1
Chapter 1
PROBLEMS AHEAD
On May 13, 2005, Uzbek Interior Ministry and National Security Service troops fired
on anti-government protesters in the city of Andijian, Uzbekistan. While denied by
the government, independent investigations placed the number of dead at nearly
1,500, with reports surfacing that hundreds of bodies were hidden in mass graves
outside the city. Unrest spread the following day, and mass hysteria broke out in the
region as thousands of people fled across the border to Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbek
government attempted to cover up the massacre by blaming it on an Islamic extremist
terrorist group, but as evidence emerged, reports surfaced that no terrorist group was
involved and that the order to fire upon the protesters was given from within the
government. The United States Department of State immediately criticized the Uzbek
government for the massacre; however, no mention of a break in relations, sanctions,
or reduction of U.S. assistance was mentioned. This was particularly important due to
the fact that the U.S. maintained an important airbase on Uzbek soil for the purpose
of transiting personnel and material into Afghanistan since November 2001. While
U.S. assistance funds continued to flow to Uzbekistan after the massacre, statements
critical of the Uzbek government continued to stream out of the State Department
alongside those of the U.N. and the EU. In the morning of July 29, 2005, over four
hundred Uzbek refugees were flown by the U.N. out of Kyrgyzstan to take asylum in
Western Europe, and within four hours, a courier arrived at the U.S. embassy in the
2
Uzbek capital of Tashkent with a formal notice of eviction of U.S. forces from Uzbek
territory, giving the U.S. 180 days to remove all personnel, aircraft, and equipment
from Uzbekistan (Wright & Tyson 2005, A.01). Such a notice came as a remarkable
shock to U.S. diplomats and defense planners, as Uzbekistan had received some of
the highest amounts of assistance in the region while supporting U.S. operations in
Afghanistan; this about-face was a uniquely public occurrence of a small regional
country turning its nose up to American incentives and ordering the U.S. away.
Understanding the Problem
This thesis examines the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance as an instrument
of foreign policy in promoting U.S. goals and interests. As the anecdotal
recounting above indicated, U.S. security assistance has been provided to a wide
range of recipient countries, yet direct benefit to the U.S. has often been
ambiguous or unforthcoming. Two major obstacles to such understanding require
attention: first, the context and aims of a foreign policy instrument such as
security assistance must be elucidated; and second, the effectiveness of security
assistance in promoting those identified goals must be measured through
observation of historical cases of U.S. security assistance provision. As such, this
study seeks to answer the question: has U.S. security assistance to countries of the
former Soviet Union promoted United States’ strategic interests in the region?
This question possesses five intrinsic elements to be unpacked in the chapters to
follow:
3
Theoretical context: Security assistance provided by the U.S. to other
states must be understood within a theoretical conception of the U.S. in relation to
other states. Thus, the forms of relations existing between the U.S. and other
states must be placed within such contexts in order to understand, let alone
explain, the form of foreign policy instruments employed, and the gains expected
from these actions. The consideration of the theoretical literature to follow will
find the two major theories of the international relations discipline to be wanting,
but will find that the explanatory power of Fourth Variant Theory shows promise
in providing a means for understanding U.S. actions in the post-Cold War and
post-9/11 eras.
Policy: The bilateral provision of U.S. security assistance implies a level
of security cooperation and relations in which the provision of assistance
accomplishes a security goal which would be difficult, impossible, or otherwise
too costly for the U.S. to pursue through traditional security methods (invasion,
occupation, etc.). As an element of the national security budget, it is relatively
miniscule, and requires minimal personnel for its implementation. In return, it is
claimed, the U.S. accomplishes many of its strategic goals in other regions and
countries. Thus, security assistance as a policy tool must be understood in order to
determine its efficacy in promoting U.S. security interests.
Quid pro quo nature of U.S. Security Assistance: A key assumption
embedded within the question is the quid pro quo nature of security assistance. As
a tool of foreign policy, it is conceived of as designed for the elicitation of
4
cooperation from the bilateral recipient country. While not difficult to conceive,
this is no minor assumption, and it must be understood whether such assistance
entails expectations of cooperation, and whether such expectations are met.
Exposing such expectations and the motivations for them may be difficult, but
when larger existential matters of security are present, such motivations rise to the
top, and expectations of cooperation become more clearly definable. In this light,
a useful theory of explanation is important in pointing out the larger motivations
which shape interests, expectations, and policy implementation; such a theory
may be drawn out of the international relations literature for such a purpose.
Region: The former Soviet Union consists of a varied group of states
ranging from the integrated and relatively wealthy states of Slovakia and the
Czech Republic, to the isolated and relatively poor states of Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan. However, more unique than its geography, is the region’s shared
history; every single one of these states gained independence from the Soviet
Union within a two year window, providing an opportunity for a semi-controlled
environment that is very rare in international relations. Also, different states
within this region have gone through cycles of importance to U.S. security policy
at different times, allowing for a very rich and deep collection of subjects; all of
the states of this region, with the notable exception of Russia, are comparatively
weak powers. Thus, if anything, this region provides an ideal setting for
understanding the effects of a particular policy in question.
5
Interests: The question seeks to know the value of security assistance by
understanding its efficacy in promoting U.S. strategic goals. Thus, U.S. interests
must be identified within the region in question. Because a state’s interests can be
so broadly defined, it is appropriate to consider interests within the same issue
area as the policy applied. Therefore, U.S. security interests in the region must be
understood and identified as goals and aims which policy seeks to serve. As an
instrument of foreign and security policy, security assistance must be appraised of
its ability to provide gain in those issue areas.
This thesis will operate from a skeptical approach to the question and
problem identified for study. It will be exposed from the literature that U.S.
security assistance is fully expected to produce political quid pro quo compliance
from recipient states; using this approach from the literature, this study will
construct a hypothesis which expects benefit to the U.S. from security assistance
provided. However, it should be noted that the hypothesis is derived strictly from
the literature, yet the expectations are that, like the anecdotal story above, such
benefits are not always, if rarely, resultant.
This topic of study will be investigated in the following manner: in
Chapter 2, the theoretical considerations regarding the status of the United States
in recent years in regard to bilateral relationships with other states will be
considered; in Chapter 3, U.S. security assistance characterization, history, and
expectations will be presented; Chapter 4 will present the methodological
approach to be taken for the purpose of determining the effectiveness of security
6
assistance; Chapter 5 will present the rationale for case selection, and then
investigate the data within the cases to expose the relevant findings; finally,
Chapter 6 will present the findings and outcomes from the case studies, as well as
present the conclusions and recommendations of this study.
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Chapter 2
THE PROBLEM OF THEORY
Level of Study
There are many ways in which a foreign policy tool such as security assistance
may be studied. One could study the processes and historical elements leading to
policy creation as well as the historical development of security assistance as a
U.S. government program and the bureaucratic elements inherent to it. One could
also study the effects of U.S. application of bilateral security assistance on the
international system, and any changes within the system that might arise form
such action. However, both of the above approaches of study fail to directly
understand whether U.S. goals were achieved in relation to the interaction
between the U.S. and the recipient states as facilitated by the provision of security
assistance, which is the key purpose of this study. In order to do so, one must
approach the patron/recipient relationship within the context of the motivations,
expectations, and interests in which assistance is provided and outcomes
expected. This approach is not one of historical process-tracing, or systemic
variation calculating, but rather one of state-to-state relations.
However, that is not to contend that historical processes of policymaking
or systemic variations related to such relations are unimportant; however, to
determine whether the application of a bilateral policy (security assistance)
promotes the security interests of the U.S. is to take a snapshot of the relations,
8
expectations, motivations, interests, and outcomes of such interaction. An in depth
discussion on the history of U.S. security assistance policy and the systemic
effects related to it are stories for another time. This study will treat U.S. security
assistance as water under the historical bridge, seeking only to understand its
direct effects on the bilateral relationships of the U.S. and the recipient.1
Theoretical Context
When considering the foreign relations of the U.S., it is necessary to consider the
context in which such relations originated and developed. The U.S. experienced a
radical redefinition of its international role following the end of World War II as
American economic, military, and political capacities surpassed other states by
wide margins. The U.S. took on many different responsibilities such as providing
security, public goods, political leadership, and much of the costs of post-war
reconstruction in the industrialized nations of Western Europe. In this role, the
U.S. embraced the role of hegemon in its relations with these states.
As will be described below, hegemony implies benefits and costs to the
leading state for the sake of its own benefit. In this way, the U.S. experienced a
period of hegemony in the post-war world. However, by the 1970s the distinct
strains of such a role showed their wear on the U.S. The Vietnam War cost the
country international credibility, Nixon’s dumping the gold standard weakened its
1
During the analysis section later in this study, consideration of domestic and unit level specifics
may become necessary in order to fully grasp the environments in which specific bilateral
relationships developed, however this will only be undertaken for the purpose of illustrating
within the cases the larger issues of interaction identified.
9
leadership position economically, reduced industrial exporting diminished its
trading competitiveness, and rising foreign debt placed the U.S. in weaker
bargaining positions financially and politically (Rosecrance 1990, 68).2 This
decline continued into the post-Cold War era leading up to and following the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. Relative to previous levels, the U.S. was weakened; it
was a hegemon in decline. Thus, U.S. foreign relations in the following decades
were developed in a context of reduced American bargaining power and leverage;
this during a time when Russia resurged after a decade of internal strife, China
grew at breakneck rates, and the EU further integrated political and economically.
And while arguments have been made that U.S. actions since 9/11 (wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, as well as assertiveness in relations with Iran and African states)
are indicative of American re-ascendency, the U.S. clearly operates in a spectrum
of reduced bilateral relations with many of its allies, and most third-world or nonaligned countries relative to its Cold War status (Gamble 2002, 138-140). Thus,
the context of American hegemonic decline and the effect it has had on relations
with other states must inform any study of contemporary U.S. foreign relations.
In order to fully understand or appreciate the concept of hegemony and the
implications afforded it within the international relations literature, it must be
clarified exactly what hegemony, hegemonic stability, and hegemonic decline
means.
2
Waltz even argued that a primary reason why the U.S. declined toward the end of the Cold War
was because the Soviet Union had declined, reducing the level of threat, and thus the level
required to hold preeminence (1993, 75-76)
10
Hegemony
In an economic perspective, Keohane defines hegemony as possessing a
“preponderance of material resources” as well as control over the sources of those
materials, the preeminent national market, and “competitive superiority in the
production of goods” (1984, 32-33). He and Nye earlier defined it more generally
as “one state [which] is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing
interstate relations, and willing to do so” (Keohane and Nye 1977, 44). This
second definition of hegemony is useful in that it allows consideration of different
issue areas, as well as consideration of interactions and relations between the
hegemonic state and other states individually; for just as hegemony is a
designation within the international context, it is also a designation of the form of
bilateral relations between states (there can only be one hegemon in any dyad).
This definition put forth by Keohane and Nye will be embraced in this study when
referring to a hegemonic state.
A hegemonic power typically undertakes the costs of providing stability to
enhance the security and economic prosperity in which it operates. In doing so,
the hegemonic power promotes mutual gains through the expansion of military
protection or development of markets as was the case during the Pax Britannica
of the nineteenth century and the Pax Americana of the twentieth century
(Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1997, 418; Gilpin 1981, 144). International hegemonic
stability prevails when a key state holds: “control over raw materials, control over
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sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the
production of highly valued goods” (Keohane 1984, 32). Such stability may also
prevail when the hegemon presents an example of successful economic
development and the hegemon uses its considerable resources to establish open
market-structure; both of which are most likely to occur during periods of
hegemonic ascendency and zenith (Krasner 1976, 322-323). According to
Kindleberger, hegemonic presence is key “for the world economy to be stabilized,
there must be a stabilizer, one stabilizer” (1973, 305). Kindleberger asserts that a
strong leader is necessary for stability, that there is no such problem of too much
power in the hands of the hegemon, but rather too little. He argues that without
such a strong power, free-riding would proliferate to the point of system
breakdown, failure of cooperation, and the loss of public goods (1981, 253). It is
important to note that hegemonic presence is not strictly determinative of a stable
international system, nor is it strictly necessary for cooperation to occur (Keohane
1984, 39). The literature of hegemonic stability theory is directed at
understanding the (assumedly positive) effects of hegemony on the international
system, as well as the public goods provided by a hegemon. However, hegemonic
stability theory is a weak theory for this study for three reasons: it is directed
toward the international systemic level, while this study is focused on bilateral
relations between the hegemon and countries receiving security assistance
(unequal dyads); the theory assumes stability as the result of hegemonic actions,
yet this study is not focused on explaining or understanding stability, rather the
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form of bilateral relations between states; finally, the theory posits that many of
the public goods provided by the hegemon are by-products and not necessarily
direct programs of the hegemon, however, this study is considering specific
bilateral policies and programs used intentionally as instruments of foreign policy.
Obviously, elements of the theory will surface when considering the conceptions
of the major international relations theories on the subject, and will be elucidated
upon when they do, however this study will shy away from hegemonic stability
theory for the above reasons so as not to further complicate the theoretical
considerations to follow.
As proffered in the above descriptions, there are many conceptual
requirements of hegemony; it is a status not often achieved by even very powerful
states, and while hegemony implies status within the international system, it also
implies a dominant position in bilateral relations. Clearly, the absence of control
over the abovementioned measures of hegemony implies the absence of a
hegemon. In the hegemonic lifetime expected by scholars, as will be exposed
shortly, the hegemon is expected to rise, peak, and decline. How would one
identify when a period of decline has begun? The answer is surprisingly simple: a
hegemon enters a period of decline when it no longer commands control over the
above indications of hegemony; this is determined by simple comparison to the
benchmark levels of control experienced at the peak of hegemony.
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Investigating the Other Theories
The centrality of declining U.S. hegemony in this study dictates a particular
approach to appraising the theoretical literature of the international relations
discipline. This approach is one of ever-narrowing focus on the two primary
theoretical bodies of literature within the discipline: realism and liberalism. In
order to coherently approach these bodies of literature, specific questions may be
posed so as to gain deeper understanding with each inquiry. In this case, it is
necessary to understand the basic premise of a theory, and thus, the first question
asks just that: what are the central principles to the theory? From there the next
question needs to speak to the level of approach taken in this study: the state level.
This question must elicit the theories’ primary expectations of state behavior, and
thus asks: what form of state behavior is expected? Considering that U.S. foreign
relations, and U.S. behavior, exist within the context of declining U.S. hegemony,
the following level of inquiry needs to speak to the theoretical expectations of the
two theories regarding hegemonic decline in general, asking: in what manner or
form is hegemonic decline expected? Building on the general premises of the
theory, the expected behavior, and form of hegemonic decline, the final level of
inquiry must discern exactly what forms of action are taken by the declining
hegemon in response to its descent from preeminence. An inherent assumption at
this level, prevalent in the literature, is that upon realization of declining status, a
hegemon will respond in some manner; thus the final question required asked of
each theory is: how is a hegemon expected to react to its own decline?
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These four questions form the basis of the literature review that follows in
an attempt to accurately portray the premises and expectations of realism and
liberalism. It is expected that these questions will allow an appropriate appraisal
of the ability of the theories to explain U.S. foreign relations as considered in the
research question of this study. Relating to the inherent elements of the research
question, the theories will be judged on their ability to explain U.S. foreign
relations in the form of security assistance to countries of the former Soviet
Union. They will also be judged on their ability to contextualize the U.S. interests
at stake, and the appropriateness and capacity of security assistance in promoting
those interests in the region.
