Ignorance and Obligation
Albert Lenel
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The topic of my paper stems from an article by H. A. Prichard, ''Duty and
Ignorance of Fact." In this article, Prichard raises important questions concerning
obligations. The basic question is whether obligations arise from certain
characteristics a situation has (i.e. objective characteristics) or whether
obligations arise from characteristics a moral agent thinks a situation has (i.e.
subjective characteristics).
In considering this question, Prichard begins with the following example.
Suppose see a man who looks like he has just fainted and I believe that if shout,
I might revive him. I might wonder if I have a duty to shout, because I might
wonder whether he really has fainted, or whether shouting really would revive
him. It seems obvious that my doubt about my duty stems from my doubt about
the objective facts (i.e. what really is the case) and not from any doubts about
what I think is the case. In such a situation, I might wonder whether shouting
really will help and thus whether it is my duty to shout, but something would
certainly be wrong if instead l wondered whether I thought shouting would help
and then based my duty on what I thought. We would hesitate to say that I did
my duty if I ignored the person who fainted because I thought shouting would
disturb him, though actually it would have revived him. We might agree that I
thought I was doing my duty, but not that I was doing it.
This example provides some justification for an objective view of obligations.
It leads, however, to further difficulties, as Prichard points out. One problem is
that we can never know for certain that the objective facts of a situation are such
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that a certain moral rule applies. Also, we can never know that our actions will
bring about the desired results. This brings us to an undesirable conclusion. We
can never know that we have a particular duty, or even that we (or anyone else)
has ever had a duty. From this conclusion we can go on to prove that we can
never do a duty because it’s a duty - or because we know it's a duty - simply
because we can never know what our duties are. Yet another unwanted result of
the objective view of duties is shown by the following example. Suppose in the
past I performed an action out of malice. Prof. Prichard uses the fainting man
example again. In this case, the man faints, but I think he is asleep. Out of malice
(this is my sole motive) I shout at him, hoping to disturb his slumber. He had in
fact fainted, however. My shouting did not disturb him as intended, but actually
revived him. Thus, the case resembles the original example concerning the
objective facts: a man faints and I revive him. In the first example, however, I am
trying to revive him (i.e. I am trying to do my duty). In the second case, I am
trying to disturb him (i.e. I am not trying to do my duty). Yet if the straightforward
objective view is held, the two cases must both be examples of my doing my duty
(since my duty was to revive the fainting man). It seems clear, however, that the
two examples are very different. Doing one's duty accidentally, while trying not to
do it (or at least not trying to do it), doesn’t seem nearly as commendable as
doing one's duty on purpose.
Prichard also considers something similar to the following case. Suppose we are
about to enter an expressway from a blind on - ramp. Should we slow down in
order to merge with traffic? If there is, in fact, no traffic, the objective view would
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imply that there was no obligation to slow down. Certainly this is mistaken.
Whether there is traffic or not, we should slow down, just in case there is traffic.
Here, the subjective view seems much more appropriate. Since we do not know
whether there is traffic or not, we should slow down. It is not the objective facts of
the case which bring about this obligation (or there wouldn't be one). The
obligation arises from what we think the characteristics of the situation are (e.g.
that there might be traffic.)
Not only are there examples in which an obligation arises from the subjective
characteristics of the case (as above), but there are also examples in which an
obligation does not arise because of the subjective characteristics of the case. In
our ethics class, we considered the following example.
1. There is an obligation to render aid. (This is assumed.)
2. A needs aid.
3. B does hot know that A needs aid.
In this example, B is not obligated to help A because he doesn't know that A
needs help. Thus, what might have been an obligation (according to the objective
view) is not an obligation according to the subjective view.
A more concrete example might be more convincing. Suppose A is drowning in
his pool. B could easily save A, but because there is a fence around the pool and
A is drowning very quietly, B does not know that A is in any distress. Is B
obligated to save A in this situation? I hope it seems clear that he is not. The
reason B is not obligated is that he is ignorant of a relevant non-moral fact (e.g.
that A needs help.)
