EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
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2004
2009
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
24.5.2005
PE 357.763v01-00
AMENDMENTS 289-887
Draft report
(PE 355.794v01-00)
Alexander Radwan
1. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council recasting Directive
2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions
(COM(2004)0486 – C6-0141/2004 – 2004/0155(COD))
and
2. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council recasting Council
Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit
institutions
(COM(2004)0486 – C6-0144/2004 – 2004/0159(COD))
Recast of Directive 2000/12/EC
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendments by Parliament
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 289
Recital 11 a (new)
(11a) Due to the legal impediments both on
a national and cross-border basis at the
time of drafting this Directive, it is not
possible to apply the Directive at the level of
the consolidated undertaking in Europe. As
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evolution in the directive of consolidated
supervision is necessary to deliver a
coherent framework for credit institutions
active on a cross-border basis in line with
the achievement of the internal market.
The ultimate objective must be to deliver
full application of the rules on a
consolidated basis once the obstructive
differences between Member States as
regards the rules to which these institutions
are subject have been removed. It is the
intention of the Commission to remove
those impediments as part of its Forward
Looking Agenda before the end of 2009.
Or. en
Justification
The proposal for a Directive currently applies the rules at solo entity level. This reflects the
fragmented nature of supervision in the EU. As the ultimate objective of the Directive should
be consolidated supervision in line with the Single Market, the Commission should seek to
eliminate the obstacles to consolidated supervision as part of its forward agenda. The level of
application of the rules in the Capital Requirements Directive must be reviewed before the
end of 2008 by the Commission and the Member States.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 290
Recital 11a (new)
(11a) Due to the legal impediments both at
a national and cross-border basis at the
time of drafting this Directive, it is not
possible to apply the Directive at the level of
the consolidated undertaking in Europe. As
evolution in the directive of consolidated
supervision is necessary to deliver a
coherent framework for credit institutions
active on a cross-border basis in line with
the achievement of the internal market.
The ultimate objective must be to deliver
full application of the rules on a
consolidated basis once the obstructive
differences between Member States as
regards the rules to which these institutions
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are subject have been removed. It is the
intention of the Commission to remove
those impediments as part of its Forward
Looking Agenda before the end of 2009.
Or. en
Amendement déposé par Astrid Lulling
Amendement 291
Considérant 12 bis (nouveau)
(12 bis) Pour les établissements agréés par
leurs autorités compétentes, les États
membres peuvent également fixer des
règles plus strictes que celles prévues à
l'article 9, paragraphe 1, premier alinéa,
à l'article 9, paragraphe 2, et aux articles
12, 19 à 21, 44 à 52, 75 et 120 à 122. Les
États membres peuvent également
demander que l'article 123 soit respecté
sur une base individuelle ou autre, et que
la sous-consolidation décrite à
l'article 73, paragraphe 2, soit appliquée
à d'autres niveaux au sein d'un groupe.
Or. fr
Justification
Afin d'éviter tout malentendu, ce considérant (qui reprend la position du Conseil) précise
que la portée de la présente directive est d'harmonisation minimale, comme l'était la directive
2000/12/CE. Par conséquent, les Etats membres restent libres d'édicter des règles plus
strictes que celles qui sont prévues par la directive.
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 292
Erwägungsgrund 33 a (neu)
(33a) Hierzu hat der Baseler Ausschuss für
Bankenaufsicht am 26. Juni 2004 eine
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Rahmenvereinbarung über die
Internationale Konvergenz der
Kapitalmessung und
Eigenkapitalanforderungen verabschiedet.
Die Bestimmungen in dieser Richtlinie
über die
Mindesteigenkapitalanforderungen der
Kreditinstitute sowie die
Mindesteigenkapitalbestimmungen in der
Richtlinie 93/6/EWG für Kreditinstitute
und Wertpapierfirmen bilden ein
Äquivalent zu den Bestimmungen der
Baseler Rahmenvereinbarung.
Or. de
Justification
Durch diesen Erwägungsgrund würde klarstellt, dass die EU-Richtlinie die konkrete
Umsetzung der Baseler Rahmenvereinbarung darstellt und inhaltlich ein Äquivalent zur
Baseler Regelung bildet. Ein solcher Passus wäre von Bedeutung zur Vermeidung der
"Doppelrechnung" bzw. Erstellung eines "Überleitungsbogens" für Baseler Zwecke für die
international tätigen Institute (Basel-Banken).
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 293
Erwägungsgrund 34
(34) Der Vielfalt der Kreditinstitute in der
Gemeinschaft sollte unbedingt Rechnung
getragen werden; zu diesem Zweck sollten
die Kreditinstitute für die Ermittlung ihrer
Mindesteigenkapitalanforderungen für das
Kreditrisiko zwischen verschiedenen
Ansätzen mit unterschiedlich hohem Grad
an Risikoempfindlichkeit und
Differenziertheit wählen können. Durch den
Einsatz externer Ratings und institutseigener
Schätzungen individueller
Kreditrisikoparameter gewinnen die
Bestimmungen zum Kreditrisiko erheblich
an Risikoempfindlichkeit und
aufsichtsrechtlicher Solidität. Den
Kreditinstituten sollten angemessene
Anreize zu einer Umstellung auf Ansätze
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(34) Der Vielfalt der Kreditinstitute in der
Gemeinschaft sollte unbedingt Rechnung
getragen werden; zu diesem Zweck sollten
die Kreditinstitute für die Ermittlung ihrer
Mindesteigenkapitalanforderungen für das
Kreditrisiko zwischen verschiedenen
Ansätzen mit unterschiedlich hohem Grad
an Risikoempfindlichkeit und
Differenziertheit wählen können. Durch den
Einsatz externer Ratings und institutseigener
Schätzungen individueller
Kreditrisikoparameter gewinnen die
Bestimmungen zum Kreditrisiko erheblich
an Risikoempfindlichkeit und
aufsichtsrechtlicher Solidität. Den
Kreditinstituten sollten angemessene
Anreize zu einer Umstellung auf Ansätze
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mit höherer Risikoempfindlichkeit gegeben
werden.
mit höherer Risikoempfindlichkeit gegeben
werden. Wenn die Kreditinstitute in
Anwendung der Ansätze dieser Richtlinie
zur Ermittlung des Kreditrisikos ihre
Schätzungen vorlegen, müssen sie ihre
Datenverarbeitungserfordernisse auf das
legitime Datenschutzinteresse ihrer
Kunden gemäß den geltenden
gemeinschaftlichen
Datenschutzvorschriften abstimmen; die
Verfahren der Kreditinstitute zur
Kreditrisikomessung und zum
Kreditrisikomanagement sollten dabei
verbessert werden, um Methoden zur
Festlegung der aufsichtsrechtlichen
Eigenkapitalerfordernisse an
Kreditinstitute zu entwickeln, die den
differenzierten Verfahren der einzelnen
Kreditinstitute Rechnung tragen. Die
Verarbeitung der Daten erfolgt gemäß den
Vorschriften für die Übermittlung
personenbezogener Daten, die in der
Richtlinie 95/46/EG des Europäischen
Parlaments und des Rates vom 24. Oktober
1995 zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei
der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten
und zum freien Datenverkehr1 festgelegt
sind. In diesem Zusammenhang umfasst
die Datenverarbeitung im Bereich der
Kreditvergabe und dem Kreditmanagement
gegenüber Kunden auch Entwicklung und
Validierung von Systemen zum
Kreditrisikomanagement und zur
Kreditrisikomessung. Das dient sowohl zur
Verwirklichung des berechtigten Interesses
der Kreditinstitute als auch der Zielsetzung
der Richtlinie, verbesserte Methoden zur
Risikomessung und -steuerung
anzuwenden und diese auch für
regulatorische Eigenkapitalzwecke zu
nutzen. Die Kommission ist aufgefordert,
eine Mitteilung zu erstellen, inwieweit
datenschutzrechtliche Anforderungen die
Umsetzung der Richtlinie beeinträchtigen.
_________________________________
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ABl. L 281 vom 23.11.1995, S. 31.
Or. de
Justification
Präzisierung des Erwägungsgrundes dahingehend, dass die Sammlung und Speicherung
personenbezogener Daten für Zwecke der Entwicklung und Validierung interner
Risikosteuerungsinstrumente wie auch zur Risikosteuerung selbst zulässig und vereinbar mit
EU-datenschutzrechtlichen Bestimmungen ist.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 294
Erwägungsgrund 35 a (neu)
(35a) Die Bestimmungen dieser Richtlinie
entsprechen dem Grundsatz der
Verhältnismäßigkeit, da sie insbesondere
den Unterschieden zwischen den
Kreditinstituten in Bezug auf deren Größe,
deren Umfang, den Umfang der getätigten
Geschäfte und deren Tätigkeitsbereich
Rechnung tragen.Der Grundsatz bedeutet
auch, dass für retail exposures möglichst
einfache Rating Verfahren, auch im IRBAnsatz, anerkannt werden.
Or. de
Justification
Der Ausschuss begrüßt und folgt den Ratsänderungsvorschlag. Bei der Anwendung der
Richtlinie muss verhindert werden, dass kleinere Institute auf Grund aufsichtlicher Vorgaben
in ihrer Geschäftstätigkeit unverhältnismäßig belastet werden.
Gleichzeitig muss verhindert werden, dass die Vorteile aus der Eigenmittelreduktion für retail
Forderungen gegenüber Verbraucher und KMU durch zu hohe Komplexität der
Ratingprozesse und damit durch die Kosten des Ratings kompensiert werden. Der Vorschlag
ist in Einklang mit der allgemeinen politischen Zielsetzung der Union, KMU den Zugang zu
Finanzmitteln zu erleichtern (zB Frühlingsgipfel 2005 des Europäischen Rates)
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Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 295
Erwägungsgrund 36
(36) Kreditrisikominderungstechniken
sollten verstärkt anerkannt werden, wobei
der rechtliche Rahmen insgesamt
gewährleisten muss, dass die Solvenz nicht
durch eine unzulässige Anerkennung
beeinträchtigt wird.
(36) Kreditrisikominderungstechniken
sollten verstärkt anerkannt werden, wobei
der rechtliche Rahmen insgesamt
gewährleisten muss, dass die Solvenz nicht
durch eine unzulässige Anerkennung
beeinträchtigt wird. Im Rahmen des
Möglichen sind die bisher schon in den
jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten banküblichen
Sicherheiten zur Minderung von
Kreditrisiken im Standardansatz, aber auch
in den anderen Ansätzen anzuerkennen.
Or. de
Justification
Es ist wichtig festzuhalten, dass auch künftig die bereits bestehenden Sicherungstechniken
anerkannt werden, wie z.B. die Forderungszession.
Amendement déposé par Wolf Klinz
Amendement 296
Recital 57
(57) Die zur Durchführung dieser Richtlinie
erforderlichen Maßnahmen sollten gemäß
dem Beschluss 1999/468/EG des Rates vom
28. Juni 1999 zur Festlegung der
Modalitäten für die Ausübung der der
Kommission übertragenen
Durchführungsbefugnisse erlassen werden.
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(57) Die zur Durchführung dieser Richtlinie
erforderlichen Maßnahmen sollten gemäß
dem Beschluss 1999/468/EG des Rates vom
28. Juni 1999 zur Festlegung der
Modalitäten für die Ausübung der der
Kommission übertragenen
Durchführungsbefugnisse erlassen werden.
Die Kommission kann notwendige
Veränderungen der technischen Anhänge
durchführen. Davon abgesehen darf sie zur
Sicherung der Rechte des Europäischen
Parlaments beim Erlass von
Durchführungsmaßnahmen die
Bestimmungen dieser Richtlinie nicht
verändern und muss gemäß den in dieser
Richtlinie festgeschriebenen Grundsätzen
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handeln.
Or. de
Justification
Die Rechte des Europäischen Parlaments gegenüber Rat und Kommission müssen gewahrt
bleiben. Allerdings sollte gleichzeitig bezüglich der technischen Anhänge mehr Flexibilität
bestehen und die Kommission somit die Möglichkeit erhalten, schnelle Veränderungen in
diesem Bereich durchzuführen.
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 297
Recital 57
(57) The measures necessary for the
implementation of this Directive should be
adopted in accordance with Council
Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999
laying down the procedures for the exercise
of implementing powers conferred on the
Commission.
(57) The measures necessary for the
implementation of this Directive should be
adopted in accordance with Council
Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999
laying down the procedures for the exercise
of implementing powers conferred on the
Commission, taking into account the
application of the comitology procedures
recommended in the Lamfalussyframework.
Or. en
Justification
Recognizing the fact that this proposal for a Directive was drafted before the Lamfalussy
framework was applicable to the banking sector, it should be considered whether the current
amount of technical detail in this Directive is really something that should be dealt with by
the Commission only, given the new possibilities in aacordance with the newly adopted
Directive COM(2003)0659.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 298
Article 1, paragraph 3
3. The institutions permanently
excluded pursuant to Article 5, with the
exception, however, of the central banks of
the Member States, shall be treated as
financial institutions for the purposes of
Article 39 and Title V, Chapter 4, Section 1.
3. The institutions permanently
excluded pursuant to Article 2, with the
exception, however, of the central banks of
the Member States, shall be treated as
financial institutions for the purposes of
Article 39 and Title V, Chapter 4, Section 1.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par Manfred Weber
Amendement 299
Artikel 2 a (neu)
Artikel 2a
Banken mit einer Bilanzsumme bis fünf
Mrd. EUR, die ihre überwiegende
Geschäftstätigkeit auf einen regional
abgegrenzten Markt innerhalb eines
Mitgliedsstaates beschränken, sind nicht
zur Erfüllung der Bestimmungen dieser
Richtlinie verpflichtet. Diese Banken haben
jedenfalls die Bestimmungen der Richtlinie
2000/12/EG („Basel I“) weiterhin
anzuwenden.
Or. de
Justification
Nach dem Vorbild der Umsetzung der Basel II-Regelungen bei den US-Banken soll es
kleineren regional tätigen Banken offen stehen, ob sie das Basel II-Regime einführen oder
weiterhin Basel I anwenden.
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Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass die Empfehlungen des Basler Ausschusses nur an
international tätige Banken gerichtet sind und daher eine Anwendung auf Banken mit
regional orientierter Geschäftstätigkeit nicht notwendig erscheint.
Die übersichtlicheren Strukturen in kleineren Banken rechtfertigen eine differenzierte
Anwendung, zumal die aus Basel II entstehenden Aufwendungen kleinere Institute
unproportional höher als Großbanken belasten.
Da gerade die regionalen Sparkassen und Genossenschaftsbanken der Hauptfinancier für die
KMU-Kunden im ländlichen und kleinstädtischen Bereich sind, muss eine unverhältnismäßige
Belastung dieser Banken vermieden werden. Nur die Sicherung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der
regionalen Banken garantiert, dass die Kunden in diesen Märkten nicht auf einige wenige
Großbanken angewiesen sind.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 300
Article 3, paragraph 1, subparagraph 3
In the case of credit institutions other than
those which are set up in areas newly
reclaimed from the sea or have resulted from
scission or mergers of existing institutions
dependent or answerable to the central body,
the Commission, pursuant to the procedure
set out in Article 150 may lay down
additional rules for the application of the
second subparagraph including the repeal of
exemptions provided for in the first
subparagraph, where it is of the opinion that
the affiliation of new institutions benefiting
from the arrangements laid down in the
second subparagraph might have an adverse
effect on competition.
In the case of credit institutions other than
those which are set up in areas newly
reclaimed from the sea or have resulted from
scission or mergers of existing institutions
dependent or answerable to the central body,
the Commission, pursuant to the procedure
set out in Article 151 may lay down
additional rules for the application of the
second subparagraph including the repeal of
exemptions provided for in the first
subparagraph, where it is of the opinion that
the affiliation of new institutions benefiting
from the arrangements laid down in the
second subparagraph might have an adverse
effect on competition.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 301
Article 4, paragraph 6
(6) «institutions», for the purposes of
Sections 2 and 3 of Title V, Chapter 2,
means institutions as defined in [Article 2(3)
of Council Directive 96/3/EEC];
6. «institutions», for the purposes of
Sections 2 and 3 of Title V, Chapter 2,
means institutions as defined in [Article
3(1)(c) of Council Directive 96/3/EEC];
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 302
Article 4, paragraph 10
(10) «participation» for the purposes of
points (o) and (p) of Articles 57 (2), 71 to 73
and Title V, Chapter 4 means participation
within the meaning of the first sentence of
Article 17 of Council Directive
78/660/EEC1, or the ownership, direct or
indirect, of 20 % or more of the voting rights
or capital of an undertaking;
10. «participation» for the purposes of
points (o) and (p) of Articles 57, 71 to 73
and Title V, Chapter 4 means participation
within the meaning of the first sentence of
Article 17 of Council Directive
78/660/EEC1, or the ownership, direct or
indirect, of 20 % or more of the voting rights
or capital of an undertaking;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 303
Article 4, paragraph 17
(17)“EU parent financial holding company”
mean a parent financial holding company in
a Member State which is not a subsidiary of
a credit institution authorised in any Member
State;
(17)“EU parent financial holding company”
mean a parent financial holding company in
a Member State which is not a subsidiary of
a credit institution authorised in any Member
State or of another financial holding
company set up in any Member State;
Or. en
Justification
Alignment with Council proposal. Replaces amemdment 14 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendment 304
Article 4, paragraph 18
(18) “public sector entities” means noncommercial administrative bodies
responsible to central governments, regional
governments or local authorities, or
authorities that in the view of the competent
authorities exercise the same responsibilities
as regional and local authorities;
(18) “public sector entities” means noncommercial administrative bodies
responsible to central governments, regional
governments or local authorities, or
authorities that in the view of the competent
authorities exercise the same responsibilities
as regional and local authorities, or noncommercial undertakings owned by central
governments that have specific
arrangements (guarantees);
Or. en
Justification
Follows from amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report.
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Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 305
Article 4, paragraph 18
(18) ”public sector entities” means noncommercial administrative bodies
responsible to central governments, regional
governments or local authorities, or
authorities that in view of the competent
authorities exercise the same responsibilities
as regional and local authorities.
(18) ”public sector entities” means noncommercial administrative bodies
responsible to central governments, regional
governments or local authorities, or
authorities that in view of the competent
authorities exercise the same responsibilities
as regional and local authorities, and may
include self administrative bodies governed
by law that are under public supervision,
like Chambers and social insurance
institutions.
Or. en
Justification
Clarification that the term public sector entity may include chambers or public social
insurance institutions, if they are comparable to public administrative bodies (e.g. public
supervision, revenue raising power granted by law, etc).
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 306
Article 4, paragraph 28
(28) "conversion factor" means the ratio, to
the currently undrawn amount of the
commitment, of the currently undrawn
amount of a commitment subject to an
advised or unadvised limit that will be
drawn and outstanding at default;
(28) "conversion factor" means the ratio of
the currently undrawn amount of a
commitment that will be drawn and
outstanding at default to the currently
undrawn amount of the commitment, the
extent of the commitment shall be
determined by the advised limit, unless the
unadvised limit is higher;
Or. en
Justification
Alignment with Council proposal. Substitution of amendment 16 of Radwan report.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 307
Article 4, paragraph 33
(33) “repurchase transaction” means any
transaction governed by an agreement
falling within the definition of ‘repurchase
agreement’ or ‘reverse repurchase
agreement’ as defined in [Article 3 point (m)
of Directive 93/6/EEC];
(33) “repurchase transaction” means any
transaction governed by an agreement
falling within the definition of ‘repurchase
agreement’ or ‘reverse repurchase
agreement’ as defined in [Article 3(1) point
(m) of Directive 93/6/EEC];
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 308
Article 4, paragraph 34
(34) “securities or commodities lending or
borrowing transaction” means any
transaction falling within the definition of
‘securities or commodities lending’ or
‘securities or commodities borrowing’ as
defined in [Article 3 point (n) of Directive
93/6/EEC];
(34) “securities or commodities lending or
borrowing transaction” means any
transaction falling within the definition of
‘securities or commodities lending’ or
‘securities or commodities borrowing’ as
defined in [Article 3(1) point (n) of
Directive 93/6/EEC];
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 309
Article 4, paragraph 45, point (b)
(b) two or more natural or legal persons
between whom there is no relationship of
control as set out in the first indent but who
are to be regarded as constituting a single
risk because they are so interconnected that,
if one of them were to experience financial
problems, the other or all of the others
would be likely to encounter repayment
difficulties;
(b) two or more natural or legal persons
between whom there is no relationship of
control as set out in point (a) but who are to
be regarded as constituting a single risk
because they are so interconnected that, if
one of them were to experience financial
problems, the other or all of the others
would be likely to encounter repayment
difficulties;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 310
Article 4, paragraph 47 a (new)
(47a) "Purchased receivables" means
receivables purchased by a credit
institution, which may be treated under a
distinct approach based on the default risk
of the obligors under the receivables and
on dilution risk, instead of as exposures to
the receivables' sellers to whom it has
recourse.
Or. en
Justification
The Basel Committee did not intend to capture Factoring and Invoice Discounting business
within the Purchased Receivables approach. These changes are required to enable firms to
adopt the more appropriate corporate secured lending approaches for such product groups.
If the Directive remains unchanged and is applied literally by member states, it would pose a
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significant risk to SME liquidity.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 311
Article 6
Member States shall require credit
institutions to obtain authorisation before
commencing their activities. Without
prejudice to Articles 7 to 9, 11 and 12 they
shall lay down the requirements for such
authorisation and notify them to the
Commission.
Member States shall require credit
institutions to obtain authorisation before
commencing their activities. Without
prejudice to Articles 7 to 12 they shall lay
down the requirements for such
authorisation and notify them to the
Commission.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 312
Article 24, paragraph 1, point (e)
(e) the financial institution must be
effectively included, for the activities in
question in particular, in the consolidated
supervision of the parent undertaking, or of
each of the parent undertakings, in
accordance with Title V, Chapter 4, Section
1, in particular for the calculation of the
solvency ratio, for the control of large
exposures and for purposes of the limitation
of holdings provided for in Article 120.
(e) the financial institution must be
effectively included, for the activities in
question in particular, in the consolidated
supervision of the parent undertaking, or of
each of the parent undertakings, in
accordance with Title V, Chapter 4, Section
1, in particular for the purposes of the
minimum own funds requirements set out
in Article 75 for the control of large
exposures and for purposes of the limitation
of holdings provided for in Article 120 to
122.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 313
Article 26, paragraph 4
4. Branches which have commenced their
activities, in accordance with the provisions
in force in their host Member States, before
1 January 1993, shall be presumed to have
been subject to the procedure laid down
in Article 25 and in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this Article. They shall be governed,
from that date, by paragraph 3 of this
Article, and by Article 23, Sections 2 and 5
and Article 43.
4. Branches which have commenced their
activities, in accordance with the provisions
in force in their host Member States, before
1 January 1993, shall be presumed to have
been subject to the procedure laid down
in Article 25 and in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
this Article. They shall be governed, from
that date, by paragraph 3 of this Article, and
by Article 23 and Article 43 Sections 2 and
5.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 314
Article 36
The Member States shall inform the
Commission of the number and type of cases
in which there has been a refusal pursuant to
Article 25 and 26 or in which measures have
been taken in accordance with Article 30(3).
The Member States shall inform the
Commission of the number and type of cases
in which there has been a refusal pursuant to
Article 25 and 26 (1) to (3) or in which
measures have been taken in accordance
with Article 30(3).
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 315
Article 46, subparagraph 1
Member States may conclude cooperation
agreements, providing for exchanges of
information, with the competent authorities
of third countries or with authorities or
bodies of third countries as defined
in Articles 47 and 48(1) only if the
information disclosed is subject to
guarantees of professional secrecy at least
equivalent to those referred to in this Article.
Such exchange of information must be for
the purpose of performing the supervisory
task of the authorities or bodies mentioned.
Member States may conclude cooperation
agreements, providing for exchanges of
information, with the competent authorities
of third countries or with authorities or
bodies of third countries as defined in
Articles 47 and 48(1) only if the information
disclosed is subject to guarantees of
professional secrecy at least equivalent to
those referred to in Article 44(1). Such
exchange of information must be for the
purpose of performing the supervisory task
of the authorities or bodies mentioned.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 316
Article 57, point (o) (i)
(i) insurance undertakings within the
meaning of Article 6 of First
Council Directive 73/239/EEC , Article 6 of
First Council Directive 79/267/EEC2 or
Article 1(b) of Directive 98/78/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council;
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(i) insurance undertakings within the
meaning of Article 6 of First
Council Directive 73/239/EEC , Article 4 of
Directive 2002/83/EC2 or Article 1(b) of
Directive 98/78/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council3;
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2
2
OJ L 63, 13.3. 1979, p. 1
OJ L 345, 19.12.2002, p. 1
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 317
Article 57, point (p) (ii)
(ii) instruments referred to in Article 18(3)
of Directive 79/267/EEC.
(ii) instruments referred to in Article 27(3)
of Directive 2002/83/EC.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 318
Article 58
Where shares in another credit institution,
financial institution, insurance or
reinsurance undertaking or insurance
holding company are held temporarily for
the purposes of a financial assistance
operation designed to reorganise and save
that entity, the competent authority may
waive the provisions on deduction referred
to in points (l) to (p).
Where shares in another credit institution,
financial institution, insurance or
reinsurance undertaking or insurance
holding company are held temporarily for
the purposes of a financial assistance
operation designed to reorganise and save
that entity, the competent authority may
waive the provisions on deduction referred
to in points (l) to (p) of Article 57.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 319
Article 59
As an alternative to the deduction of the
items referred to in points (o) to (p),
Member States may allow their credit
institutions to apply mutatis mutandis
methods 1, 2, or 3 of Annex I to Directive
2002/87/EC. Method 1 (Accounting
consolidation) may be applied only if the
competent authority is confident about the
level of integrated management and internal
control regarding the entities which would
be included in the scope of consolidation.
The method chosen shall be applied in a
consistent manner over time.
As an alternative to the deduction of the
items referred to in points (o) to (p) of
Article 57, Member States may allow their
credit institutions to apply mutatis mutandis
methods 1, 2, or 3 of Annex I to Directive
2002/87/EC. Method 1 (Accounting
consolidation) may be applied only if the
competent authority is confident about the
level of integrated management and internal
control regarding the entities which would
be included in the scope of consolidation.
The method chosen shall be applied in a
consistent manner over time.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 320
Article 60, subparagraph 1
Member States may provide that for the
calculation of own funds on a stand-alone
basis, credit institutions subject to
supervision on a consolidated basis in
accordance with Chapter 4, Section 1 or to
supplementary supervision in accordance
with Directive 2002/87/EC, need not deduct
the items referred to in points (l) to (p)
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Member States shall provide that for the
calculation of own funds on a stand-alone
basis, credit institutions subject to
supervision on a consolidated basis in
accordance with Chapter 4, Section 1 or to
supplementary supervision in accordance
with Directive 2002/87/EC, shall not deduct
the items referred to in points (l) to (p)
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which are held in credit institutions,
financial institutions, insurance or
reinsurance undertakings or insurance
holding companies, which are included in
the scope of consolidated or supplementary
supervision.
which are held in credit institutions,
financial institutions, insurance or
reinsurance undertakings or insurance
holding companies, which are included in
the scope of consolidated or supplementary
supervision.
Or. en
Justification
The existing Article introduces a national discretion which will result in different approaches
across the EU, leading to significant competitive distortions in respect of capital
requirements for identical underlying business. The proposed change provides an important
levelling of the playing field.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendment 321
Article 60, subparagraph 1
Member States may provide that for the
calculation of own funds on a stand-alone
basis, credit institutions subject to
supervision on a consolidated basis in
accordance with Chapter 4, Section 1, or to
supplementary supervision in accordance
with Directive 2002/87/EG, need not deduct
the items referred to in points (l) to (p)
which are held in credit institutions,
financial institutions, insurance or
reinsurance undertakings or insurance
holding companies, which are included in
the scope of consolidated or supplementary
supervision.
Member States may provide that for the
calculation of own funds on a stand-alone
basis, credit institutions subject to
supervision on a consolidated basis in
accordance with Chapter 4, Section 1, or
which are associated to a central institution
and as a group fulfil the requirements of
the minimum level of own funds on a
consolidated basis, or to supplementary
supervision in accordance with Directive
2002/87/EG, need not deduct the items
referred to in points (l) to (p) which are held
in credit institutions, financial institutions,
insurance or reinsurance undertakings or
insurance holding companies, which are
included in the scope of consolidated or
supplementary supervision.
Or. en
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Justification
The idea of deducting holdings of the unconsolidated own funds is to avoid the double-use of
own funds.
Within a banking group where several local credit institutions are associated to one common
central institution, the focus of a holding in the central institutions is not a high rate of return.
In contrast to other holdings, in such a case it is all about outsourcing of stuff functions to a
common subsidiary. Such a holding is systematically important for the functioning of the
whole group. The holding in the central institution is inherent to the system of such a group.
The continuity of the central institution lies in the interest of all the credit institutions
(economies of scales). Besides, the additional existing group-internal guarantee systems
guarantee the continuance of such undertakings.
Such a group is acting as an economic unit, operating under the same trademark, using the
same IT-infrastructure, having common undertakings which fulfil special tasks within the
group (like the central institution) and having additional guarantee schemes, usually on a
voluntary basis. All the credit institutions within the group are dependent from each other and
from the common undertakings so that a holding in the central institution is crucial to the
whole group.
A deduction of own funds is therefore not necessary and would be unjustified in the case of
holdings of credit institutions, which are associated to one common central institution, if the
group can demonstrates to the competent authority that the whole group has to fulfil the
requirements of the minimum level of own funds on a consolidated basis. Such a requirement
would guarantee that own funds can not be used more than one time. Besides, all in all there
are no more own funds for the group on a consolidated basis than there would be, if the
unconsolidated own funds were to be deducted.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 322
Article 60, subparagraph 1
Member States may provide that for the
calculation of own funds on a stand-alone
basis, credit institutions subject to
supervision on a consolidated basis in
accordance with Chapter 4, Section 1 or to
supplementary supervision in accordance
with Directive 2002/87/EC, need not deduct
the items referred to in points (l) to
(p) which are held in credit institutions,
financial institutions, insurance or
reinsurance undertakings or insurance
holding companies, which are included in
the scope of consolidated or supplementary
supervision.
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Member States may provide that for the
calculation of own funds on a stand-alone
basis, credit institutions subject to
supervision on a consolidated basis in
accordance with Chapter 4, Section 1 or to
supplementary supervision in accordance
with Directive 2002/87/EC, need not deduct
the items referred to in points (l) to (p) of
Article 57 which are held in credit
institutions, financial institutions, insurance
or reinsurance undertakings or insurance
holding companies, which are included in
the scope of consolidated or supplementary
supervision.
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Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 323
Article 63, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2
To these may be added cumulative
preferential shares other than those referred
to in point (h) of Article 57 (2).
To these may be added cumulative
preferential shares other than those referred
to in point (h) of Article 57.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 324
Article 63, paragraph 3
3. For credit institutions calculating riskweighted exposure amounts under Section 3,
Subsection 2, positive amounts resulting
from the calculation in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 34, may, up to 0.6% of risk
weighted exposure amounts calculated under
Subsection 2, be accepted as other items. For
these credit institutions value adjustments
and provisions included in the calculation
referred to in Annex VII, Section 3, part 1,
paragraph 34 and value adjustments and
provisions for exposures referred to in point
(e) of Article 57 shall not be included in own
funds other than in accordance with this
AM\565454XM.doc
3. For credit institutions calculating riskweighted exposure amounts under Section 3,
Subsection 2, positive amounts resulting
from the calculation in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 34, may, up to 0.6% of risk
weighted exposure amounts calculated under
Subsection 2, be accepted as other items. For
these credit institutions value adjustments
and provisions included in the calculation
referred to in Annex VII, part 1, paragraph
34 and value adjustments and provisions for
exposures referred to in point (e) of Article
57 shall not be included in own funds other
than in accordance with this provision. For
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provision. For these purposes, risk-weighted
exposure amounts shall not include those
calculated in respect of securitisation
positions which have a risk weight of
1250%.
these purposes, risk-weighted exposure
amounts shall not include those calculated in
respect of securitisation positions which
have a risk weight of 1250%.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 325
Article 65, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. Where the calculation is to be made on a
consolidated basis, the consolidated amounts
relating to the items listed under Article 57
(2) shall be used in accordance with the rules
laid down in Chapter 4, Section 1.
Moreover, the following may, when they are
credit («negative») items, be regarded as
consolidated reserves for the calculation of
own funds:
1. Where the calculation is to be made on a
consolidated basis, the consolidated amounts
relating to the items listed under Article 57
shall be used in accordance with the rules
laid down in Chapter 4, Section 1.
Moreover, the following may, when they are
credit («negative») items, be regarded as
consolidated reserves for the calculation of
own funds:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 326
Article 66, paragraphe 3
3. Les autorités compétentes peuvent
autoriser les établissements de crédit à
dépasser les limites prévues au paragraphe 1
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3. Les autorités compétentes peuvent
autoriser les établissements de crédit à
dépasser les limites prévues au paragraphe 1
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dans des circonstances exceptionnelles et
provisoires.
dans des circonstances exceptionnelles et
provisoires et à maintenir le traitement
appliqué aux participations visées à
l'article 57, point o), acquises
antérieurement à l'entrée en vigueur de la
présente directive.
Or. fr
Justification
Les dispositions nouvelles modifient fondamentalement le traitement des participations
détenues par des établissements de crédit dans les sociétés importantes d'assurance ou de
réassurance tel qu'il résultait de la Directive en cours de refonte mais également de la
Directive 2002/87/CE du 16 décembre 2002 maintenue en vigueur. Il convient d'éviter qu'une
modification brutale du traitement prudentiel ne détériore l'équilibre économique existant.
Amendement déposé par Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 327
Article 68, paragraph 1
1. Credit institutions shall comply with the
obligations laid down in Articles 22 and 75
and Section 5 on an individual basis.
1. Credit institutions shall comply with the
obligations laid down in Articles 22, 75,
120, 123, Section 5 and Chapter 5 on a
consolidated basis.
Or. en
Justification
The individual level of application of the ratio (article 68 of the CRD) is inconsistent with the
new Basel Accord. Article 69 allows derogation (waiver), but it is too restrictive. Moreover, it
introduces a sub-consolidated level in opposition to the European framework and creates a
further additional level of capital requirements as well as a further obligation to report.
The new European Directive must provide, as is the case in CAD 2, that the consolidated
level is the standard basis for prudential control and that the waiver is left to national
regulators to choose an individual supervision if they consider it necessary.
The amendment to article 68 cannot be separated from the amendment to article 69.
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Amendement déposé par Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 328
Article 68, paragraph 2
2. Every credit institution which is neither a
subsidiary in the Member State where it is
authorised and supervised, nor a parent
undertaking, and every credit institution
not included in the consolidation pursuant
to Article 73, shall comply with the
obligations laid down in Articles 120 and
123 on an individual basis.
2. Subsidiaries and parent undertaking
included in a consolidated supervision are
excluded from individual application of the
Directive requirements except for
application of Article 69.
Or. en
Justification
The individual level of application of the ratio (article 68 of the CRD) is inconsistent with the
new Basel Accord. Article 69 allows derogation (waiver), but it is too restrictive. Moreover, it
introduces a sub-consolidated level in opposition to the European framework and creates a
further additional level of capital requirements as well as a further obligation to report.
The new European Directive must provide, as is the case in CAD 2, that the consolidated
level is the standard basis for prudential control and that the waiver is left to national
regulators to choose an individual supervision if they consider it necessary.
The amendment to article 68 cannot be separated from the amendment to article 69
Amendement déposé par Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 329
Article 68, paragraph 3
3. Every credit institution which is neither a
parent undertaking, nor a subsidiary, and
every the credit institution not included in
the consolidation pursuant to Article73,
shall comply with the obligations laid down
in Chapter 5 on an individual basis.
deleted
Or. en
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Justification
The individual level of application of the ratio (article 68 of the CRD) is inconsistent with the
new Basel Accord. Article 69 allows derogation (waiver), but it is too restrictive. Moreover, it
introduces a sub-consolidated level in opposition to the European framework and creates a
further additional level of capital requirements as well as a further obligation to report.
The new European Directive must provide, as is the case in CAD 2, that the consolidated
level is the standard basis for prudential control and that the waiver is left to national
regulators to choose an individual supervision if they consider it necessary.
The amendment to article 68 cannot be separated from the amendment to article 69
Amendement déposé par Wolf Klinz
Amendment 330
Article 69, paragraph 1 Introductory part
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten können beschließen,
Tochterunternehmen eines Kreditinstituts
von der Anwendung des Artikels 68 Absatz
1 auszunehmen, wenn sowohl das
Tochterunternehmen als auch das
Kreditinstitut von dem betreffenden
Mitgliedstaat zugelassen und beaufsichtigt
werden, das Tochterunternehmen in die
konsolidierte Beaufsichtigung des
Mutterkreditinstituts einbezogen ist und alle
nachstehenden Bedingungen erfüllt sind, so
dass eine angemessene Verteilung der
Eigenmittel auf Mutter und Töchter
gewährleistet ist:
1. Mutterkreditinstitute und deren
Tochterunternehmen sind von den
Anforderungen des Artikels 68 Absatz 1
ausgenommen, wenn sowohl das
Tochterunternehmen als auch das
Kreditinstitut von dem betreffenden
Mitgliedstaat beaufsichtigt werden, das
Tochterunternehmen in die konsolidierte
Beaufsichtigung des Mutterkreditinstituts
einbezogen ist und alle nachstehenden
Bedingungen erfüllt sind, so dass eine
angemessene Verteilung der Eigenmittel auf
Mutter und Töchter gewährleistet ist:
Or. de
Justification
Eine Überwachung auf konsolidierter Ebene der Konzernmutter sollte innerhalb eines
Mitgliedsstaats der Regelfall sein, daher muss Wahlrecht gestrichen werden. Zudem wird
durch die Neuformulierung vermieden, dass die Mutter zusätzlich einen Einzelabschluss
vorlegen muss. Mittelfristig gesehen sollte EU-weit innerhalb eines Konzerns keine
Einzelmeldung der Tochter- und Mutterinstitute mehr erforderlich sein. Die Kommission
sollte in drei Jahren einen Bericht gegebenenfalls mit Änderungsvorschlägen vorlegen, ob die
notwendigen rechtlichen und institutionellen Voraussetzungen für diese Ausdehnung
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vorhanden sind.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendment 331
Article 69, paragraph 1 Introductory part
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten können beschließen,
Tochterunternehmen eines Kreditinstituts
von der Anwendung des Artikels 68 Absatz
1 auszunehmen, wenn sowohl das
Tochterunternehmen als auch das
Kreditinstitut von dem betreffenden
Mitgliedstaat zugelassen und beaufsichtigt
werden, das Tochterunternehmen in die
konsolidierte Beaufsichtigung des
Mutterkreditinstituts einbezogen ist und alle
nachstehenden Bedingungen erfüllt sind, so
dass eine angemessene Verteilung der
Eigenmittel auf Mutter und Töchter
gewährleistet ist:
1. Die Mitgliedstaaten können beschließen,
Kreditinstitute oder Tochterunternehmen
eines Kreditinstituts von der Anwendung des
Artikels 68 Absatz 1 auszunehmen, wenn
sowohl das Tochterunternehmen als auch
das Kreditinstitut von dem betreffenden
Mitgliedstaat zugelassen und beaufsichtigt
werden, das Tochterunternehmen in die
konsolidierte Beaufsichtigung des
Mutterkreditinstituts einbezogen ist und alle
nachstehenden Bedingungen erfüllt sind, so
dass eine angemessene Verteilung der
Eigenmittel auf Mutter und Töchter
gewährleistet ist:
Or. de
Justification
Die vom Berichterstatter vorgeschlagene Umwandlung des nationalen Wahlrechtes wird
begrüßt. Die Einbeziehung auch des Mutter-Kreditinstitutes als Einzelinstitut entspricht der
derzeitigen Regelung in Artikel 52(7). Aussagekräftig für die Eigenmittelsituation einer
Gruppe ist der konsolidierte Abschluss, nicht der Einzelabschluss der Mutter. Damit würde
auch der Aufwand reduziert.
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 332
Article 69, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to any subsidiary of a
credit institution, where both the subsidiary
and the credit institution are subject to
authorisation and supervision by the
Member State concerned, and the subsidiary
is included in the supervision on a
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1. The Member States shall not apply
Article 68(1) to a credit institution or to any
subsidiary, where the subsidiary and the
credit institution are subject to authorisation
and supervision by a Member State, and the
credit institution and its subsidiary are
included in the supervision on a consolidated
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consolidated basis of the credit institution
which is the parent undertaking, and all of
the following conditions are satisfied, in
order to ensure that own funds are
distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries:
basis of the credit institution which is the
parent undertaking, and all of the following
conditions are satisfied in order to ensure
that own funds are distributed adequately
among the parent undertaking and the
subsidiaries:
Or. en
Justification
In the present Commission’s proposal the conditions to apply the waiver are more restrictive
than those currently in force on the basis of Directive 2000/12/EC. In the proposal, the
waiver would only be applicable to subsidiaries whereas in the current situation, the waiver
is available for both “parent undertaking” and “subsidiaries”. It should be possible for a
host supervisor, in particular for EU non material subsidiaries where there are no national
depositors, to relay his supervision rights to the consolidating supervisor. In this case, the
consent of both the consolidating supervisor and the host subsidiary supervisor are required
to allow the waiver. When this condition is met, there is no reason anymore to have a national
discretion: Member States can be obliged to permit this waiver since the discretion is
available at the level of the supervisors. This makes the provision more flexible and provides
an incentive to improved cooperation between supervisors.
Amendement déposé par Harald Ettl
Amendment 333
Article 69, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to any subsidiary of a
credit institution, where both the subsidiary
and the credit institution are subject to
authorisation and supervision by the
Member State concerned, and the subsidiary
is included in the supervision on a
consolidated basis of the credit institution
which is the parent undertaking, and all of
the following conditions are satisfied, in
order to ensure that own funds are
distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries:
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to a credit institution or
to any subsidiary of a credit institution,
where the subsidiary and the credit
institution are subject to authorisation and
supervision by a Member State, and the
credit institution and its subsidiary are
included in the supervision on a consolidated
basis of the credit institution which is the
parent undertaking, and all of the following
conditions are satisfied, in order to ensure
that own funds are distributed adequately
among the parent undertaking and the
subsidiaries:
Or. en
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Justification
The waiver should be extended to the parent company as is currently the case in Directive
2000/12/EC, Article 52(7). The current proposal would result in both entity and consolidated
level requirements which would not be prudentially justified and which would result in
redundant capital being held.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 334
Article 69, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to any subsidiary of a
credit institution, where both the subsidiary
and the credit institution are subject to
authorisation and supervision by the
Member State concerned, and the subsidiary
is included in the supervision on a
consolidated basis of the credit institution
which is the parent undertaking, and all of
the following conditions are satisfied, in
order to ensure that own funds are
distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries:
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to a credit institution or
to any subsidiary, where the subsidiary and
the credit institution are subject to
authorisation and supervision by a Member
State, and the credit institution and its
subsidiary are included in the supervision
on a consolidated basis of the credit
institution which is the parent undertaking,
and all of the following conditions are
satisfied in order to ensure that own funds
are distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries:
Or. en
Justification
Member States have the national discretion to waive the level of application at solo entity.
However the conditions to apply this waiver are more restrictive than those currently in force
in the present Directive 2000/12/EC. In the proposal, the waiver would only be applicable to
subsidiaries whereas in the current situation, the waiver is available for both “parent
undertaking” and “subsidiaries”. The waiver should also not be limited to a Member State,
but should be extended to the whole community. As it is still a national discretion ("Member
States may choose not to apply"), the consent of both the consolidating supervisor and the
host subsidiary supervisor are required to allow the waiver. In a further stage, this national
discretion, that distort the Single Market, should be deleted and the level of application
should be at the consolidated level.
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Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 335
Article 69, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to any subsidiary of a
credit institution, where both the subsidiary
and the credit institution are subject to
authorisation and supervision by the
Member State concerned, and the subsidiary
is included in the supervision on a
consolidated basis of the credit institution
which is the parent undertaking, and all of
the following conditions are satisfied, in
order to ensure that own funds are
distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries:
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to a credit institution or
to any subsidiary of a credit institution,
where the subsidiary and the credit
institution are subject to authorisation and
supervision by the Member State concerned,
and the credit institution and its subsidiary
are included in the supervision on a
consolidated basis of the credit institution
which is the parent undertaking, and all of
the following conditions are satisfied, in
order to ensure that own funds are
distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries:
Or. en
Justification
The waiver should be extended to the parent company as is currently the case under article
52(7) of Directive 2000/12/EC. The Commission's text would result in both entity and
consolidated level requirements, which would not be prudentially justified and which would
result in redundant capital being held.
Amendement déposé par Pervenche Berès
Amendement 336
Article 69, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to any subsidiary of a
credit institution, where both the subsidiary
and the credit institution are subject to
authorisation and supervision by the
Member State concerned, and the subsidiary
is included in the supervision on a
consolidated basis of the credit institution
which is the parent undertaking, and all of
the following conditions are satisfied, in
order to ensure that own funds are
distributed adequately among the parent
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1. The Member States shall not apply
Article 68(1) to a credit institution, or any
subsidiary of a credit institution where the
subsidiary and the credit institution are
subject to authorisation and supervision by a
Member State concerned, and the credit
institution and its subsidiary are included in
the supervision on a consolidated basis of
the credit institution which is the parent
undertaking, and all of the following
conditions are satisfied, in order to ensure
that own funds are distributed adequately
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undertaking and the subsidiaries:
among the parent undertaking and the
subsidiaries:
Or. en
Justification
The current proposal which does not extent the waiver to parent company as it is the case in
Directive 2000/12/Ec, would lead to heavy administrative burden not justified by prudential
requirement.
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 337
Article 69, paragraph 1, point (b)
(b) its parent undertaking is committed to an
unconditional, explicit and irrevocable
obligation to transfer own funds to the
subsidiary and meet its liabilities, or the
risks in the subsidiaries are of negligible
interest;
(b) either the parent undertaking satisfies
the competent authority regarding the
prudent management of the subsidiary and
has declared, with the consent of the
competent authority, that it guarantees the
commitments entered into by the
subsidiary, or the risks in the subsidiaries
are of negligible interest;
Or. en
Justification
Der Ratsänderungsvorschlag wird befürwortet. Das nationale Wahlrecht sollte beibehalten
werden. Die Voraussetzungen für die Befreiungsmöglichkeit werden spezifiziert.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 338
Article 69, paragraph 1, point b
(b) its parent undertaking is committed to an
unconditional, explicit and irrevocable
obligation to transfer own funds to the
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(b) either the parent undertaking satisfies
the competent authority regarding the
prudent management of the subsidiary and
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subsidiary and meet its liabilities, or the
risks in the subsidiaries are of negligible
interest;
has declared, with the competent authority
that it guarantees the commitments entered
into by the subsidiary, or the risks in the
subsidiaries are of negligible interest;
Or. en
Justification
The Council amendment should be endorsed, since the conditions to apply this waiver are
more restrictive than those currently in force in the present Directive 2000/12/EC and the
condition (b) as currently written is near impossible to meet.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 339
Article 69, paragraph 1, point (b)
(b) its parent undertaking is committed to an
unconditional, explicit and irrevocable
obligation to transfer own funds to the
subsidiary and meet its liabilities, or the
risks in the subsidiaries are of negligible
interest;
(b) either the parent undertaking satisfies
the competent authority regarding the
prudent management of the subsidiary and
has declared, with the consent of the
competent authority, that it guarantees the
commitments entered into by the
subsidiary, or the risks in the subsidiaries
are of negligible interest;
Or. en
Justification
The systematic monitoring of the solvency ratio at three different levels whereas consolidated
monitoring is generally all that is necessary is against the principles of a single internal
market and financial integration. Moreover it could expose European banks to competitive
distortion vis-à-vis banks in third countries, particularly in the United States, which would
apply the Basel rules. Therefore it should be possible to extend to the parent credit
institutions the waiver existing for subsidiaries (article 69 paragraph 1).
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 340
Article 69, paragraph 1, point (b)
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(b) its parent undertaking is committed to an
unconditional, explicit and irrevocable
obligation to transfer own funds to the
subsidiary and meet its liabilities, or the
risks in the subsidiaries are of negligible
interest;
(b) either the parent undertaking satisfies
the competent authority regarding the
prudent management of the subsidiary and
has declared, with the competent authority
that it guarantees the commitments entered
into by the subsidiary, or the risks in the
subsidiaries are of negligible interest;
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 69, paragraph 1 by I. van den Burg.
Amendement déposé par Jonathan Evans
Amendement 341
Article 69, paragraph 1, point c
(c) the risk evaluation, measurement and
control procedures of the parent undertaking
cover the subsidiary;
(c) the risk evaluation, measurement and
control policies of the parent undertaking
cover the subsidiary;
Or. en
Justification
Groups do not necessarily have group-wide procedures (which could be business line
specific) but they do have group-wide policies.
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 342
Article 69, paragraph 1, point d
(d) the parent undertaking has the right to
appoint or remove a majority the members
of the management body of the subsidiary.
(d) the parent undertaking holds more than
50 % of the voting rights attaching to
shares in the capital of the subsidiary and
has the right to appoint or remove a majority
of the members of the management body of
the subsidiary.
Or. en
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Justification
See Amendment to Article 69, paragraph 1, point b of Mr. Hoppenstedt.
Amendement déposé par Harald Ettl
Amendement 343
Article 69, paragraph 1, point d
(d) Das Mutterunternehmen ist zur
Bestellung oder Abberufung der Mehrheit
der Mitglieder des Leitungsorgans des
Tochterunternehmens berechtigt.
(d) Das Mutterunternehmen ist zur
Bestellung oder Abberufung der Mehrheit
der Mitglieder des Leitungsorgans,soweit
gesellschaftsrechtlich zulässig, oder des
Aufsichtsorgans des Tochterunternehmens
berechtigt.
Or. de
Justification
Diese Regelung widerspricht dem Aktienrecht jener Mitgliedstaaten, in denen die Bestellung
und Abberufung des Leitungsorgans formalrechtlich durch den Aufsichtsrat erfolgt.
Amendement déposé par Astrid Lulling
Amendement 344
Article 69, paragraph 1, point d
(d) l’entreprise mère a le droit de nommer ou
de révoquer la majorité des membres de
l’organe de direction de la filiale.
(d) l'entreprise mère détient plus de 50 %
des droits de vote attachés à la détention de
parts ou d'actions de la filiale et a le droit
de nommer ou de révoquer la majorité des
membres de l'organe de direction de la
filiale.
Or. fr
Justification
Il est hautement souhaitable de maintenir l’option pour chaque Etat membre de ne pas
appliquer les dispositions concernant le respect des exigences en fonds propres et la
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réglementation des grands risques (cf. article 68 paragraphe 1 de la directive 2000/12/CE
amendée) au niveau d’une banque individuelle si plusieurs conditions sont respectées,
notamment lorsque l'entreprise mère détient plus de 50 % des droits de vote attachés à la
détention de parts ou d'actions de la filiale et a le droit de nommer ou de révoquer la majorité
des membres de l'organe de direction de la filiale. D’un point de vue prudentiel il ne convient
pas d’affranchir unilatéralement des entités d’un groupe bancaire du respect des exigences
en matière de fonds propres ou de la réglementation des grands risques.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 345
Article 69, paragraph 1, point (d)
(d) the parent undertaking has the right to
appoint or remove a majority the members
of the management body of the subsidiary.
(d) the parent undertaking holds more than
50% of the voting rights attaching to shares
in the capital of the subsidiary and has the
right to appoint or remove a majority of the
members of the management body of the
subsidiary.
Or. en
Justification
The systematic monitoring of the solvency ratio at three different levels whereas consolidated
monitoring is generally all that is necessary is against the principles of a single internal
market and financial integration. Moreover it could expose European banks to competitive
distortion vis-à-vis banks in third countries, particularly in the United States, which would
apply the Basel rules. Therefore it should be possible to extend to the parent credit
institutions the waiver existing for subsidiaries (article 69 paragraph 1).
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 346
Article 69, paragraph 1, point (d)
(d) the parent undertaking has the right to
appoint or remove a majority the members
of the management body of the subsidiary.
(d) the parent undertaking has the right to
appoint or remove a majority of the
members of the management body of the
subsidiary.
Or. en
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Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 69, paragraph 1 by I. van den Burg.
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 347
Article 69, paragraph 1, point (d a) (new)
(da) there is an agreement between the
involved host and home supervisors about
transferring these supervisory tasks to one
of them as the consolidating supervisor
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 69, paragraph 1 by I. van den Burg.
Amendement déposé par Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 348
Article 69, paragraph 1
1. The Member States may choose not to
apply Article 68(1) to any subsidiary of a
credit institution, where both the subsidiary
and the credit institution are subject to
authorisation and supervision by the
Member State concerned, and the
subsidiary is included in the supervision on
a consolidated basis of the credit institution
which is the parent undertaking, and all of
the following conditions are satisfied, in
order to ensure that own funds are
distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries:
1. Member States may define exceptions to
the consolidated supervision, only for
significant listed subsidiaries or in case of
lack of support from the parent
undertaking or non adequate allocation of
own funds to the subsidiary and request an
entity or sub-consolidated level of
application.
(a) there is no current or foreseen material
or legal impediment to the prompt transfer
of own funds or repayment of liabilities by
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its parent undertaking;
(b) its parent undertaking is committed to
an unconditional, explicit and irrevocable
obligation to transfer own funds to the
subsidiary and meet its liabilities, or the
risks in the subsidiaries are of negligible
interest;
(c) the risk evaluation, measurement and
control procedures of the parent
undertaking cover the subsidiary;
(d) the parent undertaking has the right to
appoint or remove a majority the members
of the management body of the subsidiary.
2. The Member States may exercise the
option provided for in paragraph 1 where
the parent undertaking is a financial
holding company set up in the same
Member State as the credit institution,
provided that it is subject to the same
supervision as that exercised over credit
institutions, and in particular to the
standards laid down in Article 71(1).
Or. en
Justification
The individual level of application of the ratio (article 68 of the CRD) is inconsistent with the
new Basel Accord. Article 69 allows derogation (waiver), but it is too restrictive. Moreover, it
introduces a sub-consolidated level in opposition to the European framework and creates a
further additional level of capital requirements as well as a further obligation to report.
The new European Directive must provide, as is the case in CAD 2, that the consolidated
level is the standard basis for prudential control and that the waiver is left to national
regulators to choose an individual supervision if they consider it necessary.
The amendment to article 68 cannot be separated from the amendment to article 69.
Amendement déposé par Astrid Lulling
Amendement 349
Article 69, paragraph 2
2. Les États membres peuvent exercer la
faculté prévue au paragraphe 1 lorsque
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deleted
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l'entreprise mère est une compagnie
financière ayant son siège dans le même
État membre que l'établissement de crédit,
à condition qu'elle soit soumise à la même
surveillance que celle exercée sur les
établissements de crédit, et en particulier
aux règles énoncées à l’article 71,
paragraphe 1.
Or. fr
Justification
See Amendment to Article 69, paragraph 1, point d of Ms. Lulling.
Amendement déposé par Pervenche Berès
Amendement 350
Article 69, paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Without prejudice to points (a) to (c) of
this paragraph, Member states do not apply
dispositions of article 68 to credit
institutions which are a parent undertaking
under their agreement and their
supervision:
a) there is no current or foreseen material
or legal impediment to the prompt transfer
of own funds or repayment of liabilities;
b) competent authorities benefiting from
dispositions of this paragraph shall inform
competent authorities of all member states;
c) procedures for assessment, measure and
control of risks cover the parent
undertaking.
Or. en
Justification
The current proposal which does not extent the waiver to parent company as it is the case in
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Directive 2000/12/Ec, would lead to heavy administrative burden not justified by prudential
requirement.
Amendement déposé par Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendement 351
Article 69, paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Subject to the items referred to in points
(a) to (c) of this paragraph, the Member
States may choose not to apply Article 68
(1) to any parent credit institution subject
to authorisation and supervision by the
Member State concerned :
a) there are no current or foreseen material
practical or legal impediments to the
prompt transfer of own funds or repayment
of liabilities ;
b) the competent authority which makes
use of this paragraph shall inform the
competent authorities of all other Member
States ;
c) the risk evaluation, measurement and
control procedures cover the parent
undertaking.
Or. en
Justification
See Amendment to Article 69, paragraph 1 of Mr Gauzès.
Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 352
Article 70, paragraph 1
The competent authorities may allow on a
case by case basis parent credit institutions
in a Member State to incorporate in the
calculation of their requirement under
Article 68(1) subsidiaries in the Community
which meet the conditions laid down in the
points (a), (c) and (d) of Article 69(1), and
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1. Subject to paragraphs 1a to 1c, the
competent authorities may allow on a case
by case basis parent credit institutions to
incorporate in the calculation of their
requirement under Article 68(1) subsidiaries
which meet the conditions laid down in the
points (c) and (d) of Article 69(1), and
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whose material exposures or material
liabilities are to that parent credit institution
in a Member State.
whose material exposures or material
liabilities are to that parent credit institution.
Or. en
Justification
Alignment with Council proposal + editorial error. Substitution of am 25 of Radwan draft
report.
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 353
Article 70, paragraph 1
1. The competent authorities may allow on a
case by case basis parent credit institutions
in a Member State to incorporate in the
calculation of their requirement under
Article 68(1) subsidiaries in the Community
which meet the conditions laid down in the
points (a), (c) and (d) of Article 69(1), and
whose material exposures or material
liabilities are to that parent credit institution
in a Member State.
1. Subject to paragraphs 1a to 1c, the
competent authorities may allow on a case
by case basis parent credit institutions to
incorporate in the calculation of their
requirement under Article 68(1) subsidiaries
which meet the conditions laid down in the
points (c) and (d) of Article 69(1), and
whose material exposures or material
liabilities are to that parent credit institution.
Or. en
Justification
Der Ratsänderungsvorschlag wird befürwortet. Die Voraussetzungen für die
Befreiungsmöglichkeit werden spezifiziert. Eine Ausweitung der Ausnahme von der
Einzelinstitutsaufsicht auf europäische Tochterunternehmen ist aufgrund fehlender
rechtlicher und institutioneller Voraussetzungen nicht vertretbar (damit auch Ablehnung
einer Überprüfung der Ausweitung auf EU-Töchter etwa nach fünf Jahren).
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 354
Article 70, paragraph 1
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The competent authorities may allow on a
case by case basis parent credit institutions
in a member state to incorporate in the
calculation of their requirement under
Article 68 (1) subsidiaries in the
Community which meet the conditions laid
down in the points (a), (c) and (d) of Article
69 (1), and whose material exposures or
material liabilities are to that parent credit
institution in a Member State.
1. Subject to paragraphs 1a to 1c, the
competent authorities may allow on a case
by case basis parent credit institutions to
incorporate in the calculation of their
requirement under Article 68(1) subsidiaries
which meet the conditions laid down in the
points (c) and (d) of Article 69(1), and
whose material exposures or material
liabilities are to that parent credit institution.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal would result in a very material increase in capital requirements
without a proportionate prudential benefit. These additional costs are likely to be passed on
to the consumer. The proposed change allows for a much wider application of Article 70.
These changes are important for all Member States that do not propose to use the option
provided by Article 60 not to deduct from the parent institution’s own funds the amount of
capital invested in such subsidiaries.
