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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The aim of the current study was to examine the relationships of ethnicity and
ethnic identity status with styles of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is “the process by
which a person determines how to resolve a specific moral [ethical] conflict” regardless
of the magnitude or triviality of the dilemma (Mennuti & Creamer, 1991, p. 241). There
has been much research examining gender differences using either Kohlberg’s (1969) or
Gilligan’s (1977) proposed models of moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s model holds to a
hierarchy of moral reasoning based upon upholding ideals of “justice” and a sense of
right and wrong. In contrast, Gilligan’s hierarchical model states that women advance
along a “care” based model that involves helping others while also meeting one’s own
needs.
However, most of the research based on these models has been conducted on
predominately European American university students; thus, the results may not be
generalizable to other ethnic populations. In other words, there has been very little
research that studied ethnic differences in moral reasoning, which raises several
questions. Does Kohlberg’s model only apply to European American men? Does
Gilligan’s model only apply to European American women? Also, many studies do not
use validated and reliable measures, making their findings less than solid. These issues
are addressed in the current study, hopefully contributing to a clearer and stronger
understanding of moral reasoning. Specifically, the current study helps clarify the extent
to which the application of Kohlberg’s and Gilligan’s models to the general population is
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appropriate and suggests their models of moral reasoning may need to be reevaluated to
more accurately represent possible sex and ethnic differences. Consequently, this will
help solidify the understanding of this aspect of human development as it applies to
Americans of various ethnic backgrounds.
Background and Significance
Moral orientation development. Kohlberg (1966) saw a gap in the literature in the
conceptual and psychological understanding of moral reasoning development. He felt that
simply judging someone based on his or her adherence to the rules of a group or society
was a poor measurement of morality, especially in light of Nazi rule in Germany.
Kohlberg then decided to establish a new theory of moral development, reflecting many
of the ideas presented in systemic moral philosophies, as well as the psychological and
philosophical beliefs of John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Immanuel Kant (Tapp &
Kohlberg, 1971).
Based upon these sources and personal research, Kohlberg (1969) proposed a
model of moral reasoning development that involved three levels: preconventional,
conventional, and postconventional (Kail & Cavanaugh, 2004). Each level then held two
sub-stages. The preconventional level contained the first two stages. Stage 1 is obeying
authority. In Stage 1, an individual does what he or she is told without question and right
and wrong is based on whether it coincides with an authority figure’s commands. Stage 2
is acting well behaved in exchange for rewards, favors or avoidance of punishment. In
Stage 2, a sense of right and wrong is based on what will result in punishment or reward
for the individual.
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The conventional level contained the middle two stages. Stage 3 is behaving the
way others want you to act. In Stage 3, an individual’s sense of right and wrong is based
on what will please or anger/hurt others. Stage 4 is abiding by the rules in order to
preserve social order. In Stage 4, a sense of morality is based on the desire to follow the
rules of society to maintain social harmony. In other words, right and wrong is what
society says because it is for the greater good.
Last, the postconventional level contained the last two stages. Stage 5 is following
the morals of society when you believe they are applicable. In Stage 5, an individual tries
to adhere to societal rules for the greater good, but believes there are exceptions to the
rule. For example, he or she may view stealing as prohibited and against the law.
However, in a life or death situation he or she may view the illegal activity morally
acceptable. Stage 6 is an individual moral viewpoint based on abstract ideology and
values (Kail & Cavanaugh, 2004). In Stage 6, an individual creates his or her own view
of right and wrong based on more abstract principles. Combining various levels of
societal and personal views of morality, he or she makes individual ethical decisions for
each separate dilemma. In Kohlberg’s model, the higher the stage, the less the reasoning
is based on selfish desires, or “following the rules,” and the more it is based on abstract
principles of justice.
Kohlberg went on to conduct many studies that supported this model of moral
reasoning. One such study was a 20-year longitudinal study by Colby et al. (1983).
Results indicated that all the participants, who were males beginning at ages 10, 13 and
16, “proceeded through the developmental stages in… sequence”, “ no subject skipped a
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stage in the sequence” and “only 4% [six] of the adjacent testing times showed downward
stage change” (p. iii). However, a criticism of this study, as well as of much of
Kohlberg’s early research, was that his model was created based upon and supported by
male participants only. The ethnic composition of this study is not addressed beyond
socioeconomic status and religious background.
Later studies showed that female participants functioned at lower levels than male
participants did, generally the third stage, and were classified as possessing the same
moral functioning as children (Gilligan, 1977; Holstein, 1976). Lyons (1988) also noted
that although Kohlberg established a suitable justice moral reasoning model, this model
failed to relate to or explain morality’s association with interpersonal relationships.
In fact, several argued (e.g., Adelson & Doehrman, 1980; Bettelheim, 1965) that
women had been neglected in the mainstream views of psychology, with value being
placed on autonomy and individuation (e.g., Blos, 1967; Erikson, 1962) instead of care
and a connection to others (Gilligan, 1988). These views were constructed and held in
spite of literature previously showing that women have a “relational bias… [in their]
conceptions of self and morality” with their sense of self being centered on their
interconnection with others (Lyons, 1988, p. 32; see also Broverman, Vogel, Broverman,
Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Piaget, 1932/1965). Gilligan postulated that this bias,
instead of being an anomaly, was a separate and distinct view of morality from that of
Kohlberg’s justice model (Gilligan, 1988).
Gilligan (1977) sought to identify this distinct view of moral reasoning when she
interviewed 29 women about their upcoming decision on whether to abort their
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pregnancy. The interview included asking the women about the decision, how they were
feeling about it, the pros and cons of both keeping the fetus or aborting it, the people it
would effect, and how the decision would affect their view of themselves. Afterwards,
each participant was presented with three of Kohlberg’s hypothetical dilemmas and asked
to discuss how she would resolve each situation.
During the interviews, the women often expressed a perceived obligation to be
caring and felt “a responsibility to discern and alleviate the ‘real and recognizable
trouble’ of this world” (Gilligan, 1977, p. 511). They also expressed an understanding of
Kohlberg’s higher postconventional moral reasoning, yet primarily functioned at a lower
level of his model. This affirmed Gilligan’s postulation that there was a need to better
conceptualize moral judgments of women (Gilligan, 1977).
Gilligan (1977) came to the conclusion that “women’s experiences and
development are quite different from those of men, centering on attachment and intimacy
rather than on separation and autonomy” like Kohlberg’s model (Norman, Murphy, &
Gilligan, 1982, p. 292). In other words, Gilligan concluded that women were more care
focused while men were more justice focused. Gilligan then created a different model of
moral reasoning for women with three stages. Stage 1 focused on individual survival. In
this stage a woman views right and wrong based on what is best for her individual selfish
needs. For example a woman may divorce her loving husband because she feels it is the
right thing to do for her own happiness. In Stage 2 an individual feels a responsibility to
“ensure protection for the dependent and unequal” (Gilligan, 1977, p. 492). In this stage a
woman’s sense of morality is based on trying to protect those who cannot help
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themselves. For example, a poor mother may starve in order for her young child to have
enough food to eat. Stage 3 involves balancing the responsibility to take care of one’s
own needs and those of others in a non-violent manner. In this stage a woman is able to
find a balance between her own needs and those of others. For example, a woman who
loves her job may work part-time, in order to provide the love and attention her children
need. Similar to Kohlberg’s stage where men could advance to the next higher
functioning stage, in Gilligan’s model women could also move up to the next stage as
their moral reasoning developed.
To further develop Gilligan’s care model of moral reasoning, Gilligan and
Attanucci (1988) approached their published set of three studies with the question: why
do women tend to score lower on Kohlberg’s moral orientation model? Their hypothesis
was that men and women are able to reason from both justice and care viewpoints.
Additionally they hypothesized women tend to mainly function in Gilligan’s care model,
and men in Kohlberg’s justice model of orientations (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988).
In each study the participants were individually orally interviewed and asked a
series of predetermined questions regarding a decision on a moral conflict in their past.
The interviewer additionally “asked questions to encourage the participants to clarify and
elaborate their responses” (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988, p. 229). They were also
questioned about morality and identity in general. The discussions of the real-life moral
dilemmas were coded according to Lyons’ Manual for Coding Real Life Dilemmas
(1988) by three trained coders. The final classification (care only, care focused, carejustice, justice focus, and justice only) of the presented dilemma, and thus the participant,
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was based on the frequency of each mode of moral reasoning. In all three studies, women
were not found to significantly prefer care over justice reasoning. Although, it is true that
in the three studies care orientations were more likely to be used by women, there was
not a significant relationship between gender and moral orientation because both men and
women used both justice and care orientations (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988).