Realist Theory
Realist international relations theory has been directed toward two levels of
international politics, the systemic and the unit level. Realist theory at the
systemic level has perhaps received the greatest attention due the development of
theories seeking to explain systemic structure in the twentieth century,
particularly the absence of superpower war during the Cold War. In this vein,
Kenneth Waltz has led the charge to differentiate structural international politics
from state, or policy, level politics. He argues that structural realism is not a
theory of foreign policy, because it ignores the politics of the domestic level
(Waltz 1979, 72-73), and that the end of the Cold War has not made structural
realism obsolete as state behavior is shaped by systemic structure now as ever
15
(Waltz 2002, 60). The second plane is that of unit level politics between
individual states (Morgenthau 1978, 4-5). Both levels are interrelated, yet distinct,
within realist theory, for as changes in unit-level behavior adjust the systemic
distribution of capabilities and polarity, a likewise change in the international
system is expected to have significant effects on unit-level behavior. (Lebow &
Risse-Kappen 1995, 33).
Realist Expectation of Behavior and Change
Because recent realist theory assumes that states operate within an anarchic
system, it is expected that national power is absolutely essential to promoting and
accomplishing national security and interests (Waltz 1979, 111; Waltz 1959,
159).3 Although the centrality of national power in realist theory is nearly
universal, its definitional attributes are anything but shared. Waltz argues that
power can be measured by considering the distribution of capabilities among
states, particularly how states rank “on all of the following items: size of
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military
strength, and political stability and competence” (Waltz 1979, 192). However,
Gilpin (1981, 33), argues that it is the military, economic, and technological
capabilities of states that define national power; and Kindleberger (1970, 56, 65)
3
Neorealism relies on microeconomic theory to explain international systems, and the treatment of
states within such systems as rational egoists in pursuit of greatest utility functions; thus, systemic
elements of the theory emerge from attention to variations within the system rather than within the
state (Waltz 1979, 89-91, 93-95, 98; Keohane 1984, 27
16
conceptualizes power as “strength capable of being used efficiently,” and not only
strength, but strength “plus the capacity to use it effectively.”
While definitional agreement on the nature and specific use of power is
lacking in realism, a primary assumption of the theoretical body is the expectation
that states pursue power, and that state behavior can be explained in such a
context. In this assumption also, there is disagreement on exactly why states
pursue certain forms of behavior over others. At the unit level, Morgenthau
expected the pursuit of power for its own sake. For Morgenthau, states, as
collective derivatives of human nature, define interests in terms of power, and
thus states are power maximizers and behave accordingly (Morgenthau 1978, 5).
However, Waltz argues that the anarchical structure of the international system,
made up of like units, forces states into self-help behavior in order to pursue
security. For Waltz, polarity within the international system is determinative of
balance of power behavior as states seek to prevent others from gaining
dominating and threatening power (Waltz 1979, 81, 93-101). As a result of the
anarchic system described by Waltz, Mearsheimer expects states to pursue
dominant power in relation to others and seek to capture hegemony over states.
This is because, he argues, a state can never be fully confident of how much
power can guarantee security, and thus dominant power is the only option for
assuring security; this leads Mearsheimer to expect an aggressive or offensive
pursuit of power and hegemony by great powers, forcing the international system
into a perpetual security dilemma (2001, 35).
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Realist Expectation of Hegemonic Decline
Realist theory values the relative distribution of capabilities amongst states as
definitive of the international system as well as the relations amongst states.
Realism fully expects sharp declines in the relative strength of great or hegemonic
powers, but often differs on the cause and form of decline. Some realists expect
hegemonic decline as historical inevitabilities derived from observation of
historical ebbs and flows in hegemonic power (Gilpin 1981, 210). Modelski
expects a cycle in which a hegemon rises, peaks, declines, and is eclipsed by
another; and has observed such cycles as occuring approximately every one
hundred years (1987, 5). Kennedy fully expects great powers to decline violently,
and often suddenly; for, he notes, great power growth typically includes some
form of artificial element, such as the temporary diminishment of other states
following a world war. Kennedy argues that it is only a matter of time before the
great power enters a period of relative, or even absolute, decline (1987, 332-337).
For Gilpin, the great crux of successful hegemonic expansion and preeminence is
that the hegemon carries within itself the inevitable seeds of decline as it cannot
perpetually sustain the costs of systemic stabilization and suppression of
challengers (1981, 144-149).
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Response to Decline Expected by Realism
The realist literature focuses on hegemonic decline as a difficult and tumultuous
event for not only the declining power itself, but also other states that may
experience, or take advantage of, shocks to the status quo order of international
relations prior to decline; and a central expectation of realists is that once in
decline, a great or hegemonic state will try to stop or even reverse their decline
(Waltz 1993, 71, 76-77). The realist prognosis for the outcome of hegemonic
decline is not hopeful as it centers on war as the most likely outcome, with few
other potentialities. Operating from a nearly universal assumption that once in
decline, a hegemonic state will try to slow or halt their decline. Realists approach
the issue of declining hegemony principally from the perspective of the hegemon
(or its effects on the structural of the system), seeking to explain the direct actions
or interactions involving the hegemon as it realizes its decline. Four primary
forms of expected reaction emerge from the realist literature: war, growth and
deterrence, retrenchment, and cooperation.
War is the most commonly expected form of reaction amongst realists.
Gilpin argues that a hegemon may instigate a preventative war against a rising
challenger as the most attractive reaction to weaken or destroy the challenger
(1981; 94, 191, 201). Snyder takes the concept of preventative war as a viable
option for a hegemon faced by growing challenges a step further and argues that a
hegemon may initiate a preventative war in which it attacks before the challenger
has the opportunity to fully create new military assets, which he argues is distinct
19
from preemptive war when the hegemon delays attack until after the challenger
has created new military assets but before it has mobilized or deployed them
(Snyder 1985, 160). Snyder argues that the magnitude of the power shift is a key
determinant as to whether a hegemon will initiate a preventative war, for if a
hegemon detects a rapidly rising challenger approaching a vulnerable equilibrium
of military capacity, it will be much more likely to attack as opposed to a situation
of a slow-rising challenger (Snyder 1985, 157-158). Such theoretical emphasis on
war as not only the first, but often best option for a declining or challenged
hegemon exposes the realist theoretical focus on war as the primary outcome of
hegemonic decline.
As Mearsheimer (2009) argues, growth and deterrence is another option
for rational states to protect themselves, and that is to be “especially powerful”.
Short of seeking hegemony, Mearsheimer argues that striving for “preponderant
power” is a particularly wise option for great powers to deter aggression and
retain rank in the international power structure; or in the event of aggression, to be
best prepared for defensive war against a challenger. Growth allows a great power
to rid itself of the problems inherent of balancing coalitions and the efforts
required to assemble them, so long as the growth does not scare them into the
ranks of challengers (250-251). Gilpin also expects such expansionist behavior as
an option for a declining hegemon, as the great power may seek to limit long term
costs of slowing its decline by expending short term resources to improve its
defensive position (1981, 191).
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When not focused on war as the primary reaction of a hegemon to its own
decline, realists have furthered few other expected forms of reaction, cooperation
is one such form of reaction expected by realists; but for realists this is the least
likely scenario because they primarily expect self-help, security-maximizing
behavior from states, which often complicates interstate cooperation (Jervis 1978,
172-173). Greico does expect some cooperation through “voluntary adjustment by
states of their policies so that they manage their differences and reach some
mutually beneficial outcome” but only under very limited and specific conditions
(Greico 1990, 22).
Finally, retrenchment is another expected form of reaction; Gilpin (1981)
argues that a hegemon may attempt to slow or stop its decline through the use of
retrenchment as a general strategy in its approach to foreign policy commitments.
By bringing commitments into balance with its resources, a hegemon can seek to
avoid being stretched too thin and completely losing its dominance in relations
with other states. He identifies three different forms of retrenchment, with the first
form as a simple abandonment of commitments; this cut-and-run approach can
allow a hegemon to escape potentially fatal overextension. Second, a hegemon
may seek to create or bolster alliances in order to bring friendly states close, and
enemies even closer for observation or manipulation. Finally, Gilpin identifies
appeasement as a form of retrenchment available to a declining hegemon as a
method of preventing direct confrontation with rising challengers (192-193).
While Gilpin finds historical evidence of these forms of retrenchment, he admits
21
that states rarely retrench of their own will; and retrenchment in any of the three
forms rarely stops, and only occasionally slows, the fall of a truly declining
hegemon (194).
Cooperation is a fourth form of reaction by a hegemon to its decline
expected by realists; but for realists this is the least likely scenario because they
primarily expect self-help, security-maximizing behavior from states, which often
complicates interstate cooperation (Jervis 1978, 172-173). Greico does expect
some cooperation through “voluntary adjustment by states of their policies so that
they manage their differences and reach some mutually beneficial outcome” but
only under very limited and specific conditions (Greico 1990, 22).
Critique of Realism
Realism, with its overbearing theoretical emphasis on great powers, systems, and
relative power, is severely limited in its ability to usefully explain or predict
international phenomena since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the
subsequent end of the Cold War. Crucially, realism’s ability to explain hegemonic
decline outside of war is bounded, as it is theoretically expected that such a
scenario would not occur. Thus, realism falls short in predicting or explaining the
behavior of a declining hegemon, aside from simply proffering that it will resist or
use war, and lacks any useful framework of understanding behavior outcomes. It
becomes obvious that the realist obsession with the nature, form, and definition of
power is of little consequence when seeking to understand why and how a
22
declining hegemon behaves when war is not present. This was the case at the end
of the Cold War, the absence of an existential threat allowed an easing of tension
amongst former enemies and allies alike. Suddenly the U.S. lacked a large-scale
threat to international security to corral allies and neutrals into line with its
interest and goals; this was to compound the trend of decline begun in the 1970s.
The key to realism’s failure in this context was that the U.S. did not, and
has not, resorted to preventative war with perceived challengers, neither have
rising challengers made any attempts to unseat the U.S. through military
aggression. Nor has the U.S. embarked on a policy of retrenchment, and has in
fact sought to increase its international presence through interventionist missions
during the 1990s and two wars since 9/11. However, such an increased
international presence failed to prove as the growth for the sake of deterrence that
Mearsheimer expects. Increased presence was coupled with defense drawdowns
during the Clinton administration, and the absence of a rising challenger to fend
off; such behavior was in reaction to non-existential threats from ethnic conflict or
non-state terrorist groups. While the cooperation expected by realists such as
Greico appears to exist, it does so in a nearly unchanged fashion since it emerged
after World War II; there is little evidence of a systematic change in the form of
cooperation since the U.S. began its decline. It is more appropriate to speak of
such cooperation in terms of habit than as new forms of relations. The realist
literature leaves a gaping hole of explanation when considering the behavior of
23
the U.S. as a declining hegemon since the end of the Cold War, and is thus passed
over here in search of a theory better suited to such a task.
Liberal Theory
Liberal international relations theory has emerged as an intertwining of the
theoretical traditions of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. Focusing on the peace
and prosperity expected within liberal economic order and liberal democratic
governance, liberals conceive of interstate relations in a world very different from
that of realists. Doyle concisely exposes the key tenets of liberal theory as it has
developed over several centuries in The Ways of War and Peace. First, he asserts
that while states exist in the absence of world government, they do not inherently
exist in a state of general war; rather, a “state of nature” often makes peace a
difficult undertaking, but a frequent one nonetheless. Second, Doyle rejects the
“like units” argument of realism that states are innately similar, differentiated
principally by their power and capabilities. Doyle argues in contrast that states
drastically differ in their approach to human rights, liberal or non-liberal society,
and forms of government and market. As a result of these differences, the
international behavior of states differs for a multitude of reasons, not solely, or
even primarily, on their level of power. Thirdly, Doyle seeks to break the realist
obsession with war and conflict by illuminating the liberal assertion that the social
and economic aims and interests of states exceed those of security and defense,
24
and can extend to the promotion of economic expansion, cooperation, and human
rights (Doyle 1997, 211).
Liberal Expectation of Behavior and Change
Liberalism expects states to realize that war is wasteful and deleterious to the
benefits of market commerce and industrialization, and thus desire the peaceful
resolution of conflict. It is expected that democratic states develop a commitment
to human political and legal rights, and in doing so find it easier to interact with
other liberal rather than non-democratic states; such interaction is expected to
spread and increase a peaceful sphere of cooperation (Rosenau & Durfee 2000,
34). Liberalism’s focus on peaceful interaction amongst states inevitably leads to
the considerable liberal literature on the topic of cooperation, which has been
defined among liberals as referring to legitimized (institutionalized) international
relationships that are not founded on coercion (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1997,
418).
Liberal Expectation of Cooperation
For liberals, cooperation is best reflected as the preferable and optimistic
outcomes of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt games in which cooperation
produces greater benefit than does defection for the participants. Liberals apply
this logic to the behavior of, and interaction between, states on issues from trade
and economic matters to security affairs. Keohane presents a clear liberal
25
definition of cooperation by asserting it exists “when the policies actually
followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization
of their own objectives, the result of a process of policy coordination” (1984, 5152). Liberals assert that when states possess incomplete information on others, as
is almost always the case, they are more likely to display rational cooperative
behavior over a finite number of interactions (Andreoni & Miller 1993, 570). The
liberal literature focuses on four primary areas of cooperation between states:
Security Communities, interdependence, integration, and institutionalization.
These four forms of cooperative behavior expected by liberal theorists encompass
the general expectations of state behavior within the theory. States are not
expected to favor military or use-of-force options of conflict resolution if
cooperation exists. This is expected because the use of force option is only one
among many issues, and states share many, if not most, of the other issues and are
not willing to sacrifice the gains of cooperation when resolving disputes.
Deutsch et al. (1957, 5-7) sought to understand the cooperative behavior
of states within political communities, defined as “social groups with a process of
political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular
habits of compliance.” They concentrated on the formation of security
communities as an expression of a political community and form of international
cooperation. They made the argument that increased democracy, trade, and
integration within international organizations greatly reduced the chances of war
within such communities. They noted that war had only a slightly greater chance
26
of occurrence within pluralistic security communities (communities of politically
sovereign yet democratic, free market states) than within amalgamated security
communities (communities of politically integrated states, such as the U.S.).
Deutsch et al. asserted that convergence of security, commerce, and social
interests made pluralistic integration within security communities fungible enough
to serve as a replacement for war in the resolution of dispute and conflict (199203).
Liberal theory also expects cooperation as a result of interdependence
between states. Keohane and Nye (1977) took notice that when relations between
states “did not center on military-security concerns,” cooperation on many other
issues became achievable (5). They identified such cooperative behavior as
complex interdependence in which bargaining processes (not the use of force)
connected states (20). They argue that interdependent relationships exist when
“there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of
transactions” which they differentiate from interconnectedness between states that
do not share costly effects of relationships (9). Indicative of complex
interdependence is state behavior influenced by non-state actors and NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) such as firms, international bodies such as
the U.N., and transnational groups (24). Within complex interdependence, there is
no hierarchy of issues and thus, military issues do not inherently posses greater
importance over others. As a form of cooperation, complex interdependence can
27
only exist within a pluralistic security community, because military force is not
used to resolve disputes (25).
Liberal theory also expects states to display cooperative behavior as a
result of integration amongst states. Liberals conceive of integration on different
levels and within different issues and structures. Integration involves varying
degrees of shifted loyalty, and the ability of states to internalize the integrative
process and behave accordingly; this is conceived of as a multidimensional
phenomenon leading to a sense of shared identity and community (Dougherty &
Pfaltzgraff 1997, 422). Haas defined integration as a process by which states’ alter
their behavior in order to shift loyalties and activities to a central jurisdiction
(1958, 16). Just as Haas conceived of a centralized, new form of political
organization encompassing its member states, Deutsch expected states to integrate
into political communities in which traditional conceptions of power (the ability
to make others act differently than they would otherwise) among states is
transformed into a shared sense of community (1957, 5-6; 1978, 198-199).
Integration is also expected by liberals in the form of decentralization of low-level
authority functions, and greater political integration of high-level (politics among
units) authority functions, thus blurring the lines of nationalist loyalty. Burton
argues that nationalism “is a condition in which all loyalties are focused at
the….common provider of all services,” because “loyalties are attracted to the
sources of services” and in a world of ever-increasing integration, Burton argues,
28
loyalties to multiple institutions have developed as the state has waned as sole
provider of services (1972, 119-120).
