Military uses of outer space and the
international space law
Bhupendra Jasani
Department of War Studies
King’s College London
UK
Introduction
There are numerous spacecraft
orbiting the near and far earth
orbits performing various
military functions;
These By 1967, outer space
became a heavily militarised
environment
This was not surprising as the
use of artificial earth-orbiting
satellites for defence was
conceptualised as early as late
1940s
The first use of satellites for
defence was demonstrated in
1960 with the launch of the US
military reconnaissance satellite
that was capable of acquiring
data with high resolution
Extensive application of space
for civil and defence flourished
during the Cold War period and
continued even after its end.
orbits
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Capabilities of satellites
continued
While the
capabilities of many
of the military
satellites are still
closely guarded
secret, we know that
they are an integral
part of terrestrial
weapon systems as
illustrated
dramatically during
the 1991 Gulf War
and the invasion of
Iraq in 2003;
Consider
improvement of
ground resolution of
earth observation
satellites.
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Capabilities of some satellites
continued
El Rahab Airport- Yeman
22032015
El Rahab Airport- Yeman
27032015
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Capabilities of satellites
continued
1996 image of the UK
Dungeness nuclear power
plant acquired by a Russian
Cosmos satellite carrying
1996a KVR-1000 sensor with
2m resolution
Landsat-5 image acquired on 3
November 1997 over Dungeness
Nuclear power station; bands 6
(thermal) as red, 5 as green and 4
as blue; the warm water discharged
into the sea can be detected while
clearly the reactor buildings are well
insulated. Source EOSAT
Dungeness Nuclear Power Plant
acquired by ERS-2 radar satellite
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Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons
Progress has also been made in the capabilities of civil
and defence communications and navigation satellites;
Space assets are an important element of terrestrial
security making them targets during any earth-bound
conflicts;
There now exists a perception that during any terrestrial
conflict a state may feel the need to deny the adversary
the use of his space assets;
Moreover, active protection of one’s own space assets
has become necessary leading to the development, testing
and to some extent the deployment of anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons;
Of course, the testing of some ASATs have caused
debris in space already in addition to those generated
from natural and other human activities in space.
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ASAT weapons
continued
Various space weapon systems and their deployment modes, both existing and potential, are summarised below
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ASAT weapons
continued
It should be pointed out here that most of the weapons listed in the
table are either conceptual or are being researched upon;
In addition there are those that do not destroy either a satellite or a
missile but they destroy their command, control and space
surveillance equipment that are vital to the efficient operations of
spacecraft and missiles;
Only the ones that either exist or will be realised soon are reviewed
here;
Conceptualisation of earth- and space-based weapons aimed at
satellites and missiles began even before signing the Outer Space
Treaty in October 1967;
The early ASAT weapons fall under the category of kinetic energy
weapons (KEW);
Essentially the idea was to hit a satellite in orbit by a co-orbital
weapon or a ground- or an air-based missile;
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ASAT weapons
Also in the 1960s the ASAT weapons deployed nuclear warheads;
However, it was soon realised that such weapons were not very
useful as they were indiscriminate weapons that could destroy all
nearby satellites that included one’s own spacecraft;
Both the USA and the former USSR developed, tested and deployed
KEWs;
A problem with KEW ASAT weapon is that it takes time to reach its
target and an impact can create considerable amount debris that can
harm one’s own satellites as well as those of others;
Thus, directed energy weapons (DEWs) have been investigated;
China also began its own research in ASAT technology in the
1980s;
Others, for example India, have shown interest in the development
of such weapons;
Consider the US ASATs
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Summary of US ASAT weapons-KEWs
Type of
weapons
Orbital range (km) War head
Kill radius Status
(km)
Number
deployed
Nike-Zeus
320
-
-
Test
-
Thor IRBM
1,100
1 Mt nuclear
8
Test Feb 1964April 1975
-
Bold Orin
missile on B-47
bomber
-
-
-
Investigated in
1950s
-
Modified antiradiation
homing missile
on F-15
In a test P78-1 Solwind
satellite destroyed
Kinetic Kill
Miniature Kill
Vehicle
Direct hit
Tested on
13Sept. 1985
Cancelled
Sea-based SM-3
missile
LEO
Direct assent
Direct hit at
10km/sec
Tested on 20
Feb. 2008
Hundreds on
board several
ships
US Army &
Missile Defense
Agency
LEO
Direct assent
Direct hit
-
Two types of
interceptors
6 in orbit
Advanced
1,300
Technology Risk
Reduction Sat
Direct assent co- Direct hit
orbital guided by
IR sensors
First placed in
2009
Micro Satellite
Technology
Experiment
deployed
Direct impact
LEO deployed in 2 in LEO weigh
2006 and in GSO 230kg
in 2014
In LEO & GSO
Direct hit
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Summary of US ASAT weapons
Current status of DEWs & space plane
Laser ASAT
Space plane
Ground-based laser tested on 17
October 1997 against a MSTI-3
satellite in orbit at 420km;
Rocket powered X-37B plane
launched in 2010 in 400km orbit;
While 1Mw Mid-Infrared Advanced
Chemical Laser (MIRACL) failed, a
30w beam used for alignment of
system and tracking temporarily
blinded the satellite;
Two potential ASAT X-37B planes
would be deployed in turn for a
year or so;
Thus, a commercially available
laser with a 1.5m mirror could be an
effective ASAT weapon.
