in the urbanized chaos of space, our everchanging maps of the world, etc.
F. The Myth of Progress: Marxism claimed progress through ideology; post-modernity claims the impossibility of progress in
any "real" sense
G. Knowledge as Primary Force of Production: Art and knowledge as impression vs. expression; knowledge as
conformity/power vs. liberation; knowledge as progression vs. creation; knowledge through mind vs.
body/subconscious
IV. Whence "Truth"?
A. Does Post-Modernism deny Truth? Most interpreters argue "no," since truth can be (1) local, and (2) there, but not
knowable from any grand narrative scheme
B. Truth may become existential, in the sense that everyone has their own truths, which can sometimes be evoked in larger
groups, in ways that enrich our experience
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 111
IS IT PAST POST-TIME FOR POST-MODERNISM?
Brian H. Spitzberg, Ph.D.
School of Communication, S.D.S.U.
Interpersonal Communication Theory Panel
W.S.C.A., Mesa, AZ, February 2009
The fact that you are here in this place at this time is prima facie evidence that abstract concepts
are capable of communication, and that communication pragmatically is capable of coordinating our
actions in regard to spatio-temporal referents.
The evolving criticisms of critical/interpretive spokespersons, such as Gergen, to a lesser extent,
Anderson and Craig, and those inappropriately attributed to scholars such as Kuhn, is that hypotheticodeductive approaches are fundamentally flawed because: (a) the realm of human experience is too
subtle and rich to be reduced to causal hypotheses or the methods employed to measure, test, and
represent such experience; and (b) reality is socially constructed, and therefore, the scientific
methodology is tautologically corrupted by the theory-dependence of the observational process. Both of
these lines of attack are themselves ill-informed and flawed.
First, the claim is that human experience, unlike physical or biological domains, is an actional
realm, characterized by intention and choice, and therefore, abeyant to a teleological form of causation
rather than traditional Aristotelian forms of causal determination. For the future to cause the present is
assumed to vitiate traditional axiomatic forms of theory construction and validation due to the inherent
break in the causal chain between past and present. There are several problems with this criticism,
including:

Just because we have not yet found human experience to be highly predictable is not proof that
it is not predictable (and some programs of research are revealing certain human experiences to
be highly predictable);

Many presumptively actional phenomena may possess far more tangible spatio-temporal and
tangible existence; e.g., Fisher/Aron: passionate love in fMRI scans
Second, the claim is made that the socially constructed nature of knowledge infects the research
process in ways that invalidate the ability to claim “objective” or “externally validated” observations in
test of our theoretical conjectures. This line of criticism is also fundamentally flawed:

First, such a claim is self-reflectively invalidating, in that it claims that all claims are subject to
subjectivity, and therefore there is theory-free reference point against which the validity of this
criticism may be evaluated. By opening all knowledge claims to linguistic relativism, no one
argument is any more valid than another, and therefore, an argument claiming the invalidity of
scientific epistemologies is equally refuted by any reasoned response;

Second, the very evidence often adduced to support the linguistic and theoretical biases of
knowledge often rely upon the very scientific method being critiqued as invalid;

Third, research on cognitive psychology (e.g., color experiments) demonstrates that we actually
largely perceive the same world, independent of beliefs. We are able, and may be inclined, to
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 112
elaborate belief-consistent explanations, but the data of experience themselves are not
particularly sensitive to preexisting beliefs or theories, much less, language;

Fourth, the process of scientific and methodological rigor and procedure was formulated a priori
to any particular theoretical commitments, so the epistemology is independent of the theories
that seek to be confirmed or infirmed by its application;

Fifth, scientific debates often occur within paradigms, indicating that differences can be argued
over data despite sharing a common cultural, linguistic, and even general theoretical
foundation;

Sixth, the auxiliary hypotheses employed to manage the fallout of experiments are themselves
subject to rigorous experiment, test, observation, and evidence, so that no part of the process is
arbitrary;

Seventh, to argue the linguistic/cultural relativity of perception is to require allusion to evidence
of such. Such allusion presupposes the ability of data to provide ‘objective’ evidence in claims of
rhetorically-constructed knowledge, which is a self-contradictory claim;

Eighth, scientific observation is only theoretically tautological
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 113
Selected Recommended Sources
Bostrom, R. N. (2003). Theories, data, and communication research. Communication Monographs, 70,
275-294.
Bostrom, R. N. (2004). Empiricism, paradigms, and data. Communication Monographs, 71, 343-341.
Charland, M. (2003). The incommensurability thesis and the status of knowledge. Philosophy and
Rhetoric, 36, 248-263.
Chow, S. L. (1992). Acceptance of a theory: Justification or rhetoric? Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour, 22, 447-474.
Fuchs, S. (2001). What makes sciences “scientific”? In J. H. Turner (Ed.), Handbook of sociological theory
(pp. 21-35). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum.
Gilman, D. (1992). What's a theory to do...with seeing? or some empirical considerations for observation
and theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43, 287-309.
Greenwald, A. G., Pratkanis, A. R., Leippe, M. R., & Baumgardner, M. H. (1986). Under what conditions
does theory obstruct research progress? Psychological Review, 93, 216-229.
Irzik, G., & Grünberg, T. (1995). Carnap and Kuhn: Arch enemies or close allies? British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 46, 285-307.
Jost, J. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2002). The estrangement of social constructionism and experimental
social psychology: History of the rift and prospects for reconciliation. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 6, 168-187.
Koutougos, A. (1989). Research programmes and paradigms as dialogue structures. In K. Gavroglu, Y.
Goudaroulis, & P. Nicolacopoulos (Eds.), Imre Lakatos and theories of scientific change (Vol. 111,
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 361-374). Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Krueger, J. I. (2002). Postmodern parlor games. American Psychologist, 57, 461-462.
Laudan, L., Donovan, A., Laudan, R., Barker, P., Brown, H., Leplin, J., Thagard, P., & Wykstra, S. (1986).
Scientific change: Philosophical models and historical research. Synthese, 69, 141-223.
Martindale, D. (1979). Ideologies, paradigms, and theories. In W. E. Snizek, E. R. Fuhrman, & M. K. Miller
(Eds.), Contemporary issues in theory and research: A metasociological perspective (pp. 7-24).
Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Mayo, D. G. (1996). Ducks, rabbits, and normal science: Recasting the Kuhn’s-eye view of Popper’s
demarcation of science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 271-290.
Pavitt, C. (2004). Theory-data interaction from the standpoint of scientific realism: A reaction to
Bostrom. Communication Monographs, 71, 333-342.
Popper, K. (1980). Science: Conjectures and refutations. In E. D. Klemke, R. Hollinger, & A. D. Kline (Eds.),
Introductory readings in the philosophy of science (pp. 19-34). Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
Spitzberg, B. H. (2000). On defining and evaluating theory. Abstracted and adapted from: Spitzberg, B. H.
(2001). The status of attribution theory qua theory in personal relationships. In V. Manusov & J.
H. Harvey (Eds.), Attribution, communication behavior, and close relationships (pp. 353-371).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Turner, J. H. (1985). In defense of positivism. Sociological Theory, 3, 24-30.
Turner, J. H. (1990). The misuse and use of metatheory. Sociological Forum, 5, 37-53.
Wallach, L., & Wallach, M. A. (1994). Gergen versus the mainstream: Are hypotheses in social
psychology subject to empirical test? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 233-242.
Wallach, L., & Wallach, M. A. (1994). Gergen versus the mainstream: Are hypotheses in social
psychology subject to empirical test? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 233-242.
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 114
SCIENCE AS A GAME
(ala Spitzberg, 2009)
I.
II.
Context: Framing the Game
A. The field as multi-paradigmatic (sans dominant grand unifying theories)
B. The search for synthesis
The Meaning(s) of the Metaphor
A. The nature of games:
1. Rationality: A presumption that strategic play can render optimal outcomes
2. Agents: “An individual agent is called a player (or sometimes, an “actor”). The
player exercises human intelligence, assessing “his” party’s situation, selecting
from the available courses of action and committing his party [which may be
himself] to this selection” (p. 86) parties (“something with a unitary interest to
promote,” Goffman, 1969, p. 86)
3. Tokens: “An individual may function as a token, that is, a means of expressing and
marking openly a position that has been taken” (p. 87)
4. Moves: a choice, enacted or performed as a tactical selection; “A move,
analytically speaking, is not a thought or decision or expression, or anything else
that goes on in the mind of a player; it is a course of action” p. 90)
5. Utility function: the “ordering, weak or strong, of aims and goals” of an agent or
actor (p. 91)
6. Normative constraints, whether imposed externally or self-imposed
7. Style of play: a characteristic, or predictable, pattern of moves
8. Information state: “the knowledge the opponent may possess about the important
features of his own situation” and the other players or agents (p. 95)
9. Consensual rules & repertoires of moves/tactics
10. Motives can often be inferred by moves, but they are not isomorphic; further,
both/either ends and means can be valued
11. Both self and audience, and front-stage and back-stage, perspectives are
considered
12. The game can sometimes be gamed (“Another important attribute of players is
their integrity, that is, the strength of their propensity to remain loyal to a party
once they have agreed to play for it, and not to instigate courses of action on
behalf of some other party’s interests, notably their own” p. 97)
13. Strategic interaction: “Two or more parties must find themselves in a wellstructured situation of mutual impingement where each party must make a move
and where every possible move carries fateful implications for all of the parties. In
this situation, each player must influence his own decision by knowing that the
other players are likely to try to dope out his decision in advance, and may even
appreciate that he knows this is likely. Courses of action or moves will then be
made in light of one’s thoughts about the others’ thoughts about oneself. An
exchange of moves made on the basis of this kind of orientation to self and others
can be called strategic interaction” p. 101)
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B. The game of scholarship
1. The Main Objective: Sustain an engaging living
2. The Field of Play: The “discipline” and “profession”
3. The Official Rules: get Ph.D., get good letters, good position, publications, grants,
tenure, a 2-day-a-week schedule and an office with a window
4. The Moves: papers, publications, publications, committees, visibility
5. The Players: the taxpayers, high-level administrators (trustees, presidents, etc.),
mid-level administrators (e.g., V.P., Deans, etc.), low-level administrators (e.g.,
Chairs, committees, etc.).
C. Possible Strategies:
1. Path of least resistance (i.e., get tenure, then rest on laurels)
2. Maximum visibility (quantity and self-promotion)
3. Stealth: (i.e., good “worker bee” or “flying under the radar”)
4. Administrative aspirations: seeking money and power
III.
Possible Points & Paradoxes:
A. Theories, studies, and publications may not be a search for truth as much as a search
for status
B. Just because a game may not be “about seeking truth” doesn’t mean that truth may
not be a likely by-product of the process
C. Games evolve, but generally only in ways that largely preserve the “traditions” (and
therefore resist radical change—lest the game itself cease to exist)
D. The “culture of committee meetings” is analogous to the coach’s meetings, league
meetings, etc., through which the “business” of the game is sustained and promoted
“truth’s ultimate unattainability does not necessarily negate the value of truth as a regulating
ideal for science…In other words, truth as a product of the scientific process is different
from truth as a regulating ideal that may guide epistemic activity. … Donald Campbell (1994)
… [argued] that ‘the world as it is’ is a ‘co-selector’ of consensual beliefs among scientists”
(Jost & Kruglanski, 2002, p. 173)
We may not have any philosophically assured epistemology to render access to the truth.
However, playing the game as if we do may have the effect of moving us closer to the truth.
In this sense, therefore, that Kuhn (1969) rejects the charge that he is a relativist: “Scientific
development is… a unidirectional and irreversible process. Later scientific theories are
better than earlier ones for solving puzzles…that is not a relativist’s position, and it displays
the sense in which I am a convinced believer in scientific progress” (p. 169)
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 116
“An appropriately programmed perceptual mechanism has survival value” (Kuhn, Structure, p.
161). “The world is not invented or constructed…. Creatures born into it must take it as they
find it” (Kuhn, Road since…, p. 101). “Insofar as the structure of the world can be
experienced and the experience communicated, it is constrained by the structure of the
lexicon of the community which inhabits it” (Kuhn, Road since…, p. 101). “The essential
function of the concept of truth is to require choice between acceptance and rejection of a
statement or a theory in the face of evidence shared by all” (Kuhn, Road since …, p. 99).
“Producing knowledge capable of claiming scientific legitimacy involves certain obligations and
rights on the part of the researcher It is a question of playing the game of science, observing
– and being seen to observe – its procedural rules and committing to its norms. Once these
obligations are fulfilled, the social scientist can lay claim to the rights of procedural or
formal, though not substantive, consensus: he/she deserves to be listened to because
he/she has played the game” (Hynes et al., 2011, p. 298).
A few sources:
Barash, D. P. (2003). The survival game: How game theory explains the biology of cooperation
and competition. New York, NY: Henry Holt.
Brumback, R. A. (2009). Impact factor wars: Episode V—The empire strikes back. Journal Of
Child Neurology, 24(3), 260-262. doi:10.1177/0883073808331366
Coren, S. (1982). The game of academe. Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 23(2),
97-101. doi:10.1037/h0081249
Fejes, A., Johansson, K., & Dahlgren, M. (2005). Learning to play the seminar game: Students'
initial encounters with a basic working form in higher education. Teaching In Higher
Education, 10(1), 29-41. doi:10.1080/1356251052000305516
Goffman, E. (1969). Strategic interaction. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Hynes, M., Sharpe, S., & Greig, A. (2011). Appearing true in the social sciences: Reflections on
an academic hoax. Journal of Sociology, 48, 287-303.
