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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Thich Nhat Hanh: “Buddhism is already engaged. If it is not, it is not Buddhism.”
Walpola Rahula: “Buddhism is based on service to others”…political and social engagement is the
“heritage of the bhikkhu” and the essence of Buddhism.
Robert Thurman: “The primary Buddhist position on social action is one of total activism, an unswerving
commitment to complete self-transformation and complete world-transformation.”
Stated in simplest terms, engaged Buddhism means the application of Buddhist
teachings to contemporary social problems. Engaged Buddhism is a modern reformist
movement. A practitioner is socially engaged “in a nonviolent way, motivated by concern
for the welfare of others, and as an expression of one’s own practice of the Buddhist
Way” (King Being 5). In this description Sallie B. King invokes the spirit of the Bodhisattva vow: May I attain Buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings. According to
Ken Jones engaged Buddhism is “an explication of social, economic, and political processes and their ecological implications, derived from a Buddhist diagnosis of the existential human condition” (Kraft New). Jones emphasizes the social theory underlying engaged Buddhism. According to engaged Buddhists the “three poisons” of greed, anger
and ignorance apply both to the individual and to “large-scale social and economic forces” (Kraft New); their remediation is therefore the collective concern of society. As the
subject of numerous treatises, anthologies, lectures and symposiums, engaged Buddhism
plays a vital role in the twenty-first century dialogue concerning universal humanism and
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human rights. Ken Jones writes that the original 1989 edition of his book, The Social
Face of Buddhism, “was an argument for a socially engaged Buddhism that at that time
was little developed and not widely accepted…Since then engaged Buddhism has come
more fully of age” (The New xv).
Sallie B. King suggests that while engaged Buddhists share “key concepts, teachings, and practices drawn from tradition” (Being 12), engaged Buddhism itself “has no
central origin, creed, or institutional headquarters, but developed separately in each Buddhist country with sufficient political freedom, in response to the social, economic, and/or
political issues and crises facing that people” (12). Christopher S. Queen agrees the origins of social activism in engaged Buddhism are not well articulated: “some argue that
social service has appeared in the Buddhist record since the time of the Buddha and King
Asoka, before the common era, and increasingly since the rise of the bodhisattva ethic of
Mahayana Buddhism in the centuries that followed” (“Engaged Buddhism” 249). Other
scholars argue that Buddhist activism is a product of the late twentieth and early twentyfirst century and “reflects the globalization and hybridization of Asian, European, and
American values” (249). Still other scholars question whether Buddhist activism is Buddhist at all. Helen Tworkov, current Executive Director of the Buddhist magazine Tricycle: The Buddhist Review asks, “What makes engaged Buddhism Buddhist?” ( Kraft
New). Tworkov writes, “…what is called ‘Buddhist ethics’ offers nothing new to a predominantly Christian society…Social action, as distinct from radical political action, is
sanctioned—even, shall we say, favored--by the Protestant ethic that continues to dominate this [American] culture…. Is it possible to have anything but Protestant Buddhism?”
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(Kraft New). David Loy raises similar questions from a Buddhist perspective in the essay
“What’s Buddhist about Socially Engaged Buddhism?”
Kenneth Kraft writes in the essay Prospects of a Socially Engaged Buddhism that
Thich Nhat Hanh first uses the term engaged Buddhism in his 1963 book by that title
(18). Years later as quoted in Ken Jones’ The New Social Face of Buddhism, Thich Nhat
Hanh says, “‘Buddhism means to be awake—mindful of what is happening in one’s
body, feelings, mind and in the world. If you are awake you cannot do otherwise than act
compassionately to help relieve suffering you see around you. So Buddhism must be engaged in the world. If it is not engaged it is not Buddhism’” (179). While Nhat Hanh’s
use of the term appears to be the first, Christopher Queen notes additional early references to “socially engaged Buddhism” by Sulak Sivaraksa in 1988 and identifies the
prevalence of the term within such groups as the Buddhist Peace Fellowship founded in
1978, and the International Network of Engaged Buddhists founded in 1989 (Queen and
King Engaged 34). Further, as early as 1958 Dr. A.T. Ariyaratne, founder of the Sri
Lankan Sarvodaya Shramadana movement, drew out the “social implications of traditional teachings, such as the Four Noble Truths, the Five Precepts, selflessness (anatta)
and interdependence (paticcasamuppada)” (Queen Action 11)
Although commentators trace these early references, a perception of engaged
Buddhism with “no central origin” is at the heart of academic debate concerning its scriptural and philosophical authenticity. Thomas Freeman Yarnall addresses this debate and
explores overviews of two engaged Buddhist schools of thought he refers to as “Tradi-
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tionists” and “Modernists” (Yarnall 286-287). Traditionists identify apparent differences
between modern schools of engaged Buddhism and ancient Buddhism as superficial, and
choose to emphasize continuity with Buddhism’s traditional past (Yarnall 288). Modernists argue that traditional Buddhism is only “latently” socially engaged and that since the
modern world faces problems that did not exist in the Buddha’s time this latency remained untapped until Buddhism encountered the Western world. Modernists emphasize
newness and discontinuity with the traditional past.
Despite the debate surrounding the issues of continuity and discontinuity both
schools of thought cite a common handful of scriptures and commentaries to support their
methodology. Among the principal texts are The Dhammapada, The Edicts of Asoka, and
Nagarjuna’s Precious Garland. In addition both schools cite the core teachings of Buddhism as their philosophical and ethical foundation, including: The Four Noble Truths,
The Eightfold Noble Path, The Five Precepts, the Vow of the Bodhisattva, the doctrine of
Dependent Origination and Interdependence. In his overview of the “Traditionists”
Thomas Yarnall links scholars both from historically Buddhist cultures and from Western
cultures. These include Thich Nhat Hanh, Sulak Sivaraksa, Dr. Walpola Rahula, Ven.
Khemadhammo, Kato Shonin, the Dalai Lama, Patricia Hunt-Perry, Lyn Fine, Paula
Green, Joanna Macy, Stephen Batchelor, Bernard Glassman Roshi, and Robert Thurman
(Yarnall 289). “Modernists,” scholars chiefly from Western cultures, include Cynthia
Eller, Nelson Foster, Richard Gombrich, Ken Jones, Joseph Kitagawa, Kenneth Kraft,
Christopher Queen, Aitken Roshi, Sangharakshita, Gary Snyder, Judith Simmer-Brown,
and Max Weber (Yarnall 295).
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In this thesis I survey and critique the methodology of several of these exemplary
social leaders and scholars of Buddhist studies. I also survey original Buddhist texts, and
argue that there is strong scriptural and philosophical continuity between ancient traditional Buddhism and modern engaged Buddhism. I argue for the existence of core Buddhist social ethics as illustrated in such principal texts as The Dhammapada, The Edicts
of Asoka, and Nagarjuna’s Precious Garland. The heart of this Buddhist social code of
ethics motivates both the individual seeker of Nirvana and the seeker for social justice
and human liberation on synonymous paths. The corpus of evidence compels me to disagree with Christopher Queen’s assertion that the power for social transformation “latent”
in Asian Buddhism can only transform society when “mediated through Western sociopolitical theories” (Introduction From Altruism 22). He writes that “political activism…not social service…is the distinctive innovation” of engaged Buddhism in the twentieth century (23). Having examined the traditionist and modernist scholars’ positions, I
now agree with Thomas Yarnall and others that such statements create an artificial discontinuity with tradition.
I propose a synthesis of core Buddhist teachings that simultaneously envisions the
conduct of an ideal individual in an ideal society. Such a synthesis integrates ideas both
from traditional and modern Buddhist scholars, guided by the unique relevance of the
teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama--both twenty-first century spiritual
heroes whose spirit of engagement does not sacrifice tradition.
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Natalie Quli, Berkeley scholar and Ph.D candidate from the Graduate Theological
Union, writes a noteworthy and compelling argument that helps to further clarify the parameters of this thesis. Quli cautions the Buddhist Studies community against “Orientalism.” This is a cultural perspective that fosters a sense of protecting Asians from the contaminating forces of Western Buddhist Modernism and promotes a kind of “nostalgia” for
“pure” Buddhism. In Quli’s view this kind of study creates a false dichotomy between the
modern, progressive West and the traditional, passive East. Such a model for “two” Buddhisms--the authentic and the hybrid--amounts to racist ethnocentrism (Quli). “Indeed,
this tendency to reject the hybrid as inauthentic is an extension of the colonial search for
pure races and pure cultures, and as such is part and parcel of what anthropology identifies as “salvage studies” (Quli 23).
Quli argues the “salvage paradigm” is based on the nostalgia of colonialism,
which “tells the story of human history as that of humankind’s original authenticity and
subsequent decline, analogous to Eden and the fall from grace, from tradition to modernity” (Quli 23). This is the foundation of anthropological salvage studies of Otherness…
where the “good Buddhists” have not been affected by Westerners and the “bad Buddhists,” i.e. Buddhist modernists, are those whose Buddhisms reflect interaction with
Western sources (Quli 24). Quli’s central thesis is that such a separation of traditional
versus modernist prevents a fair evaluation of Western Buddhism, since traditional is
viewed as “pure” and modern is viewed as “corrupt.”
While I acknowledge the concerns in Quli’s argument, they are not the concerns
of this thesis. In this thesis I do not argue for the superiority of a pure, traditional form of
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Buddhism over some hybrid form of Western influenced Buddhism, only that the core
social ethics exists in the original teachings, and that an artificial chasm between traditional and modern obscures the true nature of engagement.
Chapter 2
Theravada and Mahayana Schools
This essay contains numerous references to the Theravada and Mahayana traditions in Buddhism, and it is therefore necessary to provide a brief description of their historical and spiritual origins. John T. Bullitt writes a concise overview for Access to Insight, a Theravada Buddhist website dedicated to making a large collection of texts from
the Tipitaka public, as well as materials published by the Buddhist Publication Society.
Theravada is known as the “Doctrine of the Elders” and draws scriptural inspiration from the Tipitaka or Pali Canon, “which scholars generally agree contains the earliest surviving record of the Buddha’s teachings” (Bullitt). The Buddha called his religion
the Dhamma-Vinaya, “the doctrine and discipline.” He established the Sangha, a social
structure to support the Dhamma or the practice of the religion. Sangha is the name for
the original order of monks and nuns, known as bhikkhus and bhikkhunis, and remains
today as a reference to the Buddhist monastic community as well as any community of
lay and monastic individuals practicing the Dhamma and who are supportive of Buddhist
ideals (Bullitt).
Bullitt describes the splintering off of several Buddhist sects following the death
of the Buddha, each sect committed to specific interpretations of the original teachings.
One of the schools became known as a reform movement, the Mahayana, (the “Greater
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Vehicle”), which referred disparagingly to the other schools as the Hinayana, (the “Lesser Vehicle”). Theravada is the longest surviving school of the non-Mahayana group, and
to avoid enduring negative connotations it is now more common to refer to Theravada as
“Southern” Buddhism because of its association with Southeast Asia, and to Mahayana as
“Northern” Buddhism because of its northward migration from India into China, Tibet,
Japan, and Korea (Bullitt).
Pali is the language of the Theravada, most likely spoken in central India during
the Buddha’s lifetime but not necessarily spoken by the Buddha himself. The Buddha’s
cousin, Ananda, was able to recite all of the Buddha’s sermons from memory. Following
the Buddha’s death Ananda and five hundred monks recited and verified the teachings,
known as suttas, each beginning with the phrase, “Thus have I heard…” (Bullitt). Over
the next few centuries the monastic community met in “Councils” to arrange and compile
the teachings, resulting in the “three baskets” known as Pitakas which comprise the Tipitaka. The “three baskets” are the Vinaya Pitaka or “basket of discipline,” the Sutta Pitaka
or “basket of discourses,” and the Abhidhamma Pitaka or “basket of special/higher doctrine.” The Pali Canon--classic Theravada literature--consists of the Tipitaka combined
with exhaustive commentaries by Sri Lankan monks dating from the third century BCE
but not translated into Pali until the fifth century CE (Bullitt).
Dr. Walpola Rahula writes that the terms Mahayana and Hinayana “appeared in
the Saddharma Pundarika Sutra or The Sutra of the Lotus of the Good Law” between the
first century BCE and the first century CE (Rahula Theravada). He suggests that the Mahayana school became clearly defined in the second century CE, when “Nagarjuna devel-
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oped the Mahayana philosophy of Sunyata and proved that everything is Void in a small
text call Madhyamika-karika” (Rahula). He cautions against confusing the terms Hinayana and Theravada as synonymous, since Theravada Buddhism gravitated to Sri Lanka,
and Hinayana sects developed in India apart from any form of Buddhism in Sri Lanka
(Rahula). He notes also that in 1950 “the World Fellowship of Buddhists inaugurated in
Colombo unanimously decided that the term Hinayana should be dropped when referring
to Buddhism existing today in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, etc.” (Rahula).
Rahula compares the Theravada and Mahayana schools as follows:
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Both accept Sakyamuni Buddha as the Teacher.
The Four Noble Truths are exactly the same in both schools.
The Eightfold Path is exactly the same in both schools.
The Paticca-samuppada or the Dependent Origination is the same in both
schools.
Both rejected the idea of a supreme being who created and governed this world.
Both accept Annica, Dukkha, Anatta and Sila, Samadhi, Panna without any difference (Rahula).
Damien Keown, in The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, further addresses the ethical development in the Mahayana tradition: “The Mahayana was critical of the failure of the Small
Vehicle to recognize the importance of ethics in soteriology…It redressed this deficiency
by emphasizing that ethical perfection involving concern for others (karunalupaya) was
of equal importance to insight (prajna)” (163). And, “The Mahayana formulated an expanded tripartite conception of ethics embracing: (a) temperance (samvara); (b) the cultivation of virtue (kusala-dharma-samgrahaka-sila); and (c) altruism (sattva-artha-kriyasila)” (163).
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Theravada and Mahayana also distinguish the state(s) of perfection and attainment
of the “awakened ones,” but only by degree. Theravada emphasizes the arahant, while
Mahayana emphasizes the bodhisattva. Thanisaro Bhikkhu defines the arahant as “a
‘worthy one’ or ‘pure one,’ a person whose mind is free of defilement and thus is not destined for further rebirth. A title for the Buddha and the highest level of his noble disciples’ (Refuge 86). He defines the bodhisatta as “a being (striving for) Awakening;’ the
term used to describe the Buddha from his first aspiration to become a Buddha until the
time of his full Awakening” (86). Reginald Ray reflects the more classical Mahayana
perspective: “Like the Buddha, [the bodhisattva] vows to attain full enlightenment for the
good of beings and progresses through a long series of births as a bodhisattva in fulfillment of that vow…this saint takes rebirth as a virtually enlightened being whose primary
purpose for remaining in samsara is to help others” (186).These definitions are drawn
from multiple scriptural sources, but according to the Pali Text Society’s Pali-English
Dictionary, the earliest references to arahant and bodhisatta appear in The Dhammapada, the Visuddhi-magga and the Digha Nikaya, or the “Collection of Long Discourses”
(Pali Text).
Although these distinctions in doctrinal emphasis are worthy of scholarly attention the differences do not materially affect a discussion of ethics in socially engaged
Buddhism. Scriptural references to states of perfection and compassionate altruism cited
by both schools only strengthen the case for continuity with tradition. The Vow of the
Bodhisattva is one of the most symbolically vivid yet practical appeals for social welfare
in all Buddhist literature: May I attain Buddhahood for the benefit of all sentient beings…
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However innumerable sentient beings are, I vow to liberate them all. However inexhaustible the defilements are, I vow to extinguish them. However immeasurable the dharmas
are, I vow to master them all. However incomparable enlightenment is, I vow to attain it.