Liberal theorists also expect cooperation as a result of the
institutionalization of international politics. Institutionalist elements of liberal
theory originate from the functionalist arguments of Mitrany, who asserted that
cooperation within technical areas across borders could spill over into functional
areas of mutual gain for cooperating states (1948, 357-359). In, this vein, liberals
expect states to transform conceptions of self-interest through membership in
international institutions (Keohane & Nye 1977, 24-26). While institutionalists
accept the general principle of anarchy in the international system, they ascribe it
much less a determinative power than do realists; thus, liberal institutionalists
expect cooperation as a result of increasingly connected states interacting (and
mediated) through international institutions (Young 1982, 16). Kahler argues that
the reduction in economic distances among states (as a result of social,
technological, and cultural changes), as well as the relaxation of government
inhibitions of international transactions forms the basis for greater
institutionalization of integration through formal institutions such as the WTO and
IMF (1995, xii).
Liberal Expectation of Hegemonic Decline
There is surprisingly little within the liberal literature speaking to an expectation
of hegemonic decline. Each of the major liberal conceptions of cooperation
29
expects the absence or lessened role of a hegemon; there is no place, nor need, for
a hegemon in the presence of security communities, complex interdependence,
integration, or institutionalization. This is surprising because they all
acknowledge the place of hegemons (or preeminent states) in history. This begs
the question: what transformation took (or takes) place between a hegemonic
peak, and the expected outcomes of cooperation theorized by liberals? What
happens to the hegemon? Surely it must have declined to allow cooperation other
than that which it designed or enforced itself, but there is no attention to the actual
decline itself by liberals. This inattention to the importance of hegemonic decline
in the liberal literature appears more as a result of being overlooked than ignored;
and may be due to liberal theorists’ attention to the expected decline of the state in
general (Rosecrance 1996; Strange 1996; Ohmae 1995), a topic not addressed in
this study.
Response to Decline Expected by Liberalism
As little as there is on the topic of hegemonic decline within the liberal literature,
there is likewise an absence of liberal literature speaking directly to the forms of
reaction by a hegemon to its decline. The central liberal work on the topic of
hegemonic decline, Keohane’s After Hegemony (1984), focuses primarily on the
systemic level, and more particularly at the effects of hegemonic decline on the
international system itself. For Keohane, it is not about what happens to the
hegemon, or even how it reacts and adjusts to its own decline. He embraces the
30
realist expectation that hegemonic power wanes following the peak experienced
after world wars but goes no further to investigate its actions during the downturn
(25-26); and rather, turns his attention to the “institutional legacy of hegemony”
and regimes of cooperation that remains in its place (9, 15).
Critique of Liberalism
As a general theory of international relations, liberalism displays elements of
utility in explaining state action since World War II. Expanding spheres of open
markets and democratic government appear to validate the expectations of
classical liberals that human and international relations can improve. Cooperation
on different levels proliferates amongst states. However, useful as it is for
explaining general trends in international politics, liberalism is clearly limited in
its ability to explain the problem identified in this study.
While liberals expect cooperation, and cooperation is evident in U.S.
foreign relations in the form of security assistance to countries of the former
Soviet Union, such cooperation does not at all resemble that which is expected by
liberal theory. The U.S. does not share with countries of the region all of the
elements of a security community, it was only twenty five years ago that these
states were considered enemies in the Cold War; and relations with several of
them (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan)
have been tense at different times since their independence. Interdependence as
defined by liberals has been slow and shallow: none of the states in the region are
31
major trading partners of the U.S., U.S. firms and NGOs have made little inroads
into the region, and the costs of relationships with these states are hardly
reciprocal as would be expected within interdependence. Liberal expectations of
integration are clearly absent in U.S. foreign relations with countries of the
region. And while a few are members of NATO, political and economic
integration has been slow, largely insignificant, and has stalled in recent years.
Liberal expectations of institutionalization in the region are similar to other liberal
expectations of cooperation, stalled, shallow, and limited. NATO and the WTO
withstanding, no other significant forms of institutionalization between the U.S.
and the region have developed.
These failures of the liberal theory are compounded by liberalism’s failure
to directly address hegemonic decline itself. Without useful insight into the forms
of, and reactions by, a hegemon in decline, the theory is severely limited in its
utility to explain the actions of the U.S. at this point in its history, or the manner
in which it interacts with other states. Like realism, liberal international relations
theory fails to present the necessary utility for explaining the problem at hand, and
must be passed over for a more useful theory of explanation.
Critique of General Theory
The above appraisals of realism and liberalism display a concerning inability of
the two major general theories to explain how the U.S. interacts with the
relatively weak powers of the former Soviet Union in the context of declining
32
U.S. hegemony through the provision of security assistance. This is most likely
because general theories of international relations seek only to make broad
predictions of trends and reactions and typically fail to, or seek not to, predict the
form and timing of international phenomena, and are thus at a disconnect with the
exact reality of world events. General theories are often criticized for failure in
expecting the timing of the end of the Cold War, as well as a near complete
failure to expect the form of change that took place: the peaceful implosion of the
Soviet Union from within. Even measured by its own standards of probabilistic
predictions, the body of international relations theory displayed an embarrassing
performance of prediction, as ill-prepared theories prevented most international
relations theorists from identifying the end of the Cold War even as it happened
(Lebow & Risse-Kappen1995, 2). Because the necessary information was present
and accessible, Lebow and Risse-Kappen describe such a letdown as a complex
failure in which the events leading to the end of the Cold War may well have been
predicted if they had been interpreted properly through the application of theories
inline with, and empirically connected to, the real world (1995, 3).
While the two major general theories of the field display limited utility in
explaining the problem of hegemonic action while in decline, non-traditional
conceptual approaches to security related foreign policy in international relations
may provide fresh approaches to understanding the dynamics inherent in the
relations between states involved in security assistance flows. Such a problem
requires a theory capable of explaining U.S. foreign relations in the form of
33
security assistance to weak states of a region possessing varying importance and
strategic interests to the U.S.; a region, in which neither war nor expected forms
of cooperation have been the norm since the end of the Cold War. Such a theory
must explain all of this in the context of declined U.S. hegemony in which all
U.S. foreign relations have formed in recent years.
Within the international relations discipline, a theory emerges with the
potential for addressing the theoretical requirements outlined above. Maria
Sampanis’s Fourth Variant is a theory that addresses the harsh reality of
hegemonic decline, the forms of reaction taken by declining hegemons, and the
potential for cooperation between great and weak powers.
Sampanis’s Fourth Variant
In Preserving Power Through Coalitions, Sampanis addresses the speedy dive, or
long drawn-out ordeal of the decline of hegemonic great powers. For Sampanis,
the fall is the result of a great power’s inability to hold onto or achieve power, as
shifts in power status adjusts the relationships amongst states. Such adjustments
have been traditionally conceived of by international relations scholars as shifts in
relative power within a zero sum system; these shifts have also been conceived of
in cyclical terms: power leads to growth, growth leads to overextension, and
overextension leads to the collapse of the system (1). Sampanis suggests states
still pursue power, but that globalization has brought about a change in the form
of power sought by states. She argues that embedded influence in, and preference
34
for leadership of, institutions is a primary example of globalized forms of power
which would allow states to effectively pursue goals (4). Realizing that states seek
power in a variety of issue areas for the accomplishment of a variety of purposes
and goals, Sampanis argues that once great powers, and particularly hegemons,
have achieved such status, that they will attempt to maintain it and prevent their
decline (5). A declining great power need not experience negative growth, and
need not be fully captive to fear of relative gains by others. However, a declining
great power faces greatest threats to its positions of leverage of prestige as a result
of absolute and relative declines. Autonomy and leverage afforded by hegemonic
status provides independence of goal-setting, and the ability to achieve those
goals, but decline brings about the weakening of the hegemon’s international
bargaining position (6).
Sampanis acknowledges that hegemonic response to decline has
traditionally been explained in three variants of hegemonic decline theory: war,
behavior consistency, and behavioral change in pursuit of horizontal coalitions
(7). In war, the declining hegemon seeks to slow or prevent decline either
offensively or defensively through military force. Behavioral consistency by a
declining hegemon may occur due to a hegemon’s inability to recognize its own
decline, or international constraints placed on the hegemon may prevent it from
pursuing any other behavior than the status quo (8). The third variant of action by
a declining hegemon is that of changing behavior to coalesce with other great
powers to provide stability to the hegemon, and in doing so, these partners of
35
close relative or “horizontal” power take greater interest in preserving the
established arrangement alongside the hegemon (9).
However, Sampanis argues that these three traditional variants fail to
adequately explain the behavior of a hegemon in decline. She argues rather, that a
declining hegemon primarily seeks self-preservation and the preservation of its
power for the sake of autonomy and leverage. Declining hegemons act in an effort
to preserve autonomy and leverage, as well as other key intangible aspects of
power such as reputation, prestige and influence, all of which allow independence
and power over outcome. Sampanis expects a declining hegemon to employ the
use of coalitions to recover its international bargaining arrangement, but she
expects that the prospects for horizontal coalitions decline as the hegemon
perceives a competitive threat from would-be horizontal partners, forcing the
hegemon to seek partners elsewhere. A declining hegemon would also be less
inclined toward horizontal coalitions due to the inherent costs of incentivizing
strong powers into cooperation as well as the likely loss of independence in the
establishment of goals and considerable concessions. Sampanis expects that the
desire for low-cost coalition formation will drive the declining hegemon to seek a
coalition that maintains its status at the least cost; thus the primary motive for
cooperation as a means for the preservation of status is to recover international
bargaining primacy and a horizontal coalition of strong states would only speed
up decline as the hegemon becomes only one of the leaders rather than the leader
(14-16).
36
Thus, Sampanis expects a declining hegemon to pursue a vertical coalition
in which the hegemon dominates its middle and weak powers coalition members.
By employing incentives, the hegemon arranges the coalition’s goals in line with
its own, gaining preeminence within the coalition and using the coalition to
recover its bargaining position internationally. The leverage gained through the
vertical coalition will allow the hegemon to continue to pursue its goals
strategically by using the coalition to bolster its international bargaining position,
and tactically by exploiting leverage within the coalition on a variety of issues.
While a declining hegemon is expected to first seek the status quo (2nd variant)
and then horizontal coalitions (3rd variant), it is expected that a declining hegemon
will be incapable or unwilling to pursue these options for lack of power or
perceived competition (140). However, Sampanis argues that vertical coalition
formation is evolutionary; as hegemonic decline increases, the hegemon seeks
more horizontal coalitions to prevent total hegemonic eclipse and is more willing
to coalesce with competitive peers. However, the key to improving the hegemon’s
bargaining power for the formation of a horizontal coalition will be the vertical
coalitions it had employed at earlier stages of decline (17-18).
It is important to make the point here that this is only a partial description
of the theory; Sampanis furthered this theory to show that a hegemon embeds
hierarchy within these coalitions to protect itself from current and future decline
that is almost inevitable. However, the theory itself presents exceptional potential
utility for explaining what interest the U.S. holds in the former Soviet nations.
37
This is where the importance of U.S. foreign relations in the former-Soviet region
emerges. These states provide vertical coalition targets, and relatively inexpensive
security assistance programs hold the potential for enticing them into such a
coalition.
This study moves forward embracing the Fourth Variant Theory as the
theory possessing the greatest potential for explaining the effectiveness of U.S.
security assistance to the countries of the former-Soviet Union. However, it must
be made clear that the larger theoretical construct of Fourth Variant Theory is
beyond the scope or context of this study. Applying this theory allows for two
separate goals: one which would seek to determine whether vertical coalitions
successfully improve the influence and bargaining position of the hegemon that
forms them, and another which would address the formation of vertical coalitions
themselves. This study will be of the latter, trusting in Fourth Variant Theory
expectations that vertical coalitions will improve influence and bargaining
position. Such an approach will allow for the consideration of security assistance,
and set the context for foreign policy in relation to weak or middle states.
38
Chapter 3
U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Security Assistance Considered
The research question for this study identified five crucial elements related to
determining the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance in promoting U.S.
strategic interests in the countries of the former Soviet Union: theory, region,
interests, policy, and the quid pro quo nature of security assistance. Theoretical
considerations were made above, and because they involve detailed investigation
specific to the setting and locale of this question, the elements of region and
interests will be fully explored in the analysis section later in this study. The
policy and quid pro quo elements of U.S. security assistance require a broader and
more conceptual approach than region and interests; thus, this section will seek to
understand these elements historically, practically, and conceptually. Such an
approach elicits three important questions on the topic of U.S. security assistance;
first, what is the target of discussion? This question seeks to understand the
definitional approach to the topic, and the historical and political development of
security assistance within U.S. foreign policy. Second, how is the discussion of
security assistance approached? Inherent to such a question is the need to
understand how security assistance is conceptualized as an instrument of foreign
policy. Finally, what is security assistance linked to? This question seeks to
understand the supposed quid pro quo nature of security assistance and addresses
39
the anticipation that the provision of security assistance is accompanied by an
expectation of a specific outcome.
These three questions will be addressed systematically below and will
provide the historical and conceptual background to the topic of this study. These
questions will preface the in depth evaluation of security assistance found in the
analysis section to follow.
Target of Discussion
In 1962, Hans Morgenthau proposed a succinct and direct definition of foreign aid
as: “the transfer of money, goods and services from one nation to another” (301);
thirty years later, Holsti added “technology or technical advice” to the list (1992,
192). Some argue that such definitional parsimony is best elaborated to include
only publicly funded resources, because the only flows available for strategic
manipulation are those provided by governments to other governments (Deibel
2007, 249; Brown and Opie 1953, 1).4 Upon understanding foreign aid, it is
necessary to understand security assistance as an element of foreign aid, yet
separate in its composition and purpose as defined below.
The first official definition of security assistance provided for in a treaty
document was in 1946 in which it was defined as “the furnishing of arms,
ammunition, equipment and supplies; certain naval vessels and aircraft, and the
Paul Moseley’s definition: “money transferred on concessional terms by the governments of rich
countries to the governments of poor countries” (1987, 21) fails to consider the massive flows of
foreign aid from the U.S. to other rich countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and
Germany.
4
40
instruction and training assistance by the Army and Navy of the United States”
(United Nations Treaty Series 1947, Vol. 45, p. 50). Stephanie Neuman takes a
very unique approach to defining security assistance, going so far as to say that it
includes “any and all actions by states, international organizations, or nonstate
actors that directly or indirectly contribute to the military efforts of a combatant.”
In this way, security assistance is abstracted away from conceptualization as
strictly the supply of military hardware or training from one state to another
(1995, 49). While Neuman’s widely inclusive definition may allow a more
complete picture of total security assistance in the literal term, it makes the
considerable assumption that all suppliers regulate and report sales and transfers
of armaments, ammunition, training and informal support in the same way. This is
useful to note for while the U.S. has devoted formal efforts to such regulation and
reporting, other primary suppliers such as Russia and China have made little
public effort of regulation or reporting of conventional arms transfers.5
According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the organization
responsible for the management and coordination of U.S. security assistance,
Security Assistance is a group of programs, authorized by law, that
allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly
foreign Governments. Security Assistance transfers may be carried
out via sales, grants, leases, or loans and are authorized under the
premise that if these transfers are essential to the security and
economic well-being of allied Governments and international
5
Security assistance was created as a tool for improving U.S. defense and security abroad through
shoring up recipient countries. However, it was not a form of alliance and did not directly entail an
American obligation to intercede if a recipient state was attacked or threatened (Brown and Opie
1953, 439-440))
41
organizations, they are equally vital to the security and economic
well-being of the United States (U.S.). Security Assistance
programs support U.S. national security and foreign policy
objectives. They increase the ability of our friends and allies to
deter and defend against possible aggression, promote the sharing
of common defense burdens, and help foster regional stability.
Security Assistance can be the delivery of defense weapon systems
to foreign Governments; U.S. Service schools training
international students; U.S. personnel advising other Governments
on ways to improve their internal defense capabilities; U.S.
personnel providing guidance and assistance in establishing
infrastructures and economic bases to achieve and maintain
regional stability; etc. When we assist other nations in meeting
their defense requirements, we contribute to our own security.