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Russian ASAT weapons
 Russia (former Soviet Union) began testing its ASAT weapons
as early as 1967 and continued, on and off, for a number of
years;
 Most of the early tests were for the development of co-orbital
ASAT weapons to damage satellites by explosive in the vicinity
of target spacecraft or by direct collisions;
 Cosmos 186 satellite, launched on 27 October 1967,
rendezvoused with Cosmos 188 that was orbited on 30 October,
demonstrating Russia’s capability to manoeuvre satellites to
rendezvous with another spacecraft;
 The ASAT weapon weighing 1,400kg took one and a half to three
hours to reach the target;
 After several tests, in December 1971, Russia suspended further
testing declaring the system operational by early 1973;
 The interceptor was capable of reaching altitudes of between
230 and 1,000km.
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Russian ASAT weapons
continued
 The testing of Russian co-orbital ASAT system
resumed in 1976 during which the altitude of the
interceptor improved between 150km and 1,600km;
 Time taken for the interception was reduced to a single
orbit;
 The system remained operational between 1978 and
1982;
 However, on Christmas Day in 2013, the work on ASAT
development resumed when a small manoeuvrable
satellite was launched into a low orbit;
 Two more such spacecraft were launched one in May
2014, a Cosmos-2499 and the other in March 2015.
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Russian ASAT weapons
continued
 An air-launched ASAT missile on a MiG-13 aircraft, Russia’s Kontakt
system, was also being developed as well as an airborne laser to
blind a target or even to damage it;
 On the other hand, a direct ascent ASAT missile known as Nudol
was successfully tested on 18 November 2015;
 The interceptor missile is mounted on a mobile launcher giving it a
limited flexibility by positioning it under a target satellite for a direct
ascent interception;
 Besides its kinetic-energy ASAT, Russia is also investigation airbased laser system to either blind sensors on board satellites or
even to cause damage to them without destruction thereby avoiding
creation of debris;
 However, no details are available;
 The interceptions would take place in low-earth orbits.
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Chinese ASAT weapons
 China began developing a direct-ascent missile ASAT system,
known as SC-19;
 In 2005 and 2006 two tests were carried out without destroying
the targets;
 However, a test conducted on 11 January 2007, resulted in the
destruction of the target causing thousands of pieces of debris;
 The target was an old dead meteorological Feng Yun-1C satellite
launched on 10 May 1999 in sun-synchronous orbit at an orbital
inclination of 99º and at an altitude of between 845km and
865km;
 The kinetic-kill ASAT is believed to weigh about 600kg;
 Assuming the mass of the target satellite was 880kg and its
speed of about 9km/sec, the combined kinetic energy was
estimated to be about nine times that of an explosive yield of
one ton of TNT.
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Chinese ASAT weapons
continued
 In 2010 China launched a number of small satellites including two
called SJ-6F and SJ-12
 These came very close to each other in control manner without
collision.
