Wellington Conference on Contemporary China:
Institutional Dynamics and the Great Transformation of China
Village Elections and the Institutionalization of Legitimate Authority
C S Bryan Ho
Department of Government and Public Administration
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
University of Macau
(This is a draft paper. Please keep me informed if you wish to use it for citation purpose)

The author would like to express appreciation for the kind assistance rendered by Professor Q S Xin,
researchers, and student helpers at the Anhui Centre for Poverty Alleviation and Villagers’ Selfgovernance in the survey and interview research. The author would also like to thank Dr. K S Chan for
providing his helpful advice on statistical techniques and analysis.
2
Introduction
Political scientists have long studied competitive elections and electoral
participation as an essential feature of democracy or democratization in developing
countries.1 Without exception, the implementation of semi-competitive elections in rural
Post-Mao China since 1988 has attracted the attention of Chinese scholars and Western
trained social scientists in their investigation of democratic development. Indeed,
instituting villagers’ self-government by means of direct and contested elections in rural
China is one of the most significant political reforms in post-Mao China.2 The Organic
Law of Villagers’ Committees (Trial) came into effect in June 1988 after it was passed
by the National People’s Congress in November 1987. After ten years of
implementation, the trial law was formalized in November 1998. 3 Among the
significant changes, the Organic Law (permanent) aimed to ensure fair and competitive
elections by stipulating every villager’s right to directly nominate candidates (i.e.
haixuan), election by means of non-equal quota method (i.e. more candidates than the
number of position)(cha e xuanju), candidates running for the post of village head be
given a chance to air their views before elections, and secret balloting. 4 These elections
are semi-competitive because rural residents are accorded the legal right under the
Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees to choose their leaders, but not different political
platforms of different political parties.
In a one-party state, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still maintained
monopoly of political power from the centre to the province and all the way down to the
village level, with party organizations instituted at each level. Various studies showed
that local leaders were loathed to carry out implementation of free and fair elections.5
The underlying reasons for such a strong resistance were manifold, but basically cadres
were apprehensive of the erosion of their authority. This is especially so when elected
leaders enjoyed legitimate power mandated by the electoral constituencies. Semicompetitive elections may have unintended consequences.
The revised Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees in 1998 emphasized the
dominant leadership of the village party secretary despite the implementation of direct
election. 6 From a neo-institutional perspective, this clause is significant as it clearly
demonstrated the constraining effect of institution on political choice and participation.
It reaffirms the institutionalization of village authority as dependent on the traditional
authority of the party rather than solely on the basis of rational-legal principles. In spite
of village elections, villagers’ committees remain de jure state-led mass organizations at
the grassroots level. Although the party at the local level may be a constraining factor
1
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman eds., The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1960); Almond Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), The Civic
Culture Revisited (Boston: Little Brown, 1980).
2
Jonathan Unger, “Power, Patronage, and Protest in Rural China,” in Tyrene White (ed.), China Briefing
2000. The Continuing Transformation (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 89.
3
A copy of the Organic Law (permanent) in English can be found in FBIS-CHI-98-311 11/07/98;
Description of source: Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese --China's official news service (New
China News Agency).
4
Article 14 of the revised Organic Law, see the Organic Law in English in FBIS-CHI-98-311, 11/07/98;
Description of Source: Beijing Xinhua Domestic Services in Chinese-China’s official news service (New
China News Agency); see also Linda Jakobson, “Blazing New Trails: Villagers’ Committee Elections in
P.R.China,” UPI Working Papers, No. 19 (1999), p. 4.
5
Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State: Introducing
Village Elections in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000), p. 479; Daniel Kelliher, “The
Chinese Debate over Village Self-government,” The China Journal, No. 37 (January 1997), pp. 63-86.
6
Article 3 of the revised Organic Law, see the Organic Law in English in FBIS-CHI-98-311, 11/07/98.
3
for the implementation of semi-competitive elections, what if the party at the local level
plays an enabling role in implementing semi-competitive elections? This paper argues
that a rational choice perspective emphasizing the significance of economic factors or
the domineering role of the party-state in elections limits our understanding of strategic
actions on the part of political actors in the struggle over village elections. The
complexity of Chinese society in terms of its size as well as scope warrants our attention
of the interplay of socio-cultural, economic and political or institutional factors, which
may constitute or undermine free and fair elections. These factors could be mediating
factors that either constrain or enable the procedural legitimacy of election in particular
context.