(DSCA 2003, 35).
The security assistance referred to in this study will reflect a paraphrase of the
DSCA definition enforced by the U.S. government and will follow as: a group of
programs which transfer military products and services for the purpose of
supporting U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives, in this way,
definitional latitude is limited and confidence is maintained that the subject of
study is finite and tangible.
Internal Security Assistance which provides “funding, equipment, training
and other assistance to the police and internal security agencies of foreign
governments to help counter security threats, including terrorist organizations,
drug trafficking, and hostile states” will only be mentioned occasionally. Internal
Security Assistance often has more to do with the domestic situation of a state,
rather than the strategic interests sought by the U.S. in a particular region (Jones
42
et al. 2006, 2-9). However, when Internal Security Assistance is relevant to such
interests, as identified later, it will be noted.
United States foreign assistance has undergone several reincarnations and
alterations since its inception in the mid-twentieth century. What began as the
lend-lease effort before and after the U.S. entered WWII became a massive relief
project for post-war reconstruction primarily in Europe. As Europe showed signs
of recovery, growing concern over the communist threat prompted the U.S. to
implement a new structure of aid in the form of security assistance to countries
whose stability or security were identified as in the interest of the U.S. Countries
such as the Philippines, Turkey, Greece, Nationalist China, and Iran were initially
identified as recipients of foreign, particularly security, assistance (Brown & Opie
1953, 543). The Truman Doctrine, and the resulting legislation, provided an initial
$400 million for assistance to countries under immediate communist threat, and in
1949 Truman initiated the Point IV Program as an effort to provide aid to a larger
number of less-developed countries. The Mutual Defense Act of 1949 formalized
the growing security assistance programs, uniting them under the authority of the
Secretary of State, and increasing their expenditure amounts (Hovey 1965, 5, 133134).
Foreign assistance emerged as a key priority early for the Kennedy
administration. In March 1961, Kennedy signaled to Congress that the U.S.
possessed “an historic opportunity for a major economic assistance effort…to
more than half the people of the less-developed nations” and should establish a
43
new extensive foreign policy with foreign aid as one of the primary instruments
(Feis 1964, 63). Senator William Fulbright introduced a bill in the Senate entitled
the “Act for International Development” which was later re-titled as the Foreign
Assistance Act (FAA). The act passed congress on September 4, 1961 and went
into force as Public Law 87-195 ten days later. The act segregated foreign
assistance into two specific categories; Part I focused on (non-military)
development aid in the form of loans, grant, and technical assistance to be
administered by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) under the policy umbrella of the Department of State (DOS). Part II
provided for security assistance in its various forms as described earlier. Part II
assistance fell under the political control of the DOS and policy adjustment and
implementation of the Department of Defense (DOD), separating it from
development assistance bureaucratic control (U.S. Senate 2003, 15, 19). Part II of
the FAA mandates that security assistance may only be provided to countries for
the express purpose of
antiterrorism, non-proliferation purposes, for legitimate selfdefense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or
collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of
the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to
participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations
for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and
security, or for the purpose of assisting foreign military forces in
less developed friendly countries (or the voluntary efforts of
personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States in such
countries) to construct public works and to engage in other
activities helpful to the economic and social development of such
friendly countries (U.S.C. XXII, 32, II, I, §2302).
44
According to section 2311 of the FAA, “The President is authorized to furnish
military assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, to any
friendly country or international organization, the assisting of which the President
finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace”
(U.S.C. XXII, 32, II, I, §2302). The FAA has subsequently been amended every
two years since its first passage to allow for the continual growth of U.S. foreign
assistance programs and bureaucracy.
By the mid-seventies, security assistance to countries in Southeast Asia
and the Middle East had received substantial negative attention both domestically
and internationally. While the FAA mandated specific stipulations as to the nature
of security assistance recipients, the DOS and DOD held considerable power over
the implementation of security assistance programs. Thus, Congress passed the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976
in late April of that year, but it was vetoed by President Ford on May 7th as he
cited that its language was too restrictive of security assistance policy. Congress
made several minor changes to the bill and reached a compromise with the Ford
administration resulting in Ford’s signature on June 30. The act made provisions
for much wider oversight by Congress, and mandated considerable reporting
requirements on the part of executive branch agencies (Rider & Logan 1977, 88).
The AECA allowed for general freedom on the part of conducting military sales
to other states, unless Congress prohibits the sale through joint legislation. It
placed firm control over arms exports within the President, requiring that any
45
commercial sale be approved and regulated through the executive branch; and
sales could only be made to states employing arms for legitimate self-defense. It
also required that Congress receive preliminary notification of prospective arms
sales 20 days before a formal agreement of sale is established, and 30 days before
the conclusion of a sale.6 In formalizing the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) procedures by which executive agencies are to
follow, Congress created for itself a greater oversight capacity, and even a method
of interference in security assistance through the provision of legislative blocks to
FMS and DCS (Grimmet 2007, 1-2). The AECA has been amended frequently to
account for growing amounts of security assistance, but its structure remains the
same. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) was created to manage
and coordinate security assistance and is responsible for notifying Congress of
arms sales (DSCA 2003, 35-36). Overall, the AECA expanded the powers of the
President over all forms of U.S. arms sales, and increased the role of Congress in
its oversight and interference position in arms transfers. As noted above, the
details and recipient qualifications of the FAA and AECA are regularly revised,
however the basic provisions of the acts remain, as well as the organizations and
mechanics originally established within the acts.7 While the nature of recipients
6
Section 36(b) of the AECA mandates such provisions for defense equipment sales of $14 million
or more, defense articles and services of $50 million or more, and defense design and construction
services of $200 million or more.
7
However, the FAA was not revised between 1986 and 2003 (Brainard 2003, 167) and has been
revised only twice since 9/11 in 2004 and 2009.
46
constantly changes, U.S. foreign aid as an apparatti has changed little in recent
decades.
Approach to Discussion
In the early 1960s, the discussion on the place of foreign aid within U.S. foreign
policy became a hot topic in academic and policy circles. With the emerging
success of the Marshall Plan and the growing threat perceived of the Soviet Union
and its spread of communism, American foreign policy scholars and practitioners
exhibited considerable disagreement regarding the constitutive nature and purpose
of foreign aid. Two primary approaches emerged: foreign aid conceived of as
altruistic, beneficent, and morally obligated stood in stark contrast to security
assistance conceived of as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy for the purpose of
doing its bidding in the name of U.S. interests. American sentiment in support of
economic and political development as well as the desire for the opening of
developing markets for U.S. trade prompted much of the security assistance
program growth experienced in the initial years of foreign aid programs. This
sentiment altered to account for the growing Soviet threat in the early 1960s, and
domestic approval for security assistance became directly related to its perceived
usefulness as a tool of containment. Herbert Feis asserted that for the early Cold
War years, foreign aid existed primarily as an instrument for the containment of
communism, and was justified as the countermeasure to communism, to contain
its negative effects (Feis 1964, 63-64, 67-68).
47
Brown and Opie assert that security assistance was to “strengthen
countries making common cause with the United States in resisting aggression;
and to strive for the establishment throughout the world of the conditions of
stability and progress that are essential to the security and well being of the
United States” (1953, 1). Reflecting the larger sentiment toward security
assistance in the early Cold War era, John Montgomery asserted that “as a
political instrument of U.S. policy, [it] is here to stay because of its usefulness and
flexibility” (1962, 9); U.S. security assistance training of foreign military
personnel during the first several decades of the Cold War was widely regarded as
the most useful and effective form of U.S. strategic influence in foreign military
establishments (Wolpin 1971, 130).8
The conceptualization of foreign aid, and particularly security assistance,
as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy for the pursuit of American strategic
interests has remained remarkably strong since the initial of the passage of the
FAA. This remained true during the rest of, and after, the Cold War period
(Weissman 1975, 11; Mcgillivray & White 1993, 2; Maizels & Nissanke 1984,
891; Rugumamu 1997, 7-9; Wedel 1998, 6; Browne 1999, 170).
8
Feis argued that during this period, foreign aid was driven by three sets of
suppositions/inferences: first, unless the U.S. appeased the discontent and poverty of poor and
newly independent states, the Soviet Union would provide such a role and gain allies in doing so.
Second, the U.S. had to convince impoverished countries that communism would not achieve
economic growth, and that the Soviet Union was oppressive in its economic intentions. Third, the
communists sought to exploit the turbulence of transition and modernization experienced by many
poor states, and must be prevented from doing so (1964, 67-68).
48
The end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have been
accompanied by the proliferation of smaller, less existential international security
threats; these developments have drawn the need for a renewed consideration of
security assistance. However, little seems to have changed in the way security
assistance is conceived of; it remains conceptually as an instrument for the
promotion of national interests and foreign policy goals (Picard & Groelsema
2008 4-7, 12; Alesina & Dollar 2000, 59-60; Sogge 2002, 194; Riddell 2007, 55,
57; Browne 2006, 9). That, from its modern incarnation to its current iterations,
security assistance has remained as simply a tool for interest promotion should
come as no shock; the literature on foreign aid in general and security assistance
particularly displays a remarkable consensus in conceiving of security assistance
as primarily an instrument of foreign policy to serve the self-interests of the U.S.
Having established the conceptual foundation of security assistance as a
self-serving tool of foreign policy, it is necessary to determine the linkage of
security assistance provision to expected outcomes that promote U.S. interests and
policy goals. The discussion below will seek to understand the conceptual quid
pro quo nature of security assistance to round out the literature on the subject.
Issue Area Linkage
Morgenthau (1962) notes that foreign aid is necessary for the purpose of securing
interests abroad in situations in which military or diplomatic capacity is either
incapable or inappropriate (301). Seeing disconnect only in the historical
49
mechanics of aid apparati, Morgenthau argues that in essence, all forms of foreign
aid are bribes for political ends, simple payment for political services be they
compliance, tolerance, agreement, etc. (302).
Security assistance, he argues, is primarily for political purposes; U.S.
military strength is such that allies and buffer states lack any real usefulness as
military cohorts, it is the political gains benefitted from such transfers that make
them useful. The acceptance of such assistance, Morgenthau argues, obligates the
recipient to the expectations or desires of the patron. He argues that security
assistance clearly exists for the purpose of establishing political quid pro quo as
the U.S. has no military need for relatively more advanced military forces in
underdeveloped countries, often quite to the contrary. He even goes so far as to
qualify high tech military transfers as what he calls “prestige aid” for the simple
purpose of strengthening the psychological defense-image of states with little to
no need or capacity for such instruments, all for the purpose of indebting the
recipient politically to the patron (303); James Kurth argues this exact point when
showing that aircraft transfers to South Vietnam and Iran were instances of
military technology transfers above the technical ability of the recipient to
maintain and employ (Kurth 1973, 46).
Since Morgenthau, specific terms within the foreign aid literature have
evolved to speak of linkages between assistance provision and the promotion of
the provider’s goals. The conditionality of assistance can be multifaceted and
include both material and political requirements of the recipient. Aid tying has
50
been identified by analysts as a form of conditionality in which the donor state
requires that the recipient only purchase specific goods and/or services from the
donor. The more crucial form of conditionality is that of alignment, in which
assistance programs are directly linked to the goals, objectives, and interests of
the donor; and while aid tying is most commonly found in American development
and economic aid, alignment is almost universally evident in U.S. security
assistance (Buss & Gardner 2008, 188-189; Riddell 2007, 99-100).9
In some historical cases, alignment linkage has been very clearly
delineated within treaties and/or legislation as was the case of the Philippines
Military Assistance Act of 1946; aid to Greece and Turkey in the late 1940s was
provided under political expectation, rather than open disclosure, that the Internal
Security Assistance provided would be used to “maintain their own free
institutions and national integrity against aggressive movements aimed at
imposing totalitarian regimes upon them.” The foreign policy goals attached to
assistance in these cases were widely considered attained by the early 1950s, and
gave reason for the growth of security assistance in the years to come (Brown and
Opie 1953, 440-443).
Interests linkage between security assistance provision and strategic goals
have also been openly stated in congressional proceedings; the most poignant and
direct being the statement made by former Under Secretary of the Air Force and
9
Assistance has just as easily been suspended when recipient countries display unwillingness or
stubbornness to obliging to U.S. interests or goals as was in the case with Zimbabwe, Pakistan,
Brazil, and Ethiopia (North & North 2008, 283).
51
Under Secretary of Defense for International Affairs Townsend Hoopes before the
Joint Economic Committee in 1971. Hoopes asserted that the primary overt
linkages of security assistance were:
-To obtain U.S. access to bases and other facilities in strategic places; and
-To gain the allegiance of the particular diplomatic support of aid
recipients.
Hoopes also noted Internal Security Assistance and alliance preservation as
purposes, but the focus of his testimony was emphatically on the two purposes
outlined above, noting them as the most useful and important elements of U.S.
security assistance (Economic Issues in Military Assistance 1971, 83). In its
official policy review document in 2001, the DOD listed force projection in the
form of strategic basing rights abroad as the third most important facing U.S.
national defense and national security in the current era; the report asserted that
force projection challenges must be overcome in distant and strategic locations in
order to effectively promote U.S. security and defense abroad (DOD 2001, 30).
Basing access and/or rights on foreign territories is one of the most
common linkages of U.S. security assistance. The U.S. has paid billions of dollars
since the end of WWII to maintain military presence in nearly every region of the
globe. Security assistance for bases in the Philippines, Panama, Spain, and Turkey
has been only the more publicized iterations of a multiregional basing program
(Montgomery 1967, 17-18). Robert Harkavy argues that basing access is not only
an indicator of linkage between U.S. security assistance and tangible outcomes,
52
but that the relationship between security assistance provision and basing access
is the most overt gauge as to the effectiveness of security assistance in projecting
U.S. military force abroad. He notes that the relationships emergent since the end
of WWII based on security assistance provision have become remarkably stable
and indicative of recipient countries’ acquiescence to U.S. defense and security
priorities (1989, 4-5).
The ability to influence recipient states so as to procure policy alignment
with U.S. interests is the other major element of security assistance; the U.S.
cannot simply pay for the extension of American presence and hope to realize its
interests, it must convince others to facilitate, support, or at least not object to the
pursuit of those interests (Montgomery 1967, 18).
For all of the conditionality of U.S. security assistance, some analysts
caution that states may have incentives to accept arms transfers and payments to
accomplish their own short term goals, but will always have domestic incentives
to pursue their own national interest in the long run even if it is incongruent with
U.S. interests. It is only through interest harmonization or ever-increasing
amounts of assistance can the U.S. maintain cooperation with states indicating
interest incongruence. These analysts warn that such approaches may not be
possible or sustainable and that security assistance as an instrument of promoting
policy alignment, like any other, is limited (Cahn 1984, 78-84; Graves 1993, 196).
However, many argue that it is only when the goal (as determined by U.S.
interests) is closely tied to the objective of the assistance provided, that any
53
reasonable chance of successfully realizing the goal exists (Deibel 2007, 255;
Baldwin 1985, 310). In this way,
The best odds obtain when… [assistance] is closely related to (or
exactly the same as) the specific work to be carried out by the aid
project; short-term; genuinely supported by the political leadership
of the recipient country; not burdened with secondary objectives;
and disbursed, delayed, or suspended according to a credible and
tight connection to the donor’s insistence on clear performance
standards…. (Burnett 1992, 16).
Morgenthau’s interpretation of foreign aid as a straight-forward political tool fits
in line very well with Sampanis’s expectation for a declining hegemon to entice
cooperation out of a vertical coalition, and it becomes clear that there is
considerable agreement within the literature as to the instrumental and interestpromoting nature of security assistance. It also becomes clear that the provision of
security assistance is expected to require some form of cooperation or compliance
from the recipient, and that this typically takes the form of security related issues
such as basing rights, or policy alignment. The above-considered literature
displays an explicit expectation that security assistance is typically related to
security interests or goals of the U.S., and that when such linkages are distanced
or strained to include unrelated objectives, the possibility for objective attainment
greatly diminishes.
