Table of Contents
A. Introduction
B. Analysis of national legislation
1. Regulation of the activities of PMSCs
2. Scope of legislation
3. Licensing, authorisation, registration of PMSCs, and training of their personnel
4. Permitted and prohibited activities
5. Rules on acquisition of weapons and the use of force and firearms
6. Accountability and remedies
7. Ratification of regional and international instruments on mercenaries
C. Conclusion and recommendations
A. Introduction
1
As noted in its reports in 2013 and 2014 to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/24/45 and
A/HRC/27/50), the Working Group continues to believe that it is critical to study and identify
legislative approaches regarding the activities of PMSCs (private military and security companies) and
to assess the effectiveness of such legislation in protecting human rights and promoting
accountability for violations. For this reason, the Working Group continued with its project to identify
common points, good practices and regulatory gaps regarding national legislation on PMSCs. The
Working Group would like to thank all Member States which submitted relevant laws and
regulations.
Following the first phase of the research that focused on samples of English and French speaking
countries in Africa and some selected countries in Asia(A/HRC/24/45 and A/HRC/27/50), the current
report presents the Working Group’s findings on the national legislation of France, Hungary,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom).
The data of the current analytical study have been collected through a desk-based research that used
various sources, including the respective national laws1, the mission report of the Working Group to
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland2, the 2012 report of the open-ended
intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international
regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military
and security companies on its second session3, the findings of the PRIV-WAR project4, the
information collected by Private Security Monitor5, the 2011 study of the Confederation of European
1
France: Loi no. 83-629 du juillet 1983 réglementant les activités privées de surveillance, de gardiennage et de
transport de fonds (“Law No. 83-629”)
Switzerland: Loi fédérale sur les prestations de sécurité privées fournis à l’étranger du 27 septembre 2013
(“LPSP of 2013”), Concordat sur les entreprises de sécurité du 18 octobre 1996 (“Concordat on security
companies of 1996”), Concordat sur les prestations de sécurité effectuées par des personnes privées du 12
novembre 2010 (“Concordat on the services of private security companies of 2010”), Ordonnance sur
l’engagement d’entreprises de sécurité privées par la Confédération du 31 octobre 2007 (“Decree on the hiring
of private security companies by the Confederation of 2007”) Hungary: Act CXXXIII of 2005 on the rules of
personal and property protection activities and private investigation (“Act CXXXIII of 2005”), Decree of Ministry
of Interior of 22/2006. (IV.25) on the implementation of Act CXXXIII of 2005 on the rules of personal and
property protection activities and private investigation (“Decree 22/2005”), Decree of Ministry of Interior of
68/2012. (XII. 14.) on the training and examination of personnel in charge of police tasks, assistant supervisors
and personnel in charge of personal and property protection activities and private investigation (“Decree
68/2012”), Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (“Act C of 2012”), Governmental Decree 253/2004. (VIII.31.) on
firearms and ammunitions (“Governmental Decree 253/2004”)
United Kingdom: Private Security Industry Act 2001 (“PSIA of 2001), Export Control Act 2002 (“ECA of 2002”)
2
Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, 19 February 2009, A/HRC/10/14/Add.2
3
Report of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an
international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private
military and security companies on its second session, 24 December, 2012, A/HRC/22/41
4
France: PRIV-WAR Report – France, National Reports Series 11/09, The Regulatory Context of Private Military
and Security Service sin France, V. Capdeville, University Paris II & H.Cherief, University of Dijon 21 May 2009,
PRIV-WAR Report, The United Kingdom, National Reports Series 01/09, The Regulatory Context of Private
Military and Security Services in the UK, Kerry Alexander and Nigel White, University of Sheffield 30 June 2009.
5
See http://psm.du.edu/
2
Security Services “CoESS Facts & Figures”6 and other relevant sources publicly available on the
internet7.
The report reviewed those laws that specifically focus on PMSCs and their activities that States made
available for the purpose of the current analysis. The report did not cover other related pieces of
legislation (such as criminal codes, procedures regarding civil liability, general laws/rules on business
registration or on the use of firearms), or regulations, policies, administrative measures or selfregulations.
The main topics addressed in the survey were: a) the scope of the legislation; b) licencing,
authorisation, registration of PMSCs and the training of their personnel; c) permitted and prohibited
activities of PMSCs; d) rules on acquisition of weapons and the use of force and firearms by PMSC
personnel; e) accountability for violations of the law committed by PMSC personnel/remedies
provided for victims; f) ratification of mercenary conventions.
B. Analysis of national legislation
The research shows that the selected and analysed European countries address the question of
private security companies and their activities by mainly focusing on the surveillance or the
protection and guarding provided to persons and property/goods, the transportation, protection and
shipment of cash, funds, jewels, precious metals and other valuables and the service of private
investigation. The study reveals that none of the analysed legislation covers the activities of private
military companies and their provided services.
The research notes that only one country’s national legislation has extraterritorial applicability and
covers the activities of PMSCs abroad (Switzerland), whereas the rest of the examined legislation
focuses on the domestic sphere (France, Hungary, United Kingdom). It is to be noted as well that only
one State includes a clear-cut prohibition of PMSC personnel to take direct part in hostilities
(Switzerland) and the other analysed States’ laws remain rather vague or absent in regulating this
point.
The research shows at the same time that, while the analysed countries are not States Parties to the
United Nations Mercenaries Convention, all have at the national level regulations on the prohibition
of mercenary activities.
1. Regulation of the activities of PMSCs
With regard to the national legislation of PMSCs…
6
CoESS Fact and Figures , available at:
http://www.coess.org/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Private_Security_Services_in_EuropeCoESS_Facts_and_Figures_2011(1).pdf
7
Elke Krahmann: Regulating Private Military Companies: What Role for the EU?, in Contemporary Security
Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2005), pp. 103-125, Regulating Private Security in Europe: Status and Prospects, by
Hans Born, Marina Caparini, and Eden Cole, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Policy Paper – №20, „The Potential Use of PMSCs to Fulfill the EU Security Strategy”, by Marco Marilli, in
Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol 5, Issue
3
The analysis shows that in general States have rather detailed national legislation covering the
activities of the private security industry that provides detailed rules on licensing and authorisation of
private security services and on the necessity of providing training to PMSC personnel.
