“Law and Democratization: The Uses of Constitutional Law in Taiwan,
Korea and Latin America”
Javier A. Couso,
Universidad Diego Portales, Chile.
WORK IN PROGRESS. PLEASE DO NOT CITE.
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I. Introduction.
The notion that democratization depends to some extent on law was ‘discovered’
by political scientists rather late in the proceedings. In fact, only when the so-called ‘third
wave of democratization’ was coming to an end (in the early 1990s), did scholars
working on democratic transitions look at the role that law –and, in particular,
constitutional law— can play in consolidating and deepening democracy (Stozky, 2003;
Greenberg and S. Katz eds., 1993). Due to this realization, over the last decade or so the
literature on democratization has been greatly expanded with studies investigating the
intersection between law and democracy in many areas of the world (Gloppen, Gargarella
& Skaar, 2004; Przeworski & Maravall 2003; Klug, 2000; J. Mendez, G. O'Donnell &
Pinheiro, 1999). This literature, however, has tended to focus on single country casestudies or on regional analysis, but rarely comparing across regions, as I will try to do in
this paper with Latin America and Taiwan and South Korea.
For all their differences, the fact that most of the Latin American states started
their democratization processes just about the time that Taiwan and Korea did provides
an opportunity to compare the trajectory of each region’s transitions. Furthermore, the
Civil Law background of all these countries makes the comparative analysis of the role of
law on democratization all the more interesting. As an effort to engage in such exercise
this paper will summarize the main themes that come out in the relationship between
constitutional law and democratization in these two regions.
2
Here a caveat is in order. There is an obvious imbalance in taking Latin America
as a single unit in order to then compare it with the pair Taiwan/Korea. Indeed, while the
latter two can be put together reasonably well in terms of their shared characteristics, we
cannot say the same with regard to Latin America, given the sheer diversity of that region
in terms of the degrees of state-formation, economic performance, presence (or not)of a
sizable indigenous population, political stability and so forth. Thus, for example, while
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, México and Uruguay could plausibly be put together for
comparative purposes, countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and
Nicaragua clearly belong to a different category, due to their lack of stateness, poor
economic development, indigenous population ethnic and chronic political instability.
The paper is organized in the following way. First, there is a brief description of
what I take to be the the most relevant differences and similarities between the pair
Taiwan/Korea and Latin America for the purpose of comparing their democratization
processes. This is followed by a section characterizing the background in which the
relationship between law and democratization has unfolded in these two regions over the
last two decades, in particular, the emergence of a new approach to constitutionalism and
the role of the courts in a democracy. In the third section, I engage in a comparative
analysis of the way in which law has influenced democratization in Taiwan, Korea and
Latin America. Finally, the concluding section reflects on what this exercise in
comparative politics indicates.
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II. Differences that matter.
As we said in the previous section, the first obvious political link between Taiwan
and Korea and most of Latin America is the remarkable coincidence in the timing of their
respective transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, which started in both regions
toward the mid 1980s. This similarity should not, however, be overemphasized, given the
sharp structural differences between these two regions.
The first and most important distinction relates to economics. Indeed, while South
Korea and Taiwan are in fact developed countries, none of the Latin American states
have reached that point (while the former two exhibit a per capita GDP well over 20,000
US $, in Latin America the same statistics is just around 4,000 US $ on average).1
Although economic development is not necesarilly connected with democratization –
there are some very prosperous countries ruled by heavily authoritarian regimes— it
cannot be denied that material progress may be a relevant variable when it comes to
consolidating democracy.2
Furthermore –and perhaps more relevant for democratization— Taiwan and
Korea are considerably more egalitarian than the Latin American region. In fact, while
these two East Asian countries rank among the most equal in the world (with Gini
1
Even the most affluent countries of Latin America, Chile and Argentina have a per
capita GDP of just around 10,000 US $, that is, is less than half of that of Taiwan or
Korea.
2
Some scholars have actually argued that before a country reaches 6,000 US & of per
capita GDP no democarcy is feasible. See Pzweworzky (1999).