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 117
Source: Brumback (2009)
Source: Coren (1982)
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 118
A SELECTED QUANDARY OF THEORETICAL ISSUES
PARADIGMS
The Nature of Paradigms:
Paradigms consist of a (1) creative aspect (hypothesis generation) and (2) critical aspect (hypothesis testing)
(McGuire, '73, 447)
“Paradigms organize theories, which organize science, which validates theories, which justifies paradigms”
(Spitzberg, 2002)
"Within the confines of a given paradigm an inquirer decides (a) how to conceptualize and stipulate a
problem, (b) whether to use a substantive theory (and which one) to guide the investigation, (c)
what will be admitted as data..., and (e) what criteria will be applied to judge the integrity of the
approach to and solution of the problem" (Schwandt, '89, 390)
Differences between ideology and scientific theory:
(1) Objective: prescription vs. description/explanation
(2) Location of operation: action vs. thought
(3) Components: values/axiology vs. laws/explanation
(4) Criteria: good/bad vs. true/false (Martindale, '79, 8)
["All social science is ideology" (Martindale, '79, 10)]
"I think science--both 'normal science' and 'revolutionary, paradigm-replacing science"--differs from less
promising, non-cumulative, and personalistic enterprises like politics, psychotherapy, folklore,
ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics, and theology in part because of its skeptical insistence on reliable
(intersubjective, replicable) protocols that describe observations" (Meehl, '78, 813)
Four Paradigms (McKeon, elaborated by Smith, '88):
(1) phenomenal: laws, positivism, empirical necessity
(2) operational: operationalism, sophists, logical necessity
(3) naturalistic: p
(4) phenomenological: phenomenology, practical necessity
Four Paradigms (Phillipson, '72):
(1) Behaviorist: Actor-impulses, Order-balance, Form-laws
(2) Functionalist: Actor-needs, Order-system maintenance, Form-Pattern
(3) Voluntarist: Actor-interests, Order-domination/compromise, Form-projects
Four Paradigms (Altman & Rogoff, '87):
(1) Trait: individual units, material causes, separate observers
(2) Interactional: person X env. units, efficient causes, separate observers
(3) Oganismic: holistic units, final causes, separate observers
(4) Transactional: holistic units with aspects, formal causes, observers are phenomena
Making factual generalizations about similar phenomena not encompassed by the observations constitutes
science; drawing factual or aesthetic/value conclusions about the observed phenomena constitutes
rhetoric (Miller, '75, 232-3)
“Viewing theories as affective and morally charge[d] symbolic frameworks of world order, suggests that it is,
in part, a theory’s capacity to secure nonlogical commitments that account for the crystallization of
a school. Moreover, a school functions then not simply as a vehicle of collective reason but as a
form of moral community” (Seidman, 1987-88, p.134)
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Coping With Multiple Paradigms:
Multiple levels of explanation are required, given that explanation should be "pitched" at the level of the
phenomenon (Cronen & Davis, '78; McDermott, '75)
Strategies to resolve paradigm conflict:
(1) denial: differences are thematic-not paradigmatic
(2) co-optation: paradigms are complementary
(3) supremacy: decisive test
(4) replacement: synthesis or dialectic new paradigm
(5) primacy of method: use method, not theory
(6) anarchism: pluralism (Schwandt, '89)
"The choice of one paradigm over another is not subject to empirical proof, for each carries its own criteria
of acceptability" (Krippendorf, '84, 24; see also Smith, '88)
"... in science ... it is often difficult to separate what is extremely radical from what is pathological."
(J. B. Cohen)
"In effect, some of the greatest conceptual strides are to be made when the theorist can bracket the
accepted realities and fumble toward the articulation of the absurd."
(Gergen, 1986, p.157)
"What appears from the outside like a faith, a fiction, or a fantasy comes to feel from the inside like a
rational enterprise."
(R. A. Shweder)
THE NATURE OF EXPLANATION
Types of explanation: causal vs. teleological (McDermott, '75)
Types of generality: syntactical & domain (Cushman & Pearce, '77)
Types of necessity: nomic, logical, practical (Cushman & Pearce, '77; Cronen & Davis, '78)
Generality reduces to generality (Cronen & Davis, '78)
Forms of Conditionship:
1. Reversible or irreversible (if X, then Y and if Y then X; vs. if X, then Y, but if Y, then ?)
2. Deterministic of stochastic (if X, then always Y; vs. if X then probably Y)
3. Sequential or coextensive (if X, then later Y; vs. if X then also Y)
4. Sufficient or contingent (if X, then Y regardless; vs. if X then Y but only if Z)
5. Necessary or substitutable (if X, and only if X, then Y; vs. if X, then Y, but if Z, then also Y)
(Zetterberg, in McDermott, p.90)
"To the extent that the mind furnishes the categories of understanding, there are no real-world objects of
study other than those inherent within the mental makeup of persons. There are no objects save
those for which there are preceding categories.... in the act of comprehension, object and concept
are one; objects reduce to the mental a priori." (Gergen, 1976, P. 141).
“The success of theoretical explanations is the success of science itself.” (Mos & Boodt, 1990, p. 75)
“Not every guess is a hypothesis and not every hypothesis can be denominated a theory” (Mos & Boodt,
1990, p. 82)
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 120
PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES
CONCEPTUAL:
The "Self-Reflective Systems" Paradox:
Language is both object and instrument of theory construction (McDermott, '75)
"It is therefore a characteristic of systems involving their observers that they develop their own definition of
the very system in which the observers participate" (Krippendorf, '84, 33)
Scientific discovery feeds back into the system it is studying, thereby altering it (McClintock, '85, 164)
Theory can become a self-fulfilling prophecy (McClintock, '85, 164)
The Induction/Deduction Dilemma:
Induction ultimately involves deduction (McDermott, '75)
"Induction ... is a myth. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific
procedure" (Popper, '80, 27)
"Only the falsity of the theory can be inferred from empirical evidence, and this inference is a purely
deductive one" (Popper, '80, 29)
"No rule can ever guarantee that a generalization inferred from true observations, however often repeated,
is true.... And the success of science is not based upon rules of induction, but depends upon luck,
ingenuity, and the purely deductive rules of critical argument" (Popper, '80, 27)
Inductiondiscover and deductionjustification, but not vice versa (McDermott, '75)
"No scientific theory can ever be deduced from observation statements, or be described as a truth-function
of observation statements" (Popper, '80, 25-6)
The Heisenberg Dilemma:
Heisenberg Principle: the process of measurement changes the nature of the phenomenon (thus rendering
exact knowledge impossible) (McClintock, '85, 160)
Precision and generalization are mutually exclusive (Blalock, '79, 125)
The Complexity/Validity Conundrum:
A complex theory is required to know what constructs to eliminate to achieve parsimony, yet complexity
must be generated from simpler models (Blalock, '79, 134)
"We may not be able to explain our own cognitive functioning if it turns out to be more complex than the
cognitive capability we possess to explain it. And the same obtains for explaining our social
behaviors" (McClintock, '85, 163)
“In his romantic paean The Tables Turned, William Wordsworth wrote: ‘Sweet is the lore which nature
brings; Our meddling intellect Misshapes the beauteous form of things: We murder to dissect’”
(Gould, 1985, p.377)
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The Practicality of Theory:
“...one is left to wonder if theory is more practical than other narrative forms such as poetry, essays, or
major works of fiction. Certainly, these too are important contexts of thinking and full of ideas that
potentially relate to practice in the same way. It is not established and probably naive to insist that
theory enjoys priority over these other narrative forms in deserving the appellation ‘practical’”
(Sandelands, 1990, p. 258).
“. . . all exciting science must be obsolescent from inception . . .” (Gould, 1995, p. 373).
“My suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose”
(J. B. S. Haldane, quoted by Gould, 1995, p. 387, emphasis added)
“Theory-free science makes about as much sense as value-free politics” (Gould, 1995, p. 419)
METHODOLOGICAL:
Methodological Myopia:
"available research designs, methods, and measurement techniques are singularly instrumental in
determining just how social problem questions will be asked and answered." (Proshansky, '81, 128)
"the nature and significance of theoretical endeavors in the behavioral sciences...is inextricably rooted in
the empirical strategies and methodological orientations that define the research process in these
fields of inquiry" (Proshansky, '81, 101)
“All methods are in the pursuit of truth, and that goal is not achieved by ignoring contributions from certain
methods” (Lieberson, 1992, p.3)
The Ineffability of the Real:
"Measurement problems are solved at the expense of generalizability" (Blalock, '79, 130)
"The phenomenal integrity of human behavior and experience is lost in the fundamental requirement of the
approach that theoretical formulations must be cast in terms that directly allow derived concepts
and propositions to be objectively defined and thereby made operationally precise" (Proshansky,
'81, 104)
The Complexity of Complexity:
The more complex the theory, the more impossible it is to ascertain which part needs refinement
(McClintock, '85, 165)
The more complex the theory, the more alternative models that can be constructed employing the same
components (McClintock, '85, 171)
"any single behavioral event is almost by definition subject to multiple interpretations by an external
observer" (McClintock, '85, 163)
Popper’s Paradox:
“Notoriously, ... Popper is quite explicit that good theories are bold and therefore likely to be false”
(Papineau, 1989, p. 432).
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Falsifying Falsification:
Falsifiability is a partial function of:
(1) precision,
(2) specification of conditions under which predictions are expected to hold, [see also Meehl, '78,
818]
(3) and extent to which measurement is as accurate as variations in prediction relative to
theoretical rivals (Blalock, '79, 123; see also Greenwald et al., '86 re: condition-seeking as a form of
verification)
The Disconfirmation Dilemma: nonconfirming results allow attribution of failure to (1) inferences from
theory to prediction, (2) procedure development, (3) data analysis & testing (Greenwald et al.,
1986; see also Blalock, '79, 126; Proshansky, '81, 116)
PEARLS OF WISDOM
Ethnocentrism:
“The famous statement by Freud . . .: The most important scientific revolutions all include, as their only
common feature, the dethronement of human arrogance from one pedestal after another of previous
convictions about our centrality in the cosmos.” (Gould, 1995, p. 164-165).
The Nature of Theory:
"whereas the statement of 'facts' can be judged true or false, ... this criterion of truth cannot help to
determine which of an infinite number of true facts to include or exclude from any explanation.
And it is the very important role of theories or models to limit our search for explanation to some
realizable number of facts" (McClintock, '85, 158)
"Still the most satisfactory way of appraising the status...of any science, is in terms of an inventory of its
theories" (Martindale, '79, 19)
"All human research...involves conceptions, assumptions, and other generalizations about people, what
they are like, how they behave, and how they think and feel" (Proshansky, '81, 105)
"Historically speaking all--or very nearly all--scientific theories originate from myths..." (Popper, '80, 24)
The Nature of Meta-Theory:
“The goal is to use theories to build better ones, not to become sociological monks copying and reciting
passages from the sacred texts” (Turner, 1990, p.44).
The Nature of Science:
"The ordinary conception of the scientific method is false; it is actually a form of illustration. Science does
not progress--at least not in a linear sense--but undergoes periodic convulsive revolutions as one
noncomparable faith replaces another" (Martindale, '79, 14)
"Science is corrosive of all values which are based exclusively on simple epistemological processes"
(McClintock, '85, 162)
"In view of all the violent forces against it, scientific objectivity, when it is in fact realized, may be seen to
have many of the characteristics of the moment of calm at the eye of a hurricane" (Martindale, '79,
12)
"every scientist has a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo" (Cohen, '85, 18)
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"science is an exceptional enterprise in that revolutionary activity has been institutionalized" (Cohen, '85,
19)
"In human affairs there is no major achievement without passion" (Martindale, '79, 10)
"Passionate interest in a particular outcome can create selective perception and distorted interpretation
such that one sees only evidence and argument for his/her cause. But only a scoundrel will
manufacture evidence" (Martindale, '79, 10)
"some of the greatest strides are to be made when the theorist can bracket the accepted realities and
fumble toward the articulation of the absurd." (Gergen, 1976, p. 157)
Paradox and Reflexivity:
“Bohr has written, ‘There are trivial truths and great truths. The opposite of a trivial truth is plainly false. The
opposite of a great truth is also true.’” (McGuire, 1973, p.455)
“It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. … We feel that even when all possible
scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course
there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.” (L. Wittgenstein, 1961, Tractatus, 6.52)
“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is
mystical.” (L. Wittgenstein, 1961, Tractatus, 6.522)
Misc.
"We must openly accept all ideologies and systems as means of solving humanity's problems. One country,
one nation, one ideology, one system is not sufficient."
Dalai Lama
"The point of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with
something so paradoxical that no one will believe it."
Betrand Russel
"The ability to simplify means to eliminate the unnecessary so that the necessary may speak."
Hans Hoffman
"Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one."
Albert Einstein
"There are two ways to slide easily through life; to believe everything or to doubt everything. Both ways
save us from thinking."
Alfred Korzybski
"The invariable mark of wisdom is to see the miraculous in the common."