Chapter 3
Scriptural Origins of Buddhist Fundamentals
Just as with the Theravada and Mahayana schools, this thesis contains numerous
references to Buddhist fundamentals. The following discussion addresses operational definitions for the core principles that appear throughout.
Triple-Gem
Thanissaro Bhikkhu elucidates the core principles of Buddhism and their original
sources in Refuge: An Introduction to the Buddha, Dhamma, & Sangha. He cites The
Dhammapada in the preface: “But when, having gone for refuge to the Buddha,
Dhamma, and Sangha, you see with right discernment the four Noble Truths” (Bhikkhu,
Thanissaro Refuge 1). Seeking refuge occurs on both the external and internal levels, a
concept that is central to the Buddhist path. Buddhism teaches that life contains the dangers of greed, anger, and delusion, and that the practice consists of a search for release
from these dangers. Seeking refuge on the external level means looking for “models and
guidelines” to help the individual find “which qualities lead to danger and which to release” (Refuge 2). Seeking refuge on the internal level means cultivating those mental
qualities that lead to release.
Buddhism refers to the Triple Gem--the three refuges of the Buddha, the
Dhamma, and the Sangha. These refuges are also conceived as both external and internal.
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Taking refuge in the Buddha means placing trust in the reality of the Buddha’s Awakening and believing that the qualities he embodied and the truths he awoke to will serve as a
guide for human conduct (2). The Dhamma is the Buddha’s path of practice—the threefold aspect of his teachings consisting of the words of the teachings, the practice of those
teachings, and the potential for Awakening by putting the teachings into practice. The
Sangha in the conventional sense is a community of monks and nuns, and in the broader
sense is any community of monks, nuns, and lay people who live and practice Buddhist
ideals. According to tradition if one develops wisdom, purity, and compassion, the Triple
Gem of the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha become the internal refuge. The ultimate refuge is the point at which one Awakens, beyond the realm of greed, anger and delusion (23).
The Four Noble Truths
Thanissaro Bhikkhu employs the common metaphor of the Buddha as a doctor
treating the spiritual disease of his patients, framed as the Four Noble Truths. The first
noble truth diagnoses the inherent condition of human existence--stress, suffering, or
dukkha. In the Samyutta Nikaya the Buddha says: “Now this monks, is the noble truth of
stress: Birth is stressful, aging is stressful, death is stressful…In short, the five aggregates
for sustenance are stressful” (32). The second noble truth defines the cause of this dukkha: “And this, monks, is the noble truth of the origination of stress: the craving that
makes for further becoming—accompanied by passion and delight, relishing now here
and now there—i.e., craving…” (33). The third noble truth teaches the end of craving:
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“And this monks, is the noble truth of the cessation of stress: the remainderless fading
and cessation, renunciation, relinquishment, release and letting go of that very craving”
(33). The fourth noble truth defines the path: “And this, monks, is the noble truth of the
way leading to the cessation of stress: precisely this Noble Eightfold Path—right view,
right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
right concentration” (33).
Thus the Buddha diagnoses the disease, prescribes the treatment, and describes
what one will experience when the disease is cured: “But as soon as this knowledge and
vision of mine—with its three rounds and twelve permutations concerning these four noble truths as they actually are—was truly pure, then did I claim to have directly awakened
to the unexcelled right self-awakening…The knowledge and vision arose in me: ‘Unshakable is my release. This is the last birth. There is now no further becoming’” (33).
The Four Noble Truths express the fundamental Buddhist worldview and define
an ethical code of conduct required for salvation. The personal “imperatives implicit” in
the four categories identified in the Four Noble Truths are as follows: the stress must be
comprehended; the craving must be abandoned; the cessation of stress must be realized;
and the truth of the Noble Eightfold Path must be developed (Wings 280-281). Thanissaro
Bhikkhu describes these imperatives as following “a basic problem-solving approach:
one solves the problem of stress by following a path of practice that directly attacks the
cause of the problem (281). The Noble Eightfold Path develops the necessary “qualities
of mind” required to perceive all objects of craving as “stressful, inconstant, and notself.” One develops dispassion, experiences release, and “the problem is solved” (281).
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Aggregates, Sila, Five Precepts
John Bullitt writes that the Eightfold Path should not be perceived as sequential
and linear, but “is best understood as a collection of personal qualities to be developed”
(Bullitt). The eight factors align within three classical Buddhist divisions known as “aggregates”: right view and right intention are qualities associated with discernment (panna); right speech, right action and right livelihood are associated with virtue (sila); right
effort, right mindfulness and right concentration are associated with concentration (samadhi). As these personal qualities mature and evolve, the practitioner becomes increasingly adept at seeing his or her experience in terms of annica (inconstancy), dukkha, and
anatta (not-self), discovers craving to be the root cause of dukkha, and attains a taste of
Nibanna.
The factors associated with virtue, or sila, are “condensed into a very practical
form in the five precepts, the basic code of ethical conduct to which every practicing
Buddhist subscribes: refraining from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying and using
intoxicants” (Bullitt). In the Abhisanda Sutta the Buddha refers to the precepts as “rewards of merit” and “gifts”: “There are these five gifts, five great gifts—original, longstanding, traditional, ancient, unadulterated, unadulterated from the beginning—are not
open to suspicion, will never be open to suspicion, and are unfaulted by knowledgeable
contemplatives and priests…” (Refuge 25). And in the Samyutta Nikaya, the Buddha
teaches the requirement of the “sublime attitudes” (brahma-vihara) of good will, compassion, appreciation, and equanimity, which strengthen one's ability to side with skillful
intentions” (Wings 60):
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There is the case where a monk develops mindfulness as a factor for Awakening
accompanied by good will, dependent on seclusion... dispassion... cessation, resulting in letting go. He develops analysis of qualities as a factor for Awakening...persistence as a factor for Awakening...rapture as a factor for Awakening...serenity as a factor for Awakening...concentration as a factor for Awakening...equanimity as a factor for Awakening accompanied by good will, dependent
on seclusion... dispassion... cessation, resulting in letting go. (Samyutta Nikaya
Access)
Thanissaro Bhikkhu explains that the Buddhist approach to morality—“the avoidance of
bad kamma, the development of skillful mental states, and the purification of intention”-is a perfect match with verse 183 of The Dhammapada: “The non-doing of any evil, the
performance of what's skillful, the cleansing of one's own mind: This is the Buddhas'
teaching” (Access).
John Bullitt remarks that the act of following this path of skillfulness, intention,
and mindfulness results in a transformation of the individual “into a more generous, loving, compassionate, peaceful, and clear-headed member of society. The individual’s sincere pursuit of Awakening is thus a priceless and timely gift to a world in desperate need
of help” (Bullitt).
Anatta -- No self
Thanissaro Bhikkhu writes that the Buddha did not address the question of no self
at all, because “to hold either that there is a self or that there is no self is to fall into extreme forms of wrong view that make the path of Buddhist practice impossible” (Refuge
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61). He suggests that the basic ground rules for interpreting the Buddha’s teachings involve knowing how to ask the right questions. Questions and answers that do not lead to
the end of suffering and stress should be “put aside” (61). The Buddha said to abandon
such questions as “Do I exist?” or “Don’t I exist?” because their answers lead only to suffering and stress (62). The Buddha explains this position in the Samyutta Nikaya: “As he
attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: “The view I
have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It
is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of
self that I perceive not-self...This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a
contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views” (Wings 159). The Buddha
taught instead that one should focus “appropriate attention” on the duties implicit in the
Four Noble Truths: “This noble truth of stress is to be comprehended...This noble truth of
the origination of stress is to be abandoned...This noble truth of the cessation of stress is
to be realized...This noble truth of the path of practice leading to the cessation of stress is
to be developed...” (Samyutta Nikaya Wings 159).
Following this path of virtue and concentration leads to a calm state of mind in
which one’s attention shifts to questions such as “Am I suffering stress because I’m holding onto this particular phenomenon? Is it really me, myself, or mine? If it’s stressful but
not really me or mine, why hold on?” (Refuge 62). These would be worthy questions according to the Buddha as their answers potentially uproot self-identification and the stress
and suffering that it causes. Therefore anatta is not really a “doctrine of no-self” but a
strategy for breaking free from the causes of suffering (62).
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This/That Conditionality – Dependent Co-arising
Thanissaro Bhikkhu cites the following verse from the Anguttara Sutta: “(1)
When this is, that is. (2) From the arising of this comes the arising of that. (3) When this
isn't, that isn't. (4) From the stopping of this comes the stopping of that” (Wings 300).
“This formula is non-linear, an interplay of linear and synchronic principles… Because
this is the pattern underlying dependent co-arising, it is a mistake to view dependent coarising simply as a chain of causes strung out over time” (300). He describes this interplay of past and present events occurring simultaneously as an infinitely complex “causal
process.” This causal process is fluid, unstable, and results in stress and suffering. In the
Samyutta Nikaya the Buddha compares dependent co-arising to heavy rain water flowing
down mountain slopes and respectively affecting gullies, ponds, lakes, rivers, and
oceans… “In the same way: fabrications have ignorance as their prerequisite, consciousness has fabrications as its prerequisite…release has dispassion as its prerequisite,
knowledge of ending has release as its prerequisite” (Wings 301).
Fabrications, ignorance, name and form, the six sense media, craving, clinging…all are linked in the causal chain of prerequisites and all lead to stress and suffering.
The essence of the teaching of dependent co-arising is to develop the requisite skillfulness, mindfulness, discernment and concentration to discover the roots of the causal process and break it down. This is the “true function” of the teaching of dependent coarising: “as a guide to appropriate attention” (310). The practitioner understands which
questions to avoid and which to ask in pursuing the Third Noble Truth.
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Among other metaphorical descriptions of release from the causal chain of stress
and suffering this is known as “clear knowing,” “disbanding,” and “unbinding” (301). In
the Suttas, Sariputta describes “two sheaves of reeds” being pulled away to unravel the
process of suffering: “…If one were to pull away one of those sheaves of reeds, the other
would fall; if one were to pull away the other, the first one would fall. In the same way,
from the cessation of name-&-form comes the cessation of consciousness, from the cessation of consciousness comes the cessation of name-&-form...Thus is the cessation of
this entire mass of stress” (307).
The understanding of this Buddhist doctrine of causal process, Paticca Samuppada, is said to constitute the wisdom and right view in the Eightfold Path, and is the “intellectual and expressible content of the insight to which Gotama awakened, the realization
by which he became the Buddha” (Macy Mutual 27). Joanna Macy and other Buddhist
scholars assert that on the social level this analysis of dependent co-arising means the
“liberation of the individual and the health of her society are inseparable,” and that Buddhist ethics arises within a “mutual morality” (212). Interdependence is therefore “…the
notion that the human being arises interdependently with its natural and social environment” (188-89) “... and that nature of the self is “profoundly participatory” (194). Some
Buddhist scholars will suggest that the notion of interdependence compels social and political engagement as a logical imperative. We are called upon to act for the health and
maintenance of political structures, “not only because they condition our lives, but also
because they serve as vehicles for our concern for other beings” (198).
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Chapter 4
Buddhist Ethics
Many scholars of World Religions portray Buddhism as a quietist, passive religion concerned with individual salvation. Political theorist and sociologist Max Weber is
among those frequently cited. Joanna Macy writes, “‘Early Western scholars of Buddhism, beginning with Max Weber, have perceived Buddhism as ‘other-worldly’ and
without specific formulations of social ethics. They understood the release from this
world as Buddhism’s goal. Yet the Pali scriptures abound in passages where the Buddha
deals explicitly with social ethics, and many more cases where the social implications are
certainly obvious’” (Yarnall 294). Donald Swearer suggests that Weber’s “characterization of early Buddhism as exemplifying a type of otherworldly mysticism” (Buddhist 78),
and his assessment of a “post-Asokan dualistic Buddhism,” (ie, one Buddhism for the
masses and one for the monastic elite), are central in the Buddhist ethics debate (78).
Yarnall maintains Weber is not alone with early Western scholars who promote this other-worldly view of Buddhism, “for as Christopher Queen contends in his 1996 anthology:
‘Today, after eighty years of new research, many specialists are inclined to agree with
Weber that, in its essence, primitive Buddhism was not based on service to others, but on
the quest for individual enlightenment’” (294).
Frank Reynolds writes in “Four Modes of Theravada Action” that comparative
studies such as Weber’s have their place in the sociology of religion, but with less than
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benign results. He charges that “it is at least equally true that its use [the otherworldly/this-worldly distinction] has led to over-simplified interpretations that have caricatured rather than characterized a variety of traditions, both western and eastern” (Reynolds). Reynolds acknowledges Weber’s contributions to the field of religious studies but
states that the arguments of many others who have emphasized this “other-worldly” distinction have been “seriously faulted” and that the “preconceived notions of their meaning derived from the western context have been imposed on the Theravada data which do
not, in fact, conform to them” (Reynolds).
Donald Swearer also disagrees with the idea that Buddhism (particularly Theravada) is “dominated by world-renouncing values” in “Buddhist Virtue, Voluntary Poverty, and Extensive Benevolence” (71). He argues that Buddhist virtue incorporates two
fundamental elements: “overcoming attachment to self and acting compassionately on
behalf of others,” and these elements “bear a family resemblance to voluntary poverty
and extensive benevolence” (71). Swearer asserts that “the primary moral disposition in
Buddhism is nonattached equanimity…and…for Theravada Buddhists, moral virtue is
grounded ontologically in the concept of interdependent co-arising (paticca samuppada)”
(74). The moral virtues cultivated by the practice of “nonattached equanimity” are “renunciation, restraint, and voluntary poverty, on the one hand, and generosity, loving
kindness, and benevolence, on the other” (74). Damien Keown writes also that Buddhist
ethics is thoroughly altruistic: “Moral development…benefits both oneself and others”
(Nature 231).
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Scriptural sources confirm this pervasive teaching of active, social altruism. In the
Sigalovada Sutta: The Buddha’s Advice to Sigalaka for example, the Buddha says:
A compassionate maker of friends, / Approachable, free from stinginess, / A leader, a teacher, and diplomat; / Such a person attains glory. Generosity and kind
words, / Conduct for others' welfare, / Impartiality in all things; These are suitable
everywhere. These kind dispositions hold the world together, / Like the linchpin
of a moving chariot. And should these kind dispositions not exist, / Then the
mother would not receive Respect or honor from her child, Neither would a father. Upon these things / The wise reflect; They obtain greatness / And are
sources of praise. (Kelly)
In the Dighajanu (Vyagghapajja) Sutta: Conditions of Welfare, under the heading “Conditions of Spiritual Progress” the Buddha asks: "What is the accomplishment of faith…of
virtue…of charity…of wisdom? These four conditions, Vyagghapajja, conduce to a
householder's weal and happiness in his future life” (Thera “Dighajanu”). Narada Thera
writes in the Introduction to this translation, “the Buddha follows up on his advice on material welfare with four essential conditions for spiritual welfare…To mention only one of
the implications: a wisely and generously employed liberality will reduce tensions and
conflicts in society. Thus the observing of these conditions of material and spiritual welfare will make for an ideal citizen in an ideal society” (Thera).
The fundamental ethical teachings discussed in the foregoing sections are integral
to the Buddhist Canon, and unveil a tangible thread of continuity between traditional
Buddhism and a justification for socially-engaged Buddhism. The following narrative
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will focus on the The Dhammapada, The Edicts of Asoka, and Nagarjuna’s Precious
Garland.