4
coefficients of .27 and .31), Latin America is considered to be the most unequal region
on earth, with an average Gini coefficient of around .55 (Londoño & Szekely, 1997).3
This radically different socio-economic background is particularly relevant when it
comes to democratization, due to the intimate link which exists between democracy and
equality. In fact, widespread economic inequality is consider to conspire against
democratic consolidation because it leads to the disenchantment of the poor with the
regime, as well as to the surge of populist leaders with a weak adherence to liberal
democratic principles. 4
Another relevant difference between Taiwan/Korea and Latin America is the
international context which sorrounded their respective transitions. Indeed, while both
sets of countries experienced their respective democratic processes just before the end of
the Cold War, the impact of international politics in the Taiwanese and Korean transitions
(in particular, the involvement of United States and the chronical conflict with mainland
China and North Korea, respectively) appears to have been far more relevant than was
the case in Latin America (a region that by the mid 1980s was becoming incresingly
irrelevant to U.S. foreign policy).
In the word of the authors of this study: “With regard to inequality, we have produced
some evidence that confirms that this is the region of the world where income is most
unequally distributed”
4
The cases of Hugo Chávez, in Venezuela, and Correa, in Ecuador, come immediately to
mind.
3
5
III. Grounds for comparizon
Having mentioned what I take to be the most relevant differences between
Taiwan/Korea and Latin America when it comes to engage in a comparative analysis of
their respective democratization efforts, I now turn to analyze their commonalities.
The first common trait between these two regions is the hierarchical nature of the
social relationships that have historically characterized them. Although this traditional
feature of sociability in both Taiwan/Korea and Latin America appears to be rapidly
changing toward more horizontal relationships (due to globalization, new patterns of
consumption and the like)5, the fact is that the legacy of deeply hierarchical social
structures rooted in Confucianism and Catholic absolutism (in Taiwan/Korea and Latin
America, respectively) represents a cultural obstacle for societies attemping to
consolidate political regimes predicated on more egalitarian social relationships.
Another commonality between these two regions is that they both share
‘centralist’ administrative traditions, that is, a way of exercising public auhtority where
the central government plays a disproportionate role,6 a feature that normally goes hand
in hand with a weak civil society. This tradition contrasts sharply with the more decentralized state structure and strong civil society characteristic of consolidated
democracies.
5
For Latin American case see Danilo Martuccelli (2007).
For the Latin American story see Claudio Véliz, The Centralist Tradition of Latin
America (Princeton University Press, 1980)
6
6
This last point relates to another commonality between Latin America and the two
East Asian countries we have been analyzing, and which is particularly relevant when it
comes to the study of democratization. I refer to the illiberal past of both Taiwan/Korea
and Latin America. In the case o the latter, due to the heavy legacy of a long colonial past
under a monarchy which left no space for freedom of speech and conscience (Wiarda,
2002; Adelman, 1999). And in the case of the former, due to its Confucianist roots.
Finally, Taiwan, Korea and Latin American countries have all presidencialists
regimes, a feature that in most emerging democracies poses the ever present threat of
executive abuse of power and a tendency to monopolize state authority.
IV. Law and Democracy in the Era of Democratic Transition
Before analyzing the way in which the relationship between law and
democratization has played out in each of these regions it is important to note that this
process took place in the context of the simultaneous transformation of both politics and
law. Indeed, while in the political realm there was a momentous shift from
authoritarianism to democracy, in the juridical one a similarly important change was
happening, with the substitution of an approach to law and courts centered on legal
positivism and a strict separation of powers for a ‘new constitutionalist’ paradigm
centered on a human rights-based understanding of constitutional law and the acceptance
of judicial control of the constitutionality of legislation (Sieder et al, 2005; Ginsburg,
2003).
7
According to this new constitutional approach the role of the courts is to actively
enforce the fundamental rights proclaimed in the constitution through the direct
application of the constitution and international human rights instruments. This
conception is coupled with a moral understanding of the nature of judicial interpretation
which favours an activist search of constitutional principles over ‘mere’ legal rules (very
much influenced by the work of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy), a view of
adjudication which departs radically from the one prevalent in Civil Law jurisdisdictions
such as those of Latin America and Taiwan and Korea until just a couple of decades ago.
The emergence of this new paradigm of constitutional law and judicial
interpretation has legitimated in the eyes of many relevant legal actors (including legal
academics, judges and litigators) the kind of judge-made law which was regarded as
anathema in traditional Civil Law jurisprudence.
While the dynamic between law and democratization in these countries has been
one of mutual interpenetration (with law contributing to shape the nature of democratic
transition at the same time that it was itself beeing influenced by democratization),
specialists and commentators have been more interested in identifying the impact of law
on democratization than the other way around. Consequently, any comparative exercise
like the present one (which necessarily relies in secundary literature) must concentrate on
the impact of law in democratization, at least until more empirical research accumulates
in each of these two regions on the admittedly fascinating issue of the impact of
democratization processes on law.