At the same time the research revealed that, with the exception of Switzerland, none of the analysed
legislation included international human rights and humanitarian law references in the criteria of
authorisation of PMSC activities or any other related standards regarding the selection process and
the training materials
With regard to the national registration of PMSCs, the study points out that none of the analysed
States’ national legislation requires from PMSCs a specific registration other than the general
registration in the trade and commerce register.
The study also emphasizes that while States in general seem to have detailed provisions on the
permitted and prohibited activities, with the exception of Switzerland, the relevant laws are not
specific and exhaustive enough related to those acts that PMSCs shall not carry out in any
circumstances, including the personnel’s direct participation in hostilities.
The research notes that none of the analysed legislation includes any provisions on the illegal
acquisition of weapons and on illicit trafficking in arms specifically by PMSC personnel and their
consequences. In addition, the study reveals that the regulatory approaches regarding the use of
force and firearms are rather divergent: the Hungarian and the Swiss national legislation entirely
prohibits the use of force and firearms in all situations except for the case of self-defence and Stateexigency, in France the use of force is allowed by certain PMSC personnel to carry out specific
activities and in the United Kingdom there is no related provision available at the national legislation
level.
Finally, with regard to the accountability of PMSCs and their personnel, the analysis points out that
the relevant legislation lacks specific rules on the content of monitoring activities and inspections, as
well as references to the company’s or its personnel’s compliance with the standards of international
human rights law and humanitarian law, and to effective remedies to victims.
The following comparative thematic analysis provides further specific details and examples on these
general points.
2. Scope of legislation
This section looks at whetherthe analysed legislation covers both private military companies and
private security companies; the meaning of the terms used for defining the scope of the application
of the relevant laws; whether the analysed laws regulate on the direct participation in hostilities of
PMSC personnel; whether the legislation applies to the export of security and/or military services
beyond their borders; and whether or not such laws apply extraterritorially.
The research revealed that all analysed countries have national legislation on the private security
industry. However, the specificity of the regulation in the United Kingdom is that, apart from some
general provisions related to licencing and authorisation, it lacks a detailed national legislation on the
activities of PMSCs, therefore the industry was inclined to adopt a self-regulatory approach to
4
regulate the conduct of its activities within the framework of the British Association of Private
Security Companies (launched in 2006), including financial sanctions, compulsory training courses,
site inspections and suspending or withdrawing membership rights.8 In a written Ministerial
Statement in October 2013 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that the United Kingdom
has undertaken to establish a system of national certification to professional standards for PSCs,
which would measure PSCs’ implementation of the commitments and principles set out in the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC). The Ministerial Statement
strongly encouraged all PSCs working in complex environments abroad to pursue certification to
these standards by accredited certifying bodies9. Also, as it was noted in its response to the Working
Group’s request for national legislation and regulations relating to PMSCs, the United Kingdom
“believes the most effective way to promote high standards for PMSCs internationally and reduce
the risk that their activities might give rise to human rights or international humanitarian law
concerns is through voluntary regulation of the sector. ” The United Kingdom added its intention “to
introduce standards for private security companies working on land or at sea in complex or high risk
environments on which UK-based PSCs will be able to seek certification by independent third party
auditors appointed by the UK accreditation service.” 10
In 2011, the Department for Transport issued a Guidance to UK Flagged Shipping on Measures to
Counter Piracy, Armed Robbery and Other Acts of Violence Against Merchant Shipping with the aim
of “assisting all UK registered ship owners, companies, ship operators, masters and crews in
understanding the risk of piracy, armed robbery and other acts of violence against ships, and [to
remind] them of the importance of taking action to deter such acts and advises on how to deal with
them should they occur”. The Guidance paper includes no references to human rights or any other
legal standards.
As a common point, all of the four analysed countries’ national legislation covers the activities of
local private security companies11 ,including the surveillance or the protection and guarding
provided to persons and property/goods, the transportation, protection and shipment of cash, funds,
8
PRIV-WAR Report – The United Kingdom, The Regulatory Context of Private Military and Security Service sin
the UK, Kerry Alexander and Nigel White, University of Sheffield, 30 June 2009, Section 1.6. (pp. 16-18).
At the same time, in the Parliamentary session 2006/2007 more than 100 members of the Parliament signed
an early day motion (EDM 690) urging the Government to take steps towards a binding legislation and in the
parliamentary session 2007/08 yet another early day motion (EDM 785) emphasized that “self-regulation by
the industry is not appropriate in this instance” and urged “the Government to bring forward legislative
proposals for the control of the PMSC sector as an urgent priority”. (EDM 785, “Private Military and Security
Companies”, 24 January 2008, primary sponsored by David Anderson. See more in the PRIV-WAR Report – The
United Kingdom – National Report Series 01/09, The Regulatory Context of Private Military and Security
Services in the UK, Kerry Alexander and Nigel White, University of Sheffield, 30 June 2009, Section 2 „Political
Debate”)
9
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Written Ministerial Statement on International Code of Conduct for
Private
Security
Providers
Association
Launch,
15
October
2013,
available
here:
http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/national_regulations/countries/europe/united_kingdom/united_kingdo
m_written_ministerial_statement_icoca_launch_2013.pdf
10
Available here:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/NationalRegulatoryFrameworks.aspx
11
France: Law No. 83-629, Article 1, Switzerland: Concordat on security companies of 1996, Article 4 and
Decree on the hiring of private security companies by the Confederation of 2007, Article 2, Hungary: Act
CXXXIII of 2005, Article 1, para 1, the United Kingdom: PSIA of 2001, Schedule 2, Part 1.
5
jewels, precious metals and other valuables, as well as the service of private investigation12. In
addition, in the United Kingdom the term “activities of a security operative” includes the services
provided by security consultants and keyholders (i.e. keeping custody of, or controlling access to, any
key or similar device for operating any lock)13 and according to a recent piece of legislation in
Switzerland, the relevant law even covers traffic management, assistance provided to public
authorities, the transport of detainees, and the private detective services as well14.
None of the analysed laws cover the activities of private military companies or their activities and
services.
As for the geographical scope of application, the analysed States’ legislation varies in scope and
content. France, for example, has no extraterritorial scope and therefore the actions of French
private security companies and their personnel fall outside the scope of the domestic legislation15.