Thus, to summarize, it is expected that U.S. security assistance will be
closely tied to two outcomes: first, basing rights for the purpose of force
projection in areas of strategic interest to the U.S. Second, security policy
54
alignment will be required of recipient states in a variety of forms, but primarily
in acquiescence to the promotion of U.S. strategic interests either in the region or
territory of the recipient, or at least the curtailment of criticism or objection to
such interest promotion.
55
Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
Hypothesis
Considering the literature thus far reviewed on the topics of U.S. decline
prevention and vertical coalition, the provision of security assistance has been
furthered as an explicit instrument for interest and goal promotion. From this
literature, a hypothesis may be furthered to supply an answer to the research
question.
Fourth Variant Theory has provided the expectation that vertical coalitions
improve international influence and bargaining position and that foreign policy
instruments, such as the provision of U.S. security assistance, exist for the
purpose of accomplishing U.S. goals and interests. Thus, it is expected that when
security assistance is provided to other countries, the U.S. will construct vertical
coalitions integrating recipient countries; subsequently, the realization of vertical
coalitions will improve the influence and bargaining position of the U.S. in
accordance with Fourth Variant Theory. In other words: when security assistance
is not applied effectively, vertical coalitions will fail to materialize. Thus, it is
hypothesized that the provision of “high” levels (which will be defined below) of
security assistance provision will result in the formation of vertical coalitions, and
conversely, that “low” levels of security assistance provision will result in the
failure to effectively form vertical coalitions. This hypothesis is based on a
56
singular focus upon security assistance as the tool of coalition building. It is fully
expected that many different policies and engagement programs may be necessary
for coalition formation; however, this study is focused on the ability of security
assistance to effectively promote U.S. interests through vertical coalitions.
Independent Variable
Because the hypothesis infers a relationship of U.S. security assistance leading to
the formation of vertical coalitions, the independent variable of this study is U.S.
security assistance. Thus, the dependent variable is the successful formation of
vertical coalitions as assumed by Fourth Variant Theory to improve international
influence and bargaining position.
Levels of security assistance provision will be observed in US dollar
amounts in order to measure the volume of security assistance; observed levels
will subsequently be broken into yearly averages per country, calculated by taking
the security assistance provided to a country for the while period and dividing that
total by the number of years observed. By doing so, each country will display a
yearly average for the period which can then be compared within the case. It is
expected that each case will display a spectrum of yearly averages with some
countries receiving relatively large amounts and others receiving relatively low
amounts. This spectrum is useful, as it allows for distinction among the provision
levels over time, without the need to look at each year separately. Also, it is
useful, because it incorporates the entirety of the period into each country’s
57
average provision. As will be discussed below, this will hopefully account for
latency in the fulfillment of U.S. interests in relation to the recipient country, as
countries may not immediately display effects from security assistance provision;
such displays may take time, and by looking at the yearly average of the entire
period, time is accounted for. The two countries displaying the highest yearly
averages for the period will be selected for observation, as it is hypothesized that
they would display characteristics of joining, or remaining within, vertical
coalitions with the U.S. Also, the country displaying the lowest yearly average for
the period will be observed as well, as it is hypothesized to display actions or
positions uncharacteristic of joining, or remaining within, U.S. vertical coalitions.
This approach allows for selection on the independent variable, so that country
selection within each case is not based on the most convenient data available.
With three countries selected from each case, the effect of the independent
variable upon the dependent variable will then be observed for noticeable
variation.
Dependent Variable
If the provision of U.S. security assistance is the independent variable as
described above, than clearly, the dependent variable of this study is the formation
of vertical coalitions. Fourth Variant Theory expects the U.S., as a declining
hegemon, to reach out and create vertical coalitions as a high priority of foreign
policy. Obviously, measuring variation within this variable presents a challenge as
58
two crucial elements of the variable emerge: the need for a useful definition of
vertical coalitions and measurement of successful formation of vertical coalitions;
thus, this dependent variable requires a complex operationalization for
determining and qualifying variation of the variable. For Sampanis, defining
vertical coalitions is a reasonably clear-cut task, they are coalitions in which “one
member dominates the other members” and that dominant member “maintains
relative advantage in one or more aspects of power” so as to “promote many of its
goals as the coalitions goals” and this is accomplished by offering incentives to
the weaker members (Sampanis 2003, 17). Using this simple definition, it
becomes obvious that when a coalition has been formed, these key aspects are
present in concert and the dominant member of a hierarchical coalition elevates its
priorities within the coalition by offering incentives. Sampanis makes the crucial
point that vertical coalition formation is strategic in that it purposes to improve
international influence and bargaining position, but she also argues that it is a
tactical instrument for strengthening leadership and influence bilaterally so that
the hegemon’s position within the larger international framework can be
improved (2003, 18).
Fourth Variant Theory clearly expects vertical coalitions to serve as a
method for the U.S. to slow or stop the decline of its international influence, and
thus improve its influence and bargaining position. Based on this assumption of
the theory, if a vertical coalition can be formed, the U.S. would be equipped with
a powerful instrument for reversing the effects of its decline. However, the
59
formation of a vertical coalition poses a challenge to the U.S. as states rarely
forfeit their international autonomy without recompense. Thus, the various
instruments of U.S. foreign policy may be employed for the purpose of creating
incentives for states to adhere to U.S. leadership within a vertical coalition. As
identified earlier, security assistance is focused on within this study to determine
its ability to form vertical coalitions. Therefore, the success of security assistance
as an instrument of forming vertical coalitions serves as indication of variation in
the dependent variable. Measurement of vertical coalition formation as a
dependent variable is approached straight-forward as a dyadic yes or no, although
it is conceivable that an evaluation of indeterminacy may emerge as well. Thus,
for this study, a vertical coalition will be determined as formed when an
international arrangement emerges that displays three key characteristics: the U.S.
as the dominant member, U.S. security goals become coalition security goals, and
the U.S. has offered security assistance as incentive to such ends. While such an
arrangement may appear as multilateral, it must be remembered that vertical
coalition formation is a bilateral accomplishment, as each member of the coalition
has been drawn into an acquiescent relationship with the U.S.; no particular
relationship amongst the middle and weak powers is implied or necessary. Again
to reinforce the assertions from the introduction, this study seeks understanding of
the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance in a bilateral form, a vertical coalition
should not be confused herein as determinative or inherent to multilateral or nonvertical interaction amongst states in the international system.
60
In determining the effectiveness of security assistance in forming vertical
coalitions, it is expected that there exist several indicators of security assistance
programs successfully promoting interests and goals in the form of vertical
coalitions. While strategic value to the U.S., force projection, and policy
alignment (Economic Issues in Military Assistance 1971, 83; Montgomery 1967,
17-18; Harkavy 1989, 4-5) emerged from the literature as such indicators, it is
entirely plausible that many indicators specific to each recipient country and
period are also present, and must be considered when determining whether a
country has formed a vertical coalition, or remained in one, with the U.S.
Certainly the most important indicator, the strategic value of a particular
country to the U.S. varies greatly, and is difficult to objectively measure.
However, when placed in the context of locale and history, it is possible to make
the case for a country’s strategic value to the U.S. at the time. Strategic value can
be displayed in any number of ways, of which force projection and policy
alignment are but only two examples.
Force projection is primarily identified within the literature as U.S. access
to bases and other facilities in strategic locales, and historically this has included:
construction of U.S. military bases and outposts on foreign territory, U.S. military
tenancy of sovereign military facilities (such as ports, airbases, and airports), or
flyover and transit rights (Harkavy 1989, 7-8, 15-17). Thus, force projection as an
indicator of effective security assistance emerges as a self-obvious component.
The minimum force projection are flyover and transit rights in which U.S.
61
military forces are permitted to fly over or cross sovereign territory for the
purpose of conducting operations in another country or locale. Elevation of force
projection from that point would entail U.S. military tenancy of a host’s facilities
such as naval ports, airbases, and airports which would display real force
projection from within a country. Finally, U.S. military force projection is
maximized by the acquisition or construction of a U.S. military base with legally
agreed upon rights of station within a sovereign country permitting activities
included in the two lower levels of force projection, but adding increased range of
projection and greater convenience of operation. Table 4.1 displays force
projection in order of expected utility to the U.S.:
Table 4.1.
Levels of Force Projection
1.No Force Projection
2. Flyover or Transit Rights
3. U.S. Military Tenancy of Sovereign Facility
4. Acquisition of U.S. Military Base
Another important indication of the effectiveness of security assistance is
that of policy alignment for such alignment is foundational to building and
leading any meaningful form of coalition as expected by Fourth Variant Theory
(Sampanis 2003, 17). While the U.S. seeks policy alignment on a wide spectrum
of policies and issues, it is appropriate to consider policies and issues closely
related to security assistance when attempting to measure its ability to corral the
policies of other countries into line with the U.S. The U.S. often seeks
62
acquiescence from local states when pursuing high priority security initiatives for
a region, such as it did during the Gulf War when it sought cooperation from
neighboring Arab states in isolating Iraq. High priority security initiatives are
typically overt and announced as such by the U.S. Incidences of such initiatives
immediately come to mind: the military position in Berlin during the early Cold
War, the defensive stance of Taiwan in the Straight of Formosa, and the missile
shield in Eastern Europe; these are instances of security initiatives prioritized over
all others in a specific region or locale deemed as imperative security interests of
the U.S. However, these initiatives are rarely goals in their own right, but simply
elements of some larger strategy i.e.: Containment, the restraint of Chinese power,
continental defense, etc.
In this context, policy alignment with the U.S. in its stance on an initiative
may be determined as crucial in a country’s relations with the U.S., and security
assistance is provided to acquire such alignment. Considering this, the current
study will approach policy alignment as defined as acquiescence of a country
receiving U.S. security assistance to the primary U.S. security initiative for its
region or locale. This will be measured in simple terms; acquiescence will be
observed when a country declares its support for the initiative, and its willingness
to assist in some material manner. Instances in which a recipient country fails to
display acquiescence to U.S. policy on a high priority security initiative will be
measured as an indication of the ineffectiveness of security assistance to promote
policy alignment.
63
Considering the above indicators, and others which will emerge in the
cases, the timing of variation in the dependent variable is an important factor. As
mentioned above, the latency of acquiescence expected by the U.S. of a recipient
country varies. It is plausible that the U.S. may provide security assistance to a
country without requiring any immediate acquiescence, but will call on such
acquiescence in the future when the strategic value of that country has changed
for the U.S. Also, the indicators mentioned here are not universal; force projection
may be strategically valuable to the U.S. in one country, and not in another, and
certain countries will always present greater strategic value to the U.S. when
compared to others.
In consideration of the two dependent variable indicators given above, a
determination of the effectiveness of security assistance will be made not in a
threshold manner, in which an observation must meet certain criteria in order to
be classified in a certain manner, but rather in historical and geographical context
as well as the role of the recipient country in U.S. strategic interests. The
methodology described above will be applied to separate case studies to follow in
an attempt to systematically determine the effectiveness of U.S. security
assistance by employing the above measurements.
64
Chapter 5
CASES
Having addressed the two crucial elements of policy and the quid pro quo nature
of security assistance earlier, it is necessary to address the final two crucial
elements of the research question: region and interests. In understanding the
regional element of the research question, it is necessary to consider three
important points: what exactly constitutes this region, why the region was chosen
for analysis, and during which historical era(s) will the region be observed. It will
be within this third point on the historical context of observations, that interests
will enter the scene, for interests change over time and are adjusted for a variety
of reasons. Upon considering the region and era-specific U.S. interests present, it
will then be possible to observe the outcomes of U.S. security assistance provision
to the countries in the region and evaluate such provisions for their effectiveness
in forming vertical coalitions in regard to the specific interests at hand.
What Constitutes the Region?
The research question identified the countries of the former Soviet Union as the
targets of observation for the evaluation of the effectiveness of U.S. security
assistance. In order to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of security
assistance in forming vertical coalitions that include such countries, it is necessary
to understand exactly which countries are being observed so as to avoid any
65
confusion. To be clear, and for the purposes of this study, the countries of the
former Soviet Union will be defined as countries ruled directly by the Soviet
Union government in Moscow and countries under occupation by Soviet forces
and/or communist governments directed by Moscow. This definition includes of
all the countries that existed in a submissive political and security arrangement
with Soviet leadership in Moscow; this definition does not include several
countries of the former Warsaw Pact because they either failed to display direct
submissiveness to Moscow, or openly diverged from Soviet leadership and
position. Thus, several countries often included in a definition of “Soviet” or
“Communist” are excluded for the above reasons, these are: Albania, which
withdrew from the Warsaw Pact in 1968; Romania, which diverged from Soviet
policy under the leadership of Nicolai Ceausescu; and the Yugoslav Republic(s),
which remained independent from the Soviet Union under the leadership of Josip
Tito. Countries satisfying the definition above include Armenia; Azerbaijan;
Belarus; Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Estonia; Georgia; Hungary; Kazakhstan;
Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova; Poland; Slovakia; Tajikistan;
Turkmenistan; Ukraine; and Uzbekistan.10 These countries will serve as the foci
of analysis herein, and will be observed for the effects of the independent variable
(provision amount of U.S. security assistance) on the dependent variable (the
formation of vertical coalitions). Noticeably, Russia is omitted from the above list
10
MacKenzie & Curran describe the process by which these countries were absorbed into the
Soviet Union as being one of three distinct manners: they were already part of the Russian Empire
before WWII, they remained occupied by Soviet forces after WWII, or they were assimilated via a
communist coup or invasion (1977, 568-571).
66
of countries to be considered. This is because Russia is a large power competitor
to the U.S., the kind which the U.S. seeks to improve its influence over and
bargaining with. It is for this exact purpose that the U.S. is expected to form
vertical coalitions which could not include Russia as it is too powerful to
subordinate itself in bilateral relations with the U.S., especially regarding security
matters. By definition and composition, Russia is excluded due to its size and
international position vis a vis the U.S., this is also due to its role in the region
competing against U.S. interests and attempts for dominance, it would be
inappropriate to speak of Russia as a target of vertical coalition efforts by the U.S.
Why Former-Soviet Countries?
With a clear understanding of the definition of the region, the rationale for
choosing the region for this study may be presented. There are two important
factors to understanding the logic for selecting the countries of this region for
analysis of the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance in forming vertical
coalitions: the experimental nature of the region, and the strategic location of the
region. The region displays many of the qualities of a quasi-experiment. The
value of observing the countries of this region in a quasi-experimental approach
emerges from the historical controls afforded, of which four are readily apparent.
First, all of the countries of this region achieved independence from the Soviet
Union within a period of two years from 1990 to 1992. This historical similarity
controls for national political development, as each country became free to
67
establish its own national-political goals without interference from the Soviet
Union. Second, bilateral relations between the countries of the region and the U.S.
were all initiated within this two year period, allowing for nearly identical
contexts of relationship-formation. Third, remarkable historical similarity
emerges when considering the historical context of U.S. security assistance to
these countries; as will be shown in the analysis section later, nearly every single
former-Soviet country in Eastern Europe began receiving security assistance from
the U.S. in 1994. Likewise, nearly every single former Soviet country in Western
Asia began receiving security assistance from the U.S. in 2001. Finally, the
countries of this region display considerable similarity in the amount of U.S.
security assistance received in the fifteen years that they have been receiving it, as
opposed to countries in other regions that receive enormously disparate amounts
of security assistance from the U.S. These controls over important variables
provides a high level of internal validity for this analysis in that the countries
display significant likeness when considering bilateral relations with the U.S. (the
essence of vertical coalitions) and U.S. security assistance provision (the policy
under investigation herein).