Another limitation, like many earlier studies on moral reasoning, is that the
samples in all three studies were small (i.e., study 1, N = 21; study 2, N = 39; study 3, N
=20), making it difficult to generalize their findings. In addition, the participants
consisted mainly of adolescents and young adults. This was a further limitation because
the study could only be accurately applied to the general population within the same age
range (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). Also, only study 2 of the three had an almost
“balanced” racial composite with 19 white and 20 minority participants (Gilligan &
Attanucci, 1988). So, in light of the small population samples, limited age range and lack
of adequate racial, educational and occupational representation, one would be hard
pressed to argue the results of this study are an accurate representation of the United
States as a whole.
Similar to the previous study by Gilligan (1977), the interview used in these three
studies was created by the authors and not validated, making the results vulnerable to the
effects of possible confounding variables and demand characteristics. Though the authors
aimed to use the same questions for each participant, interviews often run the risk of the
results being influenced by external factors. For example, the mood or reactions to
responses displayed by the interviewer could have caused the participant to modify his or
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her answer. When the interviewer asked participants to clarify their responses, the
interviewer may have phrased the question in such a way as to elicit a particular type of
response. The participant may have elaborated honestly and openly, or he or she might
have modified his or her answer in order to please the interviewer. In particular, if the
participant functioned at the moral level of wanting to please others, Stage 3, this could
be a serious confounding variable unless the interviewer or coders caught it. For example,
they may have chosen an answer that reflected Kohlberg’s fifth stage because the
participant thought this is what the interviewer wanted. The authors even stated “the
interview itself must be considered for its influence on the likelihood of eliciting care or
justice reasoning” (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988, p. 234). In the current study this was
avoided; rather, the effects were lessened by using a validated, reliable, and written
measure.
Findings and measurement. Later studies presented several further findings about
justice and care moral orientations. The findings spanned various topics such as gender,
the conceptual differences and similarities of the models, an individual’s use of both
models, the effects of dilemma type, and the issue of coding hypothetical dilemmas.
In fact, since Gilligan’s original study in 1977, many studies have examined
gender differences in both care and justice moral reasoning but with varied findings. The
results ranged from having a marginal gender difference wherein men were more justice
focused and women were more care focused (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Yacker & Weinberg,
1990), to finding men used justice reasoning more often than women (Crandall, Tsang,
Goldman, & Pennington, 1999; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Wark & Krebs, 2000), to finding
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that women used care reasoning more often than men (Crandall et al., 1999; Ford &
Lowery, 1986; Stander & Jensen, 1993; Wilson, 1995), to finding that there was no
significant gender difference (Daniels, D’Andrea, & Heck, 1995; Friedman, Robinson, &
Friedman, 1987; Jones & Watt, 1999; Knox, Fagley, & Miller, 2004; Rothbart, Hanley &
Albert, 1986; Silberman & Snarey, 1993; Vikan, Camino & Biaggio, 2005; Walker,
1989; Walker, de Vries, and Trevethan, 1987). Of the studies with marginal gender
differences, Yacker and Weinberg (1990) reported a gender difference that was
statistically significant at the p < .07 level, which is greater than the usual .05 standard
alpha level cut-off, and Jaffee and Hyde (2000) only found small, not quite significant
differences. Consequently, some researchers believe that both genders use both
orientations (not necessarily favoring one over the other), and which mode is used is
dependent upon other external factors, such as dilemma type (Crandall et al., 1999;
Woods, 1996). Yet, despite all this, the research literature still does not come to a
consensus on the possibility of a gender difference or what exactly is that difference.
In light of these inconsistent findings, Gilligan’s model has been considered by
some as merely an expansion of Kohlberg’s model (Jorgensen, 2006). Yet each model
holds a completely distinct set of core values. Kohlberg’s model views detachment from
others and objectivity as the ultimate goal in moral development. Consequently, women
who operate in relational terms, no matter how autonomous, are viewed as stunted in
their moral development according to Kohlberg’s model but morally advanced according
to Gilligan’s model (Linn, 2001). Thus, the core values of each model, i.e., justice or
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care, are fundamentally different. Nonetheless, an individual can still reason with more
than one moral model.
Indeed, it has been shown repeatedly that many people understand both
models/viewpoints. For example, while reflecting upon a personal moral dilemma, many
of the participants in Gilligan and Attanucci’s (1988) study could discuss both justice and
care modes of reasoning. However, a majority still operated and made decisions mainly
according to only justice or only care. Similarly, several of the women in Gilligan’s
(1977) study expressed a clear understanding of Kohlberg’s higher levels of moral
reasoning, yet were more care focused in their discussion of their present dilemma. In a
study by Johnston (1988), participants were also able to examine the dilemmas from both
moral orientation standpoints, though they preferred to dominantly use one over the
other. Consequently, though people have been shown to understand both moral reasoning
viewpoints, most still operate according to only one or the other.
Some have speculated that the mode of moral orientation used by an individual
may be influenced by external factors. One such factor is the use of a personal, real-life
dilemma, as opposed to a hypothetical dilemma. Gilligan used real-life dilemmas in order
to help develop her theory by allowing women to speak in their own voice, choosing their
own dilemmas to discuss (Gilligan, 1977) and even used a similar interview method in a
later study (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988). She believed it was important that women, so
often confined to terms and viewpoints created by men, were given a chance to express
“in women’s own terms the experience of their adult life” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 173).
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Several studies have used both “real-life dilemmas” as well as hypothetical
dilemmas in order to investigate the relationship between type of dilemma and overall
moral functioning (Walker, 1989; Walker et al., 1987). However, trying to classify a
participant’s moral orientation based on individual past experiences can be a problematic
variable. For example, if Person A discussed the dilemma of deciding with his girlfriend
whether she should abort their child, and Person B discussed the dilemma of finding a $5
bill in a wallet with no identification in it, it would be hard to compare the two responses.
One instance, arguably, involves the life or death of the unborn child, does not directly
involve the participant and is a legal procedure. The other individual risks someone else
not getting his or her wallet back and feeling guilty for keeping the money. Although
some similarities could be discussed (e.g., conscience, religious standards), the
magnitude or triviality of the decisions could affect the way an individual would solve
them.
A personal moral dilemma could be a problematic variable for another reason. For
example, a normally justice oriented man recently had to make the decision to take his
beloved wife off a machine that was keeping her alive. Would he still view the issue in
justice terms or would the situation (e.g., that it involves someone he loves deeply)
influence his decision to act in a care based manner?
Additionally, the aforementioned personal event may or may not be representative
of a person’s current moral functioning, especially if the decision was made at a young
age. The moral dilemma may be reconstructed, not in terms of how the participant
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originally resolved the problem, but in terms of his or her current functioning
(Blackburne-Stover, Belenky, & Gilligan, 1982).
Some researchers have also argued that the content of the dilemmas themselves
can affect an individual’s observed style of moral reasoning (Crandall et al., 1999;
Walker, 1989; Wark & Krebs, 2000). If everyone is recalling a different, personal moral
dilemma, it becomes harder to know where the influence comes from: gender or the
dilemma. An additional problem arises when coding the resolution of personal dilemmas:
how do you accurately determine an individual’s moral orientation?
Walker et al. (1987) scored their participants’ real-life dilemmas by using
procedures described in Colby and Kohlberg’s manual (1987). There was only 75% intercoder agreement. However, this manual was meant to be used to score the answers to set
hypothetical moral dilemmas, not individual real-life dilemmas, also challenging the
accuracy of the study’s results. In another study by Walker (1989), similar procedures
were used, wherein both Colby and Kohlberg’s manual and Lyons’ manual were used to
score each participant’s response to hypothetical and real-life dilemmas accordingly.
However, only 32 interviews were re-scored of which there was only an inter-coder
agreement of 75% and 76% respectively. Walker (1989) admitted, in regards to Lyons’
manual, that “there is, to date, scant evidence to support its reliability or face and
criterion validity” (p. 164).
Thus, using personal dilemmas and free responses can greatly complicate a
study’s findings. However, if all participants are asked to solve several moral dilemmas,
look at the same dilemmas, and then choose a resolution from those presented to them,
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then the standardization of the measurement of responses is greatly improved, as is the
study’s internal validity.
