UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS
School of International, Development and European Studies

Children’s Security and Human
Insecurity:
Mitigating the Impacts of Armed Conflict on
Civilian Children - the Rhetoric and Reality
of Human Security in the Post Cold War Era.
By Sara Edson
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
MA in International Studies (1998-1999)
Acknowledgements
In memory of S.H. - and to all those at Camp Quality and the Starship Children’s
Hospital who taught me about ‘children’s agency’ and ‘human dignity.’
I would like to express my gratitude to all those people who took time out from their busy
schedules to suggest where I might obtain useful source material for this project and or
send out copies of relevant publications. In particular, thanks to Rebecca Bennett at the
UN, Allison Pillsbury at The Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children in
New York, Peter Buckland and Susan Fountain at UNICEF, Jennifer Dec at Save the
Children, Chen Reis at the University of Essex, Rachel Hinton at the University of
Edinburgh, Helen Brocklehurst at the University of Aberystwyth, Alastair Ager at Queen
Margaret College, Jo Boyden and David Tolfree.
I would also like to thank my supervisor Dr. Hugh Dyer for his thought provoking
discussions and academic guidance.
Finally, my deepest thanks go to my close family and friends both ‘Downunder’ and here
in the UK, for their loving support and encouragement throughout the duration of this
course.
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Abstract
This study is an examination into how the international community fails to fully
understand or soundly apply the concept of ‘human security’. It specifically looks into
how children’s security is undermined in the Post Cold War era, with the reality of
intrastate disorder, and by a conflated rhetoric which characterises New World Order
values. The importance of this topic is that while civilian children’s security has to date
not been considered ‘high politics’, their human security or insecurity has multifarious
implications for national, regional and global security, given that they represent the next
generation of states citizens. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989 CRC) is
an instrument coterminous with New World Order values. It held out some promise for a
greater degree of children’s civil, political, social and economic security in peace and
wartime. Yet in terms of mitigating the social and economic effects of armed conflict on
civilian children the success of this piece of legislature is questionable; either in terms of
protecting children or promoting their resilience, at the individual and socio-economic
levels of analysis. This work argues that to increase these children’s human security in
the mid to long term, humanitarian agencies should be more aware of ethnocentric biases
in the metatext of the 1989 CRC and pay closer attention to the specific social and
economic needs and agency of children, in their particular locales. In redefining human
security through children’s security in this manner, a ‘critical thinking space’ is
conceived which might rapproche some New World Order rhetoric and reality and be a
bridge towards greater human security.
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………….2
Abstract………………………………………..…………………………….3
Section 1:
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………....6
Methodology……………………………………………………………………………...7
Chapter 1. Background to Human Security
1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………12
1.2 End of the Cold War and Redefinition of Security……………………………….12
1.3 Concept of Human Security……………………………………………………13
1.4 Defining Human Security through Human Rights……………………………….15
1.5 Development of Human Rights Norms (1945-1989)……………………………...19
1.6 Limitations of Children’s Security Before 1989.…………………………………20
1.7 Promising Greater Security- Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.…….21
Section 2:
Chapter 2. Human Insecurity: Impacts of Armed Conflict on Civilian Children
2.1 Introduction...…………………………………………………………………....…23
2.2 Armed Conflict Today……………………………………………………....……. 23
2.3 Impacts on Civilian Children ……………………………………………………..24
2.3.1 Physical and Psychological Effects………………………………..………...24
2.3.2 Wider Health Impacts………………………………………………………..26
2.3.3 Disruption to Education……………………………………………...………27
2.3.4 Wider Social, Cultural and Economic Ramifications…………….………..28
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Chapter 3. Corresponding Duties of Humanitarian Programmes to the Social and
Economic Rights of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
3.1 Introduction: Promoting Positive Liberties………….……………..…………….30
3.2 Drawbacks of Psychological Programmes…………………….……….………….31
3.3 Merits of Pyschosocial Programmes…………………….……...…………………32
3.31 Peace Education - Children as a Social Bridge …………………..…………..36
3.4 Enhancing Children’s Social and Economic Security: Participatory Model…...38
Section 3:
Chapter 4. Redefining Human Security through Children’s Security
4.1 Introduction: Positivist Versus Post-Positivist Lenses…………………………...39
4.2 Globalist Thought and Children’s Security……...……………………………….40
4.3 Critical Theory and Human Security……………………………………………..42
4.4 Revisiting the Human Security Dilemma through Children
-A Critical Thinking Space…………………………………………………...……44
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….….……..48
Appendices
A Synopsis of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)…………………..50
B Aims of Peace Education…………………………………………………………..51
References…………………………………………………………………...…...……..52
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SECTION 1:
Introduction:
In the Post-Cold War era ‘security’ in International Relations has supposedly been
redefined to include the advent of ‘human security’. This should mean that there are also
greater opportunities for realising ‘children’s security’. Yet the international community
remains unsure as to how to make both of these concepts meaningful. I argue that the
realisation of human security in general and children’s security in particular remains
thwarted - so long as a Cold War mentality prevails. The international community may
no longer be bifurcated in Superpower terms; however there is still an implicit refusal to
disengage with polarised thinking on what does and does not constitute ‘high politics’.
Children are not considered high politics. This traditional distinction between high and
low politics is divorced from the essential tenets of human security though. The paradox
does International Relations a great disservice.
This hypothesis is tested in the dissertation by surveying the international community’s
attempts to mitigate the impacts of armed conflict on civilian children. I firstly cast
doubts on the extent to which children’s security has been assured via the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child. In the wake of the Cold War this legal instrument was to hold
out hope of a New World Order for children in peace and wartime. Yet it is clear that for
children in failing states the promise of a more secure future contrasts markedly with
their current dis-ordered reality. I evaluate the extent to which the social and economic
principles of the 1989 CRC have been adopted by humanitarian agencies in their
programmes. I suggest that the existing gap between the rhetoric and reality of children’s
wellbeing can and should be lessened by implementing policies that work in greater
tandem with children’s social and economic needs and agency, in their particular cultural
environ. Interposed between the rhetoric from the top down and the reality from the
bottom up, this approach can make a theoretical, but moreover a practical contribution
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towards fulfilling the promise of human security for civilian children on the ground. It
might also prove a critical thinking and acting space for human security per se.
Methodology:
This study is divided into three sections.
The first section is comprised of the introduction, this methodological section and the
first chapter. Chapter 1 backgrounds the concept of ‘human security’. The end of the
Cold War gave impetus to this concept which has proved difficult to define. I suggest
one way to make sense of the abstraction is to parallel it with the more longstanding
human rights literature. In chapter 1 I show how there was a burgeoning of human rights
norms from World War II to 1989, however this was subordinate to a forty-year Cold
War structure which suppressed human rights and invoked human insecurity. This is
symptomatic of a dichotomy between idealism and realism as well as emblematic of a
false split between low and high politics.i These two themes underscore this work. In
chapter 1 I introduce the Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter CRC 1989) as
a specific exemplar of these rifts which stymie human security.
In this first section resource material is drawn from secondary sources; namely books,
articles and papers on human rights and world politics. There is some departure from this
with the use of two reports on human security acquired via the Internet.
The second section of this study embodies and develops the case study, namely - the
impacts of armed conflict on children and the international community’s attempts to
mitigate these. In accordance with article 1 of the 1989 CRC, I initially define the ‘child
as a person under the age of 18’. However, I concede that this upper limit may be too
high given children in the developing world often assume adult roles earlier than their
Western counterparts (see Chapter 3 for an elaboration of this point). I use the term
‘international community’ interchangeably; to refer to both a ‘community of states’ as
well as to the activities of International Governmental and Non-Governmental
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Organisations (hereafter IGO’s and NGO’s). The former definition is more appropriate
when discussing the 1989 CRC’s principles as a binding document and the latter when
talking about the implementation of them by humanitarian agencies. While I am
interested in developing their potentiality in tandem, there are distinct power differentials
between the two and my focus here is on the scope of the latter given that article 41 of the
1989 CRC contains a loophole for the states abdication of responsibility (see Appendix
1).
The responses of the international community to mitigating the impacts of armed conflict
on civilian children can be divided into three categories. The first and most controversial
is military humanitarian intervention. The second is International Humanitarian Law
(hereafter IHL); i.e. law applied in war.
The third grouping are humanitarian
programmes.
This project concerns itself with how children’s security has been addressed by the latter
two categories. This is because ‘military humanitarianism’ enhances human security at
the expense of human rights thereby nullifying human security. IHL and humanitarian
programmes are the preferable conduits of human security for they are not physically
forceful interventionary measures and they require mutual consensus. State parties agree
to ratify legal norms and humanitarian assistance must usually be permitted by the state.
This is no guarantee that human security will be enhanced. ‘Soft laws’ are often flouted
and humanitarian agencies have been known to denigrate human security. ii Nevertheless,
the underlying co-operative premises of IHL and humanitarian programmes are more
promising than the inherently contradictory premises of military humanitarianism.
In this study the selected focus of IHL as it relates to children in war is the 1989 CRC.
This is the obvious choice as it is the most recent, comprehensive and significant piece of
legislation with respect to promoting and protecting children’s human rights in peacetime
and in war. The 1989 CRC ties in with the framework of this study given it came into
play as the Cold War ended. At the World Summit for Children in New York in 1990 an
‘era of special protection for children in times of peace and war was heralded (Hamilton
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n.d: 22). Like the New World Order diatribe in general, this is a salient example of a
hyperbolic promise which has largely failed to deliver.