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 355
Article 70, paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The treatment in paragraph 1 shall be
allowed only where the parent credit
institution demonstrates fully to the
competent authorities the circumstances
and arrangements, including legal
arrangements, by virtue of which there are
no current or foreseen material practical or
legal impediments to the prompt transfer of
own funds or repayment of liabilities on
demand by the subsidiary to its parent
undertaking or at any other time.
Or. en
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Justification
See Amendment to Article 70, paragraph 1 of Mr Hoppenstedt
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 356
Article 70, paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The treatment in paragraph 1 shall be
allowed only where the parent credit
institution demonstrates fully to the
competent authorities the circumstances
and arrangements, including legal
arrangements, by virtue of which there are
no material practical or legal impediments,
and none are foreseen, to the prompt
transfer of own funds, or repayment of
liabilities when due by the subsidiary to its
parent undertaking.
Or. en
Justification
Credit institutions, including those that typically service small retail consumers and SMEs,
often hold mortgages or leased assets within subsidiaries. The amendment to Article 70 seeks
to ensure that competent authorities can take full and appropriate account of the prudential
risk posed by subsidiaries to credit institutions at an individual level. To avoid incurring
prohibitive costs, the requirement of subsidiaries should be the ability to repay liabilities
when due.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 357
Article 70, paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The treatment in paragraph 1 shall be
allowed only where the parent credit
institution demonstrates fully to the
competent authorities that there are no
current or foreseen material practical or
legal impediments to the prompt transfer of
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own funds by the subsidiary to its parent
undertaking.
Or. en
Justification
See the Amendment to Article 70, paragraph 1 of Ms Kauppi.
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 358
Article 70, paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Where a competent authority exercises
its discretion in accordance with paragraph
1, it shall on a regular basis and not less
than once a year inform the competent
authorities of all the other Member States
of the use made of paragraph 1 and of the
circumstances and arrangements referred
to in paragraph 1a. Where the subsidiary is
in a third country, the competent
authorities shall also provide the same
information to the competent authorities of
that third country.
Or. en
Justification
See Amendment to Article 70, paragraph 1 of Mr Hoppenstedt
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 359
Article 70, paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Where a competent authority exercises
its discretion in accordance with paragraph
1, it shall on a regular basis and not less
than once a year inform the competent
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authorities of all the other Member States
of the use made of paragraph 1 and of the
circumstances and arrangements referred
to in paragraph 1a. Where the subsidiary is
in a third country, the competent
authorities shall also provide the same
information to the competent authorities of
that third country.
Or. en
Justification
See the Amendment to Article 70, paragraph 1 of Ms Kauppi.
Amendement déposé par Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt
Amendement 360
Article 70, paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Without prejudice to the generality of
Article 144 competent authorities which
make use of paragraph 1 shall publicly
disclose, in the manner indicated in Article
144:
(a) the criteria it applies to determine that
there is no current or foreseen material,
practical or legal impediment to the prompt
transfer of own funds or repayment of
liabilities;
(b) the number of parent credit institutions
which make use of paragraph 1 and the
number of these which incorporate
subsidiaries in a third country;
(c) on an aggregate basis for the Member
State:
(i) the total amount of own funds of parent
credit institutions which make use of
paragraph 1 which are held in subsidiaries
in a third country;
(ii) the percentage of total own funds of
parent credit institutions which make use of
paragraph 1 represented by own funds
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which are held in subsidiaries in a third
country;
(iii) the percentage of total minimum own
funds required under Article 75 of parent
credit institutions which make use of
paragraph 1 represented by own funds
which are held in subsidiaries in a third
country.
Or. en
Justification
See Amendment to Article 70, paragraph 1 of Mr Hoppenstedt
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 361
Article 70, paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Without prejudice to the generality of
Article 144 competent authorities which
make use of paragraph 1 shall publicly
disclose, in the manner indicated in Article
144:
(a) the criteria it applies to determine that
there is no current or foreseen material,
practical or legal impediment to the prompt
transfer of own funds;
(b) the number of parent credit institutions
which make use of paragraph 1 and the
number of these which incorporate
subsidiaries in a third country;
(c) on an aggregate basis for the Member
State:
(i) the total amount of own funds of parent
credit institutions which make use of
paragraph 1 which are held in subsidiaries
in a third country;
(ii) the percentage of total own funds of
parent credit institutions which make use of
paragraph 1 represented by own funds
which are held in subsidiaries in a third
country;
(iii) the percentage of total minimum own
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funds required under Article 75 of parent
credit institutions which make use of
paragraph 1 represented by own funds
which are held in subsidiaries in a third
country.
Or. en
Justification
See the Amendment to Article 70, paragraph 1 of Ms Kauppi.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 362
Article 72, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2
However, in respect of their significant
subsidiaries, they shall disclose the
information specified in Annex XII, part 1,
paragraph 5, on an individual or subconsolidated basis
However, in respect of their significant
subsidiaries, they shall disclose the
information specified in Annex XII, part 1,
paragraph 5, on an individual or subconsolidated basis. The competent
authorities of the parent credit institution
will classify significant subsidiaries.
Or. en
Justification
From the wording the process to define significant subsidiaries does not become clear. The
amendment clarifies that the supervisor of the parent company has the responsibility to
classify significant subsidiaries.
We want to stress that there is no public interest in disclosure of figures for a subsidiary
100% owned by the parent company.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 363
Article 72, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2
However, in respect of their significant
subsidiaries, they shall disclose the
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However, in respect of their significant
subsidiaries, they shall disclose the
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information specified in Annex XII, part 1,
paragraph 5, on an individual or subconsolidated basis.
information specified in Annex XII, part 1,
paragraph 5, on an individual or subconsolidated basis. The competent
authorities of the parent credit institution
will classify significant subsidiaries.
Or. en
Justification
See Amendment to Article 72, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 of Mr Karas.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 364
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (a)
a) the exposure must be either to an
individual person or persons, or to a small or
medium sized entity;
(a) the exposure must be either to an
individual person or persons, or to a small or
medium sized entity. Exposures to personal
investment companies established solely for
the purposes of managing the finances of a
person or persons shall be treated in the
same way as if the exposure were provided
directly to the person or persons concerned;
Or. en
Justification
text
Amendement déposé par Jonathan Evans
Amendement 365
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (a)
a) the exposure must be either to an
individual person or persons, or to a small or
medium sized entity;
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(a) the exposure must be either to an
individual person or persons, or to a small or
medium sized entity. Exposures to personal
investment companies established solely for
the purposes of managing the finances of a
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person or persons shall be treated in the
same way as if the exposure were provided
directly to the person or persons concerned;
Or. en
Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market.
Amendement déposé par Harald Ettl
Amendement 366
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (a)
a) the exposure must be either to an
individual person or persons, or to a small or
medium sized entity;
(a) the exposure must be either to an
individual person or persons, or to a small or
medium sized entity. Exposures to personal
investment companies established solely for
the purposes of managing the finances of a
person or persons shall be treated in the
same way as if the exposure were provided
directly to the person or persons;
Or. en
Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market.
Amendement déposé par Wolf Klinz
Amendement 367
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (a)
a) sie richten sich entweder an eine
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(a) sie richten sich entweder an eine
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Einzelperson/an Einzelpersonen oder ein
kleines oder mittleres Unternehmen
Einzelperson/an Einzelpersonen oder ein
kleines oder mittleres Unternehmen.
Forderungen an Zweckgesellschaften, die
einzig zum Zweck der Verwaltung des
Vermögens einer oder mehrerer Personen
gegründet wurden, sollten so behandelt
werden als ob die Forderung direkt an die
betroffene(n) Person(en) gerichtet sei;
Or. de
Justification
Den Zweckgesellschaften muss Rechnung getragen werden.
Amendement déposé par Jonathan Evans
Amendement 368
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (b)
b) the exposure must be one of a significant
number of exposures with similar
characteristics such that the risk associated
with such lending are substantially reduced;
(b) the exposure must be one of a number of
exposures with similar characteristics such
that the risk associated with such lending are
substantially reduced;
Or. en
Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market. In Article 79.2 (b) the use of the phrase
“significant number of exposures” may preclude small banks from classifying portfolios as
retail. Deletion of “significant” puts the emphasis on diversity of risk within a portfolio of
assets with similar characteristics.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 369
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (b)
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b) sie ist eine vielen Forderungen mit
ähnlichen Merkmalen, so dass die Risiken
dieser Ausleihungen erheblich reduziert
werden;
(b) sie ist eine vielen Forderungen mit
ähnlichen Merkmalen, so dass die Risiken
dieser Ausleihungen erheblich reduziert
werden; die Anforderungen hinsichtlich
des Diversifizierungsgrades dürfen jedoch
bei kleineren Instituten zu keiner
Einschränkung des Kreditangebotes
führen.
Or. de
Justification
Die in den früheren Entwürfen vorgesehene Beschränkung der Kredithöhe an das
Eigenkapital einer Bank hätte zu einer unerwünschten Einschränkung der Kreditmöglichkeit
von KMU-Kunden geführt.
Zur Vermeidung von negativen Auswirkungen auf bestimmte KMU-Branchen sollte die
Grenze für die Behandlung von KMU-Krediten von 1 Mio. EUR ausschließlich für
betriebliche Kredite zur Verfügung stehen.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 370
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (b)
(b) the exposure must be one of a significant
number of exposures with similar
characteristics such that the risks associated
with such lending are substantially reduced;
(b) the exposure must be one of a number of
exposures with similar characteristics such
that the risk associated with such lending are
substantially reduced;
Or. en
Justification
See Amendment to Article 79, paragraph 2, point a of Mr. García-Margallo y Marfil.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 371
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (c)
c) the total amount owed to the credit
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(c) the total amount owed to the credit
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institution and any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries, including any past due
exposure, by the obligor client or group of
connected clients must not, to the knowledge
of the credit institution, exceed EUR
1million. The credit institution must take
reasonable steps to acquire this knowledge.
institution and its parent undertaking and its
subsidiaries, including any past due
exposure, by the obligor client or group of
connected clients, but excluding claims or
contingent claims secured on real estate
property, must not, to the knowledge of the
credit institution, exceed EUR 1 million. The
credit institution must take reasonable steps
to acquire this knowledge.
Or. en
Justification
text
Amendement déposé par Wolf Klinz
Amendement 372
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (c)
c) der dem Kreditinstitut und gegebenenfalls
dem Mutterunternehmen und dessen
Tochtergesellschaften von dem Kunden oder
der Gruppe verbundener Kunden insgesamt
geschuldete Betrag einschließlich etwaiger
überfälliger Forderungen darf nach Wissen
des Kreditinstituts nicht über eine Mio. EUR
hinausgehen. Das Kreditinstitut unternimmt
angemessene Schritte zur Erlangung dieses
Wissens.
(c) der dem Kreditinstitut und
gegebenenfalls dem Mutterunternehmen und
dessen Tochtergesellschaften von dem
Kunden oder der Gruppe verbundener
Kunden insgesamt geschuldete Betrag darf
nach Wissen des Kreditinstituts nicht über
2,5 Mio. EUR hinausgehen. Das
Kreditinstitut unternimmt angemessene
Schritte zur Erlangung dieses Wissens. Der
Zeitwert der RetailMindestleasingzahlungen kann der
Forderungsklasse der Retailforderungen
zugeordnet werden.
Or. de
Justification
Anpassung der Definitionen von Art. 72 Absatz 2 an Artikel 86 Absatz 4. Ferner ist die
vorgeschlagene Begrenzung zu eng. Sie hätte einen negativen Einfluss auf kleine Banken und
könnte die Verfügbarkeit von Krediten für KMU einschränken.
Ferner soll der Zeitwert von Retail-Mindestleasingzahlungen als den Retail-Forderungen
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oder der Forderungsklasse der bedingten Retail-Forderungen zugeordnet betrachtet werden,
um sicherzustellen, dass die Konsistenz bei allen Ansätzen gegeben ist.
Amendement déposé par Harald Ettl
Amendement 373
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (c)
(c) the total amount owed to the credit
institution and any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries, including any past due
exposure, by the obligor client or group of
connected clients, must not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, exceed
EUR 1 million. The credit institution must
take reasonable steps to acquire this
knowledge.
(c) the total amount owed to the credit
institution and parent undertakings and its
subsidiaries, including any past due
exposure, by the obligor client or group of
connected clients, but excluding claims or
contingent claims secured on residential
real estate property, must not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, exceed
EUR 1 million. The credit institution must
take reasonable steps to acquire this
knowledge.
Or. en
Justification
In order to be eligible for the retail treatment for both the standardised and IRB approaches,
credit institutions are forced to demonstrate that their aggregate exposures to one
counterparty are below € 1m. This poses a number of fundamental and practical issues and
does not reflect the way in which institutions distinguish between retail and corporate
exposures.
Therefore, residential mortgage lending should be excluded from the aggregation calculation
for the retail treatment.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 374
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (c)
(c) The total amount owed to the credit
institution and any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries, including any past due
exposure, by the obligor client or group of
connected clients must not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, exceed
EUR 1 million. The credit institution must
take reasonable steps to acquire this
AM\565454XM.doc
(c) The amount owed to the credit
institution, including any past due exposure,
by the obligor client, but excluding claims
or contingent claims secured on real estate
property, must be consistently managed and
treated as retail exposure by the credit
institution.
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knowledge.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal does not reflect market practice and will result in significant
additional costs without corresponding prudential benefits. It could restrict the availability of
funding to SMEs. The proposed change reinforces the Basel Framework, which recognises
that banks should not be forced to develop extensive new information systems simply for the
purpose of ensuring perfect compliance [Basel Framework, paragraph 231].
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 375
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (c)
c) der dem Kreditinstitut und gegebenenfalls
dem Mutterunternehmen und dessen
Tochtergesellschaften von dem Kunden oder
der Gruppe verbundener Kunden insgesamt
geschuldete Betrag einschließlich etwaiger
überfälliger Forderungen darf nach Wissen
des Kreditinstituts nicht über ein Mio. EUR
hinausgehen. Das Kreditinstitut unternimmt
angemessene Schritte zur Erlangung dieses
Wissens.
(c) der dem Kreditinstitut und
gegebenenfalls dem Mutterunternehmen und
dessen Tochtergesellschaften von dem
Kunden geschuldete Betrag einschließlich
etwaiger überfälliger Forderungen darf nach
Wissen des Kreditinstituts nicht über ein
Mio. EUR hinausgehen. Das Kreditinstitut
unternimmt angemessene Schritte zur
Erlangung dieses Wissens.
Or. de
Justification
Die in den früheren Entwürfen vorgesehene Beschränkung der Kredithöhe an das
Eigenkapital einer Bank hätte zu einer unerwünschten Einschränkung der Kreditmöglichkeit
von KMU-Kunden geführt.
Zur Vermeidung von negativen Auswirkungen auf bestimmte KMU-Branchen sollte die
Grenze für die Behandlung von KMU-Krediten von 1 Mio. EUR ausschließlich für
betriebliche Kredite zur Verfügung stehen.
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Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 376
Article 79, paragraph 2, point (c)
(c) the total amount owed to the credit
institution and any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries, including any past due
exposure, by the obligor client or group of
connected clients must not, to the knowledge
of the credit institution, exceed EUR 1
million. The credit institution must take
reasonable steps to acquire this knowledge.
Securities shall not be eligible for the retail
exposure class.
(c) the total amount owed to the credit
institution and its parent undertaking and its
subsidiaries, including any past due
exposure, by the obligor client or group of
connected clients, but excluding claims or
contingent claims secured on real estate
property, must not, to the knowledge of the
credit institution, exceed EUR 3 million.
The credit institution must take reasonable
steps to acquire this knowledge. Securities
shall not be eligible for the retail exposure
class.
Or. en
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 377
Article 72, paragraph 3
3. The competent authorities responsible for
exercising supervision on a consolidated
basis pursuant to Articles 125 to 131 may
decide not to apply in full or in part
paragraphs 1 and 2 to the credit institutions
which are included within comparable
disclosures provided on a consolidated basis
by a parent undertaking established in a third
country.
3. The competent authorities responsible for
exercising supervision on a consolidated
basis pursuant to Articles 125 and 126 may
decide not to apply in full or in part
paragraphs 1 and 2 to the credit institutions
which are included within comparable
disclosures provided on a consolidated basis
by a parent undertaking established in a third
country.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 378
Article 73, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The Member States or the competent
authorities responsible for exercising
supervision on a consolidated basis pursuant
to Article 125 to 131 may decide in the
following cases that a credit institution,
financial institution or ancillary services
undertaking which is a subsidiary or in
which a participation is held need not be
included in the consolidation:
1. The Member States or the competent
authorities responsible for exercising
supervision on a consolidated basis pursuant
to Articles 125 and 126 may decide in the
following cases that a credit institution,
financial institution or ancillary services
undertaking which is a subsidiary or in
which a participation is held need not be
included in the consolidation:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 379
Article 75, point (b)
(b) in respect of their trading-book business,
for position risk, settlement and counterparty risk and, in so far as the limits laid
down in Articles 111 to 117 are authorised
to be exceeded, for large exposures
exceeding such limits, the capital
requirements determined in accordance with
[Directive 93/6/EEC, Chapter V, Section 4];
(b) in respect of their trading-book business,
for position risk, settlement and counterparty risk and, in so far as the limits laid
down in Articles 111 to 117 are authorised
to be exceeded, for large exposures
exceeding such limits, the capital
requirements determined in accordance with
[Directive 93/6/EEC Article 18 and Chapter
V, Section 4 of that directive];
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 380
Article 79, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2 a (new)
2a. The present value of retail minimum
lease payments is eligible for the retail
exposure class.
Or. en
Justification
The present value of retail minimum lease payments should be considered as belonging to the
retail claims or contingent retail claims class in order to guarantee consistency.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 381
Article 80, paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts for exposures to
institutions, competent authorities shall
decide whether to adopt the method based
on the credit quality of the central
government of the jurisdiction in which the
credit institution is incorporated or the
method based on the credit quality of the
counterparty institution in accordance with
Annex VI.
3. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts for exposures to
institutions, Member States shall decide
whether to adopt the method based on the
credit quality of the central government of
the jurisdiction in which the credit institution
is incorporated or the method based on the
credit quality of the counterparty institution
in accordance with Annex VI.
Or. en
Justification
The adoption of the method shall be given to Member States, not to competent authorities.
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This amendment is identical with the amendment accepted by the Council.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 382
Article 80, paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts for exposures to
institutions, competent authorities shall
decide whether to adopt the method based
on the credit quality of the central
government of the jurisdiction in which the
credit institution is incorporated or the
method based on the credit quality of the
counterparty institution in accordance with
Annex VI.
3. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts for exposures to
institutions, competent authorities shall
decide whether to adopt the method based
on the credit quality of the central
government of the jurisdiction in which the
institution is incorporated or the method
based on the credit quality of the
counterparty institution in accordance with
Annex VI.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 383
Article 80, paragraph 7, introductory part
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its institution to a
counterparty which is its parent undertaking,
its subsidiary or a subsidiary of its parent
undertaking, provided that the following
conditions are met:
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its institution to a
counterparty which is its parent undertaking,
its subsidiary or a subsidiary of its parent
undertaking or an undertaking linked by a
relationship within the meaning of Article
12(1) of Directive 83/349/EEC, provided
that the following conditions are met:
Or. en
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Justification
The wording of Article 80(7) is modelled on traditional group structures of the pyramid type,
but does not reflect the structures of other types of consolidating groups (e.g. hour-glass
structured co-operative groups). The amendment seeks to apply the principle "same risks same treatment" to those groups, without changing the conditions for a 0%-weighting under
80 (7)(a)-(e).
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 384
Article 80, paragraph 7, introductory part
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, or an undertaking
linked by a relationship with the sense of
article 12(1) of Directive 83/349/EEC
provided that the following conditions are
met :
Or. en
Justification
The aim of this amendment is to take into account the positive effects of the integration in the
European banking sector ; in this respect, the possibility to apply a 0 % risk weight to certain
types of intra-group exposures within the European union would not be subject to a criterium
based on the national localisation of the relevant entities. In the same spirit, such a treatment
would apply to mutual and cooperative banks.
Amendment by Pervenche Berès
Amendment 385
Article 80, paragraph 7, introductory part
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7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking or an undertaking
linked by a relationship within the meaning
of Article 12, paragraph 1 of Directive
83/349/EEC, provided that the following
conditions are met:
Or. en
Justification
This amendment proposes a global approach to prudential neutrality concerning intra-group
exposure. It suggests to apply the principle "same risks - same treatment" to consolidated
groups not included in the wording of the European Commission, without changing the
conditions for a 0-weighting.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 386
Article 80, paragraph 7, introductory part
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (a) to (h) of Article
57(1) , competent authorities shall exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
Or. en
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Justification
A 0% risk weight is a correct reflection of the risk associated with intra-group exposures. In
order to remove competitive distortions within the Single Market, a 0% risk weight should be
applied as a rule to all intra-group exposures to counterparties within the EU. The position of
depositors and borrowers would be fully protected by the conditions, particularly condition
(e).
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 387
Article 80, paragraph 7, introductory part
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1) , competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (a) to (h) of Article
57(1) , competent authorities shall exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
Or. en
Justification
Historically, there has never been any default on intra-group exposures. The Basel II
framework does not risk weight intra-group exposures. Thus a 0% risk weight is a correct
reflection of the risk associated. However, in the current proposal a 0% risk weight is only
allowed for domestic intra-group exposures and as a national discretion. Thus in order to
remove competitive distortions within the Single Market, a 0% risk weight should be applied
as a rule to all (EU and domestic) intra-group exposures to counterparties within the EU. The
position of depositors and borrowers would be fully protected by the conditions, particularly
condition (e). If intra-group exposures would have to be risk wieghted then it should be the
same RW for both national and EU intra-group exposures.
Capital should not be held against intra-group non-capital exposures where risk is managed
on an integrated basis and appropriate controls are in place over activities of subsidiaries.
The zero weighting of cross-border intra-group exposures to connected counterparties will
remove the capital differential between credit institutions in a particular national market
depending on whether they are a home credit institution or one from another member state.
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Amendment by Gunnar Hökmark
Amendment 388
Article 80, paragraph 7
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1) , competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1) , competent authorities shall exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
Or. en
Justification
It is essential that the 0% risk weight is applied as a rule to all intra-group exposures to
counterparties within the EU. This is in line with the Single Market objectives.
Amendment by Bernhard Rapkay, Udo Bullmann
Amendment 389
Article 80, paragraph 7, introductory part
(7) Mit Ausnahme von Forderungen, die
Verbindlichkeiten in Form der in Artikel 57
Absatz 1 Nummern 1-8 genannten
Positionen begründen, können die
zuständigen Behörden Forderungen eines
Kreditinstituts gegenüber seinem
Mutterunternehmen, seinem
Tochterunternehmen oder einer Tochter
seines Mutterunternehmens unter
folgenden Voraussetzungen von Absatz 1
ausnehmen:
(7) Mit Ausnahme von Forderungen, die
Verbindlichkeiten in Form der in Artikel 57
Absatz 1 Nummern 1-8 genannten
Positionen begründen, können die
zuständigen Behörden Forderungen eines
Kreditinstituts in folgenden Fällen von
Absatz 1 ausnehmen:
Or. de
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 390
Article 80, paragraph 7, introductory part
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (1) to (8) of Article
57(1), competent authorities may exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 1 of this
Article the exposures of a credit institution
to a counterparty which is its parent
undertaking, its subsidiary or a subsidiary of
its parent undertaking, provided that the
following conditions are met:
7. With the exception of exposures giving
rise to liabilities in the form of the items
referred to in points (a) to (h) of Article 57,
competent authorities may exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 1 of this Article
the exposures of a credit institution to a
counterparty which is its parent undertaking,
its subsidiary or a subsidiary of its parent
undertaking, provided that the following
conditions are met:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Bernhard Rapkay, Udo Bullmann
Amendment 391
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (a)
a) der Kontrahent ist ein Kreditinstitut oder
eine Finanzholdinggesellschaft, ein
Finanzinstitut, eine
Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft oder ein
Anbieter von Nebendienstleistungen und
unterliegt angemessenen
Aufsichtsvorschriften;
(a) Bei Forderungen eines Kreditinstituts
gegenüber seinen Mutterunternehmen,
seinem Tochterunternehmen, einer Tochter
seines Mutterunternehmens oder
gegenüber einem verbundenem
Unternehmen im Sinne von Artikel 12
Absatz 1 der Richtlinie 83/349/EWG unter
folgenden Voraussetzungen:
(i) der Kontrahent ist ein Kreditinstitut oder
eine Finanzholdingsgesellschaft, ein
Finanzinstitut, eine
Vermögensverwaltungsgesellschaft oder ein
Anbieter von Nebendienstleistungen und
unterliegt angemessenen
Aufsichtsvorschriften;
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(ii) der Kontrahent ist wie das Kreditinstitut
in die Vollkonsolidierung einbezogen;
(iii) bei den Kontrahenten werden die
gleichen Risikobewertungs-, -mess- und kontrollverfahren durchgeführt wie bei
einem Kreditinstitut;
(iv) der Kontrahent hat seinen Sitz in dem
gleichen Mitgliedstaat wie das
Kreditinstitut;
(v) ein substanzielles oder rechtliches
Hindernis für die unverzügliche
Übertragung von Eigenmitteln vom
Kontrahenten auf das Kreditinstitut oder
die Rückzahlung von Verbindlichkeiten an
das Kreditinstitut durch den Kontrahenten
ist weder vorhanden noch abzusehen.
Or. de
Amendment by Bernhard Rapkay, Udo Bullmann
Amendment 392
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (b)
b) der Kontrahent ist wie das Kreditinstitut
in die Vollkonsolidierung einbezogen;
(b) Bei Forderungen eines Kreditinstituts
gegenüber einem Kontrahenten, der
Mitglied des selben Haftungsverbandes,
namentlich nach Artikel 3 (1) der
Richtlinie 94/19/EG oder entsprechend den
Regelungen in Artikel 3 Absatz 1
Buchstabe (a) der Richtlinie 2000/12/EG,
ist, unter den folgenden Voraussetzungen:
(i) der Kontrahent ist ein Kreditinstitut oder
eine Finanzholdingsgesellschaft oder ein
Finanzinstitut und unterliegt
angemessenen Aufsichtvorschriften;
(ii) die Eigenmittel der dem
Haftungsverbund angehörigen Institute
werden nicht mehrfach mit Risiken belegt;
(iii) der Haftungsverbund verfügt über
geeignete, einheitlich festgelegte Systeme
der Risikobeobachtung und
Risikoklassifizierung mit
korrespondierenden
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Einwirkungsmöglichkeiten;
(iv) der Kontrahent hat seinen Sitz in dem
gleichen Mitgliedstaat wie das
Kreditinstitut;
(v) ein substanzielles oder rechtliches
Hindernis für die unverzügliche
Übertragung von Eigenmitteln auf den
Kontrahenten oder die Rückzahlung von
Verbindlichkeiten an das Kreditinstitut
durch den Haftungsverbund ist weder
vorhanden noch abzusehen; insbesondere
wird die Liquidität und Solvenz der dem
Haftungsverbund angeschlossenen
Institute gewährleistet; der
Haftungsverbund verfügt über die dazu
erforderlichen Mittel.
Or. de
Amendment by Bernhard Rapkay, Udo Bullmann
Amendment 393
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (c)
(c) bei dem Kontrahenten werden die
gleichen Risikobewertungs-, -mess- und kontrollverfahren durchgeführt wie bei
dem Kreditinstitut;
entfällt
Or. de
Amendment by Bernhard Rapkay, Udo Bullmann
Amendment 394
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
(d) der Kontrahent hat seinen Sitz in dem
gleichen Mitgliedstaat wie das
Kreditinstitut;
deleted
Or. de
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Amendment by Gunnar Hökmark
Amendment 395
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
(d) the counterparty is established in the
same Member State as the credit
institution;
(d) the counterparty is established within the
EU;
Or. en
Justification
It is essential that the 0% risk weight is applied as a rule to all intra-group exposures to
counterparties within the EU. This is in line with the Single Market objectives.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 396
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
(d) elle est établie dans le même Etat
membre que l'établissement de crédit;
(d) elle est établie dans un État membre;
Or. fr
Justification
Le paragraphe en question permet aux autorités compétentes d’exempter du calcul des
montants pondérés des risques, les risques d’un établissement de crédit sur une contrepartie
qui est son entreprise mère, sa filiale ou une filiale de son entreprise mère. Toutefois cette
exemption est soumise à des conditions dont l’une au moins celle concernant le point d) est
contraire au Traité alors qu’elle établit une discrimination des établissements de crédit
filiales d’un groupe bancaire à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne en fonction de leur
nationalité. Dans le cadre du marché intérieur il ne fait pas de sens de distinguer entre les
risques d’un établissement de crédit sur une contrepartie qui est son entreprise mère, sa
filiale ou une filiale de son entreprise mère, lorsque l’établissement de crédit en question est
situé dans le même Etat membre que les autres entités du groupe précités ou lorsqu’il est
situé dans un autre Etat membre.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 397
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
(d) the counterparty is established in the
same Member State as the credit
institution;
(d) the counterparty is also established in the
EU or a country member of the OECD;
Or. en
Justification
A 0% risk weight is a correct reflection of the risk associated with intra-group exposures. In
order to remove competitive distortions within the Single Market, a 0% risk weight should be
applied as a rule to all intra-group exposures to counterparties within the EU.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 398
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
(d) the counterparty is established in the
same Member State as the credit
institution;
deleted
Or. en
Justification
The aim of this amendment is to take into account the positive effects of the integration in the
European banking sector ; in this respect, the possibility to apply a 0 % risk weight to certain
types of intra-group exposures within the European union would not be subject to a criterium
based on the national localisation of the relevant entities. In the same spirit, such a treatment
would apply to mutual and cooperative banks.
Amendment by Pervenche Berès
Amendment 399
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
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(d) the counterparty is established in the
same Member State as the credit
institution;
deleted
Or. en
Justification
This amendment proposes a global approach to prudential neutrality concerning intra-group
exposure. It suggests to apply the principle "same risks - same treatment" to consolidated
groups not included in the wording of the European Commission, without changing the
conditions for a 0-weighting.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 400
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
(d) the counterparty is established in the
same Member State as the credit
institution;
deleted
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 80, paragraph 7 by P. Kauppi.
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 401
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (d)
(d) the counterparty is established in the
same Member State as the credit
institution;
deleted
Or. en
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Justification
Intragroup exposure and 0% risk weight should not be restricted to only parties within the
same Member State
Amendment by Bernhard Rapkay, Udo Bullmann
Amendment 402
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (e)
e) ein substanzielles oder rechtliches
Hindernis für die unverzügliche
Übertragung von Eigenmitteln vom
Kontrahenten auf das Kreditinstitut oder
die Rückzahlung von Verbindlichkeiten an
das Kreditinstitut durch den Kontrahenten
ist weder vorhanden noch abzusehen.
deleted
Or. de
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 403
Article 80, paragraph 7, point (e)
(e) there is no current or foreseen material or
legal impediment to the prompt transfer of
own funds or repayment of liabilities from
the counterparty to the credit institution.
(e) there is no current or foreseen material or
legal impediment to the prompt transfer of
own funds from the counterparty to the
credit institution.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 80, paragraph 7 by P. Kauppi.
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Amendment by Bernhard Rapkay, Udo Bullmann
Amendment 404
Article 80, paragraph 7, subparagraph 2
In einem solchen Fall wird ein
Risikogewicht von 0 % zugeteilt.
In den vorgenannten Fällen wird ein
Risikogewicht von 0% zugeteilt.
Or. de
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 405
Article 80, paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Competent authorities may also apply a
risk weight of 0 % to exposures of credit
institutions which meet the following
conditions:
(a) the requirements set out in points (a),
(d) and (e) of paragraph 7;
(b) the credit institution and the obligors
are participants in the same scheme which
meets the requirements of Directive
94/19/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 30 May 1994 on deposit
gurantee schemes1;;
(c) participants in the scheme referred to in
point (b) are obliged to give advance notice
of at least 24 months if they wish to leave
the scheme;
(d) the multiple use of elements eligible for
the calculation of own funds (multiple
gearing) as well as any inappropriate
creation of own funds between the
members of the scheme referred to in point
(b) shall be eliminated.
_________________
1 OJ
L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5.
Or. en
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Justification
In manchen Mitgliedstaaten haben Kreditinstitutsgruppen lange Tradition, die
gesellschaftsrechtlich nicht als konsolidierungspflichtige Konzerne konstruiert sind. Die
Mitgliedstaaten müssen abwägen, ob in diesen Gruppen ein solcher institutssichernder
Haftungsverbund und ein konzernähnlicher Durchgriff auf die Gruppenmitglieder rechtlich
und faktisch gegeben ist, der eine Gleichstellung was die Institutssicherung und die
Eigenkapitalkonsolidierung mit Kreditinstituten anlangt, auf welche die Bestimmungen des
Art. 80, paragraph 7, litera (b) and (c) zutreffen.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 406
Article 80, paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. National supervisors may also apply
Article 80(7) to those banks, belonging to a
joint liability scheme equal or similar to
that under Article 3 point (a) of this
directive or which complies with the
provisions of Directive 94/19/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of
30 May 1994 on deposit guarantee
schemes1, which do not satisfy the
requirements of points (b) and (c) of Article
80 paragraph 7, but which, owing to their
structure, have a guarantee and liability
system with a comparable risk profile with
regard to their internal group lending. Any
such comparability requires that
(a) a multiple use of supervisory capital is
excluded;
(b) the scheme disposes of a suitable system
for the monitoring of risks and possibilities
to take influence.
______________
1 OJ
L 135, 31.5.1994, p. 5.
Or. en
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Justification
The application of Article 80(7) should follow the principle of treating the same risks in the
same way. Accordingly, banks adhering to certain liability and cross-guarantee schemes
should be allowed to apply a 0%-weighting, if some essential safeguards are in place. Such
option encourage smaller banks to organize in more sound and safer structures
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 407
Article 80, paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Die nationale Aufsicht kann auf in
einem institutssichernden
Haftungsverbund, der die Bestimmungen
der Richtlinie 94/19/EG des Europäischen
Parlaments und des Rates vom 30. Mai
1994 über Einlagensicherungssysteme1
erfüllt, zusammengeschlossene Banken
Artikel 80 Absatz 7 ebenfalls anwenden.
Voraussetzung hierfür ist, dass die
Anforderungen unter paragraph 7 a-e
erfüllt werden oder alternativ zu b
mindestens einmal im Quartal eine
einheitliche Verbundrechenschaftslegung
(Bilanz, Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung,
Lagebericht und Risikobericht)
veröffentlicht wird sowie im Rahmen der
Erfüllung der Anforderungen von Art. 80
Abs. 7c die verbundinternen Ausfälle
entsprechend Anhang VII Teil 4 Nummer
44a auf Verbundebene überwacht werden.
Or. de
Justification
Bankengruppen können auf eine Eigenkapitalunterlegung innerhalb der Gruppe verzichten,
wenn bestimmte bankaufsichtliche Mindeststandards erfüllt sind, die in der Gesamtschau das
Risiko erheblich herabsetzen. Die Freistellung von der Eigenkapitalunterlegung sollte auch
auf Haftungsverbünde ausgedehnt werden, sofern diese eben diese bestimmten
bankaufsichtlichen Mindeststandards erfüllen, wobei sie statt einer Vollkonsolidierung eine
einheitliche Verbundrechenschaftslegung (Bilanz, Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung, Lage- und
Risikobericht) vorlegen können.
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Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 408
Article 84, paragraph 3
3. Ein Kreditinstitut, das eine Genehmigung
zur Verwendung des IRB-Ansatzes
beantragt, weist nach, dass es für die
betreffenden IRB-Forderungsklassen seit
mindestens drei Jahren Ratingsysteme
verwendet, die den in diesem Anhang für die
interne Risikomessung und das interne
Risikomanagement genannten
Mindestanforderungen im Grossen und
Ganzen entsprechen. Dies gilt ab dem 31.
Dezember 2010.
3. Ein Kreditinstitut, das eine Genehmigung
zur Verwendung des IRB-Ansatzes
beantragt, weist nach, dass es für die
betreffenden IRB-Forderungsklassen seit
mindestens zwei Jahren Ratingsysteme
verwendet, die den in diesem Anhang für die
interne Risikomessung und das interne
Risikomanagement genannten
Mindestanforderungen im Grossen und
Ganzen entsprechen.
Or. de
Justification
Zur Erleichterung des Aufwandes wird die vorgeschlagene Änderung der
Übergangsvorschriften begrüßt. Die vorgeschlagene Anpassung der Zeitreihenanforderungen
sind aber nur dann sinnvoll, wenn gleichzeitig auch die Anforderungen hinsichtlich „broadly
in line“ angepasst werden.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 409
Article 84, paragraph 3
3. Ein Kreditinstitut, das eine Genehmigung
zur Verwendung des IRB-Ansatzes
beantragt, weist nach, dass es für die
betreffenden IRB-Forderungsklassen seit
mindestens drei Jahren Ratingsysteme
verwendet, die den in diesem Anhang für die
interne Risikomessung und das interne
Risikomanagement genannten
Mindestanforderungen im Genossen und
Ganzen entsprechen. Dies gilt ab dem 31.
Dezember 2010.
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3. Ein Kreditinstitut, das eine Genehmigung
zur Verwendung des IRB-Ansatzes
beantragt, weist nach, dass es für die
betreffenden IRB-Forderungsklassen seit
mindestens zwei Jahren Ratingsysteme
verwendet, die den in diesem Anhang für die
interne Risikomessung und das interne
Risikomanagement genannten
Mindestanforderungen im Genossen und
Ganzen entsprechen.
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Or. de
Justification
Die derzeitigen Historienanforderungen werden als zu streng angesehen. Die den
Schätzungen zugrunde gelegten Beobachtungszeiträume sollen auf 2 Jahre verkürzt werden.
Bei diesem Änderungsantrag handelt es sich um eine notwendige Ergänzung der vom
Berichterstatter an anderen Stellen vorgeschlagenen Änderungsanträgen. ##
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 410
Article 84, paragraph 4
(4) Ein Kreditinstitut, das eine Genehmigung
zur Verwendung eigener LGD-Schätzungen
und/oder eigener Umrechnungsfaktoren
beantragt, weist nach, dass es seine LGDSchätzungen und Umrechnungsfaktoren seit
mindestens drei Jahren in einer Weise
verwendet, die den in diesem Anhang für die
Nutzung eigener Schätzungen genannten
Mindestanforderungen im Grossen und
Ganzen entspricht. Dies gilt ab dem 31.
Dezember 2010.
(4) Ein Kreditinstitut, das eine Genehmigung
zur Verwendung eigener LGD-Schätzungen
und/oder eigener Umrechnungsfaktoren
beantragt, weist nach, dass es seine LGDSchätzungen und Umrechnungsfaktoren seit
mindestens zwei Jahren in einer Weise
verwendet, die den im Anhang VII, Teil 4,
für die Nutzung eigener Schätzungen
genannten Mindestanforderungen im
Grossen und Ganzen entspricht.
Or. ##
##
Justification
##
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 411
Article 86, paragraph 2, point (a)
(a) exposures to regional governments and
local authorities which are treated as
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authorities or public sector entities which
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exposures to central governments under
Subsection 1;
are treated as exposures to central
governments under Subsection 1;
Or. en
Justification
Follows from amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 412
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (a)
(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries by the obligor client or group
of connected clients does not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, which
must have taken reasonable steps to confirm
the situation, exceed EUR 1 million;
(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries by the obligor client or group
of connected clients, but excluding claims
or contingent claims secured on real estate
property, does not, to the knowledge of the
credit institution, which must have taken
reasonable steps to confirm the situation,
exceed EUR 1 million;
Or. en
Justification
In order to be eligible for the retail treatment for both the standardised and IRB approaches,
credit institutions are forced to demonstrate that their aggregate exposures to one
counterparty are below €1m. However, it is not clear whether mortgage loans should be
included in the aggregation calculation or whether they are treated separately. Aggregating
all counterparties’ exposures to include credit cards, small business loans, overdrafts and
mortgages could in many cases prove impossible, given that these exposures can span a
number of subsidiaries, a number of systems and a number of countries. Moreover, it does not
reflect the way in which credit institutions distinguish between retail and corporate
exposures. This requirement could potentially restrict the availability of funding to SMEs
compared to current underwriting practices. Therefore, mortgage lending ought to be
excluded from the aggregation calculation for the retail treatment.
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Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 413
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (a)
(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries by the obligor client or group
of connected clients does not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, which
must have taken reasonable steps to confirm
the situation, exceed EUR 1 million;
(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries by the obligor client or group
of connected clients, but excluding claims
or contingent claims secured on real estate
property, does not, to the knowledge of the
credit institution, which must have taken
reasonable steps to confirm the situation,
exceed EUR 3 million. Exposures to
personal investment companies established
solely for the purposes of managing the
finances of a person or persons shall be
treated in the same way as if the exposure
were provided directly to the person or
persons concerned.
Or. en
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 414
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (a)
a) they shall be either to an individual person
or persons, or to a small or medium sized
entity, provided in the latter case that the
total amount owed to the credit institution
and to any parent undertaking and its
subsidiaries by the obligor client or group of
connected clients, does not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, which
must have taken reasonable steps to confirm
the situation, exceed EUR 1 million;
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(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries by the obligor client or group
of connected clients, but excluding claims
or contingent claims secured on residential
real estate property does not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, which
must have taken reasonable steps to confirm
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the situation, exceed EUR 1 million;
Or. en
Justification
In order to be eligible for the retail treatment for both the standardised and IRB approaches,
credit institutions are forced to demonstrate that their aggregate exposures to one
counterparty are below € 1m. This poses a number of fundamental and practical issues and
does not reflect the way in which institutions distinguish between retail and corporate
exposures. Therefore, mortgage lending to be excluded from the aggregation calculation for
the retail treatment.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 415
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (a)
a) sie richten sich entweder an eine
Einzelperson/an Einzelpersonen oder ein
kleines oder mittleres Unternehmen, wobei
in letztgenanntem Fall der dem Kreditinstitut
und gegebenenfalls dem Mutterunternehmen
und dessen Tochtergesellschaften von dem
Kunden oder der Gruppe verbundener
Kunden insgesamt geschuldete Betrag nach
Wissen des Kreditinstituts nicht über eine
Mio. EUR hinausgehen darf; das
Kreditinstitut hat angemessene Schritte
unternommen, um sich von der Richtigkeit
seines Kenntnisstands zu überzeugen;
(a) sie richten sich entweder an eine
Einzelperson/an Einzelpersonen oder ein
kleines oder mittleres Unternehmen, wobei
in letztgenanntem Fall der dem Kreditinstitut
und gegebenenfalls dem Mutterunternehmen
und dessen Tochtergesellschaften von dem
Kunden oder der Gruppe verbundener
Kunden insgesamt geschuldete Betrag nach
Wissen des Kreditinstituts nicht über 2,5
Mio. EUR hinausgehen darf; das
Kreditinstitut hat angemessene Schritte
unternommen, um sich von der Richtigkeit
seines Kenntnisstands zu überzeugen. Der
Zeitwert von RetailMindestleasingzahlungen kann der
Forderungsklasse der Retail-Forderungen
zugeordnet werden.
Or. de
Justification
Die vorgeschlagene Begrenzung ist zu eng. Sie hätte einen negativen Einfluss auf kleine
Banken und könnte die Verfügbarkeit von Krediten für KMU einschränken. Ferner soll der
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Zeitwert von Retail-Mindestleasingzahlungen als den Retail-Forderungen oder der
Forderungsklasse der bedingten Retail-Forderungen zugeordnet betrachtet werden, um
sicherzustellen, dass die Konsistenz bei allen Ansätzen gegeben ist.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 416
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (a)
(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries by the obligor client or group
of connected clients does not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, which
must have taken reasonable steps to confirm
the situation, exceed EUR 1 million;
(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking and
its subsidiaries by the obligor client or group
of connected clients does not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, which
must have taken reasonable steps to confirm
the situation, exceed EUR 1 million.
Exposures to personal investment
companies established solely for the
purposes of managing the finances of a
person or persons shall be treated in the
same way as if the exposure were provided
directly to the person or persons concerned;
Or. en
Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 417
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (a)
(a) they shall be either to an individual
person or persons, or to a small or medium
sized entity, provided in the latter case that
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(a) they shall be consistently managed and
treated as a retail exposure by the credit
institution;
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the total amount owed to the credit
institution and to any parent undertaking
and its subsidiaries by the obligor client or
group of connected clients does not, to the
knowledge of the credit institution, which
must have taken reasonable steps to
confirm the situation, exceed EUR 1
million;
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal does not reflect market practice and will result in significant
additional costs without corresponding prudential benefits. It will particularly impact smaller
banks and could restrict the availability of funding to SMEs. The proposed change reinforces
the Basel Framework, which recognises that banks should not be forced to develop extensive
new information systems simply for the purpose of ensuring perfect compliance [Basel
Framework, paragraph 231].
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 418
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (b)
(b) they are treated by the credit institution
in its risk management consistently over
time and in a similar manner;
deleted
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal does not reflect market practice and will result in significant
additional costs without corresponding prudential benefits. It will particularly impact smaller
banks and could restrict the availability of funding to SMEs. The proposed change reinforces
the Basel Framework, which recognises that banks should not be forced to develop extensive
new information systems simply for the purpose of ensuring perfect compliance [Basel
Framework, paragraph 231].
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Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 419
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (d)
(d) they each represent one of a significant
number of similarly managed exposures.
(d) they each represent one of a number of
similarly managed exposures.
Or. en
Justification
The use of the phrase “significant number of …exposures” may preclude small banks from
classifying portfolios as retail. Deletion of “significant” puts the emphasis on diversity of risk
within a portfolio of assets with similar characteristics.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 420
Article 86, paragraph 4, point (d)
(d) they each represent one of a significant
number of similarly managed exposures.
(d) they each represent one of a number of
similarly managed exposures.
Or. en
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 421
Article 86, paragraph 4, subparagraph 1 a (new)
The present value of retail minimum lease
payments is eligible for the retail exposure
class.
Or. en
Justification
The present value of retail minimum lease payments should be considered as belonging to the
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retail claims or contingent retail claims class in order to guarantee consistency.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 422
Article 86, paragraph 6, introductory part
6. Within the corporate exposure class,
credit institutions shall separately identify as
specialised lending exposures, exposures
which possess the following characteristics:
6. Within the corporate exposure class,
credit institutions shall separately identify
specialised lending. The five sub-classes of
specialised lending are project finance,
object finance, commodities finance,
income-producing real estate and highvolatility commercial real estate. Each of
these sub-classes is defined as follows:
Or. en
Justification
The omission from the Directive Text of Basel’s specific definitions of the specialised lending
sub-classes could lead to inconsistent application and therefore competitive inequality
between Member States and between the European Union and other jurisdictions.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 423
Article 86, paragraph 6, point (a)
(a) the exposure is to an entity which was
created specifically to finance and/or
operate physical assets;
(a) Project finance is a method of funding
in which the lender looks primarily to the
revenues generated by a single project, both
as the source of repayment and as security
for the exposure.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 86, paragraph 6 by J. Evans.
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Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 424
Article 86, paragraph 6, point (b)
(b) the contractual arrangements give the
lender a substantial degree of control over
the assets and the income that they
generate;
(b) Object finance refers to a method of
funding the acquisition of physical assets
where the repayment of the exposure is
dependent on the cash flows generated by
the specific assets that have been financed
and pledged or assigned to the lender.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 86, paragraph 6 by J. Evans.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 425
Article 86, paragraph 6, point (c)
(c) the primary source of repayment of the
obligation is the income generated by the
assets being financed, rather than the
independent capacity of a broader
commercial enterprise.
(c) Commodities finance refers to
structured short-term lending to finance
reserves, inventories, or receivables of
exchange-traded commodities where the
exposure will be repaid from the proceeds
of the sale of the commodity and the
borrower has no independent capacity to
repay the exposure.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 86, paragraph 6 by J. Evans.
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Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 426
Article 86, paragraph 6, point (c a) (new)
(ca) Income-producing real estate refers to
a method of providing funding to real
estate where the prospects of repayment
and recovery on the exposure depend
primarily on the cash flows generated by
the asset.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 86, paragraph 6 by J. Evans.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 427
Article 86, paragraph 6, point (c b) (new)
(cb) High-volatility commercial real estate
lending is the financing of commercial real
estate that exhibits higher loss rate
volatility (i.e. higher asset correlation)
compared to other types of specialised
lending.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 86, paragraph 6 by J. Evans.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 428
Article 86, paragraph 8
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8. The exposure class referred to in point (g)
of paragraph 1 shall include the residual
value of leased properties, if not covered
elsewhere in this Directive.
8. The exposure class referred to in point (g)
of paragraph 1 shall include the residual
value of leased properties when the risk on
this residual value is not transferred to the
lessee. Conversely, when this risk is
transferred to the lessee, it is a credit
obligation of the lessee which must be
treated accordingly.
Or. en
Justification
By definition and according to the international accounting rules, a financial lease is a
financing contract whereby the risk of the residual value is transferred to the lessee. Hence,
the residual value must be treated exactly as the other instalments, i.e. with a credit risk
weighting and not an “other asset” risk weight. The Basel Accord clearly identifies the risk
on residual value, which is a credit obligation when this risk is transferred to the lessee or
belongs to the “other asset” category when the risk is kept by the lender. Unfortunately,
probably by oversight, this distinction has been dropped in the Directive and must be
reinserted.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 429
Article 86, paragraph 8
8. The exposure class referred to in point (g)
of paragraph 1 shall include the residual
value of leased properties, if not covered
elsewhere in this Directive.
8. The exposure class referred to in point (g)
of paragraph 1 shall include the residual
value of leased properties, if not included in
the lease exposure as defined in Annex VII,
part 3, paragraph 4.
Or. en
Justification
This amendment is linked to my amendment to Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 4 on lease
payments.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 430
Article 87, paragraph 2
2. The risk-weighted exposure amounts for
dilution risk for purchased receivables shall
be calculated according to Annex VII,
part 1, paragraph 26.
2. The risk-weighted exposure amounts for
dilution risk for purchased receivables shall
be calculated according to Annex VII, part
1, paragraph 26. However, firms may treat
Invoice Discounting and Factoring as
secured lending in which case the
provisions of Articles 87 and 88 relating to
purchased receivables shall not apply.
Or. en
Justification
The Basel Committee did not intend to capture Factoring and Invoice Discounting business
within the Purchased Receivables approach. These changes are required to enable firms to
adopt the more appropriate corporate secured lending approaches for such product groups.
If the Directive remains unchanged and is applied literally by member states, it would pose a
significant risk to SME liquidity.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 431
Article 87, paragraph 4
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, the
calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts for credit risk for all exposures
belonging to the exposure class referred to in
point (e) of Article 86(1) shall be calculated
in accordance with Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 15 to 24 subject to approval of
competent authorities. Competent authorities
shall only allow a credit institution to use the
approach set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 24 to 25, if the credit institution
meets the minimum requirements Annex
VII, part 4, paragraphs 114 to 122.
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, the
calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts for credit risk for all exposures
belonging to the exposure class referred to in
point (e) of Article 86(1) shall be calculated
in accordance with Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 15 to 24 subject to approval of
competent authorities. Competent authorities
shall only allow a credit institution to use the
approach set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 23 and 24, if the credit
institution meets the minimum requirements
Annex VII, part 4, paragraphs 114 to 122.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 432
Article 87, paragraph 5
5. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, the
calculation of risk weighted exposure
amounts for credit risk for specialised
lending exposures may be calculated in
accordance with Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 5. Competent authorities shall
publish guidance on how institutions should
assign risk weights to specialised lending
exposures under Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 5 and shall approve institutions
assignment methodologies.
5. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, the
calculation of risk weighted exposure
amounts for credit risk for specialised
lending exposures may be calculated in
accordance with Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 5. Competent authorities shall
publish guidance on how credit institutions
should assign risk weights to specialised
lending exposures under Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 5 and shall approve institutions
assignment methodologies.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par Harald Ettl
Amendement 433
Article 87, paragraph 11, subparagraph 1
11. Where exposures to a collective
investment undertaking (CIU) meet the
criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75 and the credit institution
is aware of all of the underlying exposures
of the CIU, the credit institution shall look
through to those underlying exposures in
order to calculate risk-weighted exposure
amounts and expected loss amounts in
accordance with the methods set out in this
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11. Where exposures in the form of a
collective investment undertaking (CIU)
meet the criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75 and the credit institution
is aware of all of the underlying exposures
of the CIU, the credit institution shall look
through to those underlying exposures in
order to calculate risk-weighted exposure
amounts and expected loss amounts in
accordance with the methods set out in this
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Subsection.
Subsection.
Or. en
Justification
The CIU treatment should refer to a situation in which a bank holds a stake in a CIU; this is
evidenced by the fact that the CIU approach approximates the equity approach. However, the
wording "exposures to CIU" can be interpreted as including exposures that banks have to
CIUs (mainly derivatives).
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 434
Article 87, paragraph 11, subparagraph 1
11. Where exposures to a collective
investment undertaking (CIU) meet the
criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75 and the credit institution
is aware of all of the underlying exposures
of the CIU, the credit institution shall look
through to those underlying exposures in
order to calculate risk-weighted exposure
amounts and expected loss amounts in
accordance with the methods set out in this
Subsection.
11. Where exposures in the form of a
collective investment undertaking (CIU)
meet the criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75 and the credit institution
is aware of all of the underlying exposures
of the CIU, the credit institution shall look
through to those underlying exposures in
order to calculate risk-weighted exposure
amounts and expected loss amounts in
accordance with the methods set out in this
Subsection.
Or. en
Justification
The CIU treatment as described clearly points to a situation in which a bank holds a stake in
a CIU; this is evidenced by the fact that the CIU approach approximates the equity approach.
However, the wording ‘exposures to CIU’ can be interpreted as including exposures that
banks have to CIUs (mainly derivatives). It would be more appropriate and consistent to
require that exposures to CIUs get a normal IRB treatment, i.e. that banks use their own
validated rating models for CIUs and use the normal IRB treatment for exposure calculation
(i.e. Potential future exposure plus add-on approach for derivatives). Given that (a) the
earlier consultation papers on the treatment of CIUs and (b) the equivalent part in the
Standardised approach pertaining to CIUs indeed mention ‘exposures in the form of CIUs’,
the wording ‘exposures to’ was probably brought in unintentionally and should therefore be
changed in “exposures in the form of CIU”.
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Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 435
Article 87, paragraph 11, subparagraph 1
11. Where exposures to a collective
investment undertaking (CIU) meet the
criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75 and the credit institution
is aware of all of the underlying exposures
of the CIU, the credit institution shall look
through to those underlying exposures in
order to calculate risk-weighted exposure
amounts and expected loss amounts in
accordance with the methods set out in this
Subsection.
11. Where exposures in the form of a
collective investment undertaking (CIU)
meet the criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75 and the credit institution
is aware of all of the underlying exposures
of the CIU, the credit institution shall look
through to those underlying exposures in
order to calculate risk-weighted exposure
amounts and expected loss amounts in
accordance with the methods set out in this
Subsection. Credit institutions may rely on
a third party to make this calculation,
provided that the correctness of the
calculation and the report is adequately
ensured.
Or. en
Justification
The CIU treatment refers to a situation in which a bank holds a stake in a CIU. However, the
wording ‘exposures to CIU’ can be interpreted as including exposures that banks have to
CIUs (mainly derivatives). It would be more appropriate and consistent to require that
exposures to CIUs get a normal IRB treatment, i.e. that banks use their own validated rating
models for CIUs and use the normal IRB treatment for exposure calculation (i.e. Potential
Future Exposure plus add-on approach for derivatives). Given that (a) the earlier
consultation papers on the treatment of CIUs and (b) the equivalent part in the Standardised
approach pertaining to CIUs indeed mention ‘exposures in the form of CIUs’, the wording
‘exposures to’ was probably brought in unintentionally and should therefore be changed in
‘exposures in the form of CIU’.
It is proposed to allow credit institutions wishing to use the IRB Approach to rely on a third
party to calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts and expected loss amounts, given that
credit institutions may rely on a third party to calculate and report an average risk weight for
the CIU under the Standardised Approach (see paragraph 78 in Annex VI of Directive
2000/12/EC) as well as under the IRB approach where credit institutions are not aware of all
of the underlying exposures of the CIU (see Article 87, paragraph 12, subparagraph 2 of
Directive 2000/12/EC).
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Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 436
Article 87, paragraph 11, subparagraph 2, point (b)
b) for all other underlying exposures, the
approach set out in Subsection 1, subject to
the following modifications:
i) the exposures are assigned to the
appropriate exposure class and attributed
the risk weight of the credit quality step
immediately above the credit quality step
that would normally be assigned to the
exposure;
ii) exposures assigned to the higher credit
quality steps, to which a risk weight of
150% would normally be attributed, are
assigned a risk weight of 200%.
(b) for all other underlying exposures, the
approach set out in Subsection 1.
Or. en
Justification
Where there is insufficient information to apply IRB to CIUs it is unreasonable to require a
treatment worse than the standardised approach in respect of the CIU. The proposed
amendment would enable to use the standardised approach where there is insufficient
information to use IRB, thereby allowing to attribute risk weights according to the class to
which exposures belong.
Amendement déposé par Harald Ettl
Amendement 437
Article 87, paragraph 12, subparagraph 1
12. Where exposures to a CIU do not meet
the criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 and 75, or the credit
institution is not aware of all of the
underlying exposures of the CIU, the credit
institution shall look through to the
underlying exposures and calculate riskweighted exposure amounts and expected
loss amounts in accordance with the
approach set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 17 to 19. If, for those purposes,
the credit institution is unable to differentiate
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12. Where exposures in the form of a CIU
do not meet the criteria set out in Annex VI,
part 1, paragraphs 74 and 75, or the credit
institution is not aware of all of the
underlying exposures of the CIU, the credit
institution shall look through to the
underlying exposures and calculate riskweighted exposure amounts and expected
loss amounts in accordance with the
approach set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 17 to 19. If, for those purposes,
the credit institution is unable to differentiate
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between private equity, exchange-traded and
other equity exposures, it shall treat the
exposures concerned as other equity
exposures. For these purposes, non equity
exposures are assigned to one of the classes
(private equity, exchange traded equity or
other equity) set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 17 and unknown exposures are
assigned to other equity class.
between private equity, exchange-traded and
other equity exposures, it shall treat the
exposures concerned as other equity
exposures. For these purposes, non equity
exposures are assigned to the relevant
exposure class and unknown exposures are
assigned to other equity class.
Or. en
Justification
Non equity exposures should be mapped to the appropriate risk class rather than one of the
equity classes (private equity, exchange traded equity, other equity).
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 438
Article 87, paragraph 12, subparagraph 1
12. Where exposures to a CIU do not meet
the criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 and 75, or the credit
institution is not aware of all of the
underlying exposures of the CIU, the credit
institution shall look through to the
underlying exposures and calculate riskweighted exposure amounts and expected
loss amounts in accordance with the
approach set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 17 to 19. If, for those purposes,
the credit institution is unable to differentiate
between private equity, exchange-traded and
other equity exposures, it shall treat the
exposures concerned as other equity
exposures. For these purposes, non equity
exposures are assigned to one of the classes
(private equity, exchange traded equity or
other equity) set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 17 and unknown exposures are
assigned to other equity class..
12. Where exposures in the form of a CIU
do not meet the criteria set out in Annex VI,
part 1, paragraphs 74 and 75, or the credit
institution is not aware of all of the
underlying exposures of the CIU, the credit
institution shall look through to the
underlying exposures and calculate riskweighted exposure amounts and expected
loss amounts in accordance with the
approach set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 17 to 19. If, for those purposes,
the credit institution is unable to differentiate
between private equity, exchange-traded and
other equity exposures, it shall treat the
exposures concerned as other equity
exposures. For these purposes, non equity
exposures are assigned to one of the classes
(private equity, exchange traded equity or
other equity) set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 17 and unknown exposures are
assigned to other equity class.