The Hungarian legislation has no extraterritorial application either. The Swiss legislation at the same
time not only covers the activities of local security companies16 and private security companies17, but
the services provided by private security companies hired locally or abroad by the Swiss
Confederation locally18, and by private security companies abroad as well19.With regard to private
security services provided abroad, the relevant Swiss law of 2013 regulates a range of private
security activities from protection tasks and guarding moveable and immoveable items in complex
environments to guarding prisoners, searching persons and objects to operational or logistical
support for armed or security forces, counselling and training armed and security forces, as well as
intelligence activities20. The law on private security services abroad regulates the activities of natural
persons, legal persons and partnerships that provide security services from Switzerland abroad or
from abroad in Switzerland, as well as the activities of those private security companies that are
established, managed, or controlled in Switzerland and provide security services abroad21.
In the United Kingdom, the Export Control Act 2002 envisages controls for the provision of goods, the
transfer of technology, and technical assistance abroad22, but it does not specifically focus on the
regulation of the private military industry. As it was observed already earlier by the Working Group,
the legal system of the United Kingdom is based on the principle of territoriality, which means that
under United Kingdom law, individuals cannot be prosecuted in the United Kingdom for crimes
committed abroad and those cases of few exceptions when British nationals (committing sexual
12
France: Law No. 83-629, Article 1, paras 1-3 and from Article 20 to Article 33, Hungary: Act CXXXIII of 2005
Article 1, para 2, Switzerland: Concordat on security companies of 1996, Article 4 and Decree on the hiring of
private security companies by the Confederation of 2007, Article 2, the United Kingdom: PSIA of 2001, Schedule
2, Part 1
13
PSIA of 2001, Schedule 2, Part 1
14
Concordat on the services of private security companies of 2010, Article 3
15
Report on Swiss-Based Military and Security Service Providers Operating in Crisis and Conflict Regions - Phase
II:
Comparative
Study
of
Regulatory
Approaches,
DCAF,
2007,
available
at:
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/sicherheitsfirmen/ber-dcaf-teil2-e.pdf
16
Concordat on security companies of 1996
17
Concordat on the services of private security companies of 2010
18
Decree on the hiring of private security companies by the Confederation of 2007
19
LPSP of 2013
20
LPSP of 2013, Article 4
21
Ibid., Article 2
22
ECA of 2002, Provisions 1-4
6
offence crimes, murder, or manslaughter abroad) could be tried in a British court of law, the
specificity related to employees of private military and security companies is missing23.
With respect to the regulation of private military and security companies abroad, in 2002 the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) developed the “Green Paper”, which outlined six options for the
regulation of such companies operating out of the United Kingdom24. The Green Paper was reviewed
by the Government of the United Kingdom in 2005 and the various options have been discussed, but
no action was taken since then. As it was noted by the Working Group, following its mission to the
United Kingdom, the Foreign Affairs Select Committee was formed as the parliamentary body in
charge of monitoring the progress made on legislation regarding the activities of PMSCs, which made
some recommendations towards wider transparency and regulation of British PMSCs.
As for the PMSC personnel’s direct participation in hostilities, the Swiss law very clearly prohibits
direct participation in hostilities in an armed conflict abroad, including the hiring, training and
provision of security personnel for direct participation in hostilities abroad, or establishing, managing
or controlling a company in Switzerland involved in such activities25, and the relevant law also has an
extraterritorial scope of application. The laws in the United Kingdom do not define what military or
security activity can be outsourced to private companies, but – as it has been stated by the
Government lately - there is an “understanding” that military activity in situations of armed conflict
can only be delivered by military personnel under the command of a commissioned officer26. The
Hungarian legislation does not rule on the PMSC personnel’s direct participation in hostilities, but it
emphasizes that its provisions are not applicable to the members of armed forces and State law
enforcement agencies.27 The relevant French laws have no provisions of PMSC personnel’s direct
participation in hostilities.
The vague definition of the ambit of services and the fact that none of the analysed legislation covers
private military companies or their military activities result in regulatory gaps, especially considering
that PMSCs normally provide various other services besides only guarding and patrolling, such as
military services, as well as training and advisory services on security matters and implementation of
security measures. With the exception of Switzerland, the absence of the rules on direct participation
in hostilities of PMSC personnel and the lack of extraterritorial application of the concerned laws, as
well as the missing provisions on the export of security and military services abroad further add to
the regulatory gaps, especially with regard to the transnational nature of private security and military
services, and the generally high likeliness of PMSC personnel’s use of force and involvement in
hostilities. The insufficient regulation regarding the scope of the analysed legislation seriously
23
A/HRC/10/14/Add.2, paras 29 and 30
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee „Private Military Companies”, Ninth Report of Session 200102, HC 922, Published on 1st August 2002 by authority of the House of Commons, London, The Stationary
Office
Limited,
available
here:
http://www.parliament.the
stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/92202.htm – the described six options were as
follows: 1. A ban on military activity abroad; 2. A ban on recruitment for military activities abroad; 3. A licensing
regime for military services; 4. Registration and notification; 5. A general license for PMCs/PSCs; 6. Selfregulation: a voluntary code of conduct.
25
LPSP of 2013, Article 8
26
A/HRC/22/41, para 53 and Cover letter of the Government of the United Kingdom responding to the request
of the Working Group with regard to national legislation and regulations relating to private military and/or
security companies.
27
Act CXXXIII of 2005, Article 2
24
7
undermines the rule of law and the effective functioning of a democratic State institution responsible
for ensuring public safety in accordance with international human rights standards and national laws.
3. Licensing, authorisation, registration of PMSCs and training of their personnel
This section analyses the relevant procedures and entities of licencing, authorization, registration of
PMSCs and the training of their personnel, as well as whether the relevant criteria related to human
rights law have been built into these processes.
Similar to what has been already noted by the Working Group with regard to the legislation of
Anglophone28 and Francophone African countries29, in two of the analysed four countries’ national
legislation the entities that issue authorizations and licences are appointed by or exist within the
ministry responsible for internal security. Accordingly, in France the authorisation for all activities
covered by the law is delivered by the department Prefect (or in Paris by the Police Prefect)30 and
accredited by the Council of State according to a set of conditions31. It is interesting to note though
that the relevant law in France specifically emphasizes that by providing authorization for the
surveillance or the protection and guarding provided to persons and property/goods, the
transportation and protection of funds, jewels and precious metals activities, the authorizing body
does not commit in any ways for any responsibility of public authorities.32 Similarly, in Hungary,
private security activities are only to be carried out with a licence issued by the police33.