Chapter 2 surveys the rights civilian children are supposedly ‘guaranteed’ under the 1989
CRC, but which are clearly grossly undermined in situations of intra state conflict. This
study concentrates on civilian children and armed conflict rather than child soldiers. This
is because non-combatants endure the majority of suffering.iii The human rights abuses
that civilian children experience are commensurate with the complete erosion of human
security. The violations of rights range from physical and psychological harms to the
individual to collective societal disarray.
I give an illustrative account of these by
drawing upon civilian children’s experiences from different continents. The majority of
examples are drawn from the developing world because intrastate conflict is a common
feature in these regions.
Chapter 3 focuses on how the social and economic principles of the 1989 CRC are
applied in practice in some of the international community’s humanitarian programmes.
I firstly consider and note the deficiencies of the psychological model. I then turn to
discuss the merits of broader psychosocial approaches. These seek to encourage the
educational and or vocational development and security of youngsters in their respective
socio-cultural settings.
This study chooses not to discuss emergency assistance programmes which focus on
children’s short-term human security needs for food and medical supplies.
These
currently receive the most media attention and attract significant donor funds, however as
Chapter 1 asserts - attending to these needs is but a part of the human security equation.
The psychosocial programmes which I endorse in this thesis have middle to longer-term
security as their aim. I illustrate their legitimacy in enhancing children’s human security
and advocate investing more resources in these areas.
Given this study’s concern with realising children’s social and economic rights, the
reader might expect some discussion of the impact of structural adjustment programmes
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(hereafter SAP’s) on children’s security. These long-term programmes which are run
under the auspices of the international community have sought to make war-economies
more stable, indirectly augmenting children’s security. However SAP’s, like military
humanitarianism work against the very human rights they purport to uphold (Cornia et al
1987 in Doyal and Gough 1991:153, Macrae and Zwi 1994:230).iv The present study is
located in the pluralist domain (given the emphasis on human rights), so SAP’s which
come under the globalist framework are for the main, put aside. Nonetheless, given the
economic leanings of Chapter 3 – there needs to be some account of the import of the
globalist lens as it relates to human rights and security. This takes place in Chapter 4
when I attempt to broaden out the ramifications of children’s security for the human
security mandate.
Section 2’s resources are comprised of a mixture of primary and secondary ones. My
interest in this subject area stemmed from a series of photo-journalistic articles on
children and civil war in The Independent newspaper. While there seemed an abundance
of material on the effects of intrastate conflict on children, accessing evaluative and
analytical material on humanitarian programmes which mitigate the impacts of war and
ameliorate children’s security proved more challenging.
In an attempt to find out what was being done, I initially contacted people with a
professional interest in the field within the UK. On the academic side information was
forthcoming from psychologists and social anthropologists, legal experts at the
University of Essex (where a Children’s Legal Centre and the Unit for Children and
Armed Conflict is established) and independent researchers alike.
Branching further afield international organisations (both IGO”s and NGO’s) were
contacted via the World Wide Web. The first port of call was the UN Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in New York (this office being
responsible for commissioning the first comprehensive study on the impact of armed
conflict on children in 1996). Agencies such as UNICEF and Save the Children also
obligingly mailed out relevant reports, working papers or offered suggestions as to who
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to contact regarding programmes in operation for mitigating the impacts of intrastate
conflict on children.
Unfortunately following up on the leads proved difficult. This was most likely
attributable to the fact that in war-torn countries communication networks are more
limited. Also, resource material on this subject is scattered piecemeal. This frustrating
fact is widely recognised and was the reasoning behind setting up a Children and Armed
Conflict Centre at the University of Essex (Machel 1996).
The third and final section comprises of chapter 4, and the appendices. Chapter 4 takes
us back to the beginning. How do we really conceive of human security in the Post-Cold
War era? Security is still largely conceived in conventional realist terms and this means
human (let alone children’s security) does not feature as high politics. Here I elaborate
on human security in the context of International Relations (hereafter IR) theory.
Pluralist and globalist paradigms seem to offer some insights into how to better achieve
human security. Yet, they are hampered by shared positivist assumptions with realism. I
will define and show how the post-positivist analytical framework of ‘critical theory’ can
aid us to lodge children’s social and economic security within the larger critical security
debate.
From here we are in a new position for the international community to explore making
the concept of human security a less lofty ideal and a better reality.
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Chapter 1: Background to Human Security
1.1Introduction
‘In the years since the end of the Cold War, humankind has leap frogged ahead and
stumbled backwards simultaneously. New possibilities for co-operation, community and
well- being have opened. At the same time we have witnessed the proliferation of
conflicts, an upsurge of intolerance and hatred, and callous abandonment of the most
elemental notions of human rights and human dignity’ – James Grant, Executive Director
of UNICEF at the World Conference on Human Rights 1993.
1.2 End of the Cold War and Redefinition of Security
The International System underwent extraordinary and sweeping changes from the
middle of the 1980’s on. Of paramountcy Superpower rivalry waned and the Cold War
drew to a close in 1989. Both the former Soviet Union and the United States made a
concerted effort to move away from the traditional conception of international security as
a purely military balance of power (Booth 1998:345). Demilitarisation and
deideologisation were embodied in Gorbachev’s reforms of perestroika (restructuring)
and glasnost (openess) (McGwire cited in Booth 1998:50). President Bush grandiosely
reciprocated with talk of a New World Order. This was ‘an era in which there could be
greater power co-operation [multilateralism], a strengthening of the UN, and a more
robust role for international law’ (Evans 1998:371). Fukuyama (1992) similarly
hyperbolic, went so far as to say that this was the ‘end of history’. Liberal democracy in
the political and economic spheres could now triumph throughout Central and Eastern
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (Donnelly 1998:13).
From 1989 onwards the international security agenda was no longer dominated by the
threat of nuclear war (UNHCR 1997:1). However, shifting from a bipolar order to a
multipolar one resulted in a diffusion of threats (Gaddis cited in Booth 1998: 41). There
was resurgence in nationalism and ethnicity at the state level and societies fractionated
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with pronounced transnational implications (Blechman, cited in Booth 1998: 296). As a
counterpart to Bush and Fukuyama, Huntingdon (1993) and Kaplan (1994) referred to
these as ‘the coming anarchy’.
Throughout the 1990’s the international system has been characterised by distinct regions
of human order and marked areas of human disorder. Globalisation and integration in the
developed world contrast with fragmentation elsewhere (Linklater 1995:4). Economically
advanced and highly interdependent societies with democratic structures bind the
industrialised North together to form ‘zones of peace’ where war as an instrument of
interstate conflict is now almost unthinkable. However in the lesser developed countries,
like Central and Eastern Europe and parts of Asia and Africa where the economies are
less well evolved and democracy tends to be frail or absent - ethnic, religious, economic
and ideological conflict is frequent within states (Holm and Sorenson 1995:3, Booth
1998:17). ‘The old battlefields of the Third World, where the proxy wars of the US and
USSR were played out (such as Afghanistan and Angola) are still bloodied by conflict’
(Macrae and Zwi 1994:1).
And yet, despite the backdrop of intrastate conflict (and the most dramatic human rights
setback at the time - the June 1989 Tianamen Square massacre in Beijing (Donnelly
1998:13)), simultaneously; the Iron Curtain came down, Apartheid was abolished and
there were a series of pro-democracy movements throughout Eastern Europe, Asia and
Africa. This seemed to signify that human rights issues were of import to the
international community (Booth1995: 6).
Subsequent to this the parameters of ‘security’ were broadened to incorporate nonmilitary elements of instability, in not just the humanitarian but also the economic, social
and ecological fields (UNHCR 1997:2, NY Times cited in Onda 1993:313).
1.3 Concept of Human Security
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Human security like all abstract concepts is plagued with ambiguities (Buzan cited in
Booth 1991:39). It seems pre-eminently though to be about ‘preserving human dignity’ in
each of the aforementioned humanitarian, economic, social and ecological domains
(Palme 1995:3). Human security is also about recognising the intrinsic ‘interdependence’
of these four domains. Human security is often used interchangeably with the phrase
‘common security’. Perhaps in turning to investigate this phrase we might clarify human
security.
Common security is comprised of both comprehensive and collective security elements.
This is problematic because while ‘comprehensive security’ (aligned with Gorbachov’s
New Thinking) seeks to change military based conceptions of security (Palme 1995:3),
‘collective security’ (coined by the Americans) does not entirely discount the utility of
military force (Palme 1995:3). This tension is mirrored in the UN Charter which is
premised on the idea of non-intervention but also specifies conditions under which
intervention is admissible (Kent 1995:160). Namely, when ‘violations of human rights
are so gross, extensive and persistent as to endanger world peace’ (Mullerson 1997:166).
This precept has been the justification for several Post Cold War UN or NATO led
operations undertaken in the Gulf, Africa and Balkans throughout the 1990’s. Collective
security and human rights concerns have subsequently become uneasily jointed. This is
an uneasy juncture because the use of military force cannot be consistent with a
conception of human security via human dignity, and the interests and welfare of all
human beings (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996:15, Pilger 1999). Human security is
supposed to be about ‘protection from [such a] sudden and or hurtful disruption in the
pattern of daily life’ (UNHCR 1997:3).
Human security in accordance with its emphasis on ‘humanitarian values’ maintains that
the socio-economic security of people must be regarded as equally as important as the
political security of states. ‘It is thus also about safety from chronic threats such as
hunger and disease’ (UNHCR 1997:3). Human security holds that the state cannot be
secure for long without its citizens having a degree of security in their recourse to food,
shelter and warmth; health, education and employment (Palme 1995:3). When people’s
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basic needs are not satisfied ‘economic stagnation and stymied human social
development are likely to inculcate resentment and alienation’ (Booth 1998:296). In turn
this can provoke civil and political unrest.