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These examples show what Prichard meant by the subjective view. Before
continuing with some problems for this view, it should be pointed out that
Pilchard is not advocating other forms of subjectivism.
Most importantly, Prichard is not advocating a totally subjective view of moral
laws (moral facts, or obligations). He is not suggesting that our obligations are
only what we think they are. Prichard uses the example of torturing heretics.
Though the people who tortured heretics may have believed they were obligated
to do so, they were wrong. Nor can they be excused because they thought they
were so obligated.
The example of the heretic - torturers also involves ignorance. In this case,
the torturers were not ignorant of the non-moral facts. They knew that they were
causing intense suffering in others, and they did it intentionally. They were
ignorant of the fact that they were doing something wrong, however. The
ignorance is of a moral fact. They knew what the non-moral facts were, but yet
were ignorant of a moral fact.
Prichard refutes such a subjective view. Certainly he is right in this case.
Some Nazis thought they were doing their duty by killing Jews. But, though they
thought this was their duty, they were wrong. In this sense, duties (obligations
and moral facts) are objective.
Now Prichard is involved in dichotomy. His subjective view must allow that
ignorance of a non-moral fact excuses one from an obligation (or even prevents
the obligation from arising). The objective nature of his view on moral facts
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(obligations, etc.), however, must allow that ignorance of a moral fact does not
excuse one from an obligation.
To make matters clearer, I will expand upon the example used from class.
1. There is an obligation to render aid. (This is an assumption.)
2. A needs aid.
3. B does not know that A needs aid.
4. C does know that A needs aid, but
5. C does not know that there is an obligation to render aid.
Therefore, B has no obligation to help A because B is ignorant of a relevant nonmoral fact. C, however, is obligated to help A (though he doesn't know it)
because ignorance of moral fact is no excuse.
In this example, Prichard’s position seems intuitively correct. I'm not sure it
will work so well with more complicated cases. Suppose the correct moral fact on
abortion, for example, is that it is murder and should be regarded as such. Next,
suppose Judith Thompson (who argues very effectively for the position that a
woman has a stronger right over her body than the fetus, and thus should be
allowed to have an abortion if she freely chooses to do so) chooses to have an
abortion. She is not ignorant of any non-moral fact. She may even regard the
fetus as a person, and she knows she is going to have it killed. She also has a
mistaken belief that her right over her body is stronger than the fetus' right to life
(i.e. she believes a false moral proposition).
Prichard would have to maintain that if she has an abortion, she is as morally
blameworthy as any other murderer, since ignorance of a moral law is no excuse.
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Perhaps this example is not as clear as I'd like, but something appears to be
wrong here. It’s not as if she refused to think about the relevant moral facts.
Thompson worked very hard at arriving at what she believed is a correct moral
principle, and then she lived by it. Though she is ignorant of a moral fact (by
hypothesis), she did her best to find out what the correct moral facts were. In this
case, I find Prichard’s position somewhat unfair. As Reid says,
“When a man must act . . . he ought surely to use all the
means in his power to be rightly informed. When he has
done so, he may still be in error; but it is an invincible
error, and cannot justly be imputed to him as a fault”1
There are clearer examples which show that Prichard's position must be
modified. Consider again the example with subjects A, B, and C. C was said to
be obligated to help A, whether C knew the moral fact, “There is an obligation to
render aid,'' or not. But what if C is a seven year child? Perhaps C hasn't been
given a chance to learn this obligation yet. What if C was brought up by psychotic
parents and never received any moral education? Or perhaps C is braindamaged or severely retarded. In these cases, it seems clear that C’s ignorance,
even of a moral fact, excuses him from his obligation.
Prichard’s view seemed very attractive at first, but what can be done about these
1. Human Acts, Eric D'Arcy, p. 113.
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apparent difficulties? If these examples really are counter-examples to
Prichard’s view, what is it about them that make them exceptional cases?