In the United Kingdom, it is the Security Industry Authority that issues licences to domestic “activities
of a security operative”34 and the Swiss legislation regulates the provision of private security services
abroad by requiring from all persons and companies intending to carry out security services abroad
to notify the “competent authorities”35.
With regard to the criteria for authorisation, according to the relevant laws in France, among others,
no accreditation is provided to executives and employees who have been convicted for a
misdemeanour or a crime according to the criminal record, who have been expelled from France, or
whose behaviour is contrary to the honour, integrity, moral standards, or against the security of
people or goods, public security or the security of the State36, and no authorisation is given to
activities whose nature causes “trouble to public order”37. The French legislation has no reference to
required human rights standards in either cases.
While in the relevant law of the United Kingdom it is stated that the licensing criteria are developed
by the Security Industry Authority38 and the licencing conditions are set by the Secretary of State39,
no reference is made to human rights standards to be integrated. As it was recorded in the report of
28
A/HRC/24/45, para 39.
A/HRC/27/50, para 17.
30
Law No. 83-629, Articles 7 and 25.
31
Law No. 83-629, Article 5.
32
Law No. 83-629, Article 8.
33
Act CXXXIII of 2005, Article 5
34
PSIA of 2001, Article 7
35
LPSP of 2013, Articles 10-12
36
Law No. 83-629, Articles 5 and 22
37
Law No. 83-629, Article 7, para 3 and Article 25, para 3
38
PSIA of 2001, Article 7
39
Ibid., Article 9
29
8
the Working Group on its country mission in 2008, with regard to the contracts of the British
Government employing private military and security companies outside of its territory – lacking
relevant legislation -, all companies have to fill a pre-qualification questionnaire and the companies
are chosen according to criteria determined by the procurement services of Government. These
criteria usually focus on professional training of personnel and acquaintance of personnel with basic
norms of law, including criminal, civil and international humanitarian law. In all contracts, there are
clauses that allow for the termination of a contract if a human rights violation is proven. However, as
the report pointed out, there is no formal system specifically for the review of contracts with private
military and security companies. These contracts are subject to only a general selection process.40
The report of the Working Group also pointed out that for the companies which are not hired by
government bodies it is hard for the Government to exert any control or to verify their compliance
with human rights standards if they are not hired by the British Government41.
According to the respective Swiss legislation, the “competent authorities” in charge of approving the
activities of the concerned PMSCs may decide to prohibit or approve the concerned activity or to
undertake further investigation, for example in the case of the authorities’ awareness of the
company’s violation of certain Swiss or international legal obligations42. Furthermore, it is also stated
in the Swiss law that the relevant authorities can decide to prohibit in whole or in part certain
activities because they may be contrary to the aims of the law, including services that may be used to
commit human rights violations43 and it states at the same time that a company’s activities will be
prohibited in any case if, for example, it committed in the past human rights violations without
providing the guarantees of no repeat, or it does not respect the International Code of Conduct for
security service providers44. In Switzerland, the law is very explicit and detailed regarding the
selection process and the related required criteria. Firstly, it rules on certain guidelines for the
federal authorities to follow when employing private security companies abroad for the protection of
persons and guarding and surveillance of goods and real estates45. Secondly, the relevant legislation
also emphasizes that prior to hiring such company, the federal authorities must ensure that the
company meets some requirements, including the recruitment, training and oversight of its
personnel; that its reputation and business conduct are irreproachable, as attested by its adherence
to the International Code of Conduct for security service providers; provides sufficient internal
controls to ensure that its personnel will respect the norms of behaviour and be sanctioned for
failure to do so and that it has a civil liability insurance for an amount equivalent to the risk involved
related to the business activity46.
As for the entrance requirements in Hungary, the law requires from at least one member/partner of
the company to have a guard’s card (delivered by the police), and from the company to have a
liability insurance pertaining to the private security activity. No operational permit can be issued to a
company whose senior officer does not have a clean criminal record, whose members or owners
have been fined for their past company activities and who did not pay the fines or to a company that
40
A/HRC/10/14/Add.2, para 26
Ibid., Article 27
42
LPSP of 2013, Article 13, para 1, d)
43
Ibid., Article 14, para 1
44
Ibid., Article 14, para 2
45
Ibid., Article 30
46
Ibid., Article 31, para 1
41
9
was prohibited in the past by court to exercise its activities47. The Hungarian legislation does not
refer to human rights standards either.
While it is clear that all these laws set as a precondition for authorization of the activities of a private
security company certain criteria at least related to the behaviour of its management and personnel
and the civil liability of the company, with the exception of the Swiss legislation, none of the analysed
laws include any reference to human rights law criteria to be considered by the authorizing bodies.
With regard to the registration of PMSCs, at present, none of the analysed countries’ legislation
requires a specific registration of PMSCs other than the general registration in the trade and
commerce registers.
As for the training of PMSC personnel, from among the four analysed countries’ legislation, it is the
Swiss law that provides the most details and includes the most references to human rights related
standards. More particularly, it requires from the company to train its personnel in the protection
task to perform and the applicable national and international law and certain essential areas, such as
fundamental rights, use of force and arms in situations of self-defence or state of necessity, conduct
to be adopted with persons resisting or behaving violently, first aid, assessment of damage to health
resulting from the use of force, and combating corruption48. At the same time, the Swiss law allows
an exception to these requirements if no company satisfying them is available and the protection
task cannot be completed otherwise, but nevertheless stipulates a maximum duration of six months
for such contracts49.
In Hungary, it is the Ministry of Interior that is in charge of organizing and providing the necessary
training for those involved in private security services, in cooperation with the Chamber of Personal
and Property Protection and Private Detective Activities and the National University of Public
Service50. With regard to the training standards, the relevant law makes no reference to human rights
law, only requires from the personnel involved in private security services to be aware of the
fundamental ethical and professional rules, to use the coercive measures and tools according to the
law, and to apply proportionally the coercive measures in cases of self-defence51.
