Public Trust in the U.S. Food System When Good Communication Isn’t Good Enough Steve Sapp Department of Sociology Iowa State University Introduction The U.S. food system provides millions of persons with a large quantity of safe, wholesome, and relatively inexpensive food. Most U.S. consumers are geographically and conceptually far removed from this system. Now that Americans no longer live on the farm they wonder what’s going on down on it. And they worry that the news is not good. Introduction The public understandably is: Ignorant: They (we all) cannot help but be, given the complexity of our technologies. Untrusting: They (we all) should be. Democracies require engaged citizens. Skeptical: They (we all) have to be for survival. And because science, government regulations, and industry practices cannot always be trusted, skepticism is justified. Introduction Being ignorant, untrusting, and skeptical does not mean that consumers (we all) are irrational, unreasonable, or hysterical. These traits simply are a natural outcome of living in a technologically advanced and democratically governed society. In a democratic society, this ignorant, untrusting, and skeptical public to some extent decides how the food system will be structured and managed. Introduction Hence, the U.S. food system is a public system. Therefore, consumer trust will significantly affect the structure and functioning of this system. Established institutions seek to retain trust. Alternatives seek to gain and retain trust. Introduction What are the key determinants of public trust in the U.S. food system? What actions can institutional actors take to gain and retain public trust? Within the social sciences, these questions fall within the domain of “risk communication.” Risk communication has two related goals: “Look out!” “Stop worrying!” Risk Communication: Approaches To convince others to stop worrying, scientists might choose to provide no communication. That is, they might take the perspective that nothing needs to be said because they and risk managers are the ones who are well educated and know what they are doing. To some extent, this is a very good argument! Unfortunately, scientists and risk managers err sufficiently that, within democratic societies, the public demands to become involved in the decision-making process. Risk Communication: Approaches When scientists attempt to explain the facts, however, they face other problems because explanations involve subjective evaluations. Scientists and representatives of groups concerned about the technology then argue about whose interpretation is the most correct. These arguments come to the attention of the media, who understandably report them. Risk Communication: The Media When the media report on a controversy, it becomes amplified. We notice a “hoopla” effect. Proponents of the technology then blame the media for arousing unnecessary anxiety about the technology. Assuming the media are responsible in their actions, this critique is unjustified. It is more correct to note that negative information carries disproportionate weight, for many good reasons. Risk Communication: Trust Some scholars argue that this amplification of risk and reporting of negative information destroys trust, which is fragile. Others argue that this downturn in trust is temporary and can be overcome with risk communication techniques aimed at restoring trust. To make a long story short: Convincing others to “stop worrying” equates to gaining their trust because trust explains most of the variance in adoption of new technologies. Risk Communication: Trust Informing scientists and business organizations about how to gain trust, therefore, is the key to teaching them how to inform the public about new technologies. So, we ask the question, “What influences public trust in institutions?” If we know what drives trust, then we can inform scientists and business organizations about how to convince the public to stop worrying (again, under the presumption that the technology mainly is a good one). Risk Communication: Trust Explaining public trust and training scientists and business leaders to communicate adequately with the public is easy! We simply develop a theoretical model with the variables shown on the next slide. Then, we estimate the model, determine which variables are most effective at explaining trust, define these variables for scientists and business leaders, and convince them to listen to our advice. Risk Communication: Trust Here are just some of the variables we will need to explain public trust in societal institutions: perceived risks complexity age familiarity value similarity anomie source credibility observability income media attention stigma alienation perceived benefits relative advantage sex and gender compatibility trialability race and ethnicity prior exposure education….. Risk Communication: Theory Of course, a simpler model would be preferable! We seek a model that: 1. explains much of the variance in trust 2. with just a few variables 3. that are easily defined to others 4. and appeal to them as actionable. Risk Communication: Recreancy The solution might lie in the Recreancy Theorem, which asserts that public trust in societal institutions reflects assessments of the Competence and Fiduciary Responsibility of institutional actors. Where Competence refers to perceptions of expertise and skill, and Fiduciary Responsibility refers to perceptions that the source will behave with in the “right” way (ethically). Fiduciary Responsibility can also be called Confidence. Risk Communication: Recreancy Our theoretical model can be diagrammed like this: Competence Trust Compliance Confidence Where Compliance refers to willingness to heed the recommendations of others. This variable is used to evaluate the external validity of the measure of trust, as an indicator of commitment to a source of information. Risk Communication: Recreancy Note that, for the most part, scientists, business leaders, and proponents of new technologies prefer risk communication strategies that focus upon establishing competence. Proponents want the public to believe that proponents know what they are doing, that the scientific findings are accurate and unbiased. We will therefore be interested in discovering the relative effects of competence and confidence in explaining trust. Recreancy: Empirical Analysis Examination of trust in the U.S. food system. Nationwide survey of primary food preparers at home. Final sample of 2,008 adults living in 50 states. Measurements on competence, confidence, trust, compliance, and social-demographic (i.e., age, sex, education, income) and other controls. Five areas of the U.S. food system: food safety, nutrition, worker care, environmental protection, animal welfare. 7-9 pertinent actors within each area (e.g., producers, processors, grocers, regulators, restaurants, advocacy groups). Recreancy: Empirical Analysis This research design yields 41 tests of our theoretical model. These are the results: Path Std. Estimates Avg. Low High Trust Compliance Competence Trust Confidence Trust .676 .216 .668 .520 .154 .579 .792 .311 .768 R-Square Avg. Low High Trust Compliance .745 .495 .590 .299 .837 .713 Recreancy: Empirical Analysis The results indicate that the model: 1. explains much of the variance in trust 2. with just a few variables 3. that are easily defined to others. Also, the results indicate overwhelmingly that confidence, not competence, is the key driver of public trust in societal institutions responsible for the U.S. food system! Recreancy: Prospects Presenting messages aimed at instilling confidence in the source have been an important part of advertising and other promotional activities for many years. But this approach is relatively new to proponents of the complex and sometimes controversial technologies used in the U.S. food system. Future research needs to further explore the meanings of competence and confidence and actions effective at building them to gain trust. Public Trust in the U.S. Food System When Good Communication Isn’t Good Enough Thank You!