Ralph Waldo Emerson
The Statement Below is True:
The Statement In This Box is False
So is The Statement Above This One!
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BRAIN TEASERS & WHEEZERS
“We live within the words of language, the shapes of poetry and plastic art, the structure of music, the
framework of religious representation and religious beliefs. And it is only within these [media] that we
‘know’ each other. This intuitive knowledge does not yet have the character of ‘science’” (Cassirer, 1961,
p. 143).
“When it raises itself to the knowledge of universal laws for which there is no difference between the
near and the distant, natural science becomes master of the distant. … This form of universality is closed
to the science of culture. It cannot renounce anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism. … Its goal is not
the universality of laws; but neither is it the individuality of facts and phenomena. In contrast to both, it
sets up an ideal of knowledge of its own. What it seeks to realize is the totality of the forms in which
human life is realized.” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 144)
“This fundamental idea of modern [scientific] research found its decisive philosophical legitimation in
Descartes’ concept of mathesis universalis. The cosmos of universal mathematics, the cosmos of order
and measure, comprehends and exhausts all knowledge. … That this fundamental idea of classical
philosophical rationalism not only fertilized and extended science, but that it gave to science a wholly
new meaning and goal… The development of systems of philosophy from Descartes to Malebranche and
Spinoza, and from Spinoza to Leibniz affords unbroken evidence of this.” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 49)
“[According to Vico] Hence the unavoidable alternative which our knowledge faces: it can orient itself
toward the real, but in this case it can never completely penetrate its object, but describes it instead
only piecemeal and empirically, with respect to particular properties and characteristics; or it can
achieve complete insight, an adequate idea, which constitutes the nature and essence of the object, but
then knowledge never leaves the sphere of its own concept formation.” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 53)
“with the resources peculiarly its own, language is not able to generate scientific knowledge, or even to
arrive at it. Nevertheless, it is an indispensable stage on the way to it; it constitutes the only medium in
which the knowledge of things can arise and progressively develop.” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 58)
“Each of the humanistic disciplines develops determinate concepts of form and style and uses them in
arriving at a systematic survey, a classification and differentiation of the phenomena with which it
concerns itself. These concepts of form are neither ‘nomothetic’ nor ‘idiographic.’ They are not
nomothetic for their function is not to establish general laws from which the individual phenomena can
be deductively inferred. But neither do they admit of being reduced to historical inquiry.” (Cassirer,
1961, p. 120)
“We understand a science in its logical structure only when we have arrived at clarity as to the manner
in which it achieves the subsumption of the particular under the universal. But in solving this problem we
must be on our guard against a one-sided formalism. For there is no general schema which we may refer
to or invoke. This problem is common to all the sciences; but its solution leads in many directions.”
(Cassirer, 1961, p. 135)
“‘the particular’ says Goethe, ‘is always more than a match for the universal; the universal always has to
accommodate itself to the particular.’” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 135)
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“A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a possible mode
of signifying. And that is generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case turns out to be
unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the
world” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 3.3421)
“The artist, the scientist, the founder of a religion, are able to perform truly great achievements only if
they abandon themselves completely to their work, if they neglect their own being for it. But, as soon as
it finally stands before its creator, the finished product is never simply a thing of satisfaction; it is, at the
same time, a disappointment.” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 193)
“The creative process must always satisfy two different conditions: one the one side, it must tie itself to
something existing and enduring, and, on the other, it must be receptive to new use and application—
this alters what [in other respects] remains the same. Only in this way does one succeed in doing justice
to both the objective and the subjective demands [implicit in the creative act].” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 200)
“we can now define more sharply the specific difference which exists between process [Werden] in
‘nature’ and process in ‘culture.’ … Mobility and permanence are the rightful claim of both; but these
two factors appear in a different light the moment we shift our gaze from the world of nature to the
human world…. [In the world of nature] the individual is of no distinctive importance here; “ (Cassirer,
1961, p. 214)
“But in the cultural phenomena…the coming-to-be and the activity of individuals are linked to that of
the species in a very different and profoundly formative manner….These works of language, poetry,
plastic art, and religion, become ‘monuments,’ the symbols of recognition and remembrance of human
kind” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 215)
“The burning of the library at Alexandria annihilated many things of priceless value for our knowledge of
antiquity; most of Leonardo’s paintings are lost to us because the colors in which they were painted
have not lasted. But even in these cases the works as such remain tied to the whole of culture as if by
invisible threads.” (Cassirer, 1961, p. 216)
“what is expressed linguistically, in imagery, in plastic form, is embodied in language and art and endures
henceforth through it. It is this process which distinguishes the mere transformation [Umbildung] taking
place in the sphere of organic emergence from the formation [Bildung] of humanity. The former is a
passive occurrence, the latter is active. Accordingly, the former leads simply to variations, whereas the
latter leads to enduring creations” (Cassirer, 1961, pp. 216-17).
“Nature … is here independently of our theories of it.” (Northrop, 1947, p. 276)
“social institutions … confront the scientist with two quite different questions: (1) What is the character
of social institutions in fact? … (2) How ought social institutions to be? …
The first of these two types of questions is factual; the second is normative. Thus, whereas
natural science faces only problems of fact, social science is confronted with problems of fact and with
problems of value. …
The generalizations appropriate for these two types of problem are fundamentally different. …
It is important to have different names for these two types of theory in social science. It seems
appropriate to call them factual social theory and normative social theory respectively.
A factual social theory is one which is false if it is not in complete accord with what is the case. …
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A normative social theory designates what ought to be, rather than what is….None corresponds
perfectly to any de facto state of affairs anywhere. They designate possible ideals, rather than the
actual. Thus, by its very nature a normative social theory differs always in part and perhaps even in toto
from what is in fact the case.
This means that the scientific method for determining normative social theory cannot be that of
natural science applied to social facts. The latter method is appropriate for factual social theory. It is
inappropriate for normative social theory.” (Northrop, 1947, pp. 255-257)
“Scientific inquiry in any field must begin with some method taken over a priori from some other field,
but with the character of the problems of its own field and the analysis of these problems. A subject
becomes scientific not by beginning with facts, with hypothesis, or with some pet method brought in a
priori, but by beginning with the peculiar character of its particular problems. … these problems are of
two fundamentally different types: (1) problems of fact and (2) problems of value.” (Northrop, 1947, p.
274)
“the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the
kinds of explanation offered in the natural sciences” (Winch, 1958, p. 72)
“social interaction can more profitably be compared to the exchange of ideas in a conversation than to
the interaction of forces in a physical system” (Winch, 1958, p. 128)
“constantly I felt I was moving among two groups…who had almost ceased to communicate at all…”
(Snow, 1964, p. 2)
“I believe the intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split into two polar
groups” [literary intellectuals vs. scientists] (Snow, 1964, p. 3)
“Literary intellectuals at one pole—at the other scientists…. Between the two a gulf of mutual
incomprehension—sometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of
understanding” (Snow, 1964, p. 4)
“Non-scientists tend to think of scientists as brash and boastful” (p. 4) “the tone, restricted and
constrained, with which literary intellectuals are at home: it is the subdued voice of their culture” (Snow,
1964, p. 5)
“The non-scientists have a rooted impression that the scientists are shallowly optimistic, unaware of
man’s condition. On the other hand, the scientists believe that the literary intellectuals are totally
lacking in foresight, peculiarly unconcerned with their brother men, in a deep sense anti-intellectual,
anxious to restrict both art and thought to the existential moment” (Snow, 1964, p. 5)
“At one pole, the scientific culture really is a culture, …there are common attitudes, common standards
and patterns of behaviour, common approaches and assumptions.” (Snow, 1964, p. 9)
“This polarization is sheer loss to us all. To us as people, and to our society” (Snow, 1964, p. 11)
“Intellectuals, in particular literary intellectuals, are natural Luddites” (Snow, 1964, p. 22)
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“It is permissible to lump pure and applied scientists into the same scientific culture, but the gaps are
wide. Pure scientists and engineers often totally misunderstand each other. Their behaviour tends to be
very different” (Snow, 1964, p. 31)
“This is a line that once I tried to draw myself: but thought I can still see the reasons, I shouldn’t now.
The more I have seen of technologists at work, the more untenable the distinction has come to look”
(Snow, 1964, p. 67)
“The scientific process has two motives: one is to understand the natural world, the other is to control
it.” (Snow, 1964, p. 67)
[Snow recognizes that as speaking as an Englishman] “In the United States, for example, the divide is
nothing like so unbridgeable” (Snow, 1964, p. 69)
“It is probably too early to speak of a third culture already in existence. But I am now convinced that this
is coming” [from] “social historians” (Snow, 1964, pp. 70-1)
-------------------------------“Man is unique not because he does science,
and he is unique not because he does art,
but because science and art equally are expressions of his marvelous plasticity of mind.”
J. Bronowski, The ascent of man, 1973 (in Kaplan: Science says)
“Every science begins as philosophy and ends as art.”
W. Durant, The story of philosophy, 1926 (in Kaplan: Science says)
“The greatest scientists are always artists as well.”
Einstein, 1923, Durham Morning Herald, Aug. 21, 1955, (in Kaplan: Science says)
“Both the man of science and the man of art live always at the edge of mystery, surrounded by it.
Both, as the measure of their creation, have always had to do with the harmonization of
what is new with what is familiar, with the balance between novelty and synthesis,
with the struggle to make partial order out of chaos….
This cannot be an easy life.”
J. R. Oppenheimer, in Jung, Brighter than a thousand suns, 1958
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Selected References
Becker, S. L. (1989). The rhetorical tradition. In S. S. King (Ed.), Human communication as a field
of study: Selected contemporary views (pp. 27-42). Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press.
Cassirer, E. (1961). The logic of the humanities (transl. C. S. Howe). New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Cohen, H. (1985) The development of research in speech communication: A historical
perspective. In W.T. Benson (Ed.), Speech communication in the 20th century (pp. 282-298).
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University.
Comstock, G. (1983). The legacy of the past. Journal of Communication, 33, 42-50.
Delia, J.G. (1987). Communication research: A history. In C.R. Berger & S.H. Chaffee (Eds.),
Handbook of communication science (pp. 20-98). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Farrell, T.B. (1987). Beyond science: Humanities contributions to communication theory. In C.R.
Berger & S.H. Chaffee (Eds.), Handbook of communication science (pp. 123-139). Newbury
Park: Sage.
Golden, J. L. (1987). Contemporary trends and historical roots in communication. A personal view.
Central States Speech Journal, 38, 262-270.
Gonzalez, H. (1988). The evolution of communication as a field. Communication Research, 15,
302-308. (see also: Peters, J. D. (1988). The need for theoretical foundations: Reply to
Gonzalez. Communication Research, 15, 309-317.
Harper, N. L. (1979). Human communication theory: The history of a paradigm. Rochelle Park, NJ:
Haden Book Co.
Katz, E. (1983). The return of the humanities and sociology. Journal of Communication, 33, 41-52.
Leff, M.C., & Procario, M.O. (1985). Rhetorical theory in speech communication. In T.W. Benson
(Ed.), Speech communication in the 20th century (pp. 3-27). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University.
Littlejohn, S.W. (1982). An overview of contributions to human communication theory from other
disciplines. In F.E.X. Dance (Ed.), Human communication theory: Comparative essays (pp. 243285). New York: Harper & Row.
Miller, G.R. (1975). Humanistic and scientific approaches to speech communication inquiry:
Rivalry, redundancy, or rapprochement. Western Speech Communication, 39, 230-239.
Northrop, F. S. C. (1947). The logic of the sciences and the humanities. New York: Macmillan.
Powers, J. H. (1995). On the intellectual structure of the human communication discipline.
Communication Education, 44, 191-222.
Prior, M. E. (1962). Science and the humanities. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.
Rogers, E. M., & Chaffee, S. H. (1983). Communication as an academic discipline: A dialogue.
Journal of Communication, 33, 18-30.
Rosengren, K. R. (1983). Communication research: One paradigm, or four? Journal of
Communication, 33, 185-207.
Schramm, W. (1983). The unique perspective of communication: A retrospective. Journal of
Communication, 33, 6-17.
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 129
Schramm, W. (1989). Human communication as a field of behavioral science: Jack Hilgard and his
committee. In S. S. King (Ed.), Human communication as a field of study: Selected
contemporary views (pp. 13-26). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Shweder, R. A. (1986). Explanation in the social sciences and in life situations. In D. W. Fiske &
R. A. Shweder (Eds.), Metatheory in social science: Pluralisms and subjectivities (pp. 163196). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Snow, C. P. (1961). The two cultures and the scientific revolution. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Snow, C. P. (1964). The two cultures: and a second look (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Sorensen, G. (1993). Social science: A framework for communication inquiry. In S. A. Deetz (Ed.),
Communication yearbook 16 (pp. 557-572). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Wallace, K. R. (Ed.). (1954). History of speech education in America: Background studies. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Winch, P. (1958). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein, L. (1961). Tractatus logico-philosophicus (D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness, transl.).