This was the aim of a study by Liddell, Halpin and Halpin (1992) when
developing the Measure of Moral Orientation (MMO). The authors wanted to develop a
measure that could quickly assess a participant’s moral orientation, taking just a few
minutes instead of an hour (which is required for coding an interview with Lyons’
manual). This also increases the possible number of participants for a study. Liddell also
sought to create a measure to assess one’s moral orientation both in terms of Kohlberg’s
justice model and Gilligan’s care model, a first of its kind (Liddell et al., 1992).
Liddell et al. (1992) first created 11 dilemmas that were viewed as commonplace
for college students based upon Liddell’s experience working with this population. These
dilemmas were then given to 28 college students who discussed them in groups of three
to five students each. Based upon their tape recorded discussions, one dilemma was
deleted for an unspecified reason and the remaining 10 dilemmas had a total of 79
possible responses. A working definition of both care and justice moral orientations were
established based upon previous research literature (i.e., Langdale, 1986). Using these
definitions, five university faculty members rated each of the 79 responses as either a
care or justice item. After rewriting or eliminating those items without inter-rater
agreement, 78 items remained: 37 justice items and 41 care items. For the MMO, these
items were each listed after their corresponding dilemma, followed by a 4-point Likert
scale asking the participant to which degree he or she agrees or disagrees with the
statement/item. The participant’s care and justice scores were then computed by adding
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the responses for each item (one point for strongly disagree up to four points for strongly
agree), thus resulting in both a justice and a care score.
These 11 dilemmas were then followed by a 12 item self-description
questionnaire, asking the participants to rate, on the same 4-point Likert scale, to what
degree he or she believes the statement applies to him or her. This questionnaire was used
to provide a self-descriptive care and self-descriptive justice score. After several studies,
the MMO was first revised to include nine moral dilemmas with 35 care and 34 justice
responses, and 14 self-descriptive items: 7 self-care and 7 self-justice items (Liddell &
Davis, 1996). It was later revised again as the MMO-2 which included seven moral
dilemmas with 26 responses for care and 26 for justice, and completely eliminated the
self-care and self-justice items. Participant’s scores from the MMO-2 would then be
calculated for both care and justice, just like the MMO, with higher scores reflecting a
stronger orientation (with the scores possibly ranging from 26 to 104 for each). Since its
original construction, the MMO has been widely used and tested (Liddell, 1998; Liddell
& Davis, 1996; Liddell et al., 1992).
The Measure of Moral Orientation-2 appears ideal for its use in the present study.
Though other moral orientation measures exist, some only measure moral orientation
strictly in terms of Kohlberg’s model, such as the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest,
Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma & Bebeau, 1999),
Kohlberg’s Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby, 1982) and
Gibb’s Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM; Gibbs et al., 1982), and the Moral
Judgment Scale (MJS; Maitland & Goldman, 1974). Others only measure care in women,
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such as the Ethic of Care Interview (ECI; Skoe, 1990), or do not measure moral
orientation in terms of care or justice, such as the Maturity of Moral Judgment Scale
(Hogan, 1973). Several other measures are only mentioned in one or two published
journal articles, such as Gilligan’s Sexual Moral Judgment Scale (Gilligan, Kohlberg,
Learner & Belenky, 1971) and the Care/Response Orientation Scale (Wilson, 1995), or
have very little validity and/or reliability evidence, like the Moral Orientation Scale
(Yacker & Wienberg, 1990). Thus, the MMO-2 was chosen for the current study because
it is not only ideal for use in studies with larger participant populations, but it also is able
to measure an individual’s moral reasoning in terms of both care and justice.
Moral orientation and ethnicity. Just as gender, type of dilemma and interview
coding may influence moral orientation usage, another factor that may play a role in
moral reasoning but is not fully understood is ethnicity. In study 2 by Gilligan and
Attanucci (1988) the “dilemmas presented by white students were more likely to fall in
the care-justice category and dilemmas of [unspecified] minority students in the justice
focus category” (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988, p. 232). In a study by Knox et al. (2004), all
of the participants were African American college students who, regardless of gender, on
average were justice focused. Consequently, it appears that it is only in European
American populations that women are theoretically care focused and men are
theoretically justice focused in their moral orientations. However, with the lack of
research and lack of ethnic group comparisons in this particular study, this point remains
unclear. Just as Kohlberg’s model has been criticized as being based on a male model of
moral reasoning, Gilligan’s model has been criticized as being based on “white, middle-
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class women in the United States” (Stack, 1986, p. 324), thus creating a gap in the current
research on moral reasoning.
Based on previous research, there is an obvious need to build upon Kohlberg and
Gilligan’s moral orientation theories by examining and comparing moral orientation in
people of various ethnicities and cultural orientations (Brabeck, 1989; Scarr, 1987; Stack,
1986; Woods, 1996). As a result, studies have been conducted, examining Kohlberg’s
and/or Gilligan’s model in other countries, such as Israel (Snarey, Reimer, & Kohlberg,
1985), Turkey (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982), Brazil and Norway (Vikan et al., 2005), and
Japan (Shimizu, 2001).
Snarey et al. (1985) interviewed 92 Israeli kibbutz adolescents using Kohlberg’s
moral judgment interview, Form A (which consisted of three hypothetical situations) and
9 to 12 probe questions. Some of these participants were interviewed one or two years
later and some were then interviewed a third time five years later. The authors found that
the Israeli kibbutz adolescents’ moral development was upward and gradual, similar to
Kohlberg’s participants in the United States. This helped support Kohlberg’s model as
being applicable cross-culturally. When comparing this study’s results to those of
previous studies, the authors found the Israeli adolescents generally reasoned at higher
moral stages than the same-aged participants in both the United States (Colby et al.,
1983) and Turkey (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982; Turiel, Edwards, & Kohlberg, 1978).
Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) had previously interviewed participants in Turkey,
ages 10 to 28, up to four times over the course of 12 years. They orally interviewed the
participants using an adapted version of Kohlberg’s six hypothetical dilemmas, to make
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the situations more applicable to the Turkish population. They followed this with probing
questions to discover why a particular answer was given. They found that Kohlberg’s
model also appeared applicable to the Turkish participants. They discovered that village
participants tended to start in lower stages and then stop development at Kohlberg’s
Stage 3, while the city participants continued past Stage 3 in their moral development.
Vikan et al. (2005) examined care moral reasoning, as defined by Gilligan, among
Norwegian students and Brazilian students, and discovered no significant difference
among genders. Nonetheless, the Brazilian students tended to function in Gilligan’s
middle stage which valued “self-sacrificing care for others” (Vikan et al., 2005, p. 109).
The authors believed this reflected the collective nature of Brazilian culture, which values
what is best for the collective group/family/society. Meanwhile the Norwegian students
were found to use Gilligan’s highest stage more frequently, where what is right “is
questioned if it serves to protect others at one’s own expense” (Vikan et al., 2005, p.
109). Likewise the authors believed this paralleled the more individualistic Norwegian
culture that values what is best for the individual, personal freedom of choice and justice.
Thus, the authors hypothesized that there was a cultural influence in the use of the stages
in Gilligan’s model that needs to be taken into consideration when examining moral
reasoning. This could also be the case for not just Gilligan’s model but moral reasoning
as a whole. For example, if the cultures were given care as well as justice scores, would
the individualistic centered (Norwegian) population elicit a higher justice score as well?
Would they use justice reasoning more than the care reasoning? Would the collectivistic
(Brazilian) population function at Stage 3 in Kohlberg’s justice model? Would they use
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care reasoning more than justice reasoning? Unfortunately, Vikan et al. (2005) only
examined Gilligan’s model, but it is a good example of the need for further exploration of
moral reasoning.
In Japan, Shimizu (2001) also did not find a significant difference between
genders in the use of care oriented moral reasoning. The study’s participants viewed
caring as a communal responsibility instead of an individual orientation or decision.
Each of these studies helped reveal something about other cultures in the study of
moral reasoning. Snarey et al. (1985) helped show that Kohlberg’s model can be applied
cross-culturally. Arguably, Nisan and Kohlberg (1982) showed the need for Gilligan’s
model to be applied to both genders, instead of just women, as many village participants
appeared stuck at Kohlberg’s Stage 3 of development. It also suggests the possible
cultural differences (e.g., Turkish villagers vs. Turkish city dwellers) in the use of a
justice or care model of moral reasoning. Vikan et al. (2005) similarly highlighted the
possibility of the existence of cultural differences (e.g., collective vs. individualistic) in
the use of care. Shimizu (2001) revealed no significant difference in gender in another
country, but sparked the question as to whether there would be a cultural difference
between countries or ethnicities. Each of these studies revealed the need for greater
understanding in regards to culture and ethnicity.