Chapter 5
The Dhammapada
The Dhammapada is a Buddhist text from the Pali canon. The Tipitaka, (as stated
in the earlier section on Theravada and Mahayana), is generally acknowledged as the earliest historical collection of Buddhist teachings which form the doctrinal foundation of
Theravada Buddhism. The Dhammapada is found in Sutta Pitaka, one of the “three baskets” of teachings. It contains 423 aphorisms in 26 chapters. According to Buddhist tradition the oral contents of The Dhammapada were first verified and written down at the
First Buddhist Council, (typically designated at three months after Buddha’s death in 483
BCE). In the preface to his translation of The Dhammapada, Ananda Maitreya says it is
“often characterized as the most representative of the teachings of the Buddha” (viii).
With its pervasive message of right action, harmony and oneness with all beings, The
Dhammapada provides a “grounded moral philosophy” (viii), and is frequently considered a primary source for Buddhist social ethics.
In the introduction to Acharya Buddharakkhita’s translation of The Dhammapada,
Bhikkhu Bodhi discusses apparent discrepancies in the teachings--passages for example
which seem to praise works of merit, and other passages which praise going beyond both
merit and demerit. Even the chapter headings imposed by various translators may be perceived as more metaphorically convenient than thematically accurate. He says, “The key
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to resolving these apparent discrepancies is the recognition that the Dhamma assumes its
formulation from the needs of the diverse persons to whom it is addressed, as well as
from the diversity of needs that may co-exist even in a single individual” (Bhikku Bodhi
intro).
Bhikku Bodhi formulates a critical analysis of The Dhammapada that contains
four levels of intent, [designed to meet three human aims: “human welfare here and now,
a favorable rebirth in the next life, and the attainment of the ultimate good”] (Bodhi). He
provides an analysis of the verses throughout The Dhammapada that is relevant within
these levels of intent, not necessarily as verses clustered within certain chapter headings.
The first of Bhikku Bodhi’s four levels is: “establishing well-being and happiness
in concrete human relations” (Bodhi). Teachings at this level illustrate a way for man to
fulfill familial and social responsibilities, while maintaining a life without conflict or violence. The teachings counsel human beings to avoid evil, cultivate good, and cleanse
one’s mind, and also to adhere to the Five Precepts, “the fundamental moral code of
Buddhism, which teach abstinence from destroying life, from stealing, from committing
adultery, from speaking lies and from taking intoxicants” (Bodhi). The Five Precepts are
spelled out in verses 246-247: “One who destroys life, utters lies, takes what is not given,
goes to another man's wife, and is addicted to intoxicating drinks — such a man digs up
his own root even in this world” (Buddharakkhita translation). Many verses teach that
human beings should treat others with kindness and compassion, and should constantly
strive toward the resolution of conflict and hatred: “4. ‘He abused me, he struck me, he
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overpowered me, he robbed me.’ Those who do not harbor such thoughts still their hatred. 5. Hatred is never appeased by hatred in this world. By non-hatred alone is hatred
appeased. This is a law eternal” (Buddharakkhita). The Buddha teaches patience and forgiveness to end the cycle of vengeance and retaliation (Bodhi).
The second level of teachings concerns karma, or kamma in Pali. These verses
address an apparent imbalance or lack of moral justice in the human condition in which it
is possible for good people to suffer hardship and for bad people to experience fortune
and luxury. Those who follow the ethical injunctions for generosity, goodwill, detachment and understanding are not always repaid with good circumstances. “…This is the
law of kamma (Sanskrit: karma), of action and its fruit, which ensures that morally determinate action does not disappear into nothingness but eventually meets its due retribution, the good with happiness, the bad with suffering…” (Bodhi). The verses at this level
suggest that good actions lead humans towards a release from suffering in future births,
and that negative actions lead to the opposite. “The observance of morality is justified,
despite its difficulties and apparent failures, by the fact that it is in harmony with that
law…” (Bodhi). The observance of moral actions leads to the release of suffering both
for the individual and for all of mankind, and is therefore right action. “17. The evil-doer
suffers here and hereafter; he suffers in both the worlds. The thought, "Evil have I done,"
torments him, and he suffers even more when gone to realms of woe. 18. The doer of
good delights here and hereafter; he delights in both the worlds. The thought, "Good have
I done," delights him, and he delights even more when gone to realms of bliss” (Bud-
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dharakkhita). “122. Think not lightly of good, saying, "It will not come to me." Drop by
drop is the water pot filled. Likewise, the wise man, gathering it little by little, fills himself with good.” “132. One who, while himself seeking happiness, does not oppress with
violence other beings who also desire happiness, will find happiness hereafter.” “133.
Speak not harshly to anyone, for those thus spoken to might retort. Indeed, angry speech
hurts, and retaliation may overtake you” (Buddharakkhita).
The third level of teachings addresses man’s desire for liberation from the human
condition and the endless round of rebirths. These verses apply to the spiritual seeker
who has mastered the preparatory and provisional personal trainings of good moral conduct, sila, and deal with Nibbana/Nirvana, “the unconditioned state where there is no
more birth, aging and death, and no more suffering” ( Bodhi). The focus of these verses is
the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path – the core of the Buddha’s teachings:
“190-191. He who has gone for refuge to the Buddha, the Teaching and his Order, penetrates with transcendental wisdom the Four Noble Truths — suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the Noble Eightfold Path leading to the cessation of
suffering. 192. This indeed is the safe refuge, this the refuge supreme. Having gone to
such a refuge, one is released from all suffering” (Buddharakkhita).
Bhikku Bodhi applies the Buddhist overview of the Noble Eightfold Path which
divides the eight practical trainings into three categories: moral discipline (sila)—speech,
action and livelihood; concentration (samadhi)—right effort, mindfulness and concentration; and wisdom (prajna)—right understanding and right thought. A gradual ripening
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and perfection of each path results in the final release of the mind from eternal suffering.
Although Buddha’s teachings are completely non-discriminatory and are relevant to people from any segment of society, there is a clear practical advantage to those who maintain a lifestyle in the company of a Sangha—a community of individuals who dedicate
their lives to the practice of the Eightfold Path.
The fourth level of teaching in The Dhammapada contains praise for those who
have attained the goals set out in the previous three levels. These verses define the stages
of attainment according to the Pali canon: “stream entry,” the stages of once-returner and
non-returner, and finally the stage of the arahant—“the Perfected One, the fully accomplished sage who has completed the development of the path, eradicated all defilements
and freed himself from bondage to the cycle of rebirths” (Bodhi). Buddhist literature refers to the arahant as the hero of The Dhammapada. “Always shining in the splendor of
his wisdom, the Buddha by his very being, confirms the Buddhist faith in human perfectibility and consummates the Dhammapada's picture of man perfected, the arahant” (Bodhi). This ideal is portrayed in the following verses: “385. He for whom there is neither
this shore nor the other shore, nor yet both, he who is free of cares and is unfettered —
him do I call a holy man. 386. He who is meditative, stainless and settled, whose work is
done and who is free from cankers, having reached the highest goal — him do I call a
holy man. 387. The sun shines by day, the moon shines by night. The warrior shines in
armor, the holy man shines in meditation. But the Buddha shines resplendent all day and
all night. 388. Because he has discarded evil, he is called a holy man. Because he is se-
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rene in conduct, he is called a recluse. And because he has renounced his impurities, he is
called a renunciate” (Buddharakkhita).
The Dhammapada is so filled with the Buddha’s insights that followers and
scholars alike may experience first-hand the flavor of his wisdom and compassion. There
is no denying the Buddha’s emphasis on moral training as a means to attaining individual
liberation from suffering. Buddha’s fundamental message is to identify suffering as the
problem and to suggest moral training and purification of the mind--heedfulness--as the
solution. The goal is individual freedom from suffering. This emphasis does not, however, preclude a formula for social action. The arahant’s level of purification and attainment may be the heroic ideal, but it is within reach of all practitioners. In fact, it is only at
this level of attainment that the individual can truly benefit the welfare of others because
his or her welfare is resolved. The Buddha repeatedly suggests that strict adherence of
morality and the practice of kindness and compassion will benefit human relations; which
is why The Dhammapada continues to be a primary source for Buddhist moral virtue and
social ethics.
Chapter 6
The Edicts of Asoka
The life story of King Asoka was transformed from myth and legend into reality
in the nineteenth and twentieth century when scholars discovered stone pillars in Delhi,
India with inscriptions or “edicts” from the “Beloved of Gods, King Piyadasi [Priyadar-
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si],” later determined to be King Asoka. Legends tell of a once-ruthless prince who converted to Buddhism and became a model of wisdom and compassion. He is described as
acquiring a serious conviction to Buddhist principles in reaction to the horror he experienced during the Kalinga war in 262 BCE. The Edicts are proof of his transformation of
personality, and represent his desire to be perceived as a good and sincere leader; but
more important they represent a leader concerned for the welfare of his subjects. According to S. Dhammika, King Asoka saw himself as performing his duties as a Buddhist by
initiating reform. Although a passionate Buddhist, King Asoka was also tolerant and
open-minded, encouraging others to pursue and practice their own religion. Asoka’s reforms encouraged people to be more “moral, kind, and generous.” Dhammika suggests
that Asoka’s spiritually based political system is the first attempt in history to create a
Buddhist polity (Dhammika).
While Dhammika’s overview of King Asoka’s legendary status may seem idealized, it is nevertheless accurate to say that Asoka’s application of Buddhist principles has
had a profound influence extending into the modern era. Scholars and commentators-traditionist and modernist alike--refer to Asoka in lofty terms. In What the Buddha
Taught Walpola Rahula characterizes King Asoka as embracing the Ten Duties of the
King: “1. Liberality, 2. High moral character, 3. Sacrifice for good of people, 4. Honesty/integrity, 5. Kindness, 6. Austerity, 7 No hatred/ill-will, 8. Non-violence, 9. Patience,
10. Non-opposition” (Rahula 85). Like Rahula, Ken Jones writes that Asoka fulfills the
“Dhammaraja Ideal,” the Buddha’s vision of a “spiritually informed monarch” who ac-
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tively promotes Buddhist principles (New 45). Robert Thurman links Asoka’s program of
social reform with human rights, and suggests these principles were present in the Buddha’s “earliest teachings” (“Social” 148). Thurman maintains The Edicts of Asoka “provide the foundation for a Buddhist social philosophy” and the “operative principles of the
politics of enlightenment” (as quoted in Jones New 45).
In the Rock Edict XIII, Asoka promotes the Dharma: “King Priyadarsi considers
moral conquest [that is, conquest by Dharma, Dharma vijaya] the most important conquest” (Edicts 29). He proclaims in Edict IV that this “inculcation” of the Dharma has
“increased…abstention from killing animals and from cruelty to living beings, kindliness
in human and family relations, respect for priests and ascetics, and obedience to mother
and father and elders…For instruction in Dharma is the best of actions. The practice of
Dharma is impossible for the immoral man” (31-32).
In Pillar Edict VII, Asoka refers to the Dharma-mahamatras, his “Censors of Morality”: “My officers charged with the spread of Dharma are occupied with various kinds
of services beneficial to ascetics and householders, and they are empowered to concern
themselves with all sects” (34). In Edict VI: “Since I am convinced that the welfare and
happiness of the people will be achieved only in this way, I consider how I may bring
happiness to the people…I act in the same manner with respect to all…No task is more
important to me than promoting the well-being of all the people” (36-37).
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Asoka continues to promote the Dharma in Pillar Edict II: “Dharma is good…It
consists of…kindness, liberality, truthfulness, and purity” (41). In the Brahmagiri Rock
Edict II, Asoka says: “One should respect the supreme value and sacredness of life. One
should speak the truth. One should practice these virtues of Dharma” (43). In Rock Edict
XI : “There is no gift that can equal the gift of Dharma, the establishment of human relations on Dharma, the distribution of wealth through Dharma, or kinship in Dharma” (44).
The Bhabra Rock Edict demonstrates Asoka’s devotion to the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha, and he recommends a list of the Buddha’s sermons which teach to
the heart of the Dharma (66-67).
These excerpts from The Edicts of Asoka fall into two categories--those relevant
to the state and those relevant to the individual. Edicts to the individual citizen encourage
respect toward one’s parents, elders, and teachers. He encourages generosity, harmlessness, moderation in saving and spending. He encourages proper treatment of all individuals. He suggests people should be well-learned with the kind of education that fosters tolerance and respect. He encourages qualities of the heart, such as kindness, selfexamination, truthfulness, gratitude, purity of heart, enthusiasm, loyalty, self-control, and
love of the Dhamma/Dharma (Dhammika).
Edicts directed to the state encourage compassion, moderation, tolerance, and respect for all life. Asoka abandons the former aggressive foreign policy and replaces it
with the notion of peaceful coexistence. He reformed the judicial system to include more
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stays of execution and regular amnesties. He developed public works, and became more
accessible as a leader. He encouraged a state that protects both its people and its animals.
He fostered harmony among religions by encouraging tolerance and open-mindedness,
and he established a Department of Religious Affairs, the Dharma Mahamatras
(Dhammika).
The Edicts of Asoka are clearly a Buddhist manual for proper conduct according
to the earliest original teachings, and the manifestation of those qualities in the function
of an ideal society. The Edicts represent the earliest deliberate demonstration of Buddhist
social action by a Buddhist leader, and are therefore crucial to identifying the evolution
of both Buddhist activism and Buddhist socialism.
Chapter 7
Nagarjuna’s Precious Garland
Nagarjuna is known as the great Buddhist dialectician, “the Second Buddha” from
the second century CE and the man who “outlined the kind of society that would accord
with Buddhism’s basic tenets” (Kraft “Introduction” 4). Along with several influential
treatises on Buddhist theory and ethics, Nagarjuna is known for a pair of religious and
ethical letters addressed to the king Gautamiputra, entitled To a Good Friend (Suhrlekha)
and Precious Garland (Ratnavali). In Awakening-Struggle, Towards a Buddhist Critical
Social Theory, Robert Hattam refers to the Precious Garland as the “scriptural justification for engaged Buddhism” and the “exposition of a socially-engaged view of the Bo-
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dhisattva path” (170-171). Nagarjuna’s Precious Garland contains five-hundred stanzas,
each four lines long, arranged within five chapters of equal length. The chapter headings
are: 1. “High Status and Definite Goodness,” 2. “The Interwoven,” 3. “Collections for
Enlightenment,” 4. “Royal Policy,” 5. “Bodhisattva Deeds” (Nagarjuna’s Precious Garland Hopkins).
Nagarjuna defines “high status” and “definite goodness” in Chapter One: “For
having attained high status / One comes gradually to definite goodness / High status is
considered to be happiness, / Definite goodness is liberation. / The quintessence of their
means / Is briefly faith and wisdom” (Verses 3-4). He explains the requisite behavior in
one who practices high status: “Not killing, not stealing, / Forsaking the mates of others, /
Refraining completely from false, / Divisive, harsh, and senseless speech, / Thoroughly
forsaking covetousness, harmful intent, / And the views of Nihilists-- / These are the ten
gleaming paths of action; / Their opposites are dark” (8-9).
Nagarjuna teaches the “wrong view” of identification with “I” and “mine”: “Just
as without depending on a mirror / The image of one’s face is not seen, / So too the conception of I does not exist / Without depending on the aggregates. / When the Superior
Ananda / Heard what this means, He attained the eye of doctrine / And repeatedly spoke
of it to monastics” (33-34).