 A test carried out in 2013 similar to that conducted in 2007, indicated
the maturity of the Chinese ASAT capability
 In July of the same year a small inspection spacecraft, SY-7, was also
launched
 The tests in 2013 and 2014 had extended range of probably 10,000km
or more
 The SY-9 ASAT tested in 2014 is a land-based mobile system making
it more survivable
 In a latest test, Chine launched, on 30 October 2015, its Dong Neng 3
direct ascent ASAT missile
 Most of the above tests have been land-based direct ascent ASAT
missile
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Chinese ASAT weapons
continued
 China has also been testing co-orbital ASAT weapons
 For example, in July 2013, Shiyan-7, Shijian-15 and Chuangxin-3 have
performed unusual manoeuvres;
 While it is difficult to conclude from these the nature of the tests but
they may have been a part of the development of co-orbital ASAT
weapon;
 In addition to kinetic-kill ASATs, China has been developing satellite
jamming and blinding capabilities;
 As for the latter, for example, it was reported that China has been
shining laser beams at the US optical reconnaissance satellites;
 However, it is not certain that such actions were deliberate laser
attacks or possible part of Chinese satellite laser tracking activities;
 However, it would not be surprising if States are engaged in satellite
blinding activities as well as in the development of satellite jamming
technologies;
 In the near future these are likely to be ground-based systems rather
than space-based ones.
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ASAT ambitions of other
countries
 No doubt countries with significant space and nuclear
programmes, may consider developing ASAT systems of their
own;
Isaral:
 For example, on 10 December 2015, Israel successfully
intercepted a target in space using the US-based Arrow 3
ground-base missile;
 This was a second attempt to test an ASAT weapon as the one
conducted in 2014 had failed;
India:
 Reportedly, India is also investigating hit-to-kill kinetic energy
ASAT;
 With the above activities in outer space, it may now be useful
to examine briefly whether these are consistence with the
legal regimes already in place.
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Bi-lateral arms control
treaties
• The use of observation satellites for verification of bilateral arms control treaties was first introduced in the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II, signed
between the USA and the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in 1972 and 1979, respectively;
• The other nuclear weapons related bi-lateral treaty was
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
signed in 1987 and ratified and came into force in 1988;
• The verification of these treaties is to be carried out by
the National Technical Means (NTM), observation
satellites being a major element;
• Under the non-interference with the NTM
clause,satellites are protected, ate least in peace time.
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Multi-lateral nuclear arms control treaties
• Most multi-lateral treaties do not have such a mechanism;
• Verification by satellites under a Multi-lateral Technical Means (MTM) was
conceptualised because of the availability of commercial high resolution images;
• Also according to the Principle V of the Remote sensing Principles, “States
carrying out remote sensing activities shall promote international cooperation in
such activities. To this end, they shall make available to other States
opportunities for participation therein.”
• Under the Partial nuclear Test bBan Treaty (PTBT) signed in 1963, “…no State
Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical
means of verification in a manner consisting with generally recognised principles
of international law,…” .(Article IV.5);
• However, information from the NTMs are not usually shared and satellites are not
stated tools of verification in the nuclear test ban treaties;
• But, each State party undertakes to cooperate with each other and, for example,
with the CTBT Office (CTBTO) “in the improvement of verification regime, and in
the examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies
such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring.” (Article IV.11);
• Thus, seeds were planted to verify multi-lateral treaties using space-based
systems.
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Multi-lateral nuclear arms control treaties
continued
• Furthermore, for the verification of the 1970 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the parties undertake to accept a safeguards
mechanism carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
• In 1993 and 1994, the Director General’s Standing Advisory Group on
Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) formulated specific recommendations
regarding the detection of undeclared nuclear activities;
• One of the recommendations advised “assessment of the usefulness,
technical feasibility, associated costs and acceptability of the Agency
obtaining satellites photographs from commercial sources”;
• In 2001 the IAEA established a unit with imagery analysis capability and the
Agency’s Satellite Imagery Analysis Laboratory (SIAL) became fully
operational;
• Thus, for first time a multi-lateral arms control measure formally accepted
the use of observation satellites as a verification tool although no
provisions are made on non-interference with such MTM;
• It is useful to examine the existing outer space related treaties to determine
if further measures exist that accepts and safeguards the uses of space
assets.
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Multi-lateral outer space related treaties
• Essentially there are three treaties, two conventions, four principles and two resolutions specifically dealing with
activities in outer space;
• In addition there are some relevant documents, for example, the 2007 Guidelines on Debris Mitigation and 2009
Safety for nuclear power source;
• None of these treaties have any verification provisions although orbiting weapons of mass destruction are
prohibited in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty;
• Under the 1972 Liability Convention a State bears international responsibility for all space objects launched from
its territory so that it is fully liable for damages that result from that space object;
• For example, 0.5mm metal chip travelling at an average relative speed of about 10km/s, could kill an astronaut, a
cosmonaut or a taikonaut working outside a space station;
• The term “space object” includes “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts
thereof” (Article I);
• Can debris from space objects be regarded as “parts of a space object”?