Miller (1994) compared middle-class American child and adult populations (who
were mainly non-Hispanic European American in background) with lower and middle
class Hindu Indian child and adult populations. In a series of studies, Miller found a
distinct cultural difference in moral code development between cultures. Americans
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adhered mainly to an “individually oriented interpersonal moral code… stressing
personal freedom of choice, [and] individual responsibility” (p. 3). Americans often
viewed interpersonal dilemmas as an issue of personal choice instead of being bound by
duty. In contrast, Hindu Indians were found to utilize a “duty-based” interpersonal moral
code wherein interpersonal commitments are obligatory and based both on an
individual’s nature as well as his or her position in society.
Shweder (1996) similarly found that the American population tended to be
individualistic in their moral reasoning, while Brahmans in Orissa, India placed a greater
emphasis on duty, community, and purity in their moral reasoning. Shweder believed this
difference was a reflection of the three types in moral reasoning: morality of autonomy
(typically endorsed by Americans), as well as morality of community and morality of
divinity (both typically endorsed by the Brahmans in India). The morality of autonomy
focuses on “harm, rights, and justice”, and preference is given to increasing an
individual’s “choice, autonomy, and control” (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993, p. 614; see
also Shweder, 1990). The morality of community views the individual as part of a larger
collective and “requires duty, respect, obedience to authority, and actions consistent with
one’s… social role” (Haidt et al., 1993, p. 614; see also Shweder, 1990). This moral
viewpoint supports interdependence, and focuses on care and interpersonal connection
(Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001). The morality of divinity views the
individual as a spiritual being and focuses on maintaining/obtaining purity and sanctity,
while avoiding sin or other acts which are debasing or repulsive spiritually (Haidt et al.,
1993; see also Shweder, 1990). Thus, both Shweder (1996) and Miller (1994) pointed out
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that different cultures operate according to different views of morality. More specifically,
non-Hispanic European Americans tended to be more individualistic and used a morality
of autonomy. Conversely, Brahman or Hindu Indians were found to be more collective
and used a morality of community and divinity.
In summary, the aforementioned studies reveal several findings about specific
ethnic groups that were also examined in the present study. European Americans have
been found to be more individualistic and focused on autonomy and personal freedom
(Miller, 1994; Shweder, 1996). This in addition to the fact that much of Kohlberg’s
research was based upon participants belonging to this ethnic group (Colby et al., 1983)
suggests that European Americans are more justice focused in their moral reasoning.
Correspondingly, African Americans have been found to use justice more than care
(Knox et al., 2004). Knox and colleagues argue that this may be because of this ethnic
group’s long struggle with discrimination and prejudice, resulting in a strong desire for,
and focus on, justice and fair treatment. Wilson (1999) did not find a significant
difference in the moral orientations of African Americans and European Americans,
though the exact use of care and justice by each group was not specified. Conversely,
Asian culture tends to be more collectivistic in nature, focusing on doing what is best for
the community, family, and society (Miller, 1994; Shweder, 1996). In fact, Shimizu
(2001) found that Japanese individuals, regardless of gender, highly endorsed a care
moral orientation. Similarly, Hispanic cultures are often family oriented (SantiagoRivera, Arredondo, & Gallardo-Cooper, 2002; Sue & Sue 2003). Hispanic American
children were also found to function at a lower, unspecified stage in Kohlberg’s model
21
than European American children (Cortese, 1982). This is reminiscent of women being
found to function at a lower stage than men in Kohlberg’s model as well (Gilligan, 1977).
One could infer from these studies that Hispanic Americans as well as Asian Americans
are more care focused than justice focused in their moral reasoning. Conversely, it
appears that African and European Americans are more justice focused in their moral
reasoning.
Shortcomings of ethnicity studies. Although cultural differences in moral
reasoning styles have been verified in cross cultural studies (e.g., Miller, 1994; Shweder,
1996; Stander & Jensen, 1993; and Vikan et al., 2005), very few studies have compared
several ethnicities within a multicultural society in terms of moral reasoning. Even fewer
have compared the various cultures within the United States alone. Although Snarey et al.
(1985) made a cross-cultural comparison using results from previous studies, the
procedures in the studies were not the same. Furthermore, in the study by Knox et al.
(2004) one can only hypothesize about the possible differences (e.g., that African
American women are more justice focused that European American men) but cannot
make firm conclusions. One cannot make sound, comparable statements about the ethnic
differences if these comparisons are drawn from different studies with different
procedures.
Of the few studies that did compare ethnic groups, either only two groups were
compared or the sample sizes were severely unbalanced. Ji (1997) found that Asian
Americans (N = 95) tended to use lower stages in Kohlberg’s model than European
Americans did (N = 70). Wilson (1999) found no significant difference in moral
22
reasoning among European American (N =37) and African American (N = 35) nursing
students. Though it is a start, both studies only compared one minority group with the
European American population. Thus, there is a need to include several ethnicities in a
study in order to more accurately compare and understand the moral reasoning of ethnic
subgroups.
Researchers that have attempted to conduct studies in several ethnic groups have
had difficulty with unequal and small sample sizes. For example, in a study by Silberman
and Snarey (1993) the participants were comprised of about 108 African Americans, 40
European Americans, 27 Hispanic Americans, 6 Asian Americans, and 9 people of
"other" ethnicities. The authors found that Hispanic and Asian American children
reasoned at a higher level on Kohlberg’s model than African American or European
American children. However, it is very difficult to accurately generalize findings of a
study to individuals from various people groups, when there is such an uneven
representation in the sample population (e.g., trying to compare 33 people to 148 people).
Consequently, the findings of this study were not considered when developing the
hypotheses for the current study. Similarly, Wilson (1995) explored the relationship of
ethnicity and moral reasoning using a sample population of 83 European Americans, 29
African Americans, 2 Asian Americans, and 4 Hispanic Americans. In this study no
significant ethnic difference was found, but these results are also difficult to generalize
due to the largely uneven and severely small sample sizes (Wilson, 1995).
Though there are a small number of studies examining ethnicity and moral
reasoning, there are even fewer studies that examine the relationship of ethnicity and
23
moral orientation using the MMO. Wilson (1999) found no significant relationship
between moral orientation and ethnicity (specifically among European Americans and
African Americans) using the MMO in nursing students. Aside from this single study, no
other published article using the MMO has examined the relationship between ethnicity
and moral orientation. There is an obvious need for research examining the relationship
of moral reasoning and ethnicity, especially with the MMO.
Ethnic identity. Related to the field of ethnicity is the concept of ethnic identity,
which “is a self-constructed understanding of oneself in terms of one’s cultural and ethnic
background and the attitudes and feelings associated with that background” and group
membership (Phinney, 2005, p. 189). Though this is a concise definition, the concept of
ethnic identity has historically been difficult to define and describe.
In 1990, Phinney published an article reflecting and summarizing her previous
reviews of the literature on ethnic identity because she felt it was an important topic
considering the social movements of the last few decades. She believed most research
revolved around ethnic group attitudes towards other groups or in regards to
discrimination, prejudice, etc., while few authors examined the attitudes and views of
people towards their own ethnic group, especially with minority groups. Several
publications (e.g., Du Bois, 1983; Kingston, 1976; Malcolm X, 1965; Rodriguez, 1982)
had also previously acknowledged the struggle of ethnic group members to understand
their own ethnicity (Phinney, 1990).
In her literature review, Phinney discovered that very little empirical research had
examined ethnic identity. Those studies that have examined ethnic identity (e.g., Aboud,
24
1987; Banks, 1976; Brand, Ruiz, & Padilla, 1974) generally had young children for
participants and focused on “minority children’s racial misidentification or preference for
White stimulus figures” (Phinney, 1990, p. 499). The literature that did examine
adolescents and adults generally used only one ethnic group, were inconsistent in the
exact definition of ethnic identity, and/or utilized measures that were low in reliability
and not widely used (e.g., Adams, Bennion, & Huh, 1987; Marcia, 1966; Parham &
Helms, 1981; Singh, 1977; Teske & Nelson, 1973; Tzuriel & Klein, 1977; White &
Burke, 1987) . This made it difficult to accurately compare and generalize findings about
ethnic identity. Phinney concluded from the literature review that ethnic identity needed
to be further investigated and a clearer definition of this concept needed to be established.