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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Perspectives on Theory and Theorizing
Art Bochner
NCA President
In February 2008, Dawn Braithwaite and Brian Spitzberg organized a panel for the Western
Communication Association Convention on the topic, “The Status of Theory in Interpersonal
Communication.” The panel drew a large and enthusiastic audience. After the convention, several of
those in attendance wrote to me, urging that I discuss the panel in one of my editorials. Not wanting to
speak for any of my colleagues on the panel, I asked Brian Spitzberg to collect short versions (akin to
abstracts) from each panelist and to encourage each to broaden the scope of their argument(s) beyond
the realm of interpersonal communication. I hope these all too brief representations of rather complex
arguments will stimulate further discussion and debate on CRTNET or in Spectra.
***
Engaging Theory
As we edited two recent theory books, we seized the opportunity to examine the “lay of the
land” of the theories guiding scholarship. We recognize that scholars differ, at times greatly, concerning
how to study, develop, and evaluate theories. We recognize that there are different types of theories
that need to be evaluated in different ways, as scholars use different meta-theoretical discourses,
paradigms, or intellectual traditions to study a phenomenon of interest.
The complexities are compounded as researchers rarely explicitly articulate their metatheoretical commitments, although we believe they should do so more often. It is important to identify
the paradigm represented in order to understand and intelligently evaluate the work.
In our books on interpersonal and family communication theory, we examined all studies after
1990 to identify theories used, paradigmatic underpinnings, and the amount of theory-based research.
Taken together, we found the vast majority of work in interpersonal and family communication was
post-positivist (80%, higher in interpersonal), 17% interpretive, and a small amount was critical. We
discovered that interpersonal had a higher degree of theory-based work (69%) and 43% in the
comparatively newer sub-discipline of family communication. Of course, we realize these numbers may
not be mirrored across the discipline.
What are some implications of these findings? Briefly, first, we contend that scholars should
strive for theory-centered research whenever possible, as theory helps researchers bring both
intelligibility and coherence to their findings and theory helps us intelligently launch new research.
Second, while all excellent research is valuable, interpersonal and family communication would benefit
from increased paradigmatic balance; our ability to shed light on some of the most important issues in
the lives of humans rests in our ability to embrace and apply multiple perspectives and methods to
capture the complexity that is communication. Thus, we argue that multiple perspectives should have a
comparable presence at the scholarly table.
Dawn O. Braithwaite & Leslie A. Baxter
***
A Role for Biology
We don’t often deal with covering laws in communication, but here’s one worth considering: All
communicative acts are biological acts. It derives from the acknowledgement that, as biological beings,
humans can perform no action whatsoever without engaging in anatomical and physiological activity.
Every behavior requires neurological and motor coordination to enact, and has effects on metabolic,
immune, muscular, and/or endocrine processes. Therefore, every human act is a biological one, and
because communicative acts are human acts, they are therefore biological acts as well.
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 131
If you cringe when reading these words, you’re proving my point. Your act of decoding and
interpreting these statements—which required the involvement of your eyes and your brain—produced
a noticeable physiological effect. That effect isn’t a social construction. Rather, it represents your
biological engagement with the communication process you’re enacting right now.
This covering law doesn’t deny that communication is also symbolic, cultural, political, aesthetic,
spiritual, and social. Like many human activities, communication is subject to complex interactions
between a range of internal and external influences. What makes this statement a covering law and not
simply an observation is that it applies equally to all communication behaviors. The case could be made
that not every communicative act is cultural, or social, or political, for instance—many are, but some are
not. But every communicative act is biological.
I know this proposition will strike some as unreasonably deterministic, but it need not be. Calling
a behavior biological doesn’t necessarily imply that it is also uncontrollable. What it does imply is that
communication has implications for physical health and that some patterns of communicating may have
more positive physical consequences than others. As a discipline, we can capitalize on this observation
by identifying how communication contributes not only to social and relational well-being but also to
our physical health.
Kory Floyd
***
Reviving Popper
Theories rarely die due to contradictory evidence; they die because their originators die (or
move into administration). So, how do (and should) theories evolve? Flaws in the hypothetico-deductive
model are apparent: (a) as Popper observed, verification is easy, whereas falsification is hard; (b) but a
disconfirmation dilemma arises because non-observations of a predicted phenomenon can be attributed
to methodology or context rather than the theory.
Such problems have led some critical and interpretive scholars to deride scientific methods as
logically flawed, and scientific theories as too blunt to explain human action. Popper distrusted
interpretive world views, and proffered a criterion of demarcation: A theory is scientific if it makes risky
predictions (e.g., physics), and pseudo-scientific (e.g., astrology) if its predictions are impermeable to
observational contradiction.
With these ideas in mind, I make three claims. First, social scientists will make better theories
the bigger the risks they take. Such predictions improve methods, rid the field of flawed claims more
efficiently, and enhance the credibility of accumulated claims that survive more rigorous observational
tests. Claims to epistemological superiority cannot be made without the following phrase (repeat after
me): “This prediction, and therefore the theory from which it is derived, are false.” Second, without an
equivalent criterion of quality, critical and interpretive approaches will permit indefinite perpetuation of
potentially flawed claims. Third, social scientific approaches reveal clear potential for cumulative
knowledge, despite the existence of human choice. Research has predicted with 94% accuracy which
couples fail. Interpersonal communication research has used self-report methods to predict as much as
40% of the variance in stress-related hormones. Meta-analyses continue to demonstrate accumulated
and theoretically predicted effects, and resolve questions requiring a strictly empirical and quantitative
epistemological criterion. Any criticism of the failures of scientific approaches will need to provide some
alternative for the accumulation of knowledge rather than merely identify what scientific approaches
have yet to resolve.
Brian Spitzberg
***
Theories as Useful Vocabularies
Communication studies can be viewed as a field of discourse that seeks to relate beings to other
beings. Stories are the best ways to achieve this kind of relating. Richard Rorty observed that when you
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weigh the good and the bad the social novelists have achieved against the good and bad the social
theorists have done, you find yourself wishing there had been more stories and fewer theories. If we
take our lessons from the novelists rather than the scientists, then we don’t ask “how can we achieve
control over the uncertainties of life?” Instead, we ask ‘how can we arrange things to be more
comfortable with each other and with others who are different from us?” “How can we change our
institutions so that everyone’s right to be understood, heard, and be given a voice, has a better chance
to be achieved?”
Theory-making is a vocation aimed at developing vocabularies that are useful for particular
purposes. As Ken Gergen points out “the chief product of research is language.” Thus, a theorist
inevitably functions as a social constructionist who invents language that mediates and/or creates social
realities. Moreover, all theories and theoretical discourses are constitutive of their referential fields.
In my ideal world of inquiry, an interactional conception of communication—how the practices
of speaking, hearing, and conversing enable us to make our way through the world—would displace the
transmission or depiction notion of communication in which language is viewed as nothing more than a
vehicle or tool for describing or inscribing a preexisting ontological world. This conversational model of
inquiry assumes that all attempts to speak for, write about, or represent other people’s lives necessarily
are partial, situated, and mediated ways of creating and/or inscribing values. Thus communication
inquiry necessarily is a site of moral responsibility.
It is time to break the hold of certain disciplinary norms that idealize the importance of
universals over particulars, stability over change, graphs over stories, and the ahistorical over the
contingent. In my view, all research is storytelling, whether you call it empiricism, interpretivism, or
criticism.
Art Bochner
***
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“IN THEORY, …”:
ON DEFINING AND EVALUATING THEORY IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES
Running Head: “In theory, ...”
A Précis by
Brian H. Spitzberg
School of Communication
San Diego State University
10.16.2K
Portions of this manuscript previously appeared in:
Spitzberg, B. H. (2001). Attribution theory qua theory.
In V. Manusov & J. H. Harvey (Eds.),
Attribution, communication behavior, and close relationships (pp. 353-371).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
****
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 134
“IN THEORY, …”
ON DEFINING AND EVALUATING THEORY IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES
Consider the following statements, which are not entirely uncommon in everyday
interaction: “In theory, I would think that . . .” “My theory about that is . . .” “You know, I have a
theory about that. . .” These expressions reflect an ever-present drive to account for, explain, or
make sense of the world around us. As Kurt Lewin opined, perhaps there really is “nothing
more practical as a good theory” (Eysenck, 1987; Marrow, 1969; Sandelands, 1990). We employ
theories in our everyday process of enacting and co-creating practical achievements. Yet, we
have only rudimentary ideas of the precise nature, constituents, or criteria of theories. We use
theories every day, but know little about their nature. A primer in the nature and evaluation of
theories is therefore in order.
Defining Theory
A theory is formally defined here as a verifiable conceptual system of interrelated
propositions explaining conditionship among a set of phenomena. These propositions may be
formal, as in axiomatic theories or causal models, or informal, as in elaborate metaphors. These
propositions may be explicit, as in mathematical formulae, or implicit, as in a diagrammatic
model or narrative description of a process. The essence of a theory is that it explains a set of
phenomena. “Explain” may be understood in a primitive sense as the offering of an account or
narrative structure that renders an event, set of events, phenomenon or process
comprehensible. Comprehension ordinarily, and perhaps necessarily, is tied to notions of
causality, function, and underlying structure (Corrigan & Denton, 1996; cf. Sandelands, 1990).
The role of causality in understanding suggests a difference between description and
explanation; description does not require causal analysis but explanation does. A theory may
accomplish a number of things, such as prediction, but ultimately, in the social sciences, to be a
theory it must proffer an explanation. In its most essential function, explanation is an answer to
the “why” question—why does X happen the way it does? The most logical candidate
theoretical answer, therefore, will tend to begin with an implicit or explicit conjunction:
because. . . .
Evaluating Theory
The subsuming criterion for theory evaluation is quality. A theory is higher in quality to
the extent it more adequately accounts for a phenomenon (Pavitt, 2000) compared to its
competitor candidate accounts, and to the extent that it furthers accumulation of general and
precise knowledge over time. There are many criteria that provide reasonable approaches to
ascertaining theoretical adequacy. To facilitate their description, a list of such criteria is
reviewed, categorized into intrinsic and extrinsic qualities.
Intrinsic qualities are those that can be evaluated internal to the theory itself, or within
the domain of scholarly activity directly relevant to the theory. Intrinsic criteria can be
categorized as either necessary or desirable. Necessary characteristics are those functions a
theory must fulfill in order to even be considered a theory (vs. a primitive metaphor, a story, a
description, a taxonomy, etc.). Desirable characteristics are those features of the theory that
connote generally higher quality the more of these characteristics (e.g., parsimony) the theory
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possesses. Extrinsic qualities are those characteristics of the theory that get applied and
assessed by the relevant school, invisible college, discipline, paradigm (in Kuhn’s “collective
practices” sense), and/or society that represent the audiences to which the theory is addressed.
The intrinsic and extrinsic criteria are summarized in Table 1. These criteria are not
exhaustive, original, or even entirely consistent (Blalock, 1979; Eysenck, 1987; Freese, 1980;
McClintock, 1985; Stamp, Vangelisti, & Knapp, 1994). They also do not reflect many of the
larger meta-theoretical issues involved in theory construction (e.g., Turner, 1985, 1990, 1991).
They do reflect much of the content of traditional, or modernist, approaches to the aesthetics
of theory evaluation. A brief foray into these criteria will facilitate the examination of
attribution theory.
- - - Insert Table 1 about here - - Intrinsic Qualities
Necessary conditions. A theory must explain a process, events, or phenomena. To do so,
a basic understanding of the concepts relevant to this explanation, and their interrelationship,
must be provided. This explanation must be more abstract than the referent. This is at least one
difference between scientific theory and either history or ethnography. In providing an abstract
explanation, a theory must apply equally across its intended domain or scope and the domain
must consist of potentially more than one context or episode. For example, a theory of
attributional influence that does not apply to marital decision-making, for example, would not
be a “theory of attributional influence.” A theory’s propositions must also avoid direct
contradiction. A theory should not claim that in context C, stimulus S produces internal
attributions (X) and external attributions (Y), if X and Y are defined in by the theory as mutually
exclusive categories.
A diversion into verification. A theory must be verifiable. Here a detour is necessary. The
original positivist and covering law model (Carnap, 1953; Hempel, 1965) represented an
elaborate formal logical system to assess the validity of theories. One of the basic assumptions
of this model was that mapping rules (i.e., rules of correspondence) could be formulated to link
the symbols of a theory (e.g., its terms and relations) to their respective referents in the world
being theorized. This is a necessary assumption if theories are going to be verifiable and/or
falsifiable through observation of the empirical world.
Popper (1959) attempted to fortify the basic soundness of the positivist agenda by
demarcating between science and pseudo-science. Science, he claimed, must be potentially
falsifiable (and by extension, deductive rather than inductive). Conversely, pseudo-science is
indestructible. As Popper (1980) explicates:
(1) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory—if we look
for confirmations.
(2) Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; . . .
(3) Every “good” scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen.
The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is nonscientific.
Irrefutability is not a virtue of theory (as people often think) but a vice.
(5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. Testability is
falsifiability; . . .
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(6) Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine test
of the theory; . . .
(7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their
admirers—for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. . . .
One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its
falsifiability, or refutability, or testability. (Popper, 1980, pp. 22-23)
Despite the strength and clarity of these pronouncements, cracks soon developed in the
Popperian edifice. Specifically, it was soon realized that theories are never tested in pure form.