1.4 Defining Human Security through Human Rights
As the previous segment indicates human security is not easy to define. The difficulties
parallel dichotomies found within human rights interpretations. This section highlights
those tensions within human rights norms which mirror our theme of rhetoric and reality
in human security.
Human rights typically fall into two camps. Firstly, ‘civil and political rights’ include: the
‘inalienable’ rights to life, liberty and security of the person, freedom from slavery,
torture and arbitrary arrest, freedom of movement and asylum, the right to a nationality,
freedom of opinion and expression and the right to free elections (Vincent 1986b: 11).
Secondly, ‘social and economic rights’ include: the right to work for a just reward, the
right to rest and leisure, the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well
being, the right to education, and the right to participation in the cultural life of a
community (Vincent 1986b: 11).
There is heated debate over whether the first or second camps express the more
‘fundamental human rights’. Civil and political rights are said to exact fewer duties on
the state taking precedence for they can be more realistically achieved (Vincent 1986a:
13). In contrast to this, the corresponding duties to social and economic rights require a
more active response from the international community. These rights are perceived as
more complex eliciting potentially limitless duties on the state (Stanley 1997:3).
For social and economic rights to be effectively realised an enormous redistribution of
power and resources would be required, both within and between countries (Beetham
1995:43, Donnelly 1996:389). This statement links with the time-old quandary in IR;
15
whether security resides with order (that is maintaining the status quo balance of power)
or justice (redistributing this balance of power more ‘equitably’). Bull summarises the
hiatus with his comment that ‘international society’s failure to accord Third World
demands for justice is tied up with the threat this might have to the international society’s
privileged order (cited in Linklater 1995:45). Yet, as Vincent cogently points out the
other reality is that sense cannot be made of a right to life [liberty and security], unless it
entails a right to social and economic subsistence as well (1986b: 13).
The practicalities of implementing social and economic rights seem insurmountable. As
Beetham postulates, ‘when hundreds of millions suffer from malnutrition and
vulnerability is there any realistic prospect of these people’s ‘rights ‘being upheld?’
(1995:43).
Yet ‘some studies by economists and social development planners deduce there are
sufficient economic resources to ensure that the basic rights of practically everyone in the
world could be guaranteed within a decade or so, without a huge cost to taxpayers in the
developed world’ (Beetham 1995:55).
However it does not seem to be in the West’s interests to undertake extensive economic
restructuring in the developing world. However, the recent bombing campaign and
reconstructive package for Kosovo is highly suggestive that when the issues are ‘closer to
home’ finance is indeed available.
In any case, it is not simply a matter of coffer transfers or even technical fixes in Kosovo
or indeed elsewhere. This brings us back to the beginning of a circular argument. Should
we resign ourselves to defeat when it comes to realising social and economic human
rights norms in the conflict ridden East and South?
In a world that both respects and disrespects human rights many people would propound,
as does the author of this study - that there is a middling approach. Namely, that
‘although it may not be politically possible to put an end to human rights emergencies
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everywhere, it does not mean that something, or something more could not, or should not
be done somewhere’ (Mullerson 1994:4). In this dissertation I advocate there is a space
for the international community to ‘do something more’ within the scope of their
humanitarian programmes.
A dichotomous relationship integral to the discussion of rhetoric and reality in human
rights and or human security is the debate between ‘universalism’ and ‘cultural
relativism’. The universalist school says there are certain human rights which apply to
all-regardless. Yet this is met with the charge that universal human rights are but a
Westernised and pre-eminently American idea of what constitutes ‘moral order’ and by
extension - human security (Ikenburry 1998-9, Chomsky 1994).
The relativist approach holds that ‘rules about morality vary from place to place, and that
the only way to understand this variety is to place it in its cultural context, in itself a
source of its validity (Vincent 1986a: 37). This seems difficult to assimilate though, in
instances when ‘culture is torture’ (Booth 1995:115). The argument rings hollow when
used to justify practices like the forced marriage of young girls, bonded child labour in
South East Asia, female circumcision in Africa and ethnic cleansing in Europe’ (Hime,
cited in Alston 1994: pvi). How can this be in line with respecting human dignity and
human security? It is the worst human rights rhetoric of all.
It is somewhat ironic that the West similarly practices cultural relativism – given that
they credit themselves with institutionalising basic or fundamental human rights norms.
Both the UN and NATO, under the aegis of the US, have spearheaded the ultimate
cultural relativism of the 1990’s, with their oxymoronic ‘military humanitarianism’
which presupposes some human rights abuses (namely bombing) are better than others
i.e. (ethnic cleansing). NATO’s interventions are also culturally prejudiced; intercepting
to protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo but choosing to ignore other hotspots where
equally horrific human rights violations have been taking place for years on the African
and Asian continents.
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This smacks of inconsistent standards (Bailey 1994:142). Moreover, it alerts us to the
proverbial ‘interest and prudence which remain key factors in state behaviour’ (Roberts,
cited in Mullerson 1997:164) superseding human security. This is something the US so
much as admitted to after the Somalia debacle in the early 1990’s v. It is the epitome of
the rhetoric and reality of human rights and human security when the world’s hegemon
says one thing (i.e. that there are universal human rights which must be respected) but
practices the very contrary.
Clearly the argument for local distinctiveness can all too easily become a justification for
[political] repression’ [by smaller and greater powers alike] (Kaballo, cited in Beetham
1995:191).
Nonetheless, we should not entirely discredit that ‘there is a need for culturally sensitive
approaches to human rights and human security and appreciate some flexibility is
required across societies which are diverse’ (Himes, cited in Alston 1994: pvii). This
point is expanded upon in chapter 3 where I am concerned with policy implementation
that is sensitive to the child’s actual environs.
As Rwezaura points out the ‘best interests of the child’, or ‘welfare of the child’ in Africa
may be interpreted differently from the West, given their societies are organised
differently, economically and socially (1994:100). Children in African societies often
have to work at an earlier age than Western children. Universally claiming that this
negates the right to a childhood can be universalism couched in unduly Western terms. vi
It can be patronising and only serve to exacerbate human security.
Despite a lack of consensus on which human rights are the most fundamental the majority
of states have ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Donnelly 1996:390).
Yet there continues to be a ‘huge gulf between its promise and the fulfilment’ (Beetham
1995:59). The historical development of human rights norms suggests the realpolitik
Cold War structure has played a significant role in thwarting the realisation of human
rights norms to the present day.
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1.5 Development of Human Rights Norms (1945-1989)
Human rights and human security fits most comfortably into the longstanding pluralist
tradition of IR. This is because firstly, more emphasis is placed on an increasingly
interdependent world where economic and social concerns are considered as important as
national security ones. Secondly, non-state actors are deemed important entities in world
politics, thus international law and international organisations can enter centre stage.
Thirdly, pluralism is driven by the classical tradition of liberalism, which asserts that the
individual is the most important unit of analysis and the claimant of rights (in chapter 3 I
discuss how this individualist conception in Southern countries can be problematic
though). The state correspondingly has a duty to maintain those political, social and
economic conditions under which individuals can enjoy their rights (Viotti and Kauppi
1993:228-233) thereby sustaining political order and contributing to the security and
predictability which are prerequisites for progress (Vincent 1986a: 17). This theory is
obviously complicated when applied in practice to failed or failing states.
Nevertheless, in accordance with this pluralist tradition, the institutionalisation and
internationalisation of human rights norms did burgeon this century after World War II,
even amongst non-liberal states with the ratification of the UN Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948) (Donnelly 1998:3-5,Onda 1993:295). Thus the idea of an
international community was tentatively born.
Yet, this process was effectively stillborn as for the next four decades the world was
carved up into the two opposing ideological blocs of capitalism versus communism. Both
rivalling Superpowers were deadlocked in doctrinal realism and executed flagrant
disregard for human rights. Whilst America supported anticommunist but repressive
regimes in Latin America and Asia, the Soviets imposed totalitarian dictatorships
throughout Central and Eastern Europe and Asia (Donnelly 1998:5).
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In the 1960’s (initiated by détente, peace movements, the formation of groups like
Amnesty International, and later by the Vietnam Syndromevii), human rights issues and
the importance of human stability were tentatively brought once more to the fore of the
international political arena. Towards the end of the decade an International Bill of Rights
was created comprised of an International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and one
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Together with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights these treaties are a statement of the standards of behaviour which all
states should aspire to, and the minimum social and political guarantees recognised by the
international community as necessary for a life of dignity in the contemporary world
(Donnelly 1998:9).
In the 1970’s the personal security conception became a formal part of East West
relations with the Helenski Accords, [despite the concurrent demise of détente]. Basket 3
of this agreement attempted to place human rights concerns on the same plane as the
traditional politico-military and economic issues making up Baskets 1 and 2 (Evans
1998:223).
In spite of the Reagan administration’s moves towards a Second Cold War, in the 1980’s
a ‘norms cascade’ spiralled with a proliferation of human rights activity (Donnelly
1996:389). This entailed a deluge of regimes; norms and social construction scholarship
in IR (Sikkink 1998:518). There was also a spawning of international, regional and
bilateral agreements that dealt specifically with children’s rights. It was the desire for
uniformity in these that led to the creation of the 1989 CRC (Van Bueren 1995:14). See
Appendix 1 for a synopsis of this document.
1.6 Limitations of Children’s Security Prior to 1989
The measure of security offered to civilian children in war up until 1989 surmounted to
little more than schemes where they were designated ‘zones of peace’. This meant ceasefires were called so that food or vaccines could be ferried through to children. This was
primarily in accordance with preserving their civil and political rights to life. (UNICEF
1996:34 –5). It was evinced in a limited capacity in conflicts throughout Central
20
America, Africa and Asia from the 1980’s (AI 1999:93). While laudable, it must be
noted that the protection offered was only of a temporary nature (Hampson 1996:50).
