CHAPTER 23
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Learning Objectives
LO1 The different types of mergers and acquisitions, why they should (or shouldn’t)
take place, and the terminology associated with them.
LO2 How accountants construct the combined balance sheet of a new company.
LO3 Taxable versus tax-free acquisitions.
LO4 Some financial side effects of mergers and acquisitions.
LO5 Cash versus common stock financing in mergers and acquisitions.
LO6 How to estimate the NPV of a merger or an acquisition.
LO7 The gains from a merger or acquisition and how to value the transaction.
LO8 Divestitures involving equity carve-outs and spin-offs.
Answers to Concepts Review and Critical Thinking Questions
1.
(LO1)
a.
Greenmail refers to the practice of paying unwanted suitors who hold an equity stake in the firm a
premium over the market value of their shares, to eliminate the potential takeover threat.
b.
A white knight refers to an outside bidder that a target firm brings in to acquire it, rescuing the
firm from a takeover by some other unwanted hostile bidder.
c.
A golden parachute refers to lucrative compensation and termination packages granted to
management in the event the firm is acquired.
d.
The crown jewels usually refer to the most valuable or prestigious assets of the firm, which in the
event of a hostile takeover attempt, the target sometimes threatens to sell.
e.
Shark repellent generally refers to any defensive tactic employed by the firm to resist hostile
takeover attempts.
f.
A corporate raider usually refers to a person or firm that specializes in the hostile takeover of
other firms.
g.
A poison pill is an amendment to the corporate charter granting the shareholders the right to
purchase shares at little or no cost in the event of a hostile takeover, thus making the acquisition
prohibitively expensive for the hostile bidder.
h.
A tender offer is the legal mechanism required by the exchange when a bidding firm goes directly
to the shareholders of the target firm in an effort to purchase their shares.
i.
A leveraged buyout refers to the purchase of the shares of a publicly-held company and its
subsequent conversion into a privately-held company, financed primarily with debt.
2.
(LO4) Diversification doesn’t create value in and of itself because diversification reduces unsystematic,
not systematic, risk. As discussed in the chapter on options, there is a more subtle issue as well.
Reducing unsystematic risk benefits bondholders by making default less likely. However, if a merger is
done purely to diversify (i.e., no operating synergy), then the NPV of the merger is zero. If the NPV is
zero, and the bondholders are better off, then stockholders must be worse off.
3.
(LO1) A firm might choose to split up because the newer, smaller firms may be better able to focus on
their particular markets. Thus, reverse synergy is a possibility. An added advantage is that performance
evaluation becomes much easier once the split is made because the new firm’s financial results (and
stock prices) are no longer commingled.
4.
(LO1) It depends on how they are used. If they are used to protect management, then they are not good
for stockholders. If they are used by management to negotiate the best possible terms of a merger, then
they are good for stockholders.
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5.
(LO3) One of the primary advantages of a taxable merger is the write-up in the basis of the target
firm’s assets, while one of the primary disadvantages is the capital gains tax that is payable. The
situation is the reverse for a tax-free merger.
The basic determinant of tax status is whether or not the old stockholders will continue to participate in
the new company, which is usually determined by whether they get any shares in the bidding firm. An
LBO is usually taxable because the acquiring group pays off the current stockholders in full, usually in
cash.
6.
(LO7) Economies of scale occur when average cost declines as output levels increase. A merger in this
particular case might make sense because Eastern and Western may need less total capital investment to
handle the peak power needs, thereby reducing average generation costs.
7.
(LO1) Among the defensive tactics often employed by management are seeking white knights,
threatening to sell the crown jewels, appealing to regulatory agencies and the courts (if possible), and
targeted share repurchases. Frequently, antitakeover charter amendments are available as well, such as
poison pills, poison puts, golden parachutes, lockup agreements, and supermajority amendments, but
these require shareholder approval, so they can’t be immediately used if time is short. While target firm
shareholders may benefit from management actively fighting acquisition bids, in that it encourages
higher bidding and may solicit bids from other parties as well, there is also the danger that such
defensive tactics will discourage potential bidders from seeking the firm in the first place, which harms
the shareholders.
8.
(LO7) In a cash offer, it almost surely does not make sense. In a stock offer, management may feel that
one suitor is a better long-run investment than the other, but this is only valid if the market is not
efficient. In general, the highest offer is the best one.
9.
(LO7) Various reasons include: (1) Anticipated gains may be smaller than thought; (2) Bidding firms
are typically much larger, so any gains are spread thinly across shares; (3) Management may not be
acting in the shareholders’ best interest with many acquisitions; (4) Competition in the market for
takeovers may force prices for target firms up to the zero NPV level; and (5) Market participants may
have already discounted the gains from the merger before it is announced.