Layne argues that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.
focused a remarkable concentration on Eastern Europe for the sake of establishing
and securing hegemony in the region, both to fill the void left by the Soviets, and
to maintain its preeminent position in Europe; for if Europe was allowed to create
its own security alliance without the U.S., as was being proposed in the EU, the
68
U.S. would experience even further diminished leverage on the continent. Europe
was not only important, but strategically paramount to U.S. interests for the
purpose of peace enlargement and maintenance, market enlargement, natural
resources access, and investment protection (2006, 112). The region possesses
enormous strategic value due to several factors: it is the largest landmass region in
the world extending from the Atlantic to Pacific and to the Black Sea and
Mediterranean in the south; it includes the foremost strategic rival to the U.S. in
the region in Russia; it borders China, the greatest potential competitor to the U.S.
in recent years; it encompasses some of the greatest natural resource reserves in
the world; it presents a logistical nightmare for force projection and military
operations due to difficult geographical access as well as rival political
competition; it is proximate to major U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and
Pakistan; the list goes on. Twenty countries satisfy the definition above as former
Soviet states, and sixteen countries border these (including important allies such
as Germany and Japan, and strategic locales of concern such as China,
Afghanistan and Pakistan), making this region one of, if not, the most
strategically important regions to the U.S. Such great numbers also improves the
representativeness of this analysis, as the countries of this region, while not
strictly archetypical of U.S. security assistance recipient countries around the
world, display characteristics found in all other countries receiving U.S. security
assistance: geographical importance, strategic and/or military importance,
valuable/potential markets, and natural resources. Thus, it is obvious that the
69
region in question presents an excellent opportunity for analyzing the
effectiveness of U.S. security assistance in forming vertical coalitions. This is so
due to the region’s nearly ideal quality as a social scientific experimental setting
in international relations, and due to the remarkable representativeness of the
countries composing the region itself for the purpose of understanding larger
trends of international relations as they relate to the provision of U.S. security
assistance to countries worldwide.
Historical Periods of Observation
The historical setting for this study is that of the nearly two decades since the end
of the Cold War, and the emergence of the countries receiving U.S. security
assistance targeted for analysis in this study. As discussed in the earlier sections
of this study, the post-Cold War period holds immense importance for the U.S. as
it has attempted to capitalize on its preeminence and slow or halt its decline. The
absence of a major rival posing an existential threat to the U.S. has allowed for
interaction and even intervention in regions of the globe previously out of reach to
U.S. influence. The countries of the former Soviet Union compose one such
region, and their independence since the early 1990s has fostered nearly twenty
years of opportunity for the U.S. to advance its interests in this newly open
region.
Periods of great change allow for unique analysis and observation in new,
and hopefully enlightening, settings. As described earlier, the emergence of so
70
many new countries during such a concentrated period under such similar
circumstances creates a rare opportunity for experiment-like settings. The key
element here is timing; a great change takes place, and suddenly observations
previously unavailable are revealed. For the purpose of determining the
effectiveness of security assistance in promoting U.S. interests, particularly the
formation of vertical coalitions, the countries of Eastern Europe provide a unique
opportunity for observation in the years following the end of the Cold War;
likewise, the countries of Eurasia provide a similarly unique opportunity for
observation since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Thus, the analysis to follow will be
separated into two regional/historical cases: one case will consist of the countries
of Eastern Europe between 1994 and 2008 covering the period since the U.S.
began providing security assistance to the region, and the other will consist of the
countries of Eurasia during 2001-2008 in the same manner.
Case 1: Eastern Europe 1994-2008
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the subsequent independence
gained by its composite and satellite countries created a security and power
vacuum in Eastern Europe. Russia emerged as the strongest regional presence, but
paled in comparison to the control and influence wielded by the Soviet Union.
While initially surprised, the U.S. under the George H. W. Bush administration
immediately sought to stabilize the region through arms control and foreign
assistance programs. These programs were continued and expanded by the
71
Clinton administration during the remainder of the 1990s to witness the stable
growth of democracy and security in the region. Under the Clinton administration,
the U.S. began providing security assistance to the countries of the region through
standard U.S. security assistance programs such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS),
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training
(IMET), and others. Provision of such programs to these countries began in 1994
and steadily grew during the decade, and after. Thus, Eastern Europe during the
1990s presents an excellent case study for determining the effectiveness of U.S.
security assistance, particularly in its ability (or inability) to form vertical
coalitions as expected to improve influence and bargaining position by Fourth
Variant Theory. In this study, the trans-caucuses countries of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia are not included as part of Eastern Europe, but rather as
part of Eurasia, this is in accordance with the U.S. Department of State and
USAID reporting methods; thus these countries will be treated as such in this
study.11
As explained earlier, the levels of U.S. security assistance provided to the
countries of this region will be measured in yearly averages for the entire period
to observe fluctuation of the independent variable and effects inherent to it. The
levels of security assistance received by each country will then be considered
against the dependent variable of vertical coalition formation as measured by
11
For a breakdown of regional classification, refer to U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants,
Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 2008, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, pp.
218.
72
indicators relevant to the strategic value of recipient countries to the U.S.,
including military force projection, support for the U.S. high priority security
initiatives, and other specific requirements of acquiescence placed on the recipient
by the U.S. The countries found to receive the highest levels (in yearly averages
for the period of observation) are expected to display acquiescence to the U.S.
characteristic of bilateral relations within a vertical coalition.
When considering the record of security assistance to countries of Eastern
Europe since the 1990s, see Table 5.1, several key points surface: regional
averages per year between 1994 and 1997 are almost unmentionably low, and do
not even exceed $1 million; these numbers dramatically increase starting in 1998
and remain much higher than earlier years; Poland receives the greatest amount of
security assistance by far, while Belarus never receives more than $300,000 in
one year barely more than $1 million total for the entire period; and no country
receives more than $10 million in a single year until the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland are each provided nearly tenfold levels of security assistance
in 1998, a year before joining NATO. Once again, it is expected that in this case,
the provision of high (yearly average) levels of security assistance will form
vertical coalitions.
0.9
0.9
0
1.7
0.3
0.7
0.3
Lithuania 0.3
Moldova 0.1
2.6
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia 0.4
Ukraine
1
0.6
1
0.3
0.5
0.5
1
3.8
125
3.9
7.6
7
17.2
9
3.8
8.2
1.7
5.4
5.4
8.6
5.4
8.3
4.9
4.6
3.4
8.2
1.7
5.4
4.7
7.4
4.8
7.4
6
0
0.1
0
2.1
11.7
10.3
20.8
10.3
27.8
2.2
7.7
8.3
9
7.4
10
9.9
0
9.5
11.9 12.6 14.2
7.2
15.4
9.8
10.3
7.7
14.2 30.1 35.2
2.7
8.4
8.4
12
7.6
12
43.8 52.6
12.3
9.7
3.6
7.7
6.3
10.7
7.2
10.7
18.6 11.1 20.3
0
0.1
0
14
7.5
6.1
90
2.1
7.5
7
9
6.3
8
1.5
6.5
5
3.8
5
4.7
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
1.1
2.6
2.5
2.1
2.6
4.4
8.2
0
25.8
78.4
74.3
110
75.1
119
125
1.2
4.8
8.7
7.7
15.8 11.4
4.9
5.7
7.9
2.1
116
175
75.6
31.8 30.5 29.1 418
2.5
5.7
7.3
4.2
7.4
5
10.2 11.5 11.1
0
Sources: USAID. (2002 & 2008). U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Authorizations.
1
0.5
1
0.3
0.5
0.4
1
0.6
17.2
10.4
0
5.7
0.8
Hungary 2.6
0.4
0.7
5.2
0.1
Average 0.87 0.65 0.63 0.67 18.3
0.9
0.2
Estonia
0.8
0.9
0.3
5.4
0.5
1
Czech R.
0.7
0.3
5.1
0.4
Bulgaria 0.9
1
0.1
0.2
Belarus
U.S. Security Assistance in US 1998 Dollars (millions)
7.8
11.7
5.1
27.9
1.7
5.2
4.9
7.4
5
7.9
8.4
0.08
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total Yr. Avg
Table 5.1.
73
74
As was indicated in the methodology section above, the two countries
displaying the highest yearly averages for the period, as well as the country
receiving the lowest yearly average will be observed in greater detail to determine
variation in the dependent variable (formation of vertical coalitions). Evident in
Table 5.1, Poland and Ukraine received the two highest yearly averages of US
$27.9 million and US $11.7 million respectively. Belarus received the lowest
yearly average of US $80,000. Also notable are those countries which received
above the regional yearly average, as they may also be expected to display
characteristics of vertical coalitions with the U.S., these included Bulgaria at US
$8.4 million and the Czech Republic at US $7.9 million; Hungary narrowly
misses the regional yearly average by only US $400,000.
Thus, the data above displays ground for several anticipated outcomes,
primary of those is the expectation that both Poland and Ukraine will display
characteristics of vertical coalitions with the U.S. Secondarily, Belarus is
expected to not display such characteristics. It is also plausible that Bulgaria and
the Czech Republic will display similar characteristics as Poland and Ukraine,
however such displays are expected to be less determinative of vertical coalition
formation due to the lower amount of security assistance provided to those
countries.
75
Poland
Poland’s strategic value to the U.S. since the end of the Cold War has been
evident in several different manners. Poland’s location as the largest country
connecting Western and Eastern Europe has made it important for any groundbased offensive in European history, in either direction. This has made Poland one
of the most in-demand pieces of real estate in Europe. Upon gaining
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Poland displayed immediate
overtures of cooperation to the U.S. in a desire for closer relations. While U.S.
developmental aid began flowing to Poland in 1992, the U.S. began providing
security assistance in 1994, and has consistently provided high levels (relative to
regional averages) ever since.
As indicated earlier, Poland’s bilateral relations with the U.S. since 1994
in the realm of security affairs will be considered for levels of acquiescence
indicative (or not) of its membership of a vertical coalition with the U.S. Most of
the major security initiatives for Europe since the end of the Cold War have not
been directly related to Poland; even still, the U.S. has sought considerable
acquiescence from Poland, while providing considerable levels of security
assistance. This began in 1995, when the U.S. led NATO in enforcing the
provisions of the Dayton Agreement ending the war in Bosnia. The U.S.
persuaded several non-alliance countries to participate as well, including Poland
which sent an entire battalion to serve in the agreement Implementation Force
(IFOR) in December 1995, and remained as part of the Stabilization Force
76
(SFOR) through 2004 when the EU took over security in Bosnia (Baumann et al.
2004, 192). During this conflict, Poland was never called upon to serve as a base
of operations for the U.S., nor were there any requests for force projection on
Polish territory, this was due to Poland’s distance from the area of operations, as
well as the fact that combat sorties were flown out of U.S. airbases in Italy and
Taszar Air Base in southern Hungary (U.S. European Command 2004).
Poland was accepted as a member of NATO on March 12, 1999 along
with Hungary and the Czech Republic. This was the first phase of enlargement of
the alliance into Eastern Europe which had been in negotiation since June of
1996. Poland also contributed to the NATO peacekeeping mission to Kosovo in
the beginning in the summer of 1999, and has maintained troops in the NATO
Kosovo Force (KFOR) ever since (NATO 2010a).
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. invoked Article V of the NATO
charter regarding collective self-defense. In response to this, Poland formally
agreed to enact Article V and gave full support to the U.S. during Operation
Enduring Freedom, the invasion of Afghanistan. This included flyover rights, use
of ports, air bases, and intelligence resources. Poland also contributed to the
NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, maintaining the
seventh largest troop contingency in the mission, and has recently announced
plans to increase the contribution from 2,100 troops to 2,700 troops in-country
(ISAF 2010a). Poland also politically supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and
contributed to the military mission, Operation Iraqi Freedom, deploying over
77
2,500 troops at peak levels. Poland withdrew its contingency in October 2008 as
domestic political tension over the country’s role made continuing deployment in
Iraq untenable for President Lech Kaczynski (U.S. Forces-Iraq 2008).
Finally, Poland presents a unique case of U.S. force projection. Poland’s
location has prevented it from playing a strategically important force projection
role in the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, its proximity
to Russia has not gone unnoticed. In 2005, it was announced that the U.S. was
interested in deploying long-range missile interceptors in Poland, and in 2007
formal negotiations were initiated, and in August 2008, only two weeks after the
South Ossetia conflict in Georgia, the U.S. and Poland formalized an agreement
for the deployment of interceptor missiles in eastern Poland. However, the U.S.
scrapped the plan in November 2009 in favor of short-range defense missiles,
posing a much less aggressive stance to Russia. This was a unique circumstance
in that Poland acquiesced fully to the U.S. position on missile deployment, and
even expressed regret when the U.S. announced the scaling back of the project
(Dempsey 2009). The several points above present an interesting display of
bilateral relations between Poland and the U.S. in security affairs since the end of
the Cold War. Following the consideration of the remaining presentation of
countries below, the findings section will explore in depth the trends and
conclusions to be made from these observations.
78
Ukraine
Ukraine’s post-Cold War strategic value to the U.S. is obvious. It is the largest
country in Eastern Europe following Russia by land mass, it holds the longest
international border with Russia in the Region, it holds the longest coastline on
the Black Sea, and it is one of the most militarized former-Soviet countries due
largely to the fact that the Soviet Union had located much of its weapons
production and nuclear armaments in Ukraine during the Cold War. Also, since
gaining its independence in 1991 Ukraine has displayed ongoing domestic
political conflict between western-oriented, Ukrainian-speaking political parties,
and eastern-oriented, Russian-speaking political parties which have maintained
close ties to Russia. Ukraine approached cooperation with the U.S. at a more
cautious pace than did Poland. It was enticed primarily by funding from the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) in which the U.S. compensated it
for the release and destruction of its Soviet era nuclear weapons. When it began
receiving security assistance from the U.S. in 1994, it did so with strict conditions
and limited military cooperation in the region due to its constitutional prohibition
of foreign troops on Ukrainian territory unless special permission is granted by its
parliament, the Rada (Verkhovna Rada 2010).
Like Poland, most of the major security initiatives for Europe since the
end of the Cold War have not been directly related to Ukraine, and while the U.S.
has sought acquiescence from Ukraine, providing considerable levels of security
assistance in return, the record of followership is quite different from that of
79
Poland. Like Poland, Ukraine contributed to the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR
missions in Bosnia; however, Ukraine sent only a company-sized contingent of
approximately 200 troops to remain with the mission (Clark 1996, 137).
Ukraine expressed eagerness to accede to NATO membership early in the
1990s, and was the first former-Soviet country to sign the NATO Partnership for
Peace (PfP) agreement in 1994, granting elevated observer status, nearly junior
membership to the alliance (NATO 2010b). In 1997, NATO and Ukraine signed
the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership forming the NATO-Ukraine Commission
(NUC). The NUC sought to build relations between Ukraine and the alliance, and
intensified discussions of membership in 2005. Internal political conflict has
prevented the discussions from being furthered to a point of negotiation for
membership. With the loss Viktor Yushchenko’s bid for reelection in the January
2010 presidential elections, the domestic driving force behind Ukraine’s entry
into the alliance all but disappeared (Levy 2010, A1).
While not a member of NATO, Ukraine did contribute to the NATO led
KFOR peacekeeping mission to Kosovo in 1999. It sent a company-sized
contingent, which has remained in-country ever since (NATO 2010a). Following
the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Ukraine immediately declared support for the U.S.
operation in Afghanistan, and offered flyover rights for U.S. aircraft in transit to
the area of operation, it also permitted refueling of transport aircraft at Ukrainian
air bases, but did not permit the access of offensive aircraft such as fighter jets or
bombers due to constitutional prohibitions (Gerleman et al. 2001, 9). Ukraine
80
contributed directly to Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF by deploying a
small contingent of military doctors and medical staff in support of Lithuanian
troops, and has maintained that level throughout the mission (ISAF 2010b).