And as Zwi adds, not widespread, and on the decline (1992-49-50).
This is not particularly encouraging for augmenting children’s security. However, the
notion of children as peace zones is a useful metaphor. It endorses the truism that central
to all belief systems is the importance of a child’s well being (hence the exceptions in war
made on their behalf (Machel 1996:5)). Even if children’s rights are not realised via this
medium, the programmes are testament to the belief that a reasonably secure childhood is
important. Moreover, they are an implicit recognition that children’s rights and their
security in intrastate conflict, are desirable for the development of an autonomous adult
personality [and state citizen]. This is a thin and tentative thread but one I take up in
chapter’s 3 and 4.
1.7 Promising Greater Security: Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
The conceptual parent to the Convention on the Rights of the Child was the Declaration
of Childrens Rights (1959). Members of the UN initially opposed this as a binding
agreement. Van Bueren (1995:13) says that we should not look at this dispute in light of
the East West contest. However, it is difficult to overlook the fact that the US neither
ratified the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which the communist
countries accorded priority with), nor did they ratify the 1989 CRC itself which has a
substantial social and economic componentry (Nyland 1998). It has also been suggested
that Poland who pushed for the drafting of the 1989 CRC wanted to seize some of the
human rights initiative from Jimmy Carter (Alston 1994:6).
Nevertheless, Cold War wrangles aside - after some 20 years of negotiations in 1979, the
International Year of the Child, opposition to the Declaration of the Child (1959) from
the US was revoked (Karunatilleke 1997:114) and a 10-year drafting process began for
the 1989 CRC.
21
Given this lengthy drafting process it is somewhat surprising that quick ratifications (bar
the US and Somalia (Kurantilleke 1997:116)) were obtained and one year after the
Convention’s adoption by the UN Assembly it came into force. Equally extraordinary
and unprecedented was substantial NGO participation as well as having input from
various UN agencies and the newly formed Defence of Children International (1979).
Above all, the Convention on the Rights of the Child broke new ground for a global
human rights treaty in adopting a single method of monitoring for the protection of both
civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights in times of peace and armed
conflict (Van Bueren 1995:392, Nyland 1998:24).
It would seem that children’s rights and social and economic security had come to the
fore of the international arena at last. Yet, as chapter 2 will illustrate children’s social and
economic rights in situations of armed conflict continue to be undermined in the 1990’s
with the 1989 CRC making minimalist inroads into human security.
22
SECTION 2:
Chapter 2: Human Insecurity: Impacts of Armed Conflict on Children
2.1 Introduction
‘During the last decade, it is estimated that there have been 2 million children killed, 4-5
million disabled, 12 million left homeless, more than one million orphaned or separated
from their parents, and some 10 million psychologically traumatised’ (UNICEF Report:
State of the Worlds Children 1996:13).
In situations of intrastate conflict civilian children have been subject to multitudinous
human rights violations and human insecurities. This chapter outlines why civilian
children are increasingly embroiled in civil warfare in the 1990’s - and how their lives are
adversely affected. Using the principles of the 1989 CRC as a measure we can see that
there is a clear gap between the rhetoric and reality of New World Order values.
2.2 Reality of Armed Conflict Today
Throughout the 18th, 19th and early 20th century wars mostly occurred between states.
The major casualties were soldiers who died from war injuries and infections (Goldson
19996:809). In World War I combatants comprised some 95% of the death toll (Otunnu
1998:3). However, ‘the topography and definition of the modern battlefield has changed’
(Plunkett 1998:74). Contemporary conflicts are mostly within states. The majority of
armed conflicts now take place in developing states (Van Bueren 1995: 328).
Government and rebel factions in villages and suburban areas fight wars where the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants is not clear-cut. ‘The enemy camp
is now all around’ (UNICEF 1996:13-14). As a result, some 90% of all causalities today
are in fact civilians (Summerfield 1996a: 3). This draws our attention to an increasingly
higher proportion of injuries incurred by civilian children (UNICEF 1996:13-14) who
comprise some 30% of the civilian populace (Kuper 1997:6). In 1995 alone, some 30
armed conflicts of this intrastate variety were said to be waging in different parts of the
world (Onyango 1998:219).
23
These latter twentieth century wars are also distinguished from their predecessors by
virtue of their protracted length. Angola, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Somalia and Sudan are
classic examples of countries with long histories of armed conflict, some of which have
been sustained for up to 30 years. This means that from childhood through to early
adulthood entire generations have to contend with the instability and insecurity of war on
a day to day basis (UNICEF cited in Onyango 1998:219, Machel 1996).viii
Intrastate conflict results in huge numbers of both internally displaced people and
refugees. Ladd and Cairns give a figure of 30 million, saying that 50 per cent of these are
children under the age of 15 (cited in Cairns 1996:15). This alludes to a colossal degree
of both short and long term instability; with children uprooted from their families, homes,
schools and cultural enclaves (Tolfree 1996:8, Ahearn and Athey cited in Cairns
1996:15).
2.3 Impacts on Civilian Children
Children are often deliberately targeted in internecine warfare. To destroy or harm what
is of highest value to the enemy, indeed the very symbol of a community’s future is one
of ‘the most effective forms of terrorism’ (Boothby cited in Kent 1995:83, Van Bueren
1995:xx). Civilian children are affected in the following ways:
2.3.1 Physical and Psychological effects
Articles 6, 8 and 16 of the 1989 CRC assert the child’s right to protection against
unlawful attacks and interference (AI 1999: 106). However the most visible effects of
armed conflict on children are physically inflicted ones. Civilian children are killed
outright as a result of torture, firearms, bombs and landmines. Or they sustain serious
injuries and or life long disabilities - losing limbs, eyesight and hearing (Zwi et al.
1992:47).
24
Alongside the physiological impacts are the psychological traumas children experience as
a result of war. This is a violation of article 19 which says measures should be taken to
protect the child from all forms of mental violence and injury, including sexual abuse (AI
1999:107).
Children witness parents, relatives, friends and their environment destroyed around them
(Oyango 1998:228).
Subsequently, they may appear withdrawn, exhibit signs of
depression or demonstrate hyperalertness.
Many experience vivid nightmares.
Regression in childhood development such as bedwetting and refusing to speak is also
common.
Some children acquire behavioral disorders becoming acutely fearful,
extremely restless or aggressive (Geltman1998: 291, Save the Children 1996). Others
feel confused and or hopeless and lethargic (Rutter and Richman in Boyden 1997:8).
Severe stress can also induce gastrointestinal complaints, difficulty in breathing and
dizziness (Boyden 1997:8, Weinstein cited in Zwi 1992:47).
The extent to which children can be psychologically scarred is exemplified by a group of
child refugees from Sierra Leone who drew themselves without arms or mouths (Diaz
1997). Such utter paralysis is the epitome of human insecurity.
One of the most insidious physical and psychological harms to be inflicted on children in
intrastate conflict is government soldiers or rebel troops systematically raping girls. This
weapon of war was used in Rwanda undermining community ties as the rape victim is
then completely ostracized (Geltman1998: 290, UNICEF 1996: 19). Rape has similarly
been used as an instrument of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia (Swiss and
Miller, cited in Plunkett 1998:73).
In military camps girls are often compelled to provide ongoing sexual favors to soldiers
in return for food and or to ensure a degree of physical protection - [ironically out of a
desire for security] (Butler 1998:15, Machel 1996:23). As a result of these sexual
practices, the transmission of STD’s including the HIV virus has become more
widespread throughout Africa (UNICEF 1996:19). Rape, unwanted pregnancies and
25
STD’s have manifold destabilising effects to individuals, their families and society at
large too; consider for example the huge and unmeetable economic costs in treating
AID’s patients in poor countries like Uganda and Zambia.
2.3.2 Wider Health Impacts
Endemic civil warfare is often dubbed ‘low intensity’ because ‘less people die from
bombs or bullets than they do from lack of food and medical services’ (UNICEF1996:
20). But up to twenty times more citizens, including children die in this manner.ix The
term ‘complex political emergencies’ more accurately reflects this very ‘high intensity’
of intrastate conflict which clearly undermines children’s ‘right to a standard of living
adequate to health and well being [supposedly guaranteed in article 24 of the 1989 CRC]
(Summerfield 1996a: 23).
Food security is a striking example of how children’s insecurity is compounded by
interlinking elements in situations of intrastate conflict. Food is one of our most basic
needs yet in war the whole food chain is disrupted. This starts with production; crops and
stock are destroyed - food and future income revenues are drastically reduced lessening
security (Machel 1996:34). The next stage affected in the chain is distribution. The
states transport networks are often rendered inaccessible in war with for example bridges
and roads being blown up. In turn, this affects availability. Food supplies become
scarcer and prices inevitably rise beyond people’s reach.
Hence consumption and
biological utilization of the food are affected. Growing children are likely to eat less and
foods of a lesser quality. If children are in refugee camps they are more prone to
infectious diseases like diarrhoea and subsequently may not absorb nutrients effectively
(Goldson 1996:810-12). There have also been several instances when donor food has
been inappropriate in terms of religious and or cultural etiquette meaning children cannot
eat food provided (Perrin 1996:30).
This nutritional side of the health equation is exacerbated by the inadequacy of health
supplies, lack of health workers and facilities already the case in underdeveloped
countries (Hamilton n.d: 3) or the destruction of preexisting health provisions
26
(Summerfield 1996a: 5). Often immunisation programs are disrupted. This can mean
that even in places where more comprehensive health systems were evident children are
once more prone to contracting diseases hitherto relegated to medical history.