10. (LO8) An equity carve-out is a type of divestiture wherein the parent firm creates an entirely new
company through an IPO and the new shareholders become the owners of the public company. In a
spin-off, the parent company distributes subsidiary shares to existing stockholders and no new equity is
raised. In a carve-out the parent is attempting to gain some value from a business unit that does not
necessarily fit into its strategic plan. In a spin-off the parent is simply distancing itself from a
subsidiary by transferring ownership to existing shareholders. When Wendy’s sold a portion of Tim
Horton’s through a carve-out, it was able to raise new funds to finance other operations. The spin-off
of Allstate by Sears made sense since Sears did not want to continue in the insurance business and
divested itself of its insurance division through this restructuring mechanism.
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Solutions to Questions and Problems
NOTE: All end of chapter problems were solved using a spreadsheet. Many problems require multiple steps.
Due to space and readability constraints, when these intermediate steps are included in this solutions
manual, rounding may appear to have occurred. However, the final answer for each problem is found
without rounding during any step in the problem.
Basic
1.
(LO7) For the merger to make economic sense, the acquirer must feel the acquisition will increase
value by at least the amount of the premium over the market value, so:
Minimum economic value = $417,000,000 – 376,000,000 = $41,000,000
2.
(LO7) The maximum cash price per share for Devonshire that should be paid is the existing share price
plus the one-time benefit per share:
Maximum share price = $70 + ($120,000,000 / 4,000,000)
Maximum share price = $90
3.
(LO2)
a) Since neither company has any debt, using the pooling method, the asset value of the combined
must equal the value of the equity, so:
Assets = Equity = 40,000($14) + 15,000($4) = $620,000
b)
With the purchase accounting method, the assets of the combined firm will be the book value of
Firm X, the acquiring company, plus the market value of Firm Y, the target company, so:
Assets from X = 40,000($14) = $560,000 (book value)
Assets from Y = 15,000($17) = $255,000 (market value)
The purchase price of Firm Y is the number of shares outstanding times the sum of the current
stock price per share plus the premium per share, so:
Purchase price of Y = 15,000($17 + 6) = $345,000
The goodwill created will be:
Goodwill = $345,000 – 255,000 = $90,000
And the total asset of the combined company will be:
Total assets XY = Total equity XY = $560,000 + 255,000 + 90,000 = $905,000
XY Co., post-merger
Assets
Goodwill
Total
$815,000
90,000
$905,000
Equity
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$905,000
$905,000
4.
(LO2) In the pooling method, all accounts of both companies are added together to total the accounts in
the new company, so the post-merger balance sheet will be:
Amherst Co., post-merger
Current assets
Fixed assets
Total
5.
$15,400
42,400
Current liabilities
Long-term debt
Equity
$57,800
$ 6,600
11,700
39,500
$57,800
(LO2) Since the acquisition is funded by long-term debt, the post-merger balance sheet will have longterm debt equal to the original long-term debt of Amherst’s balance sheet, plus the original long-term
debt on Essex’s balance sheet, plus the new long-term debt issue, so:
Post-merger long-term debt = $9,800 + 1,900 + 16,000 = $27,709
Goodwill will be created since the acquisition price is greater than the book value. The goodwill
amount is equal to the purchase price minus the market value of assets, plus the market value of the
acquired company’s debt. Generally, the market value of current assets is equal to the book value, so:
Goodwill = $16,000 – ($9,300 market value FA) – ($3,400 market value CA) + ($1,300 + 1,900)
Goodwill = $6,500
Equity will remain the same as the pre-merger balance sheet of the acquiring firm. Current assets and
debt accounts will be the sum of the two firm’s pre-merger balance sheet accounts, and the fixed assets
will be the sum of the pre-merger fixed assets of the acquirer and the market value of fixed assets of the
target firm. The post-merger balance sheet will be:
Amherst Co., post-merger
Current assets
Fixed assets
Goodwill
Total
6.
$15,400
45,300
6,500
$67,200
Current liabilities
Long-term debt
Equity
$ 6,600
27,700
32,900
$67,200
(LO2) In the pooling method, all accounts of both companies are added together to total the accounts in
the new company, so the post-merger balance sheet will be:
Knapps Enterprises, post-merger
Current assets
Other assets
Net fixed assets
Total
7.