Ukraine participated in much higher levels in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
sending a full battalion of nearly 1,700 troops into Iraq in March, 2003. Troop
levels remained until the summer of 2005 when they were reduced to 900, and the
entire contingency was withdrawn in December 2005 (U.S. Army 2008). Unlike
Poland, the U.S. has not proposed any form of missile interceptor shield to be
based on Ukrainian territory, however, military relations between the U.S. and
Ukraine have been hampered in recent years as major joint exercises have been
cancelled due to domestic political resistance to deepening military cooperation
with the U.S. This was the case in 2006 and 2009 in which Joint Exercise Sea
Breeze, the largest NATO-led naval exercises in the Black Sea scheduled to be
held on Ukrainian territory, were not approved by the Rada out of concern for
alienating Russia and allowing too much American influence in the Ukrainian
military (Eurasia Daily Monitor 2009). Relations also faced a major setback in
April 2010 when Ukraine and Russia reached a gas import agreement in which
Russia was guaranteed a thirty year extension of its naval base lease in the Crimea
and the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet there. Such a development may prove to
stall the prospect of membership in NATO for Ukraine as it makes such a
distinctive turn toward improving relations with Russia over the calls from NATO
to end the Russian lease (Reuters 2010).
81
Belarus
As the former-Soviet country in Eastern Europe receiving the least amount of
U.S. security assistance since the end of the Cold War, in both yearly average and
total assistance, Belarus is fully expected to display characteristics unlike those
expected of a vertical coalition with the U.S. To speak of Belarus as holding any
strategic value to the U.S. would be difficult. Relations between the two countries
have remained strained since Belarus gained its independence in 1991. Since then,
Belarus has maintained exceptionally close political, economic, security ties with
Russia, supporting Russia’s stance on bilateral issues with the U.S. Regarding the
areas of security cooperation considered above in the sections on Poland and
Ukraine, the record of Belarus’s cooperation with the U.S. is starkly contrasted.
Belarus made no contribution to the IFOR or SFOR missions in Bosnia during the
1990s. While it did join the PfP, as did every other former-Soviet Country, it was
the last to do so in Eastern Europe, and never made any signals of intentions for
NATO membership (NATO 2010b). It did not contribute to the KFOR mission in
Kosovo, nor did it offer any support, or even flyover permission, to the U.S. for
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan; a measure that even Russia
extended for a short period (Gerleman et al. 2001, 2). Belarus did not offer any
support to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, and has not contributed any troops or
material support for the mission since it began (Partlow 2007, A02). Bilateral
relations between the U.S. and Belarus have further soured since the U.S.
Ambassador to Belarus was ejected in March, 2008, and Belarus recalled its own
82
ambassador to the U.S. Since then, Belarus has ejected ten U.S. diplomats and
required the staff of the U.S. embassy in Minsk be reduced by half (Schwartz
2008, A4).
Case 1: Outcomes
Based on the hypothesis of this study, it was expected in this case that, for
receiving the highest yearly average of U.S. security assistance for the period,
Poland would display characteristics of vertical coalition membership with the
U.S. It was also expected that Ukraine, receiving the second highest yearly
average for the period would display characteristics much like those of Poland, if
not slightly diminished due to a slightly lower yearly average provision. It was
expected that Belarus would display characteristics most unlike those expected of
vertical coalition membership with the U.S. Given the historical data considered
above, it becomes clear that these three expectations were mostly fulfilled.
Through its support of U.S.-led missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq, Poland displayed remarkable policy alignment with the U.S. as well as
personnel and material support for U.S. operations; it was also the first Eastern
European country to join the PfP program, and NATO. While no U.S. military
force projection on Polish territory manifested during the period, there was no
evident need for such, as Poland opened its skies to the U.S. whenever requested;
it also agreed to the stationing of U.S. missile interceptor bases on its territory,
even though the U.S. altered such plans in late 2009. Clearly, Poland displays
83
characteristics expected of vertical coalition membership with the U.S. throughout
the period, and has displayed ever-increasing willingness to acquiesce to U.S.
security priorities and initiatives.
Ukraine displayed similar characteristics as Poland during this period: it
supported the U.S.-led missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq; it also
joined the PfP program and began a serious dialogue with NATO over
membership. However, prospects for NATO membership have declined in recent
years due to a political shift in Ukrainian leadership towards favoring Russia in
foreign relations. The cancellation of joint exercises with NATO and the
extension of the Russian naval lease in Crimea display important developments
uncharacteristic of vertical coalition membership. It is not expected that Ukraine
will display vertical coalition membership on exactly the same level as Poland
due to the difference in security assistance received by the two states; and clearly,
Ukraine’s actions in recent years indicate a decline of acquiescence to the U.S.
Such a determination may thus be made that while Ukraine does display vertical
coalition membership regarding missions and operations outside its own territory,
it clearly does not do so within Ukrainian territory. This distinct difference leads
one to believe that Ukraine may be marked as a neutral observation, with positive
and negative fulfillment of the hypothesized outcomes.
The historical data presented above show very clearly that Belarus has
displayed little to none of the characteristics of vertical coalition membership with
the U.S. It did not support or contribute to any of the operations in the Balkans,
84
Afghanistan, or Iraq. It displayed no desire to join NATO, and its relations with
the U.S. have grown increasingly strained. In fact, by considering its relations
with Russia, it may even be argued that it has displayed characteristics of vertical
coalition membership with Russia. It is obvious that at no point in the period
observed did Belarus join a vertical coalition with the U.S., this fulfils the
hypothesized expectation that as the country receiving the lowest yearly average
U.S. security assistance provision in Eastern Europe during this period, it was
least expected to display vertical coalition membership with the U.S. The larger
findings of this case will be further examined alongside those of the second case
in the findings and conclusions section below.
Case 2: Eurasia: 2001-2008
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed a critical gap in U.S. national
defense and national security. For the first time, the U.S. was dealt a significant
offensive blow from a non-state actor on its own territory, causing the U.S. to
become fully aware of the extensive network of terrorist and Islamic extremist
groups operating internationally. It had been known for several years that many
such groups had been operating from Central Asia with the approval and support
of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. In an effort to eradicate al Qaeda and
its support base, the U.S. led a NATO coalition offensive against the Taliban in
what became the opening round of the “Global War on Terror.” Suddenly, Central
Asia and the Eurasian region became strategically crucial to the U.S. as a combat
85
area of operation. However, the military operation in Afghanistan presented
considerable logistical and operating challenges for the U.S. as it bordered China
to the East, Iran to the West, was completely landlocked, and held no directly
accessible transport routes via the Indian Ocean or from the north via Eurasia.
Thus, the U.S. found itself requiring the cooperation of countries in the region for
transportation, transit, logistical, and operational support. In order to procure such
cooperation and support, the U.S. began providing security assistance programs to
countries of the region, particularly the former-Soviet countries of Eurasia.
Provision of such programs to these countries began in 2001 and has fluctuated
since. Thus, former-Soviet Eurasia between 2001 and 2008 presents another
excellent case study for determining the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance,
particularly in its ability (or inability) to form vertical coalitions as expected to
improve influence and bargaining position by Fourth Variant Theory. As in the
case above, so too will this case consider the amounts of U.S. security assistance
provided to countries of the region to observe fluctuation of the independent
variable. Once again, countries found to receive high levels are expected to
display acquiescence to the U.S. characteristic of bilateral relations within a
vertical coalition.
0.1
0.3
0
0
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan 0.1
0.3
0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0
0.3
0.4
0.3
0
0
0.06 0.07 0.18 0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0
0
1.9
2
0.8
1.5
2.1
3.2
5.8
0
0
1.9
2.2
0.9
0
1.9
2.2
8.3
0
0
6.6
4.9
1.3
2.3
0.9
0
1.4
5.9
5.7
3.6
3.4
9
9
5.3
5.9
48
4.8
7.5
0.9
11.6 0.3
5.6 22.2
4
9.4 45.6 9.7
1.2
0
2.4 12.6 5.3
4.5
4.5
0.5
0.8
2.3
5.1
4.2
5.4
0
1.1
0.9
3
6
4.7
0
1.3
1.5
3.4
5.6
3.6
0
0.7
0.6
2.6
4.4
6.9 82.8 9.1 16.5 14.3 14.6 11
2.5
2.3
2.1 22.3 5.8
3.4
0
0
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
72.6
2.8 58.7
0
0.3 17.1
0.9 19.6
1.8 42.3
2.3 63.8
9.8 183
3.9 41.6
3.5 39.5
Sources: USAID. (2002 & 2008). U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Authorizations.
Average
0
0
0.1
Georgia
0
0
Azerbaijan
0
0
Armenia
Uzbekistan
U.S. Security Assistance in US 1998 Dollars (millions)
3.9
4.8
1.1
1.3
2.8
4.2
12.2
2.7
2.6
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total Yr. Avg
Table 5.2.
86
87
As in the first case above, the levels of U.S. security assistance provided to
the countries of this region will be measured in yearly averages to observe
fluctuation of the independent variable and its expected effects. The levels of
security assistance provided to each country will then be considered against the
dependent variable of vertical coalition formation as measured by indicators
relevant to the strategic value of recipient countries to the U.S., including military
force projection, support for the U.S. high priority security initiatives, and other
specific requirements of acquiescence placed on the recipient by the U.S. The
countries found to receive the highest levels (in yearly averages for the period of
observation) are expected to display acquiescence to the U.S. characteristic of
bilateral relations within a vertical coalition.
As indicated earlier, the U.S. government treats the trans-caucuses
countries of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan as part of Eurasia for statistics
reporting purposes. Thus, these countries are included within this region when
considering the levels of U.S. security assistance provision, see Table 5.2.
However, this case seeks to isolate the attention placed on the region surrounding
Afghanistan since the U.S. began operations in that country in 2001. The distance
from this area of operation has directed U.S. focus away from the trans-caucuses
countries during this conflict. Knowing this, it is not inappropriate to argue that a
more concise approach to U.S. security focus surrounding the war in Afghanistan
would omit these countries from the analysis. While Armenia and Azerbaijan
received trivial amounts of U.S. security assistance during this period, see Table
88
5.2, Georgia did receive very high levels compared to the rest of the region.
Georgia’s omission from the analysis should not take away from the value of the
analysis as it allows consideration of more relevant countries; however, it is
important to note that if included, it would have changed the case outcomes as the
highest recipient of U.S. security assistance in the region. In this way, it is also
appropriate to consider the period of 2001 to 2008 so as to further isolate the
focus of the U.S. on this region during this time as a result of the war on terror
and operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, from this point on, references to the
case or the region will be specifically regarding the countries of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan during the period of 20012008.
When considering the record of security assistance to countries of Eurasia
during the period of 2001-2008, see Table 5.3, several key points surface: yearly
averages were highest in 2001 and 2002 during the initial phase of American
operations in the region, and began to decline steadily in the following years. The
highest amount of security assistance during the period was provided to
Uzbekistan, giving it the highest yearly average, this due largely to the relatively
huge amount it received in 2002, and high levels in 2001 and 2003. Kazakhstan
received the next highest levels, and Turkmenistan received the lowest levels with
a yearly average of less than US $2 million.
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Table 5.3.
Case 2 U.S. Security Assistance in 1998 US Dollars (millions)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total Yr.
Avg.
Kazakhstan
22.3 5.8
4.5
4.2
6
5.6
4.4
2.3 55.1 6.9
Kyrgyzstan
2.4 12.6 5.3
5.1
3
3.4
2.6
1.8 36.2 4.5
Tajikistan
0
11.6 0.3
2.3
0.9
1.5
0.6
0.9 18.1 2.3
Turkmenistan 1.2
7.5
0.9
0.8
1.1
1.3
0.7
0.3 13.8 1.7
Uzbekistan
9.4 45.6 9.7
0.5
0
0
0
0
65.2 8.2
Average
7.1
16.6
4.1
2.6
2.2
2.4
1.7
1
37.7
Thus, the data above displays ground for several anticipated outcomes,
primary of those is the expectation that both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will
display characteristics of vertical coalitions with the U.S. Secondarily,
Turkmenistan is expected to not display such characteristics. It is also plausible
that Kyrgyzstan will display similar characteristics as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan,
however such a display is expected to be less determinative of vertical coalition
formation due to the lower amount of security assistance provided to that country.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan’s strategic value to the U.S. since the beginning of American
operations in Afghanistan has been substantial. Uzbekistan directly borders
northern Afghanistan and is also the only country in the region to border all four
of the other countries under consideration in this case. Importantly, at the time of
the invasion, Uzbekistan was the only country bordering Afghanistan, aside from
Pakistan, to display amenable relations with the U.S., and was therefore the most
important potential site of force projection for the U.S. in the region. As a poor
4.7
90
country with a GDP of only US $77 billion, Uzbekistan presented an excellent
target for expected acquiescence through the provision of security assistance.
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Uzbekistan declared full support
for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. It provided the use of its
airspace for U.S. flyovers, offered military and civilian infrastructure and
facilities, allowed the deployment of U.S. troops on its territory, and offered the
U.S. of the Termez Air Base for transport flights. By the end of 2001, it offered
the U.S. tenancy of the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base (K2) in the south-eastern edge
of the country. It permitted full use and deployment from K2, including material
and personnel transport, as well as combat sorties and bombing missions
(Gerleman et al. 2001). While Uzbekistan fully supported the war on terror in
Central Asia and U.S. operations in that region, it declined to participate in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and did not contribute any troops or material to that
mission.
In May 2005, the Uzbek government violently suppressed antigovernment protests in the city of Andijian, prompting harsh criticism from the
international community, including the U.S. It responded to U.S. criticism by
revoking the U.S. lease of K2 and evicting American forces from Uzbekistan.
While it did not end flyover rights for U.S. aircraft, or withdraw support for the
larger NATO mission in Afghanistan, relations with the U.S. have suffered
greatly since 2005, giving reason for the complete cessation of U.S. security
assistance provision to Uzbekistan following the 2005 eviction. Uzbekistan
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presents a very unique case, it displayed characteristics fully expected as a
vertical coalition member with the U.S. from 2001 to 2005, but following
criticism from the U.S. in 2005, it reversed its stance and has since displayed
characteristics unlike a member of a U.S.-led vertical coalition, in that it has
rejected U.S. force projection, and displayed only low levels of policy alignment
by permitting flyovers and offering political support of the war on terror.
Kazakhstan
As the largest country in the Central Asian region, Kazakhstan holds considerable
strategic value for the U.S. due to its proximity to the Afghanistan area of
operations, and the size and stability of the country itself. Kazakhstan has the
largest GDP, land size, and population in the region, and is perceived as the leader
of the Central Asian region of states, a fact signaled by the fact that it became the
first Eurasian state, and the first Muslim country, to hold the chairmanship of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE 2010).
Responding to the attacks of 9/11 and U.S. plans for invading
Afghanistan, Kazakhstan expressed clear support for Operation Enduring
Freedom. It offered the use of its airspace, as well as its airports for transport
refueling and transit (Gerleman et al. 2001, 5). Much to the outrage of China, it
even offered the U.S. tenancy of its military air bases to promote U.S. force
projection in the region, an offer which the U.S. turned down, citing no need for
additional bases in the region due to the use of K2 in Uzbekistan (until 2005)
92
tenancy of Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, and the expansion of Bagram Air Base
in Afghanistan (Patraeus 2010). Kazakhstan further supported the war on terror by
contributing to Operation Iraqi Freedom, sending a platoon-size contingency of
troops with the invasion force in 2003, and maintained the contingency in-country
until October 2008 (United States Forces-Iraq 2008).
This observation of Kazakhstan’s bilateral relations in the realm of
security affairs presents an interesting case of consistent support by Kazakhstan of
U.S. policy on nearly every issue related to it during this period. Kazakhstan
acquiesced to the U.S. for the purpose of U.S. military force projection, even
offering military facilities, and displayed policy alignment in support for the war
on terror and invasion of Iraq; these actions display distinct followership, and will
be further analyzed in the final section of this chapter.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan, like the four other countries considered in this case, has held a
strategically valuable position to the U.S. in Central Asia since the beginning of
U.S. operations in the region. It holds a 460 mile border with Afghanistan, and a
1,100 mile border along the Caspian Sea, placing it directly in the path of aircraft
approaching from Western Europe headed to Afghanistan or Uzbekistan. It has
also been at the center of negotiations on a hydrocarbon pipeline crossing under
the Caspian Sea for the transport of oil from east to west, avoiding the long route
through monopolized Russia.