An
example of this is the recent resurgence of polio outbreaks in Kosovo (Plunkett 1998:72).
2.3.3 Disruption to Education
As well as disrupting health centres schools are targeted (Onyango 1998:228). This is
contra to ‘the right to an education specified in articles 28 and 29 of the CRC. With the
warring states preeminent focus on defense expenditure resources are diverted away from
education. For example, in Somalia public expenditure to education was reduced to
almost nothing (Kent 1995:89).
Schools that do remain open are often destroyed
(Hamilton n.d: 3). This was the case in Mozambique where up to 45% of the primary
school infrastructure was destroyed as the conflict progressed. In the Rwandan crisis in
1994, more than two thirds of the teacher base fled or were killed (Machel 1996:41). In
Ethiopia children would often not want to go top school for fear of forcible recruitment
from the government (Transnational Law 1996:333). And in Turkey and Kosovo, ethnic
Kurds and Albanians have been targeted by the state and forbidden instruction in their
native tongues (Summerfield 1996a: 9, Otunnu 1998:20).
Refugee camps may or may not have recourse to temporary classroom set-ups. If they
do, they are often rudimentary and likely to cater solely for primary school children,
leaving adolescents bereft of meaningful educational activities (Onyango 1998:226).
Given a political and social atmosphere of fear, disruption and violence – and frustrated
by limited resources, it is hardly suprising that children, such as those documented in
Palestinian studies, find it difficult to concentrate on their studies (Machel 1996:41-2).
The educational setbacks are myriad and have far reaching repercussions.
In the short term the routine and normalcy which schools provide are dissembled (Tolfree
1996, Boyden and Levison 1999:49). Longer term, children’s educational development
is impaired. There are very pointed connections to be made here with the future of the
27
country’s economy. This is because children are the human resource base of the next
generation. ‘Years lost in schooling and vocational skills will result in or exacerbate preexisting underdevelopment and hinder any fractured society’s recovery process even
further (Machel 1996: 41, Hamilton n.d: 4).x
2.3.4 Wider Social, Cultural and Economic Ramifications
Article 9 of the 1989 CRC identifies the preservation of the family unit as crucial to
children’s stability.
However, in today’s intrastate conflicts children often become
separated from their parents or caregivers. For instance, from the Rwandan genocide of
1994 an estimated 90, 000 to 115, 000 children became orphans or unaccompanied
minors (Geltman 1998:291).
The loss of or separation from parents and or witnessing their harm, and anguish
intensifies children’s vulnerability and feelings of insecurity. Numerous studies show the
presence of family members helps mitigate negative impacts of war by providing at least
a baseline of human security (Boyden 1997, Geltman 1998, Plunkett 1998, Tolfree
1996).xi This shows family reunification efforts should be a top priority for humanitarian
programmes. Further mention is made of this point in chapter 3.
From profound disturbances to the family unit, we can appreciate that the societal fabric
as a whole is traumatized (Baro cited in Summerfield 1996b: 11). This also includes
cultural suppression (supposedly outlawed in articles 14, 30 and 31 of the 1989 CRC).
This has already been made mention of with the linguistic and religious cultural negation
of ethnic minorities occurring in schools.xii It also includes the outright destruction of
places of import to religious and cultural life such as churches or mosques (Boyden
1997).
Summerfield discusses how children can become entirely disjointed from their traditional
cultures. In the Sudanese civil war for instance, disruption to the traditional cycle of
animal husbandry wrought social and economic breakdown to pastoralist Southerners. A
28
subsequent study of teenagers in Juba attested to a significant loss of social identity
amongst adolescents (1996:11).
In the next chapter we take a look at some of the different types of humanitarian
programs in operation since the inauguration of the 1989 CRC. Do these just ‘add insult
to injury’ (i.e. the rhetoric of the 1989 CRC) - or can they make some real inroads into
ameliorating civilian children’s socio-economic human security?
29
Chapter 3: Corresponding Duties of Humanitarian Programmes to the
Social and Economic Rights of the Convention on Rights of Child
‘Social justice and human rights perspectives should be at the heart of any work with war
affected populations’ (Summerfield 1996b: 32).
‘A lot more needs to be learned about children’s coping strategies, as well as the
structural factors that mediate the impact of political violence on their lives’ (Boyden
1997:200).
3.1 Introduction: Promoting Positive Liberties
Article 39 States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and
psychological recovery and the social reintegration of a child victim of…armed conflicts.
Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the
health, self-respect and dignity of the child.
Article 28 …Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education,
including general and vocational education…
Article 29 …Education should be directed towards …the development of respect for
human rights…the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the
spirit of understanding, peace [education], tolerance, equality of sexes and friendship
among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and person of indigenous
origin…
The 1989 CRC contains the tension common to all human rights treaties already alluded
to in chapter 1. That is, some of the Convention’s clauses denote ‘negative liberties’.
30
These are got at via the duty of non-interference (Vincent 1986b: 16) and include the
right to life (article 6), freedom of expression (article 12) and so on. However, other
clauses denote ‘positive liberties’. These are freedoms which require interventionary
actions in order to be fulfilled (Vincent 1986b: 16) and include the likes of articles 39, 28
and 29. It is the purpose of this chapter to focus on some psychosocial humanitarian
programmes undertaken by the international community which aim to enhance the
positive liberties within articles 39, 28 and 29.
psychological programmes.
I firstly question the merit of
I then proceed to offer cautious praise of broader
psychosocial programmes in general, and peace education in particular – for enhancing
children’s security.
3.2 Drawbacks of Psychological Programmes
In chapter 2 the deleterious impacts of armed conflict on civilian children were outlined
in some detail. From this one might construe that the child is a ‘helpless victim’ of war.
Much of the literature on children and armed conflict and particularly the psychological
effects of war on them paints such a picture. Consider the emotive language used to
describe children’s’ ‘plight’ and their ‘exploitation’ (Onyango 1998).
The child is
perceived as subject to ‘trauma’. There have been numerous instances when children are
diagnosed with PTSD.xiii ‘Is war then, a sort of mental health emergency?’ (Summerfield
1996b: 11, Macksoud and Aber cited in Cairns 1996).
Wars undoubtedly cause profound distress and suffering. But is this symptomatic of
‘illness’? Recent literature critiques the utility of humanitarian agencies applying a
Western bio-medical model across the board to children in non-Western settings. This is
because other cultures have different models –to the Western psychological one – for
interpreting and allaying distress (Summerfield 1995 and 1996b, Boyden 1994, 1997).
For instance talk therapy (which is characteristic of Western psychotherapy) has little
place in many African cultures (Tolfree 1996:31). Gibbs for example, describes how the
Mozambican interpretation of anguish is located in the ‘heart’ rather than the ‘mind’.
31
Both Mozambicans and Ethiopians in fact describe ‘active forgetting’ as one of their
coping mechanisms (Summerfield 1996b: 20).
Yet there are numerous examples of psychologists transplanting Western methods when
they are highly inappropriate and divorced from the realities of children’s lives in the
developing world (See Summerfield 1996b for a comprehensive critique on psychosocial
projects in Rwanda and Bosnia). But one illustrative instance - is professionals going
into the Sudan and cajoling children into ‘talking through their feelings. In contravening
cultural protocol such ‘help’ only causes greater distress [and undermines human
security] (Tolfree 1997:31).
As pointed out in chapter 2 in modern intrastate conflict - war is not so much perceived
as a private injury (which is the working ethos of psychological intervention), but rather
as an assault on cultural identity and society as a whole (Summerfield 1996b: 19).
Humanitarian agencies thus need an alternative model to the psychological one if their
intention is to really bolster children’s security.
3.3 Merits of Psychosocial Programmes
Given the impacts of political violence on children are more of a social or economic
rather than a mental nature - one of the best healing processes for civilian children can be
via the physical reconstruction of community infrastructure and societal stability;
restoring health services, schools, and or recourse to employment (Gibbs 1994, Boyden
1994,1997, Summerfield 1995). This model says that it is unhelpful to isolate children’s
psychological needs from their broader material, educational, social, cultural, spiritual
and economic needs (Tolfree 1996:89). It also maintains that rather than bringing in
health professionals from afar, it is better to employ local healing and support networks,
such as traditional and religious healers, churches and similar such institutions (Tolfree
1996:34).
32
As Tolfree warns us though, this community approach is not problem-free. Firstly, even
in post-conflict situations widespread mistrust and divisions still continue to resonate.
Consider Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo where there are defacto ethnic
separations (1996:28). One certainly cannot make naïve and universalist assumptions
about the propensity for social re-integration. Nor can one necessarily rely on local
healing and support networks. Witness Rwanda where most of the traditional healers
were killed in the genocide (Chauvin 1998:386).
Does this render the community approach redundant? Not if initiatives are based on the
problems and priorities made by locals themselves, they wish to and are able to draw
upon traditional methods for coping (Tolfree 1996: 85, Women’s Commission for
Refugee Women and Children 1997, Otunnu 1998). In Rwanda for example there have
been prudently successful attempts to reconcile Rwandans, through the work of local
churches, indigenous women’s organizations, and housing relocation-initiatives. These
schemes have been facilitated with the financial and administrative resources of
international aid agencies (US Committee for Refugees 1998:5). The advantage of this
model is that it is more holistic than the psychological one. This approach is about
contextualising the person–in-family-in-community-in-wider-society and humanitarian
programmes working in tandem with local realities to enhance capacities for coping
(Tolfree 1996:89, Save the Children 1996).
This should include the integral acknowledgement that many children in the developing
world participate in economically productive activities instead of, or as well as, attending
school (Denny 1999). In this respect Southern societies hold a different conception of
childhood to Northern societies.