Instead, theoretical propositions are tested in a form that can be simplified and symbolically
represented as follows:
If (T . At . Cp . AI . Cn)  (O1  O2)
T is the theory being assessed. At is the set of auxiliary theories or assumptions that bridge the
theory to the specific statements being tested. Cp is the ceteris paribus condition presuming “all
things being equal.” Ai is the auxiliary theory representing measurement and instrumentation.
Cn is the specific conditions of the experimental situation. O1 and O2 represent mutually
exclusive possible outcomes. Thus, the formula above reads roughly as: Given theory T, and
assuming At (e.g., boundary conditions such as contextual parameters), all things being equal
(Cp), and given valid measurement (AI) and experimental conditions (Cn), then O1 will occur, and
O2 will not occur. If the theory predicts O1, and instead, O2 is observed, Popper’s deductive
modus tollens claims that the theory must be rejected (Chow, 1990, 1992; Gergen, 1991;
Meehl, 1990; Papineau, 1989). However, because the theory (T) is not the only feature being
tested, it is possible to attribute the failure to observe the predicted O1 to any of the auxiliary
theories and/or assumptions of At through Cn, rather than falsify the theory T itself. This “ad
hockery” represents the basis for a disconfirmation dilemma (Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, &
Baumbgardner, 1986). Specifically, the disconfirmation dilemma is that when results of an
attempt to verify or falsify a theory do not provide support for the theory, the researcher(s)
have no way of determining whether it is the theory itself, the interpretive extensions of the
theory, or the methodology to blame. (Conversely, but seldom noted, a confirmation dilemma
can occur, such that supportive results could be due to methodological chance—as in alpha
error—or due to a mistaken interpretive extension of the theory that happens to conform to
observation). Ad hockery is the process of creating theoretical bandages, or conceptual repairs,
when research fails to support a theory. This dilemma is inimical to the concept of Popperian
falsification, even if many have sought to shore up the logic of disconfirmation (Chow, 1990,
1992; Meehl, 1990).
Other problems arose in the Popperian paradigm. For example, intuitively, Popper’s
dictum of falsification leads to a rather bizarre paradox: The better the theory, the more likely it
is to be false (Papineau, 1989). That is, elaborate articulation of an obviously false theory would
be aesthetically “scientific” from Popper’s perspective because of its high degree of falsifiability.
This paradox is partly resolved by the realization that Popper was not intending an aesthetic
criterion so much as a definitional criterion, a criterion of demarcation. As such, falsifiable
theories, or theories with high levels of falsifiable content, are ‘scientific,’ rather than pseudoscientific. Scientific theories can be presumed to be preferable (at least, to scientists), and
therefore there are aesthetic impliations built into the demarcation candidate, but a theory
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that is highly falsifiable, and survives persistent efforts to falsify it, resolves the paradox by
displaying its scientific nature as well as its validity as a conduit of knowledge. This, of course,
assumes that such theories are possible in the social sciences, and this is not an easy
assumption to demonstrate with the current state of theoretical knowledge in the social
sciences.
A diversion into paradigms. Lakatos (1970) sought to fortify Popper’s philosophy by
developing a notion of “progressiveness.” Specifically, Lakatos argued that programs of
research can be viewed as progressive or degenerative based on the fruitfulness of the
associated ad hockery. If ad hoc auxiliary theories and speculations are increasingly valuable in
refining a theory, its core assumptions, and its research directions, then the program can be
considered progressive. If, in contrast, the ad hoc theorizing increasingly calls into question the
fundamental assumptions of the theory, or if the theory increasingly requires piecemeal
patchwork that is problematic to the very coherence of the theory, the program can be
considered degenerative or regressive (Metaxopoulos, 1989). Progress is revealed in part by the
accretion of new auxiliary concepts and hypotheses that extend the theory itself. In essence,
over time a good theory possesses excess theoretical content relative to its predecessor(s) and
therefore accomplishes not only what prior theory accomplished, but even more (Avgelis, 1989;
Meehl, 1990). This also means that theory evaluation is intrinsically comparative; a theory’s
quality can only be judged relative to its competitors (Avgelis, 1989; Colomy, 1991; Laudan,
1981; Nash & Wardell, 1993).
Feyerabend (1970, 1975) decided to forego altogether Popper’s desire to maintain a
demarcation between science and nonscience. Proposing an anarchistic epistemology, or a
treatise against method, he argued that science fundamentally is no different from other forms
of knowing. He further argued for a process of counterinduction, the generation of
“unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay. . . . constant misuse of language”
(Feyerabend, 1990, p. 25), as well as the introduction of hypotheses that “are inconsistent
either with well-established theories or with well-established facts” (p. 26). “What remains are
esthetic judgments, judgments of taste, and our own subjective wishes” (p. 90). Unlike Popper,
therefore, ad hockery in this scheme is celebrated. A theoretical field is healthiest when it is
most bedeviled by rival theories and hypotheses. Such theoretical pluralism is viewed as the
best “method” through which to find the most useful theoretical approaches (Avgelis, 1989;
Churchland, 1992).
If the three approaches of Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend were to be analogized to
legal concepts (Phillips, 1977), Popper could be viewed as proposing law by statute, in which
validity is determined by the rules. Lakatos would be proposing case law, in which the merit of
each present case is determined relative to competing case exemplars. In contrast, Feyerabend
recommends legal relativism, in which everything is decided in the context of present
circumstances. Both Lakatos and Feyerabend view theory evaluation as comparative, although
Lakatos believes that theories progress only with certain types of surplus content, whereas
Feyerabend appears accepting of the value of all surplus content.
These differing conceptions of science and theory received a rather unexpected thorn in
their paws with Pepper’s (1957) notion of “world hypotheses” and especially Kuhn’s (1970)
conception of paradigm and scientific change through revolution rather than accumulation,
validation, and refinement (Masterman, 1970). Kuhn’s conception of paradigmatic revolution in
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particular, purported that the received view (D’Andrade, 1986) of science is fundamentally
flawed. Science does not change because theories are felled by the axes of strict tests. Instead,
a new worldview solves nagging problems that the normal science of the regnant paradigm is
incapable of resolving. This paradigm shift is revolutionary in the sense that it does not build on
the past so much as replace it. The basis upon which the change occurs is not so much a
rational process, as it is a gestalt shift.
From this perspective, “there is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic
decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same
decision” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 164). At some level, scientific revolutions are progressive, but not in
the sense that they increasingly achieve “truth status.” Rather, they are progressive in the
sense that theories become better at solving puzzles that existing theories seem incapable of
solving. As Kuhn (1970) admits, “I do not doubt, for example, that Newton’s mechanics
improves on Aritstotle’s and that Einstein’s improves on Newton’s as instruments for puzzlesolving” (p. 169). However, these improvements are not assumed to be entirely rational nor
tied to “truth” so much as to paradigmatic value judgments of theoretical “accuracy, simplicity,
fruitfulness, and the like” (p. 164). Theory evaluation, in this sense, is fundamentally
comparative and subjective relative to the collective practices, values, and exemplars of the
prevailing paradigm.
Thus, the evaluation of theories is not ultimately a matter of “mere” hypothesis-testing,
which is ultimately limited in its capacity to resolve theoretical debates (see Hunter, 1997;
Meehl, 1978, 1990; cf. Chow, 1990). Despite the lack of access to the “Truth” afforded by the
hypothetico-deductive perspective, the concept of verisimilitude (i.e., “truth-likeness”) has
been retained by many, if not most, scientists. Verisimilitude is taken to be the practical
collective consensus regarding the validity of a set of theoretical statements. In everyday
contexts such as courts, boardrooms and families, the question of whether a word means one
thing or another, and whether something is “there” or not, are practical achievements, and in
most cases can be resolved to the satisfaction of those involved (Schegloff, 1992). The
possibility may therefore exist for natural language, semantic and realist conceptions of theory
(e.g., Bhaskar, 1978; Clark & Paivio, 1989; Greene, 1994; Suppe, 1989).
This digression on verifiability and paradigmatic progress is necessary because the
evaluation of a theory cannot proceed along the straightforward lines of calculating the number
or percentage of hypothesis tests it passes, much less in comparing the ratio of successful
hypothesis tests to the ratio of another theory. As much as such a process may render a certain
appearance of objectivity in such judgments, reality does not disclose its mysteries so
conveniently. There is value in successful research, but it serves as only one among many
barometers of a theory’s merits. Among the additional criteria that are often drafted to account
for a theory’s quality are the following.
Desirable conditions. Generally speaking, the more specific a theory is in specifying its
propositions, the better it is. Prediction is a desirable but not necessary aspect of propositions.
For example, Darwin’s theory of evolution is highly explanatory, but lacks any predictive power
in a number of senses, as it cannot specify the direction or form of evolutionary changes. It is
immensely heuristic as it has generated new hypotheses modeled on evolutionary predictions
in many disciplines, but the end products of the evolutionary process are relatively
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unpredictable by virtue of the impact of local circumstances in determining what faculties are,
or are not, adaptive to those environments.
If predictions are to be useful, the concepts of the theory need to be observable. The
more observable the content of the theory is, the easier it should be to assess the verisimilitude
of the theory. Furthermore, the more specifically a theory identifies its scope conditions, the
better it is. Theories that subsume more concepts are generally considered preferable to those
that subsume fewer. However, theories that are simple and “elegant” are generally preferable
to those that are complex and conceptually extensive. These latter two criteria often produce
tension, but they are not logically incompatible. At its core, for example, E = mc2 is
simultaneously universal in scope, specific, and parsimonious. In contrast, formulae such as B =
 P  E (i.e., Behavior is a function of Person times Environment) is universal and parsimonious,
but far from specific in its empirical content and operationalization.
Extrinsic Qualities
To a large extent, the criteria above may be applied to a theory knowing little else
beyond the theory itself and the available research relevant to the theory. However, as Lakatos,
Feyerabend, and Kuhn have established, theories are rarely actually adopted, retained, or
rejected purely on their own intrinsic merits. Instead, any given theory is evaluated in part by
the disciplinary matrix within which it is applied, and within which it is competing for
acceptance. This matrix applies practical, cultural and ideological criteria in the evaluation of
these theories. Extrinsic criteria, in other words, concern qualities of performance and
aesthetics from the perspective of the research culture that uses the theory, rather than strictly
formal or rational characteristics.
One of the cultural preferences for theories is that the theories permit intervention into
and manipulation of the phenomenon. For example, to the extent that attribution theory
guides improvements in marital therapy, it would be desirable. Theories that are heuristic (i.e.,
suggestive of future questions and applications) are also viewed as preferable. Perhaps as a
holdover of the received view of science, theories that are efficient in subsuming existing
theories are also generally preferable. In addition, science may not have access to “the” truth as
a reference point from which to evaluate theories. However, groups of scholars nevertheless
can collectively make theoretical predictions that are supported and replicated. The
accumulation of supportive hypothesis tests, especially when these tests are strict or concern
parameters or intervals (see Meehl, 1990), therefore represents “money in the bank” (i.e.,
empirical success) in which the coin of the realm consists of “damn strange coincidences” (i.e.,
empirical novelty). Finally, theories tend to be viewed as better to the extent that they reflect
the core metaphorical images of self that culture upholds, and to the extent the theory fits the
contemporary aesthetic preferences of that culture. “A good theory is a plausible theory, and a
theory is judged to be more plausible and of higher quality if it is interesting rather than
obvious, irrelevant or absurd, obvious in novel ways, a source of unexpected connections, high
in narrative rationality, aesthetically pleasing, or correspondent with presumed realities”
(Weick, 1989, p. 517).
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A Word About Paradigms
Popper (1959, 1980) attempted to draw a bright line of demarcation between science
and pseudo-science by the criterion of risky predictions that are falsifiable through inferential
processes. Deductive methods could not provide such a line, as they are predicated on initial
claims, which themselves must be verified, and no amount of observing instances in support of
a universal claim can guarantee the validity of that claim. In contrast, a single falsifying instance
can lead to the rejection of a claim.
Conceptual systems such as astrology, religion, and Freudian theory are considered
pseudo-scientific because they make no claims that when confronted by contradictory evidence
leads to the forfeiture of belief in the conceptual system itself. Any conceptual system that is
impervious to empirical contradiction, or that makes no claims that can be empirically
contradicted in the event they are false claims, is not science. The criterion of scientific status is
the positing of predictions that are at risk if they are, in fact, empirically untrue.
This line of demarcation provided a potential distinction between two approaches to
both conceptual theorizing (i.e., the ways in which questions and propositions are formulated)
as well as methodology (e.g., experimentation and falsificationist observations). However, the
methods by which falsification is sought are subject to multiple attributions of failure, only one
of which is the theory at test, resulting in a disconfirmation dilemma (Greenwald et al., 1986).
One implication is that alternative approaches need to be identified by which the progress of
knowledge accumulation can be ascertained. That is, does science change over time in ways
that represent progress toward more valid knowledge, or at least through the rejection of less
valid knowledge?
Attempts to redress this problem by identifying alternative criteria of progress have
been proposed by others (e.g., Lakatos, 1970; Laudan et al., 1986). A potentially radical
reformulation of the problem of how science changes over time was proffered by Kuhn (1970),
who popularized the concept of paradigms. Although highly problematic in definition
(Masterman, 1970), Kuhn broadly considers a paradigm a collective set of practices among a
group of scholars. This set of collective practices indicate that these professionals tend to have
similar grounding assumptions and beliefs, similar language, similar methodological artifacts
and metaphors, and similar procedures for pursuing their knowledge claims. In their more
sociological sense, such paradigms might be considered traditions (Alexander & Colomy, 1992;
Craig, 1999), domains (Anderson & Baym, 2004), styles (Smith, 1988), or forms of metatheorizing (Ritzer, Zhao, & Murphy, 2001).