Or. en
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Justification
See Amendment to Article 87, paragraph 11 of Ms Kauppi.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 439
Article 87, paragraph 12, subparagraph 1
12. Where exposures to a CIU do not meet
the criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75, or the credit institution
is not aware of all of the underlying
exposures of the CIU, the credit institution
shall look through to the underlying
exposures and calculate risk-weighted
exposure amounts and expected loss
amounts in accordance with the approach set
out in Annex VII, part 1, paragraphs 17 to
19. If, for those purposes, the credit
institution is unable to differentiate between
private equity, exchange-traded and other
equity exposures, it shall treat the exposures
concerned as other equity exposures. For
these purposes, nonequity exposures are
assigned to one of the classes (private
equity, exchange traded equity or other
equity) set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraph 17 and unknown exposures are
assigned to other equity class.
12. Where exposures in the form of a CIU
do not meet the criteria set out in Annex VI,
part 1, paragraphs 74 and 75, or the credit
institution is not aware of all of the
underlying exposures of the CIU, the credit
institution shall look through to the
underlying exposures and calculate riskweighted exposure amounts and expected
loss amounts in accordance with the
approach set out in Annex VII, part 1,
paragraphs 17 to 19. If, for those purposes,
the credit institution is unable to differentiate
between private equity, exchangetraded and
other equity exposures, it shall treat the
exposures concerned as other equity
exposures. For these purposes, non-equity
exposures are assigned to the relevant
exposure class and unknown exposures are
assigned to other equity class.
Or. en
Justification
The CIU treatment as described clearly points to a situation in which a bank holds a stake in
a CIU; this is evidenced by the fact that the CIU approach approximates the equity approach.
However, the wording ‘exposures to CIU’ can be interpreted as including exposures that
banks have to CIUs (mainly derivatives). It would be more appropriate and consistent to
require that exposures to CIUs get a normal IRB treatment, i.e. that banks use their own
validated rating models for CIUs and use the normal IRB treatment for exposure calculation
(i.e. Potential future exposure plus add-on approach for derivatives). Given that (a) the
earlier consultation papers on the treatment of CIUs and (b) the equivalent part in the
Standardised approach pertaining to CIUs indeed mention ‘exposures in the form of CIUs’,
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the wording ‘exposures to’ was probably brought in unintentionally and should therefore be
changed in “exposures in the form of CIU”.
As an additional attention point for paragraph 12, non equity exposures should be mapped to
the appropriate risk class rather than one of the equity classes (private equity, exchange
traded equity, other equity).
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 440
Article 87, paragraph 12, subparagraph 2, point (b)
b) for all other underlying exposures, the
approach set out in Subsection 1, subject to
the following modifications:
i) the exposures are assigned to the
appropriate exposure class and attributed
the risk weight of the credit quality step
immediately above the credit quality step
that would normally be assigned to the
exposure;
ii) exposures assigned to the higher credit
quality steps, to which a risk weight of
150% would normally be attributed, are
assigned a risk weight of 200%.
(b) for all other underlying exposures, the
approach set out in Subsection 1.
Or. en
Justification
Where there is insufficient information to apply IRB to CIUs it is unreasonable to require a
treatment worse than the standardised approach in respect of the CIU. The proposed
amendment would enable to use the standardised approach where there is insufficient
information to use IRB, thereby allowing to attribute risk weights according to the class to
which exposures belong.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 441
Article 87, paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Alternatively to the methods described
under paragraphs 11 and 12 for CIUs, in
the case a full look through approach is
either impossible or inappropriate to
implement, an Internal or Ratings based
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Approach may be used with the approval of
the competent authority.
Or. en
Justification
The current text in points 11 and 12 calls for a “full look through” approach to the
underlying exposures of a CIU, which is impossible to implement in many cases and
inappropriate in case of credit exposure to the CIUs themselves. The aim is to achieve a
simpler solution than a “full look through” method each time the institution may demonstrate
to its supervisor the validity of its internal approach.
Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 442
Article 89, paragraph 1, point (b a) (new)
ba) Forderungen, die die Bedingungen des
Artikels 79 Absatz 2 erfüllen und 50 000
Euro nicht überschreiten.
Or. de
Justification
Bei kleineren Krediten könnte die Errichtung eines bankenaufsichtlichen Ratingsystems im
Einzelfall unverhältnismäßig erscheinen.
Amendement déposé par Harald Ettl
Amendement 443
Article 89, paragraph 1, point (e)
e) exposures of a credit institution to a
counterparty which is its parent undertaking,
its subsidiary or a subsidiary of its parent
undertaking provided that the counterparty is
an institution or a financial holding
company, financial institution, asset
management company or ancillary services
undertaking subject to appropriate prudential
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(e) exposures of a credit institution to a
counterparty which is its parent undertaking,
its subsidiary or a subsidiary of its parent
undertaking provided that the counterparty is
an institution or a financial holding
company, financial institution, asset
management company or ancillary services
undertaking subject to appropriate prudential
requirements or an undertaking linked by a
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requirements
relationship within the meaning of Article
12(1) of Directive 83/349/EEC and
exposures between credit institutions which
meet the requirements set out in Article
80(7a).
Or. en
Justification
Hour-glass structured banking groups (cf justification to amendment 3) and nonconsolidating banking groups which comply with solvency guarantees as stipulated in
amendment (20) should be eligible for IRB approaches.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 444
Article 89, paragraph 1, point (f)
f) equity exposures to entities whose credit
obligations qualify for a zero risk weight
under Subsection 1 (including those publicly
sponsored entities where a zero weight can
be applied).
(f) equity exposures to entities whose credit
obligations qualify for a zero risk weight
under Subsection 1 (including those publicly
sponsored entities where a zero risk weight
can be applied).
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendement 445
Article 89, paragraph 1, point (g a) (new)
ga) exposures to a collective investment
undertaking (CIU), where the CIU meets
with the criteria set out in Annex VI, part 1,
paragraphs 74 to 75, and has a nonsignificant equity exposure (less than 10%).
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Or. en
Justification
Requiring IRB credit institutions to calculate the risk weight by looking through to all the
underlying investments of the CIU would be unduly detrimental to CIUs because one of the
main advantages of investing in CIUs – booking the CIU as a single investment item instead
of booking the securities into which the CIU invests – would be unduly lost. It is therefore
proposed to allow credit institutions using the IRB Approach to use the “partial-use„
methods set in the Standardised Approach to calculate the risk weight for the regulated
collective investment vehicles (UCITS) with non-significant exposure to equity claims. By
referring to CIUs with a non-significant equity exposure, this amendment limits the scope of
the amendment in order to take care of the Commission’s view expressed in Article 89,
paragraph 1 (c), that significant exposure to equity claims should be treated in accordance
with the methods set out in the IRB Approach.
Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 446
Article 89, paragraph 1, point (g a) (new)
ga) State and State-reinsured guarantees
pursuant to Annex VIII, part 2,
paragraph 18.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference error. Substitution of am 44 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 447
Article 89, paragraph 1, point (g a) (new)
ga) ”the exposure class referred to in point
(d) of Art 86 (1)”
Or. en
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Justification
This amendment extends the possible application of partial use (IRB bank can apply the
standardized approach to certain credit segments) to the retail exposures.
The rating procedure for retail exposures in the foundation IRB is much more sophisticated
than the internal rating process for other exposure classes (e.g. retail loans: LGD-estimates
for pools.)
In the Foundation IRB for other debtors, banks will have to estimate only the Probability of
Default (PD), LGD-values are already fixed in Annex VII so that banks do not have to
estimate them (see Art 87 par 8)
However for retail loans banks will have to estimate also LGD-values and other parameters
for the pool or facility grade an exposure is allocated to (Art 87 par. 7) which will make the
rating process for retail loans more costly than the rating for other debtors (for the allocation
the bank will de facto have to estimate these parameters for every loan); This would have the
paradox effect that for smaller loans (e.g. 50.000 €) the rating procedure could be more
complex and more sophisticated than for larger loans (e.g. loan exposure of 5 Mio €).
Besides smaller companies are not able to deliver up to date business information and
financial statements (”hard facts” as an input in the rating) at any time they are requested to.
An option for partial use for retail exposures would reduce the complexity and therefore the
costs for the rating of small sized business and private loans. The proposed amendment is in
line with the EU’s policy of promoting a more favourable environment in Europe for access
by small enterprises and entrepreneurs to finance and micro credit.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 448
Article 89, paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Forderungen, die im Zuge von
Unternehmensgründungen und –
nachfolgen entstehen, können generell mit
75 % gewichtet werden.
Or. de
Justification
Die besondere wirtschaftspolitische Bedeutung von Unternehmensneugründungen und
Betriebsnachfolgen, auch für die Erreichung des prioritären politischen Ziels der Union, des
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Lissabonziels – mehr Wachstum und Beschäftigung – rechtfertigt die vorgeschlagene
Sonderbehandlung. Bei einer Besicherung würde sich eine entsprechend niedrigere
Gewichtung ergeben.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 449
Article 92, paragraph 4
4. In the case of funded credit protection, the
lending credit institution shall have the right
to liquidate or retain, in a timely manner, the
assets from which the protection derives in
the event of the default, insolvency or
bankruptcy - or other credit event set out in
the transaction documentation - and, where
applicable, of the custodian holding the
collateral. The degree of correlation between
the value of the assets relied upon for
protection and the credit quality of the
borrower must not be undue.
4. In the case of funded credit protection, the
lending credit institution shall have the right
to liquidate or retain, in a timely manner, the
assets from which the protection derives in
the event of the default, insolvency or
bankruptcy of the obligor - or other credit
event set out in the transaction
documentation - and, where applicable, of
the custodian holding the collateral. The
degree of correlation between the value of
the assets relied upon for protection and the
credit quality of the obligor must not be
undue.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 450
Article 93 a (new)
Artikel 93a
Fungiert ein Kreditinstitut als
Sicherungsgeber, ergibt sich die
Kapitalanforderung hieraus gemäß den
folgenden Grundsätzen.
a) Bei einer Absicherung ohne
Sicherheitsleistung hat der
Sicherungsgeber seine Kapitalanforderung
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so zu ermitteln, als ob das übernommene
Kreditrisiko aus einem direkten
Engagement stammen würde.
b) Bei einer Absicherung mit
Sicherheitsleistung und sofern das
Kreditinstitut in einer solchen Konstruktion
neben dem Risiko des Ausfalls des
besicherten Kredits auch das Risiko eines
möglichen Ausfalls des Sicherungsnehmers
und/oder der Sicherheitsleistung trägt, hat
es wie folgt zu verfahren:
(i) liegt für die Absicherungskonstruktion
mit Sicherheitsleistung ein externes Rating
einer anerkannten Ratingagentur vor, das
alle relevanten Ausfallrisiken aus Sicht des
Sicherungsgebers berücksichtigt, so werden
die in den Artikeln 78 bis 83
vorgeschriebenen Risikogewichte
angewandt.
(ii) Liegt für das Produkt kein Rating einer
anerkannten Ratingagentur vor, so werden
die Risikogewichte bezüglich des
abgesicherten Kreditverhältnisses, des
Sicherungsnehmers und der
Sicherheitsleistung aggregiert und mit dem
Nominalbetrag der Sicherheitsleistung
multipliziert, um den risikogewichteten
Forderungsbetrag zu ermitteln.
(iii) Die Aggregation des Risikogewichtes
der Sicherheitsleistung entfällt, wenn das
Kreditinstitut diese bereits als
anrechnungspflichtige Position
berücksichtigt.
(iv) Sollte durch die rechtliche
Ausgestaltung der Absicherung mit
Sicherheitsleistung ein Verlust für den
Sicherungsgeber im Falle des Ausfalls der
Sicherungsnehmers ausgeschlossen sein
(z.B. durch die Leistung der Sicherheit an
eine Zweckgesellschaft), kann bei der
Aggregation das Risikogewicht des
Sicherungsnehmers vernachlässigt werden.
Sollten sich aus der rechtlichen
Ausgestaltung neue Ausfallrisiken ergeben
(z.B. Anlage einer Barsicherheit durch
einen Zweckgesellschaft in Wertpapiere) so
sind diese bei der Aggregation zu
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berücksichtigen.
(v) Das sich durch die Aggregation
ergebende vom Sicherungsgeber
anzusetzende Risikogewicht ist auf 1250%
begrenzt.
Or. de
Justification
Der Richtlinienvorschlag enthält (analog zum Baseler Rahmenwerk) mit zwei kleineren
Ausnahmen keine Aussagen über die Kapitalanforderungen für Sicherungsgeber. Um
Wettbewerbsgleichheit zu gewährleisten wird ein harmonisierte Regelung vorgeschlagen, die
sich an der Systematik der Kreditabsicherung für einen Forderungskorb orientiert.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 451
Article 94, paragraph 1
Where a credit institution uses the
Standardised Approach set out in Subsection
1 for the calculation of risk-weighted
exposure amounts for the exposure class to
which the securitised exposures would be
assigned under Article 79, it shall calculate
the risk-weighted exposure amount for a
securitisation position in accordance with
Annex IX, part 4, paragraphs 6 to 35.
Where a credit institution uses the
Standardised Approach set out in Articles 78
to 83 for the calculation of risk-weighted
exposure amounts for the exposure class to
which the securitised exposures would be
assigned under Article 79, it shall calculate
the risk-weighted exposure amount for a
securitisation position in accordance with
Annex IX, part 4, paragraphs 1 to 35.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 452
Article 94, paragraph 2
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In all other cases, it shall calculate the riskweighted exposure amount in accordance
with Annex IX, part 4, paragraphs 36 to 74.
In all other cases, it shall calculate the riskweighted exposure amount in accordance
with Annex IX, part 4, paragraphs 1 to 5 and
36 to 74.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 453
Article 100, paragraph 2
2. For those purposes, a revolving exposure
shall be an exposure whereby a customer
may vary the amount drawn within an
agreed limit, and an early amortisation
provision shall be a contractual clause which
requires, on the occurrence of defined
events, investors’ positions to be redeemed
before the originally stated maturity of the
securities issued.
2. For those purposes, a revolving exposure
shall be an exposure whereby customers
outstanding balances are permitted to
fluctuate based on their decisions to borrow
and repay, up to an agreed limit, and an
early amortisation provision shall be a
contractual clause which requires, on the
occurrence of defined events, investors’
positions to be redeemed before the
originally stated maturity of the securities
issued.
Or. en
Justification
The current wording could imply that revolving exposures includes mortgages where
customers can draw amounts up to an agreed limit. The proposed amendment also ensures
consistency with the definition of revolving exposures in Annex VII, part 1 and paragraph 11.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 454
Article 101, paragraph 1
1. An originator credit institution or sponsor
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credit institution shall not, with a view to
reducing potential or actual losses to
investors, provide support to the
securitisation beyond its contractual
obligations.
institution provides support to a
securitisation beyond its contractual
obligations, it shall inform the competent
authority and all parties involved in the
transaction and hold capital against all of
the securitised exposures as if they had not
been securitised.
Or. en
Justification
The current wording makes it illegal to provide non-contractual support and requires public
disclosure of any transgression. This is very severe language for what could be a commercial
decision to support an investor. Competent authorities have a range of enforcement powers
and can take action if a credit institution knowingly understates risk and its capital
requirement or if it is regularly providing noncontractual support.
Amendement déposé par Jonathan Evans
Amendement 455
Article 101, paragraph 1
1. An originator credit institution or sponsor
credit institution shall not, with a view to
reducing potential or actual losses to
investors, provide support to the
securitisation beyond its contractual
obligations.
1. If an originator or sponsor credit
institution provides support to a
securitisation beyond its contractual
obligations, it shall inform the competent
authority and all parties involved in the
transaction and hold capital against all of
the securitised exposures as if they had not
been securitised.
Or. en
Justification
The current wording makes it illegal to provide non-contractual support and requires public
disclosure of any transgression. This is very severe language for what could be a commercial
decision to support an investor. Competent authorities have a range of enforcement powers
and can take action if a credit institution knowingly understates risk and its capital
requirement or if it is regularly providing non-contractual support.
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Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 456
Article 101, paragraph 2
2. If an originator credit institution or a
sponsor credit institution fails to comply
with paragraph 1 in respect of a
securitisation, the competent authority
shall require it at a minimum, to hold
capital against all of the securitised
exposures as if they had not been
securitised. The credit institution shall
disclose publicly that it has provided noncontractual support and the regulatory
capital impact of having done so.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
See Amendment to Article 101, paragraph 1 of Mr García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement déposé par Jonathan Evans
Amendement 457
Article 101, paragraph 2
2. If an originator credit institution or a
sponsor credit institution fails to comply
with paragraph 1 in respect of a
securitisation, the competent authority
shall require it at a minimum, to hold
capital against all of the securitised
exposures as if they had not been
securitised. The credit institution shall
disclose publicly that it has provided noncontractual support and the regulatory
capital impact of having done so.
deleted
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Justification
See Amendment to Article 101, paragraph 1 of Mr. Evans.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 458
Article 110, paragraph 2
2. Except in the case of credit institutions
relying on Article 114 for the recognition of
collateral in calculating the value of
exposures for the purposes of paragraphs 1,
2 and 3 of Article 111, Exposures exempted
under Article 111 (3) (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g)
and (h) need not be reported as laid down in
paragraph 1 and the reporting frequency laid
down in point (b) of paragraph 1 may be
reduced to twice a year for the exposures
referred to in Article 111 (3) (e) and (i), and
in Articles 115 and 116.
2. Except in the case of credit institutions
relying on Article 114 for the recognition of
collateral in calculating the value of
exposures for the purposes of paragraphs 1,
2 and 3 of Article 111, Exposures exempted
under Article 113 (3) (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g)
and (h) need not be reported as laid down in
paragraph 1 and the reporting frequency laid
down in point (b) of paragraph 1 may be
reduced to twice a year for the exposures
referred to in Article 113 (3) (e) and (i), and
in Articles 115 and 116.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 459
Article 110, paragraph 3
3. Member States may require the reporting
of concentrated exposures to the issuers of
collateral taken by the credit institution.
deleted
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Justification
Banks normally track (concentrations in) unfunded credit protection providers by adding
guarantees and credit derivatives issued by a counterparty to this counterparty's overall
exposure level and by managing this overall exposure level. For netting and funded credit
protection, it is irrelevant who has provided the collateral (the bank is basically only
interested in having a legally effective pledge on the collateral). Also, in 99% of the cases the
collateral will be provided by the client itself (exceptionally its parent). There is one
important exception: receivables as collateral. There can indeed be concentrations in the
underlying parties on whom a bank's client has a claim. It is however impossible for an
international bank consisting of many different legal entities with different source systems to
combine the data of these different receivable issuers so that these concentrations can be
identified. Already, matching counterparty identifiers is impossible The operational burden
for banks would be enormous. This requirement would only be relevant for specialised banks
active in limited industry sectors.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 460
Article 110, paragraph 3
3. Member States may require the reporting
of concentrated exposures to the issuers of
collateral taken by the credit institution.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
For netting and funded credit protection, it is irrelevant who has provided the collateral. In
99% of cases it will be provided by the client itself. Furthermore, though there can be
concentrations in the underlying parties on whom a bank's client has a claim, it is impossible
for an international bank with many different legal entities and systems to combine the data of
the receivable issuers to identify these concentrations. In addition, this is a double default
issue and we note that the issue of double default is being examined by the Basel/IOSCO
Trading Book.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 461
Article 113, paragraph 3, introductory part
3. Member States may fully or partially
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exempt the following exposures from the
application of Article 111:
mentioned in paragraph 2, Member States
may fully or partially exempt only the
following exposures from the application of
Article 111:
Or. en
Justification
paragraph 2 should allow exemption of intra-group exposures irrespective of maturity and
not be constrained by the distinction between under and over 1 year maturities in paragraph
3(i),(j) and (k).
Where groups manage intra-group exposure and liquidity risk on an integrated basis, the
imposition of an artificial maturity constraint on intra-group exposure would serve to inhibit
the prudent management of liquidity risk, by forcing subsidiaries' longer term assets to be
funded by the parent bank on a short term basis, and impair unjustifiably banks' ability to
compete through subsidiaries in each Member State.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 462
Article 113, paragraph 3, introductory part
3. Member States may fully or partially
exempt the following exposures from the
application of Article 111:
3. Member States shall fully or partially
exempt the following exposures from the
application of Article 111:
Or. en
Justification
In order to avoid disputes between Member States.
Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 463
Article 113, paragraph 3, point (c)
c) asset items constituting claims carrying
the explicit guarantees of central
governments, central banks, international
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(c) asset items constituting claims carrying
the explicit guarantees of central
governments, central banks, public sector
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organisations or multilateral development
banks, where unsecured claims on the entity
providing the guarantee would achieve a 0%
risk weight under Articles 78 to 83;
entities, international organisations or
multilateral development banks, where
unsecured, save for a guarantee provided by
a central government of a public sector
entity as referred to in Sector 3.2.
paragraph 15a of Annex VI, claims on the
entity providing the guarantee would
achieve a 0% risk weight under Articles 78
to 83;
Or. en
Justification
Follows from amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 464
Article 113, paragraph 3, point (d)
d) other exposures attributable to, or
guaranteed by, central governments, central
banks, international organisations, or
multilateral development banks where
unsecured claims on the entity to which the
exposure is attributable or by which it is
guaranteed would receive a 0% risk weight
under Articles 78 to 83;
(d) other exposures attributable to, or
guaranteed by, central governments, central
banks, public sector entities, international
organisations, or multilateral development
banks where unsecured, save for a
guarantee provided by a central
government to a public sector entity as
referred to in Sector 3.2. paragraph 15 a of
Annex VI, claims on the entity to which the
exposure is attributable or by which it is
guaranteed would receive a 0% risk weight
under Articles 78 to 83;
Or. en
Justification
Follows from amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report.
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Amendement déposé par Alexander Radwan
Amendement 465
Article 113, paragraph 3, point (f)
f) asset items and other exposures secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by collateral in the form of debt
securities issued by central governments or
central banks, international organisations,
multilateral development banks or Member
States’ regional governments or local
authorities, which securities constitute
claims on their issuer which would receive a
0% risk weighting under Articles 78 to 83;
(f) asset items and other exposures secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by collateral in the form of debt
securities issued by central governments or
central banks, public sector entities,
international organisations, multilateral
development banks or Member States’
regional governments or local authorities,
which securities constitute claims on their
issuer which would receive a 0% risk
weighting under Articles 78 to 83;
Or. en
Justification
Follows from amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 466
Article 113, paragraph 3, point (t a) (new)
ta) Transactions that are pursuant to article
45a of the Directive [93/6/EEC] exempted
from the application of article 111 of this
Directive.
Or. en
Justification
For consistency reasons, it is appropriate to include in the list of possible exemptions from
large exposure requirements, also the conditions set out in the new article 45a of the
Directive [93/6/EC].
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Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 467
Article 113, paragraph 3, point (t a) (new)
ta) fees receivable within 90 days and aged
less than 90 days for firms falling within
the definition of Article 20(2) of Directive
93/6/EEC.
Or. en
Justification
Invoiced or accrued fees owing to investment management firms should be exempted from the
large exposure rules, because: they are not part of regulatory capital as they are highly
unlikely to be included in audited profits; they are short-term in nature with no history of
default (as in many cases the investment manager can take the fee directly from fund); and
they have no impact on client assets in the event that the counterparty becomes insolvent (the
client assets of investment management firms are segregated and normally held by an
independent custodian).
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 468
Article 114, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1
2. Subject to paragraph 3, a credit institution
permitted to use own estimates of LGDs and
conversion factors for an exposure class
under Articles 84 to 89 may be permitted,
where it is able to the satisfaction of the
competent authorities to estimate the effects
of financial collateral on their exposures
separately from other LGD-relevant aspects,
to recognise such effects in calculating the
value of exposures for the purposes of
Article 113(3).
2. Subject to paragraph 3, a credit institution
permitted to use own estimates of LGDs and
conversion factors for an exposure class
under Articles 84 to 89 may be permitted,
where it is able to the satisfaction of the
competent authorities to estimate the effects
of financial collateral on their exposures
separately from other LGD-relevant aspects,
to recognise such effects in calculating the
value of exposures for the purposes of
Article 111 (1) to (3).
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 469
Article 114, paragraph 2, subparagraph 3
Where a credit institution is permitted to use
its own estimates of the effects of financial
collateral, it must do so on a consistent basis
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities. In particular, this approach
must be adopted for all large exposures.
Where a credit institution is permitted to use
its own estimates of the effects of financial
collateral, it must do so on a consistent basis
with the approach to capital.
Or. en
Justification
These changes are required to harmonise treatment of large exposures with capital
requirements. The maturity mismatch aspect will particularly affect small banks using the
standardised approach to credit risk mitigation.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 470
Article 114, paragraph 2, subparagraph 3
Where a credit institution is permitted to use
its own estimates of the effects of financial
collateral, it must do so on a consistent basis
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities. In particular, this approach must
be adopted for all large exposures.
Where a credit institution is permitted to use
its own estimates of the effects of financial
collateral, it must do so on a consistent basis
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities. In particular, this approach must
be adopted for all large exposures where the
credit institution is permitted to use own
estimates of LGDs and conversion factors
in accordance with Articles 84 to 89.
Or. en
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Justification
The Commission’s proposal would require an Advanced approach to the effects of financial
collateral on large exposures. This would impose an inappropriate constraint on the smaller,
less sophisticated credit institutions that use the standardised or foundation approaches.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 471
Article 114, paragraph 2, subparagraph 4
Credit institutions permitted to use own
estimates of LGDs and conversion factors
for an exposure class under Articles 84 to 89
which does not calculate the value of their
exposures using the method referred to in
the first subparagraph, may be permitted to
use the approach set out in paragraph 9(1)
above or the approach set out in point (o) of
Article 113(3) above for calculating the
value of exposures. A credit institution shall
use only one of these two methods.
Credit institutions permitted to use own
estimates of LGDs and conversion factors
for an exposure class under Articles 84 to 89
which does not calculate the value of their
exposures using the method referred to in
the first subparagraph, may be permitted to
use the approach set out in paragraph 1
above or the approach set out in point (o) of
Article 113(3) above for calculating the
value of exposures. A credit institution shall
use only one of these two methods.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 472
Article 114, paragraph 3, subparagraph 4
In the event that such a stress test indicates
a lower realisable value of collateral taken
than would be permitted to be taken into
account under paragraphs 2 and 3 as
appropriate, the value of collateral
permitted to be recognised in calculating
the value of exposures for the purposes of
Article 111(1) to (3) shall be reduced
accordingly.
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Or. en
Justification
The appropriate response to the risk of lower realisable value of collateral is not more
capital; in practice firms should request more collateral and/or diversity of collateral.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 473
Article 114, paragraph 3, subparagraph 4
In the event that such a stress test indicates a
lower realisable value of collateral taken
than would be permitted to be taken into
account under paragraphs 2 and 3 as
appropriate, the value of collateral
permitted to be recognised in calculating
the value of exposures for the purposes of
Article 111(1) to (3) shall be reduced
accordingly.
In the event that such a stress test indicates a
lower realisable value of collateral taken
than would be permitted to be taken into
account under paragraphs 2 and 3 as
appropriate the firm shall take this scenario
into account under its pillar 2 capital
assessment.
Or. en
Justification
Stress testing collateral is essential for robust risk management of concentration risk and it is
appropriate to make such tests obligatory.
If the results of the stress tests feed into Pillar 1, however, it will create an incentive for weak
stress testing. Smaller banks would be most affected as they may have to, reduce exposures to
small business customers. Costs to trading firms would also increase.
Therefore the stress test should be taken into account in firms’ Pillar 2 assessments and
reviewed by regulators.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 474
Article 114, paragraph 3, subparagraph 4
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In the event that such a stress test indicates a
lower realisable value of collateral taken
than would be permitted to be taken into
account under paragraphs 2 and 3 as
appropriate, the value of collateral permitted
to be recognised in calculating the value of
exposures for the purposes of Article 111(1)
to (3) shall be reduced accordingly.
In the event that such a stress test indicates a
lower realisable value of collateral taken
than would be permitted to be taken into
account under paragraphs 1 and 2 as
appropriate, the value of collateral permitted
to be recognised in calculating the value of
exposures for the purposes of Article 111(1)
to (3) shall be reduced accordingly.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendement 475
Article 114, paragraph 3, subparagraph 5, point (a) a (new)
aa) policies and procedures to address the
situation that a stress test indicates a lower
realisable value of collateral than taken
into account under paragraphs 2 and 3;
Or. en
Justification
The appropriate response to the risk of lower realisable value of collateral is not more
capital; in practice firms should request more collateral and/or diversity of collateral.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 476
Article 114, paragraph 3, subparagraph 5, point (a a) (new)
(aa) policies and procedures to address the
situation that a stress test indicates a lower
realisable value of collateral than taken
into account under paragraphs 2 and 3;
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Or. en
Justification
Stress testing collateral is essential for robust risk management of concentration risk and it is
appropriate to make such tests obligatory.
If the results of the stress tests feed into Pillar 1, however, it will create an incentive for weak
stress testing. Smaller banks would be most affected as they may have to, reduce exposures to
small business customers. Costs to trading firms would also increase.
Therefore the stress test should be taken into account in firms’ Pillar 2 assessments and
reviewed by regulators.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 477
Article 116
By way of derogation from Article 113(3)(i)
and Article 115(2), Member States may
apply a weighting of 20% to asset items
constituting claims on and other exposures
to credit institutions, regardless of their
maturity.
By way of derogation from Article 113(3)(i)
and Article 115(2), Member States may
apply a weighting of 20% to asset items
constituting claims on and other exposures
to institutions, regardless of their maturity.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 478
Article 121
Shares held temporarily during a financial
reconstruction or rescue operation or during
the normal course of underwriting or in an
institution's own name on behalf of others
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Shares held temporarily during a financial
reconstruction or rescue operation or during
the normal course of underwriting or in an
institution's own name on behalf of others
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shall not be counted as qualifying holdings
for the purpose of calculating the limits laid
down in paragraphs 1 and 2. Shares which
are not financial fixed assets as defined in
Article 35(2) of Directive 86/635/EEC shall
not be included.
shall not be counted as qualifying holdings
for the purpose of calculating the limits laid
down in Articles 120(1) and (2). Shares
which are not financial fixed assets as
defined in Article 35(2) of Directive
86/635/EEC shall not be included.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 479
Article 122, paragraph 1
1. The Member States need not apply the
limits laid down in paragraphs 1 and 2 to
holdings in insurance companies as defined
in Directive 73/239/EEC and Directive
79/267/EEC, or in reinsurance companies as
defined in Directive 98/78/EC.
1. The Member States need not apply the
limits laid down in Articles 120(1) and (2)
to holdings in insurance companies as
defined in Directive 73/239/EEC and
Directive 2002/83/EC, or in reinsurance
companies as defined in Directive 98/78/EC.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 480
Article 123, subparagraph 1 a (new)
These strategies and processes can be
imposed by the parent company of the
credit institution so that the ICCAP process
is conducted on consolidated group level
only and reviewed by the competent
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authority responsible for supervision on a
consolidated basis.
Or. en
Justification
Supervisory Review Process may be conducted on consolidated group level and subsidiary
level if the subsidiary is in a different EU member state than the parent company. It is
however impossible for a subsidiary to follow two independent sets of rules imposed by the
management of the parent company and the management of the subsidiary.
The amendment shall therefore clarify that the management of the parent company can
impose strategies and processes which are binding for the subsidiary as well. A review of the
ICCAP by the host regulator is therefore sufficient.
Our impression is, that our interpretation is indented when reading articles 123, 68(2) and
71(1) in conjunction.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 481
Article 124, paragraph 2
2. The scope of the review and evaluation
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be that of the
requirements of this Directive.
2. The scope of the review and evaluation
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be
undertaken by the competent authority
responsible for supervision on a
consolidated basis determined in
accordance with Article 126 and applied at
the level of the EU parent credit institution.
Or. en
Justification
Supervisory Review should apply at the level of the highest EU-based institution or financial
holding company. To require application at the level of the individual credit institution or
highest group member within any individual Member State will require significant resource
input by institution and supervisors alike and, where risks are managed on a group basis,
deliver no useful information
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Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 482
Article 124, paragraph 2
2. The scope of the review and evaluation
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be that of the
requirements of this Directive.
2. The scope of the review and evaluation
referred to in paragraph 1 shall be that of the
requirements of this Directive undertaken
by the competent authority responsible for
supervision on a consolidated basis.
Or. en
Justification
While acknowledging the role of host supervisors, a coherent supervision of cross-border
financial institutions is key. It is in the interest of supervisors, depositors, and borrowers that
competent authorities have view of the group’s whole risk profile. The EU rule set should
clearly reflect the practicality of requests.
Amendement déposé par John Purvis
Amendement 483
Article 124, paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Where a credit institution, the parent
undertaking of which is a credit institution
or financial holding company, which is
supervised on a consolidated basis by a
competent authority in a third country, the
EU competent authority responsible for
supervision on a consolidated basis shall by
common agreement with the third country
competent authority waive the requirements
of this Article.
Or. en
Justification
Supervisory Review should apply at the level of the highest EU-based institution or financial
holding company. To require application at the level of the individual credit institution or
highest group member within any individual Member State will require significant resource
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input by institution and supervisors alike and, where risks are managed on a group basis,
deliver no useful information
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 484
Article 124, paragraph 4
4. „Die zuständigen Behörden legen unter
Berücksichtigung der Relevanz der
Geschäfte des betreffenden Kreditinstituts
für das Finanzsystem, der Art dieser
Geschäfte, ihres Umfangs und ihrer
Komplexität die Häufigkeit und die
Intensität der in Absatz 1 genannten
Überprüfung und Bewertung fest.
Überprüfung und Bewertung werden
mindestens einmal jährlich auf den neuesten
Stand gebracht“.
4. „Die zuständigen Behörden legen unter
Berücksichtigung der Größe, der Relevanz
der Geschäfte des betreffenden
Kreditinstituts für das Finanzsystem, der Art
dieser Geschäfte, ihres Umfangs und ihrer
Komplexität die Häufigkeit und die
Intensität der in Absatz 1 genannten
Überprüfung und Bewertung fest und haben
dabei dem Grundsatz der
Verhältnismäßigkeit Rechnung zu tragen.
Überprüfung und Bewertung werden
mindestens einmal jährlich auf den neuesten
Stand gebracht.“
Or. de
Justification
Im Hinblick auf die in vielen Mitgliedstaaten vertretenen kleinen und mittleren
Kreditinstituten ist es wesentlich, dass der Gedanke der proportionalen Anwendung
ausdrücklich hervorgehoben wird. Der Berichterstatter hat den Vorschlag der
Ratsarbeitsgruppen im Abänderungsantrag 5 aufgenommen und schlägt einen neuen
Erwägungsgrund 35a vor. Darüber hinaus sollte unseres Erachtens dieser Gedanke jedoch
explizit Eingang in den Art 124 der Richtlinie finden.
Amendement déposé par Othmar Karas
Amendement 485
Article 124, paragraph 4
4. Competent authorities shall establish the
frequency and intensity of the review and
evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 having
regard to the systemic importance, nature,
scale and complexity of the activities of the
credit institution concerned. The review and
evaluation shall be updated at least on an
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4. The competent authority for supervision
on a consolidated basis shall establish the
frequency and intensity of the review and
evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 having
regard to the systemic importance, nature,
scale and complexity of the activities of the
credit institution concerned. The review and
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annual basis.
evaluation shall be updated at least on an
annual basis.
Or. en
Justification
While acknowledging the role of host supervisors, a coherent supervision of cross-border
financial institutions is key. It is in the interest of supervisors, depositors, and borrowers that
competent authorities have view of the group’s whole risk profile. The EU rule set should
clearly reflect the practicality of requests.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 486
Article 124, paragraph 4
4. Competent authorities shall establish the
frequency and intensity of the review and
evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 having
regard to the systemic importance, nature,
scale and complexity of the activities of the
credit institution concerned. The review and
evaluation shall be updated at least on an
annual basis.
4. The competent authority responsible for
supervision on a consolidated basis shall
establish the frequency and intensity of the
review and evaluation referred to in
paragraph 1 having regard to the systemic
importance, nature, scale and complexity of
the activities of the credit institution
concerned. The review and evaluation shall
be updated at least on an annual basis.
Or. en
Justification
Supervisory Review should apply at the level of the highest EU-based institution or financial
holding company. To require application at the level of the individual credit institution or
highest group member within any individual Member State will require significant resource
input by institution and supervisors alike and, where risks are managed on a group basis,
deliver no useful information
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 487
Article 129, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The competent authority responsible for
the exercise of supervision on a consolidated
basis of EU parent credit institutions and
credit institutions controlled by EU parent
financial holding companies shall carry out
the following tasks:
1. In addition to the responsibilities
imposed under the other provisions of this
directive, the competent authority
responsible for the exercise of supervision
on a consolidated basis of the EU parent
credit institutions and credit institutions
controlled by EU parent financial holding
companies shall carry out the following
tasks:
Or. en
Justification
Pillars 2 and 3 must be applied at the consolidated group level within the EU to ensure that
competent authorities have view of the group’s whole risk profile. The list of competencies
has been extended to Pillars 2 and 3. This is of essential importance to ensure a coherent
supervision of cross-border financial institutions. This extension will be in the interests of
depositors and borrowers and is consistent with best risk management practices in the
industry and the delivery of Single Market objectives.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 488
Article 129, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. The competent authority responsible for
the exercise of supervision on a consolidated
basis of EU parent credit institutions and
credit institutions controlled by EU parent
financial holding companies shall carry out
the following tasks:
1. In addition to the responsibilities
imposed under the other provisions of this
directive, the competent authority
responsible for the exercise of supervision
on a consolidated basis of the EU parent
credit institutions and credit institutions
controlled by EU parent financial holding
companies shall carry out the following
tasks:
Or. en
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Justification
The Internal Credit Institutions’ Assessment Process and the Supervisory Review Process and
the disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 must be applied at the consolidated group level in
the EU to ensure that competent authorities have a key view of a group’s whole risk profile.
This would be in the interests of depositors and borrowers, and be consistent with best risk
management practice in the industry and the delivery of Single Market objectives.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 489
Article 129, paragraph 1, point (a)
(a) supervisory overview and assessment of
compliance with the requirements laid
down in Articles 71, 72(1), 72(2) and 73(3);
deleted
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 129, paragraph 1, introductory part by J. Purvis.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 490
Article 129, paragraph 1, point (a)
(a) supervisory overview and assessment of
compliance with the requirements laid
down in Articles 71, 72(1), 72(2) and 73(3);
deleted
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 129, paragraph 1, introductory part by P. Kauppi.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 491
Article 129, paragraph 1, point (c)
(c) planning and coordination of supervisory
activities in going concern as well as in
emergency situations, including in relation
to the activities in Article 124, in
cooperation with the competent authorities
involved, and in relation to Articles 43 and
141.
(c) planning and coordination of supervisory
activities in going concern as well as in
emergency situations, including in relation
to the activities in Article 124, in
cooperation with the competent authorities
involved.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 129, paragraph 1, introductory part by J. Purvis.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 492
Article 129, paragraph 1, point (c)
(c) planning and coordination of supervisory
activities in going concern as well as in
emergency situations, including in relation
to the activities in Article 124, in
cooperation with the competent authorities
involved, and in relation to Articles 43 and
141.
(c) planning and coordination of supervisory
activities in going concern as well as in
emergency situations, including in relation
to the activities in Article 124, in
cooperation with the competent authorities
involved.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 129, paragraph 1, introductory part by P. Kauppi.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 493
Article 129, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1
2. In the case of applications for the
permissions referred to in Articles 84(1),
87(9) and 105, respectively, submitted by an
EU parent credit institution and its
subsidiaries, or jointly by the subsidiaries of
an EU parent financial holding company, the
competent authorities shall work together, in
full consultation, to determine whether or
not to grant the permission sought and to
determine the terms and conditions, if any,
to which such permission should be subject.
2. In the case of applications for the
permissions, approvals or reviews referred
to in Articles 84, 87 (9), 89, 105, 124, 146
and 148 respectively, submitted by an EU
parent credit institution and its subsidiaries
or jointly by subsidiaries of an EU parent
financial holding company, the competent
authorities will work together, in full
consultation, to determine whether or not to
grant the permission sought and to determine
the terms and conditions, if any, to which
such permission should be subject.
Or. en
Justification
See amendment to Article 129, paragraph 1.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 494
Article 129, paragraph 2, subparagraph 1
2. In the case of applications for the
permissions referred to in Articles 84 (1), 87
(9) and 105 respectively, submitted by an
EU parent credit institution and its
subsidiaries, or jointly by subsidiaries of an
EU parent financial holding company, the
competent authorities will work together, in
full consultation, to determine whether or
not to grant the permission sought and to
determine the terms and conditions, if any,
to which such permission should be subject.
2. In the case of applications for the
permissions, approvals or reviews referred
to in Articles 84, 87 (9), 89, 105, 124, 146
and 148 respectively, submitted by an EU
parent credit institution and its subsidiaries
or jointly by subsidiaries of an EU parent
financial holding company, the competent
authorities will work together, in full
consultation, to determine whether or not to
grant the permission sought and to determine
the terms and conditions, if any, to which
such permission should be subject
Or. en
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Justification
See justification to Amendment to Article 129, paragraph 1, introductory part by P. Kauppi.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 495
Article 129, paragraph 2, subparagraph 3
The competent authorities shall in a single
document agree together, within no more
than six months, their determination on the
application. This document shall be
provided to the applicant. In the absence of
a determination within six months, the
competent authority referred to in paragraph
1 shall make its own determination on the
application.
The competent authorities shall do
everything within their power to reach a
joint decision on the application within six
months. This joint decision shall be set out
in a document containing the fully
reasoned decision which shall be provided
to the applicant by the competent authority
referred to in paragraph 1.
The period referred to in subparagraph 3
shall begin on the date of receipt of the
complete application by the competent
authority referred to in paragraph 1. The
competent authority referred to in
paragraph 1 shall forward the complete
application to the other authorities without
delay.
In the absence of a joint decision between
the competent authorities within six
months, the competent authority referred to
in paragraph 1 shall make its own decision
on the application. The decision shall be set
out in a document, fully reasoned and
taking into account the views and
reservations of the other competent
authorities expressed during the six months
period. The decision shall be provided to
the applicant and the other competent
authorities by the competent authority
referred to in paragraph 1.
The decisions referred to in subparagraphs
3 and 5 shall be recognised as
determinative and applied in the Member
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States concerned.
Or. en
Justification
Alignment with Council proposal. Last paragraph was missing. Replaces amendment 59 of
Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 496
Article 131, paragraph 2 a (new)
Dabei gilt, dass die von den Kreditinstituten
in der Folge ermittelten Ergebnisse der
gegenseitigen Anerkennung durch die
betroffenen Aufsichtsbehörden unterliegen.
Dies gilt sowohl für die Berechnungen auf
konsolidierter Ebene, als auch für den
Einzelabschluss.
Or. de
Justification
Paneuropäische Kreditinstitute werden aufgrund der zahlreichen Wahlrechte mit
unterschiedlichen nationalen Vorschriften konfrontiert sein. Um die mit einer möglichen
Doppelberechnung verbundenen administrativen Kosten zu vermeiden, muss die gegenseitige
Anerkennung der nationalen Vorschriften eingeführt werden.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 497
Article 131, paragraph 3
The competent authorities responsible for
authorising the subsidiary of a parent
undertaking which is a credit institution
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The competent authorities responsible for
authorising the subsidiary of a parent
undertaking which is a credit institution
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may, by bilateral agreement, delegate their
responsibility for supervision to the
competent authorities which authorised and
supervise the parent undertaking so that they
assume responsibility for supervising the
subsidiary in accordance with this Directive.
The Commission must be kept informed of
the existence and content of such
agreements. It shall forward such
information to the competent authorities of
the other Member States and to the Banking
Advisory Committee.
may, by bilateral agreement, delegate their
responsibility for supervision to the
competent authorities which authorised and
supervise the parent undertaking so that they
assume responsibility for supervising the
subsidiary in accordance with this Directive.
The Commission must be kept informed of
the existence and content of such
agreements. It shall forward such
information to the competent authorities of
the other Member States and to the
European Banking Committee.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 498
Article 136, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1
1. Competent authorities shall require any
credit institution that does not meet the
requirements of this Directive to take the
necessary actions or steps at an early stage to
address the situation.
1. Without prejudice to Article 69 and
Article 129, competent authorities shall
require any credit institution that does not
meet the requirements of this Directive to
take the necessary actions or steps at an
early stage to address the situation.
Or. en
Justification
This amendment clarifies that sanctions, particularly the imposition of a specific own funds
requirement in excess of the minimum, shall be applied at the consolidated group level by the
consolidating competent authority (where appropriate). This will ensure the orderly and
proportionate application of the requirements of the Directive. The conditions in Article 69
will ensure that any additional own funds are distributed adequately among the parent
undertaking and the subsidiaries.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 499
Article 137, paragraph 2
2. Member States shall provide that their
competent authorities may carry out, or have
carried out by external inspectors, on-thespot inspections to verify information
received from mixed-activity holding
companies and their subsidiaries. If the
mixed-activity holding company or one of
its subsidiaries is an insurance undertaking,
the procedure laid down in Article 140(1)
may also be used. If a mixed-activity
holding company or one of its subsidiaries is
situated in a Member State other than that in
which the credit institution subsidiary is
situated, on-the-spot verification of
information shall be carried out in
accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 140(1).
2. Member States shall provide that their
competent authorities may carry out, or have
carried out by external inspectors, on-thespot inspections to verify information
received from mixed-activity holding
companies and their subsidiaries. If the
mixed-activity holding company or one of
its subsidiaries is an insurance undertaking,
the procedure laid down in Article 140(1)
may also be used. If a mixed-activity
holding company or one of its subsidiaries is
situated in a Member State other than that in
which the credit institution subsidiary is
situated, on-the-spot verification of
information shall be carried out in
accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 141.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 500
Article 143, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1
3. In the absence of such equivalent
supervision, Member States shall apply the
provisions of Article 52 this Directive to the
credit institution by analogy or shall allow
their competent authorities to apply other
appropriate supervisory techniques which
achieve the objectives of supervision on a
consolidated basis of credit institutions.
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3. In the absence of such equivalent
supervision, Member States shall apply the
provisions of this Directive to the credit
institution by analogy or shall allow their
competent authorities to apply other
appropriate supervisory techniques which
achieve the objectives of supervision on a
consolidated basis of credit institutions.
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Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 501
Article 145, paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The banks shall be called upon to
disclose their rating decisions in writing,
and comprehensibly, to SME and other
corporate applicants for loans. Should a
voluntary undertaking by the sector in this
regard prove inadequate, legislative
measures shall be adopted. The
administrative costs for the banks have to
be at an appropriate rate to the size of the
loan.
Or. en
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 502
Article 145, paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Credit institutions shall disclose the key
elements of their rating process to small or
medium sized entities applying for credit.
Should a national code of voluntary
disclosure not be agreed between
representative national associations of
credit institutions and small or medium
sized entities before 31 December 2006,
competent authorities shall enforce
appropriate regulation to ensure such a
disclosure be attained
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Or. en
Justification
Transparency of the rating process is an important topic for SMEs. Therefore it would be
useful that banks explain the key elements of their rating process to applicants. This is better
achieved at national level given the differences in operational conditions that still prevail in
the various national credit markets. It is obviously preferable that representative national
associations of the banks and SMEs sectors can reach an agreement on how such disclosure
could be delivered. However, should such an agreement not be reached before the
implementation date, national authorities should ensure via regulatory measures that an
adequate disclosure to SMEs
Amendment by Enrico Letta
Amendment 503
Article 145, paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Credit institutions shall disclose the key
elements of their rating decision process to
small or medium sized entities applying for
credit. Should a national code of voluntary
disclosure not be agreed between
representative national associations of
credit institutions and small or medium
sized entities before 31 December 2006,
competent authorities shall enforce
appropriate regulation to ensure such a
disclosure be attained.
Or. en
Justification
With the implementation of this directive, many banks will decide the conditions and the price
at which they grant loans to SMEs on the basis of their internal rating decision process. It is
therefore important that banks explain its key elements to SMEs applying for credit. This is
better achieved at national level given the differences in operational conditions that still
prevail in the various national credit markets. It is obviously preferable that representative
national associations of bank and SME sectors can reach an agreement on how such
disclosure could be delivered. However, should such an agreement not be reached before the
implementation date, national authorities should ensure via regulatory measures that an
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adequate disclosure to SMEs is provided.
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 504
Article 145, paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Die zuständigen Behörden können
Banken dazu auffordern, dem einzelnen
Kreditantragsteller ihre Kreditentscheidung
in nachvollziehbarer Weise offenzulegen,
wenn der Antragsteller einem
Kundensegment mit beschränktem Zugang
zu externer Finanzierung angehört und die
Kreditversorgung für diese
Kundensegmente durch die Offenlegung
verbessert wird.
Or. de
Justification
Sofern die Kreditversorgung für Kundensegmente verbessert werden kann, ist eine
nachvollziehbare Erläuterung der Kreditentscheidung zu befürworten. Sollte diese
Offenlegung keinen Effekt auf die Kreditversorgung einer Kundengruppe haben, ist davon aus
Gründen der potentiellen Verschlechterung existierender Kundenverbindungen sowie der
zusätzlichen Kosten abzusehen. Die Beurteilung der Kreditversorgung von Kundensegmenten
kann nur auf nationaler Ebene getroffen werden.
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 505
Article 145, paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Banks shall make publicly available an
overview of how they make their credit
decisions. If requested by an applicant,
banks shall explain the main reason(s) why
the credit application was rejected or
accepted.
Or. en
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Justification
It is important that applicants, especially SMEs, be provided with an overview as to how
credit decisions are made. A bank should make this information available on its website or
elsewhere, so that applicants could access it and see how to improve the likelihood of their
credit applications succeeding. However, care must also be taken to avoid exposing banks to
manipulation or fraud by customers. Accordingly, this amendment aims to meet the concerns
of SMEs, while at the same time producing an outcome that is workable for the banks and
does not create more costs - for the banks and for their SME and other customers – than it
does benefits.
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 506
Article 146, paragraph 3
(3) In den in Absatz 2 genannten
Ausnahmefällen weist das betreffende
Kreditinstitut bei der Offenlegung der
restlichen Informationen darauf hin, dass die
betreffenden Bestandteile nicht
veröffentlicht wurden, begründet dies und
veröffentlicht allgemeinere Angaben zu den
geforderten Informationsbestandteilen.
3. In den in Absatz 2 genannten
Ausnahmefällen weist das betreffende
Kreditinstitut bei der Offenlegung der
restlichen Informationen darauf hin, dass die
betreffenden Bestandteile nicht
veröffentlicht wurden, begründet dies und
veröffentlicht allgemeinere Angaben zu den
geforderten Informationsbestandteilen, wenn
diese in Anbetracht der in Anhang XII Teil
1 Nummern 2 und 3 genannten Kriterien
nicht als geheim oder vertraulich
einzustufen sind.
Or. de
Justification
Die in Artikel 146 Abs. 3 vorgesehene Verpflichtung zur allgemeinen Beschreibung und
Erläuterung beziehungsweise Begründung der Tatsache, weshalb eine bestimmte Information
nicht veröffentlicht wurde, darf nicht dazu führen, den Vertrauensschutz einzuschränken. Bei
entsprechend geringer Grundgesamtheit von Einzelinformationen kann eine solche
Verpflichtung dazu führen, dass der durch die Nichtveröffentlichung angestrebte
Schutzbereich wieder verloren geht. Klarstellend sollte deshalb in Artikel 146 Abs. 3 ergänzt
werden, dass die Verpflichtung zur Erläuterung der Nichtveröffentlichung einer Tatsache nur
insoweit gelten kann, als dadurch der Schutzbereich und die Schutzwirkung nicht
eingeschränkt werden.
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Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 507
Article 148, paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Die nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden
können für Institute mit regional
begrenztem Tätigkeitsbereich einen
eingeschränkten Umfang der Offenlegung
vorsehen. Dieser hat zumindest folgende
Angaben zu enthalten:
- Darstellung aller EigenmittelBestandteile,
- Information über die Angemessenheit der
Eingemittel-Deckung für künftige
Aktivitäten,
- Gesamtheit der Eigenmittel und
Eigenmittel-Koeffizient,
- Eigenmitteldeckung für die einzelnen
Risikokategorien,
- Beschreibung der wesentlichen
Merkmale des internen Ratingsystems.
Or. de
Justification
Die Offenlegung dient der besseren Information potentieller Kunden einer Bank. Daher sind
Intensität und Inhalt dieser Informationen auf den durchschnittlichen Kunden einer Bank
abzustimmen.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 508
Article 150, paragraph 1, point (j)
(j) the amount specified in Article 79(2)(c)
and in Article 86(4)(a) to take into account
the effects of inflation;
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(j) the amount specified in Article 4(6a),
Article 79(2)(c) Article 86(4)(a), Article
89(1)ba and Annex VII, part 1, paragraph
4 and Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 14 to
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take into account the effects of inflation;
Or. en
Justification
Replaces amendment 76 of the Radwan draft report in order to take account of Article
89(1)ba (new).
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 509
Article 150, paragraph 2, point (b)
(b) a temporary reduction in the minimum
level of own funds laid down in Article 75
the risk weights laid down in Title V,
Chapter 2, Section 3 in order to take account
of specific circumstances;
(b) a temporary reduction in the minimum
level of own funds laid down in Article 75
and/or the risk weights laid down in Title V,
Chapter 2, Section 3 in order to take account
of specific circumstances;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 510
Article 152, paragraph 2
2. For the first twelve-month period referred
to in paragraph 1, the amount of own funds
shall be 95% of the total minimum amount
of own funds that would be required to be
held during that period by the credit
institution under Article 4 of Directive
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2. For the first twelve-month period referred
to in paragraph 1, the amount of own funds
shall be 95% of the total minimum amount
of own funds that would be required to be
held during that period by the credit
institution under Article 4 of Directive
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93/6/EEC as that Directive and Directive
2000/12/EC stood prior to the date specified
in Article 157 of this Directive.
93/6/EEC as that Directive and Directive
2000/12/EC stood prior to the date specified
in Article 157(1) of this Directive.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 511
Article 152, paragraph 3
3. For the second twelve-month period
referred to in paragraph 1, the amount of
own funds shall be 90% of the total
minimum amount of own funds that would
be required to be held during that period by
the credit institution under Article 4 of
Directive 93/6/EEC as that Directive and
Directive 2000/12/EC stood prior to the date
specified in Article 157 this Directive.
3. For the second twelve-month period
referred to in paragraph 1, the amount of
own funds shall be 90% of the total
minimum amount of own funds that would
be required to be held during that period by
the credit institution under Article 4 of
Directive 93/6/EEC as that Directive and
Directive 2000/12/EC stood prior to the date
specified in Article 157(1) of this Directive.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 512
Article 152, paragraph 4
4. For the third twelve-month period referred
to in paragraph 1, the amount of own funds
shall be 80% of the total minimum amount
of own funds that would be required to be
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4. For the third twelve-month period referred
to in paragraph 1, the amount of own funds
shall be 80% of the total minimum amount
of own funds that would be required to be
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held during that period by the credit
institution under Article 4 of Directive
93/6/EEC as that Directive and Directive
2000/12/EC stood prior to the date specified
in Article 157 of this Directive.
held during that period by the credit
institution under Article 4 of Directive
93/6/EEC as that Directive and Directive
2000/12/EC stood prior to the date specified
in Article 157(1) of this Directive.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 513
Article 152, paragraph 5
5. Compliance with the requirements of
paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be on the basis of
amounts of own funds fully adjusted to
reflect differences in the calculation of own
funds under Directive 2000/12/EC and
Directive 93/6/EEC as those Directives
stood prior to the date specified in Article
157 of this Directive and the calculation of
own funds under this Directive deriving
from the separate treatments of expected loss
and unexpected loss under Articles 84 to 89
of this Directive.
5. Compliance with the requirements of
paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be on the basis of
amounts of own funds fully adjusted to
reflect differences in the calculation of own
funds under Directive 2000/12/EC and
Directive 93/6/EEC as those Directives
stood prior to the date specified in Article
157(1) of this Directive and the calculation
of own funds under this Directive deriving
from the separate treatments of expected loss
and unexpected loss under Articles 84 to 89
of this Directive.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 514
Article 152, paragraph 7
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7. Die Kreditinstitute können bis zum
31. Dezember 2007 anstelle der Artikel des
Titels V Kapitel 2 Abschnitt 3
Unterabschnitt 1 (Standardansatz) die
Artikel 42 bis 46 der Richtlinie 2000/12/EG
anwenden wie sie vor dem in Artikel 157
genannten Datum bestanden.
7. Die Kreditinstitute können bis zum 1.
Januar 2008 anstelle der Artikel des
Titels V Kapitel 2 Abschnitt 3
Unterabschnitt 1 (Standardansatz) sowie
Unterabschnitt 2 (einfacher IRB-Ansatz)
die Artikel 42 bis 46 der Richtlinie
2000/12/EG anwenden wie sie vor dem 31.
Dezember 2006 bestanden.
Or. de
Justification
Übernahme des Ratsänderungsvorschlags, unter der Beachtung, dass sowohl Banken, die
sich für den Standardansatz als auch Banken, die sich für einfachen IRB-Ansatz entschieden
haben, wählen können, wann sie in dem Zeitraum vom 1.1.2007 bis 1.1.2008 mit der
Umsetzung von Basel II beginnen.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 515
Article 152, paragraph 8, point (a)
(a) the provisions of that Directive referred
to in Articles 42 to 46 shall apply as they
stood prior to the date referred to in Article
157;
(a) the provisions of that Directive referred
to in Articles 42 to 46 shall apply as they
stood prior to the date referred to in Article
157(1);
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 516
Article 152, paragraph 8, point (e)
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(e) the treatment set out in Article 43(3) of
that Directive shall apply to derivative
instruments listed in Annex IV of that
Directive whether on- or off-balance sheet
and the figures produced by the treatment set
out in that Annex shall be considered riskweighted exposure amounts;
(e) the treatment set out in Article 43(3) of
that Directive shall apply to derivative
instruments listed in Annex IV of that
Directive whether on- or off-balance sheet
and the figures produced by the treatment set
out in Annex III shall be considered riskweighted exposure amounts;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 517
Article 152, paragraph 10
10. Where the discretion referred to in
paragraph 7 is exercised the capital
requirement for operational risk under
Article 75(e) shall be reduced by the
percentage representing the ratio of the value
of the credit institution’s exposures for
which risk-weighted exposure amounts are
calculated in accordance with the discretion
referred to in paragraph 7 to the total value
of its exposures.
10. Where the discretion referred to in
paragraph 7 is exercised the capital
requirement for operational risk under
Article 75(d) shall be reduced by the
percentage representing the ratio of the value
of the credit institution’s exposures for
which risk-weighted exposure amounts are
calculated in accordance with the discretion
referred to in paragraph 7 to the total value
of its exposures.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 518
Article 152, paragraph 12 a (new)
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12a. Wird das in Absatz 7 genannte
Wahlrecht ausgeübt, oder fällt das Institut
unter Artikel 157 Absatz 2, finden die
Artikel 124, 145 und 149 vor dem dort
genannten Datum keine Anwendung.