93
However, Turkmenistan has maintained distant ties with the U.S. From its
independence in 1991 to 2006, it was ruled by authoritarian president Saparmurat
Niyazov who committed the country to a strict line of neutrality. It would be this
neutral stance that Niyzaov would invoke in 2001 when declaring no overt
support for Operation Enduring Freedom, although Turkmenistan did allow the
transit of non-combat material through its airspace (Gerleman et al 2001, 9).
However, it has not permitted any stationing or deployment of U.S. personnel or
aircraft on its territory during the entirety of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, and
this stance has been maintained by Niyazov’s successor as well (Chivers 2007,
B3). While Turkmenistan has cooperated with the U.S. on certain aspects of the
war on terror, such as transnational terrorism and border control, it has not taken
part in larger cooperation or intelligence sharing. Nor did it contribute personnel,
material, or political support to Operation Iraqi Freedom. While Turkmenistan has
continued to receive low levels of U.S. security assistance, such levels are clearly
commensurate with its nearly non-existent levels of support for U.S. policy or
priorities.
Case 2: Outcomes
Based on the hypothesis of this study, it was expected in this second case that, for
receiving the highest yearly average of U.S. security assistance for the period,
Uzbekistan would display characteristics of vertical coalition membership with
the U.S. It was also expected that Kazakhstan, receiving the second highest yearly
94
average for the period would display characteristics much like those of
Uzbekistan, if maybe slightly diminished due to its lower yearly average
provision. It was expected that Turkmenistan would display characteristics most
unlike those expected of vertical coalition membership with the U.S. Given the
historical data considered above, it becomes clear that these three expectations
were mostly fulfilled.
Through its support of the U.S. war on terror, as well as it permission for
U.S. aircraft to use its airspace, Uzbekistan displayed policy alignment with the
U.S. during the entire period observed. However, it was the provision of a muchneeded air base near the border with Afghanistan that displayed remarkable levels
of acquiescence through both force projection and policy alignment; Uzbekistan
was the Central Asian example of cooperation with the U.S. That ended with the
diplomatic row that occurred in May 2005, and the eviction of U.S. forces from
the country that resulted later that year; this action was mirrored by the halting of
all U.S. security assistance to Uzbekistan ever since. Thus, Uzbekistan presents a
unique mixed-case in which high levels of security assistance were met with high
levels of acquiescence, as expected of a vertical coalition. However, a political
conflict over human rights would end the coalition, leading to the cessation of
security assistance to Uzbekistan; a very interesting turn of events where U.S.
security assistance could not keep Uzbekistan within the vertical coalition that
had been formed.
95
Throughout the entire period observed, Kazakhstan displayed
characteristics expected of a vertical coalition with the U.S. It declared support for
the war on terror, opened its skies to U.S. flights, offered the use of its airports,
and even offered the use of its military facilities for U.S. tenancy. Kazakhstan also
contributed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the only Central Asian country to do so,
and has continued to declare its support for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.
Clearly, Kazakhstan displayed vertical coalition membership with the U.S. during
this period, and has signaled its willingness to do so into the future. The
expectation that the high levels of security assistance provided to Kazakhstan
would lead to its membership in a vertical coalition with the U.S. appears to have
been clearly fulfilled.
Turkmenistan maintained its characteristic neutrality throughout the entire
period observed herein. At no point did it facilitate U.S. military force projection,
or display policy alignment with the U.S. While it did allow the transit of noncombat cargo across its airspace, Turkmenistan made no other overt motions of
support for the war on terror in Central Asia; nor did it support the invasion of
Iraq in any manner. Regarding the expectations of the study, Turkmenistan
displays complete fulfillment of the hypothesis. Receiving the lowest levels of
security assistance in the region, it was expected that Turkmenistan would be least
likely to display characteristics of vertical coalition membership with the U.S.,
and the data considered above show that such was the case. These observations
and outcomes will be compared to those of the first case study in the following
96
section to present the larger findings of the entire study; it is from those finding
that a determination of the effectiveness of security assistance in forming vertical
coalitions will be made.
97
Chapter 6
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Key Findings
The two case studies above sought to expose the effectiveness of U.S. security
assistance in facilitating the formation of vertical coalitions including recipient
countries of the former-Soviet Union. While depicted above, the findings of these
case studies will be presented in conjunction below, with the outcomes considered
for their usefulness; finally, an argument will be presented in light of the
outcomes and findings which seeks to address the conclusions drawn.
In the first case earlier considered, Eastern Europe during 1994-2008, it
was found that the hypothesized expectations displayed mostly expected results. It
was expected that Poland and Ukraine, for receiving the highest levels of security
assistance, would display characteristics of vertical coalition membership with the
U.S., and these expectations were clearly borne out in the observation of Poland,
and mostly borne out in the observation of Ukraine. Expectations that Belarus
would not display such characteristics were also borne out, as Belarus displayed
no indication of vertical coalition membership with the U.S.
In the second case, Eurasia during 2001-2008, it was found that the
observations displayed the expected results, with a twist. It was expected that
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as recipients of the highest levels of security
assistance, would form vertical coalitions with the U.S. Uzbekistan did display
98
such characteristics until 2005, when it evicted U.S. forces, even while receiving
high levels of security assistance from the U.S. Kazakhstan displayed expected
characteristics throughout the entire period, forming a solid vertical coalition with
the U.S. Turkmenistan also displayed expected results by not forming a vertical
coalition with the U.S., as it received the lowest levels of security assistance from
the U.S. throughout the period.
Table 6.1.
Fulfillment of Hypothesized Expectations
Fulfilled
Did not
Partially
Expectations Fulfill
Fulfilled
Expectations Expectations
Poland
X
Ukraine
X
Belarus
X
Uzbekistan
2001-2005
Kazakhstan
X
Turkmenistan
X
2005-2008
Notes
Formed Vertical
Coalition
Displayed some
Vertical
Coalition
Characteristics
Did not Form
Vertical
Coalition
Formed Vertical
Coalition for
half of period
Formed Vertical
Coalition
Did not Form
Vertical
Coalition
In considering the two cases, it becomes readily apparent that the data
presented largely support the hypothesis of the study. As is shown in Table 6.1, of
the six observation made between the two cases, four fulfilled the expectations of
the hypothesis of this study. Poland, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan all
99
displayed characteristics of vertical coalition formation appropriate to their
hypothesized levels of security assistance provision. One observation, Ukraine,
evidenced partial fulfillment of the hypothesized result, as it displayed vertical
coalition formation with the U.S. on security policies and missions outside of its
own territory, but not within. Finally, Uzbekistan displayed the study’s only
observation in which findings both confirmed and discounted the hypothesized
expectation at different times during the period, displaying vertical coalition
formation during the first half of the observed period, but not the latter. Thus, a
clear finding emerges: countries receiving the lowest levels of U.S. security
assistance in their region consistently displayed characteristics untypical of
vertical coalition formation with the U.S. And while not for the entire period
observed, it was also found that countries receiving the highest levels of U.S.
security assistance did display vertical coalition formation with the U.S.
Having presented the outcomes of the cases, it becomes clear that in the
two cases observed above, high levels of security assistance provision are
certainly related to vertical coalition formation. Such observation allows a larger
induction: in the realm of security affairs, it is likely that the provision of higher
levels of security assistance will be effective in forming vertical coalitions in the
cases observed above; this is because four out of the six observations fulfilled the
hypothesized results, and the remaining two cases displayed fulfillment on lesser
levels. This last point is particularly important when attempting to determine the
usefulness of singling out security assistance for effectively forming vertical
100
coalitions due to the fact that, in the cases observed, vertical coalitions proved to
be emergent dependent on how much security assistance was provided.
It is also important to recognize that in the case of Ukraine, vertical
coalition formation was evident when not tied to territorial integrity, Ukraine
displayed policy alignment with the U.S. on several matters, including
contributions to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Also, it is very important to
note that the U.S. succeeded in forming a vertical coalition with Uzbekistan from
2001 to 2005, but was unable to maintain that coalition even though Uzbekistan
was receiving the highest levels of security assistance in the region at the time.
These findings indicate a limit to the effectiveness of security assistance in
regards to domestic territorial and political environments. In the case of Ukraine,
this limit was not a significant setback and only resulted in the cancellation of two
joint military exercises; whereas, in the case of Uzbekistan, this limit resulted in
the eviction of the U.S. from one of its most strategically important and most
proximate centers of force projection in an isolated area of military operations.
The findings exposed above lend themselves to several related arguments
and conclusions. First, that high levels of security assistance display considerable
indicative relationships with tangible benefits in the form of vertical coalition
formation suggests that as a quid pro quo instrument of U.S. foreign policy,
security assistance is largely effective. Also, the data show the failure of the U.S.
to form vertical coalitions in instances of low levels of security assistance
provision in both low level recipient countries considered above, suggesting a
101
very real relationship between levels of provision and the formation of vertical
coalitions. The literature forms a chorus of positions proclaiming security
assistance as existent for the purpose of promoting U.S. interests and goals, and
the cases of this study appear to have exposed such effectiveness.
Second, This study clearly suggests that U.S. security assistance at high
levels can be effective in forming vertical coalitions with small and middle power
countries in the former-Soviet region, however, the observation of Uzbekistan
clearly demonstrates that even high levels of provision cannot always maintain
such coalitions once they have been formed. Other issue areas, human rights in
this case, can disrupt or break the form of bilateral relations fostered through the
provision of security assistance. This places the U.S. in a difficult position; it
could have remained silent regarding the human rights violations, and not
criticized the Uzbek government, but doing so would have violated the guiding
principles of the FAA that U.S. foreign assistance exists to foster liberal
democracy and open markets. It is possible that U.S. leaders rationalized that the
assistance provided to Uzbekistan would make it more compliant to U.S. demands
for outside investigations of the massacres in Andijian, such rationalizations
proved incorrect.
Such facts lend themselves to the argument that the U.S. must take greater
caution in choosing partners for military force projection more carefully in the
future. Selecting a country for force projection in an isolated region simply
because that country opened its doors ignores the many other issue areas that may
102
sour bilateral relations. While this study has sought to isolate the effects of U.S.
security assistance for the purpose of assessing its effectiveness in drumming up
followers, foreign policy cannot be conducted in so sterile an environment.
Consideration must be made of the democratic and governmental nature of
countries with which the U.S. partners, such nature may prove to be a good
indicator of recurring or future domestic problems that loom over cooperation
with the U.S., no matter how well intentioned it began. This is a problem
potentially overcome through greater attention by defense planners on the internal
composition and stability of possible partners for cooperation and force
projection, and greater interagency cooperation with development based programs
(USAID, Peace Corps) which ostensibly hold deeper knowledge of domestic
environments in countries previously ignored by defense and national security
agencies.
Finally, the study displays results indicating that high levels of security
assistance are closely related to the formation of vertical coalitions, which leads to
two separate issues: causality and attribution. On the one hand, this study showed
a close relation between the variables, yet it did not display a direct causal
relationship. It was inferred from the literature that force projection and policy
alignment are resultant of security assistance provision, but evidence to that effect
was not definitive. In the first case, vertical coalitions did not emerge
immediately, but once they did, they remained remarkably strong, continuing
today through more formalized structures such as NATO. In the second case,
103
vertical coalitions emerged immediately, but were maintained in only one of the
two expected observations. Thus, while this study displays findings that high
levels of security assistance provision lead to vertical coalition formation, it is
beyond the evidence presented herein to claim a causal order, leaving such claims
to future research.
On the other hand emerges the issue of attribution; should the U.S. simply
increase the amounts of security assistance to countries so as to increase its
chances of forming vertical coalitions? While the findings of this study suggest
that increases may lead to increased vertical coalition formation, such a
suggestion is not only unfounded, but is a costly and unrealistic recommendation.
It is beyond the means of the U.S. to increase the levels of provision of all
recipient countries to high levels. Also, as the point on causality above showed,
such a leveling increase may not even be what is required to improve chances of
vertical coalition formation. Policy should not be altered on the basis of such
evidence; a distinct and comprehensive investigation of the causal nature of
security assistance and its relationship to vertical coalition formation is necessary
to make any such assertion.
Conclusions
This study has sought to understand the context and motivation of American
foreign policy during a period of perceived hegemonic decline. It was found that
the international relations literature on the subject is wanting, but that an excellent
104
potential for theoretical utility exists in the Fourth Variant theory. By staging U.S.
foreign policy in the context of efforts to improve influence and bargaining
through the use of vertical coalitions with weak and middle powers, Fourth
Variant Theory provides the impetus for specific U.S. foreign policy instruments.
This study focused on U.S. security assistance as one such instrument, seeking to
first understand its composition, and then the expectations of foreign policy utility
placed on it. It was clear that U.S. security assistance is closely related to the
strategic value of a recipient country, U.S. military force projection, and policy
alignment with the stated aims and goals of the U.S. by recipient countries. Thus,
these factors were established in this study as indicators for the purpose of
measuring the effectiveness of security assistance in forming vertical coalitions
inclusive of recipient countries. To determine such effectiveness, historical cases
were considered which consisted of two distinct regions of former-Soviet
countries. The data analyzed from these cases displayed consistent findings
indicating that U.S. security assistance to these countries displayed observable
effectiveness in forming vertical coalitions with the recipient countries. Such
findings fulfilled the expectations of the study’s hypothesis that higher levels of
security assistance would result in the formation of vertical coalitions; this is so
due to the fact that countries receiving high levels of security assistance mostly
displayed vertical coalition membership by the permitting (or offering to permit)
U.S. military force projection on sovereign territory in conjunction with policy
alignment to U.S. security initiatives. Both positive and negative hypothesized
105
expectations were displayed as countries receiving high levels of provision
formed vertical coalitions as expected, while countries receiving low levels failed
to form vertical coalitions as expected. In both cases, there was partial deviance
from these expectations, but largely fulfillment.
This study clearly finds that within the bounds of measurement employed
herein, U.S. security assistance to the countries of the former-Soviet Union
effectively formed vertical coalitions under U.S. leadership during the periods
observed. Of course, this study focused solely on security assistance as the foreign
policy instrument for the formation of vertical coalitions, and there are certainly
many more instruments available to the U.S. for pursuing such an aim. The
findings section above also uncovered the plausibility of considering domestic
and governmental factors into decisions of cooperation and partnership even when
the strategic value of a country is obvious. This assertion was based on the
findings that in the one observation of this study in which the U.S. failed to
maintain a vertical coalition already established, domestic and governmental
factors were central to the dissolution of the coalition.
The findings of this study present clear evidence of a relationship between
the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance and the formation of vertical
coalitions. If the U.S. has experienced declining hegemony in recent years, as is
suggested by scholars, commentators, and indicators of national debt and trade
deficits, then programs and foreign policy instruments existing for the purpose of
building vertical coalitions for improving influence and bargaining must display
106
effectiveness in doing so. This study has found that one such instrument, U.S.
security assistance, has shown to be effective in the observations considered
herein, forming vertical coalitions in several instances; which, according to Fourth
Variant Theory, are crucial for a declining hegemon such as the U.S. to slow or
halt its decline. While questions as to whether vertical coalitions effectively
improve influence and bargaining are beyond the scope of this study, it is only
logical that the instruments employed to form such vertical coalitions must do so
effectively themselves, or an effective vertical coalition cannot be expected to
even emerge in the first place. If the U.S. truly is, or has been, in a state of
declining hegemony, than every instrument for addressing such decline must
perform effectively as expected, or precious resources are misapplied, only
speeding the decline. Clearly, U.S. security assistance is one such instrument
displaying effectiveness, as well as great potential as the causal mechanism for
the establishment of vertical coalitions for the purpose of improving U.S.
international influence and bargaining.
107
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