At least two potentially radical implications arose from Kuhn’s (1970) conceptualization.
First, paradigms change through revolution rather than routine scientific activity. It was posited
that paradigms proceed by facilitating normal science, a form of puzzle-solving in which
investigation is relatively routine, with disagreements negotiated by similar standards of
quality. Change occurred incrementally, with accumulation of new knowledge understood
within the conceptual boundaries of the existing paradigm. Such paradigms would, in the
process of such puzzle-solving, discover certain anomalies that resisted resolution from the
presumptions and practices of the current paradigm. At some point, a new paradigm is
proposed that radically reorganizes the presumptions and relations among conceptual
components of the previous paradigm, like a light switch illuminating a previously shadowy
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environment. Thus, change is not “progressive” so much as “reformulating” by demonstrating
the virtual irrelevance of the former map, and substituting an entirely new (type of) theoretical
map of the territory. Thus, the concept of progress is problematized by suggesting that much of
the science produced in the former paradigm is made irrelevant to the presumed progress in
the new paradigm. It was asking many of the wrong questions.
Second, any field of endeavor may have multiple paradigms, but these paradigms are
incommensurable (Kuhn, 2000). Like religions, cultural matrices of everyday life or speech
communities a paradigm is philosophically and pragmatically self-encapsulated, such that a
practitioner of a given paradigm finds nothing of additive or complementary value in any other
extant paradigm. Such incommensurability suggests that much of science consists of belief
systems or mental templates that may or may not be tethered directly to the empirical world.
Thus, Kuhn has been criticized as a relativist by many critics, illustrated by the visualization of
scientists approaching questions from non-competitive paradigms of perspective that have no
obvious communication mechanism for resolving competing claims about the empirical world.
The core aspect of relativism implicit in the conceptualization of incommensurable
paradigms is that truth claims are unyoked from correspondence rules of veracity (Kuhn, 2000).
Instead, although “the rules of the true/false game are … universals for all human
communities…, the result of applying those rules varies from one speech community to
another” (Kuhn, 2000, p. 100). If rules of correspondence do not characterize the practice of
science, it questions the prospect of a progressive science. Here, however, Kuhn recants: “the
world is not invented or constructed….Creatures born into it must take it as they find it” (p.
101). Since the title “the real world” cannot be “denied” (p. 102), it raises the question of how
science does progress toward an increasingly accurate picture of the real world. Kuhn is not
very specific on the mechanisms of this progress, but he accepts the truth of the scientific
march toward truth. He postulates that “scientific development is, like biological, a
unidirectional and irreversible process. Later scientific theories are better than earlier ones for
solving puzzles in the often quite different environments to which they are applied. That is not
a relativist’s position, and it displays the sense in which I am a convinced believer in scientific
progress” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 169).
Many have struggled with the problem of paradigm change (e.g., Levine, 1986; Rossiter,
1977; Schwandt, 1989). It seems reasonable to conjecture that normal puzzle-solving
accumulates progressive knowledge that sets important foundations from which new
paradigms can progress in more dramatic ways, and that both moderate and more radical
forms of change owe some of their progressive nature to the cultures of scientific practice. This
returns the presumption of progress to the prospect of a softer but nevertheless visible
demarcation between science and alternative paradigms of practice. Science is not infallible,
but it may instead be systematically less infallible than alternative approaches to knowledge. In
essence, it may be that the game of science works in part because the practice of systematically
acting as if we are approaching the truth creates a set of competitive and comparative cultural
practices that progressively erode the less viable and valid perspectives in favor of those that,
over time, better approximate the empirical world. Cultural rituals, practices, religions, and
other collective practices may accumulate perspectives that are progressive, but they do so in
an ongoing effort toward promotion of accepted practices. Science may have refined an
approach that explicitly and simultaneously demands both attempts at promotion and
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contradiction of operating premises and practices, always with the crucible of decision referred
at some level to the empirical world.
A Note About “Science”
The belief that there is a monolithic “scientific method” or scientific paradigm has been
considered unrealistic by most practicing scientists for some time. Science is almost as
variegated as its practitioners and their respective investigative pursuits. There are some
common tendencies or orientations, however, that characterize most working scientists.
First, science is critically reflective. This may sound uncharacteristic, compared to its
paradigmatic cousins such as ethnography and critical studies. Science is critically reflective in
the following senses: (1) Science is fundamentally oriented toward disproving its own
presuppositions; (2) Science is reflectively aware of, and must take pains to control for, rival
hypotheses to its accounts, including the potential biasing effects of observer viewpoint and
activities; (3) Science is skeptical of claims without the potential for replication or
generalizability in, of, and through experience.
Second, science is cumulatively progressive. Unlike religion, which is fundamentally
conservative in holding to tradition, belief and faith, science is radical in its ongoing pursuit of
newer, better, understandings. Religious institutions may occasionally mimic science (as in
declaring sections of a text as apocryphal), but such mimicry is predicated less on external
evidence, and instead based on concerns of consistency with prior presumptive beliefs or
ideologies. Science never forgets the past (so as neither to repeat its mistakes nor forget to
benefit from its previous discoveries), but it is fundamentally forward-looking toward what is
yet unknown. It cannot rest on its foundations nor accept any article of faith without test or
observation. Instead, it must continuously build upon, evolve, expand, and innovate new ways
and contents of understanding. No text is without potential error, and no text or article of faith
is beyond doubt. Thus, the past is mere prelude to the present, and the present is always
geared to a future that renders the present partially inadequate. It is in this sense that
traditional religion seeks to reify its past as the strictures of the present; to accept that what
once was known must be cherished as inviolate in the present. Science, in contrast, views the
past as something to grow beyond.
Third, science is a dialectic between thought and method, and among induction,
deduction, and abduction. The thought-method dialectic means that no theory can stand
alone—it must be subject to methodological test, observation, and evidence. Yet, no method
can stand alone, as all products of methods have theoretical implications that must organize
the products of such methodological application. Data without theory are little more than
noise, and theory without data is little more than a story. The induction-deduction-abduction
dialectic means that science relies on all three modes of thought as a tripod of knowledge
accumulation. Deduction reasons from interconnected general principles to further principles
(as in the syllogism: 1. If X, then Y; 2. if Y, then Z; 3. , if X, then Z). Through deduction,
theoretical axioms and hypotheses can be chained out (Wallach & Wallach, 1994). Induction
reasons from examples to generalization, and is the foundation for the hypothetico-deductive
model in which hypotheses can be tested according to observations compared to probabilistic
random distributions (i.e., the p < .05 significance level). Abduction is a mode of thought that
combines induction and deduction in moving from hypotheses to tests and back to hypotheses,
engaging the interactions between explanations and data.
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Modeling
Modeling is one of the zeniths of scientific reasoning. It incorporates analytic reasoning
(i.e., breaking wholes into parts), synthetic reasoning (i.e., [re]assembling parts into wholes),
and abstract reasoning (i.e., recognizing similar things across levels of abstraction and
concreteness). It also is fundamental to theoretical reasoning (i.e., explaining how and why
phenomena happen the way they do), and methodology (i.e., specifying hypotheses to be
tested qualitatively or quantitatively, the results of which inform the validity of the underlying
theory).
Models serve various functions in science as in everyday life. A model is a visual
simplification of concepts that exist in both a hypothesized conceptual form and an actual or
potential observed form. For example, if you believe that as social skills decrease a person’s
ability to meet others and develop satisfying relationships decreases, and that this in turn
increases the person’s loneliness, and that increases in loneliness lead to increased interaction
anxiety, then three conceptual components each potentially can be measured by a
questionnaire or survey. Thus, you would have a very basic model that looks something like the
following:
Social Skills
Loneliness
Social Anxiety
Notice that this model could have been formulated entirely differently. Some have
argued that people develop anxiety through early learning experiences, which leads to a deficit
of social skills, which thereby make the development of social relationships more difficult,
leading to loneliness. These represent alternative models of reality, and either one can be
reasonably argued and justified. Which one is “true” is irrelevant for the sake of formulating the
model—the question is whether a good set of arguments can be developed in support of the
model ultimately produced.
Once you have a basic model, it is then relatively simple to start asking additional
questions, such as how biology (e.g., sex, age, etc.), culture (e.g., ethnicity, regional
identification, etc.), context (e.g., socio-economic status, intact family status, etc.), personal
background (e.g., attachment disorder, relational history, etc.) or dispositions (e.g., self-esteem,
attribution style, etc.) influence various components or relationships of the model.
Most models follow simple rules: (1) Components on the left precede, at some point,
the components to the right in real time. (2) Every conceptual component should have a
measurement component. (3) Every arrow represents a direct effect of one concept on
another. This effect does not have to be a causal relationship, but it usually implies such an
influence. (4) Every component must have an arrow headed to at least one other component,
and may have arrows to multiple other components. (5) The spatially closer two components
are to one another, the more closely they are associated with one another than to components
further away from one another. (6) Components can be grouped according to larger
components (i.e., multiple indicators of a single concept; e.g., social skills above might be
further indicated by coordination, expressiveness, attentiveness, and composure skills). (7)
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Every arrow is a potentially testable hypothesis (or proposition). The nature of these
hypotheses is discussed next.
Hypothesizing
A hypothesis is a verbal or symbolic statement of relationship between two or more
variables (e.g., Self-esteem is positively related to self-disclosure). A variable is any construct or
concept that can be observed to take on different values (e.g., anxiety, self-disclosure,
assertiveness, etc.). It takes the form of X = fY. A definition (e.g., self-esteem is the degree to
which self is perceived positively) characterizes the nature of a variable, but not its relationship to
other variables. It takes the form of X = Y.
All of this is just a fancy way of saying that the hypothesis paper attempts to develop,
through review and personal argument, a series of hypotheses on a given topic. Many of these
hypotheses may be articulated in the existing research literature, they may be derived from
conceptual models, or the products of creativity and imagination. There are two keys to this
assignment: (1) Developing well-conceived and well-worded hypotheses, and (2) developing
reasonable arguments for each hypothesis. Like any argument, it is made credible through the
use of causal analysis, evidence, example, strong reasons, and scholarly support. The most
important thing is that every hypothesis should be carefully worded (read all these instructions to
understand this warning) and arguments should answer two “why” questions: (1) Why are the
variables related this way? (2) Why is the hypothesis likely to be true? The word “because” should
figure prominently in the explanations.
To explain a hypothesis means to make sensible how and why things are related the way
they are. Theories are basically sets of conceptual links among hypotheses. For example, a person
may want to explain the hypothesis: “As jealousy increases, the likelihood of relational violence
increases.” Guided by an understanding of argument (e.g., see recommendations for writing that
follow later in these instructions), this hypothesis could be argued thusly: Jealousy is a complex
blend of emotions based on the perception that a person’s valued relationship is threatened by a
third party or rival. [backing] Retzinger (1991) has reviewed evidence [grounds] that violence is
likely to result from a combination of anger and shame, but neither alone [backing]. Because
[warrant] anger creates an inner sense of expressive frustration and arousal, and shame provides
a target for this expression (i.e., the partner and/or the rival), the jealous person is much more
likely to engage in violence than non-jealous persons. [claim] This hypothesis may not apply to
contexts in which strong moral, religious, or public restraints are in place (e.g., even jealous
persons tend not to be overtly violent in public places). [rebuttal] The rebuttal is not necessary,
but sometimes illustrates relative objectivity and openness of the author.
In this explanation, other concepts (i.e., the theory of rage as proposed by Retzinger, with
its components of anger and rage) are used to make the link between jealousy and violence
sensible. More explanation could be provided for these concepts, more evidence reviewed in
favor of Retzinger’s hypothesis, and so forth, but the basic elements of explanation and argument
are there. The point is that explanation is neither mere restatement nor mere review of research
or expert opinion. And please note, there is no quotation, and no need for quotation. Quotations
should be used extremely sparingly—I want to see your writing, not someone else’s.
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Types of Hypotheses
Below is a series of hypotheses to illustrate how they can differ. These hypotheses may seem
overly sophisticated or technical right now. However, research of a topic has begun, hypothetical
relations will begin to emerge either stated directly (i.e., in the form of hypotheses being tested)
or indirectly (i.e., implied by the explanation and discussion of the concepts).
The simplest, and weakest, form of hypothesis is a "non-directional" statement of relationship.
For example:
H1:
Self-esteem is related to communication competence.
While this is a hypothesis, it provides minimal information regarding the precise nature of the
relationship. Avoid such statements in the paper. A more precise form is:
H2: Self-esteem is positively related to interpersonal communication competence. (Note: This
can be reworded as: “Persons high in self-esteem are significantly higher in communication
competence than persons low in self-esteem”).
Hypotheses can also vary by the form (or shape) of the relationship:
H3: Motivation, knowledge and skills are curvilinear to perceived communication competence.
(That is, they are positively related up to a moderately high range of competence, after which
higher values lead to lower perceived competence).