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V. The Impact of Law on Democratization in Taiwan/Korea and in Latin America.
By now it is almost a common place to state that law represents a critical element
in the consolidation of democratization. In particular, most scholars point to the role that
constitutional law can make. Having said, it seems important to spell out as precisely as it
is possible the ways in which the latter actually contributes to democratization. A review
of the relevant literature indicates that any assessment of the impact that law can have on
democratization should consider the following items:
a) the contribution that law and the courts in promoting political stability, arbitrating
in the inevitable political conflicts characteristic of democratic transitions;
b) the role of constitutional law as an ‘insurance mechanism,’ particularly for the
authoritarian forces at the time of regime change (and as an incentive for them to
do so);
c) the role of law in moderating state authority through the judicial control of
government abuses of power;
d) the contribution of courts in dealing with past human rights violations (that is,
those perpetrated under the authoritarian regimes;
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e) the role of the courts in deepening and creating individual rights (in generating
‘rights revolutions,’ in Charles Epp’s words),7 thus emerging as policy-making
actors.
This list of possible connections between law and democratization processes is of
course not exhaustive, but I think include the most important elements. As we shall see
below, the degree to which each of these factors has in fact played a role in the
democratization processes of Taiwan/Korea and Latin America differs significantly from
region to region (and, on occasion, from country to country).
a)
Starting with the contribution that law and the courts can make in furthering
political stability, this seems to have been more the case in Taiwan and Korea than in
Latin America (at least when taken as a whole). In fact, the record of the 1990s and early
2000s show that in Latin America the courts have achieve only modest results in
stabilizing political conflict. More worrysome, they have often been crashed or
intervened by the executive after attempting to perform their constitutional duties of
control of government abuse (as was the case in Peru, in 1993; in Venezuela, in 1999; in
Paraguay in 2005; and, most recently, in Ecuador in 2006).
7
See Charles Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective (The University of Chicago Press, 1998).
10
The relative failure of the courts in playing a stabilizing role in the political
domain in Latin America contrasts with the success of the courts in Taiwan and Korea to
serve as a stabilizing force during times of political crisis in the transition era.
The different outcomes in these two regions with regard to this aspect of the role
of law and courts on democratization may be related to the comparative higher legitimacy
enjoyed by the judiciary in Taiwan and Korea. Indeed, whereas opinion polls consistently
show that in most of Latin America the courts are distrusted by the people
(Latinobarometro, 2005), in Taiwan and Korea the courts seem to enjoy a higher degree
of popular support. If this information is so, the question then arises over what exactly
accounts for the greater legitimacy of the courts in these East Asian countries, something
that any person interested in the stabilizing effects of the judiciary in countries
undergoing democratic transitions ought to be interested in.
To summarize this point, in terms of the role of the courts as arbitrators of
political conflict the comparison between Taiwan and Korea vis-à-vis Latin America
shows that in the former courts have been more important and effective than in the latter,
something which might be related to different degrees of legitimacy exhibited by the
courts in those two regions.8
b.-
Going to the role that constitutional law and courts may play as an insurance
mechanism designed by the outgoing authoritarian regimes concerned with their future
8
This general indictment of the Latin American courts in terms of their ability to arbitrate
between different political forces in cases of crisis, of course excludes countries such as
Costa Rica and Colombia, where the courts have been willing and able to play that
crucial role.
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(Ginsburg, 2003), the record in Latin America shows that that was only the case in a
handful of countries –like Chile or Mexico— where the nature of the transition made the
‘constitutional law as an insurance mechanism’ hypothesis a very plausible one. Having
said this, even in those countries the role of the courts in upholding the constitutional
negotiation has been less prominent than originally expected (Couso, 2003). In the case
of Chile, for example, the respect of the constitutional agreement struck by the
democratic forces with the military regime at the time of the turnover owed more to the
fear of an authoritarian regression than to the role of the constitutional court in upholding
the negotiated constitution.
In the case of the rest of the countries of Latin America, the dynamics of the
transfer of power from authoritarian authorities to democratic ones –as well as other
circumstances— often led to the introduction of constitutional reforms long after the time
of the regime change (as in Argentina, in 1994; Bolivia in 2007, and Ecuador in 2007) or
led to the enactment of new constitutions with little or no participation of the former
dictatorial force. All of which do not fit well with the insurance model.
While the record in Latin America provides little evidence supporting the claim
that the constitutional law has served as an insurance mechanism introduced by previous
authoritarian forces fearful of the new democratic authorities, in the case of Korea and
Taiwan the opposite is true. In fact, it was precisely while studying the interplay between
constitutional law and democratization in these two countries (as well as in Mongolia)
that Tom Ginsburg introduced the notion of constitutionalism as an insurance mechanism
(Ginsburg, 2003).