Prichard does allow that ignorance of a non-moral fact can be an excuse, as
seen by the example with A, B, and C. B is excused from an obligation to help A
(who's in need of aid) because he is ignorant of A's situation (i.e. ignorant of a
non-moral fact). Before considering the problems encountered with examples of
ignorance of a moral fact, consider which cases of ignorance of a non-moral fact
excuse someone from an obligation (or prevent the obligation from even arising).
Is ignorance of a non-moral fact always an excuse?
Eric D’Arcy, in his book, Human Acts, brings up the example of a motorist
again. Earlier I argued for a subjective view of obligation because it is obvious
that, for example, when entering an expressway from a blind on-ramp, one
should slow down to merge with traffic, whether there actually is any traffic or not.
D'Arcy uses the same type of example to point out an entirely different fact.
Suppose a motorist entire an expressway from a blind on-ramp without bothering
to check for traffic or slow down. In D'Arcy's example, he makes it clear that the
motorist realizes the need to check for traffic and slow down. Despite this
realization, the motorist feels like risking it, zooms onto the expressway, and runs
a V. W. Beetle off the road.
Would Prichard argue that the motorist's ignorance of the non-moral fact that
there was a V.W. in the way precluded him from having any obligation toward the
V.W.? If it is only the agent’s thoughts about the situation that matter, and the
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agent wasn't aware of the V.W., how could he be under any obligation? Surely
Prichard would not say that. Prichard’s argument for allowing ignorance of a
non-moral f act as an excuse only applies in certain cases.
D’Arcy also gives an example of a case of omission in which ignorance of a
non-moral fact is no excuse. A surgeon begins to operate without first making
sure of the patient’s heart condition. If this results in injury to the patient, the
surgeon is morally blameworthy even though he was ignorant of the non-moral
fact (e.g. the patient's heart condition).
One minor difficulty concerns D'Arcy's distinction between deeds and
omissions. D’Arcy claims the driving example and the example of a hunter
shooting without checking carefully what's moving are deeds in which ignorance
is no excuse. The surgeon example and the example of a lighthouse keeper who
finishes a card game though he cannot remember if he is due back are given as
examples of omissions in which ignorance is no excuse. But in all four
examples, something is omitted (e.g. checking traffic, checking what's moving,
checking the patient's heart, and checking what time one is due back) and
something is done (in ignorance) (e.g. entering a road, shooting at some
movement, operating on the patient, and playing cards). All these examples do
point to the fact that ignorance of a non-moral fact is not always an excuse. But
all four examples seem to be both omissions (omitting getting the facts) and
deeds (proceeding without important relevant facts despite the knowledge of their
importance). At any rate, this minor objection doesn't change the overall picture.
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What is it about these four examples that nullifies the excuse (i.e. why isn’t
ignorance an excuse in these examples?). All of these examples are examples
of negligence. The agent knows his act might be harmful, yet he doesn’t bother
to get all the relevant information. D’Arcy argues that in these examples, the
agent’s ignorance is his own fault. The agent is culpable for his ignorance. In
the example with A, B, and C, B’s ignorance of A’s need for aid, if it is in no way
B’s fault that he is ignorant, excuses him from his obligation to A.
But suppose B knew A couldn't swim, knew A was near the pool, an: knew A
was irresponsible enough to fall in. B also notices that A is not making any noise
any more. B first wonders if A is all right, but decides he would rather not know if
A is in need of his help. (B is busy playing cards with the lighthouse-keeper.)
Now it seems that B is obligated to check on (and, if necessary, save) A because
B's ignorance in this case is his own fault. B is culpable for his ignorance.
It might be pointed out that in these cases of culpable ignorance; it doesn't
seem that the agent has incurred the original obligation. For example, if A needs
help and B knows it, B is obligated to help A. If B doesn't know A needs help
through no fault of his own, then B has no obligation to A. But if B's ignorance is
his fault, then it seems that B has an obligation to find out whether A needs help
(but not necessarily an obligation to help A, for example, if A doesn't need help).