Finally, deductive construction allows the development of stronger, and more tightly controlled,
theoretical arguments. For example,
H4:
As [TV exposure] increases, [verbal skills] decrease.
[A]
[B]
H5:
As [verbal skills] decrease, use of [physical violence] in conflict increases.
[B]
[C]
H6:
As [TV exposure] increases, use of [physical violence] in conflict increases.
[A]
[C]
On the Art of Explanation
“We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5.1361)
Explanation implies the identification of some “bridge” (i.e., warrant, “because...,” etc.) that
serves as an account of why one concept is related to another concept. It is an “animating
mechanism,” that gives life to a concept. For example, one popular concept is that exposure to
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violence in the media causes violence in society. The natural question is why. Answering the
“why” question gets at the concept of explanation. Even though seeing or hearing the equation:
“media violence causes societal violence” seems like an explanation, it is not. It is missing the
bridge, or animating mechanism.
To illustrate, consider a few “non-explanations.” It is not an explanation to say media
violence causes societal violence because: (1) media depictions of violence are increasing; (2)
societal violence is increasing; (3) some people have engaged in crimes they saw on TV
(“copycat crimes”); (4) people believe what they see on TV; (5) research shows media violence
increases societal violence. Each of these merely suggests correlation (rather than causation),
repeats the original assertion, or simply provides backing for an explanation that is itself
missing. In contrast, to illustrate legitimate explanations, consider the following:
Cultivation: Social learning theory claims that people learn both by direct experience
(e.g., touching a hot stove) or observation of others (e.g., observing one’s sister touch a hot
stove). Since we cannot or do not always directly experience things (e.g., robbing a bank), we
look to real and imaginative role models (e.g., media figures and narratives). Thus, the crime
and violence in the media provide models, and rewarding ones at that, for us we otherwise
would not have had.
Cognitive Availability: Our brain can be viewed as a library. If 90% of this library is filled
with science fiction, and we are asked to respond to someone’s question for information, we
are most likely to give them a fanciful piece of information, because that is what is most
represented in our mind’s library. If, in watching media, most of the acts or ways of dealing with
conflict we observe are violent in nature, it simply supplies more acts of violence to store in our
mental repertoires, and thus, when we find ourselves in a conflict, violent acts are the most
“available” to draw upon.
Disinhibition: Growing up in a culture is largely about learning what one cannot or is not
supposed to do. The very nature of culture is conformity and normative action within a given
body of beliefs and behaviors. Exposure to violence in the media may make violence appear
more normative than it is, and thus, make engaging in violence seem less deviant. In essence, it
is not making violence seem more rewarding (cultivation) or available, but merely makes the
violence within a person more acceptable.
Fantasy Fulfillment: Freud and others might argue that daily life, as well as the normal
tortures of growing up, fill us with tensions that are constantly repressed. These tensions
struggle to “get out,” managing to manifest themselves mainly in the form of fantasy. Media
violence may give form to these fantasies, making them more vivid and “real,” thereby
stimulating the enactment of fantasies in life (e.g., who has not “fantasized” about hitting
someone in the face—seeing it done may both “suggest” it, but stimulate the enactment of it).
Desensitization: One of the reasons people avoid violence is that it hurts others.
However, when violence is everywhere in the media, it can numb one’s sensibilities, and lower
one’s ability to empathize. Further, the more cartoonish the violence, the more it seems it does
not really hurt anyone. Such exposure to violence may take the “brakes” off using by making
violence seem less hurtful, and thus, less costly to use.
Excitation: Violence is a thrill. Through 5 million years of evolution, we have come to
find violence a potential threat, a potential path to victory, and therefore, arousing. Thus,
seeing violence in the media is itself, arousing, and this arousal stimulates our own arousal. Our
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arousal (adrenaline, muscular tension, etc.) needs to find an outlet, and is expressed in
violence.
Peer Group Mediation: Research on sexual violence indicates that people who engage
in sexual violence are much more likely to have friends who approve of, and have engaged in,
sexual violence. The suggestion is that peer groups mediate the transfer of violence. That is, if a
peer group watches violence in the media, this peer group may then become self-reinforcing
through its interaction, thereby serving as the proximal stimulus to its members’ violence.
Spillover: Violence in the media provides models of behavior in certain contexts that are
then available for generalization to contexts experienced in everyday life, both directly
comparable to those observed in the media, as well as contexts largely unrelated. Thus, for
example, a person may “copycat” behaviors witnessed in the media, but may also extend the
function of the behaviors observed in one context (e.g., a drop kick in a professional wrestling
program) to another context (e.g., a dispute with one’s brother).
Cultural Chaos: Violence in the media may reflect the very breakdown of society, norms,
and culture. If everyone is violent to everyone in the media, then this communicates a sense of
despair, hopelessness, alienation and angst to the viewing public. This has the effects of both
(1) inciting some to exploit the lawlessness (e.g., looting during natural disasters), (2) join the
crowd (e.g., mob violence during the L.A. riots), (3) bystander apathy providing a permissive
environment for violence.
Each of these explanations offers slightly and sometimes substantively distinct sources
of causation. For example, fantasy fulfillment, excitation and disinhibition tend to assume that
we are by nature violent, and all that is needed is something in the media to take the restraints
of society away. Cultivation and availability argue media instills violence in us. Peer-group
mediation and cultural chaos tend to view media as having an effect on society at large, which
only then affects our individual behavior.
In all these examples concepts are elaborated to make sensible the link between
violence in the media and in society. Co-occurrence makes no sense without an explanation,
and it matters which explanation is offered. A “theory” cannot be evaluated until its
explanatory rationale has been specified, and the brief examples above illustrate how
significant, and distinct, such explanations can be.
Conclusion
Understanding and explaining ultimately rely upon some underlying concept of
causation, whether viewed in narrative, idiographic, historical, or analytical ways. Causation, in
turn, is represented by propositions, whether formal (e.g., X is positively related to Y) or
informal (e.g., X happened because Y and Z happened in context C). Theories are the
conceptual tools that permit such explanations to be formalized, and eventually tested in the
crucible of social science and academic discipline. If a theory is poorly conceptualized and
constructed, it cannot be tested adequately. Such a theory thereby provides signposts to paths
down which scholarly inquiry should not continue. Until the field becomes more schooled in
and adept at theory construction, however, such errant crusades are likely to continue.
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Table 1. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THEORIES
I. NECESSARY CONDITIONS:
1. Explanatory Power: The theory must provide a sensible account of the phenomena of
concern
2. Construct and Conditionship Specification: The theory must indicate the nature of the
constructs and the relationships among these constructs (i.e., necessity, sufficiency,
parameters, function form, generality, etc.)
3. Boundary Specification: The theory must indicate the domain of its legitimate scope and
relevance
4. Intra-Boundary Generality: The theory must provide statements of relationship that hold
across all phenomena of concern
5. Internal Consistency: The theory must maintain logical consistency of all statements of
conditionship, assumptions, and units
6. External consistency: The theory must avoid contradiction of "known" data
7. Verifiability: The theory must be potentially verifiable, such that it is:
A) Operational: A sufficient number of the theoretical units must be capable of being
measured/observed
B) Falsifiable: It must be possible to establish conditions under which statements of the
theory can be observed to be true/untrue
II. DESIRABLE CONDITIONS:
1. Precision: The more the theory allows prediction of phenomena, the better the theory:
A) End State Prediction: Prediction of some identifiable "outcome" of the phenomena
behavior
B) Phase State Prediction: Prediction of various stages or evolving states of behavior
toward an end state
2. Parsimony: The more elegant and simple the theory, the better the theory
3. Correspondence with Observables: The more of the theory units that are observable, the
better the theory
4. Breadth: The broader the scope or range of the theory, the better the theory; i.e.,
verisimilitude
5. Control: The greater the potential for strategic manipulation of the phenomena, the better
the theory
6. Heurism/Novelty: The more novel content, and the more the theory suggests in the way of
new scientific endeavors, the better the theory. The more the theory explains new facts or
counterintuitive facts, the better the theory.
7. Synthesis: The more the theory facilitates the organization and inclusion of ideas and
information, the better the theory
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III. RELATIVE CONDITIONS:
7. Competition Principle: Theories should compete favorably vis-à-vis their rivals (Colomy,
1991); “theory evaluation is primarily a comparative affair” (Laudan, 1981, p. 145); “There
is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 119).
8. Money in the Bank Principle: “We are warranted in continuing to conjecture that a theory
has high verisimilitude when it has accumulated ‘money in the bank’ by passing several
stiff tests” (Meehl, 1990, p. 115)
9. Damn Strange Coincidences Principle: “The main way a theory gets money in the bank is
by predicting facts that, absent the theory, would be antecedently improbable” (Meehl,
1990, p. 115).
10. Aesthetics: “A good theory is a plausible theory, and a theory is judged to be more
plausible and of higher quality if it is interesting rather than obvious, irrelevant or absurd,
obvious in novel ways, a source of unexpected connections, high in narrative rationality,
aesthetically pleasing, or correspondent with presumed realities” (Weick, 1989, p. 517).
IV. CRITICAL CONDITIONS:
11. Generative capacity: “the capacity to challenge the guiding assumptions of the culture, to
raise fundamental questions regarding contemporary social life, to foster reconsideration
of that which is ‘taken for granted,’ and thereby to generate fresh alternatives for social
action” (Gergen, 1994, Toward transformation…, p. 109)
12. Counter-suggestiveness: “What we need here is an education that makes people contrary,
counter-suggestive, without making them incapable of devoting themselves to the
elaboration of any single view” (Feyerabend, 1980, p. 63)
IV. DEFINITION:
"A theory is a verifiable conceptual system of interrelated formal or informal propositions
explaining conditionship among a set of phenomena, which is generalizable within a
defined domain, and is internally consistent and externally sensible." (Spitzberg, 1998)
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Islands of Inquiry
Foreword:
Spitzberg, B. H. (in press). Islands of inquiry. Foreword for: G. Merrigan & C. L. Huston.
Communication research methods (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
By Brian H. Spitzberg
School of Communication
San Diego State University
Imagine an island archipelago in the vast, uncharted sea of science. Long ago
intrepid explorers from a nation state far, far away settled the islands of this archipelago.
Once the various islands were settled, the peoples found themselves separated by
shark-infested waters, treacherous reefs and inaccessible ports. Consequently, little
commerce today occurs between natives of these separate islands. Over time, the
peoples developed alternative customs, rituals, religions, values, dialects, and modes of
exchange.
Because each island produces slightly different desirable natural resources, the
various peoples of these islands face a fundamental choice: do they compete to take
the territories across the waters by force, or do they find sufficient commonality to
negotiate normative and mutually compatible relations for continued commerce?
Conflict is costly, but may be seen as a means to possess the entire archipelago, the
entire territory with all the resources and power entailed by the success of such a
conflict. In contrast, a negotiated cooperative arrangement may reduce the total
resources available to each individual island, but enable greater benefits by avoiding the
costs of waging war and arranging complementary exchanges of the best each culture
has to offer. Conflict can make a group stronger by steeling the motives to pull together
against the external enemies, yet it can also reveal the weaknesses and fractures of a
given group, and potentially, the entire overthrow of one’s own cherished culture.
The methodological “cultures” of social scientists are a lot like these separate
island cultures. They each have their rules, customs, beliefs and values. Each knows
the others exist, but they engage in relatively little commerce and often view each other
with suspicion and incredulity. Conflict, or at least indifference, occurs more often than
cooperation.
Social science began in the ancient, perhaps primal, desire to understand the
world around us. Long ago, Eastern and Western traditions evolved across and into
various eras, cultures and locales of enlightenment. As it was increasingly realized that
scientific methods for understanding the world could be cumulative and increasingly
valid, the approaches to understanding the physical world were increasingly extended to
investigating the social world.
These scholars eventually evolved into “tribes” of methodological and theoretical
disciplines and associations. These tribes settled distinct islands of academe, often only
dimly aware of the practices and beliefs of the tribes occupying the academic programs
across continents, universities, colleges, departments, and even hallways and faculty
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room tables. The methods by which these tribes became acculturated and accustomed
became claims to their natural resources of the “truth(s)” of the world, and the academic
prestige implied by successful claims to this domain. Over time, these different methods
have more often fomented indifference, alienation, and occasional struggles for respect,
rather than negotiated cooperation. Scholars peer derisively at the alien practices of the
heathen tribe across these methodological divides, and chant the righteousness of their
own personal beliefs and customs.
The domain of truth is often viewed as a limited resource, and any successful
claims by other tribes result in territory no longer available to conquer except through
renewed conflict. These territorial skirmishes often strengthen the spirits of believers
and sometimes eliminate more destructive or flawed cultural customs of certain tribes;
but often the ongoing battles serve no higher purpose than to fuel the conflict itself. The
tribes intuitively understand that identifying a foil, or a common enemy, helps reinforce
the resolve of the group. The destructiveness of the conflicts is typically exacerbated by
the tendency of the different cultures to employ distinct symbols, vocabularies and
dialects. Misunderstandings become common, even when negotiation efforts are
pursued in the interest of cooperation.
Social scientists have developed different methodological idioms of scholarly
inquiry. These methodological practices represent distinct cultures, sometimes
cooperating, but more often competing, to claim the larger territory of social science.