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c.-
This led us to the next role expected to be played by the courts in new
democracies, that of ‘moderating’ state authority through the judicial control of
government abuse of power (Halliday, Karpik & Feeley, 2007). Again in relative contrast
with the Taiwan and Korean cases, the situation in Latin America has been less than
satisfactory. Although the courts have in fact protected basic political rights such as
freedom of the press, association and so forth, they have largely failed to defend the
rights of the marginalized, such as indigenous groups, common criminals and the poor
(Human rights Watch, 2004). This rather grim assessment may sound exaggerated in light
of some landmark decisions in many countries of the region, but it is important to bear in
mind that such cases come only occasionally, and when they happened, there are often
implementation problems with decisions adverse to the government, especially in those
countries with low degrees of institutionalization of their state institutions. In fact, even
in Chile, a Latin American state generally considered to have a strong rule of law, reports
show that the courts have sistematically failed to redress government abuse of what U.S.
jurisprudence calls ‘dicrete and insular minorites’ groups (UDP Human Rights Report,
2007).
Of course, the very nature of the political regime now prevalent in most of Latin
America –electoral democracy— has led to a dramatic reduction of government
violations of human rights (we have nothing like the degree of state repression
characteristic of the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s), but there is still much
uncontrolled state abuse that goes on in domains such as police brutality, penal conditions
and use of antiterrorist legislation (leaving aside so-called social, economic and cultural
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rights, where judicial decisions often encounter difficulties in the implementation fase –
due to the lack of resources of the state— making the occasional action by the courts
largely symbolic).
Furthermore, in many countries of Latin America government moderation owes
more to the ‘court of public opinion’ than to the judiciary. In other words, it is the
‘mobilization of shame’ performed by NGOs and the media what forces governments to
respect individual rights more than the threat of court action. The relative passivity of the
national courts in controlling government abuse of marginalized groups has made the
regional human rights system –the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and
Court— the court of last resort for many disadvantaged groups facing judicial
indifference with their plight. More than the actual rulings of this system, however
(because the cases could take up to a decade to be finally decided there and then usually
have trouble getting states to comply with them), the very possibility that this regional
human rights system can actually accept to review a case has proven to be an effective
tool for social and political mobilization around the issues at stake, which in itself may
have contributed to moderate state action.
At any rate, my sense is that in Taiwan and Korea the courts have played a much
more important role in moderating state authority (although I might be idealizing too
much the East Asian story here). If that is so, again the reason for this may be the higher
degree of state formation and legitimacy of the courts prevalent there (because in failed
states all too often sound judicial rulings aiming at protect individual rights go
unenforced, due to sheer government unwillingness to comply or, which is as bad, due to
the lack of state capacity to control all the territory of the state).
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d.- Going to the next item in our agenda, that is, the role of law and the courts in
redressing past human rights violations, paradoxically even in countries where judicial
control of current governments abuses is poor –as in most of Latin America— it is often
the case that the courts are active in dealing with past human rights violations perpetrated
by the previous military regimes.9 This may have to do with the gradual weakening of the
political power hold by the previous regime as the transition goes forward, which makes
it easier for the courts to persecute past human rights violations. In fact, given that it takes
more legitimacy to confront human rights abuses perpetrated by current democratic
governments (which enjoy more legitimacy and popular support) than to attack old,
discredited regimes, it should not be consider too surprising that in Latin America the
courts are more willing to seek punishment of past human rights violations than present
ones. To put in more simple terms, for weak court systems such as those typical of Latin
America it is far more easier to address and issue where the government is an allied
(dealing with past violations) than one in which it is an adversary (checking current
violations).
Thus, and in spite of the significance that actively punishing past human rights
violations is assumed to have for the future of democracy, the sad fact of many Latin
American countries is that even though that has been done, the presents violations
Here a precision: while the expression ‘human rights abuses’ include as a technical
matter both past and present violations, in the imaginary of most Latin Americans living
in countries where there were brutal military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s the
label ‘human rights’ is typically reserved to those abuses perpetrated in the past.
9
15
(admittedly less violent, although no less dramatic for those experiencing them) continue
without much judicial redress.