Or. de
Justification
Es besteht die Notwendigkeit klarzustellen, dass im Übergangszeitraum die Säulen II und III
nur dann Anwendung finden, wenn ein Institut auch Säule I anwendet. Dies muss sowohl für
den Standardansatz als auch die beiden fortgeschrittenen Ansätze gelten. Die drei Säulen sind
stark interdependent und lassen sich in keinem der drei Ansätze getrennt voneinander
implementieren.
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 519
Article 152, paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Die Kreditinstitute können die
Vergleichsgröße gemäß den Absätzen 1 bis
4 auch an Hand des durchschnittlichen
Eigenmittelerfordernisses der Jahre 2005
und 2006 sowie des
Bilanzsummenwachstums der Jahre 2007
bis 2009 berechnen.
Or. de
Justification
Im Richtlinienvorschlag ist vorgesehen, dass jene Kreditinstitute, die fortgeschrittene Ansätze
(IRB, AMA) zur Ermittlung ihrer Eigenmittelerfordernisse verwenden, in den Jahren 2007 bis
2009 sog. Floor-Berechnungen vornehmen müssen. Konkret wird festgelegt, dass die
Eigenkapitalausstattung im Jahr 2007 mindestens 95 % (2008 mindestens 90 % und 2009
mindestens 80 %) der Mindesteigenkapitalerfordernisse entsprechen muss, welche das Institut
bei Anwendung der Basel I Regelungen vorhalten müsste. Diese aufwändige Verpflichtung ist
nicht gerechtfertigt, da die komplette Basel I Daten- und Rechenmaschinerie für weitere drei
Jahre - parallel zu den neuen Datenerfassungen – und eventuell sogar noch darüber hinaus
laufen müsste. Gerade auch weil die Institute ohnehin bereits mit erheblichen
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Umstellungskosten konfrontiert sind, sollte hier versucht werden, unnötige Zusatzkosten zu
vermeiden. Die zuständigen Behörden sollten diesbezüglich vereinfachte Verfahren vorgeben
und zulassen können.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 520
Article 153, subparagraph 1
In the calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts for exposures arising from property
leasing transactions concerning offices or
other commercial premises situated in their
territory and meeting the criteria set out in
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 51, the
competent authorities may, until 31
December 2012 allow a 50% risk weighting
to be applied without the application of
Annex VI, part 1, paragraphs 55 and 56.
In the calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts for exposures arising from property
leasing transactions concerning offices or
other commercial premises situated in their
territory and meeting the criteria set out in
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 51, the
competent authorities may, until 31
December 2012 allow a 50% risk weighting
to be applied without the application of
Annex VI, part 1, paragraphs 52 and 53.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Zsolt László Becsey
Amendment 521
Article 153, subparagraph 2 a (new)
2a. In the calculation of risk weighted
exposure amounts for the purposes of
Annex VI part 1 paragraph 4, until 31
December 2012, the same risk weight shall
be applied in relation to exposures to
Member States' central governments or
central banks denominated and funded in
the domestic currency of any Member State
as would be applied to such exposures
denominated and funded in their domestic
currency.
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Or. en
Justification
The Directive amends the rules relating to risk weights are applied to government debt
denominated and funded in a currency other than the domestic currency. Without the
suggested amendment, the risk weights, as a consequence of the EU membership compared to
the pre-accession status, for several new Member States holding debt denominated in euro
would significantly increase. This would make it difficult for these Member States to adopt the
single currency by imposing costs on Member States in the process of accession to the eurozone when new debt issued will be denominated in euro and previously issued debt will
gradually be converted into euro. Furthermore, the higher risk weights would also make it
more costly for investors in other Member States to invest in such new Member States,
hindering the single market.
Therefore a six-year long transitional period till the end of 2012 is deemed necessary during
which the same risk-weights shall be applied to the exposures to Member States’ central
governments or central banks denominated in domestic currency and in euro. This will
contribute to ensuring new Member States (first of all Visegrad countries and possibly
Romania and Bulgaria) prepare smoothly for the accession to the euro-zone.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 522
Article 154, paragraph 1
1. The requirements in Article 84(3) and (4)
shall apply from the 31 December 2009.
1. The requirements in Article 84(3) and (4)
shall apply from the 31 December 2010.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error. Replaces Amendment 87 of Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 523
Article 154, paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The competent authorities of each
Member State may for the purposes of
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Annex VI part 1 paragraph 58 set the
number of days past due up to a figure of
180 for corporate and retail exposures and
up to 270 days for public sector entities
(PSE) exposures if local conditions make it
appropriate. The specific number may
differ across product lines .
Competent authorities which do not make
use of the option in the first subparagraph
for such exposures in its territory, may set a
higher number of days for exposures to
counterparts situated in the territories of
other Member States the competent
authorities of which have made use of that
option. The specific number shall fall
within 90 days and the figures the other
competent authorities have set for
exposures to such counterparties within
their territories.
Or. en
Justification
The IRB approach in Annex VII part 4 §84 and Article 154 §4 currently allows national
legislation to lengthen the time beyond which retail/PSE and corporate exposures must be
considered “past due” to 180 days. To be consistent, this possibility should also be provided
for in the Standardised Approach. Additionally, to take into account certain national
regulations and practices, member states should be allowed to extend the past due period up
to 270 days for PSE exposures under all approaches.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 524
Article 154, paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Until 31 December 2011, the competent
authorities of each Member State may for
the purposes of Annex VI part 1 paragraph
58 set the number of days past due up to a
figure of 180 for corporate, retail and
public sector entities (PSE) exposures if
local conditions make it appropriate. The
specific number may differ across product
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lines.
Competent authorities which do not make
use of the option in the first subparagraph
for such exposures in its territory, may set a
higher number of days for exposures to
counterparts situated in the territories of
other Member States the competent
authorities of which have made use of that
option. The specific number shall fall
within 90 days and the figures the other
competent authorities have set for
exposures to such counterparties within
their territories.
Or. en
Justification
The IRB approach allows national legislation to lengthen the time beyond which credit must
be considered “past due” to 180 days. To be consistent the same possibility should be
extended to the Standardised Approach for both retail/PSE and corporate claims (and not
only for corporate exposures as in the ECOFIN amendment) for a transitional period of 5
years. Without this amendment there would be an asymmetry that would penalise SMEs in
particular. It should be noted that if this disparity of treatment were not eliminated, the same
counterpart (for example a retail borrower) could be rated as “performing” by an IRB bank
and as “non-performing” by a STA bank. The 90 days rule, as in the Council approach
(without any possible transitional extension to 180 days in the Standard for retail/PSE
customers) could possibly penalise smaller banks. It should be noted that in the retail
portfolio, entities that are vital to the European economy are also included, such as small
firms with a total outstanding debt to the credit institution of no more than EUR 1 million [as
stated in art 79.2 (c)].
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 525
Article 154, paragraph 3, subparagraph 1
Until 31 December 2017, the competent
authorities of the Member States may
exempt from the IRB treatment certain
equity exposures held at 31 December 2007.
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Until 31 December 2017, the competent
authorities of the Member States may
exempt from the IRB treatment certain
equity exposures held at 31 December 2007.
When the competent authorities of a
Member State allow this exempted position,
it shall also be extended to all equity
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exposures held by EU subsidiaries of banks
in this Member State, as well as to equity
exposures held in another Member State
that are issued by an issuer established in
this Member State.
Or. en
Justification
The 10-year grandfathering provisions for equity, under which Member State will be allowed
to exempt from the IRB treatment certain equity exposures held on 31 December 2007 until
31 December 2017 is subject to national discretion. This will create an unlevel playing field
within the EU. The 10-year grandfathering provisions for equity, under which Member State
will be allowed to exempt from the IRB treatment certain equity exposures held on 31
December 2007 until 31 December 2017 is subject to national discretion. This will create an
unlevel playing field within the EU. Thus at a minimum, in case a host supervisor allows the
grandfathering provision in its home country, this provision should be automatically extended
to equity exposures held by foreign subsidiaries of banks in this host country as well as to
equity exposures held in another country that are issued by an equity issuer established in the
host country.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 526
Article 154, paragraph 4
(4) Für Forderungen an Unternehmen
können die zuständigen Behörden jedes
Mitgliedstaats bis zum 31. Dezember 2011
die Anzahl der Tage festlegen, ab der alle
Kreditinstitute ihres Landes Forderungen an
derartige Kontrahenten mit Sitz in diesem
Mitgliedstaat nach der Ausfalldefinition in
Anhang VII Teil 4 Nummer 44 als überfällig
anzusehen haben. Diese Zahl kann zwischen
90 und 180 Tagen betragen, sollte dies
aufgrund der lokalen Gegebenheiten sinnvoll
erscheinen. Für Forderungen an derartige
Kontrahenten mit Sitz in einem anderen
Mitgliedstaat darf die von den zuständigen
Behörden festgesetzte Anzahl von Tagen
nicht über die von den zuständigen
Behörden des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats
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4. Für Forderungen an Unternehmen können
die zuständigen Behörden jedes
Mitgliedstaats bis zum 31. Dezember 2011
die Anzahl der Tage festlegen, ab der alle
Kreditinstitute ihres Landes Forderungen an
derartige Kontrahenten mit Sitz in diesem
Mitgliedstaat nach der Ausfalldefinition in
Anhang VII Teil 4 Nummer 44 als überfällig
anzusehen haben. Diese Zahl soll generell
90 Tage betragen. Sie darf nur dann bis
180 Tage ausgeweitet werden, wenn dies
aufgrund der lokalen Gegebenheiten sinnvoll
erscheint. Für Forderungen an derartige
Kontrahenten mit Sitz in einem anderen
Mitgliedstaat darf die von den zuständigen
Behörden festgesetzte Anzahl von Tagen
nicht über die von den zuständigen
Behörden des betreffenden Mitgliedstaats
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gesetzte Anzahl hinausgehen.
gesetzte Anzahl hinausgehen.
Or. de
Justification
Aufstellung einer generellen einheitlichen Anforderung von 90 Tagen und Ausweitung nur als
Ausnahmefall.
Amendment by Enrico Letta
Amendment 527
Article 154, paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Until 31 December 2011, the competent
authorities of each Member State may for
the purposes of Annex VI part 1 paragraph
58 set the number of days past due up to a
figure of 180 for exposures indicated in
Annex VI, part 1, paragraphs 13 to 18 and
39 to 41 if local conditions make it
appropriate. The specific number may
differ across product lines.
Competent authorities which do not make
use of the option in the first subparagraph
for such exposures in its territory, may set a
higher number of days for exposures to
counterparts situated in the territories of
other Member States the competent
authorities of which have made use of that
option. The specific number shall fall
within 90 days and the figures the other
competent authorities have set for
exposures to such counterparties within
their territories.
Or. en
Justification
Consistently with the IRB approach which allows national competent authorities to
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permanently or transitionally lengthen to 180 days the time beyond which credit must be
considered past due, such possibility should be transitionally extended to the Standardised
Approach for retail, PSE and corporate claims. Such a provision was simply forgotten during
the last minute negotiations in Basel creating a clear imbalance between the IRB and the
Standardised approach. Not correcting the existing text may likely be interpreted as an
imbalance of the overall new framework against small banks which will adopt the
standardised approach. A similar text has also been agreed at Council level in December
2004.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 528
Article 156, paragraph 2
Based on that analysis and taking into
account the contribution of the European
Central Bank, the Commission shall draw up
a biennial report and submit it to the
European Parliament and to the Council,
together with any appropriate proposals.
2. Based on that analysis and taking into
account the contribution of the European
Central Bank, the Commission shall draw up
a biennial report and submit it to the
European Parliament and to the Council,
together with any appropriate proposals.
Contributions from credit taking and credit
lending parties shall be adequately
acknowledged when the report is drawn up.
Or. en
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 529
Article 156, paragraph 2
Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse und unter
Berücksichtigung des Beitrags der
Europäischen Zentralbank erstellt die
Kommission alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht
und leitet ihn – gegebenenfalls zusammen
mit angemessenen Vorschlägen – an das
Europäische Parlament und den Rat weiter.
Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse und unter
Berücksichtigung des Beitrags der
Europäischen Zentralbank erstellt die
Kommission alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht
und leitet ihn – gegebenenfalls zusammen
mit angemessenen Vorschlägen – an das
Europäische Parlament und den Rat weiter.
Beiträge seitens der kreditnehmenden und
kreditgebenden Wirtschaft sind bei der
Erstellung des Berichts ausreichend zu
würdigen.
Or. de
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Justification
Die Eigenkapitalbestimmungen betreffen primär die kreditgebende Wirtschaft.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 530
Article 156, paragraph 2
Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse und unter
Berücksichtigung des Beitrags der
Europäischen Zentralbank erstellt die
Kommission alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht
und leitet ihn- gegebenenfalls zusammen mit
angemessenen Vorschlägen- an das
Europäische Parlament und den Rat weiter.
Auf der Grundlage dieser Analyse und unter
Berücksichtigung des Beitrags der
Europäischen Zentralbank erstellt die
Kommission alle zwei Jahre einen Bericht
und leitet ihn- gegebenenfalls zusammen mit
angemessenen Vorschlägen- an das
Europäische Parlament und den Rat weiter.
Beiträge seitens der kreditnehmenden und
kreditgebenden Wirtschaft sind bei der
Erstellung des Berichts ausreichend zu
würdigen.
Or. de
Justification
Es ist unverzichtbar, das neben der kreditnehmenden Wirtschaft ebenso die Beiträge der
kreditgebenden Institute und ihrer Verbände ausreichend bei der Analyse der prozyklischen
Wirkungen von Basel II durch die Kommission berücksichtigt werden.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 531
Article 156, paragraph 2 a (new)
The Commission shall monitor the effect of
consolidated supervision pursuant to
Article 129 on investor protection and on
the stability of the financial markets and
shall draw up a report, in which it shall
assess the possibility of revising the rules in
Articles 68 and 69 to European
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subsidiaries, before the end of 2008 and
submit it to the European Parliament and
to the Council, together with any
corresponding proposals.
Or. en
Justification
The proposal for a Directive currently applies the rules at solo entity level. This reflects the
fragmented nature of supervision in the EU. As the ultimate objective of the Directive should
be consolidated supervision in line with the Single Market, the Commission should seek to
eliminate the obstacles to consolidated supervision as part of its forward agenda. The level of
application of the rules in the Capital Requirements Directive must be reviewed before the
end of 2008 by the Commission and the Member States.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 532
Article 156, paragraph 2 a (new)
Die Kommission überwacht, wie die
Beaufsichtigung auf konsolidierter Basis
gemäß Artikel 129 durchgeführt wird und
legt drei Jahre nach dem in Artikel 157
Absatz 2 genannten Zeitpunkt dem
Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat
einen Bericht gegebenenfalls zusammen
mit geeigneten Änderungsvorschlägen vor.
Zu prüfen ist, ob sich die Stärkung der
Stellung der für die Konsolidierung
zuständigen Aufsichtsbehörde bewährt hat,
und ob die Befugnisse ausgeweitet werden
sollten.
Or. de
Justification
Langfristig gesehen braucht der europäische Finanzbinnenmarkt zu seiner vollen
Funktionsfähigkeit eine europäische Aufsichtsbehörde. Diese kann natürlich erst installiert
werden, wenn der Finanzbinnenmarkt funktioniert, noch hinkt er dem Binnenmarkt für Güter
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hinterher. Die Kommission sollte in drei Jahren einen Bericht vorlegen, dem sie
gegebenenfalls Änderungsvorschläge beifügt, die in Richtung einer europäischen
Aufsichtsbehörde gehen.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 533
Article 156, paragraph 2, point (b) (new)
2b. The Commission shall monitor the
effect of consolidated supervision pursuant
to Article 129 on investor protection and on
the stability of the financial markets and
shall draw up a report, in which it shall
assess the possibility of revising the rules in
Articles 68 and 69 to European
subsidiaries, before the end of 2008 and
submit it to the European Parliament and
to the Council, together with any
corresponding proposals.
Or. en
Justification
The proposal for a Directive currently applies the rules at solo entity level. This reflects the
fragmented nature of supervision in the EU. As the ultimate objective of the Directive should
be consolidated supervision in line with the Single Market, the Commission should seek to
eliminate the obstacles to consolidated supervision as part of its forward agenda. The level of
application of the rules in the Capital Requirements Directive must be reviewed before the
end of 2008 by the Commission and the Member States.
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 534
Article 156, paragraph 2 a (new)
The Commission shall monitor how
consolidated supervision pursuant to
Article 129 is implemented and shall draw
up a report three years after the date
specified in Article 157(2) and submit it to
the European Parliament and to the
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Council, together with any appropriate
proposals. It shall assess whether the
strengthening of the position of the
supervisor responsible for consolidation
has proved its worth and whether its
powers should be retained as they are,
withdrawn or extended.
Or. en
Justification
The implementation of consolidated supervision and its effect on financial markets should be
reviewed earlier than the Rapporteur proposes.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 535
Article 156, paragraph 2 b (new)
Die Kommission überwacht, wie sich die
Beaufsichtigung auf konsolidierter Basis
gemäß Artikel 69 im Hinblick auf den
Einlegerschutz und die
Finanzmarktstabilität auswirkt und legt
drei Jahre nach dem in Artikel 157 Absatz
2 genannten Zeitpunkt dem Europäischen
Parlament und dem Rat einen Bericht
gegebenenfalls mit den entsprechenden
Änderungsvorschlägen vor, in dem sie die
Möglichkeit einer Ausweitung der
Regelungen des Artikels 69 auf
europäische Tochterunternehmen prüft.
Or. de
Justification
Die Solvenzüberwachung sollte zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt EU-weit auf konsolidierter
Konzernebene möglich sein. Daher sollte die Kommission nach drei Jahren einen Bericht
vorlegen, in dem sie die Möglichkeit einer Ausweitung der Regelung des Artikels 69 auf
europäische Tochterunternehmen beleuchtet, und gegebenenfalls Änderungsvorschläge
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beifügt, die in diese Richtung gehen.
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 536
Article 156, paragraph 2 b (new)
The Commission shall monitor the effect of
consolidated supervision pursuant to
Article 129 on investor protection and on
the stability of the financial markets and
shall draw up a report, in which it shall
assess the possibility of extending the rules
in Article 69 to European subsidiaries,
three years after the date specified in
Article 157(2) and submit it to the
European Parliament and to the Council,
together with any corresponding proposals.
Or. en
Justification
The implementation of consolidated supervision and its effect on financial markets should be
reviewed earlier than the Rapporteur proposes.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 537
Article 156, subparagraph 2 c (new)
Die Kommission überwacht, wie sich die
Nullgewichtung gruppeninterner Kredite
gemäß Artikel 80 Absatz 7 im Hinblick auf
den Einlegerschutz und die
Finanzmarktstabilität auswirkt und legt
dem Europäischen Parlament und dem Rat
drei Jahre nach dem in Artikel 157 Absatz
2 genannten Zeitpunkt einen Bericht
gegebenenfalls mit Änderungsvorschlägen
vor, in dem sie die Möglichkeit einer
Ausweitung der Regelung des Artikels 80
Absatz 7 auf europaweite gruppeninterne
Kreditbeziehungen prüft.
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Or. de
Justification
Die Kommission legt in drei Jahren einen Bericht vor, indem sie überprüft, ob die
Bestimmungen des Art. 80 (7) auf europäische Unternehmensteile erweitert werden können,
und fügt gegebenenfalls Änderungsvorschläge bei.
Amendment by Ieke van den Burg
Amendment 538
Article 156, paragraph 2 c (new)
The Commission shall identify and further
elaborate on the barriers for extending this
consolidated supervision to other elements
of this Directive, in particular with regard
to issues concerning financial fall back and
lender of last resort responsibilities, and
shall present a report to the European
Parliament and the Council with
appropriate policy options, including the
option of creating an integrated European
level supervision for the large cross border
institutions.
Or. en
Justification
The financial consequences of a transfer of supervisory powers and consolidated supervision
by one national supervisor are not yet clearly assessed nor solved; the commission should
undertake a more precise study. Both for these financial aspects and for reasons of avoiding
concentration of supervisory powers with only one or two national supervisors the option of
European level supervision as suggested in the Parliaments Van den Burg report, should be
further investigated.
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Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 539
Article 156 a (new)
Article 156a
Die Kommission überprüft in
Zusammenarbeit mit den Mitgliedstaaten
die praktische Umsetzung der
Zusammenarbeit der zuständigen
Aufsichtsbehörden, insbesondere die in
Artikel 129 geregelte Zusammenarbeit der
Aufsichtsbehörde eines EUMutterkreditinstituts mit den
Aufsichtsbehörden seiner
Tochterkreditinstitute in anderen
Mitgliedstaaten. Die Kommission hat bis
zum 31.12. 2010 einen Bericht an den Rat
und das Parlament zu übermitteln, in dem
gegebenenfalls Vorschläge für eine
Erweiterung der Aufgabenstellung der
Aufsichtsbehörde des Mutterkreditinstituts
bzw. der Mutterfinanzholdinggesellschaft
und für eine Verbesserung der Verfahren
der grenzüberschreitenden
Zusammenarbeit aller betroffenen
Aufsichtsbehörden gemacht werden.
In dem Bericht sollen auch eine
Beurteilung über mögliche Verzerrungen
des grenzüberschreitenden Wettbewerbs
infolge der Bestimmungen über die
konsolidierte Aufsicht gemäß den Artikeln
68 bis 73 gemacht und gegebenenfalls
Vorschläge für deren Veränderung mit
Zielrichtung für gleiche
Wettbewerbsbedingungen im Binnenmarkt
unterbreitet werden.
Or. de
Justification
Die Bestimmungen über die Koordinierung und Zusammenarbeit zwischen den nationalen
Aufsichtsbehörden müssen für die sich weiterentwickelnden grenzüberschreitenden
Aktivitäten von Banken, Bankengruppen und Finanzkonglomeraten laufend angepasst
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werden. Die zentrale Risikoüberwachung, Risikosteuerung und Eigenkapitalzuordnung von
(grenzüberschreitend tätigen) Banken, Bankengruppen und Finanzkonglomeraten bedürfen
einer Entsprechung in der konsolidierten Aufsicht, wobei möglicherweise eine Ausweitung
der Aufgabenstellung des consolidated supervisors des Mutterinstitutes auf Funktionen der
Säule 2 des Baseler Abkommens sachlich angeraten und vom Standpunkt der Finanzstabilität
im Binnenmarkt notwendig sein wird.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 540
Article 158, paragraph 1
1. as amended by the Directives set out in
Annex XV, part A, is hereby repealed
without prejudice to the obligations of the
Member States concerning the deadlines for
transposition of the said Directives listed in
Annex XV, part B.
1. Directive 2001/12/EC as amended by the
Directives set out in Annex XIII, part
A, is hereby repealed without prejudice to
the obligations of the Member States
concerning the deadlines for transposition of
the said Directives listed in Annex XIII, part
B.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 541
Article 158, paragraph 2
2. References to the repealed Directives
shall be construed as references to this
Directive and should be read in accordance
with the correlation table in Annex XVI.
2. References to the repealed Directives
shall be construed as references to this
Directive and should be read in accordance
with the correlation table in Annex XIV.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 542
Annex III, heading 2, paragraph 3 (after Table 1)
For the purpose of calculating the potential
future exposure in accordance with step (b)
the competent authorities may allow credit
institutions until 31 December 2006 to apply
the following percentages instead of those
prescribed in Table 1 provided that the
institutions make use of the option set out in
Article 11a of Directive 93/6/EEC for
contracts within the meaning of paragraph
3(b) and (c) of Annex IV:
For the purpose of calculating the potential
future exposure in accordance with step (b)
the competent authorities may allow credit
institutions to apply the following
percentages instead of those prescribed in
Table 1 provided that the institutions make
use of the option set out in Annex IV,
paragraph 21 of Directive 93/6/EEC for
contracts within the meaning of paragraph
3(b) and (c) of Annex IV:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 543
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Exposures to churches and religious
communities constituted in the form of a
legal person under public law shall, in so
far as they raise taxes in accordance with
legislation conferring on them the right to
do so, be treated as exposures to regional
governments and local authorities, except
that paragraph 10 shall not apply. In this
case for the purpose of Article 89
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paragraph (d) permission to apply
subsection 1 shall not be excluded.
Or. en
Justification
Replaces amendment 113 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 544
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 15
15. Subject to the discretion of competent
authorities, exposures to public sector
entities may be treated as exposures to
institutions. Exercise of this discretion by
competent authorities is independent of the
exercise of discretion by competent
authorities as specified in Article 80. The
preferential treatment for short-term
exposures specified in paragraphs 30, 31 and
36 shall not be applied.
15. Subject to the discretion of competent
authorities, exposures to public sector
entities may be treated as exposures to
institutions. Exercise of this discretion by
competent authorities is independent of the
exercise of discretion by competent
authorities as specified in Article 80(3). The
preferential treatment for short-term
exposures specified in paragraphs 30, 31 and
36 shall not be applied.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 545
Anex VI, part 1, paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. In exceptional circumstances,
exposures to public-sector entities may be
treated as exposures to the central
government in whose jurisdiction they are
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established where in the opinion of the
competent authorities there is no difference
in risk between such exposures because of
the existence of an appropriate guarantee
by the central government. For the purpose
of Article 89 paragraph (d), the permission
to apply subsection 1 shall not be excluded.
Or. en
Justification
Substitution of amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report with a view to allow for a
permanent partial use of the provisions of paragraph 15a.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 546
Anex VI, part 1, paragraph 16
16. Machen die zuständigen Behörden eines
Mitgliedstaats von der
Ermessensentscheidung, Forderungen an
öffentliche Stellen wie Forderungen an
Institute zu behandeln, Gebrauch, so können
die zuständigen Behörden eines anderen
Mitgliedstaats ihren Kreditinstituten
gestatten, Forderungen an diese öffentliche
Stellen auf dieselbe Weise zu gewichten.
16. Machen die zuständigen Behörden eines
Mitgliedstaats von der
Ermessensentscheidung, Forderungen an
öffentliche Stellen wie Forderungen an
Institute zu behandeln, Gebrauch, so müssen
die zuständigen Behörden eines anderen
Mitgliedstaats ihren Kreditinstituten
gestatten, Forderungen an diese öffentliche
Stellen auf dieselbe Weise zu gewichten.
Or. de
Justification
Die Verpflichtung der zuständigen Behörde ist erforderlich, um ein „level playing field“
sicher zustellen und um eine gegenseitige Anerkennung zu gewährleisten.
Amendment by Antolín Sánchez Presedo
Amendment 547
Anex VI, part 1, paragraph 19
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19. For the purposes of Articles 78 to 83, the
Inter-American Investment Corporation is
considered to be a Multilateral Development
Bank (MDB).
19. For the purposes of Articles 78 to 83, the
Inter-American Investment Corporation, the
Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
and the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration are considered to be
a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB).
Or. en
Justification
The Central American Bank for Economic Integration is considered a Multilateral
Development Bank and therefore it must receive exactly the same general treatment as all the
others Multilateral Banks and not that of the special regime.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 548
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 20
20. Without prejudice to paragraphs 21 and
22, exposures to multilateral development
banks shall be treated in the same manner as
exposures to credit institutions in
accordance with paragraphs 28 to 31. The
preferential treatment for short-term
exposures as specified in paragraph 30, 31
and 36 shall not apply.
20. Without prejudice to paragraphs 21 and
22, exposures to multilateral development
banks shall be treated in the same manner as
exposures to institutions in accordance with
paragraphs 28 to 31. The preferential
treatment for short-term exposures as
specified in paragraph 30, 31 and 36 shall
not apply.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 549
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 27 a (new)
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27a. Forderungen an Institute mit einer
ursprünglichen effektiven Laufzeit von drei
Monaten oder weniger sind mit 20% zu
gewichten.
Or. de
Justification
Eine 20% Risikogewicht ist für derartige Forderungen in Analogie zu Randnummer 31
angebracht.
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 550
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 28
28. Exposures to institutions with an
original effective maturity of more than
three months for which a credit assessment
by a nominated ECAI is available shall be
assigned a risk weight according to Table 4
in accordance with the assignment by the
competent authorities of the credit
assessments of eligible ECAIs to six steps
in a credit quality assessment scale.
deleted
Table 4
Credit
quality
step
Risk
weight of
exposure
deleted (whole table deleted)
1
2
3
4
5
6
20%
50%
50%
100%
100%
150%
Or. en
Justification
The Italian banking industry is against a national discretion in the field of exposures to
institutions. We believe that only one solution has to be applied in Europe. The Italian
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banking industry, considering among other aspects, the low ratio of rated banks in Europe,
strongly supports the Central Government risk weight based method that is closer to the
existing Basel 1 treatment. We ask for deleting the credit assessment based method.
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 551
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 29
29. Exposures to unrated institutions shall
be assigned a risk weight of 50%.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
The Italian banking industry is against a national discretion in the field of exposures to
institutions. We believe that only one solution has to be applied in Europe. The Italian
banking industry, considering among other aspects, the low ratio of rated banks in Europe,
strongly supports the Central Government risk weight based method that is closer to the
existing Basel 1 treatment. We ask for deleting the credit assessment
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 552
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 30
30. Exposures to an institution with an
original effective maturity of three months
or less for which a credit assessment by a
nominated ECAI is available shall receive a
risk weight according to Table 5 in
accordance with the assignment bythe
competent authorities of the credit
assessments of eligible ECAIs to six steps
in a credit quality assessment scale:
30. If an exposure to an institution has an
original effective maturity of six months or
less and a risk weight would otherwise be
assigned in accordance with point 26
(paragraph 6.3) it shall receive a risk
weight according to the following table:
Or. en
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Justification
Within the context of the two options allowed for interbank exposures, we would point out that
unlike the second method (credit assessment based method) that we want to be deleted, the
Central Government risk weight based method does not envisage preferred treatment for
short-term exposures. We request that this possibility be provided for; furthermore, we
recommend extending the definition of “short-term” to include all exposures with original
maturity of six months or less (instead of three).
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 553
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 30, Table 5, column 1, row 1
Credit quality step
Credit quality step to which central
government assigned
Or. en
Justification
Within the context of the two options allowed for interbank exposures, we would point out that
unlike the second method (credit assessment based method) that we want to be deleted, the
Central Government risk weight based method does not envisage preferred treatment for
short-term exposures. We request that this possibility be provided for; furthermore, we
recommend extending the definition of “short-term” to include all exposures with original
maturity of six months or less (instead of three).
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 554
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 31
31. Exposures to unrated institutions
having an original effective maturity of
three months or less shall be assigned a
20% risk weight.
deleted
Or. en
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Justification
The Italian banking industry is against a national discretion in the field of exposures to
institutions. We believe that only one solution has to be applied in Europe. The Italian
banking industry, considering among other aspects, the low ratio of rated banks in Europe,
strongly supports the Central Government risk weight based method that is closer to the
existing Basel 1 treatment. We ask for deleting the credit assessment
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 555
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 40
40. Exposures for which such a credit
assessment is not available shall receive a
100 % risk weight or the risk weight of its
central government, whichever is the higher.
40. Exposures for which such a credit
assessment is not available shall receive a
100 % risk weight or the risk weight of its
central government, whichever is the higher.
Non-retail exposures to SMEs shall receive
a risk weight of 85 %.
Or. en
Justification
In analogy to the firm size adjustment for non retail exposures in the IRB approach, a special
risk weight should be foreseen for non retail exposures to SMEs in the standardized
approach.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 556
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 41
41. Exposures that comply with the criteria
listed in Article 79(2) may, subject to the
discretion of competent authorities, be
assigned a risk weight of 75%.
41. Exposures that comply with the criteria
listed in Article 79(2) shall be assigned a
risk weight of 75%.
Or. en
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Justification
Translation error in Radwan draft report. The German wording "werden...belegt" means
"shall be assigned" not "may be assigned". This is an intentional deviation from the Council
wording.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 557
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 43
43. Exposures fully and completely secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by mortgages on residential
property which is or shall be occupied or let
by the owner shall be assigned a risk weight
of 35%.
43. Exposures fully and completely
secured, to the satisfaction of the
competent authorities, by mortgages on
residential property which is or shall be
occupied or let by the owner or the
beneficial owner in the case of
personal investment companies shall
be assigned a risk weight of 35%.
Or. en
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 558
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 43
43. Exposures fully and completely secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by mortgages on residential
property which is or shall be occupied or let
by the owner shall be assigned a risk weight
of 35%.
43. Exposures fully and completely secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by mortgages on residential
property which is or shall be occupied or let
by the owner or the beneficial owner in the
case of personal investment companies
shall be assigned a risk weight of 35%.
Or. en
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Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 559
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 43
43. Exposures fully and completely secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by mortgages on residential
property which is or shall be occupied or let
by the owner shall be assigned a risk weight
of 35%.
43. Exposures fully and completely secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by mortgages on residential
property which is or shall be occupied or let
by the owner or the beneficial owner in the
case of personal investment companies
shall be assigned a risk weight of 35%.
Or. en
Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 560
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 43
43. Forderungen, die nach Überzeugung der
zuständigen Behörden durch Hypotheken
auf Wohnimmobilien, die vom Eigentümer
gegenwärtig oder künftig selbst genutzt oder
vermietet werden, vollständig abgesichert
sind, erhalten ein Risikogewicht von 35 %.
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43. Forderungen, die nach Überzeugung der
zuständigen Behörden durch Hypotheken
auf Wohnimmobilien, die vom Eigentümer
bzw. im Falle einer Zweckgesellschaft vom
begünstigten Eigentümer gegenwärtig oder
künftig selbst genutzt oder vermietet
werden, vollständig abgesichert sind,
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erhalten ein Risikogewicht von 35 %.
Or. en
Justification
Personen mit hohem Eigenkapital kaufen Eigentum häufig über Zweckgesellschaften, die aber
keine wirklichen Unternehmen sind.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 561
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 43
43. Exposures fully and completely secured,
to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by mortgages on residential
property which is or shall be occupied or let
by the owner shall be assigned a risk weight
of 35%.
43. Exposures or any part of an exposure
fully and completely secured, to the
satisfaction of the competent authorities, by
mortgages on residential property which is
or shall be occupied or let by the owner shall
be assigned a risk weight of 35%.
Or. en
Justification
Replaces amendment 122 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 562
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 44 a (new)
44a. Exposures to a tenant under a
property leasing transactions concerning
residential property under which the credit
institution is the lessor and the tenant has
an option to purchase may be assigned a
risk weight of 35%. paragraphs 46 and 47
shall apply for these purposes.
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Or. en
Justification
Islamic law forbids the payment of interest on borrowing, which requires financial
institutions to design products that use other financial structures such as rental payments.
Under the Commission's text, Islamic products are treated as a leasing arrangement rather
than a residential mortgage and attract higher capital requirements than standard mortgages.
This would potentially increase the cost of home ownership for these customers.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 563
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 48
48. Subject to the discretion of competent
authorities, exposures fully and completely
secured, to the satisfaction of the competent
authorities, by mortgages on offices or other
commercial premises situated within their
territory may be assigned a risk weight of
50%.
48. Subject to the discretion of competent
authorities, exposures or any part of an
exposure fully and completely secured, to
the satisfaction of the competent authorities,
by mortgages on offices or other commercial
premises situated within their territory may
be assigned a risk weight of 50%.
Or. en
Justification
Replaces amendment 125 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 564
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 50
50. Subject to the discretion of competent
authorities, exposures related to property
leasing transactions concerning offices or
other commercial premises situated in their
territory and governed by statutory
provisions whereby the lessor retains full
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50. Subject to the discretion of the
competent authorities, exposures related to
property leasing transactions concerning
offices or other commercial premises
situated in their territories under which the
credit institution is the lessor and the
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ownership of the rented assets until the
tenant exercises his option to purchase, may
be assigned a risk weight of 50%.
tenant has an option to purchase may be
assigned a risk weight of 50% provided that
the exposure of the credit institution is fully
and completely secured by its ownership of
the property.
Or. en
Justification
Islamic law forbids the payment of interest on borrowing. Islamic products are therefore
treated as a leasing arrangement rather than a residential mortgage.
The suggested amendment addresses technical problems with the Commission’s original
proposal to ensure that it fully covers the Ijara type product, by removing the ‘governed by
statutory provisions requirement’.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 565
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 55, point (a)
(a) up to 50% of the market value (or where
applicable and if lower 60 % of the
mortgage lending value (MLV)) must not
exceed 0.3 % of the outstanding loans in any
given year;
(a) Losses stemming from lending
collateralised by commercial real estate
property up to 50% of the market value (or
where applicable and if lower 60 % of the
mortgage lending value (MLV)) do not
exceed 0.3 % of the outstanding loans
collateralised by commercial real estate
property in any given year;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 566
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 55, point (b)
(b) overall losses stemming from
commercial real estate lending must not
exceed 0.5% of the outstanding loans in any
given year.
(b) overall losses stemming from lending
collateralised by commercial real estate
property must not exceed 0.5% of the
outstanding loans collateralised by
commercial real estate property in any
given year.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 567
Annes VI, paragraph 58
59. Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in paragraphs 59 to 62, the
unsecured portion of any item that is past
due for more than 90 days shall be assigned
a risk weight of :
58. Without prejudice to the provisions
contained in paragraphs 59 to 62, the
unsecured portion of any item that is past
due for more than 90 days shall be assigned
a risk weight of :
- 150% if value adjustments are less than
20% of the unsecured part of the exposure
gross of value adjustments;
- 150% if value adjustments are less than
20% of the unsecured part of the exposure
gross of value adjustments;
- 100% if value adjustments are no less than
20% of the unsecured part of the exposure
gross of value adjustments;
- 100% if value adjustments are no less than
20% of the unsecured part of the exposure
gross of value adjustments;
- 50%, subject to the discretion of competent
authorities, if value adjustments are no less
than 50% of the unsecured part of the
exposure gross of value adjustments.
- 50%, subject to the discretion of competent
authorities, if value adjustments are no less
than 50% of the unsecured part of the
exposure gross of value adjustments.
In the case of exposures to entities referred
to in Article 79 1 a), b) and c), competent
authorities may set a number of days past
due up to 180 days.
Or. en
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Justification
Most of public sector entities all over Europe do take more than 90 days to pay. The
suggested solution is to apply the same definition of past due loans as the one provided for by
the IRB definition of default which allows competent authorities to set a number which falls
within 90 – up to a figure of 180 days for PSE. This amendment must also be seen as
outweighing and limiting the effects of amendments 88, 95, 127, 129, 130, 164, 165, 166 and
167 which suggest extending past due to 180 days whatever the approaches and exposure
classes.
Amendment by Eoin Ryan
Amendment 568
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, introductory part
65. ‘Covered bonds’, shall mean bonds as
defined in Article 22(4) of Directive
85/611/EEC and collateralised by any of the
following eligible assets:
65. ‘Covered bonds’, shall mean bonds as
defined in Article 22(4) of Directive
85/611/EEC (UCITS) and collateralised by
any of the following eligible assets:
Or. en
Justification
This amendment partially recognises existing market flexibility by allowing the inclusion of
Step 2 public sector assets, but within a tighter limit of 10%, while at the same time
safeguarding the competitiveness of existing EU-based issuers. subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
paragraph 65 un-amended would mean that certain high-quality non-EU/EEA Step 2 assets
which are currently included up to a proportion not exceeding 20% in cover pools by some
EU issuers could no longer be included in the cover pool if the associated covered bond were
to qualify for the 10% risk weighting – notwithstanding that these bonds currently qualify for
AAA rating by external international credit rating agencies.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 569
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (a)
(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments, central banks, multilateral
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(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments in the EU, central banks,
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development banks, international
organisations that qualify for the credit
quality assessment step 1 as set out in this
Annex;
multilateral development banks,
international organisations that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex or, provided that they do not
exceed 10% of the nominal amount of
outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions, that qualify as a minimum for
the credit quality assessment step 2 as set
out in this Annex;
Or. en
Amendment by Eoin Ryan
Amendment 570
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (a)
(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments, central banks, multilateral
development banks, international
organisations that qualify for the credit
quality assessment step 1 as set out in this
Annex;
(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments in the EU and exposures to or
guaranteed by central governments, central
banks, multilateral development banks,
international organisations that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex or, provided that they do not
exceed 10% of the nominal amount of
outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions, that qualify as a minimum for
the credit quality assessment step 2 as set
out in this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
This amendment partially recognises existing market flexibility by allowing the inclusion of
Step 2 public sector assets, but within a tighter limit of 10%, while at the same time
safeguarding the competitiveness of existing EU-based issuers. subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
paragraph 65 un-amended would mean that certain high-quality non-EU/EEA Step 2 assets
which are currently included up to a proportion not exceeding 20% in cover pools by some
EU issuers could no longer be included in the cover pool if the associated covered bond were
to qualify for the 10% risk weighting – notwithstanding that these bonds currently qualify for
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AAA rating by external international credit rating agencies.
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 571
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (a)
(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments, central banks, multilateral
development banks, international
organisations that qualify for the credit
quality assessment step 1 as set out in this
Annex;
(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments in the EU and exposures to or
guaranteed by central governments, central
banks, multilateral development banks,
international organisations that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex or, provided that they do not
exceed 10% of the nominal amount of
outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions, that qualify as a minimum for
the credit quality assessment step 2 as set
out in this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
Banks are significant investors in covered bonds, especially those which would qualify for a
10% risk weighting under this proposal.
Under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 65, while no credit quality restrictions are to
be imposed on exposures within the EU, it is proposed that exposures to central governments,
central banks, international organisations, public sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities outside the EU must be of credit quality step 1.
This means that certain high-quality non-EU/EEA step 2 assets, which are currently included
up to a proportion not exceeding 20% in cover pools by some EU issuers, could no longer be
included in the cover pool if the associated covered bond were to qualify for the 10% risk
weighting – notwithstanding that these bonds currently qualify for AAA rating by external
international credit rating agencies.
This amendment partially recognises existing market flexibility by allowing the inclusion of
step 2 public sector assets, but within a tighter limit of 10%, while at the same time
safeguarding the competitiveness of existing EU-based issuers.
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Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 572
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (a)
(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments, central banks, multilateral
development banks, international
organisations that qualify for the credit
quality assessment step 1 as set out in this
Annex;
(a) exposures to or guaranteed by central
governments, central banks, multilateral
development banks, international
organisations in a contracting State to the
agreement on the European Economic
Area, Switzerland, the United States of
America, Canada or Japan that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 2 as set out
in this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
Banks are significant investors in covered bonds especially those which would qualify for a
10% risk weighting under this proposal. Under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 65, it
is proposed that exposures to central governments, central banks, international
organisations, public sector entities, regional governments and local authorities outside the
EU must be of credit quality step 1.
This means that certain high-quality step 2 assets from the European Union, the European
Economic Area, Switzerland, the United States of America, Canada or Japan, which are
currently included up to a proportion not exceeding 20% in cover pools by some EU issuers,
could no longer be included in the cover pool if the associated covered bond were to qualify
for the 10% risk weighting – notwithstanding that these bonds currently qualify for AAA
rating by external international credit rating agencies.
These amendments partially recognises existing market flexibility by allowing the inclusion of
step 2 public sector assets, but within a tighter limit of 10%, while at the same time
safeguarding the competitiveness of existing EU-based issuers.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 573
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (a)
a) les risques sur, ou garantis par, des
administrations centrales dans l'UE et les
risques sur, ou garantis par, des
administrations centrales, des banques
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(a) les risques sur, ou garantis par, des
administrations centrales dans l'UE, l’EEE
et l’OCDE et les risques sur, ou garantis par,
des administrations centrales, des banques
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centrales, des banques multilatérales de
développement ou des organisations
internationales, lorsqu'ils relèvent du
premier échelon d'évaluation de la qualité du
crédit visé dans la présente annexe;
centrales, des banques multilatérales de
développement ou des organisations
internationales, lorsqu'ils relèvent du
premier échelon d'évaluation de la qualité du
crédit visé dans la présente annexe;
Or. fr
Justification
Les points (a) et (b) de la proposition de directive stipulent que les expositions ou garanties
des administrations centrales et administrations régionales ou entités du secteur public des
pays hors UE ne sont éligibles que lorsqu’elles relèvent du premier échelon d’évaluation de
la qualité du crédit (donc sont notées AAA ou AA). Si ce n’est pas le cas, les obligations
couvertes par de telles expositions, et détenues par une banque d’un pays membre de l’UE ne
seront pas éligibles pour le traitement préférentiel en tant qu’obligations garanties.
Cela signifie que certains actifs de deuxième échelon de haute qualité en dehors de
l’UE/EEE, qui ne représentent pas actuellement plus de 20% des fonds communs de certains
établissements émetteurs de l’UE, ne pourraient plus faire partie des fonds communs dans le
cas où l’obligation garantie correspondrait à 10% de la pondération de risque – et ce, bien
que ces garanties relèvent actuellement de la classification AAA selon les services
internationaux d’informations financières.
Or pour sauvegarder la compétitivité des établissements émetteurs établis dans l'UE, il est
nécessaire d'élargir les expositions ou garanties bénéficiant du régime applicable à l'UE à
l'ensemble des pays de l'OCDE.
Amendment by Eoin Ryan
Amendment 574
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (b)
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities that are risk weighted as
exposures to institutions or central
governments and central banks according to
paragraphs 15, 9 or 10 respectively and that
qualify for the credit quality assessment step
1 as set out in this Annex;
AM\565454XM.doc
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities in the EU and exposures
to or guaranteed by public sector entities,
regional governments and local authorities
that are risk weighted as exposures to
institutions or central governments and
central banks according to paragraphs 15, 9
or 10 respectively and that qualify for the
credit quality assessment step 1 as set out in
this Annex or, provided that they do not
exceed 10% of the nominal amount of
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outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions, that qualify as a minimum for
the credit quality assessment step 2 as set
out in this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
This amendment partially recognises existing market flexibility by allowing the inclusion of
Step 2 public sector assets, but within a tighter limit of 10%, while at the same time
safeguarding the competitiveness of existing EU-based issuers. subparagraphs (a) and (b) of
paragraph 65 un-amended would mean that certain high-quality non-EU/EEA Step 2 assets
which are currently included up to a proportion not exceeding 20% in cover pools by some
EU issuers could no longer be included in the cover pool if the associated covered bond were
to qualify for the 10% risk weighting – notwithstanding that these bonds currently qualify for
AAA rating by external international credit rating agencies.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 575
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (b)
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities that are risk weighted as
exposures to institutions or central
governments and central banks according to
paragraphs 15, 9 or 10 respectively and that
qualify for the credit quality assessment step
1 as set out in this Annex;
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities in the EU and exposures to
or guaranteed by public sector entities,
regional governments and local authorities
that are risk weighted as exposures to
institutions or central governments and
central banks according to paragraphs 15, 9
or 10 respectively and that qualify for the
credit quality assessment step 1 as set out in
this Annex or, provided that they do not
exceed 10% of the nominal amount of
outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions, that qualify as a minimum for
the credit quality assessment step 2 as set
out in this Annex;
Or. en
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Justification
Banks are significant investors in covered bonds, especially those which would qualify for a
10% risk weighting under this proposal. Under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 65,
while no credit quality restrictions are to be imposed on exposures within the EU, it is
proposed that exposures to central governments, central banks, international organisations,
public sector entities, regional governments and local authorities outside the EU must be of
credit quality step 1. This means that certain high quality non-EU/EEA step 2 assets, which
are currently included up to a proportion not exceeding 20% in cover pools by some EU
issuers, could no longer be included in the cover pool if the associated covered bond were to
qualify for the 10% risk weighting notwithstanding that these bonds currently qualify for AAA
rating by external international credit rating agencies. This amendment partially recognises
existing market flexibility by allowing the inclusion of step 2 public sector assets, but within a
tighter limit of 10%, while at the same time safeguarding the competitiveness of existing EUbased issuers.
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 576
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (b)
b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities in the EU and exposures to
or guaranteed by public sector entities,
regional governments and local authorities
that are risk weighted as exposures to
institutions or central governments and
central banks according to paragraphs 15, 9
or 10 respectively and that qualify for the
credit quality assessment step 1 as set out in
this Annex;
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities in the EU and exposures to
or guaranteed by public sector entities,
regional governments and local authorities
that are risk weighted as exposures to
institutions or central governments and
central banks according to paragraphs 15, 9
or 10 respectively and that qualify for the
credit quality assessment step 1 as set out in
this Annex or, provided that they do not
exceed 10% of the nominal amount of
outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions, that qualify as a minimum for
the credit quality assessment step 2 as set
out in this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
As for subparagraph (a) above.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 577
Annex VI, Part 1, paragraph 65, point (b)
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities that are risk weighted as
exposures to institutions or central
governments and central banks according to
paragraphs 15, 9 or 10 respectively and that
qualify for the credit quality assessment
step 1 as set out in this Annex;
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities in the EU and exposures to
or guaranteed by public sector entities,
regional governments and local authorities
that are risk weighted as exposures to
institutions or central governments and
central banks according to paragraphs 15,
15a, 9 or 10 respectively and that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical errof. Replaces Amendment 132 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 578
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (b)
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities that are risk weighted as
exposures to institutions or central
governments and central banks according to
paragraphs 15, 9 or 10 respectively and that
qualify for the credit quality assessment
step 1 as set out in this Annex;
(b) exposures to or guaranteed by public
sector entities, regional governments and
local authorities that are risk weighted as
exposures to institutions or central
governments and central banks according to
paragraphs 15, 9 or 10 respectively in a
contracting State to the agreement on the
European Economic Area, Switzerland, the
United States of America, Canada or Japan
that qualify for the credit quality assessment
step 2 as set out as set out in this Annex;
Or. en
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Justification
Banks are significant investors in covered bonds especially those which would qualify for a
10% risk weighting under this proposal. Under subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 65, it
is proposed that exposures to central governments, central banks, international
organisations, public sector entities, regional governments and local authorities outside the
EU must be of credit quality step 1.
This means that certain high-quality step 2 assets from the European Union, the European
Economic Area, Switzerland, the United States of America, Canada or Japan, which are
currently included up to a proportion not exceeding 20% in cover pools by some EU issuers,
could no longer be included in the cover pool if the associated covered bond were to qualify
for the 10% risk weighting – notwithstanding that these bonds currently qualify for AAA
rating by external international credit rating agencies.
These amendments partially recognises existing market flexibility by allowing the inclusion of
step 2 public sector assets, but within a tighter limit of 10%, while at the same time
safeguarding the competitiveness of existing EU-based issuers.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 579
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (b)
b) les risques sur, ou garantis par, des entités
du secteur public ou des autorités régionales
ou locales dans l'UE et les risques sur, ou
garantis par, des entités du secteur public ou
des autorités régionales ou locales, lorsqu'ils
sont pondérés comme des risques sur des
établissements ou sur des administrations
centrales et des banques centrales
conformément aux points 15, 9 ou 10
respectivement et qu'ils relèvent du premier
échelon d'évaluation de la qualité du crédit
visé dans la présente annexe;
(b) les risques sur, ou garantis par, des
entités du secteur public ou des autorités
régionales ou locales dans l'UE, l’EEE et
l’OCDE et les risques sur, ou garantis par,
des entités du secteur public ou des autorités
régionales ou locales, lorsqu'ils sont
pondérés comme des risques sur des
établissements ou sur des administrations
centrales et des banques centrales
conformément aux points 15, 9 ou 10
respectivement et qu'ils relèvent du premier
échelon d'évaluation de la qualité du crédit
visé dans la présente annexe;
Or. fr
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Justification
Les points (a) et (b) de la proposition de directive stipulent que les expositions ou garanties
des administrations centrales et administrations régionales ou entités du secteur public des
pays hors UE ne sont éligibles que lorsqu’elles relèvent du premier échelon d’évaluation de
la qualité du crédit (donc sont notées AAA ou AA). Si ce n’est pas le cas, les obligations
couvertes par de telles expositions, et détenues par une banque d’un pays membre de l’UE ne
seront pas éligibles pour le traitement préférentiel en tant qu’obligations garanties.
Cela signifie que certains actifs de deuxième échelon de haute qualité en dehors de
l’UE/EEE, qui ne représentent pas actuellement plus de 20% des fonds communs de certains
établissements émetteurs de l’UE, ne pourraient plus faire partie des fonds communs dans le
cas où l’obligation garantie correspondrait à 10% de la pondération de risque – et ce, bien
que ces garanties relèvent actuellement de la classification AAA selon les services
internationaux d’informations financières.
Or pour sauvegarder la compétitivité des établissements émetteurs établis dans l'UE, il est
nécessaire d'élargir les expositions ou garanties bénéficiant du régime applicable à l'UE à
l'ensemble des pays de l'OCDE.
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 580
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (c)
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 10% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 10% limit;
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 15% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 15% limit. Exposures to
institutions with a maturity not exceeding
100 days shall not be comprised by the step
1 requirement but those institutions must as
a minimum qualify for credit quality
assessment step 2 as set out in this Annex;
Or. en
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Justification
A 10% ceiling on the level of substitution assets that may be held in the cover pool is too
restrictive for flexible management in this developing sector of financial services, and should
be increased to 15%.
Requiring holders of deposits eligible as substitution assets to be of Step 1 quality for covered
bonds to carry a 10% risk weighting is excessive, especially where the deposits are of shortterm duration (i.e. not exceeding 100 days). Issuers of covered bonds could be constrained
from placing deposits, eligible to qualify as substitution assets in given asset pools, within the
group structure (e.g. with the parent bank), which would adversely impact on liquidity and
could restrict bond issuance in the Union. A step 2 credit rating for such deposit holders
would reflect current market practice, while underpinning the low-risk approach which
secures such deposits.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 581
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (c)
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 10% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 10% limit;
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 15% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 15% limit. Exposures to
institutions with a maturity not exceeding
100 days shall not be comprised by the step
1 requirement but those institutions must as
a minimum qualify for credit quality
assessment step 2 as set out this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
A 10% ceiling on the level of substitution assets that may be held in the cover pool is too
restrictive for flexible management in this developing sector of financial services, and should
be increased to 15%. Requiring holders of deposits eligible as substitution assets to be of Step
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1 quality for covered bonds to carry a 10% risk weighting is excessive, especially where the
deposits are of short-term duration (i.e. not exceeding 100 days). Issuers of covered bonds
could be constrained from placing deposits, eligible to qualify as substitution assets in given
asset pools, within the group structure (e.g. with the parent bank), which would adversely
impact on liquidity and could restrict bond issuance in the Union. A step 2 credit rating for
such deposit holders would reflect current market practice, while underpinning the low-risk
approach which secures such deposits.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 582
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (c)
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 10% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 10% limit.
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 15% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 15% limit. Exposures to
institutions in the EU with a maturity not
exceeding 100 days shall not be comprised
by the step 1 requirement but those
institutions must as a minimum qualify for
credit quality assessment step 2 as set out in
this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
A 10% ceiling on the level of substitution assets that may be held in the cover pool is too
restrictive for flexible management in this developing sector of financial services, and should
be increased to 15%.
Requiring holders of deposits eligible as substitution assets to be of Step 1 quality for covered
bonds to carry a 10% risk weighting is excessive, especially where the deposits are of shortterm duration (i.e. not exceeding 100 days). Issuers of covered bonds could be constrained
from placing deposits, eligible to qualify as substitution assets in given asset pools, within the
group structure (e.g. with the parent bank), which would adversely impact on liquidity and
could restrict
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Amendment by Eoin Ryan
Amendment 583
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (c)
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 10% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 10% limit.
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 15% of the nominal
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to the
holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 15% limit. Exposures to
institutions with a maturity not exceeding
100 days shall not be comprised by the step
1 requirement but those institutions must as
a minimum qualify for credit quality
assessment step 2 as set out this Annex;
Or. en
Justification
Requiring holders of deposits eligible as substitution assets to be of Step 1 quality for covered
bonds to carry a 10% risk weighting is excessive, especially where the deposits are of shortterm duration (i.e. less than 100 days). Issuers of covered bonds could be constrained from
placing deposits eligible to qualify as substitution assets in given asset pools within the group
structure (e.g. with the parent bank), which would adversely impact on liquidity and could
restrict bond issuance in the Union. A Step 2 credit rating for such deposit holders would
reflect current market practice, while underpinning a low-risk approach which secures such
deposits.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 584
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (c)
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 10% of the nominal
AM\565454XM.doc
(c) exposures to institutions that qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set out
in this Annex. The total exposure of this
kind shall not exceed 15% of the nominal
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amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission of payments from the
obligors of loans secured by real estate to
the holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 10% limit;
amount of outstanding covered bonds of the
issuing credit institution. Exposures caused
by transmission and management of
payments from or liquidation proceeds of
the obligors of loans secured by real estate to
the holders of covered bonds shall not be
comprised by the 15% limit;
Or. en
Justification
The current text is not clear on how payments from borrowers can be managed before being
transmitted to bondholders. This creates severe administrative difficulties, as it is entirely
impractical for payments from borrowers to be transmitted immediately through to
bondholders. The proposed amendment is therefore an important clarification which seeks to
ensure that cash flows from borrowers are properly defined and can be properly managed.
Also, in line with the position of other member state trade bodies we propose raising the 10%
limit to 15%.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 585
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (c)
c) les risques sur des établissements,
lorsqu’ils relèvent du premier échelon
d’évaluation de la qualité du crédit visé dans
la présente annexe. Le total de ces risques ne
dépasse pas 10 % l’encours nominal des
obligations garanties de l’établissement de
crédit émetteur. Les risques générés par la
transmission de paiements des débiteurs de
prêts garantis par une sûreté immobilière aux
détenteurs d'obligations couvertes n'entrent
pas dans le calcul de cette limite de 10%;
(c) les risques sur des établissements,
lorsqu’ils relèvent du premier ou du
deuxième échelon d’évaluation de la qualité
du crédit visé dans la présente annexe. Le
total de ces risques ne dépasse pas 20% de
l’encours nominal des obligations garanties
de l’établissement de crédit émetteur. Les
risques générés par la transmission de
paiements des débiteurs de prêts garantis par
une sûreté immobilière aux détenteurs
d'obligations couvertes n'entrent pas dans le
calcul de cette limite de 20%;
Or. fr
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Justification
Limiter à un plafond de 10% les biens de substitution qui pourraient être compris dans les
fonds communs est une mesure trop restrictive pour la flexibilité d’un secteur de services
financiers en expansion. Ce plafond devrait donc être de 20%. Exiger des détenteurs de
dépôts admis comme biens de substitution que ceux-ci relèvent du premier échelon
d’évaluation afin que les obligations garanties correspondent à une pondération de risque de
10% semble excessif, particulièrement lorsque les dépôts sont à court terme (c.-à-d. quand ils
ne dépassent pas 100 jours). Cela pourrait empêcher les établissements émetteurs
d’obligations de garantie de faire des dépôts admis comme biens de substitution dans certains
fonds communs, ce dans le cadre de la structure de groupe (par ex. avec la banque mère).
Cette situation pourrait avoir un impact défavorable sur la liquidité et pourrait limiter
l’émission d’obligations au sein de l’Union. Un deuxième échelon d’évaluation de crédit
appliqué à ces détenteurs de dépôts correspondrait mieux à la pratique du marché actuel tout
en soulignant le fait que peu de risques sont associés à de tels dépôts.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 586
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property;
AM\565454XM.doc
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44 up
to the lesser of the principal amount of the
liens that are combined with any prior liens
and 80% of the value of the pledged
property or senior units or debt securities
issued by French Fonds Communs de
Créances or by securitisation entities
governed by the laws of a Member State
securitising residential real estate
exposures provided that at least 90% of the
assets of such Fonds Communs de
Créances or securitisation entities governed
by the laws of a Member State are
composed of first ranking mortgages, and
the units or debt securities have a credit
assessment by a nominated ECAI which is
the most favourable category of credit
assessment made by the ECAI in respect of
such units or debt securities up to the lesser
of the principal amount due under the units
or debt securities, the principal amount of
the liens, and 80% of the value of the
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pledged properties.