Even when representatives of these distinct cultures claim publicly the importance of
“getting along,” in private conversations with those of their own tribes, the rhetoric
generally becomes incendiary and resentful of the others’ intrusions into territories more
“rightly” reserved for one’s own endeavors.
Competition for the sake of competition may have reached the limits of its
evolutionary value. Two millennia have helped hone a verdant array of methodological
islands. Productive progress in the future may well require more than a mere truce.
Instead, the academic archipelago of social sciences may need a common bill of rights,
a common sense of collective purpose and a common recognition of each other’s
contributions. Unfortunately, such a revolution is not in the immediate offing. Before
such a revolution can occur, however, bridges must be forged between and among the
academic islands. This textbook lays the preliminary pontoons, in two important ways:
First, by locating the nature of methods in the nature of argument, and second, by
representing the broader scope of methods currently employed by the communication
discipline.
By locating the central underlying architecture of all methods in the structure of
arguments, this text helps decode the Rosetta Stone of methodological languages, the
symbolic intersection through which negotiations for collective commerce in the pursuit
of knowledge must progress. No matter what else a method attempts to accomplish, it
must rely upon, and establish the validity of, its practices through argument. Every
method guides the production, collection and analysis of data, which consist of
artifact(s), observation(s), case(s), example(s), or counts of something. But data alone
prove nothing. Data only become meaningful in the crucible of argument, which
connects the data through warrants to claims. Warrants are the reasons, rationale, or
answer to the question “why” should I believe the claim being made by this research.
The claim is the conclusion, or the particular proposition (e.g., hypothesis, value
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judgment, belief statement, etc.), which contextualizes the reasonableness of the data
in connection with a claim. The claim, once established, may then become the warrant
for subsequent arguments. Warrants are the bridges between data and claim, and
claims so established serve as bridges to further arguments.
This textbook examines ways of knowing as arguments. When a scholar has
reached a conclusion, it stands as a privileged claim—a claim that this scholar’s method
has provided specialized insight. Scholars apply a specialized method that they have
apprenticed in their education to master, and this method serves as a way of privileging
their voice compared to any given layperson’s view of the world. This does not
invalidate the layperson’s views—it only suggests that methods provide a more
reasoned or systematic approach to knowing than the average person will have had the
opportunity or expertise to apply to making claims about some particular topic of
investigation.
There are many ways of scholarly knowing, but four illustrative paradigms in the
communication discipline consist of discovery, conversation/textual analysis,
interpretation, and critical approaches. These will be defined and detailed more
extensively throughout the text, but for now, they can be illustrated in general ways. The
discovery method assumes a singular objective reality, and although no method can
reveal this objective truth in the social world, the discovery method uses various
methods of objectification, including experiments, control, and quantification in an
attempt to inch ever closer to that reality. The conversation/textual method assumes
that because communicators accomplish everyday life based only on the behaviors they
display through their communication (as opposed to reading each other’s minds),
researchers can understand such behavior best by observing and precisely analyzing
such naturally occurring activities. The interpretive method assumes that reality is
socially constructed; that there are as many realities as there are people perceiving and
influencing such perceptions through their communication. The critical method assumes
that reality is always influenced by underlying systems of often hidden influence and
power, and such structures must be evaluated through an evaluative perspective that
reveals these hidden forces, thereby presenting opportunities for pursuing more noble
or practical ends. If these paradigms are analyzed through the lens of the rationales
they rely upon, they might look something like the following arguments:
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Figure 1. Diagramming the underlying arguments of different ways of knowing.
DATA: All methodological paradigms
engage in systematic selection,
collection, observation, and
interpretation of empirical
communication-relevant data.
WARRANT: Given these data, the
methodological rationale provide
justification for rendering the
following claim(s)…
CLAIM: Given these data and
warrant(s), each of the following
paradigms claims that…:
 From the interpretive
paradigm perspective, this is
a new frame for
understanding these texts
and their implications.
 From the discovery
paradigm perspective, these
data reveal new information
about the generalizable
nature of reality.
 From the critical paradigm
perspective, these data
enlighten the role of
constraints, power, and
exploitation, and point to
possibilities for improving
communication, society, and
the human condition.
Each paradigm or method can be further elaborated into its own particular
rationale. The discovery paradigm presupposes that in any given process, there is a set
of causes and effects, and that methods properly designed to manage or control for
subjectivity of the researcher(s), and translating observations into quantifiable
measurements, can reveal something about how causes associate with such effects.
This approach to knowing implies an argument such as the following.
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Figure 2. Diagramming the underlying argument for the discovery paradigm.
DATA: Communication is a cause,
and is caused by, complex but
specifiable underlying processes.
CLAIM: Therefore, probability,
measurement, design, theoryand hypothesis-testing render
generalizable conclusions about
cause-effect relations.
WARRANT: Given statistical or
experimental control of
extraneous, mediating and
moderating variables, causal
influences can be identified to a
reasonable level of probability
(by excluding null and competing
hypotheses).
As another example, let’s say that in meticulously observing everyday
conversation, you recognize a highly complex process through which people achieve
social life. That is, apologies, compliments, requests, and the “events” of everyday life
are accomplished through a subtle choreography of move and countermove of
behavior. In such a dance, thoughts, values and beliefs are actually irrelevant to
uncovering the structure of such accomplishments. An interactant cannot peer into your
mind during a conversation; he or she recognizes an apology through the structure of
the behavior observed, and therefore, such behavior is also observable by a researcher.
The data of everyday accomplishments exists in behavior. If this is accurate, then it
seems reasonable that all inferences about what conversationalists are attempting to
achieve through interaction is exclusively “available” to others through their behavior.
Several arguments could be derived from this rationale, but consider for the moment the
following:
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Figure 3. Diagramming the underlying argument for the conversation/textual analysis
paradigm.
DATA: Everyday conversation is
accomplished exclusively through
mutually observable behavior.
CLAIM: Subjective thoughts of
interactants are irrelevant to
understanding how interaction is
accomplished.
WARRANT: Interactants have no
access to others’ subjective
thoughts, yet accomplish
everyday tasks through
interaction.
In contrast, interactants often make judgments about what others are doing
through their behavior. In so doing, sometimes making one attribution rather than
another may be an important determinant of how a person behaves in response to
others’ behavior. For example, if you think you deserve an apology from someone, and
this person provides what seems a cursory or inappropriate apology, you are likely to
devalue this person’s apology. If you think this person provided an insincere apology
because he or she thought you didn’t deserve an apology, you might begin disliking this
person. Further, you might respond by seeking further apology, or avoid interacting with
this person in the future. In short, your attributions or subjective thoughts about this
person’s behavior directly influence your interaction with this person. Consequently, an
argument can be derived as follows:
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Figure 4. Diagramming the underlying argument for the interpretive paradigm.
DATA: Subjective thoughts affect
motives and means of interaction.
CLAIM: Subjective thoughts are
essential to understanding how
interaction is accomplished.
WARRANT: Interactants seek to
understand others’ behavior by
making subjective attributions
about why the others
behaved/said what they did.
Finally, the world may reveal disparities and distortions that imply underlying
forces at work, which sustain themselves through power, deception, manipulation, and
bias. Such hidden forces require critics to expose them, and to provide an evaluative
standard against which such exploitative practices might be revealed and the victims of
such distortions thereby liberated to empower their own interests. The rationale
underlying this paradigm might look like the following.
Figure 5. Diagramming the underlying argument for the critical paradigm.
DATA: There are forms of
exploitation, deprivation,
corruption, and distortion in life.
CLAIM: Critical inquiry and
evaluations need to reveal these
forms of exploitation, thereby
pointing the way to better ways of
pursuing life.
WARRANT: Such disparities and
distortions could only be
sustained to the extent that they
are hidden or masked by
powerful interests, groups, and
individuals.
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These various arguments lead to very different claims (i.e., methods) of
understanding social interaction. For example, to the conversation analyst, only
people’s naturally-occurring behaviors count as data, whereas in ethnographic or
interpretive methods, both thoughts and behaviors count as data. Discovery
researchers will experiment with people, whereas interpretive and conversation analytic
researchers take people’s behavior for what it is, or was, and do not seek to introduce
new stimuli to the investigation context. It follows that what counts as a theory can differ
substantially across these paradigms. In one, behavior explains behavior, whereas in
another, perceptions and feelings explain behavior. Conversation analytic researchers
don’t see the relevance of the findings of survey (discovery) researchers, and survey
researchers have difficulty seeing how to generalize the conclusions of conversation
analysts without a cognitive theoretical context.
So it is with all methodological arguments—they are the ways we know, and the
ways we choose to know often seem to preclude other ways of knowing. The collective
practices and vocabularies of scholars represent what Thomas Kuhn (1970) referred to
as paradigms, and he believed them to be incommensurable. That is, a paradigm
answers all the questions it needs to, in much the same way a religion is meant to do,
and consequently, there is no need to borrow from another paradigm, just as most
people find no need to borrow religious beliefs from another religion.
So the islands upon which these researchers dwell are isolated by the arguments
they make. But maybe, just maybe, if they recognize this fact, they can begin to
understand why they reside on different islands in the first place, and how their
respective tribes differ. Maybe they can begin to see how their arguments relate to each
other, and begin a dialogue through which cooperation, rather than conflict, can be
begun (Craig, 1999). Perhaps they can learn to “talk each other’s language” (Kuhn,
1970), and thereby better understand their differences. This textbook, by excavating the
underlying basis of these differences, lays the initial bridges (and warrants) for this
dialogue to begin.
This dialogue is facilitated to the extent the various tribes and their customs are
known. Arguments are most competent when adapted to their audiences, including
those with whom we argue (i.e., other practitioners), as well as other interested parties
(e.g., granting agencies, foundations, the media, etc.). Another strength of this text is a
fair representation of the domain of the discipline. Few survey textbooks, for example,
do justice to conversation analysis, or only give shallow consideration of critical and
rhetorical methods. In contrast, this textbook recognizes the legitimacy of these
methods as equivalent because their endeavors are predicated on the same discourse
of argument. As Walter Fisher (1978) claimed, all arguments are ultimately erected on
the foundations of underlying values, and “no analytically grounded hierarchy of values
will ever claim universal adherence” (p. 377). Nevertheless, having an understanding of
the multiple cultures of values with which one may seek congress, the better the
dialogue can become in the service of that engagement.
Nowhere is this dialogue more important than in the initial enculturation of
students, beginning your own intrepid voyages into the often turbulent waters of the
communication discipline. Just as it is easier developmentally to learn multiple
languages early in the process of language learning, so it is easier to accept multiple
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 163
methodologies before any single methodological argument has fortified its armaments
and defenses against the other scholarly cultures with which it competes. Distinct
cultural groups need not engage in similar practices to reap the benefits of mutual
understanding and cooperation.
The potential distance and competition among islands of inquiry is an old
concern. Scholars have previously suggested that the key differences are in the
questions that each culture seeks to answer. The types of questions asked can be
important frames for arguments—such as determining what kind of argument
represents a sensible response. People have suggested, for example, that there need
be no competition between religion and science (Gould, 1999) or science and
humanities (Gould, 2003; Miller, 1975), because these magisteria ask different types of
questions, and thereby avoid encroachment upon one another’s terrirtories. Others,
however, have suggested that the differences between religion and science, for
example, go far deeper than just the questions asked—they go to issues such as their
orientation to skepticism, openness to new knowledge and discovery, and the degree to
which faith is placed in preserving the past versus accumulating, revising, and
correcting, and accumulating the past (Fuchs, 2001). In the case of the arguments
posed for the methods encountered in this text, for the most part, the big questions
addressed are the same—why do people communicate the ways they do, and how
does such communication affect the human condition? Instead, the major differences in
the paradigms of inquiry examined in this text have to do with ways of answering any
such questions, and this “how” question is addressed by different methods, representing
different kinds of arguments for pursuing understanding.
The journey is not an easy one. Forging relations with strange cultures and
territories seldom is. There are many barriers that even the most motivated and capable
among us face in building bridges across the waves and shoals of these methodological
divides (Bryman, 2007). On the other hand, there are usually great benefits to
developing an acquaintance and ongoing relationship with these cultures. Eventually,
with enough trade, commerce, and experience in multiple cultures of research, scholars
may become truly multi-lingual and multi-cultural, appreciating their indigenous culture
and yet fully appreciating and engaging other cultures as well. There are many fruits of
knowledge to taste and experiences to pursue that can only derive from encounters with
those beyond the borders of our own comfortable domains.
Therefore, go forth, and may you find the value of the voyage worthwhile. And for
the few of you who will ever get the privilege of applying such arguments in the service
of knowledge, may you get some glimpse of the excitement that derives from knowing
something no one else knows, of discovering something no one else has discovered, or
of seeing further than anyone else has previously seen. The risks of being wrong are
great, but the potential of charting new routes or discovering new islands, or even
building new bridges, holds its own rewards for those willing to venture forth with a spirit
of scholarly adventure. This text will help you greatly along your way, providing as it
does the charts and compass needed for the voyage ahead.
Brian H. Spitzberg
School of Communication
San Diego State University
Comm 610: Advanced Communication Theory: 164
30 December 2002
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“there is greater happiness than building theories
and accumulating facts in silence and solitude”
Charles Darwin, in a letter to his fiancée Emma, 1839