$ 6,100
1,710
22,100
$29,910
Current liabilities
Long-term debt
Equity
$ 4,150
7,500
18,260
$22,910
(LO2) Since the acquisition is funded by long-term debt, the post-merger balance sheet will have longterm debt equal to the original long-term debt of Knapp’s balance sheet plus the new long-term debt
issue, so:
Post-merger long-term debt = $7,500 + 13000 = $20,500
Equity will remain the same as the pre-merger balance sheet of the acquiring firm. Current assets,
current liabilities, long-term debt, and other assets will be the sum of the two firm’s pre-merger balance
sheet accounts, and the fixed assets will be the sum of the pre-merger fixed assets of the acquirer and
the market value of fixed assets of the target firm. Note, in this case, the market value and the book
value of fixed assets is the same. We can calculate the goodwill as the plug variable which makes the
balance sheet balance. The post-merger balance sheet will be:
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Knapp’s Enterprises, post-merger
Current assets
Other assets
Net fixed assets
Goodwill
Total
8.
$ 6,200
1,710
24,000
3,840
$35,650
Current liabilities
Long-term debt
Equity
$ 4,150
20,500
11,000
$35,650
(LO5)
a.
The cash cost is the amount of cash offered, so the cash cost is $95 million.
To calculate the cost of the stock offer, we first need to calculate the value of the target to the
acquirer. The value of the target firm to the acquiring firm will be the market value of the target
plus the PV of the incremental cash flows generated by the target firm. The cash flows are a
perpetuity, so
V* = $43,000,000 + $2,000,000/.10 = $63,000,000
The cost of the stock offer is the percentage of the acquiring firm given up times the sum of the
market value of the acquiring firm and the value of the target firm to the acquiring firm. So, the
equity cost will be:
Equity cost = .40($89,000,000 + 63,000,000) = $60,800,000
b.
The NPV of each offer is the value of the target firm to the acquiring firm minus the cost of
acquisition, so:
NPV cash = $63,000,000 – 61,000,000 = $12,000,000
NPV stock = $63,000,000 – 60,800,000 = $12,200,000
c.
9.
Since the NPV is greater with the stock offer, the acquisition should be in stock.
(LO1)
a.
The EPS of the combined company will be the sum of the earnings of both companies divided by
the shares in the combined company. Since the stock offer is one share of the acquiring firm for
three shares of the target firm, new shares in the acquiring firm will increase by one-third. So, the
new EPS will be:
EPS = ($180,000 + 810,000)/[210,000 + (1/3)(90,000)] = $4,125
The market price of Dover will remain unchanged if it is a zero NPV acquisition. Using the PE
ratio, we find the current market price of Dover stock, which is:
P = 21($810,000)/210,000 = $81
If the acquisition has a zero NPV, the stock price should remain unchanged. Therefore, the new
PE will be:
P/E = $81/$4.125 = 19.64
b.
The value of Tilbury to Dover must be the market value of the company since the NPV of the
acquisition is zero. Therefore, the value is:
V* = $180,000(13.5) = $2,430,000
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The cost of the acquisition is the number of shares offered times the share price, so the cost is:
Cost = (1/3)(90,000)($81) = $2,430.000
So, the NPV of the acquisition is:
NPV = 0 = V* + V – Cost = $2,430.000+ V – 2,430.000
V = $0
Although there is no economic value to the takeover, it is possible that Dover is motivated to
purchase Tilbury for other than financial reasons.
10. (LO5)
a.
The NPV of the merger is the market value of the target firm, plus the value of the synergy, minus
the acquisition costs, so:
NPV = 1,500($19) + $8,700 – 1,500($21) = $5,700
b.
Since the NPV goes directly to stockholders, the share price of the merged firm will be the market
value of the acquiring firm plus the NPV of the acquisition, divided by the number of shares
outstanding, so:
Share price = [5,400($47) + $5,700]/5,400 = $48.05
c.
The merger premium is the premium per share times the number of shares of the target firm
outstanding, so the merger premium is:
Merger premium = 1,500($21 – 19) = $3,000
d.
The number of new shares will be the number of shares of the target times the exchange ratio, so:
New shares created = 1,500(1/2) = 750 new shares
The value of the merged firm will be the market value of the acquirer plus the market value of the
target plus the synergy benefits, so:
VBT = 5,400($47) + 1,500($19) + 8,700 = $291,000
The price per share of the merged firm will be the value of the merged firm divided by the total
shares of the new firm, which is:
P = $291,000/(5,400 + 750) = $47.31
e.