Thus it seems that when the ignorance is culpable, the agent has an obligation to
find out the relevant facts. I'm not sure what else D'Arcy could mean by calling
an agent's ignorance culpable unless it means the agent has an obligation not to
be ignorant.
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Prichard considers the possibility of an obligation to consider the
circumstances fully. He argues that the obligation (or duty) to consider the
circumstances fully cannot arise from the possibility of there being another duty.
For, if Prichard's view is correct, if the ''duty'' to consider the circumstances fully
comes from a possible duty once we have considered the circumstances fully,
then by not considering the circumstances fully, we can absolve ourselves from
all duties. Without considering the circumstances fully, the second duty never
arises (due to ignorance). If the duty to consider the circumstances fully is based
on this second duty, then this second duty never arises, the duty to consider the
circumstances fully has no basis, and thus no longer exists either.
Prichard says:
“For plainly the duty of doing one action cannot possibly
depend on the possibility of the duty of doing another the duty
of doing which cannot arise unless the former action has
actually been done.... the truth is that our having a duty to
consider the circumstances cannot be based on the possibility
of our having a future duty of another kind if we were to
consider them. Rather, to vindicate such a duty, we must
represent the two so-called duties as respectively an element
and a possible element in a single duty, viz. to consider the
circumstances, and then if, but only if, as a result, we reach a
certain opinion, to do a certain action.”2
2. H.H. Richard, Moral Obligation, p.27.
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Prichard has a point here. If he is correct, then the duty to consider the
circumstances fully is not a separate duty, but part of a more complex duty (i.e.,
The duty to check the expressway traffic and then to yield the right of way if the
situation demands it, is a single, complex duty).
Nevertheless, Prichard does obviously allow for cases in which ignorance of
a non-moral fact is no excuse. The reason is that there are cases in which part
of the duty is to consider the relevant facts. These cases are comparable to
D’Arcy’s cases of culpable ignorance due to negligence.
Both Prichard and D’Arcy also allow for cases in which ignorance of a nonmoral fact is an excuse. Prichard can allow this by claiming that not all duties
include considering the circumstances fully. For example, we may have a duty to
help those in need, but this duty does not include as part of itself a requirement
that we check up on everyone to see if they are in need. This is comparable to
D’Arcy’s examples of non-culpable ignorance in which the agent is ignorant
through no fault of his own.
Now that we have examined the similarities and differences between
Prichard and D’Arcy concerning ignorance of non-moral facts, it’s time to
consider examples concerning ignorance of moral facts.
As previously stated, Prichard does not allow for any excuses due to
ignorance of a moral fact. In the original example of A, B, and C, both B and C
were ignorant of an obligation to A. According to D’Arcy, B has no obligation if
he is not culpable for his ignorance of a non-moral fact (A's needing help), but B
does have an obligation if he is culpable for his ignorance of this non-moral fact.
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According to Prichard, B has no obligation if no part of the obligation includes
finding out the relevant facts, but B does have an obligation if part of the
obligation is to find out the relevant facts.
D’Arcy wants to expand his view to include moral facts as well. That is,
D’Arcy argues that nonculpable ignorance of a moral fact excuses just as
nonculpable ignorance of a non-moral fact does. At first glance, the approach
seems very appealing. Consider again all the difficulties raised with Prichard’s
position on ignorance of moral facts. If an agent is incapable of knowing a moral
fact, D’Arcy calls it inculpable ignorance of a moral fact. Now there is some way
to deal with seven year olds, brain damaged people, and the severely retarded.
If, for some reason beyond the agent’s control, the agent does not know of an
obligation, the agent is not culpable for his ignorance, and therefore is excused
from the obligation.
D’Arcy says,
“In the ordinary language of day-to-day moral evaluations,
we speak as if ignorance... excuses or fails to excuse, not
according as it bears upon matters of moral rule, law, or
principle, or upon matters of relevant fact: but according as
the ignorance itself is or is not culpable. It is true that, in
order to reject an excuse put forward on grounds of
ignorance, one might argue that the ignorance in question
was a case of ignorance of moral principle, and invoke an
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ethical theory which held that such ignorance is always
culpable; but the point in making such moves would be to
show that the ignorance in question was itself culpable.''3
Prichard, in refusing to allow ignorance of moral fact as an excuse, would be
claiming that all cases of ignorance of a moral fact are cases of culpable
ignorance, according to D’Arcy.