Nagarjuna argues for the doctrine of “dependent-arising” in the concluding verses
of Chapter One. Nothing exists if not interdependent with or dependent on something
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else. This applies to color, odor, taste, objects of touch, eyes, consciousness, form, ignorance, action, birth, number, possession, cause, effect, time, name, earth, water, fire,
wind, and virtue… “Here…virtue and non-virtue, / And here names and forms / All are
ceased. / All those that earlier appeared to consciousness / Because of not knowing that
[reality] / Will later cease for consciousness in that way / Because of knowing that [reality]…The reality is later ascertained / Of what was formerly imputed by ignorance. /
When a thing is not found, / How can there be a non-thing?” (95-98).
In Chapter Two, “The Interwoven,” Nagarjuna establishes the nature of the
“world” as an illusion, and further specifies the way the King should follow the path of
“definite goodness.” “That which is secret for a common being / Is the profound doctrine,
/ The world as like an illusion, / The ambrosia of the Buddhas’ teaching” (109). He encourages “right understanding” in Verse 122: “So one comes to ruin / Through wrong
understanding / But obtains bliss and highest enlightenment / Through right understanding.” Nagarjuna encourages specific benevolent behaviors, as long as the “conception of
an I” prevails. These are “virtuous” actions which give rise to “good births”: “…Take
heed of the practices / Of giving, ethics, and patience” (125). “Even if you seek to harm
an enemy, / You should remove your own defects and cultivate good qualities…” (132).
“You should cause the assembling / Of the religious and the worldly / Through giving,
speaking pleasantly, / Purposeful behavior, and concordant behavior” ( 133). In Verse
139 Nagarjuna tells the King to practice the “four goodnesses”: “Truth, generosity, peace,
and wisdom.” He charges that although the practice of all these behaviors may at times be
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difficult or unpleasant, the King should do it anyway since it is like drinking “dreadful
medicine from one who cares” (142). From Verse 178 through the end of Chapter Two
Nagarjuna explains the benefits of “definite goodness,” including becoming a Bodhisattva. He encourages abundant giving, speaking pleasantly, purposeful behavior, never doing harm, spreading the vowed practices, adept reconciliation with friends, nursing and
curing the sick, speaking true and soft words, showing respect, serving others, loving
compassionately, and abandoning desire, hatred and delusion.
In Chapter Three, “Collections for Enlightenment,” Nagarjuna extols the “measureless” effects of “merit and wisdom”: “Thus these two collections / Are the causes of
attaining Buddhahood, / So in sum always rely / Upon merit and wisdom” (Verse 213).
By following this path, “Limitless Buddhahood is not hard to attain” (218). Nagarjuna
tells the King to strive “to remove defects and attain good qualities” ( 227). As in Chapter
One, he confirms this as the practice of “seeking high status…and definite goodness”
(230).
Nagarjuna advises the King to sustain and promote the “doctrine,” and to revere
all those teachers who propound the doctrine. In the several verses between 231 and 255
Nagarjuna encourages him to establish schools and to pay his teachers well; to alleviate
the suffering of the old, young and infirm; to provide “hostels, parks, dikes, ponds, resthouses…”; to “care compassionately” for the sick and for others who are suffering; to
provide for the persecuted in society and for farmers who have experienced crop failure;
to protect the poor; to “set prices fairly and keep profits level.” Finally, in the culmination
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of what is clearly the description of a Buddhist welfare state, Nagarjuna encourages the
King to think of others before he thinks of himself: “Just as you are intent on thinking /
Of what could be done to help yourself, / So you should be intent on thinking / Of what
could be done to help others” (256). He encourages the King to be like the Bodhisattvas
“whose attitude is to give all wealth away” (258).
The final twenty verses of Chapter Three describe the benefits of faith, good ethics, and the knowledge of emptiness. “You will attain detachment from all phenomena”
(287). The list of the “arising of twenty-five particular good qualities” includes: mindfulness, intelligence, realization and wisdom… “Therefore knowing the concordance / Of
actions and their effects, / Always help beings in fact. / Just that will help yourself” (300).
Nagarjuna introduces Chapter Four, “Royal Policy,” by saying that he speaks the
truth out of compassion. He teaches the King to always maintain an “exalted mind”:
“…Take delight in exalted deeds. / From exalted actions arise / All effects that are exalted” (309). He asks the King to establish “abodes of the Three Jewels,” to create “foundations of doctrine” “such that the exalted become free from pride, / [The equal] become
delighted, / And the inclinations of the lowly are reversed” (312). He says that “centers of
doctrine” should be “attended by those / Who are not harmful, are virtuous, / Keep their
vows, are kind to visitors, truthful, / Patient, non-combative, and always diligent” (319).
Verse 320 amplifies the justification for a welfare state that appears in Chapter Three:
“Cause the blind, the sick, the lowly, / the protectorless, the destitute, / And the crippled
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equally to obtain / Food and drink without interruption.” He tells the King if his realm
exists for the sake of the “doctrine” and not for “fame or desire” it will surely flourish.
Nagarjuna encourages an attitude of compassion and altruism: “O King, through
compassion you should / Always generate just an attitude of altruism / Even for all those
embodied beings / Who have committed awful ill deeds” (331). And again in Verse 373:
“It is renowned [in Great Vehicle scriptures] / that motivation determines practices / And
that the mind is most important. / Hence how could even suffering not be helpful / for one
who gives help with an altruistic motivation?” In Verse 337 he urges compassionate behavior toward criminals and advises against the death penalty. The final thirty verses are
in defense of the Great Vehicle, but his concluding message is clear and concise in Verse
399: “At that time [when you are a ruler] you should internalize / Firmly the practices of
giving, ethics, and patience, / Which were especially taught for householders / And which
have an essence of compassion.”
The premise in the final verse of Chapter Four and the first verse of Chapter Five,
“Bodhisattva Deeds,” is that if the King finds it too difficult to rule religiously he should
become a monastic, “For the sake of practice and grandeur” (400). But the advice is beneficial to householders and monks alike. The first thirty-three verses list fifty-seven faults
that a serious practitioner should avoid. The list includes belligerence, enmity, malevolence, hypocrisy…and concludes gravely with doubt in one’s mind about the veracity of
the Four Noble Truths and the Three Jewels. In Verse 434, Nagarjuna charges that if either the householder or the monastic gives up the “fifty-seven faults” he/she will easily
37
emulate the “good qualities” observed by Bodhisattvas, which in condensed form are:
“Giving, ethics, patience, effort, / Concentration, wisdom, compassion, and so forth”
(435). Nagarjuna covers many verses with detailed descriptions of what the practice of
these good qualities will yield, and how the maturation of these qualities will reveal
themselves in Bodhisattvas. Verses 466 through 485 are twenty stanzas that Bodhisattvas
should repeat three times daily, beginning with: “Going for refuge with all forms of respect / To the Buddhas, excellent Doctrine, / Supreme Community, and Bodhisattvas, / I
bow down to all that are worthy of honor” (466); and concluding with, “As long as any
sentient being / Anywhere has not been liberated, / May I remain [in the world] for the
sake of that being / Though I have attained highest enlightenment” (485).
In Verse 493 Nagarjuna reminds the King that if he follows this “excellent system” he will attain the “supreme achievement.” He should “Speak the truth, speak gently
to sentient beings…be of pleasant nature…be politic…be independent …be welldisciplined…generous…Be gentle like a full moon. / Be lustrous like the sun in autumn. /
Be deep like the ocean. / Be firm like Mount Meru” (494-496). Finally, the summation of
the teachings in Nagarjuna’s Precious Garland is expressed in Verse 500: “For the sake
of enlightenment aspirants should always apply themselves / To ethics, supreme respect
for teachers, patience, non-jealousy, non-miserliness, / endowment with the wealth of altruism without hope for reward, helping the destitute, / remaining with supreme people,
leaving the non-supreme, and thoroughly maintaining the doctrine.”
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In a frequently anthologized essay, “Nagarjuna’s Guidelines for Buddhist Social Action,”
Robert Thurman refers to verse 256 of the Precious Garland as “the basic principle of
Buddhist social action”: [O King] Just as you are intent on thinking / Of what could be
done to help yourself, / So you should be intent on thinking / Of what could be done to
help others.” He labels Nagarjuna’s philosophy a “socialistic universal welfare policy,”
and asserts that the “primary Buddhist position on social action is one of total activism”
(79). Thurman argues that the advice is thoroughly relevant to contemporary society because in a “modern context” we are all kings and queens facing choices for personal conduct. He suggests that Nagarjuna’s opposition to capital punishment may be the earliest
on historical record, and that this nonviolent treatment of criminals expresses “every
principle of Buddhist teaching”: compassion; impermanence; selflessness; and the preciousness of human life (87).
In the foregoing summary of Buddhist fundamentals, Buddhist ethics and the respective overviews of The Dhammapada, The Edicts of Asoka, and Nagarjuna’s Precious
Garland, I have articulated the principal tenets of traditional Buddhism as they apply to
the individual and to society. From within these traditional sources I have intended to
emphasize a Buddhist ethical code of “virtue” and a number of essential perspectives and
practices. These include faith and belief in the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path and
the merits of sila, prajna and samadhi; adherence to the Five Precepts; a belief in anatman, or no-self; a belief in karma and rebirth; a belief in dependent co-arising and interdependence; a belief in moral justice; a belief in the spiritually compatible and supportive
39
community of the Sangha; a belief in degrees of enlightenment as embodied in the arahants, the bodhisattvas, and the Buddhas; a belief in the ideal duties of a king or leader,
and by inference the duties of any human being; a belief in human rights and a social philosophy characterized as “politics of enlightenment,” and embodied as “compassionate
socialism” in the social order of an ideal society; a personal and social commitment to
loving kindness, nonviolence, justice, and generosity.
It is therefore possible to identify a social philosophy grounded in traditional
Buddhism that justifies social action and that precedes the modern world and/or the exposure of Buddhism to the Western world. This position is substantiated by numerous
scholars of Buddhist studies, but it is also contradicted by many contemporary scholars of
engaged Buddhism. The question is raised for example, if we perceive a precedent for
social theory in traditional Buddhism are we guilty of the “literalist” approach to scriptural texts--what Ken Jones calls the “reductive modernist interpretation.” He calls it a
secularization of both “scriptural meaning and engaged spirituality,” an interpretation that
“reduces the Dharma to a humanism” (Jones New 215). Jones agrees that scriptural evidence is found at this level for a social theory, including injunctions for the practice of
engagement, but he warns against “reading modern meanings into the scriptures of very
different cultures” (215).
Chapter 8
Thomas Yarnall
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This conflict of opinion speaks to the heart of the debate regarding engaged Buddhism. We now return to Thomas Freeman Yarnall’s original assertions: that “traditionists” argue for scriptural evidence of social engagement; that “modernists” say there is no
precedent for the kind of social activism or the kind of Buddhism we see in response to
contemporary conditions. In this context it is essential to provide a critical overview of
Thomas Yarnall’s presentation of both sides of the debate. I will examine the methodology of some of the key scholars of engaged Buddhism to identify their perspective on the
justification for social activism.
Yarnall, long-time scholar of Buddhist studies and currently Professor of Religion
at Columbia, writes a detailed analysis of the relevant issues concerning engaged Buddhism in the essay “Engaged Buddhism: New and Improved? Made in the USA of Asian
Materials.” Although he attempts to remain academically and professionally neutral,
Yarnall builds a case for scriptural evidence and continuity on the side of tradition, and
alleges that Modernists engage in a form of “neo-colonialism” by means of first appropriating essential Buddhist ideas, then distancing themselves from the source in order to
claim a “new” Buddhism—one that Yarnall suggests is not at all “new and improved.”
Yarnall cites such Buddhist leaders as Thich Nhat Hanh and Sulak Sivaraksa who say
that “moral responsibility” has always existed and is nothing new. Accordingly the essence of Buddhism is social engagement and continuity. The teachings have the same
practical application as they have always had. Scholars such as Thurman, Macy, Rahula
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and Sivaraksa say the notion of “disengagement” is a Western misperception and an unnecessary misapplication of labels.
Modernists argue the “latency” issue--that there are social implications in the early teachings, even a socially engaged nonviolence, but no political theory equal to its
metaphysics (Yarnall 297). Yarnall cites Ken Jones’ reference to social activism as the
“logical extension of the traditional teachings of morality and compassion to twentiethcentury conditions” (297). Jones writes, “Engaged Buddhists need no other rationale than
that of being an amplification of traditional Buddhist morality” (297).
Modernists say it is naïve and reductionist to assert that there are “modern solutions” in traditional Buddhist teachings (299). A summary of the Modernists’ position
says that traditional Buddhism is only “latently” engaged, that engaged Buddhism is responding to unprecedented problems in society, that traditional Buddhism is not a good
model, and that engaged Buddhism is the result of the latency being activated by “modern Western socio-political theory,” what Yarnall calls a “new amalgam: Western / Buddhist engagement” (303).
Yarnall critiques the Modernists’ views in some detail, but prior to that critique he
develops an argument that the Modernists have (perhaps) unwittingly “projected their
form of ‘disengaged’ Buddhism,” a philosophical stance that parallels “the early European Orientalists” (305). Yarnall suggests the Modernists have done so “in order to appropriate for themselves the title of ‘inventor of engaged Buddhism’” (306). He goes on to
42
suggest that it is inherent to the Western, particularly North American approach to life to
assume a position of superiority, hence the assumption that Asian Buddhism is passive
and that Western Buddhism is active, better, and “new and improved.” Robert Thurman
refers to this attitude as “temporal chauvinism – the assumption that anything devised or
conceived before 1960 is primitive and useless…” (309).
Yarnall then begins his analysis of three engaged Buddhist commentators—
Joseph Kitagawa, Ken Jones, and Christopher Queen. In Yarnall’s view Kitagawa creates
an unnecessary, perhaps invalid split between the religious and the socio-political world.
According to Kitagawa, King Asoka was the first Buddhist leader to implement the
Dharma in the political realm. Prior to Asoka there is no evidence that the Buddha attempted to “change society” (311). Kitagawa states “Ashoka’s way of dealing with the
two levels of reality provided the only tangible norm for the relation of Buddhism to the
socio-political order that was acceptable to many Buddhists, until the modern period”
(313).
Yarnall, referring to Ken Jones’ The Social Face of Buddhism published in 1989,
writes that although Jones is critical of Western Buddhists’ appropriation, he too is guilty
of an “extreme Orientalist-style dualism” (313). As mentioned earlier, Jones uses the
terms “secularization” and “reductive modernism.” Jones writes, “‘present day interest in
Buddhist activism has little warranty in scripture, history and tradition and is in effect a
covert form of twentieth century secularization grafted onto the traditional Dharma’”
(314). Passages such as these attest to Jones’ belief that interpreting any signs or justifica-
43
tion for social activism or social theory is a case of “reading back” a “secular” agenda
into Buddhism’s history (314).
In a further analysis of this position however, Yarnall discusses Jones’ propensity
to divide religion into “esoteric” and “exoteric” forms. The “esoteric” is the “Gnostic or
spiritual” (314) part of religion, by which individuals diagnose the human condition and
devise a means to discover their true nature. The “exoteric” part of religion “comprises
dogmas, moral codes, institutions…and other means for readily communicating, manifesting and sustaining religion in society” (314). Yarnall’s purpose in discussing these
contrasting views of religion is to illustrate Jones’ method for justifying Buddhist social
activism. Jones says that modern Buddhism can either be characterized by a culture that
interprets Buddhism and reduces it to a “rational humanism (reductive modernism),”or
one can apply the Buddhist interpretation of contemporary culture, “which gives us a
spiritual and root-existential understanding of that culture (transcendental modernism)”
(315).