The NPV of the acquisition using a share exchange is the market value of the target firm plus
synergy benefits, minus the cost. The cost is the value per share of the merged firm times the
number of shares offered to the target firm shareholders, so:
NPV = 1,500($19) + $8,700 – 750($47.31) = $13,545
Intermediate
11. (LO5) The share offer is better for the target firm shareholders since they receive only $21 per share in
cash . In the share offer, the target firm’s shareholders will receive:
Equity offer value = (1/2)($47.31) = $23.655 per share
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From Problem 10, we know the value of the merged firm’s assets will be $291,000. The number of
shares in the new firm will be:
Shares in new firm = 5,400 + 1,500x
that is, the number of shares outstanding in the bidding form, plus the number of shares outstanding in
the target firm, times the exchange ratio. This means the post merger share price will be:
P = $291,000/(5,400 + 1,500x)
To make the target firm’s shareholders indifferent, they must receive the same wealth, so:
1,500(x)P = 1,500($21)
This equation shows that the new offer is the shares outstanding in the target company times the
exchange ratio times the new stock price. The value under the cash offer is the shares outstanding times
the cash offer price. Solving this equation for P, we find:
P = $21 / x
Combining the two equations, we find:
$291,000/(5,400 + 1,500x) = $21 / x
x = .437
There is a simpler solution that requires an economic understanding of the merger terms. If the target
firm’s shareholders are indifferent, the bidding firm’s shareholders are indifferent as well. That is, the
offer is a zero sum game. Using the new stock price produced by the cash deal, we find:
Exchange ratio = $21/$48.05 = .437
12. (LO1) The cost of the acquisition is:
Cost = 200($49) = $9,800
Since the stock price of the acquiring firm is $43, the firm will have to give up:
Shares offered = $9,800/$43 = 227.907 shares (assuming NPV = 0)
a.
The EPS of the merged firm will be the combined EPS of the existing firms divided by the new
shares outstanding, so:
EPS = ($1,400 + 600)/(1000 + 227.907) = $1.6288
b.
The PE of the acquiring firm is:
Original P/E = $43/($1,400/1000) = 30.714 times
Assuming the PE ratio does not change, the new stock price will be:
New P = $1.6288(30.714) = $50.03
c.
If the market correctly analyzes the earnings, the stock price will remain unchanged since this is a
zero NPV acquisition, so:
New P/E = $43/$1.6288 = 25.41 times
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d.
The new share price will be the combined market value of the two existing companies divided by
the number of shares outstanding in the merged company. So:
P = [(1000)($43) + 200($47)]/(1000 + 227.907) = $42.673
And the PE ratio of the merged company will be:
P/E = $42.67/$1.6288 = 26.19 times
At the proposed bid price, this is a negative NPV acquisition for A since the share price declines.
They should revise their bid downward until the NPV is zero.
13. (LO6) Beginning with the fact that the NPV of a merger is the value of the target minus the cost, we
get:
NPV
NPV
NPV
NPV
= VB* – Cost
= V + VB – Cost
= V – (Cost – VB)
= V – Merger premium
14. (LO6, 7)
a.
The present value of the merger gain is the value of the perpetual savings:
Present value of merger gain = $800,000 / .14
Present value of merger gain = $5,714,285.71
b.
The cost of the cash offer is the total price paid for shares:
Cost = $25 x 2,500,000
Cost = $62,500,000
c.
The NPV of the offer is the PV of the merger gain plus the PV of the shares minus the cash cost:
NPV of cash offer = $18 x 2,500,000 + $5,714,285.71 – $62,500,000 = $50,714,285.71 – $62.5M
NPV of cash offer = -$11,785,714.29
15. (LO6, 7)
a.
The synergy will be the present value of the incremental cash flows of the proposed purchase.
Since the cash flows are perpetual, the synergy value is:
Synergy value = $350,000 / .08
Synergy value = $4,375,000
b.
The value of Harwich to Raleigh is the synergy plus the current market value of Harwich, which
is:
Value = $4,375,000+ 9,000,000
Value = $13,375,000
c.
The value of the cash option is the amount of cash paid, or $12 million. The value of the stock
acquisition is the percentage of ownership in the merged company, times the value of the merged
company, so:
Stock acquisition value = .25($13,375,000 + 23,000,000)
Stock acquisition value = $9,093,750
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d.
The NPV is the value of the acquisition minus the cost, so the NPV of each alternative is:
NPV of cash offer = $13,375,000 – 12,000,000
NPV of cash offer = $1,375,000
NPV of stock offer = $13,375,000 – 9,093,750
NPV of stock offer = $4,281,250
e.
The acquirer should make the stock offer since its NPV is greater.
16. (LO5, 7)
a.