In the developing world childhood is not such a
protected age and children are socialized through their participation in economic
processes (Boyden 1997:24-5). This is a difficult issue for the international community
given that article 32 of the 1989 CRC refers to protecting the child from ‘economic
exploitation’. Like the universalist/relativist debate which frames this moot point, this
clause is inherently subjective and contentious for humanitarian agencies whose mandate
33
is to uphold the child’s human rights. Should they work to a Western ideal, or with the
non-Western reality?
This is a fine balancing act. An example of where this problem has been successfully
circumnavigated is the Save the Children’s Psychosocial Assistance Program (PSA)
programme in Rwanda. This scheme operates on twin-tracks. Firstly, on a social level,
the programme supports rebuilding the family infrastructure, through reunification
initiatives and or fostering children within the community. On an economic level, there
is vocational training for young people and money raising projects to help pay for school
fees, which feeds back into the social level.
Community volunteer leaders facilitate rebuilding structures and routines. This helps to
reinstate normalcy and stability in the daily lives of children (Save the Children n.d: 1718). The broad spectrum of organized activities, be they educational, vocational or
recreational, provides an important source of moral support to children and adolescents
and goes some way towards fomenting group solidarity (Kabwegyere 1997:28). Integral
to this is the earning ability that vocational skills training for young people provides. In
promoting their income earning capability their independence and self esteem is
augmented (Save the Children 1996:6).
These factors enhance children’s and the
community’s human security alike.
There have been criticisms of this programme though. Operational constraints have been
noted. For instance, it has been suggested that more attention needs to be paid to making
sure skills adolescents are taught are actually marketable ones (Kabwegyere 1997:25).
However this does not detract from the programmes overall success in augmenting
human dignity.
The programmes must be situation specific. Consider how children’s economic
participation is not the same norm in Eastern Europe that it is in Africa. This, along with
better infrastructure and greater resources means humanitarian workers can instigate
programs for civilian children there with a greater emphasis on education. A refugee
34
centre in Slovenia does just this. It caters for the educational needs of some 35,000
Bosnian refugee children by mobilizing Bosnian schoolteachers via population oriented
community outreach programs. This programme has had considerable success in
improving children’s sense of stability (Kos and Jovanovic 1998).
Not dissimilarly, portable pre-school play programmes have been set up in former
Yugoslavia. These ‘address children’s cognitive, physical, social, emotional and creative
growth needs in line with the principles of the 1989 CRC (Save the Children, Tolfree
1996). A further example of the top down and bottom up approach Save the Children
staff set up programmes and lend support, but only at the behest of the community and
employing local playroom leaders.
While there are decided differences in the emphases of these projects - in Rwanda, on
vocational training and in ex-Yugoslavia on education, what is laudable in both cases, is a
willingness to marry local needs and resources with international assistance as well as the
acknowledgement that children’s social and or economic agency plays an important role
in individual, family and community resilience (Tolfree 1997:92).
While young children are vulnerable and need protection by their caregivers children who
are a bit older have considerable personal resources and coping capabilities (Tolfree
1997:92). These children should be perceived as active survivors, rather than just passive
victims. Numerous studies demonstrate that a high proportion of civilian children remain
remarkably resilient in situations of internecine war (Zwi 1992, Boyden 1994). Many
children can experience the most adverse of life circumstances and still remain
remarkably well adjusted as individuals (Dawes cited in Ager 1996:167).
Children often accommodate dissonance and change more readily than adults. Consider
refugee children’s ability to pick up host languages quickly (Palmer, cited in Boyden and
Levison 1999:55, Gibbs 1994). In this context children can be seen as a bridge between
their own culture and another. This notion of the child as a ‘social bridge’ in their family
and community is one worth exploring.
35
3.31 Peace Education – Children as a Social Bridge
The best protection for children in armed conflict would be to prevent conflict in the first
place. This is the rationale behind article 29 of the 1989 CRC and educating children in
the principles of peace and human rights in an attempt to break the cyclical nature of
prejudice and intrastate violence (Van Bueren 1996:349). Is this just an overly idealistic
goal though, in societies where intrastate conflict has been a pervasive factor for many
years - or might the concept aid children’s human security?
How have humanitarian agencies applied the concept of peace education? Either as a
separate subject or integrated into the school curriculum in countries which have
experienced protracted intrastate conflict, including the likes of Sri Lanka, Burundi,
Croatia, Lebanon (UNICEF ESARO 1997, UNICEF 1999a) (see Appendix 2 for an
outline of peace education precepts). In short, peace education involves a range of
activities which seek to remonstrate that whilst conflict is an inescapable part of our lives,
non violent means of conflict resolution are able to result in win - win situations for all
parties (Wijeyesekera 1994).
Peace building is for the main achieved through a ‘schools-in communities’ approach and
comprises of intercultural school exchanges, solidarity camps, travelling peace theatres
and having children respond to the principles of the 1989 CRC (UNICEF 1999a: 17-19).
Given it is an abstract the impact of peace education is difficult to measure. It is a
relatively recent invention and few comprehensive evaluative reports have been
undertaken (Ressler 1996:2). Its utility in terms of increasing human security has been
questioned though.
One critique is that ‘ the premises of peace education are false, for ‘it is group identity
and group behavior rather than interpersonal behavior which are the determinants in
armed conflict, [and this is not sufficiently addressed] (Boyden and Ryder cited in
Transnational Law 1996:341). While this argument has some validity, especially in light
36
of the previous sections which showed how it is the social group as well as the individual
that suffers in war, Boyden’s comment overlooks that (at least some of the more
established programs) are interested in breaking down prejudices per se, and changing the
patterns of reciprocal typifications of ‘the other ‘- at the individual and group level. For
example in Northern Ireland the Education for Mutual Understanding programme
operates on two levels; one on an interpersonal level encouraging ‘the improvement of
relationships between people of differing cultural traditions’ and the other at an intergroup level i.e. interschool exchanges between Protestant and Catholic children (Cain
Project n.d: 4).
Another criticism is that peace education is spread piecemeal. This is a valid comment.
Even in Sri Lanka which has one of the most long standing programs, only some 10 % of
the student population has partaken in the programme (UNICEF 1999b: 3). There have
been few formal initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa, and none in more insecure regions like
the Sudan (Ressler 1996:9). Peace education is almost exclusively restricted to primary
school age children too (Ressler 1996). These factors invariably make evaluating the
worth of peace education more difficult.
A further criticism (already alluded to thus far) is humanitarian programmes failing to
appreciate that ‘peace education cannot be exported wholesale from one country to
another. Just as cultures are different so too are their conflicts and by extension their
conflict resolution may be different too (Ressler 1996:12). In Burundi for example, in
areas where there is great insecurity teachers are not enthusiastic about education for
peace activities. They hold that the peace education they have been told to teach is not
sufficiently linked to their political issues for peace (Ressler 1996:8-9). This perhaps also
suggests there has to be a certain level of security before peace education can even be
considered.
I concur with critics of peace education who contend that there should be a shift from an
abstract and prescriptive to practical and elicitive approach (Ressler 1996: 4). We assert
that peace building begins with understanding local realities, especially in countries such
37
as Burundi where images of conflict are concrete ones. Peace education as a concept
should be expanded to include practical life skills for children, like land mines awareness,
female literacy campaigns, and AIDS prevention programmes (Save the Children 1996).
In this way peace education can be a potential catalyst for positive community action
[improving human security] (UNICEF 1999: 8-11).
3.4 Enhancing Children’s Social and Economic Security – Participatory Model
In this chapter I have shown how psychological, psychosocial and peace education
humanitarian programmes have been aparty to both the rhetoric and reality of children’s
rights and human security in armed conflict. I surmise that if humanitarian agencies
work with children’s social and economic rights, their realities on the ground, and
encourage the child as a social actor in their community, psychosocial programmes can
increase children’s security and human security. This participatory model can serve both
preventative and curative recovery functions – and it is based on definitions of a childs
development (be it in the North or the South), as an autonomous unit (Tolfree 1996:27).
This top down and bottom up approach within the practice of children’s security has, to
date largely been unrealised – but therein lies implications for the theory of human
security. We turn to a discussion of these in the final chapter, which resituates IR in
human security in children’s security and children’s security in human security in IR.
38
SECTION 3:
Chapter 4: Redefining Human Security through Children’s Security
4.1 Introduction: Positivist Versus Post-Positivist Lenses
This dissertation has argued that human security is impeded by false disjunctures between
high and low politics and rhetoric and reality. It is thus overshadowed by the proverbial
rift between idealism and realism which was the first ‘great debate’ in IRT and continues
to plague our conceptions of security.
Intrastate conflicts and their impacts on civilian children are an expression of realism in
the 1990’s with little emancipatory value in terms of attaining human security. Recall
how in the first chapter of this dissertation we alluded to the international community’s
most controversial mitigatory response; namely military humanitarianism. We argued
that this is but thinly disguised realpolitik perpetuating human rights abuses and
insecurity on the ground.
The international community also attempts to mitigate the impacts of armed conflict on
civilian children via IHL (i.e. the 1989 CRC) and the activities of humanitarian agencies.
These means are framed by the pluralist paradigm, given their association with human
rights norms and correlated with idealism i.e. the rhetoric of human security.
The third paradigm of IR (which has not been directly engaged with thus far in the
context of children’s human security) is globalism or structuralism. Might globalism
help rapproche the gaps between realism and idealism?
While globalism has some valid contributions to make (and these are dealt with in the
next sub-section) in sum; all three IR perspectives are in themselves inadequate lenses for
39
viewing human security in broad and progressive terms. This is because cognitively rigid
positivist methodological stances are embedded in each.xiv
However, critical theory (which is situated in the post-positivist IR school) is a useful
interpretative tool for our topic of ameliorating children’s human security.
