Key Policy Lessons
Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and PeaceBuilding in DRC, 2002-2010
Presentation in Oslo, Day 1 of Consultations
‘What Have We learnt From the Application Phase?’
16 February 2011
A Classical Joint Evaluation Framework
1. Steering Committee including Belgium (Chair), Canada,
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCHR,
Unicef, UNIFEM, United Kingdom.
2. Team: 15 persons deployed over 12 months (October
2009 – September 2010). Four deliverables.
3. Scope: area of highest sustained conflict defined as
North and South Kivu, District of Ituri, and all
interventions to resolve the conflicts between 2003 and
2010.
4. Four Consultative Groups in Kinshasa, Bunia, Goma,
Bukavu, consulted in January 2011 on Final Draft.
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ToR: What are the policies and how are they defined? What is
their performance? What is the role of government?
Relevance
Effectiveness
To what extent did the CPPB policies/
strategies and interventions provide an
accurate and relevant response to the
conflict and to the harm the conflict has
caused and still causes?
To what extent did the interventions achieve
their objectives? What are the outcomes of
the CPPB interventions?
Efficiency
Impact
How do the interventions compare to other
options, that donors did not choose but
were aware of, aiming at achieving the same
goals?
What is the impact of the CPPB policies and
strategies on the selected themes?
And are outcomes sustainable?
To what extent do the donors coordinate their CPPB efforts amongst themselves
or with local institutions and to what extent is their CPPB approach coherent?
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Principal Peace and Conflict Drivers:
• Weakness of the State: limited presence, no regulatory role
• Land Based Conflicts: clash between formal justice, current conditions
and customary law
• Fragmentation of armed groups and slow DDR: local and informal
tactics undermine SSR and DDR
• Parallel structures for mining: governance neglected and prevalence
of artisanal mining and informal trade
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Physical Map of Conflict: remote, scattered,
difficult to know, “décalé”.
5
Priority axes Stability Plan
1. Sake-Masisi
2. Rutshuru-Ishasha
3. Bukavu-Homb o
4. Bukavu-Shabunda
5. Bunia-Boga
6. Fizi-Minembwe
7. Mambasa bridge
Boga
7
LUBERO
KANYABAYONGA
ISHASHA
4
RUTSHURU
1
MASISI
Sake
Hombo
2
3
UVIRA
Minembwe
6
Hotspots are illegal armed
groups
Grey arrows are FDLR
corridors
FIZI-BARAKA
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Policies: Unable to Address Clearly the Conflicts
• A significant lack of transparency: many actors and
levels of decision making, unwillingness to report & to
learn.
• Compartmentalisation: in spite of sustained funding
(US$1.5 billion per year, a large part for the east) and
good correlation to peace agreements and elections, too
many institutional conduits.
• An excessive number of policy frameworks: too
much information sharing, not enough policy setting.
Remoteness from the ground, lack of analytical simplicity
– especially as regards conflict analysis.
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Five Themes of Intervention: Headline Conclusions
• Humanitarian Aid: 40% of total funding, plus with child rights and assistance re
SGBV = 70% of projects - explained by some as mitigating conflict. Clearly
weakens the state, and provides no conflict sensitivity analysis.
• Justice: Increasingly coordinated and effective but unable to communicate with
stakeholders and hand over. Issues of land ownership not addressed frontally.
• DDR and SSR: The largest projects and most funding, but unequal to the scale
of the issues. Most effective but isolated and not enough focused on civilian
aspects.
• Mining: Recognised by everyone as a central issue but not addressed until
2007 and only timidly (5 projects). Key issue is not criminality but informality,
many current initiatives are making formal governance even more remote.
• Capacity building: not recognised as a key option for the creation of coalitions,
under-conceptualised (no objectives, indicators). Tends to be reduced to training
workshops.
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The Deeper Issue: A Chasm Separates the State from the
Donors
Local Partner Perceptions
Donor Perceptions
•Decisions are made in
capitals and Embassies and
neglect all forms of
consultation or grievance
feedback mechanisms
• Donors complain of
corruption but do not give the
example of transparent
funding
• There is no funding available
for state capacity. Civil society
and contracts are
incomparably wealthier
• Lack of capacity is pervasive
• The state is so corrupt as to
become an optical illusion
+
• NGOs represent the most
convenient and field based set
of actors for funding.
•The project based approach
remains the only option in
such a fragile state
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A XXIst Century Malaise
A very real policy vacuum as
regards the role of the state:
- Operational instruments fill
the gap left by strategy
- Institutional specialisations
define the ends
- Inability to define success
because there is no vision of
the end state.
An experience that
characterises the post-cold
war world: Balkans, Rwanda,
Afghanistan, etc… The default
is to work with what we have.
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A Change of Posture is Required
• CPPB requires a particular approach. This begins with
simplification. Starting from conflict analysis as a
planning, monitoring and evaluation tool.
• Coordination should be based on a clear type of effects
sought in relation to drivers of conflict.
• Conflict sensitivity and development of local capacity
should be universal and start from the ground up,
particularly in remote areas.
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A Change of Posture
What management
systems?
Base
performance on
conflict analysis
Cluster around
specific drivers
Premised on
local
•Be creative in the
selection of
partners, take risks
(STAREC, China,
Church, mining
companies?).
coalitions
Refine or strengthen certain types of
Interventions: mining, humanitarian
aid, justice, capacity building, SSR
• Resist the
preference for
multiple levels of
contracting
• Create a culture of
trust & transparency
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