Prichard would, I am sure, allow that seven year olds, brain damaged
people, (etc.) who are unable to know a moral law should be excused. If this is
true, how do Prichard and D’Arcy differ concerning ignorance of moral facts?
When is ignorance of a moral fact inculpable for D’Arcy and when is it an excuse
for Prichard?
D'Arcy claims that the conditions needed to consider ignorance of a moral
fact culpable can be stated in general terms,
''...one need not claim to be able to draw up one list of
moral principles of which inculpable ignorance is
possible, and another of which it is not. The conditions
necessary for holding ignorance or error to be culpable
can be stated only in general terms: A's ignorance or
error about X is culpable if and only if X is something
which A is (1) obliged, and (2) able, to know. Now by
hypothesis the disputed point is something which he is
obliged to know; we are obliged to know what is
3. E. D’Arcy, Human Acts, p. 107.
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morally required of us.''4
Thus, D’Arcy’s view could be made to resemble Prichard’s, if we agree that
we have an obligation to know our obligations. Then, all cases of ignorance of a
moral fact would fall into D’Arcy’s category, culpable ignorance. This follows
from condition (1) of D’Arcy’s necessary conditions of culpability (i.e., if X is an
obligation and we are obligated to know our obligations, then ignorance of an
obligation is culpable).
Though D’Arcy’s view had considerable appeal initially, on closer inspection
it appears to be less plausible. Consider the notion of having an obligation to
know your obligations. My initial objection involves ignorance of the obligation to
know your obligations. But if there is an obligation to know your obligations, then
there is an obligation to know your obligation to know your obligations. This will
continue ad infinitum. Perhaps D’Arcy would admit that we do all have an
obligation to know our obligation to know our obligation... to know our obligations,
but this certainly seems awkward.
Consider a concrete example. Suppose we have an obligation to help those
in need. We may not know of this obligation. What is it of which we are guilty?
If no one is in need, then I would hesitate to say that I was violating my obligation
to know that I'm obligated to help those in need. If I know A is in need, but I don't
know that I have an obligation to help him, what obligation do I violate?
Obviously I violate my obligation to help others in need, if I don't help A. But do I
also violate my obligation to know I have an obligation to A? Don’t I violate only
4. Ibid p. 112.
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one obligation by not helping A (namely, the obligation to help those in need)?
Ultimately, it seems that my obligation to know my obligation to help others just
collapses into my obligation to help others. If I don't know of this obligation, I
may violate it by not helping someone I know is in need. But if no one is in need,
I haven't violated any obligation. And if I do fail to help someone I know is in
need, the only obligation I violate is the obligation to help those in need.
One further objection concerns the possibility of being obligated to know
something. Usually we speak of an obligation to do a certain action. It is
understandable, then, to speak of an obligation to find out or learn the facts of a
situation. But in what sense can we be obligated to know some fact (moral or
otherwise)? Though what we know depends in part on some intentional action
we perform (e.g. going to Ethics class), it is not possible for us intentionally to
know something. It’s not as if we choose to know fact A, but decide not to know
fact B. Thus talk about an obligation to know what is morally required of us,
though it seems plausible at first, is actually quite impossible. D’Arcy might want
to change this to something like, we have an obligation to find out what our
obligations are, but I don't think this will avoid the earlier objections.
D’Arcy’s position had much initial plausibility. It does seem that we separate
cases of culpable ignorance and inculpable ignorance when figuring out
blameworthiness (especially in cases of negligence). However, the duty to
find out the relevant facts of a situation cannot be derived from any possible duty
discovered this way. (Or else, as Prichard says, failing to do your duty to find out
the relevant facts would excuse you from any duty; thus there would be no
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ground for the duty to find out the relevant facts, either. Hence, failing to do your
duty to find out the relevant facts would also excuse you from this duty itself.)