In 2010, the limits applying to such units or
debt securities issued by French Fonds
Communs de Creances or by securitisation
entities governed by the laws of a Member
State, as expressed in terms of minimum
credit assessment and amount eligible for
colateralising covered bonds will be rewied.
Exposures caused by transmission and
management of payments from or
liquidation proceeds of the obligors of
loans secured by pledged properties of the
senior units or debt securities shall not be
comprised in calculating the 90% limit;
Or. en
Justification
This amendment ensures that artificial barriers (such as a cap on the proportion of the
covered bond pool comprised of MBS) that have nothing to do with maintaining credit quality
are not needlessly established.
Besides, it clarifies the wording to make sure that loans above the loan-to-value (LTV) limit
are not completely excluded, but rather that only that portion of the loan that is within the
LTV limit is included in the covered bond pool.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 587
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property;
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(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44 up
to the lesser of the principal amount of the
liens that are combined with any prior liens
and 80% of the value of the pledged
property or senior units or debt securities
issued by French Fonds Communs de
Créances or by securitisation entities
governed by the laws of a Member State
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securitising residential real estate
exposures provided that at least 90% of the
assets of such Fonds Communs de
Créances or securitisation entities governed
by the laws of a Member State are
composed of first ranking mortgages, and
the units or debt securities qualify for the
credit quality assessment step 1 as set out in
this Annex, up to the lesser of the principal
amount due under the units or debt
securities, the principal amount of the
liens, and 80% of the value of the pledged
property. Exposures caused by
transmission and management of payments
from or liquidation proceeds of the obligors
of loans secured by pledged properties of
the senior units or debt securities shall not
be comprised in calculating the 90% limit;
Or. en
Justification
The proposed amendment allows for the inclusion of senior units (i.e. AAA securities) of
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and French Fonds Communs de Creances as collateral for
covered bonds provided that the mortgages backing these securities are subject to the same
restrictions as mortgages directly backing covered bonds.
Loans above the loan-to-value (LTV) limit should not be completely excluded as this would
limit access to cheap funding for higher LTV loans, relied upon by many lower income
households and first-time buyers.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 588
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property;
AM\565454XM.doc
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that, when combined with
any prior liens, fall within 80% of the value
of the pledged property; or by senior units
issued by French Fonds Communs de
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Créances or by equivalent securitisation
entities governed by the laws of a Member
State securitising residential real estate
exposures provided that, at least, 90 % of
the assets of such Fonds Communs de
Créances or of equivalent securitisation
entities governed by the laws of a Member
State are composed of mortgages that are
combined with any prior liens within 80%
of the value of the pledged property and the
units qualify for the credit quality
assessment step 1 as set out in this Annex
where such units do not exceed 20% of the
nominal amount of the outstanding issue;
Or. en
Amendment by Eoin Ryan
Amendment 589
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property;
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(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property; or by senior units issued
by French Fonds Communs de Créances or
by securitisation entities governed by the
laws of a Member State securitising
residential real estate exposures provided
that, at least, 90% of the assets of such
Fonds Communs de Créances or of
securitisation entities governed by the laws
of a Member State are composed with first
rank mortgages that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property and the units qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set
out in this Annex where such units do not
exceed 20% of the pledged property;
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Or. en
Justification
Requiring holders of deposits eligible as substitution assets to be of Step 1 quality for covered
bonds to carry a 10% risk weighting is excessive, especially where the deposits are of shortterm duration (i.e. less than 100 days). Issuers of covered bonds could be constrained from
placing deposits eligible to qualify as substitution assets in given asset pools within the group
structure (e.g. with the parent bank), which would adversely impact on liquidity and could
restrict bond issuance in the Union. A Step 2 credit rating for such deposit holders would
reflect current market practice, while underpinning a low-risk approach which secures such
deposits.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 590
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property;
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property or by senior units issued
by French Fonds Communs de Créances or
by securitisation entities governed by the
laws of a Member State securitising
residential real estate exposures provided
that, at least, 90% of the assets of such
Fonds Communs de Créances or of
securitisation entities governed by the laws
of a Member State are composed with first
rank mortgages that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property and the units qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set
out in this Annex where such units do not
exceed 20% of the pledged property;
Or. en
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Justification
The reference to French Fonds Communs de Créances (FCC) in the Council text gives
legitimate recognition to French securitisation entities and it is clearly the intention that such
treatment be extended to similar entities in other Member States. However, the use of the
word ‘equivalent’ ties the securitisation entities of other Member States to a particular
national system.
Regulators from Member States with other legal systems would have difficulty in determining
whether their own domestic schemes were equivalent to those under the French (civil code)
concept. The law must be clear and the deletion of “equivalent” would ensure a more
objective standard.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 591
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate
or shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property;
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property;
The competent authorities may recognize
loans secured by residential real estate as
eligible where the loan to value ratio of
80% is exceeded up to a maximum level of
90% if the value of the total assets pledged
as collateral for the covered bonds exceeds
the nominal amount outstanding on the
covered bond by at least 10%.
Or. en
Justification
The LTV limit of 80% for residential loans should be replaced by a limit of 90% if the value of
the collateral exceeds the amount of the covered bond by at least 10%. A limit of 80%
excludes from refinancing a lot of loans granted to individuals by French banks and only
benefits markets that split their loans. Raising the limit to 90% is allowed in the current
French law and is a provision of the text, for loans secured by commercial loans
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notwithstanding a different risk. The aim of the proposed amendment is to allow the present
French provisions not to be restricted.
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 592
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing companies as referred to in paragraph 44 where
only liens that are combined with any prior
liens within 80% of the value of the pledged
property.
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing
companies as referred to in paragraph 44
where only liens that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property; or by senior units issued
by French Fonds Communs de Créances or
by securitisation entities governed by the
laws of a Member State securitising
residential real estate exposures provided
that, at least, 90% of the assets of such
Fonds Communs de Créances or of
securitisation entities governed by the laws
of a Member State are composed with first
rank mortgages that are combined with any
prior liens within 80% of the value of the
pledged property and the units qualify for
the credit quality assessment step 1 as set
out in this Annex where such units do not
exceed 20% of the pledged property;
Or. en
Justification
The reference to French Fonds Communs de Créances (FCC) gives legitimate recognition to
French securitisation entities and it is clearly the intention that such treatment be extended to
similar entities in other Member States. However, the use of the word ‘equivalent’ ties the
securitisation entities of other Member States to a particular national system.
Regulators from Member States with other legal systems would have difficulty in determining
whether their own domestic schemes were equivalent to those under the French (civil code)
concept. The law must be clear and the deletion of “equivalent” would ensure a more
objective standard.
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Amendment by Karin Riis-Jørgensen
Amendment 593
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d)
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing companies as referred to in paragraph 44 where
only liens that are combined with any prior
liens within 80% of the value of the pledged
property.
(d) loans secured by residential real estate or
shares in Finnish residential housing companies as referred to in paragraph 44 where
only liens that are combined with any prior
liens initially within 80% of the value of the
pledged property.
Or. en
Justification
This amendment is necessary, since a requirement of continuous compliance with LTV limits
will reinforce the negative effect of the new Directive on the economic cycle, because lenders
who fund themselves through the issue of covered bonds will be forced to put extra capital
aside to cover their credits (like other lenders) and at the same time top up the collateral
which backs their covered bonds.
Furthermore, a requirement of continuous compliance implies that covered bonds might
change their status over time from covered bonds to not covered bond (ordinary bonds). This
would pose problems to both bond investors and covered bond issuers and would also create
uncertainty concerning the “covered bond” concept in general.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 594
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e)
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens
within 60% of the value of the pledged
property. The competent authorities may
recognise loans secured by commercial real
estate as eligible where the Loan to Value
ratio of 60% is exceeded up to a maximum
level of 70% if the value of the total assets
pledged as collateral for the covered bonds
exceed the nominal amount outstanding on
the covered bond by at least 10%, and the
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(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that, when combined with any prior liens,
fall within 60% of the value of the pledged
property or by senior units issued by
French Fonds Communs de Créances or by
equivalent securitisation entities governed
by the laws of a Member State securitising
commercial real estate exposures provided
that, at least, 90% of the assets of such
Fonds Communs de Créances or of
equivalent securitisation entities governed
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bondholders' claim meets the legal certainty
requirements set out in Annex IX. The
bondholders' claim must take priority over
all other claims on the collateral.
by the laws of a Member State are
composed of mortgages that are combined
with any prior liens within 60% of the value
of the pledged property and the units
qualify for the credit quality assessment
step 1 as set out in this Annex where such
units do not exceed 20% of the nominal
amount of the outstanding issue. The
competent authorities may recognise loans
secured by commercial real estate as eligible
where the Loan to Value ratio of 60% is
exceeded up to a maximum level of 70% if
the value of the total assets pledged as
collateral for the covered bonds exceed the
nominal amount outstanding on the covered
bond by at least 10%, and the bondholders'
claim meets the legal certainty requirements
set out in Annex VIII. The bondholders'
claim must take priority over all other claims
on the collateral.
Or. en
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 595
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e)
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens
within 60% of the value of the pledged
property. The competent authorities may
recognise loans secured by commercial real
estate as eligible where the Loan to Value
ratio of 60% is exceeded up to a maximum
level of 70% if the value of the total assets
pledged as collateral for the covered bonds
exceed the nominal amount outstanding on
the covered bond by at least 10%, and the
bondholders' claim meets the legal certainty
requirements set out in Annex IX. The
AM\565454XM.doc
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 up to the lesser
of the principal amount of the liens that are
combined with any prior liens and 60% of
the value of the pledged property or senior
units or debt securities issued French
Fonds Communs de Créances or by
securitisation entities governed by the laws
of a Member State securitising residential
real estate exposures provided that at least
90% of the assets of such Fonds Communs
de Créances or securitisation entities
governed by the laws of a Member State are
composed of first ranking mortgages, and
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bondholders' claim must take priority over
all other claims on the collateral.
the units or debt securities qualify for the
credit quality assessment step 1 as set out in
this Annex, up to the lesser of the principal
amount due under the units or debt
securities, the principal amount of the
liens, and 60% of the value of the pledged
property. Exposures caused by
transmission and management of payments
from or liquidation proceeds of the obligors
of loans secured by pledged properties of
the senior units or debt securities shall not
be comprised in calculating the 90% limit.
The competent authorities may raise the
Loan to Value ratio of 60% up to a
maximum level of 70% if the value of the
total assets pledged as collateral for the
covered bonds must exceed the nominal
amount outstanding on the covered bonds by
at least 10%, and the bondholders’ claim
meet the legal certainty requirements set out
in Annex IX. The bondholders’ claim must
take priority over all other claims on the
collateral
Or. en
Justification
This allows for the inclusion of senior units of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and French
Fonds Communs de Creances as collateral for covered bonds provided that the mortgages
backing these securities are subject to the same restrictions as mortgages directly backing
covered bonds.
Loans above the loan-to-value (LTV) limit should not be completely excluded as this would
limit access to cheap funding for higher LTV loans.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 596
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e)
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens within
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(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens within
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60% of the value of the pledged property.
The competent authorities may recognise
loans secured by commercial real estate as
eligible where the Loan to Value ratio of
60% is exceeded up to a maximum level of
70% if the value of the total assets pledged
as collateral for the covered bonds exceed
the nominal amount outstanding on the
covered bond by at least 10%, and the
bondholders' claim meets the legal certainty
requirements set out in Annex IX. The
bondholders' claim must take priority over
all other claims on the collateral.
60% of the value of the pledged property; or
by senior units issued by French Fonds
Communs de Créances or securitisation
entities governed by the laws of a Member
State securitising commercial real estate
exposures provided that, at least, 90% of
the assets of such Fonds Communs de
Créances or of securitisation entities
governed by the laws of a Member State are
composed with first rank mortgage that are
combined with any prior liens within 60%
of the pledged property and the units
qualify for the credit quality assessment
step 1 as set out in this Annex where such
units do not exceed 20% of the nominal
amount of the covered bonds issue. The
competent authorities may recognise loans
secured by commercial real estate as eligible
where the Loan to Value ratio of 60% is
exceeded up to a maximum level of 70% if
the value of the total assets pledged as
collateral for the covered bonds exceed the
nominal amount outstanding on the covered
bond by at least 10%, and the bondholders'
claim meets the legal certainty requirements
set out in Annex IX. The bondholders' claim
must take priority over all other claims on
the collateral.
Or. en
Justification
The reference to French Fonds Communs de Créances (FCC) in the Council text gives
legitimate recognition to French securitisation entities and it is clearly the intention that such
treatment be extended to similar entities in other Member States. However, the use of the
word ‘equivalent’ ties the securitisation entities of other Member States to a particular
national system. Regulators from Member States with other legal systems would have
difficulty in determining whether their own domestic schemes were equivalent to those under
the French (civil code) concept. The law must be clear and the deletion of “equivalent” would
ensure a more objective standard.
AM\565454XM.doc
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Amendment by Eoin Ryan
Amendment 597
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e)
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens within
60% of the value of the pledged property.
The competent authorities may recognise
loans secured by commercial real estate as
eligible where the Loan to Value ratio of
60% is exceeded up to a maximum level of
70% if the value of the total assets pledged
as collateral for the covered bonds exceed
the nominal amount outstanding on the
covered bond by at least 10%, and the
bondholders' claim meets the legal certainty
requirements set out in Annex IX. The
bondholders' claim must take priority over
all other claims on the collateral.
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens within
60% of the value of the pledged property; or
by senior units issued by French Fonds
Communs de Créances or securitisation
entities governed by the laws of a Member
State securitising commercial real estate
exposures provided that, at least, 90% of
the assets of such Fonds Communs de
Créances or of securitisation entities
governed by the laws of a Member State are
composed with first rank mortgages that
are combined with any prior liens within
60% of the pledged property and the units
qualify for the credit quality assessment
step 1 as set out in this Annex where such
units do not exceed 20% of the nominal
amount of the covered bonds issue. The
competent authorities may recognise loans
secured by commercial real estate as eligible
where the LTV ratio of 60% is exceeded up
to a maximum level of 70% if the value of
the total assets pledged as collateral for the
covered bonds must exceed the nominal
amount outstanding on the covered bond by
at least 10%, and the bondholders’ claim
meet the legal certainty requirements set out
in Annex IX. The bondholders’ claim must
take priority over all other claims on the
collateral.
Or. en
Justification
Requiring holders of deposits eligible as substitution assets to be of Step 1 quality for covered
bonds to carry a 10% risk weighting is excessive, especially where the deposits are of shortterm duration (i.e. less than 100 days). Issuers of covered bonds could be constrained from
placing deposits eligible to qualify as substitution assets in given asset pools within the group
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structure (e.g. with the parent bank), which would adversely impact on liquidity and could
restrict bond issuance in the Union. A Step 2 credit rating for such deposit holders would
reflect current market practice, while underpinning a low-risk approach which secures such
deposits.
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 598
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e)
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens within
60 % of the value of the pledged property;
The competent authorities may recognise
loans secured by commercial real estate as
eligible where the LTV ratio of 60% is
exceeded up to a maximum level of 70% if
the value of the total assets pledged as
collateral for the covered bonds must exceed
the nominal amount outstanding on the
covered bond by at least 10%, and the
bondholders' claim meet the legal certainty
requirements set out in Annex IX. The
bondholders' claim must take priority over
all other claims on the collateral.
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens within
60% of the value of the pledged property; or
by senior units issued by French Fonds
Communs de Créances or securitisation
entities governed by the laws of a Member
State securitising commercial real estate
exposures provided that, at least, 90% of
the assets of such Fonds Communs de
Créances or of securitisation entities
governed by the laws of a Member State are
composed with first rank mortgages that
are combined with any prior liens within
60% of the pledged property and the units
qualify for the credit quality assessment
step 1 as set out in this Annex where such
units do not exceed 20% of the nominal
amount of the covered bonds issue. The
competent authorities may recognise loans
secured by commercial real estate as eligible
where the LTV ratio of 60% is exceeded up
to a maximum level of 70% if the value of
the total assets pledged as collateral for the
covered bonds must exceed the nominal
amount outstanding on the covered bonds by
at least 10%, and the bondholders’ claim
meet the legal certainty requirements set out
in Annex IX. The bondholders’ claim must
take priority over all other claims on the
collateral.
Or. en
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Justification
As per subparagraph (d) above.
Also, typographical correction of “bonds” for “bond”.
Amendment by Karin Riis-Jørgensen
Amendment 599
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e)
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens within
60% of the value of the pledged property.
The competent authorities may recognise
loans secured by commercial real estate as
eligible where the Loan to Value ratio of
60% is exceeded up to a maximum level of
70% if the value of the total assets pledged
as collateral for the covered bonds exceed
the nominal amount outstanding on the
covered bond by 10%, and the bondholders´
claim meets the legal certainty requirements
set out in Annex IX. The bondholders´ claim
must take priority over all other claims on
the collateral.
(e) loans secured by commercial real estate
or shares in Finnish housing companies as
referred to in paragraph 49 where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens
initially within 60% of the value of the
pledged property. The competent authorities
may recognise loans secured by commercial
real estate as eligible where the Loan to
Value ratio of 60% is exceeded up to a
maximum level of 70% if the value of the
total assets pledged as collateral for the
covered bonds exceed the nominal amount
outstanding on the covered bond by 10%,
and the bondholders´ claim meets the legal
certainty requirements set out in Annex IX.
The bondholders´ claim must take priority
over all other claims on the collateral.
Or. en
Justification
See amendment to Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (d).
Amendment by ◄Gay Mitchell►
Amendment 600
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e a) (new)
(ea) loans secured by ships where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens
within 60% of the value of the pledged ship.
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Or. en
Justification
The scope of the expression “collateralised” at the end of 65 (f) needs to be clarified so as to
make it clear that the requirements of paragraph 65(a) to (f) apply to the 100% of nominal
assets required to back the covered bonds in issue, but not to any excess asset coverage above
that 100% requirement, but which member States may allow so as to ensure additional
protection in law against the covered bonds in issue. It is also necessary to clarify that the
100% nominal asset backing can include cross-currency derivatives which may be used to
hedge the cover pool’s asset exposures against the
Amendment by ◄José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil►
Amendment 601
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, point (e a) (new)
(ea) loans secured by ships where only liens
that are combined with any prior liens
within 60% of the value of the pledged ship.
Or. en
Justification
The scope of the expression “collateralised” at the end of 65 (f) needs to be clarified so as to
make it clear that the requirements of paragraph 65(a) to (f) apply to the 100% of nominal
assets required to back the covered bonds in issue, but not to any excess asset coverage above
that 100% requirement, but which member States may allow so as to ensure additional
protection in law against the covered bonds in issue. It is also necessary to clarify that the
100% nominal asset backing can include cross-currency derivatives which may be used to
hedge the cover pool’s asset exposures against the
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 602
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 a (new)
For these purposes -"collateralised" means exposures as described and subject
to the restrictions in subparagraph 1, points
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(a) to (ea) which are:
(i) dedicated to the protection of holders of
covered bonds against losses; and
(ii) of a nominal amount equal to that of
outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions (after taking into account any
cross currency derivatives which hedge
those exposures against those bonds).
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by G. Mitchell.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 603
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 a (new)
For these purposes -"collateralised" means exposures as described and subject
to the restrictions in subparagraph 1, points
(a) to (ea) which are:
(i) dedicated to the protection of holders of
covered bonds against losses; and
(ii) of a nominal amount equal to that of
outstanding covered bonds of issuing
institutions (after taking into account any
cross currency derivatives which hedge
those exposures against those bonds).
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by J.M. Garcia-Margallo.
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Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 604
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 b (new)
Where covered bonds are collateralised,
Member States may permit additional
exposures, whether or not described or
qualifying under restrictions in
subparagraphs (a) to (ea), to be dedicated
in law to the protection of those covered
bonds against losses.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by G. Mitchell.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 605
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 b (new)
Where covered bonds are collateralised,
Member States may permit additional
exposures, whether or not described or
qualifying under restrictions in
subparagraph 1, points (a) to (ea), to be
dedicated in law to the protection of those
covered bonds against losses.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by J.M. Garcia-Margallo.
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Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 606
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 c (new)
Until 31 December 2010 the 20% limit for
senior units issued by French Fonds
Communs de Créances or by securitisation
entities as specified in subparagraph 1,
points (d) and (e) does not apply provided
that those senior units have a credit
assessment by a nominated ECAI which is
the most favourable category of credit
assessment made by the ECAI in respect of
covered bonds. Before the end of this
period this derogation shall be reviewed
and consequent to such review the
Commission may as appropriate extend this
period in accordance with the procedure set
out in Article 151 with or without a further
review clause.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by G. Mitchell.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 607
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 c (new)
Until 31 December 2010 the 20% limit for
senior units issued by French Fonds
Communs de Créances or by securitisation
entities as specified in subparagraph 1,
points (d) and (e) does not apply provided
that those senior units have a credit
assessment by a nominated ECAI which is
the most favourable category of credit
assessment made by the ECAI in respect of
covered bonds. Before the end of this
period this derogation shall be reviewed
and consequent to such review the
Commission may as appropriate extend this
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period in accordance with the procedure set
out in Article 151 with or without a further
review clause.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by J.M. Garcia-Margallo.
Amendment by Gay Mitchell
Amendment 608
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 d (new)
1d. Until 31 December 2010 the figure of
60% indicated in subparagraph 1 point (ea)
can be replaced with a figure of 70%.
Before the end of this period this
derogation shall be reviewed and
consequent to such review the Commission
may as appropriate extend this period in
accordance with the procedure set out in
Article 151 with or without a further review
clause.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by G. Mitchell
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 609
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 65, subparagraph 1 d (new)
1d. Until 31 December 2010 the figure of
60% indicated in subparagraph 1 point (ea)
can be replaced with a figure of 70%.
Before the end of this period this
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derogation shall be reviewed and
consequent to such review the Commission
may as appropriate extend this period in
accordance with the procedure set out in
Article 151 with or without a further review
clause.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to par. 65, point (e) a (new) by J.M. Garcia-Margallo.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 610
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 70
70. Short-term exposures on an institution or
corporate for which a credit assessment by a
nominated ECAI is available shall be
assigned a risk weight according to Table 6
in accordance with the mapping by the
competent authorities of the credit
assessments of eligible ECAIs to six steps in
a credit quality assessment scale:
70. Short-term exposures on an credit
institution or corporate for which a credit
assessment by a nominated ECAI is
available shall be assigned a risk weight
according to Table 6 in accordance with the
mapping by the competent authorities of the
credit assessments of eligible ECAIs to six
steps in a credit quality assessment scale:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 611
Annex VI, part 1, paragraph 86
86. Where a credit institution provides credit
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86. Where a credit institution provides credit
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protection for a number of exposures under
terms that the nth default among the
exposures shall trigger payment and that this
credit event shall terminate the contract, if
the product has an external credit assessment
from an eligible ECAI the risk weights
prescribed Articles 78 to 83 shall be applied.
If the product is not rated by an eligible
ECAI, the risk weights of the exposures
included in the basket will be aggregated,
excluding n-1 exposures, up to a maximum
of 1250% and multiplied by the nominal
amount of the protection provided by the
credit derivative to obtain the risk weighted
asset amount. The n-1 exposures to be
excluded from the aggregation shall be
determined on the basis that they shall
include those exposures each of which
produces a lower risk-weighted exposure
amount than the risk-weighted exposure
amount of any of the exposures included in
the aggregation.
protection for a number of exposures under
terms that the nth default among the
exposures shall trigger payment and that this
credit event shall terminate the contract, if
the product has an external credit assessment
from an eligible ECAI the risk weights
prescribed Articles 94 to 101 shall be
applied. If the product is not rated by an
eligible ECAI, the risk weights of the
exposures included in the basket will be
aggregated, excluding n-1 exposures, up to a
maximum of 1250% and multiplied by the
nominal amount of the protection provided
by the credit derivative to obtain the risk
weighted asset amount. The n-1 exposures to
be excluded from the aggregation shall be
determined on the basis that they shall
include those exposures each of which
produces a lower risk-weighted exposure
amount than the risk-weighted exposure
amount of any of the exposures included in
the aggregation.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 612
Annex VI, part 2, paragraph 9, point (c a) (new)
(ca) in case at least two banks use the
ECAI’s individual credit assessment for
bond issuing and/or assessing credit risks.
Or. en
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Justification
In order to providing for the full credibility of ECAI’s individual credit assessment, the
amendment makes for greater rigour in authorising and recognising the new rating agencies
and guarantees the reliability of the judgements the ECAIs issue on the borrower’s
creditworthiness. As a matter of fact, the market credibility is one of the most important
requirement to recognise the eligible ECAI and market acceptance of them represents a
significant proof of ECAIs’ reliability.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 613
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 3, subparagraph 4
Risk weight (RW) = LGD*(N[....
Risk weight (RW) = (LGD*N[....
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 614
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 5, subparagraph 3
In assigning risk weights to specialised
lending exposures institutions shall take into
account the following factors: Financial
strength, political and legal environment,
transaction and/or asset characteristics,
strength of the sponsor and developer
including any public private partnership
income stream, security package.
In assigning risk weights to specialised
lending exposures credit institutions shall
take into account the following factors:
Financial strength, political and legal
environment, transaction and/or asset
characteristics, strength of the sponsor and
developer including any public private
partnership income stream, security package.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 615
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 7
7. For purchased corporate receivables,
refundable purchase discounts, collateral or
partial guarantees that provide first-loss
protection for default losses, or both, may be
treated as first-loss positions under the IRB
securitisation framework.
7. For purchased corporate receivables,
refundable purchase discounts, collateral or
partial guarantees that provide first-loss
protection for default losses, dilution losses,
or both, may be treated as first-loss positions
under the IRB securitisation framework.
Or. en
Justification
The German version of the COM text already included "dilution losses". For the English
version, this amendment is needed.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 616
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 9, subparagraph 3
Risk weight:
LGD*(N[...
Risk weight (RW):
(LGD*N[...
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 617
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 10
10. Bei Retailforderungen, die durch
Immobilien abgesichert sind, wird die nach
der unter Nummer 9 angegebenen Formel
ermittelte Korrelation durch eine Korrelation
(R) von 0,15 ersetzt.
10. Bei Hypothekendarlehen und
Grundpfandrechten an Einzelpersonen
wird die nach der unter Nummer 9
angegebenen Formel ermittelte Korrelation
durch eine Korrelation (R) von 0,15 ersetzt.
Or. de
Justification
Diese Formulierung ist zu wählen, um die Einheitlichkeit zwischen Basel und der EURegelung zu gewährleisten.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 618
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 15
15. Subject to approval of the competent
authorities, a credit institution may employ
different approaches to different portfolios
where the credit institution itself uses
different approaches internally. Where a
credit institution is permitted to use different
approaches, the credit institution shall
demonstrate to the competent Authorities
that the choice is made consistently and is
not determined by regulatory arbitrage
considerations.
15. A credit institution may employ different
approaches to different portfolios where the
credit institution itself uses different
approaches internally. Where a credit
institution uses different approaches, the
credit institution shall demonstrate to the
competent Authorities that the choice is
made consistently and is not determined by
regulatory arbitrage considerations
Or. en
Justification
The possibility to employ different approaches for equity exposures should be allowed in all
the 25 Member States and not as a national discretion, as in any cases the credit institution
ought to demonstrate to the competent authorities that the choice is made consistently.
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Otherwise, credit institutions operating across borders could be subject to materially different
treatment to competitors operating in the same market. This would be inconsistent with the
Single Market objective.
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 619
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 16
16. Notwithstanding paragraph 15
competent authorities may allow the
attribution of risk weighted exposure
amounts for equity exposures to ancillary
services undertakings according to the
treatment of other non credit-obligation
assets.
16. Notwithstanding paragraph 15
competent authorities may allow the
attribution of risk weighted exposure
amounts for equity exposures to ancillary
services undertakings according to the
treatment of other non credit-obligation
assets.
The same risk weight receive equity
exposures to regional or central credit
institutions with which the lending credit
institution is associated in an alliance of
risks operating under the same trademark.
Or. en
Justification
Other groups like co-operative groups which for example adhere to a joint (mutual)
guarantee scheme or system or form an alliance of risk, which protect the credit institution
and in particular ensure its liquidity and solvency (as stipulated by directive 94/19/EC)
should be treated equally compared to a group referred to in paragraph 7. There are entities
that usually belong to all of these members which guarantee the existence of the single credit
institution and thereby increase financial stability of the whole group and the financial sector
as a whole. For all members of such a group having an institutional protection scheme
together are highly interested in absorbing possible losses and therefore guarantee the
existence of such a counterparty, the risk situation can be seen at least as good as within a
group referred to in paragraph 7. Such a group is operating under the same brand and
therefore appears as a unit within the market.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 620
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 20
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20. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be calculated according to the formulas
in paragraph 3. If institutions do not have
sufficient information to use the definition of
default set out in part 4, paragraphs 44 to 48,
a scaling factor of 1.5 shall be applied to the
risk weights.
20. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be calculated according to the formulas
in paragraph 3. If credit institutions do not
have sufficient information to use the
definition of default set out in part 4,
paragraphs 44 to 48, a scaling factor of 1.5
shall be applied to the risk weights.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 621
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 23
23. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be the potential loss on the institution’s
equity exposures as derived using internal
value-at-risk models subject to the 99th
percentile, one-tailed confidence interval of
the difference between quarterly returns and
an appropriate risk-free rate computed over
a long-term sample period, multiplied by
12.5. The risk weighted exposure amounts
at the individual exposure level shall not be
less than the sum of minimum risk
weighted exposure amounts required under
the PD/LGD Approach and the
corresponding expected loss amounts
multiplied by 12.5.
23. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be the potential loss on the institution’s
equity exposures as derived using internal
value-at-risk models subject to the 99th
percentile, one-tailed confidence interval of
quarterly returns computed over a long-term
sample period, multiplied by 12.5.
Or. en
Justification
Under the Internal Models (“VaR” models), an indirect floor has been assigned. Such a floor
results in banks that have developed equity VaR models would have to link the PD/LGD
floors to the VaR model on an exposure by exposure basis. A VaR model is essentially a
portfolio model with one outcome. Isolating individual exposures from the portfolio would be
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inconsistent with the purpose of a VaR model in which portfolio(concentration and
correlation) effects have been modelled. This indirect threshold would provide a disincentive
for the most Advanced Approach, because the risk weight under the VaR approach can only
be equal or higher than under the PD/LGD approach. The VaR approach is the most risk
sensitive and sophisticated approach and once the internal VaR model meets the validation
requirements of the home supervisor, the VaR outcome should be used for capital cost
calculations without ensuing recalibration.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 622
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 23
23. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be the potential loss on the institution’s
equity exposures as derived using internal
value-at-risk models subject to the 99th
percentile, one-tailed confidence interval of
the difference between quarterly returns and
an appropriate risk-free rate computed over a
long-term sample period, multiplied by 12.5.
The risk weighted exposure amounts at the
individual exposure level shall not be less
than the sum of minimum risk weighted
exposure amounts required under the
PD/LGD Approach and the corresponding
expected loss amounts multiplied by 12.5.
23. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be the potential loss on the credit
institution’s equity exposures as derived
using internal value-at-risk models subject to
the 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence
interval of the difference between quarterly
returns and an appropriate risk-free rate
computed over a long-term sample period,
multiplied by 12.5. The risk weighted
exposure amounts at the individual exposure
level shall not be less than the sum of
minimum risk weighted exposure amounts
required under the PD/LGD Approach and
the corresponding expected loss amounts
multiplied by 12.5 and calculated on the
basis of the PD values set out in Annex VII
Part 2, paragraph 22, subparagraph (a)
and the corresponding LDG values set out
in Annex VII, Part 2, paragraphs 23 and
24.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error. Substitutes Amendment 151 of Radwan draft report.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 623
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 25
25. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be calculated according to the formula:
25. The risk weighted exposure amounts
shall be calculated according to the formula:
Risk-weighted exposure amount = 100% *
exposure value
Risk-weighted exposure amount = 100% *
exposure value except for when the
exposure is a residual value in which case
it should be provisioned for each year and
will be calculated as follows: 1/t * 100% *
exposure value; where t is the number of
years of the lease contract term.
Or. en
Justification
If a lessee is in default before the end of the lease contract term, the credit risk relating to this
event is taken into account via LGDs. In the other case of a lessee not being in default, the
residual value of the leased asset is exclusively subject to market risk and, even then, this risk
is only realised at the end of the contract. The credit institution should take into account a
portion of the residual value risk each year over the lease contract term. The most simple and
effective way to determine this proportion is to take into account the same fraction of the
exposure every year.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 624
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 29, Table 2
Text proposed by the Commission
Remaining
Maturity
Less than 2.5 years
category
1
0%
category
2
5%
category
3
35%
category
4
100%
category
5
625%
Equal or more than
2.5 years EL
5%
10%
35%
100%
625%
Amendment by Parliament
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Remaining
Maturity
Less than 2.5 years
category
1
0%
category
2
0.4%
category
3
2.8%
category
4
8%
category
5
50%
Equal or more than
2.5 years
0.4%
0.8%
2.8%
8%
50%
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 625
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 29, subparagraph 2
Where competent authorities have
authorised a credit institution to generally
assign preferential risk weights of 50% to
exposures in category 1, and 70% to
exposures in category 2, the EL value for
exposures in category 1 shall be 0%, and for
exposures in category 2 shall be 5%.
Where competent authorities have
authorised a credit institution to generally
assign preferential risk weights of 50% to
exposures in category 1, and 70% to
exposures in category 2, the EL value for
exposures in category 1 shall be 0%, and for
exposures in category 2 shall be 0.4%.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 626
Annex VII, part 1, paragraph 30
30. The expected loss amounts for equity
exposures where the risk weighted exposure
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30. The expected loss amounts for equity
exposures where the risk weighted exposure
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amounts are calculated according to the
methods set out in paragraphs 17 to 19, shall
be calculated according to the following
formula:
amounts are calculated according to the
methods set out in paragraphs 17 to 19, shall
be calculated according to the following
formula:
Expected loss amount = EL × exposure
value
Expected loss amount = EL × exposure value
The EL values shall be the following:
The EL values shall be the following:
Expected loss (EL) = 10% for private equity
exposures in sufficiently diversified
portfolios
Expected loss (EL) = 10% for exchange
traded equity exposures.
Expected loss (EL) = 30% for all other
equity exposures.
Expected loss (EL) = 0.8% for private
equity exposures in sufficiently diversified
portfolios
Expected loss (EL) = 0.8% for exchange
traded equity exposures.
Expected loss (EL) = 2.4% for all other
equity exposures.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 627
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 6
6. Credit institutions using own LGD
estimates may recognise unfunded credit
protection by adjusting PDs subject to
paragraph 11.
6. Credit institutions using own LGD
estimates may recognise unfunded credit
protection by adjusting PDs subject to
paragraph 10.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 628
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 10
10. Notwithstanding paragraph 8, if a credit
institution is permitted to use own LGD
estimates for exposures to corporates,
institutions, central governments and central
banks, unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD or LGD
estimates subject to minimum requirements
as specified in part 4 and approval of
competent authorities. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor.
10. Notwithstanding paragraph 8, if a credit
institution is permitted to use own LGD
estimates for exposures to corporates,
institutions, central governments and central
banks, unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD and/or LGD
subject to minimum requirements as
specified in part 4 and approval of
competent authorities. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor.
Or. en
Justification
Since the ultimate repayment source is represented by the guarantor of the exposure, it is the
PD but also the LGD estimates of this guarantor that reflect the risk of the bank that
ultimately is incurred. The PD substitution implies that the bank incurs a risk on the
guarantor; consequently, it is this party’s LGD that should be used. Double default
methodology is deemed to change this stipulation.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 629
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 10
10. Notwithstanding paragraph 8, if a credit
institution is permitted to use own LGD
estimates for exposures to corporates,
institutions, central governments and central
banks, unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD or LGD
estimates subject to minimum requirements
as specified in part 4 and approval of
competent authorities. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
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10. Notwithstanding paragraph 8, if a credit
institution is permitted to use own LGD
estimates for exposures to corporates,
institutions, central governments and central
banks, unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD and/or LGD
estimates subject to minimum requirements
as specified in part 4 and approval of
competent authorities. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
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adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor.
adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor.
Or. en
Justification
Since the ultimate repayment source is represented by the guarantor of the exposure, it is the
PD but also the LGD estimates of this guarantor that reflect the risk of the bank that
ultimately is incurred. The PD substitution implies that the bank incurs a risk on the
guarantor; consequently, it is this party’s LGD that should be used. Double default
methodology is deemed to change this stipulation.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 630
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 10
10. Notwithstanding paragraph 8, if a credit
institution is permitted to use own LGD
estimates for exposures to corporates,
institutions, central governments and central
banks, unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD or LGD
estimates subject to minimum requirements
as specified in part 4 and approval of
competent authorities. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor.
10. Notwithstanding paragraph 8, if a credit
institution is permitted to use own LGD
estimates for exposures to corporates,
institutions, central governments and central
banks, unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD and/or LGD
estimates subject to minimum requirements
as specified in part 4 and approval of
competent authorities. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor.
Or. en
Justification
Since the ultimate repayment source is represented by the guarantor of the exposure, it is the
PD but also LGD estimates of this guarantor that reflect the risk of the bank that ultimately is
incurred.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 631
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Notwithstanding paragraph 8, if a
credit institution is permitted to use own
LGD estimates for exposures in covered
bonds, the institution may use data
provided by the issuing institution.
Or. en
Justification
When calculating the capital requirements under the advanced approach, a covered bond
investor has to estimate the probability of default (PD) of the issuer and the loss given default
(LGD) of the bond without having access to the relevant LGD-data. The investor will not
know the LGDs of the cover pool and he is prevented from using third party data (i.e. the
issuer given data, if available) as own estimates. In order to assert its high credit quality,
investors must be permitted to use third party data in calculating the capital requirements on
covered bonds under the advanced approach.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 632
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 14
14. The competent authorities may allow for
exposures to corporates situated in the
Community and having consolidated sales
and consolidated assets of less than EUR
500 million the use of M as set out in
paragraph 11.
14. The competent authorities may allow for
exposures to corporates situated in the
Community and having consolidated sales
or consolidated assets of less than EUR 500
million the use of M as set out in paragraph
11.
Or. en
Justification
The right of the member states to exempt certain corporates from the use of effective maturity
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in the advanced IRB approach is likely not to apply for housing and real estate corporates in
Germany as they often exceed the threshold value in their consolidated assets due to their
high investment costs. The maturity adjustments impact especially the housing and real estate
corporates in Germany and Austria, because they are largely funded by mortgage loans with
long maturities. Experience in the past shows that this financing scheme does not result in an
increase of risk.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 633
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 20
20. Credit institutions shall provide own
estimates of LGDs subject to minimum
requirements as specified in part 4 and
approval of competent authorities. For
dilution risk of purchased receivables an
LGD value of 75% shall be used. If a credit
institution can decompose its EL estimates
for dilution risk of purchased receivables
into PDs and LGDs in a reliable manner, the
PD estimate may be used.
20. Credit institutions shall provide own
estimates of LGDs subject to minimum
requirements as specified in part 4 and
approval of competent authorities. For
dilution risk of purchased receivables an
LGD value of 75% shall be used. If a credit
institution can decompose its EL estimates
for dilution risk of purchased receivables
into PDs and LGDs in a reliable manner, the
LGD estimate may be used.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 634
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 21
21. Unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD or LGD
estimates, subject to minimum requirements
as specified in part 4, paragraphs 95 to 103
and approval by the competent authorities,
either in support of an individual exposure
or a pool of exposures. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
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21. Unfunded credit protection may be
recognised by adjusting PD or LGD
estimates, subject to minimum requirements
as specified in part 4, paragraphs 95 to 103
and approval by the competent authorities,
either in support of an individual exposure
or a pool of exposures. A credit institution
shall not assign guaranteed exposures an
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adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor.
adjusted PD or LGD such that the adjusted
risk weight would be lower than that of a
comparable, direct exposure to the
guarantor, such as that resulting from the
application of the same approach for the
guaranteed exposure and the guarantor.
Or. en
Justification
It is proposed to amend §21 of part 2 of Appendix VII, incorporating a proposal intended to
be applied only when the exposure guaranteed and the guarantor are covered by an identical
internal rating method as the current treatment does not appear to be prudentially justified.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 635
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 22, point (c)
(c) 0.40% for exchange traded equity
exposures including other short positions as
set out in part 1, paragraph 17;
(c) 0.40% for exchange traded equity
exposures including other short positions as
set out in part 1, paragraph 18;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 636
Annex VII, part 2, paragraph 22, point (d)
(d) 1.25% for all other equity exposures
including other short positions as set out in
part 1, paragraph 17.
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(d) 1.25% for all other equity exposures
including other short positions as set out in
part 1, paragraph 18.
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Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 637
Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 4
4. The exposure value for leases shall be the
discounted lease payment stream.
4. The exposure value for leases shall be the
discounted minimum lease payments.
Minimum lease payments are the payments
over the lease term that the lessee is or can
be required to make and any bargain
option (i.e. option for which the exercise is
reasonably certain). Any guaranteed
residual value, fulfilling the set of
conditions in Annex VIII, part 1,
paragraphs 26 to 28 regarding the
eligibility of protection providers as well as
the minimum requirements for recognising
other types of guarantees provided in
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraphs 14 to 18,
should also be included in the minimum
lease payments.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission's text calls for a split between lease payment streams and residual values.
This has practical application difficulties. To avoid this, lease exposures should be
equivalent to IAS 17 (the IASB standard that sets out accounting rules for leasing) minimum
lease payments as these include guaranteed residual values.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 638
Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 4
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4. Bei einem Leasing entspricht der
Forderungswert dem abgezinsten
Leasingzahlungsstrom.
4. Bei einem Leasing entspricht der
Forderungswert den abgezinsten
Mindestleasingzahlungen.
Mindestleasingzahlungen sind Zahlungen
über den Leasingzeitraum, zu denen der
Leasingnehmer verpflichtet wird oder
werden kann und jegliche günstige (sehr
wahrscheinlich auszuübende) Kaufoption.
Jeglicher garantierter Restwert, der die in
Anhang VIII, Teil 1, Absatz 26 bis 28
ausgeführten Bedingungen für die
Ansprüche der Sicherungsgeber sowie die
in Anhang VIII, Teil 2, Absätze 14 bis 18
genannten Mindestanforderungen erfüllt,
sollte auch in die Mindestleasingzahlungen
einbezogen werden.
Or. de
Justification
Vermeidung von Mehrdeutigkeit des Begriffs der Leasingzahlungsströme. Ferner werden die
übliche Geschäftspraxis bei Leasingverhältnissen und die wirtschaftliche und kaufmännische
Substanz eines Leasinggeschäfts beachtet.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 639
Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 9
9. The exposure value for undrawn
purchased commitments of revolving
purchased corporate receivables exposures
shall be calculated as the committed but
undrawn amount multiplied by 75%.
9. The exposure value for undrawn
purchased commitments of revolving
purchased corporate receivables exposures
shall be calculated as the committed but
undrawn amount multiplied by 75%.
For undrawn purchased commitments, that
are unconditionally cancellable, or that
effectively provide for automatic
cancellation, at any time by the institution
without prior notice, a conversion factor of
0 % shall apply. To apply a conversion
factor of 0% credit institutions shall
actively monitor the financial condition of
the obligor, and their internal control
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systems shall enable them to immediately
detect a deterioration in the credit quality
of the obligor.
In all other cases, credit institutions which
meet the minimum requirements for the use
of own estimates of conversion factors as
specified in part 4 may use their own
estimates of conversion factors across
different product types, subject to approval
of the competent authorities.
Or. en
Justification
The treatment of the undrawn commitments of revolving purchased receivables exposures
(§9) is on two points more restrictive than that of undrawn credit lines (§11). Such
restrictions introduce a disadvantage for operations of purchase of receivables. It is
consequently suggested to add after §9 the provisions applicable to undrawn credit lines :
possibility to use a credit conversion factor of 0% and possibility for the establishments to
estimate credit conversion factors (see § 11 (a) and (d)).
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 640
Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 10
10. Where an exposure takes the form of
securities sold, posted or lent under a
repurchase transaction or securities or
commodities lending or borrowing
transaction, the exposure value shall be the
value of the securities or commodities
determined in accordance with Article 74.
Where the Financial Collateral
Comprehensive Method as set out under
Annex VIII, part 3 is used, the exposure
value shall be increased by the volatility
adjustment appropriate to such securities or
commodities as set out therein.
10. Where an exposure takes the form of
securities or commodities sold, posted or
lent under a repurchase transaction or
securities or commodities lending or
borrowing transaction, the exposure value
shall be the value of the securities or
commodities determined in accordance with
Article 74. Where the Financial Collateral
Comprehensive Method as set out under
Annex VIII, part 3 is used, the exposure
value shall be increased by the volatility
adjustment appropriate to such securities or
commodities as set out therein.
Or. en
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Justification
The German verion of the COM proposal already included "or commodities". For the English
version, this amendment is needed as an alignment to the Council proposal.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 641
Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 11, point (a)
(a) for credit lines which are uncommitted,
are unconditionally cancellable, or that
effectively provide for cancellation, at any
time by the institution without prior notice,
a conversion factor of 0% shall apply. To
apply a conversion factor of 0% credit
institutions shall actively monitor the
financial condition of the obligor, and their
internal control systems shall enable them to
immediately detect a deterioration in the
credit quality of the obligor. Undrawn retail
credit lines may be considered as
unconditionally cancellable if the terms
permit the credit institution to cancel them to
the full extent allowable under consumer
protection and related legislation.
(a) for credit lines which are
uncommitted, that are unconditionally
cancellable at any time by the institution
without prior notice, or that effectively
provide for automatic cancellation due to
deterioration in a borrower's credit
worthiness, a conversion factor of 0% shall
apply. To apply a conversion factor of 0%
credit institutions shall actively monitor the
financial condition of the obligor, and their
internal control systems shall enable them to
immediately detect a deterioration in the
credit quality of the obligor. Undrawn retail
credit lines may be considered as
unconditionally cancellable if the terms
permit the credit institution to cancel them to
the full extent allowable under consumer
protection and related legislation.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission's text contains an inconsistency between the capital treatment of payment
system commitments under the Standardised and Foundation approaches.
This could have the effect of creating a capital charge for certain guarantees within payment
systems. If not amended, this divergence will create a regulatory disincentive to
arrangements that are risk reducing for the public and financial system.
The wording should be rephrased to match the equivalent clause applying to the standardised
approach.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 642
Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 11, point (a)
(a) For credit lines which are uncommitted,
that are unconditionally cancellable, or that
effectively provide for automatic
cancellation, at any time by the institution
without prior notice, a conversion factor of 0
% shall apply. To apply a conversion factor
of 0% credit institutions shall actively
monitor the financial condition of the
obligor, and their internal control systems
shall enable them to immediately detect a
deterioration in the credit quality of the
obligor. Undrawn retail credit lines may be
considered as unconditionally cancellable
if the terms permit the credit institution to
cancel them to the full extent allowable
under consumer protection and related
legislation.
(a) For credit lines which are uncommitted,
that are unconditionally cancellable, or that
effectively provide for automatic
cancellation, at any time by the credit
institution without prior notice, a conversion
factor of 0 % shall apply. To apply a
conversion factor of 0% credit institutions
shall actively monitor the financial condition
of the obligor, and their internal control
systems shall enable them to immediately
detect a deterioration in the credit quality of
the obligor.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error. Replaces Amendment 161 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 643
Annex VII, part 3, paragraph 11, point (d)
(d) Kreditinstitute, die die
Mindestvoraussetzungen für die
Verwendung eigener Schätzungen von
Umrechnungsfaktoren gemäß Teil 4
erfüllen, können mit Genehmigung der
zuständigen Behörden ihre eigenen
Schätzungen der Umrechnungsfaktoren für
die verschiedenen Produktarten verwenden.
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(d) Kreditinstitute, die die
Mindestvoraussetzungen für die
Verwendung eigener Schätzungen von
Umrechnungsfaktoren gemäß Teil 4
erfüllen, können mit Genehmigung der
zuständigen Behörden ihre eigenen
Schätzungen der Umrechnungsfaktoren für
die verschiedenen Produktarten verwenden,
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soweit es sich nicht um jederzeit kündbare
oder automatisch gekündigte Kreditlinien
handelt, für die Ziffer a) gilt.
Or. de
Justification
Andernfalls bestünden Zweifel, ob die Freistellung der Kreditlinien nach Ziffer a) auch im
IRB Advanced Approach gilt. In diesem Falle bestünde kein Anreiz, den Advanced Approach
anzustreben. Die vorgeschlagene Formulierung schreibt das intendierte Gefälle zugunsten
des Advanced Approach fest. Eine alternative Formulierung (Einschub " ... können unbeschadet der Behandlung von jederzeit kündbaren oder automatisch gekündigten
Kredtilinien nach Ziffer a) - mit Genehmigung ....") hingegen könnte als Wahlrecht des
Instituts interpretiert werden. Damit würde die Attraktivität des Advanced Approach für
dieses bedeutende Teilportfolio in das Ermessen des Kreditinstituts selbst gegeben, was wohl
auch nicht gewollt sein kann.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 644
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 10
10. To qualify for recognition by the
competent authorities of the use for capital
requirement calculation of own estimates
of conversion factors a rating system shall
incorporate a distinct facility rating scale
which exclusively reflects conversion factor
related transaction characteristics.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
Credit institutions use their internal rating systems to associate a PD with each obligorgrade,
and an LGD with each credit facility. For those two risk parameters (PD and LGD), a rating
system has to be put in place. This rating system must comply with certain requirements as set
out in part 4 of Annex VII. In addition to those two risk parameters, credit institutions
calculate a conversion factor (“exposure value”) per product type. That conversion factor is
a calculation applied to the undrawn part of a credit facility. Thus for conversion factors, a
quantification process suffices and there is no rating assessment process which is needed (as
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for LGD and PD). Therefore, it would be wrong to include all assignment and validation
requirements that have to be used for PD and LGD to the conversion factor. This would also
be in conformity with US standards (as mentioned by the FED).
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 645
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 10
10. To qualify for recognition by the
competent authorities of the use for capital
requirement calculation of own estimates
of conversion factors a rating system shall
incorporate a distinct facility rating scale
which exclusively reflects conversion factor
related transaction characteristics.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
Under the proposal, rating system should also apply to “conversion factors”, whereas in
practice it can only apply to two risk parameters (PD and LGD). For those two risk
parameters (PD and LGD), a rating system does have to be put in place, but conversion
factors are a calculation (a number) applied to the credit facility. Thus for conversion factors,
there is no rating assessment process needed. It would therefore, be impossible to apply the
rating requirements that have to be used for PD and LGD to the conversion factor. This
would also be in conformity with proposed US standards.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 646
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 10
10. To qualify for recognition by the
competent authorities of the use for capital
requirement calculation of own estimates
of conversion factors a rating system shall
incorporate a distinct facility rating scale
which exclusively reflects conversion factor
related transaction characteristics.
deleted
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Justification
Under the proposal, rating system requirements as set out in part 4 of annex VII should also
apply to “conversion factors”, whereas in practice it can only apply to two risk parameters
(PD and LGD). For those two risk parameters (PD and LGD), a rating system has indeed to
be put in place, but conversion factors are a calculation (a number) applied to the credit
facility. Thus for conversion factors, there is no rating assessment process which is needed. It
would therefore be impossible to comply with the rating requirements that have to be used for
PD and LGD to the conversion factor. This would also be in conformity with US standards
(as mentioned by the FED).
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 647
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 11
11. A ‘facility grade’ shall mean a risk
category within a rating system’s facility
scale, to which exposures are assigned on
the basis of a specified and distinct set of
rating criteria from which own estimates of
either LGDs and conversion factors are
derived. The grade definition shall include
both a description of how exposures are
assigned to the grade and of the criteria
used to distinguish the level of risk across
grades.
11. A ‘facility grade’ shall mean a risk
category within a rating system’s facility
scale, to which exposures are assigned on
the basis of a specified and distinct set of
rating criteria from which own estimates of
LGDs are derrived. The grade definition
shall include both a description of how
exposures are assigned to the grade and of
the criteria used to distinguish the level of
risk across grades.
Or. en
Justification
Under the proposal, rating system requirements as set out in part 4 of annex VII should also
apply to “conversion factors”, whereas in practice it can only apply to two risk parameters
(PD and LGD). For those two risk parameters (PD and LGD), a rating system has indeed to
be put in place, but conversion factors are a calculation (a number) applied to the credit
facility. Thus for conversion factors, there is no rating assessment process which is needed. It
would therefore be impossible to comply with the rating requirements that have to be used for
PD and LGD to the conversion factor. This would also be in conformity with US standards
(as mentioned by the FED).
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 648
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 11
11. A ‘facility grade’ shall mean a risk
category within a rating system’s facility
scale, to which exposures are assigned on
the basis of a specified and distinct set of
rating criteria from which own estimates of
either LGDs or conversion factors are
derived. The grade definition shall include
both a description of how exposures are
assigned to the grade and of the criteria used
to distinguish the level of risk across grades.
11. A ‘facility grade’ shall mean a risk
category within a rating system’s facility
scale, to which exposures are assigned on
the basis of a specified and distinct set of
rating criteria from which own estimates of
LGDs are derived. The grade definition shall
include both a description of how exposures
are assigned to the grade and of the criteria
used to distinguish the level of risk across
grades.
Or. en
Justification
Under the proposal, rating system should also apply to “conversion factors”, whereas in
practice it can only apply to two risk parameters (PD and LGD). For those two risk
parameters (PD and LGD), a rating system does have to be put in place, but conversion
factors are a calculation (a number) applied to the credit facility. Thus for conversion factors,
there is no rating assessment process needed. It would therefore, be impossible to apply the
rating requirements that have to be used for PD and LGD to the conversion factor. This
would also be in conformity with proposed US standards.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 649
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 11
11. A ‘facility grade’ shall mean a risk
category within a rating system’s facility
scale, to which exposures are assigned on
the basis of a specified and distinct set of
rating criteria from which own estimates of
either LGDs or conversion factors are
derived. The grade definition shall include
both a description of how exposures are
assigned to the grade and of the criteria used
to distinguish the level of risk across grades.
11. A ‘facility grade’ shall mean a risk
category within a rating system’s facility
scale, to which exposures are assigned on
the basis of a specified and distinct set of
rating criteria from which own estimates of
LGDs are derived. The grade definition shall
include both a description of how exposures
are assigned to the grade and of the criteria
used to distinguish the level of risk across
grades.
Or. en
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Justification
Credit institutions use their internal rating systems to associate a PD with each obligor
grade, and an LGD with each credit facility. For those two risk parameters (PD and LGD), a
rating system has to be put in place. This rating system must comply with certain
requirements as set out in part 4 of Annex VII. In addition to those two risk parameters, credit
institutions calculate a conversion factor (“exposure value”) per product type. That
conversion factor is a calculation applied to the undrawn part of a credit facility. Thus for
conversion factors, a quantification process suffices and there is no rating assessment process
which is needed (as for LGD and PD). Therefore, it would be wrong to include all assignment
and validation requirements that have to be used for PD and LGD to the conversion factor.
This would also be in conformity with US standards (as mentioned by the FED).
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 650
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 12
12. Significant concentrations within a
single facility grade shall be supported by
convincing empirical evidence that the
facility grade covers a reasonably narrow
LGD or conversion factor band,
respectively, and that the risk posed by all
exposures in the grade falls within that band.
12. Significant concentrations within a
single facility grade shall be supported by
convincing empirical evidence that the
facility grade covers a reasonably narrow
LGD band, and that the risk posed by all
exposures in the grade falls within that band.
Or. en
Justification
Under the proposal, rating system should also apply to “conversion factors”, whereas in
practice it can only apply to two risk parameters (PD and LGD). For those two risk
parameters (PD and LGD), a rating system does have to be put in place, but conversion
factors are a calculation (a number) applied to the credit facility. Thus for conversion factors,
there is no rating assessment process needed. It would therefore, be impossible to apply the
rating requirements that have to be used for PD and LGD to the conversion factor. This
would also be in conformity with proposed US standards.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 651
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 12
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12. Significant concentrations within a
single facility grade shall be supported by
convincing empirical evidence that the
facility grade covers a reasonably narrow
LGD or conversion factor band, and that the
risk posed by all exposures in the grade falls
within that band.
12. Significant concentrations within a
single facility grade shall be supported by
convincing empirical evidence that the
facility grade covers a reasonably narrow
LGD band, and that the risk posed by all
exposures in the grade falls within that band.
Or. en
Justification
Under the proposal, rating system requirements as set out in part 4 of annex VII should also
apply to “conversion factors”, whereas in practice it can only apply to two risk parameters
(PD and LGD). For those two risk parameters (PD and LGD), a rating system has indeed to
be put in place, but conversion factors are a calculation (a number) applied to the credit
facility. Thus for conversion factors, there is no rating assessment process which is needed. It
would therefore be impossible to comply with the rating requirements that have to be used for
PD and LGD to the conversion factor. This would also be in conformity with US standards
(as mentioned by the FED).
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 652
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 12
12. Significant concentrations within a
single facility grade shall be supported by
convincing empirical evidence that the
facility grade covers a reasonably narrow
LGD or conversion factor band,
respectively, and that the risk posed by all
exposures in the grade falls within that band.
12. Significant concentrations within a
single facility grade shall be supported by
convincing empirical evidence that the
facility grade covers a reasonably narrow
LGD band, and that the risk posed by all
exposures in the grade falls within that band.
Or. en
Justification
Credit institutions use their internal rating systems to associate a PD with each obligor
grade, and an LGD with each credit facility. For those two risk parameters (PD and LGD), a
rating system has to be put in place. This rating system must comply with certain
requirements as set out in part 4 of Annex VII. In addition to those two risk parameters, credit
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institutions calculate a conversion factor (“exposure value”) per product type. That
conversion factor is a calculation applied to the undrawn part of a credit facility. Thus for
conversion factors, a quantification process suffices and there is no rating assessment process
which is needed (as for LGD and PD). Therefore, it would be wrong to include all assignment
and validation requirements that have to be used for PD and LGD to the conversion factor.
This would also be in conformity with US standards (as mentioned by the FED).
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 653
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b a) (new)
(ba) where consumer protection and bank
secrecy legislation or Chinese wall
considerations prohibit the exchange of
client data;
Or. en
Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy, data protection legislation and Chinese Walls) are imposed
hindering free flow of intra-group information across borders. In some cases, banks cannot
comply with this “one obligor, one rating” principle in view of legal repercussions.
Amendment by Robert Goebbels
Amendment 654
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b a) (new)
(ba) where consumer protection and bank
secrecy legislation or Chinese wall
considerations prohibit the exchange of
client data
Or. en
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Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg and
the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange of
rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
- There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating information
between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not exchange
information with the rest of the bank.
Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms are
not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 655
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b a) (new)
(ba) where consumer protection and bank
secrecy legislation or Chinese wall
considerations prohibit the exchange of
client data
Or. en
Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg
and the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange
of rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
- There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating
information between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not
exchange information with the rest of the bank.
Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms are
not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
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Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 656
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b a) (new)
(ba) where consumer protection and bank
secrecy legislation or Chinese wall
considerations prohibit the exchange of
client data
Or. en
Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg and
the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange of
rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
- There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating information
between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not exchange
information with the rest of the bank.
- Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms
are not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 657
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b a) (new)
(ba) where consumer protection and bank
secrecy legislation or Chinese wall
considerations prohibit the exchange of
client data
Or. en
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Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg and
the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange of
rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
- There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating information
between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not exchange
information with the rest of the bank.
- Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms are
not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 658
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b b) (new)
(bb) subject to approval of the competent
authorities, for non banking subsidiaries.
Or. en
Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy, data protection legislation and Chinese Walls) are imposed
hindering free flow of intra-group information across borders. In some cases, banks cannot
comply with this “one obligor, one rating” principle in view of legal repercussions.
Amendment by Robert Goebbels
Amendment 659
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b b) (new)
(bb) subject to approval of the competent
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authorities, for non banking subsidiaries
Or. en
Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg and
the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange of
rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
- There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating information
between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not exchange
information with the rest of the bank.
Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms are
not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 660
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b b) (new)
(bb) subject to approval of the competent
authorities, for non banking subsidiaries
Or. en
Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg
and the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange
of rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
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-
There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating
information between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not
exchange information with the rest of the bank.
Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms are
not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 661
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b b) (new)
(bb) subject to approval of the competent
authorities, for non banking subsidiaries
Or. en
Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg and
the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange of
rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
- There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating information
between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not exchange
information with the rest of the bank.
- Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms
are not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 662
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 24, point (b b) (new)
(bb) subject to approval of the competent
authorities, for non banking subsidiaries
Or. en
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Justification
Exemptions should also be granted for non-banking subsidiaries or for subsidiaries on which
legal barriers (bank secrecy or data protection legislation) are imposed hindering free flow of
intragroup information In some cases, banks cannot comply with this “one obligor, one
rating” principle in view of legal repercussions:
- E.g. private clients’ ratings may not be exchanged between Switzerland, Luxembourg and
the rest of the world because of the bank secrecy;
- For some non-banking subsidiaries statutory or other limitations prevent the exchange of
rating information; these normally do not fall under cross default provisions;
- There may be Chinese wall considerations that prevent a free flow of rating information
between different parts of a banking group. e.g. asset management may not exchange
information with the rest of the bank.
- Given the high degree of independence of some non-banking subsidiaries, IT platforms are
not shared and the rule would be overly burdensome and costly.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 663
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 41
41. A credit institution shall have in place
sound stress testing processes for use in the
assessment of its capital adequacy. Stress
testing shall involve identifying possible
events or future changes in economic
conditions that could have unfavourable
effects on a credit institution’s credit
exposures and assessment of the credit
institution’s ability to withstand such
changes.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
Credit institutions are already required to adopt conservative views and stress internal
estimations of PD, LGD and exposure at default, including taking into account an economic
downturn (Annex VII, part 4, paragraphs 19, 49, 54, 63, 74, 87 & 114). The Commission
proposal will make all types of obligor and exposure more capital intensive and therefore
more expensive and will particularly affect SMEs and small banks.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 664
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 42
42. A credit institution shall regularly
perform a credit risk stress test to assess the
effect of certain specific conditions on its
total capital requirements for credit risk.
The test to be employed shall be one chosen
by the credit institution, subject to
supervisory review. The test to be employed
shall be meaningful and reasonably
conservative, considering at least the effect
of mild recession scenarios. A credit
institution shall assess migration in its
ratings under the stress test scenarios.
Stressed portfolios shall contain the vast
majority of a credit institution's total
exposure.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
Credit institutions are already required to adopt conservative views and stress internal
estimations of PD, LGD and exposure at default, including taking into account an economic
downturn (Annex VII, part 4, paragraphs 19, 49, 54, 63, 74, 87 & 114). The Commission
proposal will make all types of obligor and exposure more capital intensive and therefore
more expensive and will particularly affect SMEs and small banks. paragraph 42 relates to
Pillar 2 requirements and could be moved to Annex XI paragraph 1(a).
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 665
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 44, point (b), Subparagraphs 4 and 5
Bei Retailforderungen und Forderungen
an öffentliche Stellen setzen die
zuständigen Behörden die Zahl der
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Verzugstage gemäß Nummer 48 fest.
Bei Unternehmensforderungen können die
zuständigen Behörden die Zahl der
Verzugstage gemäß Artikel 154 Absatz 4
festsetzen.
Or. de
Justification
Unterschiedliche Ausfallsdefinitionen bedeuten einen zusätzlichen Kostenfaktor für
grenzübergreifend tätige Kreditinstitute und können auch zu erheblichen
Wettbewerbsverzerrungen führen. Daher erscheint es notwendig, eine einheitliche Definition
für das Ereignis "Ausfall" festzulegen.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 666
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 44, Subparagraph 2
Days past due commence once an obligor
has breached an advised limit, has been
advised a limit smaller than current
outstandings, or has drawn credit without
authorisation.
For overdrafts, days past due commence
once an obligor has breached an advised
limit, has been advised a limit smaller than
current outstandings, or has drawn credit
without authorisation and the underlying
amount is material.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal conflicts with the Basel Framework and the suggested amendment
reflects industry practice. There must be a materiality element to the definition of days past
due to ensure defaults are not triggered by a small excess, e.g. EUR 1. For credit cards the
minimum payment date is embodied in the contractual relationship with the counterparty and
therefore the adoption of any other days past due interpretation will conflict with industry
practice and potentially impact the terms and conditions for credit cards.
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Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 667
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 44, Subparagraph 3 a (new)
3a. Days past due for credit cards
commence on the minimum payment due
date.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal conflicts with the Basel Framework and the suggested amendment
reflects industry practice. There must be a materiality element to the definition of days past
due to ensure defaults are not triggered by a small excess, e.g. EUR 1. For credit cards the
minimum payment date is embodied in the contractual relationship with the counterparty and
therefore the adoption of any other days past due interpretation will conflict with industry
practice and potentially impact the terms and conditions for credit cards.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 668
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 48
48. Bei Retailforderungen und Forderungen
gegenüber öffentlichen Stellen setzen die
zuständigen Behörden eines jeden
Mitgliedstaats die genaue Zahl der
Verzugstage fest, an die sich sämtliche
Kreditinstitute in ihrem Rechtsgebiet bei der
unter Nummer 44 dargelegten
Ausfalldefinition für Forderungen an
Kontrahenten mit Sitz in diesem
Mitgliedstaat zu halten haben. Die Zahl der
Verzugstage muss zwischen 90 und 180
liegen und kann für verschiedene
Produktlinien unterschiedlich festgesetzt
werden. Für Forderungen an
Kontrahenten mit Sitz im Hoheitsgebiet
anderer Mitgliedstaaten setzen die
zuständigen Behörden eine Zahl von
Verzugstagen fest, die nicht höher ist als
die von den zuständigen Behörden des
jeweiligen Sitzstaates festgesetzte Zahl von
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48. Bei Retailforderungen und Forderungen
gegenüber öffentlichen Stellen setzen die
zuständigen Behörden eines jeden
Mitgliedstaats die genaue Zahl der
Verzugstage fest, an die sich sämtliche
Kreditinstitute in ihrem Rechtsgebiet bei der
unter Nummer 44 dargelegten
Ausfalldefinition für Forderungen an
Kontrahenten mit Sitz in diesem
Mitgliedstaat zu halten haben. Die Zahl der
Verzugstage soll generell bei 90 liegen.
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Verzugstagen.
Or. de
Justification
Aufstellung einer generellen einheitlichen Anforderung.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 669
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 48
48. For Retail and PSE exposures, the
competent authorities of each Member
States shall set the exact number of days past
due that all credit institutions in its
jurisdiction shall abide by under the
definition of default set out in paragraph 44,
for exposures to such counterparts situated
within this Member State. The specific
number shall fall within 90-180 days and
may differ across product lines. For
exposures to such counterparts situated in
the territories of other Member States, the
competent authorities shall set a number of
days past due which is not higher than the
number set by the competent authority of the
respective Member State.
48. For Retail and PSE exposures, the
competent authorities of each Member
States shall set the exact number of days past
due that all credit institutions in its
jurisdiction shall abide by under the
definition of default set out in paragraph 44,
for exposures to such counterparts situated
within this Member State. The specific
number shall fall within 90-180 days for
Retail exposures and within 90-270 days
for PSE exposures and may differ across
product lines. For exposures to such
counterparts situated in the territories of
other Member States, the competent
authorities shall set a number of days past
due which is not higher than the number set
by the competent authority of the respective
Member State.
Or. en
Justification
Those member states whose current practices differ from a limit of 90 days should be allowed
to extend the number of days past due up to 180 days for corporate and retail exposures and
up to 270 days for PSE exposures. A national discretion providing for this possibility should
therefore be maintained throughout the Standardised and the IRB Approaches.
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Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 670
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 49
49. A credit institution’s own estimates of
the risk parameters PD, LGD, conversion
factor and EL shall incorporate all relevant
data, information and methods. The
estimates shall be derived using both
historical experience and empirical evidence,
and not based purely on judgemental
considerations. The estimates shall be
plausible and intuitive and shall be based on
the material drivers of the respective risk
parameters. The less data a credit
institution has, the more conservative it
shall be in its estimation.
49. A credit institution’s own estimates of
the risk parameters PD, LGD, conversion
factor and EL shall incorporate all relevant
data, information and methods. The
estimates shall be derived using both
historical experience and empirical evidence,
including statistical models. The estimates
shall be plausible and intuitive and shall be
based on the material drivers of the
respective risk parameters.
Or. en
Justification
The intent is to ensure that a credit institution that has little historical data is not permitted to
calculate own estimates of the risk parameters based on such inadequate data. However, the
statement on conservatism can be interpreted in such a way as to prevent firms with genuinely
high quality business lines, for which extensive default data is unavailable (either internally
or across the industry, including Low Default Portfolios) from applying the advanced
approach to these exposures.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 671
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 78
78. To the extent, that a credit institution
does not meet the minimum requirements
for collateral set out in Annex VIII any
amount expected to be recovered from such
collateral shall not be taken into account in
its LGD estimates.
78. To the extent that LGD estimates take
into account the existence of collateral,
credit institutions must establish internal
requirements for collateral management,
legal certainty and risk management that
are generally consistent with those set out
in Annex VIII, part 2.
Or. en
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Justification
The Commission’s proposal would severely restrict the use of the Advanced IRB approach
and would not be in keeping with the Basel Framework; the suggested changes bring them
back in line. The draft proposed by the Commission might imply that if purchased credit risk
mitigation does not meet all the requirements throughout Annex VIII, then own-LGD
estimates cannot reflect the degree of credit risk mitigation obtained. This is impractical
because it will require firms with relatively complex collateralised transactions to distinguish,
within the estimated LGD, the cash collected from risk mitigation meeting the requirements
and that collected from mitigation that does not meet the requirements. It is also unnecessary
because own-LGD estimates must take into consideration any available relevant information,
including any instrument that historically can be demonstrated to have an effect on LGD.
Moreover, advanced IRB banks started developing their LGD methodologies in the
understanding that they could bring in their own internal operational and eligibility
requirements for collateral as long as they could base their LGD ratings on historical
evidence, i.e. validate them, and as long as those methodologies would be validated by their
supervisors. Compared to a previous version of the proposed Directive, the stronger wording
of paragraph 78 now suddenly means that what has been developed is not good enough. It
would oblige banks to rebuild their models that they have been so far developing to calculate
LGD estimates and will not provide any incentives to go for the most advanced approach.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 672
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 78
78. To the extent, that a credit institution
does not meet the minimum requirements
for collateral set out in Annex VIII any
amount expected to be recovered from such
collateral shall not be taken into account in
its LGD estimates.
78. To the extent that LGD estimates take
into account the existence of collateral,
credit institutions must establish internal
requirements for collateral management,
legal certainty and risk management that
are generally consistent with those set out
in Annex VIII, part 2.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal would severely restrict the use of the Advanced IRB approach and
would not be in keeping with the Basel Framework. The draft proposed by the Commission
might imply that if purchased credit risk mitigation does not meet all the requirements
throughout Annex VIII, then own-LGD estimates cannot reflect the degree of credit risk
mitigation obtained. This is impractical because it will require firms with relatively complex
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collateralised transactions to distinguish, within the estimated LGD, the cash collected from
risk mitigation meeting the requirements and that collected from mitigation that does not meet
the requirements. It is also unnecessary because own-LGD estimates must take into
consideration any available relevant information, including any instrument that historically
can be demonstrated to have an effect on LGD.
Moreover, advanced IRB banks started developing their LGD methodologies in the
understanding that they could bring in their own internal operational and eligibility
requirements for collateral as long as they could base their LGD ratings on historical
evidence, i.e. validate them, and as long as those methodologies would be validated by their
supervisors. Compared to a previous version of the proposed Directive, the stronger wording
of paragraph 78 now suddenly means that what has been developed is not good enough. It
would oblige banks to rebuild their models that they have been so far developing to calculate
LGD estimates and will not provide any incentives to go for the most advanced approach.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 673
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 78
78. To the extent, that a credit institution
does not meet the minimum requirements
for collateral set out in Annex VIII any
amount expected to be recovered from such
collateral shall not be taken into account in
its LGD estimates.
78. To the extent that LGD estimates take
account the existence of collateral, credit
institutions must establish internal
requirements for collateral management,
legal certainty and risk management that
are generally consistent with those set out
in Annex VIII, part 2.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal would severely restrict the use of the Advanced IRB approach and
would be super-equivalent to the Basel Framework. The Commission draft implies that if
purchased credit risk mitigation does not meet all the Annex VIII requirements, then ownLGD estimates cannot reflect the degree of credit risk mitigation obtained. This is
unnecessary as own-LGD estimates must take into consideration any available relevant
information.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 674
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 81
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81. Die den LGD-Schätzungen zugrunde
gelegten Daten aus zumindest einer
Datenquelle beziehen sich auf einen
Beobachtungszeitraum von mindestens
sieben Jahren. Umfasst der verfügbare
Beobachtungszeitraum eine längere
Zeitspanne als sieben Jahre und sind die
entsprechenden Daten maßgeblich, so wird
dieser längere Beobachtungszeitraum
herangezogen.
81. Die den LGD-Schätzungen zugrunde
gelegten Daten aus zumindest einer
Datenquelle beziehen sich auf einen
Beobachtungszeitraum von mindestens vier
Jahren. Umfasst der verfügbare
Beobachtungszeitraum eine längere
Zeitspanne als sieben Jahre und sind die
entsprechenden Daten maßgeblich, so wird
dieser längere Beobachtungszeitraum
herangezogen.
Or. de
Justification
Ziel ist es, ein zu großes Auseinanderlaufen der Anforderungen von Basis-Ansatz und
fortgeschrittenem IRB-Ansatz zu vermeiden.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 675
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 92
92. Die den Schätzungen der
Umrechnungsfaktoren zugrunde gelegten
Daten aus zumindest einer Datenquelle
beziehen sich auf einen
Beobachtungszeitraum von mindestens
sieben Jahren. Umfasst der verfügbare
Beobachtungszeitraum eine längere
Zeitspanne als sieben Jahre und sind die
entsprechenden Daten maßgeblich, so wird
dieser längere Beobachtungszeitraum
herangezogen.
92. Die den Schätzungen der
Umrechnungsfaktoren zugrunde gelegten
Daten aus zumindest einer Datenquelle
beziehen sich auf einen
Beobachtungszeitraum von mindestens vier
Jahren. Umfasst der verfügbare
Beobachtungszeitraum eine längere
Zeitspanne als sieben Jahre und sind die
entsprechenden Daten maßgeblich, so wird
dieser längere Beobachtungszeitraum
herangezogen.
Or. de
Justification
Ziel ist es, ein zu großes Auseinanderlaufen der Anforderungen von Basis-Ansatz und
fortgeschrittenem IRB-Ansatz zu vermeiden.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 676
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 97
97. Credit institutions shall have clearly
specified criteria for the types of guarantors
they recognise for the calculation of risk
weighted exposures.
97. Credit institutions shall have clearly
specified criteria for the types of guarantors
they recognise for the calculation of risk
weighted exposure amounts.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 677
Annex VII, part 4, paragraph 100
100. A credit institution shall have clearly
specified criteria for adjusting grades, pools
or LGD estimates, and in the case of retail
and eligible purchased receivables, the
process of allocating exposures to grades or
pools, to reflect the impact of guarantees for
the calculation of risk weighted assets.
These criteria shall comply with the
minimum requirements set out in paragraphs
18 to 30.
100. A credit institution shall have clearly
specified criteria for adjusting grades, pools
or LGD estimates, and in the case of retail
and eligible purchased receivables, the
process of allocating exposures to grades or
pools, to reflect the impact of guarantees for
the calculation of risk weighted exposure
amounts. These criteria shall comply with
the minimum requirements set out in
paragraphs 18 to 30.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 678
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 7, subparagraph 1, point (c a) (new)
(ca) The competent authorities may
recognise as eligible collateral physical
items of a type other than those types
indicated above if satisfied as to the
following:
(i) the existence of liquid markets for
disposal of the collateral in an expeditious
and economically efficient manner;
(ii) the existence of well-established,
publicly available market prices for the
collateral. The institution must be able to
demonstrate that there is no evidence that
the net prices it receives when collateral is
realised deviates significantly from these
market prices.
Or. en
Justification
The category “other collateral” includes liens on ships and aircraft. The market values of
these collateral assets are readily determined, producing effective reduction of risk. But their
credit risk mitigation effect is recognised only in the IRB approach. Our hope is that these
types of collateral, which are quite widely used in the credit market, can go towards reducing
capital charges for banks adopting the Standardised approach as well.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 679
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 7, subparagraph 2, point (i a) (new)
(ia) debt securities issued by public sector
entities which are treated as exposures to
central governments in accordance with
paragraph 15a of part 1 of Annex VI.
Or. en
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Justification
Follows from amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 680
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 7, subparagraph 2, point (i)
(i) debt securities issued by regional
governments or local authorities exposures
to which are treated as exposures to the
central government in whose jurisdiction
they are established under Annex VI;
(i) debt securities issued by regional
governments or local authorities exposures
to which are treated as exposures to the
central government in whose jurisdiction
they are established under Articles 78 to 83;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 681
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 7, subparagraph 3, point (iii)
(iii) debt securities issued by multilateral
development banks other than those to
which a 0% risk weight is applied under;
(iii) debt securities issued by multilateral
development banks other than those to
which a 0% risk weight is applied under
Articles 78 to 83;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 682
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new)
Immobiliensicherheiten
10a. Wohnimmobilien, die vom Eigentümer
selbst genutzt oder vermietet werden bzw.
werden sollen, sowie gewerbliche
Immobilien, d.h. Büro- und andere
Geschäftsräume, können als Sicherheit
anerkannt werden, wenn
a) der Wert der Immobilie nicht wesentlich
von der Bonität des Schuldners abhängt.
Fälle, in denen rein makroökonomische
Faktoren sowohl den Wert der Immobilie
als auch die Fähigkeit des Kreditnehmers
zur Vertragserfüllung beeinträchtigen,
sollen durch diese Bestimmung nicht
ausgeschlossen werden;
b) das Risiko des Kreditnehmers nicht
wesentlich von der Wertentwicklung der
Immobilie/des Vorhabens, sondern eher
von seiner Fähigkeit, seine Schulden aus
anderen Quellen zurückzuzahlen, abhängt.
Ob mit der als Sicherheit gestellten
Immobilie Cash-Flow erwirtschaftet wird,
ist damit für die Rückzahlung nicht
wesentlich.
Or. de
Justification
Der Kreis der anerkennungsfähigen Sicherheiten im Standardansatz sollte auch auf
Immobiliarsicherheiten, Forderungsabtretungen und sonst. Sachsicherheiten erweitert
werden. Nach dem derzeitigen Stand des Richtlinienentwurfs sind diese Sicherheitenarten auf
die Nutzung des internen Ratingansatzes beschränkt. In seinem Änderungsantrag Nr. 6 zu
Erwägungsgrund 36 schlägt der Berichterstatter folgende Ergänzung vor: "Im Rahmen des
Möglichen sind bankübliche Sicherheiten zur Minderung von Kreditrisiken im Standardansatz
anzuerkennen." Die Absicht ist zu begrüßen, da sie insbesondere kleineren Kreditinstituten,
die den Standardsatz anwenden, die Anerkennung banküblicher Sicherheiten ermöglicht.
Allerdings schafft die Erwähnung dieser Absicht in einem Erwägungsgrund noch nicht die
konkrete Möglichkeit zur Nutzung dieser Sicherheiten. In dem für Fragen der Anerkennung
von Sicherheiten maßgeblichen Anhang VIII sollte deshalb die Erweiterung klargestellt
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werden.
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 683
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Anteile an finnischen
Wohnungsbaugesellschaften im Sinne des
finnischen Gesetzes von 1991 über
Wohnungsbaugesellschaften oder
nachfolgender entsprechender Gesetze
über Wohnimmobilien, die vom
Eigentümer selbst genutzt oder vermietet
werden bzw. werden sollen, können von
Kreditinstituten unter den genannten
Voraussetzungen als
Wohnimmobiliensicherheit anerkannt
werden.
Or. de
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 684
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Die zuständigen Behörden können
ihren Kreditinstituten ferner gestatten,
Anteile an finnischen Baugesellschaften im
Sinne des finnischen Gesetzes von 1991
über Wohnungsbaugesellschaften oder
nachfolgender entsprechender Gesetze
unter den genannten Voraussetzungen als
gewerbliche Immobiliensicherheit
anzuerkennen.
Or. de
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Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 685
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 d (new)
10 d. Die zuständigen Behörden können
ihre Kreditinstitute in Bezug auf
Forderungen, die durch in ihrem
Staatsgebiet liegende Wohnimmobilien
besichert sind, von der unter Nummer 13
Buchstabe b) genannten Bedingung
freistellen, wenn der betreffende Markt
nachweislich gut entwickelt und seit
langem etabliert ist und die Verlustraten
niedrig genug sind, um dies zu
rechtfertigen. Dies hindert die zuständigen
Behörden eines Mitgliedstaates, die diese
Freistellungsmöglichkeit nicht in Anspruch
nehmen, nicht daran, in einem anderen
Mitgliedstaat aufgrund einer solchen
Freistellung als Sicherheit anerkannte
Wohnimmobilien ebenfalls als Sicherheit
anzuerkennen. Die Mitgliedstaaten zeigen
öffentlich an, inwieweit sie von dieser
Möglichkeit Gebrauch machen.
Or. de
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 686
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 e (new)
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10e. Die zuständigen Behörden der
Mitgliedstaaten können ihre Institute in
Bezug auf in ihrem Staatsgebiet liegende
gewerbliche Immobilien von der unter
Nummer 13 Buchstabe b) genannten
Bedingung freistellen, wenn der
betreffende Markt nachweislich gut
entwickelt und seit langem etabliert ist und
die Verlustraten bei Krediten, die durch
gewerbliche Immobilien besichert sind, die
folgenden Bedingungen erfüllen:
a) die Verluste, die auf 50 % des
Marktwerts (oder gegebenenfalls 60 % des
Beleihungswerts, sollte dieser niedriger
sein) entfallen, gehen in keinem Jahr über
0,3 % der ausstehenden, durch gewerbliche
Immobilien besicherten Kredite hinaus;
b) die Gesamtverluste bei Krediten, die
durch gewerbliche Immobilien besichert
sind, gehen in keinem Jahr über 0,5 % der
ausstehenden Kredite hinaus.
Or. de
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 687
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 f (new)
10f. Wird eine dieser Bedingungen in
einem Jahr nicht erfüllt, so ist diese
Behandlung so lange auszusetzen, bis die
Bedingungen in einem der Folgejahre
wieder erfüllt sind.
Or. de
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Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 688
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 g (new)
10g. Die zuständigen Behörden eines
Mitgliedstaates, die die unter Nummer 15
genannte Freistellungsmöglichkeit nicht in
Anspruch nehmen, können gewerbliche
Immobilien, die in einem anderen
Mitgliedstaat aufgrund einer solchen
Freistellung als Sicherheit anerkannt sind,
ebenfalls als Sicherheit anerkennen.
Or. de
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 689
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 h (new)
Forderungen
10h. Die zuständigen Behörden können
Forderungen, die mit einer kommerziellen
Transaktion oder mit Transaktionen mit
einer ursprünglichen Laufzeit von weniger
als einem Jahr oder einem Jahr
zusammenhängen, als Sicherheit
anerkennen. Nicht anerkennungsfähig sind
Forderungen, die mit Verbriefungen,
Unterbeteiligungen oder Kreditderivaten
zusammenhängen, oder Beträge, die von
verbundenen Unternehmen geschuldet
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werden.
Or. de
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 690
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 i (new)
Sonstige Sachsicherheiten
10i. Die zuständigen Behörden können
neben den unter den Nummern 11 bis 17
genannten Sachsicherheiten Gegenstände
als Sicherheit anerkennen, wenn sie sich
davon überzeugt haben, dass
a) für eine rasche und wirtschaftliche
Verwertung der Sicherheit liquide Märkte
existieren und
b) allgemein anerkannte Marktpreise für
die Sicherheit existieren und diese
öffentlich zugänglich sind. Das Institut
muss nachweisen können, dass nichts
darauf hindeutet, dass die bei der
Verwertung der Sicherheit erzielten
Nettopreise wesentlich von diesen
Marktpreisen abweichen werden.
Or. de
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
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Amendment by Andreas Schwab
Amendment 691
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 j (new)
Leasing
10j. Forderungen aus Leasinggeschäften,
bei denen ein Kreditinstitut der
Leasinggeber und ein Dritter der
Leasingnehmer ist, werden – sofern die in
Teil 2 Nummer 11 genannten
Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind –
vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen der
Nummer 73 des Teils 3 wie Kredite
behandelt, die als Sicherheit die gleiche Art
von Gegenstand haben wie das
Leasingobjekt.
Or. de
Justification
See justification to Amendment to Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 10 a (new).
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 692
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 13, introductory part
13. Residential real estate property which is
or will be occupied or let by the owner and
commercial real estate i.e. offices and other
commercial premises may be recognised as
eligible collateral where the following
conditions are met:
13. Residential real estate property which is
or will be occupied or let by the owner or
the beneficial owner in the case of personal
investment companies and commercial real
estate i.e. offices and other commercial
premises may be recognised as eligible
collateral where the following conditions are
met:
Or. en
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Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 693
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 13, introductory part
13. Residential real estate property which is
or will be occupied or let by the owner and
commercial real estate i.e. offices and other
commercial premises may be recognised as
eligible collateral where the following
conditions are met:
13. Residential real estate property which is
or will be occupied or let by the owner or
the beneficial owner in case of personal
investment companies and commercial real
estate i.e. offices and other commercial
premises may be recognised as eligible
collateral where the following conditions are
met:
Or. en
Justification
In the high net worth market many individuals purchase their properties through Special
Purpose Vehicles for a number of reasons. Failure to allow these SPVs to be treated as retail
exposures penalises credit institutions (i.e. requires higher capital) especially small banks
who tend to specialise in the high net worth market.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 694
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 13, introductory part
13. Residential real estate property which is
or will be occupied or let by the owner and
commercial real estate i.e. offices and other
commercial premises may be recognised as
eligible collateral where the following
conditions are met:
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13. Residential real estate property which is
or will be occupied or let by the owner or
the beneficial owner in the case of personal
investment companies and commercial real
estate i.e. offices and other commercial
premises may be recognised as eligible
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collateral where the following conditions are
met:
Or. en
Justification
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 695
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 13,introductory part
13. Wohnimmobilien, die vom Eigentümer
selbst genutzt oder vermietet werden bzw.
werden sollen, sowie gewerbliche
Immobilien, d.h. Büro- und andere
Geschäftsräume, können als Sicherheit
anerkannt werden, wenn
13. Wohnimmobilien, die vom Eigentümer
bzw. im Falle einer Zweckgesellschaft vom
begünstigten Eigentümer selbst genutzt
oder vermietet werden bzw. werden sollen,
sowie gewerbliche Immobilien, d.h. Büround andere Geschäftsräume, können als
Sicherheit anerkannt werden, wenn
Or. de
Justification
Personen mit hohem Eigenkapital kaufen Eigentum häufig über Zweckgesellschaften, die aber
keine wirklichen Unternehmen sind. Vor allem der private Immobilienkredit stellt unter
anderem auch auf den Immobilien Cash-Flow als Tilgungsquelle ab. Dies muss auch
weiterhin nach dem IRB-Ansatz möglich sein.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 696
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 13, point (a)
(a) The value of the property does not
materially depend upon the credit quality of
the obligor. This requirement is not intended
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(a) The value of the property does not
materially depend upon the credit quality of
the obligor. This requirement does not
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to preclude situations where purely macroeconomic factors affect both the value of the
property and the performance of the
borrower.
preclude situations where purely macroeconomic factors affect both the value of the
property and the performance of the
borrower.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 697
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 13, point (b)
b) das Risiko des Kreditnehmers nicht
wesentlich von der Wertentwicklung der
Immobilie/des Vorhabens, sondern eher von
seiner Fähigkeit, seine Schulden aus anderen
Quellen zurückzuzahlen, abhängt. Ob mit
der als Sicherheit gestellten Immobilie
Cash-Flow erwirtschaftet wird, ist damit
für die Rückzahlung nicht wesentlich.
(b) das Risiko des Kreditnehmers nicht
wesentlich von der Wertentwicklung der
Immobilie/des Vorhabens, sondern eher von
seiner Fähigkeit, seine Schulden neben dem
Immobilien-Cash-Flow auch aus anderen
Quellen zurückzuzahlen, abhängt.
Or. de
Justification
Personen mit hohem Eigenkapital kaufen Eigentum häufig über Zweckgesellschaften, die aber
keine wirklichen Unternehmen sind. Vor allem der private Immobilienkredit stellt unter
anderem auch auf den Immobilien Cash-Flow als Tilgungsquelle ab. Dies muss auch
weiterhin nach dem IRB-Ansatz möglich sein.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 698
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 17
17. The competent authorities of the
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Member States may waive the requirement
for their institutions to comply with
condition (b) in paragraph 13 for
commercial real estate property situated
within the territory of that Member State, if
the competent authorities have evidence that
the relevant market is well-developed and
long-established and that loss-rates
stemming from lending secured by
commercial real estate propery satisfy the
following conditions:
Member States may waive the requirement
for their credit institutions to comply with
condition (b) in paragraph 13 for
commercial real estate property situated
within the territory of that Member State, if
the competent authorities have evidence that
the relevant market is well-developed and
long-established and that loss-rates
stemming from lending secured by
commercial real estate property satisfy the
following conditions:
(a) up to 50 % of the market value (or where
applicable and if lower 60 % of the
mortgage-lending-value) does not exceed
0.3 % of the outstanding loans secured by
commercial real estate property in any given
year;
(a) losses stemming from lending
collateralised by commercial real estate
property up to 50 % of the market value (or
where applicable and if lower 60 % of the
mortgage-lending-value) do not exceed 0.3
% of the outstanding loans collateralised by
commercial real estate property in any given
year;
(b) overall losses stemming from lending
secured by commercial real estate does not
exceed 0.5 % of the outstanding loans in any
given year.
(b) overall losses stemming from lending
collateralised by commercial real estate
property do not exceed 0.5 % of the
outstanding loans collateralised by
commercial real estate property in any
given year.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 699
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 21, point (b)
(b) the existence of well-established,
publicly available market prices for the
collateral. The institution must be able to
demonstrate that there is no evidence that
the net prices it receives when collateral is
realised deviates significantly from these
market prices.
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(b) the existence of publicly available
market prices for the collateral. The
institution must be able to demonstrate that
there is no evidence that the net prices it
receives when collateral is realised deviates
significantly from these market prices.
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Or. en
Justification
Theses requirements for physical collateral are in some cases not possible to comply with.
Examples of physical collateral where there is not necessary a liquid market or a wellestablished public market price include jewellery/diamonds, vehicles, aircraft and other
tangible assets. For banks being allowed to use their own LGD estimates and once a bank has
demonstrated to the satisfaction of its supervisor that a collateral type historically lowered
losses in case of default then such a collateral type should qualify as eligible.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 700
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 21, points (a) and (b)
(a) the existence of liquid markets for
disposal of the collateral in an expeditious
and economically efficient manner; and
(b) the existence of well-established,
publicly available market prices for the
collateral. The institution must be able to
demonstrate that there is no evidence that
the net prices it receives when collateral is
realised deviates significantly from these
market prices.
(i) the existence of liquid markets for
disposal of the collateral in an expeditious
and economically efficient manner; and
(ii) the existence of well-established,
publicly available market prices for the
collateral. The credit institution must be able
to demonstrate that there is no evidence that
the net prices it receives when collateral is
realised deviates significantly from these
market prices.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 701
Annex VIII, part 1, Heading (new) (after paragraph 25)
1.4.4 Commodity warrants and
commodities
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Or. en
Justification
It is appropriate to include commodity warrants and commodities in the list of eligible
collateral. See also comments re. Annex VIII, part 2, No. 1.8.3 (new) below.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 702
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 25 a (new)
25a. Commodity warrants and commodities
may be recognised as eligible credit
protection.
Or. en
Justification
It is appropriate to include commodity warrants and commodities in the list of eligible
collateral. See also comments re. Annex VIII, part 2, No. 1.8.3 (new) below.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 703
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 26, introductory part
26. The following parties may be recognised
as eligible providers of unfunded protection:
26. The following parties may be recognised
as eligible providers of unfunded credit
protection:
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 704
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 26, point (e)
(e) public sector entities, claims on which
are treated by the competent authorities as
claims on institutions under Articles 78 to
83;
(e) public sector entities, claims on which
are treated by the competent authorities as
claims on institutions or central
governments under Articles 78 to 83;
Or. en
Justification
Follows from amendment 111 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 705
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 26, point (g a) (new)
(ga) Parent, subsidiary and affiliate
corporate entities according to article 41 of
the Directive [83/349/EG] for undertakings
set out in article 3, lit. (t) of the Directive
[93/6/EG].
Or. en
Justification
It is appropriate to recognise the guarantees and warranties from parent undertakings and its
subsidiaries that are common in the energy market as eligible collateral to mitigate the
capital requirements for the counterparty risk.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 706
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 26, point (g a) (new)
(ga) natural persons
Or. en
Justification
As long as private individuals have a rating that has been assigned via a validated model,
private individuals should be recognised as eligible providers of unfunded protection.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 707
Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 26, point (g a) (new)
(ga) natural persons
Or. en
Justification
As long as private individuals have a rating that has been assigned via a validated model,
private individuals should be recognised as eligible providers of unfunded protection.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 708
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (a)
a) Rechtssicherheit
a) Rechtssicherheit
Die Hypothek oder das
Sicherungspfandrecht müssen in allen
relevanten Rechtsordnungen rechtlich
durchsetzbar sein und ordnungsgemäß und
rechtzeitig registriert werden. Das in den
Vereinbarungen festgelegte Pfandrecht muss
wirksam sein (d.h. alle rechtlichen
Die Hypothek oder das
Sicherungspfandrecht müssen in allen zum
Zeitpunkt des Kreditvertragsschlusses
relevanten Rechtsordnungen rechtlich
durchsetzbar sein und ordnungsgemäß und
rechtzeitig registriert werden. Das in den
Vereinbarungen festgelegte Pfandrecht muss
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Anforderungen zum Nachweis des Pfands
müssen erfüllt sein). Die
Sicherheitenvereinbarung und das ihr
zugrunde liegende rechtliche Verfahren
müssen das Kreditinstitut in die Lage
versetzen, die Sicherheit innerhalb eines
angemessenen Zeitraums zu verwerten.
wirksam sein (d.h. alle rechtlichen
Anforderungen zum Nachweis des Pfands
müssen erfüllt sein). Die
Sicherheitenvereinbarung und das ihr
zugrunde liegende rechtliche Verfahren
müssen das Kreditinstitut in die Lage
versetzen, die Sicherheit innerhalb eines
angemessenen Zeitraums zu verwerten.
Or. de
Justification
Die Regelung Buchstabe a) bedarf der Klarstellung, damit Kreditinstitute nicht bereits bei
Vertragsschluss alle 25 Rechtssysteme prüfen müssen. Vielmehr müssen sie nur die
Rechtssysteme prüfen, die in der jeweiligen Prüfungssituation relevant sind.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 709
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (a)
a) Rechtssicherheit
a) Rechtssicherheit
Die Hypothek oder das
Sicherungspfandrecht müssen in allen
relevanten Rechtsordnungen rechtlich
durchsetzbar sein und ordnungsgemäß und
rechtzeitig registriert werden. Das in den
Vereinbarungen festgelegte Pfandrecht muss
wirksam sein (d.h. alle rechtlichen
Anforderungen zum Nachweis des Pfands
müssen erfüllt sein). Die
Sicherheitenvereinbarung und das ihr
zugrunde liegende rechtliche Verfahren
müssen das Kreditinstitut in die Lage
versetzen, die Sicherheit innerhalb eines
angemessenen Zeitraums zu verwerten.
Die Hypothek oder das
Sicherungspfandrecht müssen in allen zum
Zeitpunkt des Kreditvertragsschlusses
relevanten Rechtsordnungen rechtlich
durchsetzbar sein und ordnungsgemäß und
rechtzeitig registriert werden. Das in den
Vereinbarungen festgelegte Pfandrecht muss
wirksam sein (d.h. alle rechtlichen
Anforderungen zum Nachweis des Pfands
müssen erfüllt sein). Die
Sicherheitenvereinbarung und das ihr
zugrunde liegende rechtliche Verfahren
müssen das Kreditinstitut in die Lage
versetzen, die Sicherheit innerhalb eines
angemessenen Zeitraums zu verwerten.
Or. en
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Justification
Die Regelung Buchstabe a) bedarf der Klarstellung, damit Kreditinstitute nicht bereits bei
Vertragsschluss alle 25 Rechtssysteme prüfen müssen. Vielmehr müssen sie nur die
Rechtssysteme prüfen, die in der jeweiligen Prüfungssituation relevant sind.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 710
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (b), subparagraph 1
(b) The value of the property shall be
monitored on a frequent basis and at a
minimum once every year. More frequent
monitoring shall be carried out where the
market is subject to significant changes in
conditions. Statistical methods may be used
to monitor the value of the property and to
identify property that needs revaluation. The
property shall be valued by an independent
valuer when information indicates that the
value of the property may have declined
materially relative to general market prices.
For loans exceeding EUR 3 million or 5%
of the own funds of the credit institution,
the property shall be evaluated by an
independent valuer at least every three
years
(b) The value of the property shall be
monitored on a frequent basis and at a
minimum once every year for commercial
real estate and once every five years for
residential real estate. More frequent
monitoring shall be carried out where the
market is subject to significant changes in
conditions. Statistical methods or index
based adjustments of original valuations
may be used to monitor the value of the
property and to identify property that needs
revaluation. The property valuation shall be
reviewed by an independent valuer when
information indicates that the value of the
property may have declined materially
relative to general market prices.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal is significantly super-equivalent to the Basel Framework and will
put European banks at a serious competitive disadvantage. The thresholds imposed on loan
value are far below any realistic measure of materiality for many banks. It will result in
material and unjustified implementation costs that will be passed on to consumers. It will
particularly impact loans to SMEs secured by real estate and increase the burden and costs
for small banks.
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Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 711
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (b), subparagraph 1
Der Wert der Immobilie muss häufig,
mindestens jedoch einmal jährlich überprüft
werden. Sind die Märkte starken
Schwankungen ausgesetzt, so muss diese
Überprüfung häufiger stattfinden. Zur
Überprüfung des Werts einer Immobilie und
zur Ermittlung von Immobilien, die einer
Neubewertung bedürfen, können statistische
Verfahren verwendet werden. Gibt es
Hinweise darauf, dass die Immobilie im
Verhältnis zu den allgemeinen Marktpreisen
erheblich an Wert verloren haben könnte, so
ist die Bewertung von einem unabhängigen
Sachverständigen vorzunehmen. Bei
Krediten, die über 3 Mio. EUR oder 5 %
der Eigenmittel des Kreditinstituts
hinausgehen, muss die Immobilie
mindestens alle drei Jahre von einem
unabhängigen Sachverständigen bewertet
werden.
Der Wert der Immobilie muss häufig,
mindestens jedoch einmal jährlich bei
gewerblich genutzten Immobilien und alle
fünf Jahre bei Wohnimmobilien überprüft
werden. Sind die Märkte starken
Schwankungen ausgesetzt, so muss diese
Überprüfung häufiger stattfinden. Zur
Überprüfung des Werts einer Immobilie und
zur Ermittlung von Immobilien, die einer
Neubewertung bedürfen, können statistische
Verfahren verwendet werden. Gibt es
Hinweise darauf, dass die Immobilie im
Verhältnis zu den allgemeinen Marktpreisen
erheblich an Wert verloren haben könnte, so
ist die Bewertung von einem unabhängigen
Sachverständigen zu überprüfen.
Or. de
Justification
Im Sinne des Grundsatzes der Proportionalität, der Vermeidung überzogener bürokratischer
Auflagen und auf Grund der in der Vergangenheit festgestellten Wertbeständigkeit von
Wohnimmobilien, ist es gerechtfertigt, den Zeitraum von drei Jahren auf fünf Jahre zu
erhöhen. Der Notwendigkeit, Immobilienbewertungen bei Krediten, die über 3 Mio. Euro
oder 5 % der Eigenmittel des Kreditinstitutes hinausgehen, mindestens alle drei Jahre von
einem unabhängigen Sachverständigen zu überprüfen, ist auch im Basler Papier nicht
vorgesehen und sollte daher auch im EU-Eigenkapitalkonzept entfallen.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 712
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (b), subparagraph 1
The value of the property shall be monitored
on a frequent basis and at a minimum once
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The value of the property shall be monitored
on a frequent basis and at a minimum once
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every year. More frequent monitoring shall
be carried out where the market is subject to
significant changes in conditions. Statistical
methods may be used to monitor the value of
the property and to identify property that
needs revaluation. The property shall be
valued by an independent valuer when
information indicates that the value of the
property may have declined materially
relative to general market prices. For loans
exceeding EUR 3 million or 5% of the own
funds of the credit institution, the property
shall be evaluated by an independent valuer
at least every three years.
every year for commercial real estate and
once every three years for residential real
estate. More frequent monitoring shall be
carried out where the market is subject to
significant changes in conditions. Statistical
methods may be used to monitor the value of
the property and to identify property that
needs revaluation. The property valuation
shall be reviewed by an independent valuer
when information indicates that the value of
the property may have declined materially
relative to general market prices. For loans
exceeding EUR 3 million or 5% of the own
funds of the credit institution, the property
valuation shall be reviewed at least every
three years
Or. en
Justification
This requirement to have the property evaluated by an independent valuer at least every three
years is overly burdensome and goes beyond bank practices. A bank should be allowed to use
internal valuers where that facility exists.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 713
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (b), subparagraph 1
The value of the property shall be monitored
on a frequent basis and at a minimum once
every year. More frequent monitoring shall
be carried out where the market is subject to
significant changes in conditions. Statistical
methods may be used to monitor the value of
the property and to identify property that
needs revaluation. The property shall be
valued by an independent valuer when
information indicates that the value of the
property may have declined materially
relative to general market prices. For loans
exceeding EUR 3 million or 5% of the own
funds of the credit institution, the property
shall be evaluated by an independent valuer
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The value of the property shall be monitored
on a frequent basis and at a minimum once
every year for commercial real estate and
once every three years for residential real
estate.. More frequent monitoring shall be
carried out where the market is subject to
significant changes in conditions. Statistical
methods may be used to monitor the value of
the property and to identify property that
needs revaluation. The property valuation
shall be reviewed by an independent valuer
when information indicates that the value of
the property may have declined materially
relative to general market prices. For loans
exceeding EUR 3 million or 5% of the own
funds of the credit institution, the property
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at least every three years.
valuation shall be reviewed at least every
three years.
Or. en
Justification
This requirement to have the property evaluated by an independent valuer at least every three
years is overly burdensome and goes beyond bank practices. A bank should be allowed to use
internal valuers where that facility exists.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 714
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (d)
(d) Insurance
The credit institution shall have procedures
to monitor that the property taken as
protection is adequately insured against
damage.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
This requirement to have the property evaluated by an independent valuer at least every three
years is overly burdensome and goes beyond bank practices. A bank should be allowed to use
internal valuers where that facility exists.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 715
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 8, point (d)
(d) Insurance
The credit institution shall have procedures
to monitor that the property taken as
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(d) Insurance
The credit institution shall have procedures
to ensure that the property taken as
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protection is adequately insured against
damage.
protection is adequately insured against
damage when the credit is granted
Or. en
Justification
It should be ascertained that the property is insured at the outset.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 716
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 9, point (b) (ii)
(ii) The margin between the amount of the
exposure and the value of the receivables
must reflect all appropriate factors, including
the cost of collection, concentration within
the receivables pool pledged by an
individual borrower, and potential
concentration risk within the credit
institution’s total exposures beyond that
controlled by the credit institution’s general
methodology. The credit institution must
maintain a continuous monitoring process
appropriate to the receivables. Observance
of the credit institution’s overall
concentration limits shall be monitored.
Additionally, compliance with loan
covenants, environmental restrictions, and
other legal requirements shall be reviewed
on a regular basis.
(ii) The margin between the amount of the
exposure and the value of the receivables
must reflect all appropriate factors, including
the cost of collection, concentration within
the receivables pool pledged by an
individual borrower, and potential
concentration risk within the credit
institution’s total exposures beyond that
controlled by the credit institution’s general
methodology. The credit institution must
maintain a continuous monitoring process
appropriate to the receivables. Additionally,
compliance with loan covenants,
environmental restrictions, and other legal
requirements shall be reviewed on a regular
basis.
Or. en
Justification
For netting and funded credit protection, it is irrelevant who has provided the collateral. In
99% of cases it will be provided by the client itself. Furthermore, though there can be
concentrations in the underlying parties on whom a bank's client has a claim, it is impossible
for an international bank with many different legal entities and systems to combine the data of
the receivable issuers to identify these concentrations. In addition, this is a double default
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issue and we note that the issue of double default is being examined by the Basel/IOSCO
Trading Book.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 717
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 9, point (b) (ii)
(ii) The margin between the amount of the
exposure and the value of the receivables
must reflect all appropriate factors, including
the cost of collection, concentration within
the receivables pool pledged by an
individual borrower, and potential
concentration risk within the credit
institution’s total exposures beyond that
controlled by the credit institution’s general
methodology. The credit institution must
maintain a continuous monitoring process
appropriate to the receivables. Observance
of the credit institution’s overall
concentration limits shall be monitored.
Additionally, compliance with loan
covenants, environmental restrictions, and
other legal requirements shall be reviewed
on a regular basis.
(ii) The margin between the amount of the
exposure and the value of the receivables
must reflect all appropriate factors, including
the cost of collection, concentration within
the receivables pool pledged by an
individual borrower, and potential
concentration risk within the credit
institution’s total exposures beyond that
controlled by the credit institution’s general
methodology. The credit institution must
maintain a continuous monitoring process
appropriate to the receivables. Additionally,
compliance with loan covenants,
environmental restrictions, and other legal
requirements shall be reviewed on a regular
basis.
Or. en
Justification
Banks normally track (concentrations in) unfunded credit protection providers by adding
guarantees and credit derivatives issued by a counterparty to this counterparty's overall
exposure level and by managing this overall exposure level. For netting and funded credit
protection, it is irrelevant who has provided the collateral (the bank is basically only
interested in having a legally effective pledge on the collateral). Also, in 99% of the cases the
collateral will be provided by the client itself (exceptionally its parent). There is one
important exception: receivables as collateral. There can indeed be concentrations in the
underlying parties on whom a bank's client has a claim. It is however impossible for an
international bank consisting of many different legal entities with different source systems to
combine the data of these different receivable issuers so that these concentrations can be
identified. Already, matching counterparty identifiers is impossible The operational burden
for banks would be enormous. This requirement would only be relevant for specialised banks
active in limited industry sectors.
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In addition, we note that the issue of double default is being examined by the Basel/IOSCO
Trading Book review so we believe that it is premature to include this requirement into Level
1 text at this time. This amendment is linked to the proposed amendment of Annex VIII,
paragraph 9.
Amendment by Piia-Noora Kauppi
Amendment 718
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 9, point (b) (ii)
(ii) The margin between the amount of the
exposure and the value of the receivables
must reflect all appropriate factors, including
the cost of collection, concentration within
the receivables pool pledged by an
individual borrower, and potential
concentration risk within the credit
institution’s total exposures beyond that
controlled by the credit institution’s general
methodology. The credit institution must
maintain a continuous monitoring process
appropriate to the receivables. Observance
of the credit institution’s overall
concentration limits shall be monitored.
Additionally, compliance with loan
covenants, environmental restrictions, and
other legal requirements shall be reviewed
on a regular basis.
(ii) The margin between the amount of the
exposure and the value of the receivables
must reflect all appropriate factors, including
the cost of collection, concentration within
the receivables pool pledged by an
individual borrower, and potential
concentration risk within the credit
institution’s total exposures beyond that
controlled by the credit institution’s general
methodology. The credit institution must
maintain a continuous monitoring process
appropriate to the receivables. Additionally,
compliance with loan covenants,
environmental restrictions, and other legal
requirements shall be reviewed on a regular
basis.
Or. en
Justification
Banks normally track (concentrations in) unfunded credit protection providers by adding
guarantees and credit derivatives issued by a counterparty to this counterparty's overall
exposure level and by managing this overall exposure level. For netting and funded credit
protection, it is irrelevant who has provided the collateral (the bank is basically only
interested in having a legally effective pledge on the collateral). Also, in 99% of the cases the
collateral will be provided by the client itself (exceptionally its parent). There are two
important exceptions: receivables and securities as collateral. With receivables there can
indeed be concentrations in the underlying parties on whom a bank's client has a claim.
Banks usually monitor concentration of those parties on a counterparty level, which limits the
importance of any single underlying party for the respective exposure. Also receivables often
have a high turnover, resulting in inconstant composition and overall concentration. For an
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international bank consisting of many different legal entities with different source systems it is
practically impossible to combine the data of these different receivable issuers so that these
concentrations can be identified. Already, matching counterparty identifiers is impossible.
The additional operational burden for banks would be enormous, while the added value to
risk management minimal.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 719
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 10, point (c)
(c) The value of the property shall be
monitored on a frequent basis and at a
minimum once every year. More frequent
monitoring shall be required where the
market is subject to significant changes in
conditions.
(c) The value of the property shall be
monitored on a frequent basis. More
frequent monitoring shall be required where
the market is subject to significant changes
in conditions.
Or. en
Justification
The requirements to monitor the value at a minimum once every year is inappropriate and
unnecessary. It would lead to substantial additional costs with no benefit in term of risks
management and goes beyond the requirements of the revised Basel framework.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 720
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 10, point (c)
(c) The value of the property shall be
monitored on a frequent basis and at a
minimum once every year. More frequent
monitoring shall be required where the
market is subject to significant changes in
conditions.
(c) The value of the property shall be
monitored on a frequent basis. More
frequent monitoring shall be required where
the market is subject to significant changes
in conditions.
Or. en
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Justification
Proper insurance is included in the credit agreement as an obligation of the counterparty and
breach of it is usually an event of default. However, it will be therefore impossible to monitor
insurance on such properties, particularly for retail mortgages as insurance companies
cannot be required to advise credit institutions that such insurance is still in place or has
been cancelled. Obligors as consumers will be unwilling to regularly provide such
information to credit institutions. As property portfolios are granular and well diversified, the
risk arising from not tracking such insurance is minimal. The requirements to monitor the
value at a minimum once every year, to have policies in place to physically inspect the
property and to monitor the insurance are inappropriate and unnecessary. It would lead to
substantial additional costs with no benefit in term of risks management. Only for specialised
lending and leasing credit institutions normally rely on guarantying cash flow of the
borrower to repay the debt. Theses requirements go also beyond the requirements of the
revised Basel framework.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 721
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 10, point (f)
(f) The credit institution’s credit policies
with regard to the transaction structure shall
address appropriate collateral requirements
relative to the exposure amount, the ability
to liquidate the collateral readily, the ability
to establish objectively a price or market
value, the frequency with which the value
can readily be obtained (including a
professional appraisal or valuation), and the
volatility of the value of the collateral.
(f) The credit institution’s credit policies
with regard to the transaction structure shall
address appropriate collateral requirements
relative to the exposure amount, the ability
to liquidate the collateral readily, the ability
to establish objectively a price or market
value, the frequency with which the value
can readily be obtained (including a
professional appraisal or valuation), and the
volatility or a proxy of the volatility of the
value of the collateral.
Or. en
Justification
While it is common practice for a credit institution’s credit policy to address the type of
exposure and to whom it is made, including taking into account collateral values, this
requirement may lead to misinterpretation. Indeed, while for some types of assets such as
motor cars and aircrafts for example an institution is able to be aware of value fluctuations,
for others this is difficult to determine.
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Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 722
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 10, point (h)
(h) The credit institution must have the
right to phsically inspect the property. It
shall have policies and procedures
addressing its exercise of the right to
physical inspection.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
Proper insurance is included in the credit agreement as an obligation of the counterparty and
breach of it is usually an event of default. However, it will be therefore impossible to monitor
insurance on such properties, particularly for retail mortgages as insurance companies
cannot be required to advise credit institutions that such insurance is still in place or has
been cancelled. Obligors as consumers will be unwilling to regularly provide such
information to credit institutions. As property portfolios are granular and well diversified, the
risk arising from not tracking such insurance is minimal. The requirements to monitor the
value at a minimum once every year, to have policies in place to physically inspect the
property and to monitor the insurance are inappropriate and unnecessary. It would lead to
substantial additional costs with no benefit in term of risks management. Only for specialised
lending and leasing credit institutions normally rely on guarantying cash flow of the
borrower to repay the debt. Theses requirements go also beyond the requirements of the
revised Basel framework.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 723
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 10, point (i)
(i) The credit institution must have
procedures to monitor that the property
taken as protection is adequately insured
against damage.
deleted
Or. en
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Justification
Proper insurance is included in the credit agreement as an obligation of the counterparty and
breach of it is usually an event of default. However, it will be therefore impossible to monitor
insurance on such properties, particularly for retail mortgages as insurance companies
cannot be required to advise credit institutions that such insurance is still in place or has
been cancelled. Obligors as consumers will be unwilling to regularly provide such
information to credit institutions. As property portfolios are granular and well diversified, the
risk arising from not tracking such insurance is minimal. The requirements to monitor the
value at a minimum once every year, to have policies in place to physically inspect the
property and to monitor the insurance are inappropriate and unnecessary. It would lead to
substantial additional costs with no benefit in term of risks management. Only for specialised
lending and leasing credit institutions normally rely on guarantying cash flow of the
borrower to repay the debt. Theses requirements go also beyond the requirements of the
revised Basel framework.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 724
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 10, point (i)
(i) The credit institution must have
procedures to monitor that the property
taken as protection is adequately insured
against damage.
(i) The credit institution must have
procedures to ensure that the property taken
as protection is adequately insured against
damage when the credit is granted.
Or. en
Justification
It should be ascertained that the property is insured at the outset.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 725
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 11, point (a)
(a) The conditions set out in paragraphs 8 or
10 as appropriate for the recognition as
collateral of the type of property leased shall
be met;
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(a) The conditions set out in paragraphs 8 or
10 as appropriate for the recognition as
collateral of the type of property leased shall
be met, except for paragraphs 8(b) and
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10(c);
Or. en
Justification
The monitoring of collateral values by the lessor is an inherent part of the lessor’s risk
management and does not warrant separate conditions to ensure this. Therefore, an adequate
solution would be to remove the obligation to comply with minimum requirements for
valuation and to monitore of real estate and other physical collateral and instead to include
an explicit reference to monitoring property values as a part of robust risk management in the
minimum requirements specific to leasing transactions.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 726
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 11, point (b)
b) der Leasinggeber hinsichtlich der
Überwachung von Standort,
Verwendungszweck, Alter und geplanter
Nutzungsdauer des Gegenstands über ein
solides Risikomanagement verfügt,
(b) der Leasinggeber hinsichtlich
Verwendungszweck des geleasten
Vermögenswertes, seines Alters und seiner
geplanten Nutzungsdauer über ein solides
Risikomanagement verfügt, einschließlich
einer angemessenen Überwachung des
Wertes der Sicherheit,
Or. de
Justification
Der Leasinggeber kann den Standort des Leasingobjekts nicht kontinuierlich verfolgen,
sondern als Eigentümer des Vermögenswerts den Standort nur innerhalb einer bestimmten
Frist ausfindig machen.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 727
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 11, point (b)
(b) There shall be robust risk management
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(b) There shall be robust risk management
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on the part of the lessor with respect to the
location of the asset, the use to which it is
put, its age, and planned obsolescence;
on the part of the lessor with respect to the
use to which the leased asset is put, its age,
and planned obsolescence and including
appropriate monitoring of the collateral
value;
Or. en
Justification
It must be clearly understood that it is impossible for a lessor to keep constant track of the
location of an asset such a car or container. Furthermore, this requirement has been
translated in different ways across the European nations, leading to additional confusion
about the intent of the requirements. As described in the justification for the previous
amendment, it should be highlighted the fact that monitoring collateral values must form an
inherent part of the lessor’s risk management.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 728
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 11, point (d)
d) die Differenz zwischen der
Abschreibungsquote des
Leasinggegenstands und der
Amortisationsrate der Leasingzahlungen
den kreditrisikomindernden Effekt des
Leasingobjektes nicht übersteigt.
(d) soweit nicht bereits bei der Berechnung
der LGD-Höhe ermittelt, die Differenz
zwischen dem Wert des ungetilgten
Betrages und dem Marktwert der
Sicherheit den kreditrisikomindernden
Effekt des Leaingobjekts nicht übersteigt.
Or. de
Justification
Der Wert des ungetilgten Betrags sollte nicht zu weit vom Marktwert abweichen. Ferner
greift die Anforderung nur, wenn das Risiko des Basisvermögenswertes nicht bereits bei der
Berechnung des LGDs berücksichtigt wurde.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 729
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 11, point (d)
(d) The difference between the rate of
depreciation of the physical asset and the
rate of amortisation of the lease payments
must not be so large as to overstate the credit
risk mitigation attributed to the leased assets.
(d) If not already estimated in the
calculation of LGD levels, the difference
between the value of the outstanding
amount and the market value of the
collateral must not be so large as to
overstate the credit risk mitigation attributed
to the leased assets.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission's text may lead to practical difficulties as it is currently stated. It is felt that
is may be more suitable to express this requirement in terms of the value of outstanding
amount not being allowed to deviate too far from market value.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 730
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 13, point (c)
c) Der betreffende Lebensversicherer wurde
über die Verpfändung bzw. Abtretung in
Kenntnis gesetzt und kann aufgrund dessen
nur mit Zustimmung des kreditgebenden
Kreditinstitut den Vertrag kündigen oder im
Rahmen des Vertrages fällige Beträge
auszahlen.
(c) Der betreffende Lebensversicherer wurde
über die Verpfändung bzw. Abtretung in
Kenntnis gesetzt und kann aufgrund dessen
nur mit Zustimmung des kreditgebenden
Kreditstitut im Rahmen des Vertrages fällige
Beträge auszahlen.
Or. de
Justification
Die Kündigung des Versicherungverhältnisses kann nicht von der Zustimmung des
kreditgebenden Kreditinstituts abhängig gemacht werden, denn die Kündigungsgründe
werden naturgemäss nur aus dem Verhältnis Versicherungsnehmer-Versicherer abgeleitet.
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Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 731
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 13, point (d)
d) Die Versicherungspolice weist einen
nichtreduzierbaren Rückkaufswert aus.
d) Der Rückkaufswert der Versicherung ist
nicht reduzierbar.