In France, according to the relevant legislation, all those persons who are authorised to carry out
private security activities of surveillance or the protection and guarding provided to persons and
property/goods, the transportation and protection of funds, jewels and precious metals must be
provided without delay a training to support their professional abilities52 (the same training is not
required for the personnel of companies carrying out acts related to private investigation). However,
the law does not make any reference to human rights standards.
According to the Private Industry Act in the United Kingdom, among the licencing criteria set out by
the Private Security Authority, the Authority may include criteria “for securing that those persons
have the training and skills necessary to engage in the conduct for which they are licenced”53 and
47
Act CXXXIII of 2005, Article 5
LPSP of 2013, Article 32, para 2
49
Ibid., Article 32, paras 3 and 4
50
Decree No. 68/2012, Articles 2 and 3, Act No. CXXXIII of 2005, Article 38, para 1, d) and
51
Ibid., Annex 2
52
Law No. 83-629, Article 6-1, para 2.
53
Private Security Act, Article 7, para 3, b)
48
10
among the licencing conditions, the Secretary of State and the Authority “shall include power to
prescribe or impose conditions containing requirements as to the training […] which the licensee is to
undergo”54, but the law makes no reference to human rights standards either.
The lack of a single dedicated body responsible for licencing and monitoring the activities of PMSCs,
the generally missing human rights criteria for the authorization process (except for the case of
Switzerland), as well as the lacking national registration systems all result in a private security
industry without effective control. The analysis of the available legislation shows that while States
have mostly succeeded in establishing a framework for both the selection and training of PMSC
personnel, the content of these important processes is not well developed and does not take into
account explicitly human rights standards.
Considering the diverse activities and the broad geographical scope covered by PMSC services, while
various systems of licensing and oversight may be possible, the Working Group’s view is that a
standard set of human rights based mandatory requirements of authorization, a national registration
system, and a single dedicated licensing expert body would be desirable in order to guarantee the
principles of the rule of law, to scrutinize effectively the conduct of PMSCs and the implementation
of the necessary international human rights standards, and to ensure the accountability of PMSC
personnel for violations of the law. Also, in order to ensure that the relevant international human
rights law and humanitarian law standards are respected and effectively used in the course of PMSC
operations, to minimize the risk of their violations, and to guarantee the effective accountability of
private military and security companies and their personnel, it is essential to introduce human rights
based vetting mechanisms of employees, as well as mandatory legal trainings with references to the
relevant international human rights and humanitarian law standards.
4. Permitted and prohibited activities
This section focuses on permitted and prohibited activities of PMSCs, as well as on the participation
in the activities of PMSCs by law enforcement agents.
The result of the research shows that in some countries’ national legislation (France and Hungary)
private security companies are specifically required to indicate the private nature of their work in
order to avoid confusion between the activities of private persons and those of public security
services.
In France, the relevant law emphasizes that the only activities to be carried out by security providers
must be guarding and protection provided to persons and property/goods and the protection
provided to the transport of funds, jewels and precious metals55 and notes that private security
companies are obliged to clearly indicate in their names the private nature of their work in order to
avoid creating confusion with regard to public security services, such as the services of the police and
the gendarmerie56, and that they shall make the same distinction regarding the uniform and the
professional identity card of their employees57. Similarly, in Hungary the relevant legislation notes
that those involved in private security activities have no public authority powers, cannot use titles
54
Ibid., Article 9, para 1, a)
Law No. 83-629, Articles 1, 2 and 21
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid., Articles 10, 11-3 and 11-7
55
11
and insigna of the authorities, must use their uniform, and must not prevent the authorities from
carrying out their powers58.
The French law permits private security activities related to surveillance or the protection and
guarding provided to persons and property/goods, the transportation and protection of funds, jewels
and precious metals to be carried out inside the private guarded building, and only with exceptional
authorizations to be carried out in public domains by the department Prefect or in Paris by the
Prefect of Paris in cases of surveillance of thefts, vandalism, and burglary against the guarded
property59. As in France only exclusively private security activities are allowed to be carried out by
private security companies, implicitly all other services that are not linked to the private security
activities covered by the scope of the law are prohibited60. Similarly, in Hungary, the relevant
legislation draws a clear dividing line between the activities of persons involved in private and public
security services by pointing out that the provisions of the law are not applicable among others, to
the personnel of the Hungarian Armed Forces and the Hungarian Police Forces61.
With regard to the surveillance or the protection and guarding provided to persons and
property/goods, the transportation and protection of funds, jewels and precious metals further
prohibited activities in France include the interference of PMSC personnel in a labour conflict or
related event or the surveillance of political, philosophical, or religious views or people’s trade-union
membership.62 Other than that, the relevant law does not list in France further specific prohibited
activities reserved for the police or the military. While the Council of State noted in France that any
contractual delegation of police prerogatives is illegal63, the law on private security activities allows
to private security companies to search bags and in exceptional circumstances when the public
security is under grave threat to carry out even body search. The law notes that the exceptional
circumstances need to be defined by a decree issued by the Prefect, but provides no further details
in this respect.64
On the other hand, the Swiss law on the provision of private security services abroad specifically
prohibits certain activities, such as the direct participation in hostilities in an armed conflict abroad
(including the hiring, training and provision of security personnel for direct participation in hostilities
abroad, or establishing, managing or controlling a company in Switzerland involved in such
activities)65, and the provision of security services associated with serious violations of human rights
(namely the provision of private security services to recipients that will presumably use them to
commit serious human rights violations)66. The law also lists certain activities that the relevant
authorities can decide to prohibit in whole or in part because they may be contrary to the aims of the
law, including services that take place in armed conflict, that may be used to commit human rights
58
Ibid., Article 16, paras 1-3
Ibid., Article 3
60
Ibid., Articles 2 and 21.
61
Act CXXXIII of 2005, Article 2
62
Law No. 83-629, Article 4
63
Conseil d’État, 17 June 1938, Ville de Castelnaudary, rec. p. 191; Conseil d’État, 1er April 1996, Commune de
Manton, rec. p. 175.
64
Law No. 83-629, Article 3-1.