This is
because it can support our contention that children are a ‘social bridge’. In 4.3 and 4.4 I
outline just how and why this is so.
4.2 Globalist Thought and Children’s Security
The globalist approach to IR concerns itself with the structure of the world’s capitalist
economy. Wallerstein describes this structure as comprising of a core and periphery.
The relationship between the core and periphery is one of advanced development in the
North versus underdevelopment in the South, and independency in the former versus
dependency in the latter (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 459). This dichotomous arrangement
is akin to the split described in chapter 1, between the ‘zones of peace’ (or club of liberal
states (Sikkink 1998:519)) and the ‘zones of conflict’. This globalist framework has
bearing on our topic given the majority of modern intrastate conflicts occur in the
underdeveloped parts of the world.
The globalist lens has commonalties with the pluralist one in deeming that transnational
actors and issues of social and economic welfare are of import.
However, whilst
pluralism believes that high politics can be a positive-sum game, globalism is more like
realism in perceiving international affairs as a negative-sum game - the ’haves’ in the
core and the ‘have nots’ in the periphery meaning there are some winners but also some losers. Africa, for instance, has moved from being at the periphery to the periphery of the
periphery of the global economy (cited in Booth 1998:249).
Various cumulative crises in the 1970’s and 1980’s such as; soaring oil prices, drought,
population increases, weak domestic governance, less demand for primary commodities,
increases in foreign debt and of course the debilitating effects of war economies, has
resulted in ‘21 of the worlds 30 poorest countries being found in the African regions
40
today’ (World Bank cited in Booth 1998:249). Foreign investors are obviously reluctant
to invest in these areas given their marked instability. This means economic instability
becomes a self perpetuating actuality (the notable exception to this is South Africa where
the economy is burgeoning by virtue of better leadership capacity, greater resource
endowment and infrastructure) (Hopwood cited in Booth 1998:263).
The international community has responded to these economic crises piecemeal with
SAP’s which aim to reorient African economies towards greater efficiency and growth
potential in the medium term. But as has already been noted SAP’s are criticized for
failing to make the necessary investments in human capital, infrastructure and institution
building for longer term development [which are vital prerequisites for human security]
(World Bank 1994 cited in Booth 1998:251).xv
Children are future human capital. They should be perceived as an investment
opportunity, because in economic terms, they are public goods that provide positive
externalities. Children (in the North or South) who grow up into responsible, healthy,
taxpaying, law-abiding adults contribute positively to society. The alternative; ill health,
illiteracy, and social dislocation are costs borne by society as a whole. The argument is
simple; since all benefit from positive externalities, it is in the interests of society at large
to ensure children’s adequate care (Folbre cited in Boyden and Levison 1999:69-70).
Hopwood suggests that mobilizing statesmen and citizens groups around children’s rights
and needs is a relatively uncontroversial way to introduce widespread economic and
social change which can work towards a pattern of global development [and thus greater
human security](cited in Booth 1998:265-266).
This is extremely controversial though seeing as children to date have not been
considered ‘high politics’.
They have been marginalised in global security terms.
Consider last year was the first and only time the UN Security Council devoted a meeting
to children’s concerns (Olannu 1998). The idea of children’s security as high politics is
41
radical. Like human rights and human security - children’s rights and children’s security
potentially subverts the established order.
Critical thinking is an overarching theoretical framework for such a radical rethink, and
it is to an exposition of this that we now turn. What is and what are the advantages of
applying critical thinking to human security?
4.3 Critical Theory and Human Security
E.H.Carr was the first IR theorist this century to point out the inadequacies of conceiving
political situations in purely realist or utopic terms. Carr wrote the following in response
to the failure of inter-war utopianism and collective security in the 1920’s and 1930’s.
‘The complete realist deprives himself of the possibility of changing reality [whereas] the
complete utopist deprives himself of the possibility of understanding either the reality
which he’s seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed. Political
science must be based on the recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice
and this can only be attained through a combination of utopia and reality’ (Carr 1939:1113).
How is this related though, to our story of civilian children’s human security in intrastate
conflict in the 1990’s? It is thematically pertinent, given the pervasive extent of human
insecurity experienced today (albeit in a different space and time) as another profound
failure of intra-war utopianism and collective security. Carr’s ideas remain applicable,
not least for his discussion of the ‘misunderstanding of the interdependence of utopia and
reality and the nature of power’. This remains a pivotal fulcrum of IR, and has
considerable bearing on the thwarted realization of human security (more about this in
4.4). In the interim I wish to develop critical theory which Carr’s notion of
‘interdependence’ was the important precursor to.
What then, are the premises behind critical theory that correlate with our contention of
children as powerful ‘social bridges’?
42
R.Cox (in Little and Smith 1991) argues that there are two sorts of theory. The first he
identifies as ‘problem solving’. The second he says is more reflective and this he coins
‘critical theory’. Whilst the former takes the world as it finds it, the latter tries to stand
apart from the prevailing order. It may take as its starting point some aspect of human
activity (for example mitigating the impacts of armed conflict on civilian children in war)
but in contrast to the problem solving approach which only leads to further subdivision of
the issue critical theory looks to engage ‘with the bigger picture’ i.e. it considers all the
relevant social, economic and political elements (the psychosocial humanitarian
programmes in chapter 3 try to do just this). By turning to the whole, of which the
contemplated part is but one component, critical theory seeks to understand the processes
in which both the part and the whole are involved. Critical theory rejects the permanency
of the existing order, but also rejects preposterously utopic alternatives (cited in Little and
Smith 1991:444-450).
Finally, critical theory endorses the amenability of change and role of agency which is in
contrast to the globalist lens where structure is assumed to have the most impetus.
A.Wendt’s work is a sophisticated foray into the power of agency over structure. In his
seminal article ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power
politics’ Wendt examines how the end of the bipolar Cold War power structure came
about via Gorbachev’s New Thinking. His reforms changed the intersubjective meanings
and reciprocal typifications of the other as ‘other’, which had characterized the rivaling
Superpowers relationship for some forty years.
Neither realist, pluralist, nor globalist thought can in themselves account for such an
extraordinary transformation as the end of the Cold War. Neither can each of these
paradigms satisfactorily account for how the international community might potentially
transform children’s or indeed human security per se. Critical theory on the other hand
can offer guidance.
43
R.B.J.Walker is a critical theorist who expands upon Carr’s supposition of false
dichotomies and Cox and Wendt’s ‘social constructionism’. In Inside/Outside (1993) he
describes how the dichotomous relationships which frame the discipline of IR (high
politics versus low politics or realism and idealism) are deeply inscribed in our very
constitutive discourse of modern politics (1993:182). The distinct problem with this is
that such bifurcation ‘has the sharpness of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ which decides everything [is
‘right’ or ‘wrong’]’ (Baudrillard in Walker 1993:1). For instance, realism is perceived as
‘realistic’ whilst idealism is by comparative default deemed ‘unrealistic’. Similarly
‘strategic studies’ are pitted against and seen to triumph over ‘peace studies’ (Krause and
Williams 1998) and military security is prioritised over socio-economic security. Yet
these demarcated borders delineate political possibilities in space and time (1993:107).
The divisions can be arbitrary, result in a crucial loss of meaning in the interplay - and
ultimately prove counterproductive in human security terms.
The Cold War was a prime example of this; adopting a simple bipolar structure to explain
a complex multifarious reality…because it seems to be part of the human condition that
we can only take a certain amount of reality at a time (cited in Booth 1995:106).
Getting back to our topic in hand, the point is that we still largely conceive of children’s
and human security in terms of such ‘hygienic ordering’(Rossett cited in Booth
1995:106).
Be it via ‘military humanitarianism’, SAP’s or humanitarian agencies
inappropriately utilising psychological treatment in non-Western settings. Such falsely
parsimonious treatments of a given situation stymies human security.
4.4 Revisiting the Human Security Dilemma through Children’s Security - a Critical
Thinking Space
The Cold War was supposed to be about ending the preoccupation with high politics as
military strategy and about greater security opportunities via International Law and
humanitarian agencies. Gorbachev’s reforms were certainly brave examples of Critical
thinking which ended the Cold War’s attendant threat of annihilation. However the
44
subsequent dissolution of the former Soviet Union resulted in a great deal of political,
economic and human insecurity on the ground. Does this then mean that Gorbachev’s
reforms were a false start, for human security and IR?
Not necessarily. ‘We must remember how the whole of history, so far, has been an
attempt to avoid uncertainty – but that security by itself is an inadequate goal; it has never
been foolproof, plans go awry, and in the process much of the experience is allowed to go
to waste, but these failures can be recycled into opportunities too…the shape of hope is
uncertain, but uncertainty is indispensable for hope’ (Zeldin 1994:372-3). And the
ontological possibility for hope is always present, rooted, ultimately in the ‘fact of
natality’, (which is synonymous with children).
New thinking on children’s security may seem diametrically opposed to the ramifications
for international security which Gorbachev’s New thinking entailed. The latter is statecentric ‘high politics’ and the former ‘low politics’.
However, the purpose of this
dissertation has been to argue that both their beginnings are conceptually linked via
critical theory. ‘The child, like all beginnings is vulnerable. [But] we must nurture that
beginning, not knowing and not being able to control the ‘end’ of the story .. It is only
the full experience of this capacity that can bestow upon human [and international],
affairs faith and hope - those two essential characteristics of human existence (Elshtein
and Arendt in Little and Smith 1991:465).
As underscored throughout this study, children are one of the most potent symbols of
beginnings, in any culture. Their rights, needs and agency are foundations for and
represent the societal future of individuals, families, cultures, nations and civilization.