Or. de
Justification
Eine Änderung von 13 d) ist erforderlich, da die Versicherungspolice in der Regel keine
Angaben zum Rückkaufswert enthält.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 732
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 13, point (d)
d) Die Versicherungspolice weist einen
nichtreduzierbaren Rückkaufswert aus.
d) Der Rückkaufswert der Versicherung ist
nicht reduzierbar.
Or. de
Justification
Eine Änderung von 13 d) ist erforderlich, da die Versicherungspolice in der Regel keine
Angaben zum Rückkaufswert enthält.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 733
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 13, point (g)
g) Die Sicherheit wird für die Laufzeit des
Kredits gestellt.
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(g) Die Sicherheit wird für die Laufzeit des
Kredits gestellt. Soweit dies nicht möglich
ist, weil das Versicherungsverhältnis
bereits vor Ablauf des Kreditverhältnisses
endet, so muss das Kreditinstitut
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sicherstellen, dass der aus dem
Versicherungsvertrag fliessende Betrag bis
zum Ende der Laufzeit des Kreditvertrages
dem Kreditinstitut als Sicherheit dient.
Or. de
Justification
In der Regel haben Versicherungsvertrag und Kreditvertrag keine kongruente Laufzeit. Die
Ergänzung trägt diesem Umstand Rechnung.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 734
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 13, point (h)
(h) Der Pfand ist in allen relevanten
Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich durchsetzbar.
(h). Das Pfand ist in allen zum Zeitpunkt
des Kreditvertragsschlusses relevanten
Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich durchsetzbar.
Or. de
Justification
Die Regelung Buchstabe a) bedarf der Klarstellung, damit Kreditinstitute nicht bereits bei
Vertragsschluss alle 25 Rechtssysteme prüfen müssen. Vielmehr müssen sie nur die
Rechtssysteme prüfen, die in der jeweiligen Prüfungssituation relevant sind.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 735
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 13, point (h)
(h) Der Pfand ist in allen relevanten
Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich durchsetzbar.
(h) Das Pfand ist in allen zum Zeitpunkt des
Kreditvertragsschlusses relevanten
Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich durchsetzbar.
Or. de
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Justification
Es bedarf der Klarstellung, dass Kreditinstitute nicht bereits bei Vertragsschluss alle 25
Rechtssysteme prüfen müssen. Vielmehr müssen sie nur die Rechtssysteme prüfen, die in der
jeweiligen Prüfungssituation relevant sind.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 736
Annex VIII, part 2, Heading (new) (after paragraph 13)
1.8.3 Minimum requirements for the
recognition of commodity warrants and
commodities:
Or. en
Justification
The amendment stipulates the material prerequisites of collateral in Annex VIII part 2. Thus,
common hedging transactions accepted as risk-mitigating in the energy market, may also be
recognised as risk-mitigating for hedging positions.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 737
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Commodities and commodity warrants
may be recognised as eligible collateral if
they are readily realisable and if
transparent and reliable market prices exist
for them.
Or. en
Justification
The amendment stipulates the material prerequisites of collateral in Annex VIII part 2. Thus,
common hedging transactions accepted as risk-mitigating in the energy market, may also be
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recognised as risk-mitigating for hedging positions.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 738
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 14, point (d)
(d) Die Absicherung ist in allen relevanten
Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich durchsetzbar.
(d) Die Absicherung ist in allen zum
Zeitpunkt des Kreditvertragsschlusses
relevanten Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich
durchsetzbar.
Or. de
Justification
Die Regelung Buchstabe a) bedarf der Klarstellung, damit Kreditinstitute nicht bereits bei
Vertragsschluss alle 25 Rechtssysteme prüfen müssen. Vielmehr müssen sie nur die
Rechtssysteme prüfen, die in der jeweiligen Prüfungssituation relevant sind.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 739
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 14, point (d)
(d) Die Absicherung ist in allen relevanten
Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich durchsetzbar.
(d) Die Absicherung ist in allen zum
Zeitpunkt des Kreditvertragesschlusses
relevanten Rechtsordnungen gerichtlich
durchsetzbar.
Or. de
Justification
Es bedarf der Klarstellung, dass Kreditinstitute nicht bereits bei Vertragsschluss alle 25
Rechtssysteme prüfen müssen. Vielmehr müssen sie nur die Rechtssysteme prüfen, die in der
jeweiligen Prüfungssituation relevant sind.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 740
Annex VIII, part 2, Heading (new) (after paragraph 15)
2.1.2. Credit protection for energy
institutions according to article 3 (t) of the
Directive [93/6/EC]:
Or. en
Justification
The amendment stipulates the material prerequisites of collateral in Annex VIII part 2. Thus,
common hedging transactions accepted as risk-mitigating in the energy market, may also be
recognised as risk-mitigating for hedging positions.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 741
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Guarantees or securities issued by
undertakings in the meaning of Annex
VIII, part 1, paragraph 26 (h) of this
Directive that met the conditions set out in
paragraph 14 of part 2.
Or. en
Justification
See comments on Annex VIII, part 1, paragraph 26(ga) (new).
Amendment by Enrico Letta
Amendment 742
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 16, introductory part
16. Where an exposure is protected by a
guarantee which is counter-guaranteed by a
central government or central bank, a
regional government or local authority
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16. Where an exposure is protected by a
guarantee which is directly or indirectly
counter-guaranteed by a central government
or central bank, a regional government or
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claims on which are treated as claims on the
sovereign in whose jurisdiction they are
established under Articles 78 to 83, a multilateral development bank to which a 0% risk
weight is applied under or by virtue of
Articles 78 to 83, or a public sector entity
claims on which are treated as claims on
credit institutions under Articles 78 to 83,
the exposure may be treated as protected by
a guarantee provided by the entity in
question provided the following conditions
are satisfied:
local authority claims on which are treated
as claims on the central government in
whose jurisdiction they are established under
Articles 78 to 83, a multi-lateral
development bank to which a 0% risk
weight is applied under or by virtue of
Articles 78 to 83, or a public sector entity
claims on which are treated as claims on
credit institutions under Articles 78 to 83,
the exposure may be treated as protected by
a guarantee provided by the entity in
question provided the following conditions
are satisfied:
Or. en
Justification
The way in which eligible counter-guarantors operate in the various Member States is not
homogeneous. In some countries the eligible counter-guarantor guarantees directly the
guarantor. In others, it guarantees the guarantor indirectly via a technical means which is
normally a guarantee fund. It is important that the directive maintains a neutral stance vis à
vis the technique eligible guarantors choose to operate with due to the specific conditions
prevailing in a given national market. The three conditions specified at the end of the
paragraph, and in particular the requirement for competent authorities to be satisfied ensures
in all admissible cases that any chosen technical means does not create any prudential
concern.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 743
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 16, introductory part
16. Where an exposure is protected by a
guarantee which is counter-guaranteed by a
central government or central bank, a
regional government or local authority
claims on which are treated as claims on the
sovereign in whose jurisdiction they are
established under Articles 78 to 83, a multilateral development bank to which a 0% risk
weight is applied under or by virtue of
Articles 78 to 83, or a public sector entity
claims on which are treated as claims on
credit institutions under Articles 78 to 83,
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16. Where an exposure is protected by a
guarantee which is counter-guaranteed by a
central government or central bank, a
regional government or local authority
claims on which are treated as claims on the
central government in whose jurisdiction
they are established under Articles 78 to 83,
a multi-lateral development bank to which a
0% risk weight is applied under or by virtue
of Articles 78 to 83, or a public sector entity
claims on which are treated as claims on
credit institutions under Articles 78 to 83,
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the exposure may be treated as protected by
a guarantee provided by the entity in
question provided the following conditions
are satisfied:
the exposure may be treated as protected by
a guarantee provided by the entity in
question provided the following conditions
are satisfied:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 744
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 17, point (a)
(a) On the qualifying default/non-payment
of the counterparty, the lending credit
institution shall have the right to pursue, in a
timely manner, the guarantor for any monies
due under the claim in respect of which the
protection is provided. Payment by the
guarantor shall not be subject to the lending
credit institution first having to pursue the
obligor.
(a) On the qualifying default/non-payment
of the counterparty, the lending credit
institution shall have the right to pursue, in a
timely manner, the guarantor for any monies
due under the claim in respect of which the
protection is provided. Payment by the
guarantor shall not be subject to the lending
credit institution first having to pursue the
obligor, unless the guarantor pays for the
financial cost subsequent to the delay of
payment.
Or. en
Justification
The impossibility for the payment to be subject to the lending credit institution first having to
pursue the obligor does not correspond to the practice of some companies providing
guarantees to SMEs. This will prejudice SMEs in so far as fewer enterprises could thereon
receive guarantees, and, accordingly, financing. It is consequently suggested to make it
possible that the payment by the guarantor be subject to the lending credit institution first
having to pursue the obligor if the guarantor pays for the financial cost subsequent to the
delay of payment.
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Amendment by Zsolt László Becsey
Amendment 745
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. In the case of unfunded credit
protection covering residential mortgage
loans, the requirements in paragraph 14(c)
(iii) and 17(a) shall be deemed applicable at
completion by the lender of any legal or
other proceedings required to acquire title
to or realize the value of mortgage
collateral.
Or. en
Justification
The proposed amendment aims at increasing legal certainty regarding the use of unfunded
credit protection on loans secured by mortgage collateral. The amendment is consistent with
the definition of unfunded credit protection (art. 4) and the provision contained in paragraph
18.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 746
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. In the case of unfunded credit
protection covering residential mortgage
loans, the requirements in paragraph 14(c)
(iii) and 17(a) shall be deemed applicable at
completion by the lender of any legal or
other proceedings required to acquire title
to or realize the value of mortgage
collateral.
Or. en
Justification
The proposed amendment aims at increasing legal certainty regarding the use of unfunded
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credit protection on loans secured by mortgage collateral. In several EU countries, this type
of credit risk mitigation is frequently used to provide lenders with additional security against
credit losses. These may indeed occur should the mortgage collateral [the property] fail to
cover the entire amount of the loan outstanding at the time of default. In such situations, the
execution of the unfunded credit protection is thus subject to the realisation of the value of the
loan's collateral, which finally determines the amount of any credit losses. The amendment is
consistent with the definition of unfunded credit protection [art. 4] and the provision
contained in paragraph 18 for mutual guarantee schemes.
Amendment by Othmar Karas
Amendment 747
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. In the case of unfunded credit
protection covering residential mortgage
loans, the requirements in paragraph 14(c)
(iii) and 17(a) shall be deemed applicable at
completion by the lender of any legal or
other proceedings required to acquire title
to or realize the value of mortgage
collateral.
Or. en
Justification
The proposed amendment aims at increasing legal certainty regarding the use of unfunded
credit protection on loans secured by mortgage collateral. In several EU countries, this type
of credit risk mitigation is frequently used to provide lenders with additional security against
credit losses. These may indeed occur should the mortgage collateral [the property] fail to
cover the entire amount of the loan outstanding at the time of default. In such situations, the
execution of the unfunded credit protection is thus subject to the realisation of the value of the
loan's collateral, which finally determines the amount of any credit losses.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 748
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 16, introductory part
16. Where an exposure is protected by a
guarantee which is counter-guaranteed by a
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16. Where an exposure is protected by a
guarantee which is counter-guaranteed by a
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central government or central bank, a
regional government or local authority
claims on which are treated as claims on the
sovereign in whose jurisdiction they are
established under Articles 78 to 83, a multilateral development bank to which a 0% risk
weight is applied under or by virtue of
Articles 78 to 83, or a public sector entity
claims on which are treated as claims on
credit institutions under Articles 78 to 83,
the exposure may be treated as protected by
a guarantee provided by the entity in
question provided the following conditions
are satisfied:
central government or central bank, a
regional government or local authority or a
public sector entity claims on which are
treated as claims on the central government
in whose jurisdiction they are established
under Articles 78 to 83, a multi-lateral
development bank to which a 0% risk
weight is applied under or by virtue of
Articles 78 to 83, or a public sector entity
claims on which are treated as claims on
credit institutions under Articles 78 to 83,
the exposure may be treated as protected by
a guarantee provided by the entity in
question provided the following conditions
are satisfied:
Or. en
Follows from Amendment 111 of Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 749
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 18, point (b)
(b) the competent authorities are otherwise
satisfied as to the loss-protecting effects of
the guarantee, including losses resulting
from the non-payment of interest and other
types of payment which the borrower is
obliged to make.
(b) the lending credit institution can
demonstrate that the loss-protecting effects
of the guarantee, including losses resulting
from the non-payment of interest and other
types of payment which the borrower is
obliged to make.
Or. en
Justification
Alignment with Council text (English version). Substitution of amendment 191 of Radwan
draft report.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 750
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 19, point (a) (i)
(i) the failure to pay the amounts due under
the terms of the underlying obligation that
are in effect at the time of such failure (with
a grace period that is closely in line with or
shorter than the grace period in the
underlying obligation); and
(i) the failure to pay the amounts due under
the terms of the underlying obligation that
are in effect at the time of such failure (with
a grace period that is closely in line with or
shorter than the grace period in the
underlying obligation);
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 751
Annex VIII, part 2, paragraph 19, point (b)
(b) Where the credit events specified under
the credit derivative do not include
restructuring of the underlying obligation as
described in the third indent of (a), the
credit protection may nonetheless be
recognised subject to a reduction in the
recognised value as specified in part 3,
paragraph 84.
(b) Where the credit events specified under
the credit derivative do not include
restructuring of the underlying obligation as
described in point (iii) of subparagraph (a),
the credit protection may nonetheless be
recognised subject to a reduction in the
recognised value as specified in part 3,
paragraph 84.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 752
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 1
1. Subject to parts 4 to 6, where the
provisions in parts 1 and 2 are satisfied, the
calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts under Subsection 1 Articles 78 to
83 and the calculation of risk-weighted
exposure amounts and expected loss
amounts under Articles 84 to 89 may be
modified in accordance with the provisions
of this part.
1. Subject to parts 4 to 6, where the
provisions in parts 1 and 2 are satisfied, the
calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts under Articles 78 to 83 and the
calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts and expected loss amounts under
Articles 84 to 89 may be modified in
accordance with the provisions of this part.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error..
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 753
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 12
12. As an alternative to using the
Supervisory volatility adjustments approach
or the Own Estimates volatility adjustments
approach in calculating the fully adjusted
exposure value (E*) resulting from the
application of an eligible master netting
agreement covering repurchase transactions,
securities or commodities lending or
borrowing transactions, and/or other capital
market driven transactions other than
derivative transactions, credit institutions
may be permitted to use an internal models
approach which takes into account
correlation effects between security
positions subject to the master netting
agreement as well as the liquidity of the
instruments concerned. Internal models
used in this approach shall provide
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12. As an alternative to using the
Supervisory volatility adjustments approach
or the Own Estimates volatility adjustments
approach in calculating the fully adjusted
exposure value (E*), credit institutions may
be permitted to use an internal models
approach for repurchase transactions,
securities or commodities lending or
borrowing transactions, and/or other capital
market driven transactions other than
derivative transactions. Internal models
must assess potential change in exposure
subject to minimum standards set out below
and in particular should take into account
correlation effects between security
positions as well as the liquidity of the
instruments concerned. Models may reflect
netting, but only where such netting is
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estimates of the potential change in value
of the unsecured exposure amount (∑E ∑C).
permissible in view of master netting
agreements covering the positions.
Or. en
Justification
The draft proposed by the Commission could imply that internal models can only be used if
all transactions are covered by a netting agreement. Credit institutions should be allowed to
take account of diversification across their market risk positions with a given counterparty
regardless of the applicability of netting. Netting and diversification are distinct concepts.
The existence of a netting agreement reduces both the current and future exposure to a
counterparty. Diversification, which is recognised in internal models, limits future exposure
without the need for a netting agreement being in place.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 754
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 13
13. A credit institution may choose to use an
internal models approach independently of
the choice it has made between the
Standardised Approach and the IRB
Foundation Approach to credit risk.
However, if a credit institution seeks to use
an internal models approach, it must do so
for all the counterparties and securities,
excluding immaterial portfolios where it
may use the Supervisory volatility
adjustments approach or the Own estimates
volatility adjustments approach as set out in
paragraphs 5 to 11.
13. A credit institution may choose to use an
internal models approach independently of
the choice it has made between the
Standardised Approach and the IRB
Foundation Approach to credit risk.
Or. en
Justification
This is super equivalent to the Basel Framework. It also suggests a major difference between
own estimates of volatility and the use of internal models.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 755
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 13
13. A credit institution may choose to use an
internal models approach independently of
the choice it has made between the
Standardised Approach and the IRB
Foundation Approach to credit risk.
However, if a credit institution seeks to use
an internal models approach, it must do so
for all counterparties and securities,
excluding immaterial portfolios where it
may use the Supervisory volatility
adjustments approach or the Own estimates
volatility adjustments approach as set out in
paragraphs 5 to 11.
13. A credit institution may choose to use an
internal models approach independently of
the choice it has made between Articles 78
to 83 and Articles 84 to 89 for the
calculation of risk-weighted exposure
amounts. However, if a credit institution
seeks to use an internal models approach, it
must do so for all counterparties and
securities, excluding immaterial portfolios
where it may use the Supervisory volatility
adjustments approach or the Own estimates
volatility adjustments approach as set out in
paragraphs 5 to 11.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 756
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 19
19. The competent authorities may allow
credit institutions to use empirical
correlations within risk categories and across
risk categories if they are satisfied that the
institution's system for measuring
correlations is sound and implemented with
integrity`.
19. The competent authorities may allow
credit institutions to use empirical
correlations within risk categories and across
risk categories if they are satisfied that the
credit institution's system for measuring
correlations is sound and implemented with
integrity`.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 757
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 21, subparagraph 3
Where risk-weighted exposure amounts are
calculated under Subsection 1 Articles 78 to
83, E is the exposure value for each separate
exposure under the agreement that would
apply in the absence of the credit protection.
Where risk-weighted exposure amounts are
calculated under Articles 78 to 83, E is the
exposure value for each separate exposure
under the agreement that would apply in the
absence of the credit protection.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 758
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 27
27. The risk weight that would apply under
Articles 78 to 83 if the lender had a direct
exposure to the collateral instrument shall
apply to those portions of claims
collateralised by the market value of
recognised collateral. The risk weight on the
collateralised portion shall be a minimum of
20% except as specified in paragraphs 28 to
30. The remainder of the exposure shall
receive the risk weight that would be applied
to an unsecured exposure to the counterparty
under Articles 78 to 83.
27. The risk weight that would apply under
Articles 78 to 83 if the lender had a direct
exposure to the collateral instrument shall
apply to those portions of claims
collateralised by the market value of
recognised collateral. The risk weight of the
collateralised portion shall be a minimum of
20% except as specified in paragraphs 28 to
30. The remainder of the exposure shall
receive the risk weight that would be applied
to an unsecured exposure to the counterparty
under Articles 78 to 83.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 759
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 37, Table 5, column 2, row 2
20 day liquidation period (%)
10 day liquidation period (%)
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 760
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 43
43. The competent authorities may permit
institutions complying with the requirements
set out in paragraphs 48 to 57 to use their
own estimates of volatility for calculating
the volatility adjustments to be applied to
collateral and exposures.
43. The competent authorities shall permit
credit institutions complying with the
requirements set out in paragraphs 48 to 57
to use their own estimates of volatility for
calculating the volatility adjustments to be
applied to collateral and exposures.
Or. en
Justification
Alignment with Council proposal. Replaces amendment 200 of the Radwan draft report.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 761
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 43
43. The competent authorities may permit
institutions complying with the requirements
set out in paragraphs 48 to 57 to use their
own estimates of volatility for calculating
the volatility adjustments to be applied to
collateral and exposures.
43. The competent authorities shall permit
credit institutions complying with the
requirements set out in paragraphs 48 to 57
to use their own estimates of volatility for
calculating the volatility adjustments to be
applied to collateral and exposures.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error. Replaces Amendment 200 of Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 762
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 71
71. Where the ratio of the value of the
collateral to the exposure value exceeds a
second, higher threshold level of C** (i.e.
the required level of collateralisation to
receive full LGD recognition) as laid down
in Table 6, LGD* shall be that prescribed in
the following table.
71. Where the ratio of the value of the
collateral to the exposure value exceeds a
second, higher threshold level of C** (i.e.
the required level of collateralisation to
receive full LGD recognition) as laid down
in Table 6, LGD* shall be that prescribed in
Table 6.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 763
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, Table 6, column 5, row3
140%
100%
Or. en
Justification
This requirement will have a negative impact on individual borrowers or SMEs. Indeed, these
types of borrowers often receive finance in cases where the amount of the exposure is the
same as the value of the collateral, i.e. 100% of the purchase price of an asset is often
financed by the credit institution. Given a degree of collateralisation of 140%, the institution
may only grant a part of the necessary sum. The borrower would therefore either be faced
with a higher cost of lending or have to provide other types of collateral.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 764
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, Table 6, column 5, row3
140%
100%
Or. en
Justification
The minimum collateralisation level of exposures has a negative impact on the financing of
SMEs. Indeed, the financing of movable assets is often the only opportunity for those
companies to invest (generally 100% of the purchase price) in working capital. Furthermore,
this condition is an inadequate duplication of the provisioning which is already inherent in
the levels of LGD with the result of severely increasing the level of capital a lessor would
have to hold under the IRBF approach in comparison with the other approaches.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 765
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, Table 6, column 5, row 4
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140%
100%
Or. en
Justification
This requirement will have a negative impact on individual borrowers or SMEs. Indeed, these
types of borrowers often receive finance in cases where the amount of the exposure is the
same as the value of the collateral, i.e. 100% of the purchase price of an asset is often
financed by the credit institution. Given a degree of collateralisation of 140%, the institution
may only grant a part of the necessary sum. The borrower would therefore either be faced
with a higher cost of lending or have to provide other types of collateral.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 766
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, Table 6, column 5, row 4
140%
100%
Or. en
Justification
The minimum collateralisation level of exposures has a negative impact on the financing of
SMEs. Indeed, the financing of movable assets is often the only opportunity for those
companies to invest (generally 100% of the purchase price) in working capital. Furthermore,
this condition is an inadequate duplication of the provisioning which is already inherent in
the levels of LGD with the result of severely increasing the level of capital a lessor would
have to hold under the IRBF approach in comparison with the other approaches.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 767
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, introductory part
By way of derogation, until 31 December
2012 the competent authorities may, subject
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By way of derogation, until 31 December
2012, subject to the indicated levels of
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to the indicated levels of collateralization
collateralization
Or. en
Justification
This requirement will have a negative impact on individual borrowers or SMEs. Indeed, these
types of borrowers often receive finance in cases where the amount of the exposure is the
same as the value of the collateral, i.e. 100% of the purchase price of an asset is often
financed by the credit institution. Given a degree of collateralisation of 140%, the institution
may only grant a part of the necessary sum. The borrower would therefore either be faced
with a higher cost of lending or have to provide other types of collateral.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 768
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, , introductory part
By way of derogation, until 31 December
2012 the competent authorities may, subject
to the indicated levels of collateralization
By way of derogation, until 31 December
2012, subject to the indicated levels of
collateralization
Or. en
Justification
In order to ensure consistent application of LGD levels throughout the EU, the LGD levels of
30% for commercial real estate leasing exposures and senior exposures secured by
residential and commercial real estate and 35% for equipment leasing exposures should not
be a matter of national discretion. Indeed, this would lead to competitive distoritions if
certain members states chose to apply the discretion while others do not.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 769
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, point (a)
(a) allow credit institutions to assign a 30%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
Commercial Real Estate leasing; and
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(a) credit institutions may assign a 30%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
Commercial Real Estate leasing; and
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Or. en
Justification
This requirement will have a negative impact on individual borrowers or SMEs. Indeed, these
types of borrowers often receive finance in cases where the amount of the exposure is the
same as the value of the collateral, i.e. 100% of the purchase price of an asset is often
financed by the credit institution. Given a degree of collateralisation of 140%, the institution
may only grant a part of the necessary sum. The borrower would therefore either be faced
with a higher cost of lending or have to provide other types of collateral.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 770
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, point (a)
(a) allow credit institutions to assign a 30%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
Commercial Real Estate leasing; and
(a) credit institutions may assign a 30%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
Commercial Real Estate leasing; and
Or. en
Justification
This requirement will have a negative impact on individual borrowers or SMEs. Indeed, these
types of borrowers often receive finance in cases where the amount of the exposure is the
same as the value of the collateral, i.e. 100% of the purchase price of an asset is often
financed by the credit institution. Given a degree of collateralisation of 140%, the institution
may only grant a part of the necessary sum. The borrower would therefore either be faced
with a higher cost of lending or have to provide other types of collateral.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 771
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, point (b)
(b) allow credit institutions to assign a 35%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
equipment leasing.
(b) credit institutions may assign a 35%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
equipment leasing.
Or. en
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Justification
This requirement will have a negative impact on individual borrowers or SMEs. Indeed, these
types of borrowers often receive finance in cases where the amount of the exposure is the
same as the value of the collateral, i.e. 100% of the purchase price of an asset is often
financed by the credit institution. Given a degree of collateralisation of 140%, the institution
may only grant a part of the necessary sum. The borrower would therefore either be faced
with a higher cost of lending or have to provide other types of collateral.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 772
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, point (b)
(b) allow credit institutions to assign a 35%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
equipment leasing.
(b) credit institutions may assign a 35%
LGD for senior exposures in the form of
equipment leasing.
Or. en
Justification
In order to ensure consistent application of LGD levels throughout the EU, the LGD levels of
30% for commercial real estate leasing exposures and senior exposures secured by
residential and commercial real estate and 35% for equipment leasing exposures should not
be a matter of national discretion. Indeed, this would lead to competitive distoritions if
certain members states chose to apply the discretion while others do not.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 773
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, point (b a) (new)
(ba) credit institution may assign a 30%
LGD for senior exposures secured by
residential or commercial real estate.
Or. en
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Justification
This requirement will have a negative impact on individual borrowers or SMEs. Indeed, these
types of borrowers often receive finance in cases where the amount of the exposure is the
same as the value of the collateral, i.e. 100% of the purchase price of an asset is often
financed by the credit institution. Given a degree of collateralisation of 140%, the institution
may only grant a part of the necessary sum. The borrower would therefore either be faced
with a higher cost of lending or have to provide other types of collateral.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 774
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 2, point (b a) (new)
(ba) credit institution may assign a 30%
LGD for senior exposures secured by
residential or commercial real estate.
Or. en
Justification
In order to ensure consistent application of LGD levels throughout the EU, the LGD levels of
30% for commercial real estate leasing exposures and senior exposures secured by
residential and commercial real estate and 35% for equipment leasing exposures should not
be a matter of national discretion. Indeed, this would lead to competitive distoritions if
certain members states chose to apply the discretion while others do not.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 775
Annex VIII, Part 3, paragraph 73, subparagraph 4 a (new)
In both cases, the required minimum
collateralisation level of the exposure (C*)
will be 100%.
Or. en
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Justification
The draft directive allow credit institutions, until 31/12/2012, to apply a LGD of 30% to real
estate leasing exposures and of 35% to equipment leasing exposures (instead of 40% for other
collaterals).
These LGD’s remain nonetheless notably higher than those that are shown by the industry
statistics. It would therefore be justified to bring the over-collateralisation requirement from
140% to 100% for leasing exposures.
This ownership grants the lessor a level of security unknown in any other type of finance
contract
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 776
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 74
74. Subject to the requirements of this
paragraphs and paragraph 75 and as an
alternative to the treatment in paragraphs 69
to 73, the competent authorities of a Member
State may authorise credit institutions to
apply a 50% risk weighting to the part of the
exposure fully collateralised by residential
real estate property or commercial real estate
property situated within the territory of the
Member State if they have evidence that the
relevant markets are well-developed and
long-established with loss-rates from lending
collateralised by residential real estate
property or commercial real estate property
respectively that do not exceed the following
limits:
74. Subject to the requirements of this
paragraph and paragraph 75 and as an
alternative to the treatment in paragraphs 69
to 73, the competent authorities of a Member
State may authorise credit institutions to
apply a 50% risk weighting to the part of the
exposure fully collateralised by residential
real estate property or commercial real estate
property situated within the territory of the
Member State if they have evidence that the
relevant markets are well-developed and
long-established with loss-rates from lending
collateralised by residential real estate
property or commercial real estate property
respectively that do not exceed the following
limits:
(a) up to 50 % of the market value (or where
applicable and if lower 60 % of the
mortgage-lending-value) must not exceed
0.3 % of the outstanding residential real
estate and/or commercial real estate loans
in any given year.
(a) losses stemming from lending
collateralised by residential real estate
property or commercial real estate property
respectively up to 50 % of the market value
(or where applicable and if lower 60 % of
the mortgage-lending-value) do not exceed
0.3 % of the outstanding loans collateralised
by that form of real estate property in any
given year.
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(b) overall losses stemming from lending
collateralised by residential real estate
property or commercial real estate property
respectively must not exceed 0.5 % of the
outstanding loans collateralised by that form
of real estate property in any given year.
(b) overall losses stemming from lending
collateralised by residential real estate
property or commercial real estate property
respectively do not exceed 0.5 % of the
outstanding loans collateralised by that form
of real estate property in any given year.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 777
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 76
76. The competent authorities, which do not
authorise the treatment in paragraph 73,
may authorise credit institutions to apply the
risk weights permitted under this treatment
in respect of exposures collateralised by
residential real estate property of
commercial real estate property respectively
located in the territory of those Member
States the competent authorities of which
authorise this treatment subject to the same
conditions as apply in that Member State.
76. The competent authorities which do not
authorise the treatment in paragraph 74,
may authorise credit institutions to apply the
risk weights permitted under this treatment
in respect of exposures collateralised by
residential real estate property of
commercial real estate property respectively
located in the territory of those Member
States the competent authorities of which
authorise this treatment subject to the same
conditions as apply in that Member State.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 778
Annex VIII, part 3, paragraph 90
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90. The competent authorities may extend
the treatment provided for in Annex VI,
paragraphs 4 to 6 to exposures or portions of
exposures guaranteed by the central
government or central bank, where the
guarantee is denominated in the domestic
currency of the borrower and the exposure is
funded in that currency.
90. The competent authorities may extend
the treatment provided for in Annex VI, part
1, paragraphs 4 to 6 to exposures or portions
of exposures guaranteed by the central
government or central bank, where the
guarantee is denominated in the domestic
currency of the borrower and the exposure is
funded in that currency.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 779
Annex IX, part 1, heading
part 1 - Definitions for purposes of Annex X
part 1 - Definitions for purposes of Annex
IX
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 780
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 4
4. For clarity, paragraph 3 refers to the entire
pool of exposures included in the
securitisation. Subject to paragraphs 5 to 8,
the originator credit institution is required to
calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts in
respect of all tranches in the securitisation in
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4. For clarity, paragraph 3 refers to the entire
pool of exposures included in the
securitisation. Subject to paragraphs 5 to 8,
the originator credit institution is required to
calculate risk-weighted exposure amounts in
respect of all tranches in the securitisation in
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accordance with the provisions of part IV
including those relating to the recognition of
credit risk mitigation. For example, where a
tranche is transferred by means of unfunded
credit protection to a third party, the risk
weight of that third party shall be applied to
the tranche in the calculation of the
originator credit institution’s risk-weighted
exposure amounts.
accordance with the provisions of part 4
including those relating to the recognition of
credit risk mitigation. For example, where a
tranche is transferred by means of unfunded
credit protection to a third party, the risk
weight of that third party shall be applied to
the tranche in the calculation of the
originator credit institution’s risk-weighted
exposure amounts.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 781
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 5
5. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts in accordance
with paragraph 3, any maturity mismatch
between the credit protection by which the
tranching is achieved and the securitised
exposures shall be taken into consideration
in accordance with paragraphs 6 to 8. The
maturity of the securitised exposures shall be
taken to be the longest maturity of any of
those exposures subject to a maximum of
five years.
5. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts in accordance
with paragraph 3, any maturity mismatch
between the credit protection by which the
tranching is achieved and the securitised
exposures shall be taken into consideration
in accordance with paragraphs 6 to 8. The
maturity of the securitised positions shall be
taken to be the weighted average maturity of
those exposures subject to a maximum of
five years.
Or. en
Justification
Both average and maximum maturity are approximations, but by using the average the
calculation will not be sensitive to individual long dated assets and will be more consistent
with market practice. The five year cap should remain to retain consistency with the single
name case of maturity mismatch. This will still be prudent, especially for sponsors, where the
maturity of the exposure can be considerably less than the maturity of the underlying assets.
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Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 782
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 5
5. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts in accordance
with paragraph 3, any maturity mismatch
between the credit protection by which the
tranching is achieved and the securitised
exposures shall be taken into consideration
in accordance with paragraphs 6 to 8. The
maturity of the securitised exposures shall be
taken to be the longest maturity of any of
those exposures subject to a maximum of
five years.
5. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts in accordance
with paragraph 3, any maturity mismatch
between the credit protection by which the
tranching is achieved and the securitised
exposures shall be taken into consideration
in accordance with paragraphs 6 to 8. The
maturity of the securitised positions shall be
taken to be the weighted average maturity of
those exposures subject to a maximum of
five years.
Or. en
Justification
Both average and maximum maturity are approximations, but by using the average the
calculation will not be sensitive to individual long dated assets and will be more consistent
with market practice. The five year cap should remain to retain consistency with the single
name case of maturity mismatch. This will still be prudent, especially for sponsors, where the
maturity of the exposure can be considerably less than the maturity of the underlying assets.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 783
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 5
5. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts in accordance
with paragraph 3, any maturity mismatch
between the credit protection by which the
tranching is achieved and the securitised
exposures shall be taken into consideration
in accordance with paragraphs 6 to 8. The
maturity of the securitised exposures shall
be taken to be the longest maturity of any
of those exposures subject to a maximum of
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5. For the purposes of calculating riskweighted exposure amounts in accordance
with paragraph 3, any maturity mismatch
between the credit protection by which the
tranching is achieved and the securitised
exposures shall be taken into consideration
in accordance with paragraphs 6 to 8.
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five years.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 784
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 6
6. The maturity of the securitied exposures
shall be taken to be the longest maturity of
any of those exposures subject to a
maximum of five years. The maturity of the
credit protection shall be determined in
accordance with Annex VIII .
6. The maturity of the securitised exposures
shall be taken to be the weighted average
maturity of those exposures subject to a
maximum of five years. The maturity of the
credit protection shall be determined in
accordance with Annex VIII.
Or. en
Justification
See justification for amendment to Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 5.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 785
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 6
6. The maturity of the securitied exposures
shall be taken to be the longest maturity of
any of those exposures subject to a
maximum of five years. The maturity of the
credit protection shall be determined in
accordance with Annex VIII .
6. The maturity of the securitised exposures
shall be taken to be the weighted average
maturity of those exposures subject to a
maximum of five years. The maturity of the
credit protection shall be determined in
accordance with Annex VIII.
Or. en
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Justification
See justification for amendment to Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 5.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 786
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 7, introductory part
7. Greift ein Originator auf Teil 4 Absätze 6
bis 35 für die Berechnung der
risikogewichteten Forderungsbeträge
zurück, kann er jede Laufzeitinkongruenz
bei der Berechnung der risikogewichteten
Forderungsbeträge für Tranchen außer Acht
lassen, die kein Rating oder ein Rating
unter Investment Grade erhalten haben.
Für alle anderen Tranchen erfolgt die
Behandlung im Sinne der
Laufzeitinkongruenz, die Gegenstand von
Anhang VIII ist, gemäß der folgenden
Formel:
7. Ein Originator hat jede
Laufzeitinkongruenz bei der Berechnung der
risikogewichteten Forderungsbeträge für
Tranchen außer Acht zu lassen, die im
Rahmen von Teil 4 mit einem
Risikogewicht von 1250% belegt werden.
Für alle anderen Tranchen erfolgt die
Behandlung im Sinne der
Laufzeitinkongruenz, die Gegenstand von
Anhang VIII ist, gemäß der folgenden
Formel:
Or. de
Justification
Diese Änderung ist eine Folge des ECOFIN-Vorschlages, den Absatz 8 in Anhang IX Teil 4
ersatzlos zu streichen. Dadurch werden Tranchen unterhalb von Investment Grade nicht mehr
automatisch mit einem Risikogewicht von 1250% versehen. Daher sollte auch die Frage der
Notwendigkeit der Berechnung einer Laufzeitinkonkruenz nicht mehr von dem Kriterium
"Investment Grade" abhängen. Statt dessen sollte sich die (verschärfende) Ausnahme im
Sinne der ursprünglichen Absicht und in Analogie zur Behandlung im IRB-Ansatz nur auf
Tranchen mit einem Risikogewicht von 1250% beziehen. Durch die Änderung im ersten Satz
wird eine Gleichbehandlung von Verbriefung im Standardansatz und IRB-Ansatz bewirkt. Die
deutsche Übersetzung von "shall" ist "hat ... zu" statt "kann".
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 787
Annex IX, part 2, paragraph 8
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8. Greift ein Originator auf Teil 4 Absätze
36 bis 74 für die Berechnung der
risikogewichteten Forderungsbeträge
zurück, kann er jede Laufzeitinkongruenz
bei der Berechnung der risikogewichteten
Forderungsbeträge für Tranchen oder
Teile von Tranchen außer Acht lassen, die
im Rahmen dieser Absätze mit einem
Risikogewicht von 1250% belegt werden.
Für alle anderen Tranchen oder Teile von
Tranchen erfolgt die Behandlung der
Laufzeitinkongruenz gemäß Anhang VIII
und der Formel in Absatz 7.
entfällt
Or. de
Justification
Durch die Änderung in Anhang IX Teil 2 Nummer 7 kann die Anforderungen in Nummer 8 in
Nummer 7 integriert werden und Nummer 8 daher gestrichen werden.
Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 788
Annex IX, part 3, paragraph 1, point (b)
(b) Es ist auf dem Markt öffentlich
verfügbar. Ratings werden nur dann als
öffentlich verfügbar angesehen, wenn sie im
Rahmen eines öffentlich zugänglichen
Forums veröffentlicht wurden und sie in die
Übergangsmatrix der ECAI eingeflossen
sind. Ratings, die nur einem begrenzten
Kreis von Unternehmen zur Verfügung
gestellt werden, gelten nicht als öffentlich
verfügbar.
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(b) Wenn die Verbriefung über ein
öffentliches Angebot an Wertpapieren
verläuft, soll die Bonitätsprüfung der ECAI
öffentlich verfügbar sein. Ratings werden
nur dann als öffentlich verfügbar angesehen,
wenn sie im Rahmen eines öffentlich
zugänglichen Forums veröffentlicht wurden
und sie in die Übergangsmatrix der ECAI
eingeflossen sind. Ratings, die als Teil einer
privaten Abwicklung erstellt werden und
die nur einem begrenzten Kreis von
Unternehmen zur Verfügung gestellt
werden, gelten als nur öffentlich verfügbar,
falls Ratings von der ECAI auf eine Art
und Weise erstellt und überprüft werden,
die mit öffentlich bekanntgemachten
Geschäften vergleichbar ist.
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Or. de
Justification
Wenn die Verbriefung nicht über ein öffentliches Angebot verläuft, besteht keine
Notwendigkeit, dass die Bonitätsprüfung öffentlich bekannt gegeben wird. Dennoch
gewährleistet die Formulierung die notwendige Transparenz und Zuverlässigkeit der
Bonitätsprüfung für Investoren.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 789
Annex IX, part 3, paragraph 4
4. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6, a credit
institution may not use an ECAI’s credit
assessments for its positions in some
tranches and another ECAI’s credit
assessments for its positions in other
tranches within the same structure that
may or may not be rated by the first ECAI.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
This requirement may have the unintended consequence of reducing the competitive
landscape of the ECAI market. Competition adds depth to market expertise and helps enhance
best practice standards. The use of different ECAIs for different tranches should not be
construed as evidence of cherry picking, rather reflective of the economics of transactions,
the dynamic nature of the securitisation market and differentiated expertise of ECAIs.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 790
Annex IX, part 3, paragraph 5
5. In cases where a position has two credit
assessments by nominated ECAIs, the credit
institution shall use the less favourable credit
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5. In cases where a tranche has two credit
assessments by nominated ECAIs, the credit
institution shall use the less favourable credit
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assessment.
assessment.
Or. en
Justification
This requirement may have the unintended consequence of reducing the competitive
landscape of the ECAI market. Competition adds depth to market expertise and helps enhance
best practice standards. The use of different ECAIs for different tranches should not be
construed as evidence of cherry picking, rather reflective of the economics of transactions,
the dynamic nature of the securitisation market and differentiated expertise of ECAIs.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 791
Annex IX, part 3, paragraph 6
6. In cases where a position has more than
two credit assessments by nominated ECAIs,
the two most favourable credit assessments
shall be used. If the two most favourable
assessments are different, the least
favourable of the two shall be used.
6. In cases where a tranche has more than
two credit assessments by nominated ECAIs,
the two most favourable credit assessments
shall be used. If the two most favourable
assessments are different, the least
favourable of the two shall be used.
Or. en
Justification
This requirement may have the unintended consequence of reducing the competitive
landscape of the ECAI market. Competition adds depth to market expertise and helps enhance
best practice standards. The use of different ECAIs for different tranches should not be
construed as evidence of cherry picking, rather reflective of the economics of transactions,
the dynamic nature of the securitisation market and differentiated expertise of ECAIs.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 792
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 11
11. A credit institution may apply the
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11. A credit institution may apply the
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weighted-average risk weight that would be
applied to the securitised exposures Articles
78 to 83 by a credit institution holding the
exposures multiplied by a concentration
ratio. This concentration ratio is equal to the
sum of the nominal amounts of all the
tranches divided by the sum of the nominal
amounts of the tranches junior to or pari
passu with the tranche in which the position
is held including that tranche itself. The
resulting risk weight shall not be higher than
1250% or lower than any risk weight
applicable to a rated more senior tranche.
Where the credit institution is unable to
determine the risk weights that would be
applied to the securitised exposures under
Articles 78 to 83, it shall apply a risk weight
of 1250% to the position.
weighted-average risk weight that would be
applied to the securitised exposures Articles
78 to 83 by a credit institution holding the
exposures multiplied by a concentration
ratio. This concentration ratio is equal to the
sum of the nominal amounts of all the
tranches divided by the sum of the nominal
amounts of the tranches junior to or pari
passu with the tranche in which the position
is held including that tranche itself. The
resulting risk weight shall not be higher than
1250% or lower than any risk weight
applicable to a rated more senior tranche.
Where the credit institution is unable to
determine the risk weights that would be
applied to the securitised exposures under
Articles 78 to 83, it shall apply a risk weight
of 1250% to the position. A credit
institution will apply to the super senior
tranches of synthetic securitisation
exposures, the same risk weight as that of
the most senior tranche position.
Or. en
Justification
As regards the use of the look-through approach for unrated super senior tranches, we
consider the application of an average risk weight for the underlying exposures (multiplied,
moreover, by a concentration coefficient) to be highly penalising. Ordinarily this tranche has
higher seniority than AAArated tranches. Such a rule introduces a disincentive for a bank
using the Standardized Approach to purchase a super senior tranche. Further, the super
senior tranche, which is highly subordinated, is contained within the AAA tranche, and
tranching is effected strictly for the marketing convenience of the originator. That means that
formally the risk is actually within the AAA tranche. This super senior tranche is not given a
because it is pointless to assign a rating to a class that has a higher rank than the AAA
tranche). There would have to be a problem visible in the more junior tranches before there
could ever be something wrong in the AAA+ tranche. Therefore, the same risk weighting
should be applied to both.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 793
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 16
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16. To determine its exposure value, a
conversion figure of 0% may be applied to
the nominal amount of a liquidity facility
that is unconditionally cancellable provided
that the conditions set out at paragraph 14
are satisfied and that repayment of draws
on the facility are senior to any other claims
on the cash flows arising from the
securitised exposures.
16. To determine its exposure value, a
conversion figure of 0% may be applied to
the nominal amount of a liquidity facility
that is unconditionally cancellable provided
that repayment of draws on the facility are
senior to any other claims on the cash flows
arising from the securitised exposures.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission proposal requires cash advance facilities to meet all the requirements of
eligible liquidity facilities. This will cause many cash advance facilities to be ineligible; it is
super-equivalent to paragraph 582 of the Basel Framework and creates an un-level playing
field.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 794
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 20
20. For these purposes, ‘originator’s interest’
means the nominal amount of that notional
part of a pool of drawn amounts sold into a
securitisation, the proportion of which in
relation to the amount of the total pool sold
into the structure determines the proportion
of the cashflows generated by principal and
interest collections and other associated
amounts which are not available to make
payments to those having securitisation
positions in the securitisation.
20. For these purposes, ‘originator’s interest’
means the exposure value of that notional
part of a pool of drawn amounts sold into a
securitisation, the proportion of which in
relation to the amount of the total pool sold
into the structure determines the proportion
of the cashflows generated by principal and
interest collections and other associated
amounts which are not available to make
payments to those having securitisation
positions in the securitisation.
To qualify as such the originator’s interest
may not be subordinate to the investors’
interest.
To qualify as such the originator’s interest
may not be subordinate to the investors’
interest.
‘Investors’ interest’ means the nominal
amount of the remaining notional part of the
pool of drawn amounts.
‘Investors’ interest’ means the exposure
value of the remaining notional part of the
pool of drawn amounts.
Or. en
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Justification
Alignment with amendment of Annex IX, part 4, para 68
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 795
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 22, point (a)
(a) Securitisations of revolving exposures
whereby investors remain fully exposed to
all future draws by borrowers so that the risk
on the underlying facilities does not return to
the originator credit institution even after an
early amortisation event has occurred are
exempt from the early amortisation
treatment, and
(a) Securitisations of revolving exposures
whereby investors remain fully exposed to
all future draws by borrowers so that the risk
on the underlying facilities does not return to
the originator credit institution even after an
early amortisation event has occurred, and
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 796
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 26, point (b)
(b) Throughout the duration of the
transaction there is pro-rata sharing between
the originator’s interest and the investor’s
interest of payments of interest and
principal, expenses, losses and recoveries
based on the beginning of the month
balance of receivables outstanding.
(b) Throughout the duration of the
transaction there is pro-rata sharing between
the originator’s interest and the investor’s
interest of payments of interest and
principal, expenses, losses and recoveries
based on the balance of receivables
outstanding at one or more reference points
during each month.
Or. en
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Justification
Sharing between originator and investor is based on the balance of receivables outstanding
each month, but not necessarily at the beginning of each month. The proposed change is more
in line with general market practice.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 797
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 36
36. For the purposes of Article 96, the riskweighted exposure amount of a
securitisation positions shall be calculated in
accordance with paragraphs 36 to 74.
36. For the purposes of Article 96, the riskweighted exposure amount of a
securitisation positions shall be calculated in
accordance with paragraphs 37 to 74.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 798
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 42, point (d)
(d) In developing its internal assessment
methodology the credit institution shall take
into consideration all published ratings
methodologies of eligible ECAIs for the
rating of securities backed by the exposures
of the type securitised. This consideration
shall be documented by the credit institution
and updated at least once a year.
(d) In developing its internal assessment
methodology the credit institution shall take
into consideration relevant published ratings
methodologies of the eligible ECAIs that
rate the commercial paper of the ABCP
programme. This consideration shall be
documented by the credit institution and
updated regularly, as outlined in paragraph
42(g).
Or. en
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Justification
It would be virtually impossible to take “all” ratings methodologies into consideration in the
development of an internal assessment methodology. At the very least it should be limited to
ECAIs that rate the ABCP programme’s commercial paper.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 799
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 45, subparagraph 1 a (new) (after Table 5)
Once new empirical data become available
the risk weight associated with the credit
quality step must be recalibrated and
changed accordingly in the tables 4 and 5 .
Or. en
Justification
The risk weight in tables 4 and 5 have been calibrated against US high yield bond spreads,
which has no connection with securitised asset transactions. Therefore once EU competent
authorities have more empirical evidence on history of securitised asset the risk weight must
be recalibrated and reinserted in the annex.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 800
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 46
46. Subject to paragraph 47, the risk
weights in column A of each table shall be
applied where the position is in the most
senior tranche of a securitisation. When
determining whether a tranche is the most
senior for these purposes, it is not required
take into consideration amounts due under
interest rate or currency derivative contracts,
fees due, or other similar payments.
46. Subject to paragraphs 46a and 47, the
risk weights in column A of each table shall
be applied where the position is in the most
senior tranche of a securitisation. When
determining whether a tranche is the most
senior for these purposes, it is not required
take into consideration amounts due under
interest rate or currency derivative contracts,
fees due, or other similar payments.
Or. en
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Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 801
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 46 a (new)
46a. A risk weight of 1% may be applie to a
position which is a position in the most
senior tranche of a securitisation and that
tranche is senior in all respects to another
tranche of the securitised positions which
would receive a risk weight of 7% under
paragraph 45, provided that:
(a) the competent authority is satisfied that
this is justified due to the loss absorption
qualities of subordinate tranches in the
securitisation; and
(b) either the position has an external
credit assessment which has been
determined to be associated with credit
quality step 1 in Table 4 or 5 or, if it is
unrated, requirements (a) to (c) in
paragraph 41 are satisfied where ‘reference
positions’ are taken to mean positions in
the subordinate tranche which would
receive a risk weight of 7% under
paragraph 45.
Or. en
Justification
The current proposed risk weight floor of 7% is not consistent with the level of risk taken and
it is penalising securitisation against other types of position with the same risk profile. The
suggested paragraph 46A is the same as agreed by ECOFIN, except for the risk weight.
Calculations made by major European banks indicate that a risk weight lower than 1% is
appropriate for super senior tranches in synthetic securitisations.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 802
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 54
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54. A conversion figure of 20% may be
applied to the nominal amount of a liquidity
facility that may only be drawn in the event
of a general market disruption and that
meets the conditions to be an ‘eligible
liquidity facility’ set out in paragraph 14.
54. A conversion figure of 0% may be
applied to the nominal amount of a liquidity
facility that may only be drawn in the event
of a general market disruption and that
meets the conditions to be an ‘eligible
liquidity facility’ set out in paragraph 14.
Or. en
Justification
By applying a higher conversion factor under IRB/SF than under the standardised approach,
the directive will discourage the adoption or the evolution towards the most sophisticated risk
management methods. A zero % should also apply to the most advanced approaches as it
applies to the standardised approach. It will re-establish the incentive to evolve towards the
most sophisticated approaches.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 803
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 54
54. A conversion figure of 20% may be
applied to the nominal amount of a liquidity
facility that may only be drawn in the event
of a general market disruption and that
meets the conditions to be an ‘eligible
liquidity facility’ set out in paragraph 14.
54. A conversion figure of 0% may be
applied to the nominal amount of a liquidity
facility that may only be drawn in the event
of a general market disruption and that
meets the conditions to be an ‘eligible
liquidity facility’ set out in paragraph 14.
Or. en
Justification
BBy applying a higher conversion factor under IRB/SF than under the standardised
approach, the directive will discourage the adoption or the evolution towards the most
sophisticated risk management methods.
A zero % should also apply to the most advanced approaches as it applies to the standardised
approach. It will re-establish the incentive to evolve towards the most sophisticated
approaches.
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Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 804
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 57
57. The highest risk weight that would be
applied under Articles 78 to 83 to any of the
securitised exposures had they not been
securitised may be applied to the
securitisation position represented by the
liquidity facility. To determine the exposure
value of the position a conversion figure of
50% may be applied to the nominal amount
of the liquidity facility if the facility has an
original maturity of one year or less. If the
liquidity facility complies with the
conditions in paragraph 54 a conversion
figure of 20% may be applied.
57. The average risk weight that would be
applied under Articles 78 to 83 to any of the
securitised exposures had they not been
securitised may be applied to the
securitisation position represented by the
liquidity facility. To determine the exposure
value of the position a conversion figure of
50% may be applied to the nominal amount
of the liquidity facility if the facility has an
original maturity of one year or less. If the
liquidity facility complies with the
conditions in paragraph 54 a conversion
figure of 20% may be applied.
Or. en
Justification
The highest risk is not representative of the real risk. The average risk is a better reflection of
the diversification of the portfolio.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 805
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 57
57. The highest risk weight that would be
applied under Articles 78 to 83 to any of the
securitised exposures had they not been
securitised may be applied to the
securitisation position represented by the
liquidity facility. To determine the exposure
value of the position a conversion figure of
50% may be applied to the nominal amount
of the liquidity facility if the facility has an
original maturity of one year or less. If the
liquidity facility complies with the
conditions in paragraph 54 a conversion
figure of 20% may be applied.
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57. The average risk weight that would be
applied under Articles 78 to 83 to any of the
securitised exposures had they not been
securitised may be applied to the
securitisation position represented by the
liquidity facility. To determine the exposure
value of the position a conversion figure of
50% may be applied to the nominal amount
of the liquidity facility if the facility has an
original maturity of one year or less. If the
liquidity facility complies with the
conditions in paragraph 54 a conversion
figure of 20% may be applied.
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Or. en
Justification
The highest risk is not representative of the real risk. The average risk is a better reflection of
the diversification of the portfolio.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 806
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 68, subparagraph 1, point (a)
(a) the nominal amount of that notional part
of a pool of drawn amounts sold into a
securitisation, the proportion of which in
relation to the amount of the total pool sold
into the structure determines the proportion
of the cashflows generated by principal and
interest collections and other associated
amounts which are not available to make
payments to those having securitisation
positions in the securitisation; plus
(a) the exposure value of that notional part
of a pool of drawn amounts sold into a
securitisation, the proportion of which in
relation to the amount of the total pool sold
into the structure determines the proportion
of the cashflows generated by principal and
interest collections and other associated
amounts which are not available to make
payments to those having securitisation
positions in the securitisation; plus
Or. en
Justification
Würde hier bezüglich nicht gezogener Beträge, wie im Kommissionsvorschlag vorgesehen,
auf den Nennwert abgezielt, führte dies im Vergleich zu dem in Basel vorgeschlagenen Text
zu einer nicht gerechtfertigten erhöhten Kapitalanforderung, da man die
Umrechnungsfaktoren gemäß Anhang VII, Teil 3, Nummer 11 nicht berücksichtigen würde.
Dies kann verhindert werden, indem nicht auf den Nennwert, sondern auf den
Forderungswert (entspricht dem Exposure at Default in der Baseler Rahmenvereinbarung)
abstellt wird, der auch eventuelle Umrechnungsfaktoren berücksichtigt.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 807
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 68, subparagraph 1, point (b)
(b) the nominal amount of that part of the
pool of undrawn amounts of the credit lines,
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(b) the exposure value of that part of the
pool of undrawn amounts of the credit lines,
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the drawn amounts of which have been sold
into the securitisation, the proportion of
which to the total amount of such undrawn
amounts is the same as the proportion of the
nominal amount described in point (a) to
the nominal amount of the pool of drawn
amounts sold into the securitisation.
the drawn amounts of which have been sold
into the securitisation, the proportion of
which to the total amount of such undrawn
amounts is the same as the proportion of the
exposure value described in point (a) to the
exposure value of the pool of drawn
amounts sold into the securitisation.
Or. en
Justification
See justification to amendment to paragraph 68, subparagr. 1, point (a) by A. Radwan.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 808
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 68, subparagraph 3
“Investors’ interest” means the nominal
amount of the notional part of the pool of
drawn amounts not falling within point (a)
plus the nominal amount of that part of the
pool of undrawn amounts of credit lines, the
drawn amounts of which have been sold into
the securtisation, not falling within point (b).
“Investors’ interest” means the exposure
value of the notional part of the pool of
drawn amounts not falling within point (a)
plus the exposure value of that part of the
pool of undrawn amounts of credit lines, the
drawn amounts of which have been sold into
the securitisation, not falling within point
(b).
Or. en
Justification
See justification to amendment to paragraph 68, subparagr. 1, point (a) by A. Radwan.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 809
Annex IX, part 4, paragraph 73
73. For the purposes of paragraph 73
73. For the purposes of paragraph 72
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 810
Annex X, part 1, paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. For undertakings according to Article 3
(t) of the Directive [93/6/EC], the capital
requirement for operational risk is equal to
12% of the relevant indicator defined
below.
Or. en
Justification
The additional requirements for the backing of operational risk for financial service providers
in the energy market present a substantial financial burden. Therefore, the factors for
operational risk should be kept on a lower level, in order not to de facto nullify any own funds
mitigations which might have been realised otherwise.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 811
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 1
1. Under the Standardised Approach, the
capital requirement for operational risk is the
simple sum of the capital requirements
calculated for each of the business lines in
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1. Under the Standardised Approach, the
capital requirement for operational risk is the
simple sum of the capital requirements
calculated for each of the business lines in
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table 2.
table 2. In each year, a negative capital
requirement in one business line, resulting
from a negative gross yield, may be imputed
to the whole. However, where the aggregate
capital charge across all business lines
within a given year is negative, then the
input to the numerator for that year shall
be zero .
Or. en
Justification
Replaces amendment 227 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 812
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 1
1. Under the Standardised Approach, the
capital requirement for operational risk is
the simple sum of the capital requirements
calculated for each of the business lines in
table 2 .
1. Under the Standardised Approach, the
capital requirement for operational risk is
calculated by adding together the annual
capital requirement of each individual
business line in Table 2. Every year,
negative capital requirements resulting
from negative gross income in a particular
business line may be offset. If the total
annual capital requirements result in a
negative amount, this amount is set at zero.
Or. en
Justification
The intention of the original proposal was to allow gross income to be offset in line with the
Basel rules. However, the Commission’s proposed text will not produce the desired result. It
must be clarified that where the offsetting results in a negative capital requirement, it must be
clear that the capital requirement will be set to zero.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 813
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 1
1. Under the Standardised Approach, the
capital requirement for operational risk is the
simple sum of the capital requirements
calculated for each of the business lines in
table 2 .
1. Under the Standardised Approach, the
capital requirement for operational risk is the
simple sum of the capital requirements
calculated for each if the business lines in
table 2. Thereby negative capital charges in
any business line may offset positive
charges in other business lines without
limit.
Or. en
Justification
It is not sufficiently clear whether the possibility, provided for in the New Basel Capital
Accord, to offset positive capital charges from one business line by negative charges in other
business lines has been taken up in the Commission's proposal. In order to avoid difficulties
in interpretation, the Basel formulation should be used. The inability to offset positive by
negative capital charges would reduce the credit institutions’ incentives to apply the
Standardised Approach and would also put credit institutions located in the EU at a
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their global competitors.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 814
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 4
4. For each business line, the relevant
indicator is the average over three years of
the sum of net interest income, and annual
net non-interest income, as defined in part 1,
paragraphs 5 to 9.
4. For each business line, the relevant
indicator is the average over three years of
the sum of net interest income, and net noninterest income, as defined in part 1,
paragraphs 5 to 9.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 815
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 6
If for any given observation the sum of net
interest income and net non-interest
income is negative, this figure shall be
assigned the value zero.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
The provision would not allow for a negative gross income in any business line. The deletion
is necessary to compliment amendment of paragraph 1.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 816
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 6, Table 2, column 1, row 4
Retail brokerage
(Activities with a individual physical
persons or with small and medium sized
entities meeting the criteria set out in Article
55 for the retail exposure class)
Retail brokerage
(Activities with a individual physical
persons or with small and medium sized
entities meeting the criteria set out in Article
79 for the retail exposure class)
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 817
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 6, Table 2, columns 1 to 3, row 10 a (new)
Energy trading
Activities that are solely in energy and
energy derivatives
12%
Or. en
Justification
See comments regarding Annex X, part 1, paragraph 1.1.
Amendment by Zsolt László Becsey
Amendment 818
Annex X, part 2, paragraph 16
16. The credit institution is able to
demonstrate to the competent authorities
that the significant proportion of its retail
and/or commercial banking activities
comprise loans associated with high
probability of default, and that the
alternative standardised approach provides
an improved basis for assessing the
operational risk.