Jones argues that relying on “historic Buddhist practice to give direct and prescriptive guidance” (316) is a misguided process and a misinterpretation of the significance of the social teachings of the Pali canon…” (317). His formula is to acknowledge
Buddhism’s “perennial set of truths intended to address the existential…sufferings of beings” (319), and to adapt the socio-political implications that are only latent in the original teachings to the realities of the modern world. Yarnall’s conclusion: although Jones is
critical of the modernists’ view, he is himself a modernist.
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Yarnall then directs his attention to Christopher Queen’s role in exploring the
“newness” issue in engaged Buddhist studies. Queen cites newness as the central question in his introduction to the anthology Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, “…whether the activist impulse of contemporary Asian Buddhism is historically new…or whether there exist substantive precedents for such engagement…in
Buddhist history” (319).
Yarnall sketches an overview of Queen’s principal motifs and argues that although these are extremely vital contributions to the field of Buddhist studies, Queen’s
position falls prey to Ken Jones’ criticism of “secular reductive modernism” and that his
views may ultimately be “incompatible with most forms of Buddhism…both doctrinally
as well as historically” (320). Yarnall suggests that Queen’s definitions for “engaged”
and “Buddhism” are designed to highlight or even to fabricate the conclusion that both
are “new” in the twenty-first century. Queen’s most explicit operational definition for
engagement comes in his 2000 anthology:
The essence of the new outlook is a recognition of (1) the inalienable value of the
human person, whatever his or her level of achievement or standing in the community, (2) the social and collective nature of experience, shaped in particular by
cultural and political institutions that have the power to promote good or evil, fulfillment or suffering, progress or decline, and (3) the necessity of collective action
to address the systemic causes of suffering and promote social advancement in the
world (321).
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Yarnall argues that Queen constructs a dichotomy between “this worldliness” and “otherworldliness,” similar in fact to the nineteenth century Orientalist view of a passive historical Buddhism, and that such a dichotomy portrays traditional Buddhists as “so otherworldly that they are not engaged” and engaged Buddhists as so “this-worldly that they
come dangerously close to not being Buddhists” (322).
Yarnall expresses discomfort with Queen’s re-interpretation of the Four Noble
Truths, a process in which the traditional conceptions of attachment=suffering in the second Noble Truth take “second place to the application of highly rationalized reflections
on the institutional and political manifestations of greed, hatred, and delusion, and on
new organizational strategies for addressing war and injustice, poverty and intolerance”
(326).
Yarnall then sketches Queen’s proposal for a fourth Buddhist “Vehicle” or new
“Yana”; [an aspect of Queen’s theory that I will address in closer detail in the following
section.] This attempt at “re-definition” or predicting a “new turning of the wheel of
Dharma” is nothing new according to Yarnall (327). He discusses the degree to which the
older Universal Vehicle and Queen’s “New Vehicle,” or “Navayana,” represent “otherworldly” in contrast to “this worldly” (330). He cites Robert Thurman’s analysis of Nagarjuna, who concludes the Universal Vehicle perspective of liberation has always been
both transcendent / transmundane, and immanent/mundane. For example, in a timely
quote from an essay in Queen’s anthology, social theorist Jose Cabezon writes, “…in the
Tibetan case it is not that the traditional goals of Buddhism (e.g., nirvana, the universal
46
emancipation of all beings, and so on), are discarded in favor of action in the world. Instead, the two goals, worldly and supramundane, are seen as reinforcing each other”
(330).
Later, addressing Queen’s and other arguments that traditional Buddhism deals
mostly with individual liberation while engaged Buddhism deals with a collective, societal liberation, Cabezon writes: “…Social action is as much the cause of nirvana as monastic discipline is; and vice versa, typically ‘nibbannic’ practices such as wisdom and compassion are as relevant to properly acting within the world as is the concept of karma”
(330).
Yarnall assesses the argument of the principal engaged Buddhist commentators,
and suggests their foundation is based on a misunderstanding of the implications within
the Mahayana tradition. Theirs is a Buddhism that de-emphasizes transcendence and
(perhaps) over-emphasizes “world-engagement” perceived to be “unprecedented and
new” (331). In his conclusion Yarnall suggests it is inherent in the history of Buddhist
studies to evolve and to perpetually evaluate the “continuity” or “discontinuity” between
such forms of Buddhism as Theravada and Mahayana. He suggests that his essay is an
invitation to a similar scholarly analysis of the “possible continuities between modern
forms of engaged Buddhism and Buddhism’s past” (331).
Yarnall articulates “Queen challenge,” first by stating Queen’s own conclusion:
“In lieu of a concerted argument that engagement, as we have defined it, has co-evolved
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with the ethics of discipline, virtue, and altruism in Buddhist history, however, one must
conclude…that it is the product of dialogue with the West over the past one hundred
years or so” (332). The challenge as Yarnall sees it is for both traditionists and modernists to “revisit the history of pre-modern Buddhist Asia” (332). To re-examine “theories
and arguments” found in Buddhist texts, both traditional and less-traditional sources; political and economic documents; archaeological records, etc. If no evidence for continuity
is found, then the debate must be conceded to the modernists for a “new” Buddhism.
Which direction does Thomas Yarnall ultimately lean? He says that it comes to a
question of “choices.” One can choose to stress continuities or to stress discontinuities.
Either way, it is important for each “side” to avoid threatening with or being threatened
by rhetoric. Yarnall seems to favor Robert Thurman’s view that there is much to learn
from the “Buddhist monastic life that has been carried down through history” (336), a
reference to Thurman’s view of the monastic army of peace. He concludes that while
mankind’s current situation is unique in many ways it is not relatively more unique than
any situation in the past.
Yarnall’s essay is a pivotal contribution to engaged Buddhist studies in a number
of critical ways. He articulates the philosophical terms of the debate. He identifies and
critiques the positions of the key commentators from both sides. Although he makes serious charges in reference to appropriation and Orientalism, his essay seems to present the
whole of these issues in a more inclusive and coherent form than any other current article
in Buddhist studies. The debate is also current enough that we are fortunate to have a dia-
48
logue between scholars, in part due to the advent of on-line conferences such as those
sponsored by the Journal of Buddhist Ethics. In this context we are able to read responses
to Yarnall’s “charges,” sometimes contained within the same anthology. I will revisit particularly relevant themes in the positions of Ken Jones and Christopher Queen,
acknowledge their respective responses to Yarnall, in addition to providing an analytical
overview of Kenneth Kraft, a third key commentator.
Chapter 9
Kenneth Kraft
Kenneth Kraft, professor of Buddhist Studies and Japanese Religions at Lehigh
University, is the author, editor, and co-editor of several books and anthologies about engaged Buddhism. Although Thomas Yarnall lists Kraft on the side of the modernists, it is
difficult to find in his writing an overt statement either rejecting traditional Buddhism or
denying the existence of a social theory in the original teachings.
Of particular interest is Kraft’s essay, “New Voices in Engaged Buddhist Studies,” an introduction to Christopher Queen’s Engaged Buddhism in the West. Written in
2000, the essay is an objective exploration of the parameters of engaged Buddhism, its
current issues, challenges, methodology, and the need for doctrinal clarification and definition. According to Kraft, scholars and engaged Buddhist leaders may say “all Buddhism is engaged,” but he questions what such broad statements really mean. Kraft addresses the potential ambiguities in the term itself. As engaged Buddhist studies, it is the
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study of engaged Buddhism. As engaged Buddhist studies, it is an approach that may incorporate personal beliefs and commitments. Inherent in these multiple meanings is the
dual approach to modern religious studies, “the study versus the practice of religion”
(Kraft New 3). To illustrate the diversity of participants in the field of engaged Buddhist
studies, Kraft hypothesizes a “King Asoka’s round table,” at which are seated representatives of these various groups. There would be scholars of engaged Buddhism as a field of
study. These individuals would be concerned with “pertinent sources and languages, the
establishment of definitions and criteria, and the application of suitable theoretical
frameworks” (3). Kraft describes such scholars as traditional--individuals who do not
necessarily identify themselves as Buddhist, but could. Another group seated around the
table consists of Buddhist scholars who are engaged in some “Buddhist related political
cause” (3). Though academics, they may also be described as “participant-observers.” As
Buddhist scholars who are engaged, this group is inclined to “challenge or reconstruct
Buddhism from within the Buddhist tradition” (3). A third side of the table would be occupied by “Buddhist practitioner-activist-thinkers” who are not formally tied to academia. This group may advocate human rights, gender issues, education, and question the nature of an ideal society (4). All individuals seated around the hypothetical table are interested in developing an “engaged Buddhist theory” (4). If Ken Jones is at the table, he
may offer the following definition: “…an explication of social, economic, and political
processes and their ecological implications, derived from a Buddhist diagnosis of the existential human condition,” a social theory he would call “engaged Buddhology” (4, 14).
If Robert Thurman is at the table, he may argue for the strategy of placing a “monastic
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army of peace” at the core of society, in order to “actualize Dharmic values throughout
the culture” (“Tibet…” 86). If Thich Nhat Hanh is at the table he would promote the
Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings as a practical application of the Noble Eightfold Path.
Kraft’s roundtable illustrates the complexity of the issues facing engaged Buddhism in the twenty-first century, and the reality that scholars of Buddhism, engaged
scholars, and activists may shift their positions around the table depending on their audience, their particular object of study, or their cause. The diversity at the table also reintroduces the debate between traditionists and modernists. Using this metaphor is Kraft’s
technique for characterizing the variety of “new voices” at the table. Kraft also identifies
some of the twenty-first century issues that engaged Buddhists are confronting, including:
opposition to war, “just-war” theories, pacifism, human rights, etc. More to the heart of
the debate are questions about the relation between “wisdom and compassionate action.”
Under this heading Kraft addresses four issues and integrates a range of opinions. The
questions are: What constitutes engagement? What becomes of the quest for enlightenment in the context of social action? What is the relation between personal transformation
and social change? And, are the activities of engaged Buddhist distinctively Buddhist?
(6-7) These issues stimulate the discussion and raise further questions regarding traditional Buddhist practice: Does the traditional way prepare people for engagement? Is
there a link between spiritual insight and improved social conditions? Does right livelihood contribute to a “new society?” Does compassion really alleviate others’ suffering?
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Kraft suggests practitioners from both sides of the debate should adopt “skillful
means” as engaged Buddhist studies clarifies its methodologies, especially in the context
of communicating the truth “in the service of bringing others to awakening” (8). He identifies two areas that must be addressed: “social scientific modes” and “doctrinal modes.”
Kraft maintains that “Westerners embracing Asian religions” cannot deny history and
cannot deny the “cultural roots of their spiritual traditions.” He encourages both a sociological and psychological analysis of Buddhist spirituality and engagement. He encourages further exploration of ethical theory and spirituality as they relate to a range of contemporary social and environmental concerns. He encourages the posing of crucial questions about Buddhism and human rights. He also calls upon engaged Buddhist scholars
and activists to apply the tools of philology to the “texts” of modern Buddhism. He asks
for example, how Buddhist studies can maintain the integrity of such principal terms as
“engagement,” “compassion,” “karma,” “right livelihood,” “karuna, metta and mudita.”
Or Western phrases used as technical terms that have no “precise Buddhist equivalents,”
such as “universal responsibility,” “activism,” “interbeing,” “ecosattvas,” even the term
“engaged Buddhism” itself, as well as Queen’s use of the term “fourth yana” (10).
Kraft profiles and analyzes thirteenth century Japanese monk Nichiren and questions whether he in fact should be considered an engaged Buddhist. Although he had a
“vision of universal Buddhism” and saw himself as a bodhisattva, Nichiren’s views were
also strongly “Japan-centered” and intolerant of other sects. Kraft’s purpose for questioning the engagement of past Buddhist figures is to highlight their teachings and attempt to
52
“confer [or not] some legitimacy on contemporary developments, reassuring participants
that engaged Buddhism remains authentically within the Buddhist tradition” (11). This
point is crucial concerning Kraft’s own position at “the round table.” He clearly acknowledges the continuities between social engagement and traditional Buddhism, as he quotes
Bardell Smith: “‘One wonders about the overly sharp distinction that is made between
modern forms of Buddhist engagement, however unprecedented many of their features
may be, and those that have occurred over the centuries, almost as if there were no prophetic or deeply engaged precursors in Buddhist history’” (11).
Kraft also proposes that engaged Buddhist studies examine its methodology. He
provides three examples of critical areas of study: “uses of Buddhist tradition, room for
criticism, and openness to new methods” (11). Framed as questions, these three critical
areas are, “When do reevaluations of traditional Buddhism go too far?” “Are assessments
of engaged Buddhist leaders too restrained?” And, “Does engaged Buddhist studies propose any new methods?” (11-12). Kraft suggests that contemporary interpretations of traditional Buddhism risk a distortion of Buddhism’s past. He cites Nichiren’s interpretations that were tailored to his own ethnocentrism. He cites various interpretations of the
“Sangha,” originally a community of monks, but in certain contexts now defined as an
“alternative educational community” (11). Kraft, like Yarnall, implies an “appropriation”
of certain Buddhist elements. He refers specifically to the case of Angulimala, a murderer
who subsequently became a disciple of the Buddha. He questions the rationality of contemporary activists incorporating Angulimala as the “patron saint of a modern prison-
53
reform movement” (12). Although he expresses utmost respect for universally recognized
engaged Buddhist figures like the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh, Kraft suggests there
may be an unspoken code that places them ‘off-limits’ to public scrutiny, a code that
serves as an obstacle to any “constructive criticism” of their engaged teachings. Finally,
in response to the question of engaged Buddhism providing any new methods Kraft refers
to potential applications in the fields of social theory and the ecocrisis, or the incorporation of meditation in community-based learning, but his examples in this area are generally less concrete.
Kenneth Kraft concludes his essay predictably, suggesting that in response to
massive suffering in the world, whatever the approach and whatever the debatable doctrinal differences, “we must be engaged.” The value of this and several other essays and
chapters treating modern Buddhist issues overshadows this oblique conclusion. Kraft
writes openly and fairly, in a tone that honors tradition while praising the rationale of a
contemporary reinterpretation, and he articulates the challenges facing socially engaged
Buddhism in the twenty-first century in language that is at the same time scholarly and
accessible.
Chapter 10
Ken Jones
Ken Jones, author of The Social Face of Buddhism in 1989, writes in the introduction to The New Social Face of Buddhism in 2003, “I have been critical of attempts to
54
‘update’ and ‘reinterpret’ Buddhism and am concerned, instead, to examine social phenomena in the light of root Buddhist teaching” (The New xvii). Although Thomas Yarnall
lists Jones along with Kraft as a modernist, this statement has the tone of a more traditional point of view. Jones thoroughly clarifies his position in The New Social Face of
Buddhism, and in chapter 17 responds to Yarnall’s critique of him as an “Orientalist.” He
addresses Yarnall’s discussion of continuity and discontinuity, and suggests his “polarization and schematization” are “unhelpful’ (218). Jones articulates his own belief that the
“sociopolitical dimension” of traditional Buddhism was more than latent, but also that “it
was shaped by a social culture very different from that of modernity” (219). He says if a
“radical disjunction” exists between premodern and modern cultures, there will be discontinuity with tradition. However, in some contemporary Asian societies where there
may be less “influence of modernity” there is likely to be more continuity (219).This is
the point that Yarnall criticizes – calling it a “modernist strategy” to assert a “unique and
unprecedented” modern context (219). In response, Jones maintains that Yarnall’s interpretation derives from a “postmodern ideological standpoint,” and that he unnecessarily
reduces the discussion to a question of political correctness (219). Jones generously concludes though, that any emphasis on continuity can only result in support for “contemporary Buddhist social engagement” and is therefore beneficial (219).