65
LPSP of 2013, Article 8
66
LPSP of 2013, Article 9
59
12
violations, or services that are used to provide operational and logistic support to armed forces67 and
states at the same time that a company’s activities will be prohibited in any case if, for example, it
committed in the past human rights violations without providing the guarantees of no repeat, or it
does not respect the International Code of Conduct for security service providers68. Nevertheless, the
Swiss law notes that exceptionally, if a superior State interest manifests, the Federal Council may
authorise an activity that normally would be prohibited69. In the Swiss Federation’s explanatory
report of 2011 on the project of drafting the Swiss law on services provided by private security
companies abroad notes, as an example for such exception an operation to liberate Swiss hostages
abroad is given, however, without further details on the required human rights guarantees in such
exceptional situation.70
The relevant law in the United Kingdom does not provide a list of prohibited activities, it only notes
that it is an offence to engage in a conduct for which a licence is required71.
As for the participation of law enforcement agents in the activities of PMSCs, in France, as a general
rule, no former police or military personnel can take up executive or employee positions in private
security companies with regard to activities related to surveillance or the protection and guarding
provided to persons and property/goods, the transportation and protection of funds, jewels and
precious metals72. As for the private investigation services, the law specifies that they cannot be
carried out by former policemen or gendarmes before a 5-year period following their cessation of
activity73. Similarly, in Hungary, the law emphasizes that staff members of the police and the civil
national security services performing official duties related to personal and property protection
activities and those employees that are not staff members, but contribute to related official duties,
cannot be members or managers of companies carrying out private security services and can only
perform – with the permission of the supervisor - planner-repairer activities of property protection
systems and protection, protection of moveable and immoveable items and the transport and
guarding of cargo and money74.
The research shows that those laws that address the question aim to exclude from the activities of
PMSCs those that may overlap with the functions of the police or the armed forces. However, only
half of the analysed legislation deals with this important issue. While there are various views on
whether outsourcing certain activities is necessary or wise, outsourcing raises new challenges for the
application of international human rights and humanitarian law, especially with regard to ensuring
that contractors are held accountable for violations, and that victims of human rights abuses have
access to remedies. Therefore, it is essential to prohibit PMSC personnel’s involvement in combat or
mercenary related activities, in order to avoid potential risks to certain fundamental human rights,
such as the right to security, right to life, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the
prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
67
Ibid., Article 14, para 1
Ibid., Article 14, para 2
69
Ibid., Article 15
70
http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/dam/data/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/sicherheitsfirmen/vn-ber-f.pdf
71
PSIA of 2001, Article 3, para 1
72
Law No. 83-629, Article 9
73
Ibid., Article 21
74
Ibid., Article 3
68
13
5. Rules on acquisition of weapons and the use of force and firearms
This section looks at whether the reviewed laws have regulations on illegal acquisition of weapons
and trafficking in firearms by PMSC personnel and the consequences of these acts, as well as the use
of force and firearms by PMSC employees.
In France, according to the laws available for this analysis, there are no rules on illegal acquisition of
weapons. At the same time, the law specifies that the employees of those private security companies
that carry out surveillance or guard property/goods can be armed under the conditions laid down by
a decree issued by the Council of State75. With regard to those private security companies whose
activities are involved in the transportation and protection of funds, jewels and precious metals, the
law states that the employees are armed, unless the funds are placed in devices that can be
destroyed and delivered in unmarked vehicles. As for the conditions of carrying the concerned
weapons, the law again makes reference to a decree issued by the Council of State76. At the same
time, the law emphasizes that staff performing the activity of protection to people cannot be
armed77.
As for the Council of State’s decree to define the conditions in which certain categories of private
security agents can bear weapons, the law notes that it should specify the categories and the types
of weapons that may be allowed to bear, the conditions of their acquisition, retention and handing
over by the person holding the authorisation, the required related trainings, as well as the conditions
under which the weapons are held during service and stored during out of service times78. The
possession and carrying of arms is strictly regulated by the relevant decree of the Council of State79
and only specific arms and elements of arms are authorized to be used by companies securing and
guarding property/goods80.
According to the relevant law in Switzerland, the personnel of private security companies cannot be
armed abroad81, but in case the situation exceptionally requires that the personnel bear arms to use
in cases of legitimate self-defence or state of necessity, the contracting authority must stipulate it in
the contract82. The law notes that it is also the contracting authority’s responsibility to ensure that
the personnel have the necessary authorization according to the applicable legislation. The Swiss law
has no provisions on illegal acquisition of weapons or its consequences. According to the relevant
law, it is the company’s responsibility to train its personnel, among others, on the use of force and
arms in situations of self-defence or state of necessity, the conduct to be adopted with persons
resisting or behaving violently, and the assessment of damage to health resulting from the use of
force83. The law notes that if the protection task cannot be executed otherwise, the Federal Council
75
Ibid., Article 10, para2
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid., Articles 10, para 2 and 11-5, para 3
79
Décret no. 95-589 du 6 mai 1995 rélatif a l’application du décret du 18 avril 1939 fixant le régime des
materiels de guerre, armes et munitions (version abrogée le 6 septembre 2013) („Decree no. 95-589”)
80
Decree no. 95-589, Article 26, para 2
81
LPSP of 2013, Article 34, para 1
82
Ibid., Article 34, para 2
83
Ibid., Article 31, para 2
76
14
may exceptionally authorise the use of coercive and police measures even beyond the situation of
legitim self-defence or state of necessity84.
The law in Hungary allows security guards to carry pepper spray, batons, guard dogs and firearms,
which can be used only in cases of self-defence and exigency85 (without clarifying though what
“exigency” may mean). According to the Hungarian legislation, the mandatory permit to carry
weapons is issued by the police86. The Hungarian legislation has no provisions on illegal acquisition of
weapons and trafficking in firearms by PMSC personnel, or on the consequences of these acts.
In the United Kingdom, it is the Export Control Act 2002 that envisages controls for the provision of
trade (trafficking and brokering) in military, paramilitary and certain other goods between countries
outside the UK (some trade controls apply to UK persons anywhere in the world, as well as to
activities carried out wholly or partly in the UK)87, which could also be applied eventually for PMSC
personnel as well, though the law was not explicitly targeting the regulation of the private military
industry. In the United Kingdom there are no provisions at the national legislation level with respect
to the use of force and firearms by PMSC employees.