While reviewing the literature, Phinney had simultaneously been working on
providing this clearer definition in her own proposed model of ethnic identity (1989). Her
ethnic identity development model was based upon the identity development model
presented by Marcia (1966), the social identity theory of Tajfel and Turner (1986), and
commonalities she found during her review of empirical literature (Syed & Azmitia,
2008).
Phinney (1989) defined ethnic identity development using three categories:
unexamined, exploration and achievement. Individuals all begin with an unexamined
ethnic identity. An unexamined individual may experience diffusion (a lack of interest in
his or her ethnicity) or foreclosure (having an ethnic identity based on views of relatives
and friends). For example, someone experiencing diffusion may not be exploring his or
her ethnic identity and may have no desire to do so. On the other hand, an individual in
25
foreclosure may come from an Irish background but not practice or associate with it other
than by name. Some individuals may then explore their ethnic identity, while others
never will.
When an individual moves into exploration, he or she may seek information on
beliefs and values pertaining to his or her ethnic background and/or compare his or her
ethnicity with others. However, at this point the individual does not commit to anything.
For example, the individual may ask his or her Jewish father what holidays his family
celebrated growing up, but he or she has no intention of personally celebrating those
holidays. Of those that explore their ethnic identity, they may either return to an
unexamined state or obtain an achieved ethnic identity.
The last category in development is ethnic identity achievement wherein the
individual internalizes the beliefs and values, feels a stronger sense of belonging to the
group and shows a more confident sense of ethnic identity. For example, a Hispanic
American in this stage may enthusiastically celebrate Cinco de Mayo and Día del Murete,
and feel a strong connection to her family and culture.
Ethnic identity itself has since been associated with several factors. An achieved
or greater sense of ethnic identity has been associated with positive psychosocial
adjustment in Hispanic American immigrants (Schwartz, Jarvis, & Zamboanga, 2007),
self-efficacy and pro-social behaviors in African American and European American
middle school students (Smith, Walker, Fields, Brookins, & Seay, 1999), and positive
self-image in Hispanic American adolescents (Umaña-Taylor & Updegraff, 2007). An
achieved or greater sense of ethnic identity has also been associated with an increase in
26
self-esteem in Asian American, African American, European American and Hispanic
American adolescents and young adults (Phinney, 1992), and a decrease in adolescent
drug use in American Indian middle school students (Kulis, Napoli, & Marsiglia, 2002).
In addition, it was associated with psychological well being, or more specifically,
positive mood, less anxiety and fewer depressive symptoms in Chinese American and
Mexican American adolescents (Kiang, Yip, Gonzales-Backen, Witkow, & Fuligni,
2006), Filipino adolescents and adults (Mossakowski, 2003), as well as African
American, Hispanic American and European American adolescents (Phinney, Cantu, &
Kurtz, 1997; Roberts et al., 1999; Umaña-Taylor & Updegraff, 2007). A strong sense of
ethnic identity has also been shown to safeguard against stress, and help an individual
better manage encountered discrimination and prejudice (Dubow, Pargament, Boxer &
Tarakeshwar, 2000; Phinney & Alipuria, 1990). Last of all, among minority individuals a
strong sense of ethnic identity can increase the likelihood of upholding society norms and
values (Smith et al., 1999). Conversely, unexplored ethnic identity has been associated
with low self-esteem for Asian Americans, African Americans, and Hispanic Americans
(Phinney et al., 1997).
Ethnic identity has also been associated with aspects of immigration status.
Specifically, it has been found that immigrant adolescents born outside the United States
sanctioned traditional family obligations more strongly than adolescents born in the
United States from immigrant parents (Phinney, Ong, & Madden, 2000). Similarly,
Latino individuals born in the United States have reported significantly less ethnic
27
identity exploration than Latino immigrant individuals born outside the United States
(Syed, Azmitia, & Phinney, 2007).
Hence, studies have shown that ethnic identity is associated with an individual’s
adherence to and sanctioning of values and beliefs found important in his or her ethnic
background (e.g., community and caring versus autonomy and justice) as well as his or
her adherence to certain moral societal standards. It could then be presumed that one’s
ethnic identity may have an association with an individual’s main mode of moral
reasoning. For example, if Asian Americans as a group are more collective in nature, and
are found to be more care focused in their moral orientation, would an Asian American
with low ethnic identity be less care focused and be more accepting of a different moral
orientation than is typical of his or her culture (e.g., justice)? This was one of the
questions examined in the current study.
Purpose of Current Study and Hypotheses
When studying moral reasoning, like any other component of human
development, it is important to investigate all subgroups, or as many as possible. After
Kohlberg helped create a developmental model of moral reasoning, Gilligan attempted to
create a model that better understood the moral reasoning and development of women.
Since then, studies have sought to accurately comprehend the possible association of
gender and moral reasoning (e.g., Crandall et al., 1999; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988;
Wark & Krebs, 2000). However, most studies rate participants as functioning solely in
one mode of moral reasoning. Walker and Snarey (2004) would argue that justice and
care should be seen on a continuum, in which people use both modes.
28
The current research on moral reasoning also seems to have neglected ethnicity,
and is largely based on population samples of European American college students.
Of the research that has examined ethnicity, studies typically look at one or two specific
populations (e.g., Ji, 1997; Knox et al., 2004) or have a largely uneven distribution in
their sample population (e.g., Silberman & Snarey, 1993). In addition, many studies lack
a validated and reliable method of interviewing participants (e.g., Gilligan & Attanucci,
1988). With the current study I attempted to amend these shortcomings by examining the
relationships between ethnicity, ethnic identity, and moral reasoning.
I proposed three main hypotheses for the current research: 1) I hypothesized that
European and African Americans would show a higher justice orientation to moral
reasoning than the other ethnic groups; 2) Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans
would have a higher care orientation to moral reasoning than the other ethnic groups; and
3) there would be a significant two-way interaction effect between ethnic identity and
ethnicity. Specifically, Asian Americans and Hispanic Americans were expected to show
a higher justice orientation if they had low commitment to their ethnic identity. Low
commitment to ethnic identity can result in a rejection or disassociation with beliefs and
values of one’s background, so perhaps this includes a rejection of the preferred moral
reasoning orientation of one’s ethnic group. Due to the inconclusive evidence in previous
research, there was not a directional hypothesis in regards to sex. Nonetheless, the main
effects of sex were also tested, given its theoretical importance, to further address these
inconclusive results.
29
Chapter 2
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
Participants
The participants were 324 students from psychology classes at California State
University, Sacramento. Seven of these participants were dropped due to submitting
incomplete questionnaires, and 36 more were dropped due to having ethnicities that were
not part of the current study’s hypotheses (3 Middle Eastern/Arab Americans, 2 Native
American/American Indians and 31 multiethnic participants). This left 279 participants
(53 males and 226 females). The participants ranged in age from 17 to 66 years (M =
21.89, SD= 6.18). In terms of identified ethnicity there were 67 Asian Americans, 25
African Americans, 137 European Americans, and 50 Hispanic Americans. (To see the
composition of participants by ethnicity and sex, please see Table 1. To see the
composition of participants by ethnic identity commitment and ethnicity, please see Table
2).
Table 1
Number of Participants by Ethnicity and Sex
American ethnicity
Sex
Asian
African
European
Hispanic
Males
15
5
25
8
Females
52
20
112
42
30
Table 2
Number of Participants by Ethnic Identity Commitment and Ethnicity
Ethnic identity commitment splits
Two way
American
ethnicity
Asiana
Africanb
Europeanc
Hispanicd
Three way
Low
High
Low
Middle
High
27
40
18
20
29
(40.30)
(59.70)
(26.97)
(29.85)
(43.28)
9
16
4
10
11
(36.00)
(64.00)
(16.00)
(40.00)
(44.00)
76
61
65
45
27
(55.47)
(44.53)
(47.45)
(32.85)
(19.71)
13
37
9
14
27
(26.00)
(74.00)
(18.00)
(28.00)
(54.00)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of the sample’s total N.
a
The term ‘Asian American’ included people with ethnic backgrounds originating from the Asian continent
as well as the Pacific islands. b The phrase ‘African American’ included individuals who label their
ethnicity as Black or African American. c The label ‘European American’ included people with an ethnic
background originating in Europe, and/or individuals who labeled themselves as White or Caucasian. d The
term ‘Hispanic American’ included individuals of Hispanic or Latino origin as well as ethnicities from
South America.