• There have been either close encounters or actual collisions with space debris causing potential damage to
space objects of other parties;
• How is one to determine the ownership of a piece of debris that may be too small to be tracked and identified
which may cause damage to another state’s property?
• This is particularly so when tracking of objects are carried out unilaterally by only a few;
• More recent example is potential damage that may be caused by debris from the Chinese 2007 ASAT test which
generated over 3,000 trackable pieces;
• One of these pieces did hit a small Russian laser-ranging satellite, Ball Lens in The Space (BLIST), on 22 January
2013 knocking it out of its orbit.
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Multi-lateral outer space related treaties
continued
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space
• The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space came
into force in 1976;
• Unser the Convention, states are required to furnish to the UN details about the
objects and their orbits, name of launching State, an appropriate designator of
the space object or its registration number, date and territory or location of
launch, basic orbital parameters (nodal period, inclination, apogee and perigee)
and general function of the space object, are mandatory;
• By and large, provision IV.1.(e) has not been fulfilled, since large number of
satellites launched serve military purposes and hardly any of them have been
described to the UN Secretary-General as having military uses;
• This is particularly so when an anti-satellite test has been carried out in outer
space;
• As a first step it is essential to strengthen the compliance with this and other
outer space related Conventions.
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Multi-lateral outer space related treaties
continued
• Under the 1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space,
information obtained from space might be exploited by commercial interests without being
made available to the sensed state;
• Could such a use of remotely sensed data be termed “..for the benefit and in the interest of all
countries.”? (Principle II)
• The MTM concept was proposed earlier could be legalised on the basis of “States carrying out
remote sensing activities shall promote international cooperation in these activities.” (Principle
V);
• But this has not happened yet;
• An International Data Centre (IDC) is proposed here in the hope that Principle VI would be
fulfilled according to which “In order to maximise the availability of benefits from remote
sensing activities, States are encouraged…to provide establishment and operation of data
collecting and storage stations and processing and interpretation facilities.”;
• “The sensed State shall also have access to the available analysed information concerning the
territory under its jurisdiction in the possession of any State participating in remote sensing
activities…” (Principle XII);
• This raises a problem not only for the sensed state but also for, for example, UN specialised
agencies, such as the IAEA, which is using data from remote sensing satellites but may not be
able to reveal it to the sensed state.
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Some conclusions
 It is often stated that outer space should be kept free of weapons;
 However, in this brief review, it is shown that the environment is
already full of weapons;
 For example, there are satellites that are designed for close
inspection of other spacecraft but could be used as ASAT
weapons;
 Then there are dedicated spacecraft designed and deployed to
destroy other satellites by direct collisions;
 While the Outer Space Treaty prohibits deployment of weapons of
mass destructions in orbits, there is no mention of conventional
weapons;
 By 1967, when the Outer Space Treaty was established, the
environment was already militarised;
 Artificial earth orbiting satellites were being extensively used both
for military and civil/commercial applications.
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Some conclusions
continued
• Because of the military applications of satellites, considerable
efforts are being devoted to the development of various types of
ASAT weapons;
• While it will be some time before exotic weapons, such as high
energy lasers and particle beam weapons are deployed either in
space or on ground, there is a real possibility of developing and
deploying ground-, air- or space-based low energy laser weapons
that could temporary incapacitate satellites;
• In the mean time, there exist a number of types of ground- and
space-based conventional ASAT weapons;
• While jamming and interfering with the operations of satellites are
not considered as active weapons, they can achieve similar results;
• Perhaps it is time again to suggest that there should be a freeze on
further development of such systems.
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Some conclusions
continued
It may not be too late either to strengthen the
Outer space Treaty or at least to have, on a
multilateral basis, an agreement on noninterference with each other’s satellites as is the
case between the USA and Russia under their bilateral arms control agreements;
A number of civil/commercial satellites are being
used to verify such multilateral treaties as the
1970 NPT;
It might also be suggested now to have a
multilateral agreement on limiting testing of ASAT
weapons.
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