The very fact that in the laws relevant for the activities of PMSCs, there are no specific provisions on
the illegal acquisition of weapons and on illicit trafficking in arms by PMSC personnel is a clear gap of
regulation. In order to ensure that PMSC personnel respect the international standards related to
arms control licensing procedures, arms transfer, acquisition of weapons, trafficking in arms and that
the staff of PMSC can be held accountable for illegal acquisition of weapons and illicit trafficking in
arms, it is essential to establish some standard methods of acquiring, exporting, importing, and
possessing weapons by private military and security companies and their employees. In addition, it is
desirable to introduce a restraint in the legal acquisition by PMSC personnel of weapons of mass
destruction, or weapons resulting in overkill, mass casualties or excessive destruction.
Different legislation regulates the use of force and firearms differently from prohibiting it except for
the situation of self-defence and State exigency to allowing the use of force and firearms only to
PMSCs carrying out certain specific activities or not regulating the question at all at national level.
Considering that the personnel of PMSCs often use force during their missions in their home
countries and abroad, and the fact that they carry out activities in conjunction and in cooperation
with the police and military forces, this issue requires more focused regulation. In order to avoid
potential risks to some fundamental human rights, such as the right to security and the right to life,
there must be a clear distinction between the activities of PMSCs and the police and armed forces, a
prohibition of PMSC personnel’s involvement in combat and mercenary related activities, as well as a
guarantee that in all other activities only adequate, mandated and proportional use of force is
allowed.
6. Accountability and remedies
84
Ibid., Article 35
Act CXXXIII of 2005, Article 27, para 4
86
Governmental Decree No. 253/2004, Article 4, para 2
87
ECA of 2002, Provisions 1-4
85
15
This section covers the reporting requirements for alleged offenses and violations; the relevant rules
on accountability and the related procedures for remedies; the involved human rights aspects and
accountability for human rights violations committed by PMSC employees.
As a common point, firstly it is to be noted that in none of the analysed States’ legislation there are
provisions on reporting obligations for infractions or violations of law committed by the personnel of
private security companies or any legal provisions on the effective remedies provided to the victims
of human rights violations committed by PMSC personnel. Secondly, it is to be pointed out that all
analysed laws rule on the regular monitoring of PMSCs differently.
In France, the law rules on a permanent control of private security companies exercised by police
officers and gendarmes. According to the relevant legal provision, following a monitoring visit, a
report is prepared by the police, which is then submitted by the authority of control to the head of
the company as well as to the Prefect of the Department and in Paris, the Prefect of the Police88.
In Switzerland, it is the authorising competent authority that controls the activities of private security
companies abroad and that submits a yearly report on its activities to the Federal Council89. The
relevant law sets out specific sanctions, including fines and imprisonment, for violations, including
direct participation in hostilities and serious human rights violations90. The Swiss law specifically
requires a civil liability insurance for the risks involved related to the activities of the company91.
In Hungary, companies carrying out private security services are controlled by the police; the police
monitors, among others, the lawfulness of the companies’ activities, whether the company holds a
liability insurance, as well as the authenticity of the data registered by the police about the
company92. The police carries out a control on an annual base and if it determines a reason that
prevents the company from exercising its activities, it withdraws its operating permit and prohibits
the continuation of the company’s activities93. According to the relevant Hungarian law, complaints
can be submitted against the measures taken by security guards that are then examined by local
administrative bodies in administrative proceedings94.
In the United Kingdom, there are no legal provisions existing at the national legislation level to deal
with the question of reporting requirements for alleged offenses and violations, the relevant rules on
accountability and the related procedures for remedies, or the involved human rights aspects and
accountability for human rights violations committed by PMSC employees.
As it was noted earlier by the Working Group related to its mission to the United Kingdom, the Green
Paper also deals with the question of the accountability of companies and employees to some
extent: it states that the liability which international humanitarian law applies to soldiers committing
war crimes would also “apply to employees of PMCs who became involved in armed conflict”.
88
Law No. 83-629, Articles 13 and 30.
LPSP of 2013, Article 37
90
Ibid., Articles 21-27
91
Ibid., Article 31, para 1, f)
92
Act No. CXXXIII of 2005, Article 8, para 5
93
Ibid., Article 8, para 7
94
Ibid., Article 62/A
89
16
With regard to the accountability of PMSCs and/or their personnel, the research showed that most of
the analysed laws (France, Hungary and Switzerland) focus on acts violating the relevant laws’
provisions regarding the scope of permitted activities, licencing, authorisation, collaboration with the
monitoring body, recruitment and other administrative processes95. In addition, the Swiss legislation
has specific provisions against those PMSC employees who take direct part in hostilities and those
who, by providing private security services, get involved in grave human rights violations96. The
analysis also revealed that while according to the relevant national legislation in the United Kingdom
one of the tasks of the Security Industry Authority is to “monitor the activities and the effectiveness
of persons carrying on businesses providing any such services”97, the law does not provide any
further information on the ways of such monitoring.
As for the consequences for violations of the laws relevant to the activities of PMSCs, the analysed
laws vary and provide a range of sanctions in the forms of imprisonment and fines of individuals98, as
well asfines, temporary suspension of the company’s activities, and withdrawal of
authorization.99.The Private Security Industry Act in the United Kingdom makes no reference to
sanctions in case of violations committed by PMSCs or their personnel.The conducted research
revealed that the analysed monitoring mechanisms vary in form and content in each country, and
that with the exception of Switzerland, the analysed laws have no provisions on a company’s or its
personnel’s compliance with the standards of international human rights, also none of the analysed
countries refer to effective remedies to victims. Considering the transnational nature of PMSC
activities and the broad geographical scope of the provided services, as well as the right of victims of
human rights violations to effective remedies, it is essential to ensure the accountability of private
military and security companies and their personnel to the Government of their country of origin,
registration or their country of operation. The Working Group notes that standardized and effective
accountability mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure the enforceability of the regimes
regulating the activities of PMSCs, as well as the necessary penal accountability and civil liability of
both individuals and corporate actors100 for human rights violations.
7. Ratification of international instruments on mercenaries
This section focuses on whether States ratified the UN Convention on Mercenaries and the
Additional Protocol I to the Four Geneva Conventions.