31
Measures
Demographic questionnaire. The demographic questionnaire, constructed by the
present researcher, included questions about sex, age, ethnicity, number of familial
generations that have lived in the United States, and languages spoken in the home and
by the participant (see Appendix A).
The Measure of Moral Orientation-2 (MMO-2). As previously discussed, the
MMO-2 is a brief self-report measuring an individual’s use of both Kohlberg’s justice
and Gilligan’s care models of moral reasoning. It was used to determine participant’s use
of each moral orientation (see Appendix B). It contains seven moral dilemmas, each of
which is followed by six to nine statements. The participant rates each statement on a 4point Likert scale (1 being strongly disagree and 4 being strongly agree). For example,
one dilemma states your roommate plagiarized your article that is about to be published
for his own term paper and one of the subsequent statements is, “I would not do anything
to harm my friendship with my roommate”. The dilemmas and statements are then
followed by a brief demographic questionnaire. The participant’s scores from the MMO2 were calculated, with higher scores reflecting a stronger orientation, for both care
(ranging from 42 to 102, M =77.44, SD= 9.90) and justice (ranging from 66 to 102, M
=84.68, SD= 6.25).
The original MMO has shown good coefficient alpha internal consistency
reliability for both scales: care (α = .83) and justice (α =.70) (Liddell & Davis, 1996; see
also Liddell, 1998; Liddell et al., 1992), as well as good test-retest reliability for both care
(r = .85) and justice (r =.79). The authors also found low correlations between care and
32
justice (r = .17), providing evidence for the measure’s discriminant validity (Liddell, et
al., 1992). In terms of construct validity, the care scores of the MMO were shown to have
both a moderately strong and statistically significant relationship with the care scores of
the World View Questionnaire (p < .005) (Liddell & Davis, 1996) as well as a significant
relationship with the connected scores from interviews coded with Lyons’ coding manual
(r = .36) (Liddell, 1998). A significant relationship was also found between MMO justice
scores and Lyons’ separate scores (r = .63) (Liddell, 1998). The current study yielded
Cronbach alphas of .87 for the overall MMO-2, as well as .87 and .75 for the subscales
care and justice respectively. (For the means and standard deviations of MMO-2 scores
by sex or ethnicity, please see Table 3 or 4 respectively).
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Justice and
Care Moral Orientation Scores by Sex
Moral
Males
Females
84.45
84.73
(6.13)
(6.29)
74.23 a **
78.20 a **
(11.05)
(9.47)
orientation
Justice
Care
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
a
Female participants differed significantly from male participants in their care scores.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
33
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Justice and Care Moral Orientation Scores by
Ethnicity
American ethnicity
Moral
Asian
African
European
Hispanic
85.69 a*
82.24 a*
84.22
85.80 a*
(6.06)
(5.37)
(6.49)
(5.91)
78.76
74.52 b*
76.56
79.56 b*
(8.93)
(8.99)
(9.72)
(11.53)
orientation
Justice
Care
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
a
African Americans’ differed significantly from Asian and Hispanic Americans in justice scores. b African
Americans’ differed significantly from Hispanic Americans in care scores.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure-Revised (MEIM-R). The MEIM-R is a
revised version of the widely used Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM; see
Appendix C), which assesses the individual’s ethnic identity status. This original measure
contained 14-items and has shown a reliability of .90 for college students (Phinney, 1992)
as well as moderate construct and criterion-related validity (Ponterotto, Gretchen, Utsey,
Stracuzzi, & Saya, 2003). It was later revised, deleting behavioral items, rewording items
to include both past and present actions, creating an equal number of exploration and
34
commitment items, and deleting items with poor validity (in terms of their relating to
either exploration or commitment in ethnic identity) (Phinney & Ong, 2007). This
resulted in the creation of the six-item MEIM-R. Each item on the MEIM-R is a
statement about ethnic identity such as, “I feel a strong attachment towards my own
ethnic group”, to which the individual responds using a 5-point Likert scale (1 being
strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree). The individual’s commitment (ranging
from 1 to 5 in the current study, M =3.57, SD= 1.12) and exploration (ranging from 1 to
5 in the current study, M =3.19, SD= 1.13) scores are calculated separately by finding the
mean of the answers given for the questions in each category. His or her ethnic identity
status is calculated using cluster analysis. The overall reliability of the MEIM-R is .81
(Phinney & Ong, 2007). The current study yielded Cronbach alphas of .90 for the overall
MEIM-R, as well as .90 and .89 for the subscales commitment and exploration
respectively. This measure was chosen for this study due to its ability to be administered
in a timely manner, and because it is a well-known and respected measure of ethnic
identity.
The participants’ commitment score for ethnic identity from the MEIM-R was
calculated by taking the mean of the participant’s scores from the corresponding
commitment statements. Participants were categorized as having high or low ethnic
identity commitment based on whether they fell above or below the group median (M =
3.67).
The overall ethnic identity score was not calculated for the current study due to
the difficulty of conducting a cluster analysis on such a large sample population. Instead
35
the commitment subscale was used in this study, while the exploration subscale was not.
According to Phinney’s (1989) model of ethnic identity, an individual may be exploring
his or her ethnic identity without committing to or associating with a specific group (the
middle category: exploration), before finally internalizing, accepting and committing to
the beliefs and values of his or her ethnic background (the highest category: ethnic
identity achievement). Thus, if an individual has a high exploration score, this does not
necessarily reflect an achieved ethnic identity. The individual could be continuing to
explore his or her ethnic identity while he or she is highly committed to this identity and
feels a strong association with it (ethnic identity achievement). Or he or she may be
investigating it currently (exploration) or has in the past but is no longer interested in his
or her ethnic identity (unexamined).
Conversely, if an individual has a high commitment score, according to the
conceptual definition, this should coincide with having an achieved ethnic identity (the
highest category). Hence, one could argue that a high exploration score could be a
reflection of any ethnic identity category while a high commitment score is most likely a
reflection of an achieved ethnic identity. This is why I chose to use ethnic identity
commitment scores. (Table 5 shows means and standard deviations of MEIM-R scores by
ethnicity, Table 6 shows means and standard deviations of MMO-2 scores by ethnic
identity commitment.)
36
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Ethnic Identity Commitment by Ethnicity
American ethnicity
Ethnic identity
commitment
Asian
African
European
Hispanic
3.85
4.01
3.18 a **
4.03 a **
(1.01)
(.84)
(1.15)
(.95)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
a
European Americans differed significantly from Hispanic Americans in ethnic identity commitment
scores.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Justice and Care Moral
Orientation Scores by Ethnic Identity
Ethnic identity commitment
Moral orientation
Justice
Care
Low
High
84.08
85.16
(6.70)
(5.84)
77.58
77.33
(8.70)
(10.80)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
37
Procedure
The present study followed a similar methodology to previous studies (e.g., Knox
et al., 2004; Liddell & Davis, 1996). Participants were recruited from CSU- Sacramento
psychology classes, and came to a testing session in an appointed room on campus for 30
minutes of research credit. During the session participants were first asked to read and
sign an informed consent form (see Appendix D). The signed consent forms were then
collected and placed together in a separate packet to keep the experimental material
anonymous. The participants were then given a questionnaire packet and asked to read it
carefully and fill it out completely, but to not put their name or any additional identifying
marks on it. The packet contained a demographic page, the Measure of Moral
Orientation-2 (MMO-2) and the Multigroup Ethic Identity Measure-Revised (MEIM-R).
All packets began with the demographic page; half of the packets presented the MMO-2
followed by the MEIM-R and the other half presented the MEIM-R and then the MMO2. Participants were told to take as much time as they needed to fill out the packet. Once
completed, participants turned in their packets to the researcher who put the experimental
material into an envelope separate from the consent forms. Participants were then given a
debriefing form (see Appendix E), which was read by the researcher, informing the
participants of the specific aims of the study and encouraging participants to contact the
researcher if they had questions. Participants were then thanked for their time and
dismissed. All of the above procedures were conducted in accordance with Human
Subjects Committee guidelines.
38
Chapter 3
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
A couple of scoring issues arose after conducting the original procedure. First,
originally the ethnic identity commitment was divided into three groups (high, middle,
and low) with nearly equal sample sizes (similar to a median split but three-way).