Ken Jones does not object to the use of scripture to validate engaged Buddhism,
but cites a preference for Diana Winston’s more sophisticated approach. Winston suggests that modern Buddhists take the traditional teachings that underlie engaged Bud-
55
dhism and “‘socialize’ them (abstract them out to social and political situations) within
particular contemporary contexts” (219). Jones explains that this approach of “socializing
textualism” differs from his more existential approach only by degree, and he agrees with
including the “dimension of contemporary social theory” (220). Without this dimension,
the “application of Buddhist themes…to contemporary problems” is too “simplistic” an
analysis (220). Jones cites Thich Nhat Hanh and A.T. Ariyaratne as examples of engaged
Buddhist leaders who have successfully adapted a social reading of Buddhist texts to the
social sphere. In an admonition that echoes Kraft, Jones writes that for engaged Buddhism to be taken seriously these applications must contribute a mindful scholarship to
the methodology of engaged Buddhist studies.
In a statement that represents a less exclusionary stance than what we will observe
in Christopher Queen, Ken Jones writes that “a socially engaged Buddhism needs no other rationale than that of being an amplification of traditional Buddhist morality, a social
ethic brought forth by the needs and potentialities of present-day society” (212). He affirms one of the core tenets of Buddhism, that the Bodhisattva vow to “liberate all beings” implies in contemporary society the concern for changing social conditions that
cause suffering for all of humanity (212). Jones outlines an argument for Buddhist social
activism, summarized as follows: Individuals cannot affect positive change in society
while remaining in a state of self-need and self-delusion, which is the root response to the
“human predicament.” “Sociohistorical” conditions bear witness to this self-delusion in
the form of “institutionalized alienation, ill will, aggressiveness, defensiveness, and ac-
56
quisitiveness” (212). Social conditions are inherited “karmically” from one generation to
the next, and the “personal struggle for identity and meaning is socialized” (212). Therefore, humans must exercise wisdom and compassion to create social conditions that “nurture positive personality change,” and that relieve the current state of “gross physical and
mental affliction” (212). If work for social change is accompanied by “meditative training,” the work will contribute to the individual’s “inconceivable liberation” as well (212).
Finally, if strengthened by an “inner awareness,” humans will be more effective in meeting the “material and spiritual needs of others” (213).
Jones characterizes his rationale for Buddhist social activism as “socioexistential,” not scriptural. However, throughout his explication of the “social face of Buddhism” Jones relies directly on the “social implications of fundamental Buddhist teaching” (213), by which he means the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path and “root insights” of Mahayana Buddhism (213). Jones disagrees with Max Weber’s characterization of ancient Buddhism as “otherworldly” and “antipolitical” insofar as such a view ignores the “not inconsiderable evidence of social concern” in the Buddhist canon (213).
He does however, agree with Christopher Queen and Bardwell Smith that the “primary
goal of Buddhism is not a stable order or a just society but the discovery of genuine freedom (or awakening) for each person” (213). Jones distinguishes his method of validation
for social action as depending on the mature and evolving practice of the individual, not
on a “teased out” scriptural authority. He refers again to Diana Winston’s essay, “Justify
Your Love: Finding Authority for Socially Engaged Buddhism,” in which Winston
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writes: “…looking inward is a hallmark of a socially engaged Buddhist critique…This
‘turning inward’ invokes compassion for others who perpetuate structures of violence as
well as providing insight into understanding just how and why these structures work, and
what could be done about them” (215). For Ken Jones therefore, the practice of “wisdom
and compassion are one”; there is mature practical spiritual experience and there is social
activism, and in reality they are “seamlessly” one and the same.
Ken Jones’ contributions to “mindfully” establishing the rationale and justification for a socially engaged Buddhism are invaluable. He elucidates the terms of the
debate. He analyzes the root human condition from the Buddhist perspective, and by extension, the condition of society. He says that the cessation of suffering for the individual
implies the liberation of society as a “radical social culture of awakening” (New 211). He
defines this as “the necessary foundation for a commonwealth of mutuality” (211), as
well as a “rationale and agenda” for Buddhist social engagement and Buddhist social theory (211).
Chapter 11
Christopher Queen
Christopher Queen, Lecturer on Religion and Dean of Students for continuing
Education in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, is the editor and contributor to Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, American Buddhism, Engaged Buddhism in the West, and Action Dharma: New Studies in Engaged
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Buddhism. Queen, like Kraft and Jones, fulfills the requirement for mindful contributions
to engaged Buddhist studies. In a personal retrospective of his own writings, Queen
writes that he has attempted to “introduce a number of critical definitions, frames of reference, and historical constructions” (Intro Action 21). In the 1996 introduction to Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia, Queen examined the “leadership, ideology and institutionalization” of nine Asian case studies, and argued that “patterns of social engagement have emerged since the late nineteenth century as a result of
the vigorous interaction of Asian, European, and American values in the post-colonial
era” (21). He also argued that engaged Buddhism cannot be traced to a “primitive counter-culture committed to social reform,” nor to the “power politics of a Buddhist state”
(21). He argued instead that twentieth and twenty-first century Buddhism signify an “unprecedented counterculture” of volunteer associations, international networks and “globalized NGOs committed to service and activism” (21). These agencies maintain a commitment to “personal transformation” and its interconnection with social change.
In the 2000 introduction to Engaged Buddhism in the West, Queen argues that
Buddhist social transformation is relatively new” (21). He refers to a continuum of engaged Buddhist activity proposed by Ken Jones that describes “soft-enders” as individuals who “trust in the ripple effects of one-to-one influence in launching a peaceful society,” and “hard-enders” as those who are committed to “influencing public policy and establishing new institutional forms” (21). Queen distinguishes engagement intended to
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“influence public policy,” (specifically political activism in contrast to social service), as
the “distinctive innovation of engaged Buddhism in the twenty-first century” (21).
Queen maintains the philosophical distinction between the “ethics of altruistic
service” and the “ethics of engagement,” but he no longer excludes altruism from the definition as he once did. In his introduction to Action Dharma: New Studies in Engaged
Buddhism, he acknowledges the important “struggle” between “tradition and modernity,”
and he suggests that to survive as a viable “vehicle” engaged Buddhism must either adapt
or decline (26). The challenge according to Queen is a “problem of definition.” He questions exactly who is “engaged,” and how this is distinguished from “involved” or “devoted” (27). Responding to his own challenge, Queen argues that “‘action dharma’ is the
dharma of social service and activism, premised on the belief that suffering is not only
the result of individual karma, and that its remediation requires collective effort” (27).
Queen identifies three characteristics of engaged Buddhism as gleaned from the
essays in the anthology. The first characteristic is awareness. This awareness implies a
seeing, a mindfulness, a remembering, and an understanding of the “interrelatedness of
all beings” (4). The second characteristic is a “deep identification,” which Queen defines
as a sense of “oneness, nondualism, interdependence, and empathy for all beings” (4).
The third characteristic is the “imperative of Action” (4). He quotes Thich Nhat Hanh,
“once there is seeing, there must be action” (4). Queen interprets these characteristics
along with Jones’ soft to hard continuum, and distinguishes “mindfulness-based practice”
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from “service-based practice.” He interprets this continuum to represent the evolution of
Buddhist ethics and their encounter with the twenty-first century.
Exploring the place of social engagement in Buddhism, Queen identifies four
styles of Buddhist ethics: discipline, virtue, altruism and engagement (7). He discusses
the ethics of discipline as the practice of the “primitive community of men and women
who attempted to follow the Buddha’s path to enlightenment” (7). Discipline ethics includes the Five Precepts and rules contained in the Vinaya. It includes teachings from The
Dhammapada, and upholds a reverence to the “three-refuge formula” of the Buddha, the
Dharma and the Sangha” (7). The focus though is on the individual, with the awareness
that such behavior on the personal level will also benefit society.
Discussing the ethics of virtue, Queen describes a process in which the “practitioner’s relationship to other persons comes more clearly into view” (8). He refers to coeditor and Buddhist ethics scholar Charles Prebish, who describes the ethics of virtue as
the shift from the study of self-purification to the study of an internal “enforced ethical
framework” (8).
Altruism, the third style of ethics, is the Buddhist moral development recommended primarily in Mahayana treatises (9). He describes altruism as the “very manifestation of buddhahood.” Service to others is “not the by-product of self-cultivation, but the
means to it” (9). Altruism is the fulfillment of the virtues of the bodhisattva path – “generosity, courage, patience, mindfulness and wisdom” (9).
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Finally, Queen argues for a fourth category--the ethics of engagement. Although
he does not mean to imply that the “first three styles of Buddhist morality are not productive of a more peaceful and prosperous society” (9), he questions their effectiveness in a
modern struggle against “political tyranny, economic injustice, and environmental degradation” (9). He describes the ethics of engagement as “radically different from the Mahayana path of altruism because it is directed to the creation of new social institutions and
relationships” (10). Queen and other modernist scholars acknowledge the “harbingers of
socially engaged practice in the annals of Buddhist history” (10), but these cases, such as
the “public works projects” of King Asoka are really exceptions to the traditional practice
of individual “discipline, virtue and altruism” (10).
Following this overview of the four styles of Buddhist ethics Queen enters a discussion of the “yanas” or “vehicles”-- the practice traditions in Buddhist history. He
suggests that scholars are “far from agreed” on the characteristics and sequence of events
that distinguish Hinayana, the “lesser” vehicle, and Mahayana, the “great” vehicle. The
Mahayana is described as emerging four hundred years after Buddha’s death (around the
turn of the Common Era) as “a repudiation of the ‘narrow’ or ‘elite’ Hinayana Buddhism
that went before” (11). Queen writes that although the boundaries separating the “oppositions” of the two yanas are difficult to map, one can find “artificial dichotomies” in
“textbook accounts” (11), such as the following citation from Richard S. Cohen: “‘The
Hinayana champions the arhat ideal, the Mahayana, the bodhisattva ideal; the Hinayana is
centered on the sangha, the Mahayana, on the Buddha; the Hinayana is rationalist in its
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metaphysics, the Mahayana, mystical; Hinayana is ethical, Mahayana devotional; the Hinayana has closed its canon, the Mahayana allows for continuing ‘revelation’” (11). Despite problems inherent in the “blurring” of the artificial categories of Hinayana and Mahayana, Queen praises Cohen’s description of the yanas as a useful reconstruction of “Indian Buddhism’s history” (12), specifically as “conventional, schematic summaries of
historical patterns of practice and belief” which help to “trace the evolution of Buddhist
spirituality” (12). In a discussion of whether the yanas signify “models of” reality or
“models for” conduct (12), Queen agrees with Swiss theologian Hans Kung, that the
yanas are better understood as a paradigm of “convictions, values and patterns of behavior” (12). As paradigms the yanas lend themselves to a dialogue that measures “critically
every new form of Buddhism…against its source (Gautama, the Buddha)” (13). Queen
asserts that new yanas do not cancel each other out in the history of Buddhism, but seem
to undergo modifications that allow for coexistence, which is the case, he argures, at the
end of the first Buddhist millennium when Vajrayana, or the “tantric-practice-vehicle”
entered the scene.
Queen’s purpose in presenting this brief overview of the evolution of the Buddhist
yanas is to suggest that all these “manifestations of the cultural history of Buddhism”
(13) have been transplanted to the West, where they have given birth to a new vehicle or
yana. Queen derives historical support from a statement made by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in
1956, when he publicly renounced Hinduism and embraced Buddhism. In reply to a reporter asking what kind of Buddhism he would be embracing, Ambedkar said, “‘Our
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Buddhism will follow the tenets of the faith preached by the Buddha himself, without
stirring up the old divisions of Hinayana and Mahayana. Our Buddhism will be a NeoBuddhism--a Navayana’” (14). Queen invokes the spirit of the “Navayana” by proposing
a fourth yana--engaged Buddhism--a new Buddhism in response to the “magnitude of
social suffering” and influenced by the “globalization” of such Western cultural values as
“human rights, economic justice, political due process, and social progress” (14). Queen
defers to tradition, but justifies the new direction. “This Buddhism is endowed with
many, if not all, of the themes and techniques from the past: interdependence, mindfulness, compassion, skillful means, chanting and walking meditation, community practice,
right livelihood, and many, many more. But it is also endowed with a sensitivity to social
injustice, institutional evil, and political oppression as sources of human suffering, that
has not been central to Buddhist analysis in the past” (15). In the introduction to Action
Dharma Queen is even more direct: “political activism—not social service—is…the distinctive innovation of engaged Buddhism in the twentieth century…I and others have
suggested…that an unprecedented Buddhism, in which collective goals are considered to
be as important or more important than personal transformation, is at hand” (22-23).
Thomas Yarnall’s charge that modernist interpreters have a “neo-Orientalist bias”
notwithstanding, Christopher Queen maintains that most scholars and students of Buddhist studies listen to each other with “sincere interest, respect, and--a word not often
used in the study of religion--appreciation” (23). While scholars may not be neutral in
their approach, “neither are they blinded by prejudice or by feelings of superiority” (23).
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As the lead editor and contributor to Action Dharma, Queen concludes his introductory
essay from a global perspective. He agrees with several commentators that the “reconstruction and engagement of Buddhism in the West” is inevitable, and he extends his
wish that “practitioners and observers, traditionists and modernists” meet their quest, and
that the “Buddha’s ancient teachings on suffering, impermanence, and selflessness will
continue to shine” (31).
Sallie B. King, in Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism, contradicts Queen’s view, and speaks directly to the terms of this thesis: “As a reformist
movement, it [engaged Buddhism] by no means breaks from or is discontinuous with the
preceding tradition. On the contrary, Engaged Buddhism draws extensively from tradition, key texts, and well-established concepts, values, and practices of the tradition, interpreting them and applying them in accordance with the challenges and demands of modernity…” (12). King devotes a chapter, “Building from Tradition,” to an examination of
exactly which key teachings engaged Buddhists draw from, and she explores the methods
of a handful of twentieth and twenty-first century Asian leaders, including Dr. B.K.
Ambedkar, A.T. Ariyaratne, Sulak Sivaraksa, Bhuddadasa, Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama. I will survey the tenets that these leaders have established as fundamental to
Buddhism in the modern world in an overview of the movements and teachings of Ariyaratne, Buddhadasa, and Sivaraksa. This analysis will illustrate modern applications of
ancient Buddhist teachings and support the argument for scriptural and philosophical
continuity with tradition.
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Chapter 12
A. T. Ariyaratne
George Bond critiques Dr. A. T. Ariyaratne, who founded the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement in Sri Lanka in 1958. Bond frames the rise of Sarvodaya within a nineteenth and twentieth century “post-colonial Buddhist revival” (121). He describes the revival, which occurred in several countries where Theravada Buddhism existed, as having
two “interconnected aims: it represented a quest by Buddhists, first, to rediscover their
Buddhist heritage and identity, and second, to respond rationally to the modern social,
political, and economic context” (121). The Buddhist revival was significant because of
its emphasis on “universalism,” which taught the spiritual responsibility of the laity and
the “responsibility for their own liberation” (121). The Sarvodaya movement stood apart
from most other groups in the revival in its interpretation of the Dhamma as involving a
“dual liberation”: “arguing that Buddhist liberation involves not only individuals but also
society…a necessary and dependent relation between the freedom of the individual and
the freedom of society” (122). The Sarvodaya movement therefore emphasized the “implications of the Dhamma for social change” and argued the “path to individual liberation
ran through social liberation” (122).