None of the four analysed countries signed or ratified the International Convention against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, but all countries are State members of
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) defining „mercenary” in article 47, paragraph 2,
95
France: Law No. 83-629, Articles 14-18 and Articles 31-33, Hungary: Act CXXXIII of 2005, Article 11 and
Articles 63-64, Switzerland: LPSP of 2013, Articles 23-24
96
LPSP of 2013, Articles 21-22.
97
PSIA of 2001, Article 1, para 2, c)
98
France: Law No. 83-629, Articles 14-15, 18 and Articles 31-32, Hungary: Act CXXXIII of 2005, Articles 63-64,
Switzerland: LPSP of 2013, Articles 21-24
99
France: Law No. 83-629, Articles 16-17 and Article 33, Switzerland: LPSP of 2013, Article 26, Hungary: Act
CXXXIII of 2005, Article 11,
100
See
Guiding
Principles
on
Business
and
Human
Rights,
available
at:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
17
which also means that all of them are legally bound to implement Protocol I.C. Conclusion and
recommendations
The objective of the study was to carry out a comprehensive analysis on national legislation
regulating PMSCs in four European countries (France, Hungary, Switzerland and the United Kingdom)
to identify and compare common elements, gaps and best practices. The study also informed the
Working Group’s efforts to demonstrate the need for a legally binding international instrument
regulating the activities of the industry, as well as its future projects to develop guidance for Member
States seeking to regulate PMSCs.
The research revealed that while all four analysed European countries have legislation regulating
PMSCs, each country approaches the privatization of the security industry differently, which results
in a patchy and inconsistent regulation. Considering the transnational nature of private security and
military services, as well as the generally high likeliness of PMSC personnel’s use of force and
involvement in hostilities, the Working Group stresses that the very different approaches and the
regulatory gaps demonstrated in the current study may result in seriously undermining the rule of
law, the effective functioning of a democratic State institution responsible for ensuring public safety,
as well as the accountability of PMSC personnel for violations of the law. Furthermore, the noted
regulatory gaps create potential risks to various fundamental human rights, such as the right to
security, right to life, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, the prohibition of torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right of victims to effective remedies.
The Working Group reiterates its view that a comprehensive, legally binding international regulatory
instrument is the best way to ensure consistent regulation worldwide and adequate protection of the
human rights of all affected by the activities of PMSCs. The Working Group emphasizes on the critical
need for States to establish minimum international standards to regulate the activities of PMSCs and
their personnel in pursuing the realization of these fundamental human rights, in accordance with
international human rights and humanitarian law standards.
The research showed that the analysed countries focus on the surveillance or the protection and
guarding provided to persons and property/goods, the transportation, protection and shipment of
cash, funds, jewels, precious metals and other valuables and the service of private investigation in
the domestic sphere, without addressing private military companies. The study also noted that only
one country’s national legislation covers the activities of PMSCs abroad and the rest of the examined
legislation focuses on the domestic sphere, without ruling on extraterritorial applicability.
Considering the often transnational nature of private security and military services, the insufficient
regulation regarding the scope of the analysed legislation seriously undermines the rule of law and
the effective functioning of a democratic State institution responsible for ensuring public safety in
accordance with international human rights standards and national laws. An international convention
would provide a standard regulatory framework on various essential issues related to the activities of
PMSCs, ensure the accountability of PMSC personnel and guarantee the right to effective remedies
of all victims worldwide.
The analysis shows that while in general States have detailed regulations on licensing and
authorisation of private security services, as well as on the procedure of selection and training of the
personnel, the relevant laws do not include any references to a single dedicated body responsible for
licencing and monitoring the activities of PMSCs and to international human rights and humanitarian
18
law in the selection criteria or the training materials. Considering the diverse activities and the broad
geographical scope covered by PMSC services, the lack of regulation in these crucial fields may result
in ineffective control over the private security industry and its personnel’s activities, and the lack of
knowledge of PMSC personnel of human rights standards. The provisions of an international
convention on licensing, authorisation, selection and training of PMSC personnel would contribute to
the establishment of common and consistent regulation that is desirable to ensure effective scrutiny
of the conduct of PMSCs and the implementation of the necessary international human rights
standards, as well as to ensure the accountability of PMSC personnel for violations of the law.
The study points out that despite the detailed provisions on the permitted and prohibited activities,
with one exception, the relevant laws are not specific and exhaustive enough related to those acts
that PMSCs shall not carry out in any circumstances, including the personnel’s direct participation in
hostilities. The research also notes that there are serious regulatory gaps concerning the illegal
acquisition of weapons and illicit trafficking in arms by PMSC personnel and their consequences, and
there are divergent approaches regarding the use of force and firearms. Taking into account the
nature of PMSC activities and the personnel’s potential participation in combat and mercenary
related activities, as well as the likeliness of PMSC staff to carry and use weapons, the lack of relevant
and standard regulation creates potential risks to certain fundamental human rights, such as the
right to security, right to life, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty and the prohibition of
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. An international convention would provide for PMSC
personnel some standard rules and methods of acquiring, exporting, importing, possessing and using
weapons and would ensure that the staff of PMSC is held accountable for illegal acquisition of
weapons, illicit trafficking in arms and prohibited use of force in all parts of the world.
Finally, the study shows that the analysed legislation lacks specific rules on the content of monitoring
activities and inspections, as well as references to the company’s or its personnel’s compliance with
the standards of international human rights law and humanitarian law, penal accountability and civil
liability of individuals and corporate actors, as well as effective remedies to victims. Considering the
transnational nature of PMSC activities and the broad geographical scope of the provided services, as
well as the right of victims of human rights violations to effective remedies, the lack of relevant rules
result in ineffective control over the private security industry. An international convention would
ensure the accountability of PMSCs by providing standardized and effective accountability
mechanisms. Such mechanisms would also ensure the enforceability of the regimes regulating the
activities of PMSCs, as well as the necessary penal accountability and civil liability of both individuals
and corporate actors101 for human rights violations.
Further research into national regulatory strategies is clearly needed in order to identify trends, gaps
and good practices in regulating PMSCs. To this end, the Working Group encourages Member States
which have not yet responded to its request to share with it laws and regulations relating to PMSCs
to do so.
101
See
Guiding
Principles
on
Business
and
Human
Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
available
at:
19