However, this created uneven, as well as some extremely small, individual cell sizes, so
participants were regrouped as having high or low ethnic identity based on whether they
fell above or below the group median (M = 3.67). The two level ethnic identity (high,
low) variable was then used for all of the multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs).
Second, due to the participants’ incomplete and sometimes inconsistent answers
on the researcher’s demographic questionnaire, the participant’s identified ethnicity was
first determined by the answer to the question, “What ethnicity or race do you identify
with?” in the demographic section at the end of the MMO-2. If only one ethnicity was
written, that was determined to be that participant’s ethnicity. However, if multiple
ethnicities were written, they were then compared to the answers provided in question
three of the researcher’s demographic questionnaire. If only one ethnicity was marked in
question three’s check boxes, then the participant’s ethnicity was determined to be that of
the marked box. If several ethnicities were both written in response to the MMO-2
question and marked on the researcher’s demographic questionnaire, then the
participant’s ethnicity was categorized as “Multiethnic/Multiracial”. The rationale behind
this method was that the phrasing of the researcher’s demographic questionnaire may
39
have led people to mark ethnicities they do not identify with, though part of their
background/heritage. Similarly, someone may identify with someone else’s culture or
ethnicity, despite the fact that the individual does not possess that ethnic background.
This could explain why some participants would simultaneously list several ethnicities
for the MMO-2 question but only mark one ethnicity on the researcher’s demographic
question.
In addition to the scoring, the design of the study also had to be changed slightly
from the original intent. First, the sample sizes of the two sexes were grossly uneven in
this study. The second reason for this change was because of the 2 (ethnic identity: high,
low) x 4 (ethnicity: European American, African American, Asian American, and
Hispanic American) MANOVA. When this analysis was run, cell sizes ranged from 9 to
76, making accurate comparisons difficult.
Consequently, the remaining study analyses were changed into three different
one-way, between subjects MANOVAs with Ethnicity (European American, African
American, Asian American, and Hispanic American), Ethnic Identity (high and low
commitment) and sex (male and female) as the independent variables. For all three
analyses, the dependent variables were justice and care moral reasoning. These analyses
were chosen in order to look at the possible relationship of ethnicity, ethnic identity
levels, and sex with moral orientation usage. The new design, however, prevents this
study from examining further any other interaction effects between the independent
variables (i.e., sex, ethnicity and ethnic identity or sex and ethnicity), due to the small and
unbalanced cell sizes created by such analyses. Consequently, it limits the assessments to
40
only the main effect of each independent variable. The ethnic groups were chosen
because they are some of the larger ethnic groups in Sacramento as well as in my
participant population.
Table 7
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Ethnicity
Source
Justice
Within-group error
Care
Within-group error
df
F
η
p
3
2.68*
.03
.05
275
(38.39)
3
2.28
.02
.08
275
(96.60)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are mean square errors.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
The first one-way MANOVA examined the main effect of ethnicity (European
American, African American, Asian American, Hispanic American). A significant effect
was found for justice moral orientation, F(3, 275) = 2.68, p = .05, partial ή2= .03, while
care orientation only approached significance, F(3, 275) = 2.28, p = .08, partial ή2= .02
(see Table 7). A planned pairwise comparison revealed that, contrary to Hypothesis 1,
African Americans had significantly lower justice scores than both Asian Americans,
(p=.02) and Hispanic Americans (p =.02). African Americans also had significantly
lower care scores than Hispanic Americans (p =.04), showing partial support for
Hypothesis 2.
41
A second one-way MANOVA examined the main effect of ethnic identity
commitment (high, low) on moral reasoning. There were no significant effects of ethnic
identity on either justice, F(1, 277) = 2.08, p = .15, partial ή2= .01, or care, F(1, 277) =
.05, p = .83, partial ή2= .00 (see Table 8).
Table 8
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Ethnic Identity
Source
Justice
df
F
η
p
1
2.08
.01
.15
277
(38.94)
1
.05
.00
.83
277
(98.27)
Within-group error
Care
Within-group error
Note. Numbers in parentheses are mean square errors.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
The third one-way MANOVA examined sex differences in moral orientation. A
significant difference was found, with female participants reporting significantly higher
care score than male participants, F(1, 277) = 7.07, p = .01, partial ή2= .03 (see Table 9).
No significant difference in sex was found for justice, F(1, 277) = .08, p = .77, partial ή2=
.00.
42
Table 9
Multivariate Analysis of Variance for Sex
Source
Justice
Within-group error
Care
Within-group error
df
F
η
p
1
.08
.00
.77
277
(39.22)
1
7.07**
.03
.01
277
(95.84)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are mean square errors.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
Only one interaction was examined due to the unbalanced samples, which resulted
small cell sizes. The interaction was a 2 (ethnic identity: high, low) x 4 (ethnicity:
European American, African American, Asian American, Hispanic American)
MANOVA. No significant interaction effect was found for justice, F(3, 271) = 1.32, p =
.27, partial ή2= .01, or care, F(3, 271) = .25, p = .86, partial ή2= .00 (please see Table 10
for corresponding statistics).
As previously stated, it was originally planned to divide ethnic identity into three
levels (high, middle, low). When this was done, in addition to the small cell sizes, it was
found that a larger percentage of the European American sample was in the low category
than the other ethnic groups (see Table 2). Also, a larger percentage of the total Hispanic
American sample was in the high ethnic identity category. In order to officially analyze
these findings, a chi-square analysis was conducted, revealing that ethnicity was
43
significantly related to ethnic identity (high, middle, low) and its distribution (X2(3) =
14.79, p < .005). The effect size was .002.
Table 10
Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Justice and Care Moral Reasoning for Ethnicity and
Ethnic Identity
Moral reasoning
Source
df
F
η
p
Justice
Ethnicity (E)
3
1.79
.02
.15
Ethnic identity (EI)
1
.37
.00
.16
E X EI
3
1.32
.01
.27
271
(38.20)
Within-group error
Care
Ethnicity (E)
3
1.75
.02
.16
Ethnic identity (EI)
1
.50
.00
.48
E X EI
3
.25
.00
.86
271
(96.63)
Within-group error
Note. Numbers in parentheses are mean square errors.
*p < .05. **p <.01.
44
Chapter 4
DISCUSSION
Findings and Application
The aim of the proposed study was to examine ethnic differences (both in terms of
ethnic background and ethnic identity) in participants’ adherence to Kohlberg’s and
Gilligan’s models of moral reasoning. Results were observed in terms of participants’
responses to a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas and questions regarding ethnicity.
Based on previous research, I hypothesized that European and African Americans
would have higher justice scores than the other ethnic groups while Asian and Hispanic
Americans would have higher care scores based on previous research (e.g., Colby et al.,
1983; Cortese, 1982; Knox et al., 2004; Miller, 1994; Santiago-Rivera et al., 2002;
Shimizu, 2001; Shweder, 1996; Sue & Sue 2003; Wilson, 1999). In support of findings
by Silberman and Snarey (1993) but contrary to my hypothesis, as well as other previous
research (Knox et al., 2004), African Americans were found to have significantly lower
justice scores than both Asian and Hispanic Americans.
In regards to the opposing research, this may be a geographical issue. Knox et al.
(2004) used a sample from a “historically Black university” which perhaps, either due to
the college or geographic location, may have inspired a greater awareness of this ethnic
group’s long struggle with discrimination, consequently increasing their focus on justice
in their moral orientation. If this school was located in the South, it is likely the African
American students would have a different mindset/viewpoint than similar students from
California.
45
In addition, California specifically has had a long history involving immigrants of
Asian and Hispanic origin. From my personal experience, it seems that many of these
immigrants have come to America to escape harsh governments and war or simply to
look for a better life, though many may live in fear of deportation. Perhaps their
background or current circumstances have helped increase these Asian American and
Hispanic American students’ focus on justice in their moral reasoning. It would be
interesting to compare ethnic groups from different parts of the United States to see if
there are geographical influences on moral orientation.
In partial support of my hypothesis is the finding that Hispanic Americans had
significantly higher care scores than African Americans. This makes sense in light of the
current research stating that Hispanic Americans tend to have a common, strong cultural
emphasis on family (Cortese, 1982; Santiago-Rivera et al., 2002; Sue & Sue 2003). That
is, if an individual values family and what is in the best interest for that unit, as opposed
to focusing on individual rights, then it seems a natural assumption that he or she would
score higher in care than justice moral reasoning.