Bond reports that the Sarvodaya movement was influenced by Mahatma Gandhi
who actually coined the term, which means “the wellbeing of all” (122). He identifies
three significant ways in which Gandhi’s Indian Sarvodaya influenced Ariyaratne and the
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Sri Lankan Sarvodaya. First, Gandhi’s “example of selfless service for humanity as the
highest form of religious practice” (122). Second, Gandhi’s use of the term Sarvodaya “to
refer to a new, nonviolent, socioeconomic order” (123). And third, Gandhi’s “focus on
the village as the heart of this new social-economic-religious order” (123). In addition to
Gandhi, the Sarvodaya movement was influenced by Anagarika Dharmapala, “the patriarch of the Buddhist revival” (123). Bond writes that Dharmapala emphasized the social
ethic in early Buddhism--a message which was probably in response to Western interpretations of Buddhism as too other-worldly. Dharmapala taught that individuals should
work to discover their identity and also to serve humanity. Ariyaratne and the leaders of
Sarvodaya shaped the goals of the movement based on these influences and emphasized a
“path of selfless service in the world,” and the “development of a new social structure
that embodied the Buddhist ideals and facilitated a dual liberation process” (124).
Ariyaratne deemphasizes the detached life of ascetics and nearly rejects the Buddhism of “rituals and rules for the acquisition of merit for rebirth” (125). Instead he focuses on the message of “selfless service to the world” as found in the Tipitaka of the Pali
canon. He cites the suttas as having as much to say about living correctly in the world as
about transcending the world, and believes this interpretation is a “reclamation” of the
earliest original teachings (125).
Ariyaratne also reinterprets the core principles of the Dhamma to teach “a path for
action in the world” (125). He interprets the Eightfold Path for example, to be as much a
prescription for daily life in the world as for the life of the renunciate. Ariyaratne’s inter-
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pretation of the “Four Divine Abidings” is another example. These comprise lovingkindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. Choosing to deemphasize their
aspect as an “exercise in mental purification,” Ariyaratne teaches that “the Four Divine
Abidings serve primarily as guidelines for social action” (127). By emphasizing their
“ethical implication” as applied to the mundane world, even as found in the classical
Theravada tradition, Ariyaratne and Sarvodaya can promote the Four Divine Abidings
“as central elements of its plan for employing the Dhamma to assist and uplift the rural
poor” (127).
The Sarvodaya’s method for implementing these ideals is the work camp, or
shramadana, which means “the gift or sharing of one’s time and labor” (127). Members
of a work camp follow the four “grounds of kindness…as the social application of the
Buddhist ethical ideals” (127). Ariyaratne views this communal lifestyle as the “antithesis
of modern, materialist social life” (128). Shramadana embodies a living out of “thisworldly asceticism that leads to dual-liberation” (128). This application of the Eightfold
Path and the Four Divine Abidings is the means for the awakening of both the self and
society.
Ariyaratne’s reinterpretation has been criticized by scholars of Buddhist studies,
as in George Bond’s question: “Does Sarvodaya’s interpretation of the Buddhist teachings sacrifice continuity with the Theravada tradition for the sake of relevance to present
problems?” (128) According to Ariyaratne the answer is in defining Sarvodaya as a “this-
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worldly path” (129). “I cannot awaken myself unless I help awaken others. Others cannot
awaken unless I do” (129).
This is Ariyaratne’s fundamental stance, since the “awakening of all” in the name
Sarvodaya signifies liberation for both the individual and society. He argues that both
forms of liberation are continuous with the original teachings. I agree with Bond that the
Sarvodaya has “maintained continuity” while introducing a social interpretation relevant
to the twenty-first century.
Chapter 13
Buddhadasa Bhikkhu
Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (1906-1993) is known as the first Thai Buddhist reformist
to expand upon Buddhism “outside the state ideology” (Satha-Anand 398). Acharn, or
Ajahn Buddhadasa critiqued the existing Thai political system (398) and proposed
“Dhammic Socialism” as an alternative method of running society. Though he is known
for interpreting Buddhist concepts for a twentieth century Thai audience, he is also
known for drawing from the traditions of Mahayana, Zen and Christianity. Buddhadasa
views Buddhism as a “religion of ‘radical universalism’” (399).
Buddhadasa (literally “slave of the Buddha”) was ordained as a Buddhist monk at
the age of twenty. After six years he left the traditional setting of the monastery and initiated a social experiment in the Thai forest called Suan Mokkh, translated as The Garden
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of Liberation. Buddhadasa spent more than sixty years teaching and applying innovations
of the “Buddha-Dhamma,” interpretations he viewed as continuous with tradition. He
saw it as his life’s work “to restore the Buddha’s teaching to its pristine state” (Bhikkhu,
Santikaro 147). Further, although Buddhadasa reinterpreted or perhaps circumvented the
“narrow religious concerns” (148) he perceived in orthodox Theravada, he saw himself as
returning to the “original source of all Buddhism,” a perspective he called “‘the natural
religion of non-selfishness’” (148). Buddhadasa focused specifically on The Four Noble
Truths, the concepts of not-self, voidness and dependent origination in his reinterpretation of the Pali Tipitaka.
Donald Swearer includes a profile of Buddhadasa in the essay, “Exemplars of
Nonviolence in Theravada Buddhism,” and aptly describes Suan Mokh as a “model
community rather than a place for individuals to retreat from the world” (70). As a community of monks, nuns, and lay men and women, Suan Mokh represents an attempt “to
actualize a balanced state of nature” (70). In this communal setting people practice overcoming their attachment to “self” and direct their behavior toward the good of the whole
community. The single guiding principle for life in Suan Mokh is “not taking more than
one’s fair share – using only what is necessary so that the rest is available for others”
(71). This is also Buddhadasa’s basic definition of socialism, and the foundation of
Dhammic Socialism, his Buddhist sociopolitical theory. Buddhadasa believed the “sociopolitical implications” of Buddhism were “inherently socialistic” (71), that society should
pursue both inner peace and world peace, and that this goal was perfectly in line with the
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purpose of Buddhism. This theory reflects Buddhadasa’s interpretation of “Dhammic” as
living correctly, living according to the Dhamma, perfectly in tune with Nature and the
Law of Nature.
Dhammic means being “‘…honest and virtuous, [but] also requires knowledge. If
one’s knowing is incorrect, no matter how honest and virtuous one may be, one will not
be able to make it Dhammic. They might make laws which go against Nature or that create suffering and danger’” ( Buddhadasa as quoted by Santikaro Bhikkhu 167). Buddhadasa stressed that his view was not based on the modern understanding of socialism-a materialistic socialism having to do with economic and political factors--but was
Dhammic, or moral. “Dhammic Socialism is the principle that society should be governed
for the sake of genuine peace” (Santikaro 167).
Santikaro Bhikkhu identifies several implications in this view of a socialist,
Dhammic society. First, Dhammic Socialism is not separate from Nature, by which Buddhadasa means the law of interdependence. Therefore “all social realities”--from economics and politics, to art, crime and religion--are part of this Nature (168). Second, this
interdependence makes nature “inherently socialistic” (168). “Socialism, as Ajarn Buddhadasa understood it, is a natural consequence of the natural order and of human beings
gathering together in mutually beneficial and supportive groups” (168).Third, Buddhadasa understands the need for human beings to be grateful to society, and their duty or
Dhamma is to “act for the benefit of society” (168). Fourth, this is both a social and a religious duty. Buddhadasa believed that working for the common good in the maintenance
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of “peace, justice and morality” also supported an individual’s religious purpose—that of
abandoning ignorance and realizing nibbana (169). Finally, the idea of Dhammic Socialism is not imported from the West or created in response to interaction with the West,
because there are examples in history like the “Buddhist Socialism” of King Asoka and
others (169).
In this way Buddhadasa argued that the concept of Dhammic Socialism was not a
Western political adaptation, but instead was integral to Thailand’s cultural and religious
heritage and was also inherent in Buddhism. He said that socialism was a moral issue,
and went directly to the idea of siladhamma in Buddhist teachings as his source. He interpreted siladhamma as “‘the condition of being normal; the Dhamma that causes normality, and the thing that is normality (itself)’” (171), where “normality” is defined as
“original as natural form, natural state or condition”, [according to the Pali Text Society
Dictionary] (171). Buddhadasa said that siladhamma applies to human beings’ social
relationships, which are naturally interdependent, and the normal state to strive for is one
that is free of “conflict, violence, injustice, exploitation, and abuse” (171). He said that all
of society should be organized according this principle. His entire concern was to create
conditions in a society which alleviate suffering. He taught that Dhammic Socialism must
not be governed by an egoistic sense of doing good, but by a combination of morality and
wisdom. If the practice of siladhamma is grounded in transcendent truth, there will be no
attachment to results, and actions that benefit the whole will be performed in response to
the natural way things are.
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Buddhadasa proposed a “Dictatorial” Dhammic Socialism and exposed his theory
to criticism, chiefly from commentators on modern Buddhist Studies who would have
expected him to advocate a liberal democracy. Santikaro Bhikkhu points out that Buddhadasa’s use of the word “dictator,” derived from the Thai term “phadetkern,” means
“to expedite, to dispose of quickly, to dictate” (174). Buddhadasa interpreted dictatorship
in a dhammic context, emphasizing a ruler that solves social problems firmly and decisively, but also according to the law of Nature or Dhamma, as he uses the term. Buddhadasa emphasized the Ten Virtues of a Ruler, (rajadhamma), discussed earlier in relation to King Asoka and Nagarjuna. He argued that an individual or a group that ruled in a
way that “conforms to Dhamma” (175) would govern for peace, harmony and a nonviolent society. In the essay “Good Governance: A Buddhist Perspective,” Dr. Tavivat Puntarigvivat quotes Buddhadasa from A Dictatorial Dhammic Socialism:
According to Pali scriptures it became necessary to extend natural socialism to the political foundations of the community when oppression in the
community became intolerable. People saw fit to invest a particularly capable, just leader with their trust and power. This leader or raja would
govern in such a way that no one could oppress anyone else, and the
community would thus enjoy contentment…Socialism as a political system, then, is truly socialistic in so far as its leaders secure the contentment
of the entire community. (Puntarigvivat 3)
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Buddhadasa’s theory is vulnerable to criticism outside of Thailand on a number of
levels, even beyond the potential negative connotations of the word “dictator.” Questions
arise regarding who it is that establishes the “common good,” what community “contentment” really consists of, and what guarantees exist that any dictator possesses and
rules according to the Dhamma. Dr. Puntarigvivat argues that Buddhadasa’s social analysis is linked to traditional Buddhism, which maintains that “social liberation or social
peace is obtained if all individuals are psychologically liberated or peaceful within themselves” (8). He concludes, though, that Buddhadasa’s theory of Dhammic Socialism “fails
to address realistically contemporary political, economic, and social issues…” (10).
Buddhadasa’s social theory critiques “modern economic and political theories as
well as the constructing of a moral guideline to create a new political philosophy” (10),
and is in this sense a vital contribution to modern Buddhism. Although they are an idealistic portrait of a “Buddhist Utopia,” Buddhadasa’s theories represent a model for interpreting traditional Buddhism and its application to social, political and environmental crises in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Chapter 14
Sulak Sivaraksa
Sulak Sivaraksa, born in Thailand in 1933, is founder and director of numerous
organizations and publications both inside and outside of Thailand that promote a Buddhist approach to peace, justice, nonviolence, civil and human rights. Sivaraksa is a prin-
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cipal founder of INEB (International Network of Engaged Buddhists) along with the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh. He has been arrested and exiled for his outspoken criticism of the repression of democracy in Thailand, and in 1995 was awarded the Alternative Nobel Prize (Right Livelihood Award). Donald Swearer, in the essay “Sulak Sivaraksa’s Buddhist Vision,” describes Sivaraksa as a “writer and publisher, lecturer, peripatetic, international conferee, peace and human rights activist, founder of NGOs, Buddhist social critic, and intellectual moralist” (200). As with the social visions of Ariyaratne and Buddhadasa, Sivaraksa unites education with social activism, insisting that both
should be grounded in spiritual development; an “awareness that politics, economics, and
education are not independent ends in themselves but are interdependent parts of a total
human being and human community” (205).
Sulak Sivaraksa’s vision for the ideal society is inspired by an adaptation and reinterpretation of traditional Buddhism. Swearer describes Sulak as more of an advocate
than a scholar, and as more of a prophet than a philosopher (212). “He is concerned to see
the classical Buddhist teachings of the Four Noble Truths, Nibbana, Interdependent Coarising, Not-self, and others not as theories but as guidelines for personal and social transformation” (213). Sivaraksa’s interpretation of Buddhist doctrine is referred to as “practical spirituality” (212).
Sivaraksa interprets traditional Buddhism as a “‘living past’ with the power to
challenge and transform, to inspire people to be more generous and compassionate and
for societies to be more just and nonviolent” (213). He emphasizes a return to the Three-
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fold Refuge or the Triple Gem of the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha. In this model, of course, the Buddha is the universal archetype of virtue, the Middle way is the Law,
or the path of harmony and mindfulness, and the Sangha is the embodiment of a peaceful,
cooperative community fostering “economic simplicity and spiritual cultivation” (213).
Sivaraksa also extols the concepts of Buddhist kingship, citing the examples of King
Asoka and others from the Pali scriptures as models of virtuous and compassionate rulers.
Sivaraksa teaches a return to the essential core of Buddhist doctrine, which he refers to as “small ‘b’ Buddhism.” This is in contrast to the “capital ‘B’ Buddhism” which
is too culturally intertwined with “Thai chauvinism and militaristic, aggressive values”
(205). The essence of small ‘b’ Buddhism is in the Four Noble Truths, the Five Precepts,
and the Four Divine Abodes. Sivaraksa interprets “right view” in the Noble Eightfold
Path as “the realization that nothing exists independently and permanently” (217).
Achieving right view results in three fundamental personal states of spiritual transformation: “overcoming selfishness, becoming detached from worldly gains, and realizing
one’s interdependence with others” (217). Sivaraksa defines the suffering of the First
Noble Truth on the societal level as “dehumanizing social, economic, and political forces” (217). Therefore, social activism aimed at the alleviation of this kind of suffering derives from this perspective of “right view.”
Sivaraksa’s interpretation of the Five Precepts is also both personal and global.
The precept of not taking life extends from literally not killing, to actively opposing such
things as weapons, production of weapons, production and indiscriminate use of pesti-
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cides. The vow to not steal expands into the realms of ethical marketing, ethical consumption, and human exploitation. Sivaraksa enlarges the precept against sexual misconduct to the realm of women’s rights and issues related to abortion and population control.
The precept that vows against falsehood involves not only the personal level, but also the
world of advertising, media and education (218). The fifth and final precept concerning
the abuse of intoxicants similarly extends beyond the personal to the realm of industry
and the production of drugs, tobacco and alcohol (218).
Sivaraksa interprets the Four Divine Abodes--love, compassion, sympathetic joy,
and equanimity--to “exemplify his commitment to the truth of the mutually interconnected nature of all things (idappaccayata)” (219). Only by cultivating these virtues, according to Sivaraksa, can the individual attain a state of selfless indifference and share in the
suffering caused by the inequities between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the
powerless (219). Such a state of spiritual growth allows one to teach and guide others to
perceive a balance between the “inner journey of spiritual perfection and the outer path of
social justice and harmony” (219). The unification of these two paths, integral to Sivaraksa’s vision, reveals another example of mutual interdependence (219).