From a historical institutionalist approach, such mediating factors that
constituted procedural legitimacy are important for our understanding of institutions
(formal and informal rules, norms and values) as not merely constraining, but offer an
opportunity for political actors to act strategically within the context “in which “old”
institutions are put to the service of different ends, as new actors come into play who
pursue their (new) goals through existing institutions.”7 In the face of changing social
and political conditions, groups and individual are not merely spectators awaiting
favour or penalty, they are “strategic actors capable of acting on “openings” provided
by such shifting contextual conditions in order to defend or enhance their positions.”8
Hence, local cadres may pursue implementation when higher authorities lend credence
to the Organic Law and tied this to the performance evaluation of cadres. In turn,
villagers, as strategic actors, will vote in elections, when shifting contextual conditions
due to various mediating factors on the procedural legitimacy offered them an
opportunity to exercise their rights to elect their own leaders despite the institutional
construct of party dominance in rural electoral politics.
Contextual Conditions: Mediating Factors and Procedural Legitimacy
The implementation of the Organic Law did not come about because of rural
residents’ demand for democracy. In the reform era, the party has slowly receded from
direct control of many aspects of the life of rural residents as the marketization process
continues in China as a whole. Although villagers’ committees were initially borne out
of local initiatives in the early years of the reform era, it caught the attention of
octogenarians, such as Peng Zhen at the centre, who strongly supported and advanced
the course for giving villagers the right to choose their own leaders. 9 The concern with
“democracy” was more of an outcome of political manoeveuring, rhetoric and discourse
at the centre, wherein conservative factions challenged Peng Zhen on the notion of
giving peasants, who have a low level of culture, the right to choose their leaders. Peng
and the reformist faction were, then, concerned with the problems of party corruption,
weakening party institutions, rural unrests, and the need to maintain stability for the
sake of continual economic development. At the institutional level, the successful
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Structuring
Politics, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), p. 16.
8
Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” p. 17.
9
Lianjiang Li and Kevin O’Brien, “The Struggle Over Village Elections,” paper prepared for 17 th World
Congress, International Political Science Association, South Korea, August 17-21, 1997, pp. 1-22;
Tianjian Shi, “Village Committee Elections in China, Institutional Tactics for Democracy,” World Politics,
Vol. 51, No. 3 (April 1999), pp. 385-412; O’Brien and Li, “Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party
State,” pp. 465-489.
7
4
implementation of semi-competitive or limited choice elections was partly due to the
role and efforts of mid-level officials in the Ministry of Civil Affairs, who advanced
elections by means of an incremental approach in the midst of reform problems and
political struggle at the centre.10
Since its inception, village elections had attracted social scientists’ interests in
its causes and consequences as well as the implications for democracy in China.11 Some
analysts studied village elections and its relation to economic development so as to
evaluate the prospect of democracy.12 In other studies, researchers find that the control
over resources by the village party secretary undermined the significance of village
elections13 and highlighted the ambiguous and conflicting role of the regime and the
local state in advancing democratic elections.14 These works have been enlightening in
identifying various factors such as the role of party leaders or economic development
essential for understanding the democratization process in rural China. Some studies
offered insights to the path dependence of local institutions and cultural factors acting as
constraints on the implementation of village elections.15 For example, to guard against
the further erosion of their authority and the challenge of legitimate authority mandated
by the populace, local cadres at the township and village levels manipulated elections or
simply annulled electoral outcomes in defiance of the reality of popular mandate. 16 This
Li and O’Brien, “The Struggle Over Village Elections,” pp. 1-22; Tianjian Shi, “Village Committee
Elections in China, Institutional Tactics for Democracy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (April 1999), pp.
385-412; Tianjian Shi, “Electoral Reform in Rural China: The Critical First Step toward Democracy,” in
Tianjian Shi, Rural Democracy in China (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000), pp. 7-22.
11
Kevin O’Brien, “Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages,” The Australia Journal of
Chinese Affairs, No. 32 (July 1994), pp. 33-59; Liu Yawei, “Consequences of Villager Committee
Elections in China,” China Perspective, No. 31 (September-October 2000), pp. 19-35; O’Brien and Li,
“Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State,” pp. 465-489; Yang Zhong and Jie Chen, “To Vote
or Not to Vote: An Analysis of Peasant Participation in Chinese Village Elections,” Comparative
Political Studies, Vol. 35, no. 6 (August 2002), pp. 686-712; Kin-Sheun Louie, “Village Self-Governance
and Democracy in China: An Evaluation,” Democratization, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 134-154. ;
Sylvia Chan, “Village Self-governance: How Democratic, How Autonomous?” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng
(ed.), China’s Challenges in the Twenty-first Century, (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press,
2003), pp. 93-128; Rong Hu, “Economic Development and the Implementation of Village Elections in
Rural China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 44 (August 2005), pp. 427-444.