The number of shares after the acquisition will be the current number of shares outstanding for the
acquiring firm, plus the number of new shares created for the acquisition, which is:
Number of shares after acquisition = 5,000,000 + 1,200,000
Number of shares after acquisition = 6,200,000
And the share price will be the value of the combined company divided by the shares outstanding,
which will be:
New stock price = $185,000,000 / 6,200,000
New stock price = $29.83870968
b.
Let  equal the fraction of ownership for the target shareholders in the new firm. We can set the
percentage of ownership in the new firm equal to the value of the cash offer, so:
($185,000,000) = $50,000,000
 = .27027 or 27.027%
So, the shareholders of the target firm would be equally as well off if they received 30 percent of
the stock in the new company as if they received the cash offer. The ownership percentage of the
target firm shareholders in the new firm can be expressed as:
Ownership = New shares issued / (New shares issued + Current shares of acquiring firm)
.27027 = New shares issued / (New shares issued + 5,000,000)
New shares issued = 1,851,849.31
To find the exchange ratio, we divide the new shares issued to the shareholders of the target firm
by the existing number of shares in the target firm, so:
Exchange ratio = New shares / Existing shares in target firm
Exchange ratio = 1,851,849.31/ 2,000,000
Exchange ratio = .9259
An exchange ratio of .9259 shares of the merged company for each share of the target company
owned would make the value of the stock offer equivalent to the value of the cash offer.
Challenge
17. (LO5, 6, 7)
a.
To find the value of the target to the acquirer, we need to find the share price with the new growth
rate. We begin by finding the required return for shareholders of the target firm. The earnings per
share of the target are:
EPSP = $640,000/175,000 = $3,657 per share
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The price per share is:
PP = 9.2($3.657) = $33.646
And the dividends per share are:
DPSP = $310,000/175,000 = $1.77
The current required return for Orford shareholders, which incorporates the risk of the company
is:
RE = [$1.77(1.05)/$ 33.646] + .05 = .1052
The price per share of Pulitzer with the new growth rate is:
PP = $1.77(1.07)/(.1052 – .07) = $53.80397727
The value of the target firm to the acquiring firm is the number of shares outstanding times the
price per share under the new growth rate assumptions, so:
VT* = 175,000($53.80397727) = $9,415,696.02
b.
The gain to the acquiring firm will be the value of the target firm to the acquiring firm minus the
market value of the target, so:
Gain = $9,415,696.02 – 175,000($33.646) = $3,527,646.02
c.
The NPV of the acquisition is the value of the target firm to the acquiring firm minus the cost of
the acquisition, so:
NPV = $9,415,696.02 – 175,000($38) = $2,765,696.02
d.
The most the acquiring firm should be willing to pay per share is the offer price per share plus the
NPV per share, so:
Maximum bid price = $38 + ($2,765,696.02/175,000) = $53.80397727
Notice, this is the same value we calculated earlier in part a as the value of the target to the
acquirer.
e.
The price of the stock in the merged firm would be the market value of the acquiring firm plus the
value of the target to the acquirer, divided by the number of shares in the merged firm, so:
PFP = ($56,550,000 + 9,415,696.02)/(1,300,000 + 100,000) = $47.1183543
The NPV of the stock offer is the value of the target to the acquirer minus the value offered to the
target shareholders. The value offered to the target shareholders is the stock price of the merged
firm times the number of shares offered, so:
NPV = $9,415,696.02 – 100,000($47.1183543) = $4,703,860.59
f.
Yes, the acquisition should go forward, and Ridgetown should offer the 100,000 shares since the
NPV is higher.
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g.
Using the new growth rate in the dividend growth model, along with the dividend and required
return we calculated earlier, the price of the target under these assumptions is:
PP = $1.77(1.06)/(.1052 – .06) = $41.50884956
And the value of the target firm to the acquiring firm is:
VP* = 175,000($41.50884956) = $7,264,048.67
The gain to the acquiring firm will be:
Gain = $7,264,048.67– 175,000($33.646) = $1,375,998.67
The NPV of the cash offer is now:
NPV cash = $7,264,048.67– 175,000($38) = $614,048.67
And the new price per share of the merged firm will be:
PFP = [$56,550,000 + 7,264,048.67]/(1,300,000 + 100,000) = $45.58146334
And the NPV of the stock offer under the new assumption will be:
NPV stock = $7,264,048.67– 100,000($33.45) = $2,705,902.34
Even with the lower projected growth rate, the stock offer still has a positive NPV. Ridgetown
should pursue the purchase Orford with a stock offer of 100,000 shares.
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