Turning to the case of Korea and Taiwan in this matter, my sense is that the courts
have so far done relatively less with regard to the crimes committed by the authoritarian
regimes of the past, being are more present and future oriented. The reason behind this
sharp contrast with the Latin American case may have to do with the fact that in Taiwan
and Korea the military regimes which immediately preceded the democratic transition
were far less criminal than their Latin American counterparts (as far as I know they did
not engage in the ‘disappearance’ of dissidents and systematic torture of hundreds of
thousands of their own people).
Summarizing this point, it appears that while in Latin America the courts have
shown relatively more readiness to try past human rights violations than current ones, in
the Taiwan and Korea the opposite has been true. As we have been pointing out with
regard to the other aspects of the relationship between law and democratization the fact
that the latter countries seem to have a more institutionalized judicial system may account
for the difference, as it takes stronger courts to defy current governments.
e.-
The last –but certainly not the least— aspect of the role of constitutional law on
democratization which has been highlighted by scholars working in the field has to do
with the deepening and/or creation of individual rights by courts endowed with the power
of judicial review of the constitution, an activity that necessarily transforms the courts
important actors of the policy-making process. Although this factor is also related to
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judicial control of government abuse it has a different significance, relating instead to the
incursion by the courts in domains formerly left to the elected branches of government
(Shapiro, 1993).
This last approach to adjudication owes much to the global spread of the U.S.
model of courts so well represented by the ‘Warren Court’ (Scheiber, 2007) which has
completely overcome the hostility towards the ‘government of the judges’ so common in
Civil Law systems such as those prevalent in Taiwan, Korea and Latin America until a
few decades ago. The impact of the new constitutional ortodoxy in all these countries has
led to unprecedented judicial activism at the service of individual rights in some Latin
American states (most dramatically in Colombia, Costa Rica and Argentina) 10 but not in
others (like Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Uruguay), although
it remains to be seen weather or not this may change in the future.
All the enthusiasm expressed by human rights activists and some scholars with
the ‘rights revolutions’ performed by the constitutional and supreme courts of the Latin
American countries were judicial activism has been strong should be tempered by the
knowledge that this unprecedented role of the judiciary has often led to the intervention
of the courts by the government, threatening the very independence of the courts (Couso,
2004), a risks that –at any rate—is always present when a court engages in active policymaking, as the history of the Supreme Court of United States suggests (Gillman, 1993).
In the case of Taiwan and Korea, it appears that the courts have been far more
conscious of the limits of their power and the need to proceed strategically in order to
advance their policy relevance while maintaining their independence, all of which has led
10
See Mauricio García Villegas et al, 1997; Bruce Wilson et al, 1991; Smulovityz, 2000).
17
to a less spectacular constitutional jurisprudence than that of Colombia, Argentina or
Costa Rica in Latin America, but perhaps one that will prove to be more lasting in the log
run.
VI. Conclusion
As we have seen in this paper, law –in particular constitutional law—has become
a crucial factor in the democratization processes of countries coming out of military
regimes. This with the background provided by the emergence of a global constitutional
paradigm which has reshaped the very understanding of constitutional law and the role
assign to courts in a democracy.
According to this new model of courts, the judiciary is charged with the duty of
controlling not just the legality of administrative action but the constitutionality of
legislation, thus potentially making the courts into powerful policy actors. This new
understanding of the role of the judiciary has penetrated even Civil Law countries such as
Taiwan, Korea and those of Latin America.
With this context in mind a comparative analysis of Taiwan/Korea and Latin
America shows that law has indeed played a positive role in the democratic transitions of
thee two sets of countries, although more so in the former two than in the latter ones. In
the case of Taiwan and Korea the courts have performed important tasks in terms of
arbitrating political conflict, controlling government abuses of power and serving as an
insurance mechanism for the former holders of powers. In the case of Latin America the
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courts have contributed in terms of dealing with past human rights violations and –in
some countries—with landmark cases upholding constitutional rights.
On balance, it appears to that law and the courts have been more relevant to the
democratization processes of Taiwan and Korea than to those of Latin America, a region
in which –with a few exceptions, of course—all too often the executive has intervened
courts that were attempting to control it, and where spectacular progress in terms of
judicial protection of fundamental rights goes hand in hand with judicial indifference to
the plight of marginalized groups such as indigenous peoples.
The explanation for the relatively more important role played by law in the
democratization processes of Taiwan and Korea seems to reside on the more
institutionalize status enjoyed by the courts there, which translates in higher government
compliance with judicial decisions.
At any rate, it is clear that in both Latin America and East Asia law is playing an
important role in the path toward democratic consolidation, and both regions can learn
from the experiences of the other in this regard.
19
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