12
Jean C. Oi, “Economic Development, Stability and Democratic Village Self-Governance,” in Maurice
Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shui-ki (eds.), China Review 1996 (Hong Kong: Chinese
University of Hong Kong, 1996), pp. 126-141; Tianjian Shi, “Economic Development and Village
Elections in Rural China,” in Tianjian Shi, Rural Democracy in China (Singapore: World Scientific,
2000), pp. 25-53; Tianjian Shi, “Electoral Reform in Rural China: The Critical First Step toward
Democracy,” in Tianjian Shi, Rural Democracy in China (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000), pp. 7-22;
Rong Hu, “Economic Development and the Implementation of Village Elections in Rural China,” Journal
of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 44 (August 2005), pp. 427-444.
13
Oi, “Economic Development, Stability and Democratic Village Self-Governance,” pp. 126-141; Jean C.
Oi and Scott Rozelle, “Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages,” The
China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000) pp. 513-539; Yang Zhong and Jie Chen, “To Vote or Not to Vote:
An Analysis of Peasant Participation in Chinese Village Elections,” pp. 686-712.
14
Liu, “Consequences of Villager Committee Elections in China,” pp. 19-35; O’Brien and Li,
“Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State,” pp. 465-489.
15
Jean C. Oi, “Economic Development, Stability and Democratic Village Self-Governance,” in Maurice
Brosseau, Suzanne Pepper, and Tsang Shui-ki (eds.), China Review 1996 (Hong Kong: Chinese
University of Hong Kong, 1996), pp. 126-141; Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, “Elections and Power: The
Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese Villages,” The China Quarterly, No. 162 (June 2000) pp. 513-539;
Yang Zhong and Jie Chen, “To Vote or Not to Vote: An Analysis of Peasant Participation in Chinese
Village Elections,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, no. 6 (August 2002), pp. 686-712.
16
Liu, “Consequences of Villager Committee Elections in China,” pp. 19-35; O’Brien and Li,
10
5
shows the paradox of the continuity of traditional authority under the CCP on the one
hand, and the endorsement of a “new” basis of authority based on rational-legal
principles through free, fair and competitive elections. One way of reconciling these
two bases of authority is the co-optation of elected leaders into the local party apparatus.
Failure to do so may lead to a stronger grassroots leadership, which may threaten the
political legitimacy of local party leadership. This is obviously not the intent of the
party for implementing the Organic Law at the grassroots level.
The perennial and persistent influence of culture could be seen in the emergence
of informal organizations (such as clans) in southern China, exerting their influence on
elections.17 Clans may act as positive factor in elections when villagers are mobilized to
take part in elections. However, local party officials, villagers and their affiliations to
lineages and clans may complicate or undermine the process and the outcome of
competitive elections. This is especially so when political and socio-cultural factors
intertwined and exerted a negative impact on elections through attempts at controlling
or manipulating elections by vote bribery, threats and vote-buying. 18 Such actions
contravened the stipulations in the revised Organic Law against electoral illegitimacy,
which undermine the procedural legitimacy of election. 19 In addition, other studies
offered insights into villagers’ subjective motivation (e.g. attempt to punish corruption
officials) in village elections.20
Scant attention has, hitherto, been given to explaining variation in participation
rates in elections due to the contextual conditions constituted by the interplay of these
different factors discussed above—institutional (political), socio-cultural and procedural
factors—and their effects on villagers’ perception of procedural legitimacy vis-à-vis
electoral participation.21 These factors could act as mediating factors having an impact
on villagers’ perception of procedural legitimacy, which could exert an effect on
participation rates in village elections. While institutional factor such as the role of the
local party-state is important, it is not immune to other factors. For example, the
designation of demonstration sites in various counties with a relatively well developed
economy as showcases opened to foreign observers on Chinese village elections clearly
indicated the significance of institutional factors, rather than economic factors alone in
the successful implementation of semi-competitive elections. 22 Hence, economic
development, though important, is not the only cause for democracy in China.
Based on a survey and documentary research in rural Anhui, this paper attempts
to show that variation in participation rates in village elections, though largely depend
on institutional factors, is partly subject to the influence of other factors – social,
economic, cultural – in context. The research employs a legitimacy-based approach and
an actor’s oriented framework to study the constitution of legitimate authority in
“Accommodating ‘Democracy’ in a One-Party State,” pp. 465-489;
17
Sylvia Chan, “Village Self-governance: How Democratic, How Autonomous?,” pp. 93-128.