In addition to the four Noble Truths, the Five Precepts and the Four Divine
Abodes, Sivaraksa emphasizes a return to the Four Dhammas – sharing, pleasant speech,
constructive actions and equality (220). He critiques the moral order of contemporary society and proposes the essential core teachings as ethical “guidelines for personal and social moral transformation” (220). And, since the world is “mutually interconnected,” so-
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ciety should expect its leaders to model self-awareness and righteousness, and to act with
loving-kindness and mindfulness as they work towards a more just society and the cessation of suffering. Finally, selflessness, non-exploitation, and non-violence are at the heart
of Sivaraksa’s application of traditional Buddhist teachings. These conditions will derive
from the practice of charity, morality, and meditation, and will result in selfless individuals working for the welfare of their community and their world.
The premise throughout this thesis is that traditional Buddhism contains a theory
for social engagement. Ariyaratne, Buddhadasa and Sivaraksa are exemplars of a Buddhist social activism that is more than “latent,” whose teachings embody a modern application and re-interpretation of the original teachings, but do not depend on the West for
validation. I now propose a synthesis of both traditional and modern Buddhism found in
the teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama--twenty-first century spiritual heroes whose spirit of engagement does not sacrifice tradition.
Chapter 15
Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama
Thich Nhat Hanh was born in central Vietnam in 1926 and became a monk at the
age of sixteen. In the early 1960s he founded the SYSS (School of Youth for Social Services), an expansive relief organization agency benefitting schools, the homeless, medical
centers and village farmers. SYSS is based on the Buddhist principles of nonviolence and
compassionate action. Nhat Hanh also founded publishing houses, a peace activist maga-
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zine, and a Buddhist university. Both Communist and non-Communist governments in
Vietnam banned Nhat Hanh for his efforts to undermine violence towards the masses, and
he has lived in exile since 1966. He is a prolific writer of poetry and prose, and has taught
and lectured on several American college campuses including Princeton, Columbia and
Cornell (Lopez Modern 201-202).
Thich Nhat Hanh founded The Order of Interbeing (Tiep Hien) in 1966, ordaining
the six original members of the Board of Directors from the SYSS, three men and three
women (Intro vii). This original core group has since expanded to thousands of members
and hundreds of Sanghas throughout the world. Fred Eppsteiner describes Nhat Hanh’s
“Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings of the Order of Interbeing” as rooted in “traditional
Buddhist morality” (vii) and readily adapted to contemporary social and moral dilemmas.
The Order is “a true expression of the bodhisattva practice of socially engaged Buddhism” (ix).
Nhat Hanh explicates the significance of the name Tiep Hien in his preface to Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism. Tiep translates as “being in touch
with” and “continuing,” and Hien translates as “realizing” and “making it here now” (3).
Therefore the guiding principles of Tiep Hien are to be in touch with the “reality of the
world and the mind,” at its most essential, and being in touch with “Buddhas and bodhisattvas” (3). Continuation means “extending and perpetuating the career of enlightenment
that was started and nourished by the Buddhas and bodhisattvas who preceded us” (4).
This aspect of realization means self-transformation based on understanding and compas-
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sion, because “calmness and serenity” can only be shared with others after they are realized within the individual. Nhat Hanh describes “making it here and now” as the secret of
Buddhism; peace for ourselves and others now, not in some future “paradise or Buddhaland” (6).
It is important to note the language in The Charter of the Order of Interbeing because it clearly documents an allegiance to the original teachings while illustrating a
practical application in contemporary society. Article Two for example states, “The aim
of the Order is to actualize Buddhism by studying, experimenting with, and applying
Buddhism in modern life with a special emphasis on the bodhisattva ideal” (105). Article
Three of The Charter states: “The Order of Interbeing was founded within the Linji
School of dhyana Buddhism. It is grounded in the Four Spirits: the spirit of nonattachment from views, the spirit of direct experimentation on the nature of interdependent
origination through meditation, the spirit of appropriateness, and the spirit of skillful
means. All four are to be found in all Buddhist traditions” (105). Article Five: “The Order
of Interbeing…draws inspiration from the essence of the Buddhadharma in all sutras…The Order of Interbeing seeks to realize the spirit of the Dharma in early Buddhism, as well as in the development of that spirit through the history of the Sangha, and
its life and teachings in all Buddhist traditions” (195). And in Article Seven: “The Order
of Interbeing…seeks all forms of action that can revive and sustain the true spirit of insight and compassion in life. It considers this spirit to be more important than any Buddhist institution or tradition. With the aspiration of a bodhisattva, members of the Order
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of Interbeing seek to change themselves in order to change society in the direction of
compassion and understanding by living a joyful and mindful life” (107).
Thich Nhat Hanh’s Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings are derived from the precepts
and trainings in Buddhist sutras. He purposely incorporates the term trainings instead of
precepts because he believes it is more consistent with the meaning of “guidelines.” The
fourteen Trainings are a reflection of the Eightfold Path. All of the Trainings contain the
introductory phrase, “Aware of the suffering created,” or “brought on by…” followed by
the pledge of commitment. What follows is an abbreviated version of the Fourteen Mindfulness Trainings:
1. Aware of the suffering created by fanaticism and intolerance, we are determined not to be idolatrous about or bound to any doctrine, theory, or ideology,
even Buddhist ones…
2. Aware of the suffering created by attachment to views and wrong perceptions,
we are determined to avoid being narrow-minded and bound to present views…
3. Aware of the suffering brought about when we impose our views on others, we
are committed not to force others…to adopt our views…
4. Aware that looking deeply at the nature of suffering can help us develop compassion and find ways out of suffering, we are determined not to avoid or close
our eyes before suffering…
5. Aware that true happiness is rooted in peace, solidity, freedom, and compassion, and not in wealth or fame, we are determined not to take as the aim of our
life fame, profit, wealth, or sensual pleasure, nor to accumulate wealth while millions are hungry and dying…
6. Aware that anger blocks communication and creates suffering, we are determined to take care of the energy of anger when it arises and to recognize and
transform the seeds of anger that lie deep in our consciousness…
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7. Aware that life is available only in the present moment and that it is possible to
live happily in the here and now, we are committed to training ourselves to live
deeply each moment of daily life…
8. Aware that lack of communication always brings separation and suffering, we
are committed to training ourselves in the practice of compassionate listening and
loving speech…
9. Aware that words can create suffering or happiness we are committed to learning to speak truthfully and constructively, using only words that inspire hope and
confidence…
10. Aware that the essence and aim of a Sangha is the practice of understanding
and compassion, we are determined not to use the Buddhist community for personal gain or profit or transform our community into a political instrument…
11. Aware that great violence and injustice have been done to our environment
and society, we are committed not to live with a vocation that is harmful to humans and nature…
12. Aware that much suffering is caused by war and conflict, we are determined
to cultivate nonviolence, understanding, and compassion in our daily lives, to
promote peace education, mindful mediation, and reconciliation within families,
communities, nations, and in the world…
13. Aware of the suffering caused by exploitation, social injustice, stealing, and
oppression, we are committed to cultivating loving kindness and learning ways to
work for the well-being of people, animals, plants, and minerals…
14. (For lay members): Aware that sexual relations motivated by craving cannot
dissipate the feeling of loneliness but will create more suffering, frustration, and
isolation, we are determined not to engage in sexual relations without mutual understanding, love, and a long-term commitment…(17-21)
Thich Nhat Hanh also incorporates the Five Precepts, but adapts the language
within the context of “guidelines” and “trainings.” The First of the Five Mindfulness
Trainings reads: “Aware of the suffering caused by the destruction of life, I am committed to cultivating compassion and learning ways to protect the lives of people, animals,
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plants, and minerals. I am determined not to kill, not to let others kill, and not to condone
any act of killing in the world, in my thinking, and in my way of life”(69). In a standard
translation of the Five Precepts, this First Precept reads, “I undertake to observe the precept…1. To abstain from the taking of life…” It is crucial to an understanding of Thich
Nhat Hanh’s position to compare this Precept with his Mindfulness Training. As an engaged Buddhist he says it is not enough to simply abstain from taking life; he shifts the
passive tone of the Precept to the active voice by expressing the imperative to intervene-not allowing or condoning violence and killing on any level, whether physical or psychological.
This example illustrates the point at which Thich Nhat Hanh acknowledges tradition but also shifts the emphasis to the level of engagement. We read in Verse 183 of The
Dhammapada, known as a summary of the Buddhist path and the “Chief of all Sayings”:
“To avoid all evil, to cultivate good, and to cleanse one's mind — this is the teaching of
the Buddhas”(Access). Thich Nhat Hanh encourages practitioners to move beyond avoiding evil and into the realm of actively engaging in doing good. In engaged Buddhist Studies terminology this is the impulse known as the “imperative to act.” Not a break from
tradition but a modern application of the original teachings.
Thich Nhat Hanh’s Mindfulness Trainings teach from the core of traditional Buddhist teachings. The Trainings represent a Buddhist code of ethical behavioral for the individual in relation to society, not cut off from society, and he thus emphasizes the interdependence of all things. Thich Nhat Hanh says: “When we go to a meditation center, we
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may have the impression that we leave everything behind…and come as an individual in
order to practice and to search for peace. This is already an illusion, because in Buddhism
there is no such thing as an individual…We have to nourish society. If we are uprooted
from society, we cannot transform it into a more livable place for us and for our children”
(King Being 92-93). Thich Nhat Hanh’s teachings embody traditional Buddhism, illustrate the justification for social engagement, and define a continuous path for the transformation of both self and society.
Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, was born in Tibet in 1935 and following the Chinese invasion and occupation in 1959 was forced to flee to India. He has lived
in exile since then, and has led a continuous campaign for human rights and world peace
based on core Buddhist teachings. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. One force of
the Dalai Lama’s teachings is their simplicity and practicality and that they are easily
adapted to twenty-first century life. The guilelessness of the Dalai Lama’s personality is
disarming, his teachings have a worldwide appeal, and everything he says can be traced
to some fundamental Buddhist scripture. The Dalai Lama emphasizes the classical teachings of compassion and responsibility for the welfare of others. “He begins from the
common Buddhist belief that all beings are motivated to find happiness and to avoid suffering” (Lopez A Modern 218), and that all beings equally deserve to find these conditions. Although consistently gentle and soft-spoken in temperament, his message is anything but meek. In response to hearing of the increasing number of billionaires in the
United States for example, the Dalai Lama says, “This I consider to be completely im-
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moral. It is also a potential source of problems. While millions do not even have the basic
necessities of life—adequate food, shelter, education, and medical facilities—the inequity
of wealth distribution is a scandal” (King Being 218). Speaking as a relentless advocate
of human rights he says, “If we are serious in our commitment to the fundamental principles of equality, principles which, I believe, lie at the heart of the concept of human
rights, today’s economic disparity can no longer be ignored…We have a responsibility to
find ways to achieve a more equitable distribution of world’s resources” (156).
Compassion, the distinguishing feature of the bodhisattva, “is a quality with
which all humans are endowed [and it must be] developed to form the basis of human
interaction and human society, serving as the foundation for policies of non-violence”
(218). This is the basis for the Dalai Lama’s pervasive motif advocating “universal human responsibility.” In Ethics for the New Millenium the Dalai Lama writes, “…it is essential that we cultivate a sense of what I call universal responsibility… What is entailed…is…a reorientation of our heart and mind away from self and toward others…to
develop an attitude of mind whereby, when we see an opportunity to benefit others, we
will take it in preference to merely looking after our own narrow interests”(159). Elsewhere he says, “Universal responsibility is the key to human survival. It is the best foundation for world peace” (157).
Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai Lama embody the Vow of the Bodhisattva-working toward the alleviation of suffering in all sentient beings. The Dalai Lama closes
his Ethics for the New Millennium in this way: “This, then, is my true religion, my simple
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faith…Our own heart, our own mind, is the temple. The doctrine is compassion. Love for
others and respect for their rights and dignity, no matter who or what they are: ultimately
these are all we need” (163).
Chapter 16
Conclusion
In the introduction to this thesis I suggest that the heart of Buddhist social ethics
motivates both the individual seeker of Nirvana and the seeker for social justice because
the paths are synonymous. The profiles of the various Buddhist exemplars and commentators over the centuries prove this statement valid. Numerous scholars and commentators
assert social engagement and continuity with tradition to be the essence of Buddhism;
they argue that “disengagement” is a Western misperception, and that prophetic or deeply
engaged precursors in Buddhist history cannot be ignored. In The Dhammapada the Buddha teaches patience and forbearance: “Hatred is never appeased by hatred.” King Asoka
and Nagarjuna encourage individual pursuit of the Dharma while transforming society
into a positive Buddhist welfare state. Ariyaratne, Buddhadasa, Sivaraksa--all advocate
the ethical conduct of an ideal citizen in an ideal society. Thich Nhat Hanh and the Dalai
Lama teach mindfulness, compassion, the imperative to act, and universal responsibility-all expressions of engaged Buddhism that are continuous with tradition. Again, the original premise is valid: there is strong scriptural and philosophical continuity between ancient traditional Buddhism and modern engaged Buddhism.
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Buddhism teaches a path to liberation through moral training, self-transformation,
and purity of character. Throughout the scriptures Buddha teaches that work for the welfare of others and work for one’s own welfare are mutually beneficial. Buddhism is therefore not selfish or passive because transformation of self also works to transform society.
The Dhammapada expresses this motivation in simple terms: “To avoid all evil, to cultivate good, and to cleanse one's mind — this is the teaching of the Buddhas.”
Buddhism teaches an ethics of virtue and altruism. Practicing Buddha’s guidelines
for right action will teach the practitioner to avoid greed, hatred, and delusion, and will
nourish the cultivation of their opposites--generosity, compassion, and wisdom. When the
“three poisons” play out at the community level they are referred to as institutionalized,
manifest in the form of severe poverty, violence, political and racial oppression. It is consistent with core Buddhist teachings to work to alleviate this kind of suffering since these
conditions cause spiritual suffering. It is a fundamental goal in Buddhism to create conditions in society that allow for oneself and others to pursue liberation--to socially engage
on behalf of the welfare of others.
I cannot agree with Ken Jones’ distinctions between soft-enders and hard-enders,
where engagement begins only with the hard-enders—individuals committed to “influencing public policy and establishing new institutional forms.” I also cannot agree with
Christopher Queen that Asian Buddhism becomes engaged only when filtered through
Western theories of political activism. Although the Western political approach to social
activism creates an intriguing and invaluable blend of Buddhist compassion with
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protestant selflessness, it is not because of interaction with the West that engaged Buddhism exists.
As stated early in this thesis, I do not argue in favor of some pure form of Buddhism untainted by interaction with the West, and I have no objection to applications and
interpretations of the original teachings to suit contemporary conditions. I believe though,
that the Buddha’s original teachings contain everything humanity needs to pursue a more
peaceful and harmonious society--a Dhammic Socialism that is conducive to both individual and social liberation. I believe that the welfare of humankind--East and West--will
benefit as societies continue to awaken to the practicality of the Dharma; as individuals
adhere to the Five Precepts; and as every member of society actively practices kindness
and compassion. Here is the final point: I believe this skillful pursuit of the Middle Way
is engaged Buddhism, and such acts of self-transformation have the power to change the
world.
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