The idealism of ‘child savers and kiddy libbers’ (Kuper 1997:12) is actually rooted in the
realpolitik language of security. We fail to fully appreciate that children’s productivity
can potentially stabilise or destabilise the international political-economy. They are
cornerstones of regional stability, thus they are high politics. Our approach to human
security should be one, which places importance on these footholds.
45
Whilst we continue to think of power in the international system as the quantitative ‘static
sum of military, economic, technical and diplomatic capabilities or the dynamic
interactions of states and their outcomes (Viotti and Kauppi 1993:44) critical thinking
supports another more qualitative interpretation. This model suggests the ‘balance of
power’ actually rests with people’s competencies - including children’s power
capabilities (Carroll in Pettman 1991:72-4).
The resources we continue to divest in military strategy, be it in the North/South/East or
West will only ever fuel the human security dilemma.
This is absurd given that
‘humanity’s most long lasting [rational] purpose has [also] been to produce more
humanity’ (Zeldin 1994:465). The central paradox between thwarting and realizing our
greater human security is one we all live with, but which is innately pronounced for
civilian children embroiled in situations of armed conflict.
In this dissertation I have tried to show how there may be a way to bridge some of the
gap between high and low politics and the reality and rhetoric of human security as it
relates to civilian children. Realising their social and economic security can be a bridge
amongst the positivist paradigms of realism, liberalism and globalism – and moreover,
with post-positivist critical theory. In tandem with opening up a theoretical thinking
space there is practical scope too - at the very least, for humanitarian agencies and
children alike to come together and play their part in creating a new and meaningful
human security project, from the top down and bottom up.
‘Within this project must be the recovery of hope, a sense of hope, a sense of the future,
and confidence in human agency. We have of course, to begin from where we are. Not
all will have the space of a Gorbachev, or the vision of a Mandela. But we all have some.
In that regard it is important to remember that the Berlin Wall did not fall; it was pushed.
It was thought up, built up, unthought, and pulled down. People changing their minds
demolished this most symbolic material structure of the Cold War. Like the Berlin wall,
the political, social, cultural and economic world in which we live today - nuclear
missiles, rat infested shanty-towns, fundamentalist churches and sweat shops are also
46
inventions, susceptible of being thought up, built up unthought and pulled down’ (Booth
1998:353).
47
Conclusion:
For most people in the world the security issue is about having enough to eat, something
to wear, a place to live and some way to keep their children alive and well…conventional
security policy diverts resources away from these fundamentals of real human security’
(Kent 1995:92).
This study has been an attempt to firstly evaluate, and secondly to redefine the rhetoric
and reality - the theory and practice of human security; some ten years on, from the end
of the Cold War and the heralding of New World Order values. Statesmen and lobbyists
alike grandiosely proclaimed that the 1990’s entailed untold chances for ‘real’ security.
But as this dissertation demonstrated with a case study of ‘the impacts of armed conflict
on children and the international community’s response to mitigating these’, the
opportunities for greater children’s and human security have continued to be thwarted by
bipolarised thinking on high politics and security per se. This is a relic of the Cold War,
an Old World Order and symptomatic of staid IRT.
The 1989 CRC was used in this project as a barometer of the international community’s
attempts to augment civilian children’s security. It is a prime example of the persistence
of rhetoric versus reality in the Post-Cold War era. Some might argue that no piece of
legislature could make a substantial inroad given the extent of children’s suffering in
complex political emergencies. But this study shows that the 1989 CRC need not be a
blunt instrument; the international community does have some leverage for mitigating the
impacts of armed conflict on children - vis-a-vis its humanitarian programmes. I have
sought to show how humanitarian agencies can work successfully with the social and
economic principles of the 1989 CRC. To do so they do need to be more sensitive to
Western ethnocentric biases inherent in the metatext of the legislature and to
simililtaneousely pay closer attention to local socio-economic and political realities.
This model encourages children’s resilience and recognises their import as social and
economic actors. This is another tentative but a critical beginning for civilians children’s
48
security. It is one which is more idealistic than it is realistic but also one based on the
premise of the interplay between idealism and realism. It is an attempt to engage with
some of the real complexities of human security and an undertaking to begin to end the
Cold War mentality - one whereby security was only ever divorced from human security.
Children’s security and human security has been, is and will be what we make of it.
49
Appendix A: Summary of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child
From the preamble:
Considering, that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the
United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justices and peace in
the world,
Recalling, that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has
proclaimed that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
Recognising, the importance of international cooperation for improving the living
conditions of children in every country, in particular to the developing countries,
The document is comprised of 41 articles. Civil, political, social and economic rights are
mentioned. The following rights pledged by state parties are germane to this dissertation:
*a child is under 18 years of age (Article 1)
*the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration (Article 3)
*the state shall undertake to implement the child’s economic, social and cultural rights in
the framework of international cooperation (Article 4)
* the child has a right to life, survival and development (Article 6)
*the child has a right to a family (Article 9)
* the child has a right to freedom of expression (Article 11)
*the child has the right to protection against unlawful interference/attacks on their family
and home (Article 16)
*the child should be protected from all forms of physical or mental violence (Article 19)
*the child has a right to play and to participate in cultural life (Article 31)
*the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation (Article 32)
*the physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of the child victim of
armed conflicts (Article 39)
*nothing in this present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more conducive
to the realisation of the rights of the child and which may be contained in the law of the
State Party (Article 41).
Source: Reproduced in In the Firing Line-War and Children’s Rights, Amnesty
International 1999.
50
Appendix B: Aims of Peace Education
Knowledge
*conflict analysis –Sri Lanka
*mediation process - Liberia
*understanding interdependence between individuals and societies - Lebanon
*recognition of prejudice - Burundi
Skills
*communication - Burundi, Croatia, Rwanda
*ability to cooperate - ditto
*critical thinking - Egypt
*constructive conflict resolution - Croatia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka
*generating alternative solutions - Sri Lanka
*participation in society on behalf of peace - Colombia
*ability to live with change - Gambia
Attitudes
*positive self image - Burundi, Egypt, Lebanon
*respect for differences - Burundi, Yugoslavia, Lebanon
*reconciliation - Croatia, Liberia
*solidarity - Burundi and Lebanon
Source: Peace Education in UNICEF 1999, pp. 10-11.
51
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Machel, G (1996), Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of Armed
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Daly, E (1998), ‘Kosovo Girls Want to Kill’, The Independent on Sunday, 25 October,
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i
An idealist considers ideas to have important causal effects as opposed to realists who see power or
material interests as the determinants of political outcomes. High politics refers to matters of security- the
strategic interests of states. Realists traditionally draw a distinction between such high political concerns
and those dealing with socio-economic or welfare issues deemed of lesser interest and low politics (Viotti
and Kaupi 1993:582-3).
ii
Consider the case of Rwanda where international organisations employed Hutu extremists in Tutsi
refugee camps (ODI 1998). This exacerbated human insecurity.
59
iii
This is not to belittle the disturbing phenomena of child soldiers. The image of a child yielding a gun; be it
out of ideological conviction (Daly 1998) or as ‘the best way to secure food and or protection’ (UNICEF
1996:17) is also symptomatic of profound human insecurity - but a deserving subject in its own right (see
Cohn 1994).
iv
For example imposing school fees in poor countries so as to make programmes self supporting has the
counterproductive effect of resulting in lower attendances (Boyden and Levison 1999:14).
v
UNOSOM II forces came into conflict with fighting factions in Somalia. Ensuing fighting resulted in some
18 US troops killed and paraded through Mogadishu. The US decided to cut their losses and issued a writ
saying that thereafter the US would only involve themselves in those civil conflicts where there was a
decided national interest at stake (ODI 1998:2).
vi
See Boyden and Levison for a critique of modern childhood and the principle of the best interests of the
child as a Western ideological construct, which is, but one conception of childhood (1999:20).
vii
This refers to the collapse of domestic support for Americas military interventionist policies in Vietnam
(Evans 1998:563).
viii
Consider also how modern weapons like anti personnel landmines are an ongoing problem for children
years after conflicts end (Transnational Law 1996:339).
ix
For example in Somalia in 1992 half of the children under the age of 5 were dead by the end of the year as
a result of undernutrition and the spread of infectious diseases (Hamilton n.d: 2).
See section on ‘children as engines of economic growth: education and human capital ‘ for an extensive
capitulation of the importance of education to the potential for a country’s economic burgeoning in Boyden
and Levison’s Report on Children as Economic and Social Actors (1999:6-14).
x
xi
This is not always crucial amongst children from certain nomadic cultures (see Rousseau 1998).
xii
See the MRG 1997 report on the impacts of intrastate conflict on indigenous children.
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was a successor to ‘shellshock’, and applied to US war veterans who
experienced a range of psychological disturbances upon their return home from Vietnam. It was originally
ascribed to the aftermath of events outside the realm of ordinary human experience. Its utility when applied
to non-Western children in protracted war situations has been questioned (Summerfield 1996b: 10).
1 Positivism –the view that knowledge comes from empirical testing of propositions or hypotheses against
evidence or facts (Viotti and Kauppi 1993:591). Post-positivism rejects this insofar as it is interested in
recognising the very epistemological (knowing) and ontological (being) assumptions which are contained
in the ‘evidence or facts’. Post-positivists do not just accept these as exogeneous givens.
1
2 There is considerable irony in measures being taken to reorient the economy, with SAP’s and foreign aid
on the one hand while on the other perepetuating the problems of warfare, compounding foreign debt and
insecurity –with the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council being the top 5 profiting exporters
of arms in the world (UNICEF 1996:25).
60