18
He Qinglian, “Nongcun jiceng shehui defang eshili de xinqi (The Rise of Local Evil Forces),” Ershiyi
Shiji Yuekan (21st Century Monthly), Vol. 41 (1997), pp. 129-134; Wang Keyue, “Cunmin xuanju de
xintai guancha (Observations of Villagers’ Psychological Disposition in Elections), in eds. Cunweihui
Xuanju Guancha (Observations on Villagers’ Committee Elections), Li Lianjiang, Guo Zhenglin, Xiao
Tangbiao (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 521-541.
19
See Article 15 of the revised Organic Law in English in FBIS-CHI-98-311, 11/07/98.
20
Tianjian Shi, “Voting and Non-voting in China: Voting Behaviour in Plebiscitary and Limited-Choice
Elections,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 4 (November 1999), pp. 1115-1139.
21
Baogang He related these factors to the competitiveness of elections. See Baogang He, “Are Village
Elections Competitive? The Case of Zhejiang,” in Joseph Y. S. Cheng (ed.), China’s Challenges in the
Twenty-first Century (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2003), pp. 71-92
22
Kevin O’Brien, “Implementing Political Reform in China’s Villages,” The Australia Journal of Chinese
Affairs, No.32 (July 1994), p. 41
6
context. Contrary to the view held by Harrop and Miller that elections in Communist
countries are concerned with consultation, nomination and campaign rather than
voting,23 I argue that villagers’ perceptions of procedural legitimacy, due to a number of
mediating factors as highlighted above, have an impact on their inclination to participate
in elections. They are more likely to participate in elections when they perceive that
they are given a choice of candidates; they abstain from voting when they perceive
election as mere formality. Non-voting is more than merely a form of protest; 24 it
constitutes electoral delegitimation. Voting, therefore, reflects the internal political
efficacy of villagers. This is dependent on villagers’ perception of procedural
legitimacy, which is affected by various intervening variables (i.e. institutional, sociocultural and procedural), rather than resting solely on the role of party cadres or
economic factors alone.
Theoretical Considerations
In contrast to Weber’s conceptualization of legitimacy in terms of ideal types,
David Beetham’s conceptualization of legitimacy offers a practical framework essential
for studying legitimacy in context.25 According to Beetham, there are three dimensions
to legitimacy: (1) legal-validity; (2) the justifiability of rules of power according to
shared belief between the powerful and the subordinate, and (3) the expressed consent
of the governed.26 Since legitimacy is a matter of degree rather an all-or-nothing affair,
the presence or absence of these three dimensions allows us to gauge the degree of
political legitimacy. In applying Beetham's three dimensions of legitimacy to the study
of village elections, this paper emphasizes the importance of a legitimacy-based
approach for understanding the emergence of competitive electoral politics in rural postMao China.
In the constitution of legitimacy, the subordinate’s perception of the source of
power and the rules for the acquisition and exercise of this power as legitimate
(procedural legitimacy in elections) is as important as the action in conferring
legitimacy (participation or voting). In the context of village elections in post-Mao
socialist China, the political legitimacy of village leadership and villagers’ committees
is dependent on:
(1)
23
the implementation of limited choice election or semi-competitive election27 as a
legitimate source for the acquisition of power as promoted by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in terms of a choice of candidates, not parties or policies,
based on the Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees;28
Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters: A Comparative Introduction (London:
Macmillan Education, 1987), p. 25.
24
Yang Zhong, Local Government and Politics in China (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 165-166.
25
On the three pure types of legitimate authority (tradition, charisma, rational-legal), see Max Weber (ed.
with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons), Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization
(New York: The Free Press, 1947, 1968), p. 328; H.H Gerth and C.Wright Mills (eds. with an
introduction), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology with a New Preface by Bryan S.Turner. London:
Routledge, 1991), pp. 78-79. David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (London: Macmillan, 1991). On
the significance of studying legitimacy in context, see also Jean-Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics
(translated by David Ames Curties)(United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
26
Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, pp. 12-13.
27
Unless otherwise stated, these two terms are used interchangeably.
28
In plebiscitary elections, voters are not offered a choice of candidates; in semi-competitive or limited
7
(2)
(3)
(4)
the support of or the lack of support from the local state and cadres in promoting
semi-competitive elections and self-government for institutional renewal;
villagers’ participation in election (voting);
the image of villagers’ self-government in terms of village committees as masslevel non-governmental organizations promoted by the CCP as legitimate
institutions for the exercise of power in rural society under the CCP leadership.