Unless some other ground for a duty to find out the relevant facts can be
found, we should stick to Prichard’s notion of a complex duty. Thus all D’Arcy’s
examples of negligence are examples of a complex duty for Prichard (e.g. the
hunter has a duty :
(a) to find out what’s moving in the bushes and
(b) not to shoot it if it is a person.)
D’Arcy’s position on ignorance of moral facts is even less plausible on close
inspection. To be culpable for your ignorance of a moral fact, D’Arcy requires that
you be both obliged and able to know this moral fact. As pointed out, the notion
of an obligation to know moral facts is very problematic. Though D’Arcy’s
position looks very neat and simple, it falls prey to many objections.
Prichard’s view might not be as symmetrical as D’Arcy’s, but it is superior
nonetheless. Instead of being culpable for being ignorant of the facts in certain
situations (which seems to create a problematic obligation to find out the facts in
a situation), Prichard uses the notion of complex duties. Thus there isn’t a duty
to find out the facts of a situation apart from the duty to act on those facts. In this
way, Prichard escapes the problem of justifying a duty to find out the relevant
facts. Instead of being culpable for being ignorant of any moral fact (which
involves D’Arcy in the impossible notion of an obligation to know your obligations)
Prichard claims that ignorance of a moral fact is no excuse. The only problem
left for Prichard concerns cases in which the agent cannot see an obligation.
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In answering this objection, Prichard could, perhaps, borrow one bit of
D’Arcy’s position. If someone is unable to see a moral fact, this might be some
grounds for an exculpatory plea. This would help Prichard in handling cases
involving seven year olds and brain damaged people, without involving him in the
paradox of an obligation to know your obligations.
Another way of handling the problem of seven year olds and brain damaged
people might also be feasible. When discussing obligations we have, we are
assuming that these obligations apply to moral agents. It might be possible to
rule out problematic cases involving children or defective people by claiming that
they are not really moral agents. If this tack is taken, however, moral agents
cannot be defined in terms of the ability to see moral facts, without becoming
circular.
There is one other reason for accepting D’Arcy’s view on ignorance of moral
facts when due to the person’s inability to see the moral fact. Consider the
objection concerning J. Thompson and abortion. Prichard's unmodified view
would lead to the fact that Thompson is as blameworthy as any murderer. If we
add D'Arcy's idea that someone's inability to know a moral fact may excuse them
from an obligation, there may be a solution to this problem. If Thompson really
did her best to figure out what her obligations were, and she still could not see
that she was wrong in believing that her right to her body was a stronger right
than the fetus’ right to life, then perhaps she can be excused (at least in part)
because she is unable (in some sense) to know the correct moral facts. As
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D’Arcy points out, however, this is not to say Thompson didn't act wrongly, only
that she is not to be blamed for it. The same could be said of the seven year old
and the brain damaged people.
Yet we would not want to apply this to anyone who had some crazy notion
about their obligations. Cases involving the violation of clear-cut moral principles
(unlike the abortion issue) should not be pardoned just because the person really
believes his crazy notions about obligations are correct. He may not choose not
to know some clear-cut obligation; but if his lack of knowledge is not the fault of
anyone else, but is his fault (in some sense), then even if he didn't choose to be
ignorant he is not exonerated by his ignorance.
The only difference between this case and the abortion case seems to be
the clarity of the obligations in question. Thus the most precise we can make the
position on exculpation due to ignorance of a moral fact would be something like
the following:
“If the obligation in question is one that a normal adult
could reasonably be expected to see, then a normal
adult can not be exculpated if he fails to see it.''5
Though this rule is very general (containing phrases like “normal adult'' and
''reasonably be expected to see”) it does fit my intuitions about children and
defects (being restricted to normal adults) as well as my intuitions about less
clear-cut obligations like abortion (being restricted to obligations that could
reasonably be expected to be seen).
5. R. Lemos, Notes from Phi 623, 3/21/79