16. The credit institution is able to
demonstrate to the competent authorities that
the alternative standardised approach
provides an improved basis for assessing the
operational risk.
Or. en
Justification
For determination of capital cost's operational risk the Directive allows to use bank's income
indicator, and - if necessary- credit volume indicator, as an alternative indicator. Application
of income indicator leads unfair results for CEE-banks, but the current 16th paragraph
preclude the use of alternative indicator.
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Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 819
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 11
11. Correlations in operational risk losses
across individual operational risk estimates
may be recognised only if credit institutions
can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
competent authorities that their systems for
measuring correlations are sound,
implemented with integrity, and take into
account the uncertainty surrounding any
such correlation estimates, particularly in
periods of stress. The credit institution must
validate its correlation assumptions using
appropriate quantitative and qualitative
techniques.
11. Correlations between operational risks of
business lines and loss event categories
may be recognised if the correlations are
based on suitable estimates, implemented
with integrity and the process of derivation
can be demonstrated.
Or. en
Justification
The assumption of a correlation of < 1 is essential if the AMA approach is to be economically
viable and it is an integral part of the internal risk management of operational losses. In the
absence of available data, however, this assumption cannot be demonstrated using
conventional mathematical and statistical methods. The current wording of § 11 would
require such a demonstration. This would mean that none of the AMA models now in use
could be approved. As a result, a correlation of 1 would always have to be assumed. But this
assumption is based on a scenario in which all the worst possible individual losses occur
simultaneously in one year. This is unrealistic and not empirically verifiable. The verification
system outlined above would allow the results of the model to be presented in a realistic
manner.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 820
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 14
14. Credit institutions must be able to map
their historical internal loss data into the
business lines defined in part 2 and into the
event types defined in part 5, and to provide
these data to competent authorities upon
request. There must be documented,
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14. Credit institutions must be able to map
their historical internal loss data into the
business lines defined in part 2 and into the
event types defined in part 5, and to provide
these data to competent authorities upon
request. There must be documented,
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objective criteria for allocating losses to the
specified business lines and event types. The
operational risk losses that are related to
credit risk and have historically been
included in the internal credit risk databases
must be recorded in the operational risk
databases and be separately identified. Such
losses will not be subject to the operational
risk charge, as long as they continue to be
treated as credit risk for the purposes of
calculating minimum capital requirements.
Operational risk losses that are related to
market risks shall be included in the scope of
the capital requirement for operational risk.
objective criteria for allocating losses to the
specified business lines and event types. The
operational risk losses that are related to
credit risk, which are material and have
historically been included in the internal
credit risk databases must be separately
identified. Such losses will not be subject to
the operational risk charge, as long as they
continue to be treated as credit risk for the
purposes of calculating minimum capital
requirements. Operational risk losses that are
related to market risks shall be included in
the scope of the capital requirement for
operational risk.
Or. en
Justification
There is no need to require credit risk related losses to be entered in the operational riskdata
base, where it is ignored for capital calculation. It could be a flag on the event in the credit
risk data base. IT system design should be left to firms.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 821
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 15
15. The credit institution’s internal loss data
must be comprehensive in that it captures all
material activities and exposures from all
appropriate sub-systems and geographic
locations. Credit institutions must be able to
justify that any excluded activities or
exposures, both individually and in
combination, would not have a material
impact on the overall risk estimates. An
appropriate minimum loss threshold for
internal loss data collection must be defined.
15. The credit institution’s internal loss data
must be comprehensive in that it captures all
material activities and exposures from all
appropriate sub-systems and geographic
locations. Credit institutions must be able to
justify that any excluded activities or
exposures, both individually and in
combination, would not have a material
impact on the overall risk estimates.
Appropriate minimum loss thresholds for
internal loss data collection must be defined.
Or. en
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Justification
The draft proposed by the Commission only allows for a single threshold which is
impractical. The approach in the Basel Framework, which allows for variable thresholds, is
preferred.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 822
Annex X, part 3, Title 2 (after paragraph 24)
2. Impact of insurance
2. Impact of insurance and other risk
transfer mechanisms
Or. en
Justification
The management of operational risks is still a domain in rapid evolution and generally
accepted best practices are still to be defined. Therefore, the title should allow for new risk
mitigation techniques or risk transfer mechanisms.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 823
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 25
25. Credit institutions shall be able to
recognise the impact of insurance subject to
the conditions set out in paragraphs 26 to 29.
25. Credit institutions shall be able to
recognise the impact of insurance subject to
the conditions set out in paragraphs 26 to 29
and other risk transfer mechanisms in their
internal AMA model provided a noticeable
risk mitigating effect is achieved.
Or. en
Justification
The management of operational risks is still a domain in rapid evolution and generally
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accepted best practices are still to be defined. There, overprescriptive rules will restrain a
constant improvement in the risk management technique. Risk mitigation will not be limited to
insurance products. For instance, financial market products will probably be created, which
have a return associated to the non-materialisation of operational risks. Therefore, the title
“Impact of insurance” should be amended to “Risk mitigation” or to “Impact of insurance
and other risk transfer mechanisms”, and paragraph 25 should be enlarged, aiming not to
inhibit market developments, and to allow new risk mitigation techniques or risk transfer
mechanisms.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 824
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 25
25. Credit institutions shall be able to
recognise the impact of insurance subject to
the conditions set out in paragraphs 26 to
29.
25. Credit institutions shall be able to
recognise the impact of insurance set out in
paragraphs 26 to 29 and other risk transfer
mechanisms in their internal AMA model
provided a noticeable risk mitigating effect
is achieved.
Or. en
Justification
The management of operational risks is still a domain in rapid evolution and generally
accepted best practices are still to be defined. There, overprescriptive rules will restrain a
constant improvement in the risk management technique. Risk mitigation will not be limited to
insurance products.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 825
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 26
26. The provider is authorised to provide
insurance and re-insurance.
deleted
Or. en
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Justification
The management of operational risks is still a domain in rapid evolution and generally
accepted best practices are still to be defined. There, overprescriptive rules will restrain a
constant improvement in the risk management technique. Risk mitigation will not be limited to
insurance products. For instance, financial market products will probably be created, which
have a return associated to the non-materialisation of operational risks. Therefore, the title
“Impact of insurance” should be amended to “Risk mitigation” or to “Impact of insurance
and other risk transfer mechanisms”, and paragraph 25 should be enlarged, aiming not to
inhibit market developments, and to allow new risk mitigation techniques or risk transfer
mechanisms.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 826
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 26
26. The provider is authorised to provide
insurance or re-insurance.
26. The provider is authorised to provide
insurance or re-insurance and the provider
has a minimum claims paying ability rating
by an eligible ECAI which has been
determined by the competent authority to be
associated with credit quality step 3 or
above under the rules for the risk weighting
of exposures to credit institutions under
Articles 78 to 83.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 827
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 27, introductory part
27. The provider has a minimum claims
paying ability rating of A (or equivalent);
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27. The insurance and the credit
institutions' insurance framework shall
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meet the following conditions:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 828
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 27, point (a)
(a) The insurance policy must have an initial
term of no less than one year. For policies
with a residual term of less than one year,
the credit institution must make residual
term of the policy, up to a full 100% haircut
for policies with a residual term of 90 days
or less.
(a) The insurance policy must have an initial
term of no less than one year. For policies
with a residual term of less than one year,
the credit institution must make residual
term of the policy, up to a full 100% haircut
for policies with a residual term of 90 days
or less. The above provision shall not apply
in the case of policies subjected to an
automatic and irrevocable renewal at
maturity.
Or. en
Justification
In respect of lower capital charges by virtue of insurance policies of more than a year’s
duration, it is standard practice to renew operational risk insurance annually. Thus on any
given observation date for the capital requirement, the residual life of a policy may be less
than a year. For policies that are not one-off, but stipulated on a continuing basis, the
provision in point a) of paragraph 27 with less than one year of residual life should not apply.
Amendment by Paolo Cirino Pomicino
Amendment 829
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 27, point (a)
(a) The insurance policy must have an initial
term of no less than one year. For policies
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(a) The insurance policy must have an initial
term of no less than one year. For policies
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with a residual term of less than one year,
the credit institution must make appropriate
haircuts reflecting the declining residual
term of the policy, up to a full 100% haircut
for policies with a residual term of 90 days
or less.
with a residual term of less than one year,
the credit institution must make appropriate
haircuts reflecting the declining residual
term of the policy, up to a full 100% haircut
for policies with a residual term of 90 days
or less. The above provision has not to be
applied in the case of policies subjected to
an automatic renewal at maturity.
Or. en
Justification
As to the possibility of a lower capital charge by virtue of insurance policies of more than a
year’s duration, we would like to point out that the normal operating practice is to renew
operational risk insurance annually, and their expiration dates may coincide with a variety of
different renewal dates. Thus on any given observation date for the capital requirement, the
residual life of a policy may be less than a year. It therefore seems illogical to pro-rate
diminishing the mitigation effect simply because the policy is subject to renewal. We request,
consequently, that for policies that are not one-off but stipulated on a continuing basis, the
provision in the point a) of §27 on policies with less than a year of residual life should not
apply.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 830
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 27, point (a)
(a) The insurance policy must have an initial
term of no less than one year. For policies
with a residual term of less than one year,
the credit institution must make appropriate
haircuts reflecting the declining residual
term of the policy, up to a full 100% haircut
for policies with a residual term of 90 days
or less.
(a) The insurance policy must have an initial
term of no less than one year. For policies
with a residual term of less than one year,
the credit institution must make appropriate
haircuts reflecting the declining residual
term of the policy, up to a full 100% haircut
for policies with a residual term of 90 days
or less. The above provision has not to be
applied in the case of policies subjected to
an automatic renewal at maturity.
Or. en
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Justification
The management of operational risks is still a domain in rapid evolution and generally
accepted best practices are still to be defined. There, overprescriptive rules will restrain a
constant improvement in the risk management technique. Risk mitigation will not be limited to
insurance products. For instance, financial market products will probably be created, which
have a return associated to the non-materialisation of operational risks. Therefore, the title
“Impact of insurance” should be amended to “Risk mitigation” or to “Impact of insurance
and other risk transfer mechanisms”, and paragraph 25 should be enlarged, aiming not to
inhibit market developments, and to allow new risk mitigation techniques or risk transfer
mechanisms.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 831
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 27, point (e)
(e) The insurance is provided by a third
party entity. In the case of insurance through
captives and affiliates, the exposure has to
be laid off to an independent third party
entity, for example through re-insurance,
that meets the eligibility criteria.
(e) The insurance is provided by a third
party entity. In the case of insurance through
captives and affiliates, the exposure has to
be laid off to an independent third party
entity, for example through re-insurance,
that meets the eligibility criteria. In the
event that capital invested in the captive is
deducted from the capital of the parent,
then risk transfer should be recognised
subject to the captive meeting the eligibility
criteria;
Or. en
Justification
The Commission's wording penalises firms twice - deduction of capital in the captive and
non-recognition of risk transfer.
Amendment by José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil
Amendment 832
Annex X, part 3, paragraph 27, point (e)
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(e) The insurance is provided by a third
party entity. In the case of insurance through
captives and affiliates, the exposure has to
be laid off to an independent third party
entity, for example through re-insurance,
that meets the eligibility criteria.
(e) The insurance is provided by a third
party entity. In the case of insurance through
captives and affiliates, the exposure has to
be laid off to an independent third party
entity, for example through re-insurance,
that meets the eligibility criteria. In the
event that capital invested in the captive is
deducted from the capital of the parent,
then risk transfer should be recognised
subject to the captive meeting the eligibility
criteria;
Or. en
Justification
The management of operational risks is still a domain in rapid evolution and generally
accepted best practices are still to be defined. There, overprescriptive rules will restrain a
constant improvement in the risk management technique. Risk mitigation will not be limited to
insurance products. For instance, financial market products will probably be created, which
have a return associated to the non-materialisation of operational risks. Therefore, the title
“Impact of insurance” should be amended to “Risk mitigation” or to “Impact of insurance
and other risk transfer mechanisms”, and paragraph 25 should be enlarged, aiming not to
inhibit market developments, and to allow new risk mitigation techniques or risk transfer
mechanisms.
Amendment by Harald Ettl
Amendment 833
Annex XI, paragraph 1, point (d a) (new)
(da) the impact of diversification effects
and how such effects are factored into the
risk measurement system;
Or. en
Justification
Diversification is one of the key principles in risk and portfolio management and a crucial
factor for determining economic capital. Since there is no recognition of diversification
effects in the calculation of regulatory capital requirements, diversification effects should be
recognized within the Supervisory Review Process.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 834
Annex XI, paragraph 1, point (d a) (new)
(da) the impact of diversification effects
and how such effects are factored into the
risk measurement system;
Or. en
Justification
Diversification is one of the key principles in risk and portfolio management, and
diversification recognition is an existing practice in market risk models, and a crucial factor
for determining economic capital. Since there is no recognition of diversification effects in the
calculation of regulatory capital requirements, there is a need to recognise diversification
effects when evaluating regulatory capital requirements within the Supervisory Review
Process (SRP).
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 835
Annex XII, part 1, paragraph 4
4. Competent authorities shall require credit
institutions to assess the need to publish
some or all disclosures more frequently than
annually in the light of relevant
characteristics of their business such as
scale of operations, range of activities,
presence in different countries,
involvement in different financial sectors,
and participation in international financial
markets and payment, settlement and
clearing systems. That assessment shall pay
particular attention to the possible need for
more frequent disclosure of items of
information laid down in part 2,
paragraphs 3(b) and 3(e), and 4(b) to 4(f),
and information on risk exposure and other
items prone to rapid change.
4. Competent authorities shall require credit
institutions to assess the need to publish
some or all disclosures more frequently than
annually in the light of relevant
characteristics of their business that are
prone to rapid change.
Or. en
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Justification
The intention in paragraph 818 of the Basel Framework is to highlight the consideration of
increased frequency of disclosure on areas prone to rapid change. Furthermore, the list of
examples included in the Commission draft could be too prescriptive for a framework
directive. We would prefer this to be covered, if need be, in level 3 work.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 836
Annex XII, part 2, paragraph 3, point (c)
(c) the total amount of additional own funds,
and own funds as defined in [Annex V of
Directive 93/6/EEC];
(c) the total amount of additional own funds,
and own funds as defined in [Chapter IV of
Directive 93/6/EEC];
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 837
Annex XII, part 2, paragraph 4, point (c) (i)
(i) each of the approaches provided in
Annex VII, part 1, paragraphs 15 to 25;
(i) each of the approaches provided in
Annex VII, part 1, paragraphs 15 to 24;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 838
Annex XII, part 2, paragraph 9, introductory part
9. The following information shall be
disclosed by each credit institution which
calculates its capital requirements in
accordance with [Annex VIII of Directive
93/6/EEC]:
9. The following information shall be
disclosed by each credit institution which
calculates its capital requirements in
accordance with [Annex V of Directive
93/6/EEC]:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 839
Annex XII, part 3, paragraph 14, point (f)
(f) for the retail exposure class and for each
of the categories as defined under (c) above,
either the disclosures outlined under (e)
above (if applicable, on a pooled basis), or
an analysis of exposures (outstanding loans
and exposure values for undrawn
commitments) against a sufficient number of
EL grades to allow for a meaningful
differentiation of credit risk (if applicable,
on a pooled basis);
(f) for the retail exposure class and for each
of the categories as defined under (c)(iv)
above, either the disclosures outlined under
(e) above (if applicable, on a pooled basis),
or an analysis of exposures (outstanding
loans and exposure values for undrawn
commitments) against a sufficient number of
EL grades to allow for a meaningful
differentiation of credit risk (if applicable,
on a pooled basis);
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 840
Annex XII, part 3, paragraph 14, point (g)
(g) the actual value adjustments in the
preceding period for each exposure class (for
retail, for each of the categories as defined
under (c) above) and how this differs from
past experience;
(g) the actual value adjustments in the
preceding period for each exposure class (for
retail, for each of the categories as defined
under (c)(iv) above) and how this differs
from past experience;
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 841
Annex XII, part 3, paragraph 14, point (i)
(i) the credit institution’s estimates against
actual outcomes over a longer period. At a
minimum, this shall include information on
estimates of losses against actual losses in
each exposure class (for retail, for each of
the categories as defined under (c) above)
over a period sufficient to allow for a
meaningful assessment of the performance
of the internal rating processes for each
exposure class (for retail for each of the
categories as defined under (c) above).
Where appropriate, the credit institutions
shall further decompose this to provide
analysis of PD and, for the credit institutions
using own estimates of LGDs and/or
conversion factors, LGD and conversion
factor outcomes against estimates provided
in the quantitative risk assessment
disclosures above.
(i) the credit institution’s estimates against
actual outcomes over a longer period. At a
minimum, this shall include information on
estimates of losses against actual losses in
each exposure class (for retail, for each of
the categories as defined under (c)(iv)
above) over a period sufficient to allow for a
meaningful assessment of the performance
of the internal rating processes for each
exposure class (for retail for each of the
categories as defined under (c)(iv) above).
Where appropriate, the credit institutions
shall further decompose this to provide
analysis of PD and, for the credit institutions
using own estimates of LGDs and/or
conversion factors, LGD and conversion
factor outcomes against estimates provided
in the quantitative risk assessment
disclosures above.
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 842
Annex XIV, Correlation Table
Text proposed by the Commission
This
Directive
Article 1
Article 2(1)
Article 2(2)
Article 3
Directive
2000/12/EC
Article 2(1)
and (2)
Article 2(3)
Act of
Accession
Article 2(4)
Article 2(5)
and (6)
Article 3 (1)
final sentence
Article 4.1
Article 1(1)
(1)
Article 4.1
(2) to (5)
Article 4.1
(7) to (9)
Article 4 .1
(10)
Article 4.1
Article 1
(11) to (14)
(10), (12)
and (13)
Article 4.1
(21) and (22)
Article 4.1
Article 1
(23)
(23)
Article 4.1
Article 1
(45) to (47)
(25) to (27)
Article 4 .2
Article 1(1)
second subparagraph
Article 5
Article 3
Article 6
Article 4
Article 7
Article 8
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Directive
2000/28/EC
Directive
2001/87/EC
Directive
2004/69/EC
Directive
2004/xx/EC
Article 3.2
Article 1(2)
to (5)
Article 1(6)
to (8)
Article 29.1
(a)
Article 29.1
(b)
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Article 8
Article 9 (1)
Article 9 (2)
Article 10
Article 11
Article 12
Article 13
Article 14
Article 15 (1)
Article 15 (2)
and (3)
Article 16
Article 17
Article 18
Article 19 (1)
Article 19 (2)
Article 20
Article 21
Article 22
Article 23
Article 24 (1)
Article 24 (2)
Article 24 (3)
Article 25 (1)
to (3)
Article 25 (3)
Article 25 (4)
Article 26
Article 27
Article 28
Article 9
Article 5(1)
and 1(11)
Article 5(2)
Article 5 (3)
to (7)
Article 6
Article 7
Article 10
Article 11
Article 12
Article 29.2
Article 13
Article 14
Article 15
Article 16
(1)
Article 29.3
Article
16(3)
Article 16
(4) to (6)
Article 17
Article 18
Article 19
paragraphs
(1) to (3)
Article 19
paragraph
(6)
Article 19
paragraph
(4)
Article 20
(1) to (3) 1
and 2 subparagraph
Article 19
paragraph
(5)
Article 20
(3) 3 subparagraph
Article 20
(4) to (7)
Article 1 (3)
final clause
Article 21
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Article 29
Article 30
Article 31
Article 32
Article 33
Article 34
Article 35
Article 36
Article 37
Article 38
Article 39 (1)
and (2)
Article 39 (2)
Article 40
Article 41
Article 42
Article 43
Article 44
Article 45
Article 46
Article 47
Article 48
Article 49
Article 50
Article 51
Article 52
Article 53
Article 54
Article 22
Article 22
(2) to (4)
Article 22
(5)
Article 22
(6)
Article 22
(7)
Article 22
(8)
Article 22
(9)
Article 22
(10)
Article 22
(11)
Article 24
Article 25
Article 3.8
Article 26
Article 27
Article 28
Article 29
Article
30(1) to (3)
Article
30(4)
Article
30(3)
Article
30(5)
Article
30(6) and
(7)
Article
30(8)
Article
30(9) 1 and
2
paragraphs
Article
30(9) 3
paragraph
Article
30(10)
Article 31
Article 32
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Article 55
Article 56
Article 57
Article 33
Article
34(1)
Article
34(2) 1
paragraph
Article
34(1) point
2 final
sentence
Article 58
Article 29.4
(b)
Article 29.4
(b)
Article 29.4
(b)
Article 59
Article 60
Article 61
Article 63
Article 64
Article 65
Article 66 (1)
and (2)
Article 67
Article 73
Article 106
Article 107
Article 108
Article 109
Article 110
Article 111
Article 113
(1) to (3)
Article 115
(1) and (2)
Article
29.4(a)
Article
34(3) and
(4)
Article 35
Article 36
Article 37
Article 38
(1) and (2)
Article 39
Article
52(3)
Article
1(24)
Article 1(1)
3 subparagraph
Article
48(1)
Article 48
(4) 1
paragraph
Article
48(2) to
(4)2 subparagraph
Article 49
(1) to (5)
Article 49
(4) (6) and
(7)
Article
49(8) and
(9)
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Article 116
Article 117
Article 118
Article 120
Article 121
Article 122
(1) and (2)
Article 125
Article 126
Article 128
Article 133
(1)
Article 133
(2) and (3)
Article
134(1)
Article 134
(2)
Article
49(10)
Article
49(11)
Article 50
Article
51(1)(2)(5)
Article
51(4)
Art. 51 (6)
Article
53(1) and
(2)
Article 53
(3)
Article
53(5)
Article
54(1)
Article 54
(2) and (3)
Article
54(4) first
paragraph
Article
54(4)
second
paragraph
Article 135
Article 137
Article 140
Article 141
Article 142
Article
55(1) and
(2)
Article
29(9)
Article
56(1) to (3)
Article
56(4) to (6)
Article 56
(7)
Article
56(8)
Article 143
Article 150
Article 151
Article
29(10)
Article
29(11)
Article
60(1)
Article
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Article
29(7)(a)
Article
29(8)
Article 138
Article 139
Article
29(5)
Art. 3.10
Art. 3.10
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Article 158
Article 159
Article 160
Annex I
Annex I final
clause
Annex II
Annex III
Annex IV
60(2)
Art. 67
Art. 68
Article 69
Annex I
Article 68
Annex II
Annex III
Annex IV
Amendment by Parliament
This
Directive
Article 1
Article 2
Article 2
Article 3
Directive
2000/12/EC
Article 2(1)
and (2)
Article 2(3)
Act of
Accession
Article 2(4)
Article 2(5)
and (6)
Article 3 (1)
final sentence
Article 4 (1)
Article 1(1)
Article 4 (2)
to (5)
Article 4 (7)
to (9)
Article 4 (10)
Article 4 (11)
to (14)
Article 4 (21)
and (22)
Article 4 (23)
Article 4 (45)
to (47)
deleted
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
Article 9 (1)
Directive
2000/28/EC
Directive
2002/87/EC
Directive
2004/69/EC
Directive
2004/xx/EC
Article 3.2
Article 1(2)
to (5)
Article 1(6)
to (8)
Article 29.1
(a)
Article 1
(10), (12)
and (13)
Article 29.1
(b)
Article 1
(23)
Article 1
(25) to (27)
deleted
Article 4
Article 8
Article 3
Article 5(1)
and 1(11)
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Article 9 (2)
Article 10
Article 11
Article 12
Article 13
Article 14
Article 15 (1)
Article 15 (2)
and (3)
Article 16
Article 17
Article 18
Article 19 (1)
Article 19 (2)
Article 20
Article 21
Article 22
Article 23
Article 24 (1)
Article 24 (2)
Article 24 (3)
Article 25 (1)
to (3)
Article 25 (3)
Article 25 (4)
Article 26
Article 27
Article 28
Article 29
Article 30
Article 5(2)
Article 5 (3)
to (7)
Article 6
Article 7
Article 10
Article 11
Article 12
Article 29.2
Article 13
Article 14
Article 15
Article 16
(1)
Article 29.3
Article
16(3)
Article 16
(4) to (6)
Article 17
Article 18
Article 19
paragraphs
(1) to (3)
Article 19
paragraph
(6)
Article 19
paragraph
(4)
Article 20
(1) to (3) 1
and 2 subparagraph
Article 19
paragraph
(5)
Article 20
(3) 3 subparagraph
Article 20
(4) to (7)
Article 1 (3)
final clause
Article 21
Article 22
Article 22
(2) to (4)
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Article 31
Article 32
Article 33
Article 34
Article 35
Article 36
Article 37
Article 38
Article 39 (1)
and (2)
Article 39 (2)
Article 40
Article 41
Article 42
Article 43
Article 44
Article 45
Article 46
Article 47
Article 48
Article 49
Article 50
Article 51
Article 52
Article 53
Article 54
Article 55
Article 56
Article 22
(5)
Article 22
(6)
Article 22
(7)
Article 22
(8)
Article 22
(9)
Article 22
(10)
Article 22
(11)
Article 24
Article 25
Article 3.8
Article 26
Article 27
Article 28
Article 29
Article
30(1) to (3)
Article
30(4)
Article
30(3)
Article
30(5)
Article
30(6) and
(7)
Article
30(8)
Article
30(9) 1 and
2
paragraphs
Article
30(9) 3
paragraph
Article
30(10)
Article 31
Article 32
Article 33
Article
34(1)
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Article 57
Article
34(2) 1
paragraph
Article
34(2) point
2 final
sentence
Article 58
Article 29.4
(b)
Article 29.4
(b)
Article 29.4
(b)
Article 59
Article 60
Article 61
Article 63
Article 64
Article 65
Article 66 (1)
and (2)
Article 67
Article 73
Article 106
Article 107
Article 108
Article 109
Article 110
Article 111
Article 113
(1) to (3)
Article 115
(1) and (2)
Article 116
Article 117
Article
34(3) and
(4)
Article 35
Article 36
Article 37
Article 38
(1) and (2)
Article 39
Article
52(3)
Article
1(24)
Article 1(1)
3 subparagraph
Article
48(1)
Article 48
(4) 1
paragraph
Article
48(2) to
(4)2 subparagraph
Article 49
(1) to (5)
Article 49
(4) (6) and
(7)
Article
49(8) and
(9)
Article
49(10)
Article
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29.4(a)
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Article 118
Article 120
Article 121
Article 122
(1) and (2)
Article 125
Article 126
Article 128
Article 133
(1)
Article 133
(2) and (3)
Article
134(1)
Article 134
(2)
49(11)
Article 50
Article
51(1)(2)(5)
Article
51(4)
Art. 51 (6)
Article
53(1) and
(2)
Article 53
(3)
Article
53(5)
Article
54(1)
Article 54
(2) and (3)
Article
54(4) first
paragraph
Article
54(4)
second
paragraph
Article 135
Article 137
Article 140
Article 141
Article 142
Article
55(1) and
(2)
Article
29(9)
Article
56(1) to (3)
Article
56(4) to (6)
Article 56
(7)
Article
56(8)
Article 143
Article 150
Article 151
Article 158
Article 159
Article
29(7)(a)
Article
29(8)
Article 138
Article 139
Article
29(5)
Article
29(10)
Article
29(11)
Article
60(1)
Article
60(2)
Art. 67
Art. 68
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Art. 3.10
Art. 3.10
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Article 160
Annex I
Annex I final
clause
Annex II
Annex III
Annex IV
Article 69
Annex I
Article 68
Annex II
Annex III
Annex IV
Or. en
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Recast of Directive 93/6/EEC
Text proposed by the Commission
Amendments by Parliament
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 843
Article 1, paragraph 1
1. This directive lays down the capital
adequacy requirements applying to
investment firms and credit institutions, the
rules for their calculation and the rules for
their prudential supervision. Member States
shall apply the requirements of this Directive
to investment firms and credit institutions as
defined in Article 2.
1. This directive lays down the capital
adequacy requirements applying to
investment firms and credit institutions, the
rules for their calculation and the rules for
their prudential supervision. Member States
shall apply the requirements of this Directive
to investment firms and credit institutions as
defined in Article 3.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 844
Article 3, paragraph 1, point (s a) (new)
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(sa) energy institution means an investment
firm whose main business is in transactions
regarding investment services or investment
advice related to the financial instruments
set out in Annex I Section C points 5, 6, 7,
9 and 10 of Directive 2004/39/EC.
Or. en
Justification
The introduction of the term „energy institution“ is appropriate in order to take the specific
regulations into account that are relevant for the energy market.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 845
Article 3, paragraph 1, point (s b) (new)
(sb) Commodities means commodities as
defined in [article xx of Directive
2005/yy/EC (Implementation Directive)
according to the comitology procedure set
out in article 4 (1), point 2 of Directive
2004/39/EC].
Or. en
Justification
Currently, the proposals for the Directives 93/6/EC and 2000/12/EC do not provide a
definition for commodities. For consistency reasons it is important to guarantee that the
relevant definition as set out in Directive 2004/39/EC will also be applied in the Directives
93/6/EC and 2000/12/EC.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 846
Article 3, paragraph 1, point (s c) (new)
(sc) Commodity derivatives mean derivative
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contracts related to the financial
instruments set out in Annex I Section C
points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Directive
2004/39/EC.
Or. en
Justification
Currently, the proposals for the Directives 93/6/EC and 2000/12/EC do not provide a
definition for commodities. For consistency reasons it is important to guarantee that the
relevant definition as set out in Directive 2004/39/EC will also be applied in the Directives
93/6/EC and 2000/12/EC.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 847
Article 15, subparagraph 1
Illiquid assets as referred to in point (d) of
Article 12(2) shall include the following:
Illiquid assets as referred to in point (d) of
Article 13(2) shall include the following:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 848
Article 15, subparagraph 1, point (b)
(b) holdings in, including subordinated
claims on, credit or financial institutions
which may be included in the own funds
of those institutions, unless they have been
deducted under points (l) to (p) of Article 57
of Directive [2000/12/EC] or under Article
15(d) of this Directive;
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(b) holdings in, including subordinated
claims on, credit or financial institutions
which may be included in the own funds
of those institutions, unless they have been
deducted under points (l) to (p) of Article 57
of Directive [2000/12/EC] or under Article
16(d) of this Directive;
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Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 849
Article 15, subparagraph 1, point (g)
(g) physical stocks, unless they are already
subject to capital requirements at least as
stringent as those set out in Articles 18 to 20.
(g) physical stocks, unless they are already
subject to capital requirements at least as
stringent as those set out in Articles 18 and
20.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 850
Article 16, point (b)
(b) the exclusion referred to in point (a) of
Article 12(2) shall not cover those
components of points (l) to (p) of
Article 57 of Directive [2000/12/EC] which
an investment firm holds in respect of
undertakings included in the scope of
consolidation as defined in Article 2 (1) of
this Directive;
(b) the exclusion referred to in point (a) of
Article 13(2) shall not cover those
components of points (l) to (p) of
Article 57 of Directive [2000/12/EC] which
an investment firm holds in respect of
undertakings included in the scope of
consolidation as defined in Article 2 (1) of
this Directive;
Or. en
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Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 851
Article 20, paragraph 1
1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this
Article, and Article 34 of this Directive, the
requirements in Article 75 of Directive
[2000/12/EC] shall apply to investment
firms.
1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3, 3a and 4 of
this Article, and Article 34 of this Directive,
the requirements in Article 75 of Directive
[2000/12/EC] shall apply to investment
firms.
Or. en
Justification
To include reference to new paragraph 3a.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 852
Article 20, paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. By derogation to paragraph 1,
competent authorities may apply the
requirements in Article 75 of Directive
[2000/12/EC] to investment firms so the
capital requirement contained in point (d)
of Article 75 of Directive [2000/12/EC] does
not exceed 12/88 parts of the sum of the
capital requirements contained in points (a)
to (c) of Article 75.
Or. en
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Justification
The proposition aims at ensuring the maximum the capital requirement may go up is linked to
the Basle calibration.
Amendment by Jean-Paul Gauzès
Amendment 853
Article 20, paragraph 4
4. Investment firms referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 3 shall remain subject to
all other provisions regarding operational
risk set out in Annex V of Directive
[2000/12/EC].
4. Investment firms referred to in
paragraphs 2, 3 and 3a shall remain subject
to all other provisions regarding operational
risk set out in Annex V of Directive
[2000/12/EC].
Or. en
Justification
To include reference to new paragraph 3a.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 854
Article 22, paragraph 2
2. Par dérogation au paragraphe 1, les
autorités compétentes peuvent autoriser
toute compagnie financière qui est
l'entreprise mère d'une entreprise
d'investissement appartenant à un tel
groupe d'utiliser une valeur inférieure à celle
calculée en application du paragraphe 1,
point d), mais en aucun cas inférieure à la
somme des exigences imposées sur une base
individuelle par les articles 18 et 20 aux
entreprises d'investissement, établissements
financiers, sociétés de gestion de portefeuille
et entreprises de services auxiliaires, qui
seraient consolidés dans d'autres
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2. Par dérogation au paragraphe 1, les
autorités compétentes peuvent autoriser
toute compagnie financière qui est
l'entreprise mère d'une entreprise
d'investissement d'un tel groupe à utiliser
une valeur inférieure à celle calculée en
application du paragraphe 1, point d), mais
en aucun cas inférieure à la somme des
exigences imposées sur une base
individuelle par les articles 18 et 20 aux
entreprises d'investissement, établissements
financiers, sociétés de gestion de portefeuille
et entreprises de services auxiliaires, qui
seraient sans cela consolidés, et du total des
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circonstances, et du total des passifs
éventuels envers des entreprises
d'investissement, des établissements
financiers, des sociétés de gestion de
portefeuille ou des entreprises de services
auxiliaires, qui seraient consolidés dans
d'autres circonstances. Aux fins du présent
paragraphe, l'exigence de fonds propres
imposée aux établissements financiers,
sociétés de gestion de portefeuille et
entreprises de services auxiliaires est une
exigence notionnelle.
engagements éventuels envers des
entreprises d'investissement, des
établissements financiers, des sociétés de
gestion de portefeuille ou des entreprises de
services auxiliaires, qui seraient sans cela
consolidés dans d'autres circonstances. Aux
fins du présent paragraphe, les entreprises
d'investissement de pays tiers, les
établissements financiers, les sociétés de
gestion de portefeuille et les entreprises de
services auxiliaires sont soumis à une
exigence de fonds propres notionnels.
Or. fr
Justification
Translation error in the French version. See last sentences: ...... les entreprises
d'investissement de pays tiers, ...
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 855
Article 26, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2
In addition, they may allow foreignexchange positions in one institution to
offset foreign-exchange positions in another
institution in accordance with the rules set
out in Annex III and/or Annex V. They may
also allow commodities positions in one
institution to offset commodities positions in
another institution in accordance with the
rules set out in Annex IV and/or Annex V.
In addition, they may allow foreignexchange positions in one institution to
offset foreign-exchange positions in another
institution in accordance with the rules set
out in Annex III and/or Annex V. They may
also allow commodities or commodity
derivatives positions in one institution to
offset commodities or commodity
derivatives positions in another institution in
accordance with the rules set out in Annex
IV and/or Annex V.
Or. en
Justification
Institutions that are part of a group of institutions are generally obliged to fulfil the capital
requirements on a consolidated basis. However, according to article 22 of the Directive
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[93/6/EC], the competent authorities may waive the application of this capital requirement. In
this case it is important that commodities or commodity derivatives positions in one
institution are eligible to offset commodities or commodity derivatives positions in another
institution; this avoids an unequal treatment of commodities/commodity derivatives in respect
to the netting possibility of positions.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 856
Article 30, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2
Other than in relation to repurchase
transactions, securities or commodities
lending or borrowing transactions, the
calculation of large exposures to clients and
groups of connected clients for reporting
purposes shall not include the recognition
of credit risk mitigation.
Other than in relation to repurchase
transactions, securities or commodities
lending or borrowing transactions, the
reporting of large exposures to clients and
groups of connected clients should be
submitted gross and net of credit risk
mitigation.
Or. en
Justification
The requirement to report trading book exposures at their exposure gross exposure value is
an excessively costly burden to be placed upon firms. As CRM techniques will be eligible to
be used in mitigation of large exposures in the Trading Book (in keeping with the treatment
for the non trading book exposures) there is already a requirement that will ensure
appropriate monitoring of exposures against the limits established in the large exposure
regime.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 857
Article 30, paragraph 4
4. By derogation to paragraph 3 competent
authorities may allow assets constituting
claims and other exposures on recognised
third-country investment firms and
recognised clearing houses and exchanges in
financial instruments to be subject to the
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4. By derogation to paragraph 3 competent
authorities may allow assets constituting
claims and other exposures on recognised
third-country investment firms and
recognised clearing houses and exchanges in
financial instruments to be subject to the
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same treatment accorded to those on
institutions laid out in Articles 113(2)(i),
115(2) and 116 of Directive [2000/12/EC].
same treatment accorded to those on
institutions laid out in Articles 113(3)(i),
115(2) and 116 of Directive [2000/12/EC].
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 858
Article 31, subparagraph 1, introductory part
The competent authorities may authorize the
limits laid down in Article Articles 111 to
117 of Directive [2000/12/EC] to be
exceeded if the following conditions are
met:
The competent authorities may authorize the
limits laid down in Article Articles 111 to
117 of Directive [2000/12/EC] to be
exceeded if either the conditions (a) to (e)
are met or the condition (ea) is met:
Or. en
Justification
For consistency reasons, it is appropriate to also include in this section the additional
possibility to exempt institutions from large exposure requirements, as proposed in the draft
report of the Rapporteur in the new article 45a of the Directive 93/6/EC.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 859
Article 31, subparagraph 1, point (e a) (new)
(ea) the conditions of Article 45a are met.
Or. en
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Justification
For consistency reasons, it is appropriate to also include in this section the additional
possibility to exempt institutions from large exposure requirements, as proposed in the draft
report of the Rapporteur in the new article 45a of the Directive 93/6/EC.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 860
Article 37, paragraph 1, introductory part
1. Die Artikel 124 bis 132, 136 und 144 der
Richtlinie [2000/12/EG] gelten mutatis
mutandis für die Beaufsichtigung von
Wertpapierfirmen in Übereinstimmung mit
dem nachfolgend Gesagten:
1. Titel V Kapitel 4 der Richtlinie
[2000/12/EG] gilt mutatis mutandis für die
Beaufsichtigung von Wertpapierfirmen in
Übereinstimmung mit dem nachfolgend
Gesagten:
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference error in the German version of the draft report. The English translation
already anticipated the mistake. Therefore, no change in the English version is needed.
Amendment by Astrid Lulling
Amendment 861
Article 37, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2
Where an EU parent financial holding
company has as subsidiary both a credit
institution and an investment firm, one
competent authority responsible for
supervision of the credit institution shall be
identified to be responsible for consolidated
supervision of the entities controlled by that
parent.
If a group has both investment firms and
credit institutions, Title V, Chapter 4 of
Directive [2000/12/EC] shall apply to the
supervision of institutions as if references
to credit institutions were institutions.
Or. en
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Justification
The Commission text would require a consolidated group with a financial holding company
parent to be subject to lead regulation by the supervisor of the bank within a group
irrespective of the overall composition of the financial group. The automatic primacy of the
banking regulator neglects the fact that in some groups the overwhelming balance of business
will be towards the investment firms. It is inappropriate for this outcome to be applied
automatically.
In keeping with the principle of the Financial Conglomerates Directive [2002/87/EC] the
regulations for consolidation and the allocation of responsibility for consolidated supervision
to the competent authority should reflect the composition of the group on a case by case basis
where a financial holding company has both a credit institution and investment firm as
subsidiaries.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 862
Article 37, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2
Where an EU parent financial holding
company has as subsidiary both a credit
institution and an investment firm, one
competent authority responsible for
supervision of the credit institution shall be
identified to be responsible for consolidated
supervision of the entities controlled by that
parent.
If a group has both investment firms and
credit institutions, Title V, Chapter 4 of
Directive [2000/12/EC] shall apply to the
supervision of institutions as if references
to credit institutions were institutions.
Or. en
Justification
The Commission text would require a consolidated group with a financial holding company
parent to be subject to lead regulation by the supervisor of the bank within a group
irrespective of the overall composition of the financial group. The automatic primacy of the
banking regulator neglects the fact that in some groups the overwhelming balance of business
will be towards the investment firms. It is inappropriate for this outcome to be applied
automatically.
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Amendment by Wolf Klinz
Amendment 863
Article 37, paragraph 1, subparagraph 2
Hat eine EUMutterfinanzholdinggesellschaft sowohl ein
Kreditinstitut als auch eine Wertpapierfirma
zur Tochter, so wird eine für die
Überwachung des Kreditinstituts zuständige
Behörde als für die Beaufsichtigung auf
konsolidierter Basis der von dieser
Muttergesellschaft kontrollierten Institute
zuständig benannt.
Wenn es in einem Konzern fast
ausschließlich Wertpapierfirmen und nur
vereinzelt Kreditinstitute gibt, ist Titel V,
Kapitel 4 der Richtlinie 2002/12/EG für die
Beaufsichtigung von Instituten so
anwendbar, als ob Bezugnahmen auf
Kreditinstitute Bezugnahmen auf Institute
wären.
Or. de
Justification
Bei manchen Konzernen fällt der weit überwiegende Teil des Geschäfts auf Wertpapierfirmen
und nur ein kleiner Teil auf Kreditinstitute. Es ist daher nicht sinnvoll, dass ein Konzern mit
einer Finanzholding als Mutter unabhängig von der Gesamtzusammenschau des Konzerns
der Hauptaufsicht durch die Aufsichtsbehörde der Bank innerhalb des Konzerns unterliegt.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 864
Article 45 a (new)
Article 45a
1. Competent authorities may permit
investment firms to exceed the limits
concerning large exposures in Article 111
of Directive [2000/12/EC]. Any excesses
need not be included by the investment
firms in their calculation of capital
requirements exceeding such limits, as set
out in Article 75(b) of Directive
[2000/12/EC]. This discretion is available
until 31 December 2010 or the date of
coming into force of any modifications
consequent on the treatment of large
exposures, pursuant to Article 119 of
Directive [2000/12/EC], whichever is the
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earlier. For this discretion to be exercised,
the following conditions, (a) to (d) or
condition (e) only, must be met:
(a) the investment firm provides investment
services or investment activities related to
the financial instruments listed in points 5,
6, 7, 9 and 10, Section C, Annex I of
Directive 2004/39 EC;
(b) the investment firm does not provide
such investment services or undertake such
investment activities for, or on behalf of,
retail clients;
(c) breaches of the limits referred to in
paragraph 1 arise in connection with
exposures resulting from contracts that are
financial instruments listed in point (a) and
relate to commodities or underlyings within
the meaning of point 10, Section C, Annex
I of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) and are
calculated in accordance with Annex III
and IV of Directive [2000/12/EC], or from
contracts concerning the delivery of
commodities or emission allowances;
(d) the investment firm has a documented
strategy for managing and, in particular,
for controlling and limiting risks arising
from the concentration of exposures. The
investment firm must inform the competent
authorities of this strategy and all material
changes to this strategy without delay. The
investment firm must make appropriate
arrangements to ensure a continuous
monitoring of the creditworthiness of
borrowers, according to their impact on
concentration risk. These arrangements
must enable the investment firm to react
adequately and sufficiently promptly to any
deterioration in that creditworthiness;
(e) exposures exceeding the large exposure
limits are cleared through a recognised
clearing-house.
2. Where an investment firm exceeds the
internal limits set according to the strategy
referred to in paragraph 1 point (d), it must
notify the competent authority without
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delay of the size and nature of the excess
and the counterparty.
Or. en
Justification
Translation error in para 1(c):"Basiswerte" means "underlyings" not "basic dimensions".
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 865
Article 45 b (new)
45b. The competent authorities in the
Committee of European Banking
Supervisors may, at their discretion, lay
down a common ceiling, to apply until 30
December 2010, for the increase in capital
requirements resulting from the obligations
to meet operational risks. Where necessary,
the above arrangement shall cover
investment firms to which Article 20(2) and
(3) do not apply. After the expiration of the
term, the European Commission shall
review whether this provision needs to be
prolongated.
Or. en
Justification
Replaces am 278 of the Radwan draft report.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 866
Article 45 c (new)
1. By 31 December 2009, the Commission
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shall, on the basis of public consultations
and in the light of discussions with the
competent authorities, report to the
European Parliament and Council on:
(a) the impact of the requirement to provide
own funds according to this Directive on
energy institutions;
(b) the continued appropriateness of the
application of the requirement to provide
own funds according to this Directive for
energy institutions.
2. On the basis of the reports referred to in
paragraph 1, the Commission may submit
proposals for related amendments to this
Directive.
Or. en
Justification
The inclusion of a review period of the newly introduced regulations is appropriate in order
to account for the specifics of the energy market when calculating capital requirements for
energy institutions.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 867
Article 47, paragraph 1, point (b)
(b) Annex II, paragraph 4.1, shall apply as it
stood prior to the date referred to in Article
46.
(b) Annex II, paragraph 4.1 of Directive
[93/6/EEC], shall apply as it stood prior to
the date referred to in Article 46.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 868
Annex 1, Title (new) (before paragraph 8)
(a) Treatment of the protection seller
Or. en
Justification
Re-ordering is required to clarify the treatment of the main forms of credit derivatives,
distinguishing between the capital charge applied to the protection seller and that applied to
the protection buyer, as well as between single name and multiple name credit linked notes.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 869
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 1
8. For credit derivatives, unless specified
differently, the notional amount of the credit
derivative contract must be used. When
calculating the capital requirement for the
market risk of the party who assumes the
credit risk (the “protection seller”), positions
are determined as follows:
8. When calculating the capital requirement
for market risk of the party who assumes the
credit risk (the “protection seller”), unless
specified differently, the notional amount of
the credit derivative contract must be used.
For the purpose of calculating the specific
risk charge, other than for total return
swaps, the maturity of the credit derivative
contract is applicable instead of the
maturity of the obligation. Positions are
determined as follows:
Or. en
Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 870
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 2
A total return swap creates a long position in
the general market risk of the reference
obligation and a short position in the general
market risk of a government bond which is
assigned a 0% risk weight under Annex VI
of Directive [2000/12/EC]. It also creates a
long position in the specific risk of the
reference obligation.
(i) A total return swap creates a long
position in the general market risk of the
reference obligation and a short position in
the general market risk of a government
bond with a maturity equivalent to the
period until the next interest fixing and
which is assigned a 0% risk weight under
Annex VI of Directive [2000/12/EC]. It also
creates a long position in the specific risk of
the reference obligation.
Or. en
Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 871
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 3
A credit default swap does not create a
position for general market risk. For the
purposes of specific risk, the institution must
record a synthetic long position in an
obligation of the reference entity. If
premium or interest payments are due under
the product, these cash flows must be
represented as notional positions in a
government bond with the appropriate fixed
or floating rate.
(ii) A credit default swap does not create a
position for general market risk. For the
purposes of specific risk, the institution must
record a synthetic long position in an
obligation of the reference entity, unless the
derivative is rated and meets the conditions
for qualifying debt, in which case a long
position in the derivative is recorded. If
premium or interest payments are due under
the product, these cash flows must be
represented as notional positions in a
government bonds.
Or. en
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Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 872
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 4
A credit linked note creates a long position
in the general market risk of the note itself,
as an interest product. For the purpose of
specific risk, a synthetic long position is
created in an obligation of the reference
entity. In addition, a long position is created
in the specific risk of the issuer of the note.
(iii) A single name credit linked note creates
a long position in the general market risk of
the note itself, as an interest rate product.
For the purpose of specific risk, a synthetic
long position is created in an obligation of
the reference entity. An additional long
position is created in the issuer of the note.
Where the credit linked note has an
external rating and meets the conditions for
a qualifying debt item, a single long
position with the specific risk of the note
need only be recorded.
Or. en
Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 873
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 5
A first-asset-to-default basket creates a
position for the notional amount in an
obligation of each reference entity. If the
size of the maximum credit event payment
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deleted
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paragraph, the maximum payment amount
may be taken as the capital requirement for
specific risk.
Or. en
Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 874
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 6
A second-asset-to-default basket product
creates a position for the notional amount
in an obligation of each reference entity
less one (that with the lowest specific risk
capital requirement). If the size of the
maximum credit event payment is lower
than the capital requirement under the
method in the first sentence of this subparagraph, this amount may be taken as
the capital requirement for specific risk.
deleted
Or. en
Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 875
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 7
Where a credit linked note basket product
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has an external rating and meets the
conditions for a qualifying debt item, a
single long position with the specific risk of
the note issuer may be recorded instead of
the specific risk positions for all reference
entities.
Or. en
Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 876
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 8
A basket product providing proportional
protection creates a position in each
reference entity for the purposes of specific
risk, with the total notional amount of the
contract assigned across the positions
according to the proportion of the total
notional amount that each exposure to a
reference entity represents. Where more than
one obligation of a reference entity can be
selected, the obligation with the highest risk
weighting determines the specific risk. The
maturity of the credit derivative contract is
applicable instead of the maturity of the
obligation.
(iv) In addition to a long position in the
specific risk of the issuer of the note, a
multiple name credit linked note providing
proportional protection creates a position in
each reference entity, with the total notional
amount of the contract assigned across the
positions according to the proportion of the
total notional amount that each exposure to a
reference entity represents. Where more than
one obligation of a reference entity can be
selected, the obligation with the highest risk
weighting determines the specific risk.
Where a multiple name credit linked note
has an external rating and meets the
conditions for a qualifying debt item, a
single long position with the specific risk of
the note need only be recorded.
Or. en
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Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 877
Annex 1, paragraph 8, subparagraph 8 a (new)
(v) A first-asset-to-default credit derivative
creates a position for the notional amount
in an obligation of each reference entity. If
the size of the maximum credit event
payment is lower than the capital
requirement under the method in the first
sentence of this sub-paragraph, the
maximum payment amount may be taken
as the capital requirement for specific risk.
A second-asset-to-default credit derivative
creates a position for the notional amount
in an obligation of each reference entity
less one (that with the lowest specific risk
capital requirement). If the size of the
maximum credit event payment is lower
than the capital requirement under the
method in the first sentence of this subparagraph, this amount may be taken as
the capital requirement for specific risk.
If a first or second-asset to default
derivative is externally rated and meets the
conditions for a qualifying debt item, then
the protection seller need only calculate
one specific risk charge reflecting the
rating of the derivative.
Or. en
Justification
Change necessary to ensure clarity and consistency between the Directive and the Basel
Accord.
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Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 878
Annex 1, paragraph 8, Title (new) (before paragraph 9),
(b) Treatment of the protection buyer
Or. en
Justification
Re-ordering is required to clarify the treatment of the main forms of credit derivatives,
distinguishing between the capital charge applied to the protection seller and that applied to
the protection buyer, as well as between single name and multiple name credit linked notes.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 879
Annex 1, paragraph 14, Table 1, column 1, row 2
Debt securities issued or guaranteed by
central governments, issued by central
banks, international organisations,
multilateral development banks or Member
States’ regional government or local
authorities which would receive a 0% risk
weighting under the RSA or IRB
approaches.
Debt securities issued or guaranteed by
central governments, issued by central
banks, international organisations,
multilateral development banks or Member
States’ regional government or local
authorities which would receive a 0% risk
weighting under the Standardised Approach
or IRB approaches.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 880
Annex 1, paragraph 14, Table 1, column 1, row 3, sentence 1
Debt securities issued or guaranteed by
central governments, issued by central
banks, international organisations,
multilateral development banks or Member
States’ regional governments or local
authorities which would receive a 20% or
50% risk weighting under the RSA
Debt securities issued or guaranteed by
central governments, issued by central
banks, international organisations,
multilateral development banks or Member
States’ regional governments or local
authorities which would receive a 20% or
50% risk weighting under the Standardised
Approach.
Or. en
Justification
Cross reference / Typographical error.
Amendment by John Purvis
Amendment 881
Annex II, paragraph 8
For the purposes of paragraph 5, in the case
of repurchase transactions and securities or
commodities lending or borrowing
transactions, all financial instruments and
commodities that are eligible to be included
in the trading book may be recognised as
eligible collateral. For exposures due to
OTC derivative instruments booked in the
trading book, commodities that are eligible
to be included in the trading book may also
be recognised as eligible collateral. For the
purposes of calculating volatility
adjustments where such financial
instruments or commodities are lent, sold or
provided, or borrowed, purchased or
received by way of collateral or otherwise
under such a transaction such instruments
and commodities shall be treated in the same
way as non-main index equities listed on a
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For the purposes of paragraph 5, in the case
of repurchase transactions and securities or
commodities lending or borrowing
transactions booked in the trading book, all
financial instruments and commodities that
are eligible to be included in the trading
book may be recognised as eligible
collateral. For exposures due to OTC
derivative instruments booked in the trading
book, commodities that are eligible to be
included in the trading book may also be
recognised as eligible collateral. For the
purposes of calculating volatility
adjustments where such financial
instruments or commodities which are not
eligible under Annex VIII of Directive
[2000/12/EC] are lent, sold or provided, or
borrowed, purchased or received by way of
collateral, or otherwise under such a
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recognised exchange.
transaction, and the institution is using the
Supervisory volatility adjustments approach
under Annex VIII, part 3 of Directive
[2000/12/EC], such instruments and
commodities shall be treated in the same
way as non-main index equities listed on a
recognised exchange.
Where institutions are using the Own
estimates of volatility adjustments approach
under Annex VIII, part 3 of Directive
[2000/12/EC] in respect of financial
instruments or commodities which are not
eligible under Annex VIII of Directive
[2000/12/EC] volatility adjustments must be
calculated for each individual item. Where
institutions are using the Internal Models
Approach defined at Annex VII, Part 3 of
Directive [2000/12/EC], they may also
apply this approach in the trading book.
Or. en
Justification
The proposed amendment makes the Directive consistent with paragraph 703 of the Basel
Framework, which provides firms with the option to apply haircutting methodologies to
collateral in the trading book. The ECOFIN supported the inclusion of the own estimates
approach, but not the recognition of the Internal Models Approach. Although this area will
probably be revisited by the Trading Book Review, it is important that this methodology
should be an option available to firms.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 882
Annex II, paragraph 8
8. For the purposes of paragraph 5, in the
case of repurchase transactions and
securities or commodities lending or
borrowing transactions, all financial
instruments and commodities that are
eligible to be included in the trading book
may be recognised as eligible collateral. For
exposures due to OTC derivative
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8. For the purposes of paragraph 5, in the
case of repurchase transactions and
securities or commodities or commodity
derivatives lending or borrowing
transactions, all financial instruments and
commodities and commodity derivatives
that are eligible to be included in the trading
book may be recognised as eligible
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instruments booked in the trading book,
commodities that are eligible to be included
in the trading book may also be recognised
as eligible collateral. For the purposes of
calculating volatility adjustments where such
financial instruments or commodities are
lent, sold or provided, or borrowed,
purchased or received by way of collateral or
otherwise under such a transaction such
instruments and commodities shall be
treated in the same way as non-main index
equities listed on a recognised exchange.
collateral. For exposures due to OTC
derivative instruments booked in the trading
book, commodities that are eligible to be
included in the trading book may also be
recognised as eligible collateral. For the
purposes of calculating volatility
adjustments where such financial
instruments or commodities are lent, sold or
provided, or borrowed, purchased or
received by way of collateral or otherwise
under such a transaction such instruments
and commodities and commodity derivatives
shall be treated in the same way as non-main
index equities listed on a recognised
exchange.
However, where institutions are using their
own estimates of volatility adjustments as
set out in Annex VIII, part 3, 1.4.2 (b) (ii)
of the Directive [2000/12/EC], they may
also use these adjustments in the trading
book. For instruments counting as eligible
collateral in the trading book but not in the
non-trading book, these adjustments must
be calculated for each individual
instrument. Where institutions are using
the Internal Models Approach as set out in
Annex VIII, part 3, 1.3.1 (b) of the
Directive [2000/12/EC], they may also
apply this approach in the trading book.
Or. en
Justification
When calculating the capital requirements for free delivery settlement and delivery risk, it is
appropriate also to apply the credit mitigation possibility for certain trading book position
also for commodity derivatives (as for commodities). Otherwise there would be an unequal
treatment. The additional amendment proposed, links the Directive [93/6/EG] with paragraph
703 of the Basle Capital Accord. Following this para. 703, undertakings are allowed to apply
one of three haircutting methodologies to collateral in the trading book: (a) the supervisory
collateral haircuts (non-main equity); (b) own haircuts; (c) VaR internal models. For
consistency reason, this option should also be given in this Directive [93/6/EG].
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 883
Annex IV, paragraph 6, subparagraph 1
6. For the purpose of paragraph 19, the
excess of an institution's long (short)
positions over its short (long) positions in
the same commodity and identical
commodity futures, options and warrants
shall be its net position in each commodity.
6. For the purpose of paragraph 19, the
excess of an institution's long (short)
positions over its short (long) positions in
the same commodity and identical
commodity derivatives shall be its net
position in each commodity.
Or. en
Justification
It is appropriate to extent the application of the netting possibility to all commodity
derivatives (open category) when calculating the capital requirements for the position risk.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 884
Annex IV, paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. By way of derogation to paragraph 18
and 20, competent authorities may, in
respect of financial instruments listed in
points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10, Section C, Annex 1
of Directive 2004/39/EC, permit investment
firms to use alternative approaches to those
set out in paragraphs 13 to 20 of this
Annex.
Or. en
Justification
The proposed change is intended to open up the rules on commodity risk for a risk-adequate
treatment for novel financial products such as weather or electricity derivatives. The current
rules on commodity risk do not adequately deal for such derivatives. Following the principle
of subsidiary, competent authorities may allow alternative approaches that account for the
specific attributes of the energy market and hence may deliver more risk-adequate rules on
capital.
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Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 885
Annex IV, paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Competent authorities may allow
positions which are, or are regarded
pursuant to paragraph 7 as, positions in the
same commodity to be offset and assigned
to the simplified approach.
Or. en
Justification
For consistency reasons, it is appropriate to allow the netting possibility (as set out for the
maturity ladder approach) also for the Simplified Approach.
Amendment by Alexander Radwan
Amendment 886
Annex V, paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. The competent authorities may allow
energy institutions to use methods of
standard deviation on the basis of historical
simulation, when calculating capital
requirements for its position risk according
to Annex IV, paragraph 6 of this Directive
as well as emission allowances.
Or. en
Justification
It is appropriate to allow methods of standard deviation on the basis of historical simulation,
when calculating capital requirements for its position risk. Risks arising for electricity traders
due to price fluctuations of electricity, are not comparable with market risks of securities and
other financial instruments, including commodity derivatives relating to common underlings
such as precious metals or agricultural products. Hence, the calculation of capital
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requirements according to the standard deviation of market value changes on the basis of a
historical simulation (thus basing the capital requirement on the historical price
development) reflect a more risk-adequate treatment of electricity.
Amendment by Jonathan Evans
Amendment 887
Annex VII, Part B, paragraph 2, point (b)
(b) clear and independent (i.e. independent
of front office) reporting lines for the
department accountable for the valuation
process.
(b) clear reporting lines for the department
accountable for the verification process.
Or. en
Justification
The requirement that there should be independent reporting lines appears to contradict the
process whereby traders are responsible for marking positions in the first instance with
independent price verification being carried out by a separate department as recognised in
paragraph 7. The core concept is that a clear and robust verification process should exist.
The requirement to demonstrate independence may compromise the ability of traders to
function, without enhancing the risk management of the environment.
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