That being said, it is interesting that African Americans scored significantly lower
than other ethnic groups in both justice and care moral orientations. This means they
endorsed both models significantly less than other groups which is congruent with
Silberman and Snarey’s (1993) findings. Perhaps there is a third model of moral
orientation which African Americans prefer to use. Or maybe the definitions of care and
justice need to be reexamined to better include different ethnic viewpoints of morality
(Brabeck, 1989; Scarr, 1987; Stack, 1986; Woods, 1996).
46
The lack of significant findings regarding European Americans with justice scores
and Asian Americans with care scores also goes against my hypotheses. It is also
inconsistent with previous research stating European Americans are more focused on
autonomy, justice and rights in their moral reasoning and Asian cultures tend to be
collective in nature (i.e., Miller, 1994; Shimizu, 2001; Shweder, 1996). Some of these
previous findings for Asian cultures took place in other countries (Miller, 1994; Shimizu,
2001; Shweder, 1996; Stander & Jensen, 1993), which may help explain this discrepancy
as being due to environment, location, or even acculturation. For example, maybe
Japanese and/or Hindu Indian individuals living in Asia are more care focused while
Asian Americans living in the United States are less care focused in their moral
reasoning. Another possibility is the framing of moral orientation. For example, an Asian
American may be more collective in nature, but this may not necessarily transfer into
having a significantly higher care score on the MMO-2 than a European American. One
could also argue that since the majority of the current study’s sample population
consisted of female participants this distorted the possible ethnic differences, giving most
of the samples similar care scores.
The hypothesis of a significant two-way interaction effect between ethnic identity
(high, low) and ethnicity was also unsupported. Despite the current study sampling from
a diverse student population, it has the same limitation as the existing studies: unequal
and small sample sizes. Previous studies have shown that achieved ethnic identity is
associated with an individual’s adherence to and sanctioning of values and beliefs found
important in his or her ethnic background (Phinney et al., 2000; Syed et al., 2007). Then
47
again, perhaps moral reasoning does not represent one of these values or beliefs. This
could explain the lack of significant findings.
A chi square analysis revealed an intriguing and significant distribution of
ethnicity among the original three levels of ethnic identity commitment (high, middle,
low). Specifically, a larger than expected percentage of European Americans had low
ethnic identity commitment. In fact, there appeared to be a large gap in the percentage of
European Americans with high ethnic identity commitment and the other three groups,
with Hispanic Americans having the highest percentage of all ethnic groups in this
category.
This finding may be due to the fact that many European Americans have been in
the United States for several generations, and have blended subcultures through marriage
many times (e.g., German, Polish, Italian, French). This has often resulted in European
Americans ‘choosing’ an ethnic background with which they would identify. In fact,
studies have found that currently European Americans’ subcultural identity is typically
more superficial instead of a representation of a strong attachment or sense of identity
(Qian, 2004; Waters, 1990). As a personal example, my family is German, but they
discarded this cultural association during World War II and now we have little
attachment to our German heritage aside from our last name.
Last of all, though a specific hypothesis about sex was not given, it was found that
female participants had significantly higher care scores than male participants. This is
consistent with some of the previous findings, specifically those that found women to use
care reasoning more often than men (Crandall et al., 1999; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Jaffee
48
& Hyde, 2000; Stander & Jensen, 1993; Wilson, 1995). However, it was inconsistent
with studies that found no significant difference between genders in moral orientation
(e.g., Knox et al., 2004; Shimizu, 2001; Silberman & Snarey, 1993; Vikan et al., 2005;
Walker, 1989).
Although gender differences have been found in some of the literature, no gender
differences have been found in studies that also examined ethnicity (e.g., Knox et al.,
2004; Snarey et al., 1985; Vikan et al., 2005). In contrast to previous literature, female
participants in the present study, regardless of ethnicity, tended to use care more often
than male participants. . It is interesting that some studies found that women use care
more often than men, but that no studies examining ethnicity found these gender
differences. Future studies should reexamine the relationship between ethnicity, sex, and
moral reasoning orientation.
In addition, male participants did not differ significantly in their justice scores
from female participants in the current study, which is both supported (e.g., Daniels et al.,
1995; Jones & Watt, 1999) and rejected (e.g., Ford & Lowery, 1986; Wark & Krebs,
2000) by previous research. This finding about sex and justice scores is especially
interesting considering Gilligan arguably established her model of moral reasoning
because women were seen as lower functioning than men in Kohlberg’s model (e.g.,
Gilligan, 1977; Holstein, 1976). Perhaps this is because men and women use a justice
orientation with equal frequency, but they differ in which justice stage they actually
function (i.e., women in Stage 3 and men in Stage 4).
49
Other possible reasons for the inconsistent findings for both sexes could be due to
external influences such as dilemma type (Crandall et al., 1999; Walker, 1989; Wark &
Krebs, 2000), interview scoring (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Walker, 1989), unbalanced
sample sizes (e.g., Silberman & Snarey, 1993; Wilson, 1995), or two or less ethnic
groups in the participant sample (e.g., Ji, 1997; Wilson, 1999). All of these factors have
been suggested to affect moral orientation preference and/or be a barrier to accurate
comparisons.
Another possible rationale for the mixed research findings on sex (e.g., Jaffee &
Hyde, 2000; Vikan et al., 2005; Wark & Krebs, 2000) is that there is only a sex
difference in care but not justice moral orientation. Consequently, if researchers looked at
overall moral reasoning, or only one mode of moral reasoning, then it could affect the
study’s findings.
Limitations and Strengths
There are several strengths and limitations of this study. One strength is that the
current study sampled from an ethnically diverse university giving larger ethnic sample
sizes that, though still uneven, was a step in the right direction for future studies. Unlike
previous studies that compared only two ethnic groups or had extremely small sample
sizes, this study examined four ethnic groups, wherein the smallest group still included
25 participants.
Also, there are currently few known studies that accurately compare people of
several ethnicities in regards to moral reasoning. This makes the current study one of the
first to examine this association with several, decently sized ethnic samples.
50
This being said, a limitation of the current study is the existence of uneven sample sizes.
In the current study European Americans were by far the largest ethnic group and African
Americans were by far the smallest. Consequently, the distributions of ethnicity and
ethnic identity resulted in some very small cell sizes, which precluded the testing of
planned interaction effects.
Similarly, the number of female participants in the study was almost four times
that of the male participants in the study. In future studies these limitations could be
remedied by requesting more male and minority participants or having an all-male
university as one of the participant sources. With more evenly distributed sample sizes
for each ethnic and sex group, future studies will be able to examine the possible
interaction effects of all of the current study’s independent variables.
An additional strength of the current study is the use of two validated and reliable
measures. Many previous studies have used unreliable and/or invalid measures or means
of interviewing with questionable levels of inter-coder reliability. In addition, the current
study used the MMO and was thus able to easily and quickly score both modes of moral
orientation. These two strengths allowed the current study to more easily, reliably and
validly rate and compare participants’ adherence to both modes of moral reasoning.
Final Conclusions
The current study’s findings have a couple of implications. First, it is consistent
with some of the previous research that there is a difference in sex in moral orientation.
The significant difference in sex for only care in this study suggests that men and women
may differ only in their preferred use of care but not justice moral orientation. Perhaps
51
the definition of justice being a male model and care being a female model of moral
reasoning needs to be revaluated. Second, there appears to be a possible relationship
between ethnicity and moral orientation usage. The significantly lower moral reasoning
scores for African Americans on both care and justice similarly suggest that the
definitions of these constructs need to be reevaluated. This study gives a glimpse of the
possible ethnic differences in moral orientation preference, while confirming the need to
consider ethnicity when defining a construct supposedly applicable to individuals of all
backgrounds.
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APPENDIX A
Demographic Survey
1) Gender:
□ Male □ Female
2) Age: ________ -years-old
3) Please describe your ethnicity in the space below and then check all boxes that
apply:_______________________________________________
□Asian/Pacific Islander American
□Black/African American
□Caucasian/European American
□Hispanic/Latino American
□Middle-Eastern/Arab American
□Native American/American Indian
□Multiethnic/Multiracial
□Other: _______________________
4) How many generations has your family lived in the United States:
□ ½ generation (you moved to the United States after the age of 12 years-old)
□ 1st generation (you moved to the United States before the age of 12 years-old)
□ 2nd generation (your parents moved to the United States before you were born)
□ 3rd+ generation (your grandparents or previous generation moved to the United
States)
5) Language(s) spoken in your family’s home:
__________________________________________________________________
6) Language(s) you speak:
__________________________________________________________________