In addition to Beetham’s work, Anne Thurston’s attempt to reconceptualize
Weber’s concept of legitimacy offers a heuristic device for understanding the change in
authority relationship with the introduction of semi-competitive elections.29 Before the
Organic Law (Trial) came into effect in the late 80s, the CCP was mainly concerned
with the relationship between ideological legitimacy and instrumental legitimacy
(economic performance and development), which were a means for bolstering the
structural legitimacy of the Party.30 Village cadres’ authority depended on their claims
to personal legitimacy (i.e. personal qualities of leaders and the moral approval that
comes with it) and instrumental legitimacy (i.e. economic performance) bolstered by
ideological legitimacy (i.e. CCP ideology and the principle of differentiation based on
Party membership and class labels). The selection process of village leaders was then
sanctioned by a closed self-confirmatory circle of power in which consent lied with a
few privileged individuals (i.e. the patrimonial local state which included village
(brigade) cadres and commune cadres)).31
After the Organic Law (Trial) came into effect in 1988 and in particular after the
electoral reforms in 1998, the CCP appeared to be more concerned with the relationship
between instrumental or performance-based legitimacy and the structural legitimacy of
choice elections, elections offer the voters a choice of candidates, but not party platforms or policies. See
Harrop and Miller, Elections and Voters, p. 16 and Shi, “Voting and Non-voting in China,” pp. 1115-1139.
29
Anne F. Thurston, Authority and Legitimacy in Post-Revolution Rural Kwangtung: The Case of the
People’s Communes, PhD Dissertation, University of California Berkeley (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UMI.,
1975), pp. 41-42, 8-10.
30
Ibid. The structural legitimacy of the Party rests on the premise that those who occupy a formally
defined position of authority have already attained cultural legitimacy (i.e. the political elite and the
political system reflects the values of society) or ideological legitimacy (i.e. the CCP ideology as a better
alternative and a better set of principles for society). The cultural legitimacy of the Party was, then,
predicated on the vanguard role of the Party in leading the Chinese revolution. As politics was in
command, the emphasis on ideological legitimacy tended to supersede the importance of economic
performance.
31
On the theoretical basis of patrimonialism and the contrast of patrimonial rulership and other types of
rulerships, see Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.), Max Weber. Economy and Society (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 212-40, 956-1070; Barrett L. McCormick,
Political Reform in Post-Mao China: Democracy and Bureaucracy in a Leninist State (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), p. 60. McCormick prefers the term ‘rulership’ to ‘authority’ or
‘domination’ so as to emphasize that Weber’s ideal-types encompass both ideas and behaviour and not
just attitudes and values. On the historically closed self-confrimatory circle of village leadership and the
under-regularized election process, see John Wilson Lewis, “The Leadership Doctrine of the CCP: The
Lesson of the People’s Commune,” Asian Survey, Vol. III, No. 10 (October 1963), pp. 457-464; James R.
Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1969), p. 137; John P. Burns, “The Election of Production Team Cadres in Rural China:
1958-74,” The China Quarterly (June 1978), pp. 273-296; John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural
China (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 4-6, 90, 112, 121, 187; Zhang Jing,
Jicheng Zhengquan: Xiangcun zhidu zhu wenti (Problems of Rural Level Governance in China)(Hanzhou:
Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2000), pp. 18-24, 175-196; Zhang Jing, “Lishu xian cunweihui huanjie
xuanju guancha” (Lishu county turnover election observation), Ershiyi Shiji (Twenty-first Century), No.
50 (December 1998), p. 142.
8
the Party. The latter now relies less on the CCP ideology.32 The basis of village cadres’
authority is now required by law to sanction the personal legitimacy and instrumental
legitimacy of village leaders. The village leadership selection process based on the
electoral mode of consent may lead to a less closed self-confirmatory circle of power as
procedural legitimacy becomes significant in Chinese grassroots electoral politics.33
Since the 1990s, the basis of the legitimate authority of village cadres has been
more than just a normative principle. The legitimation process through election has led
to concern about justifiable rule-content in the grounding of legitimacy. 34 The
legitimation of power on the basis of the contractual mode of consent (i.e. electoral
participation) might lead to a mode of governance that is less paternalistic than it used
to be, historically, in rural China. It must be emphasized that the legitimacy of villagers’
committees and elected leaders must still be qualified and approved by the Party, an
external source of authority, whereas the internal source of authority depends on the
“people,” i.e. villagers who participate in the election. The principle of sovereignty is
qualified rather than complemented by another source of authority. 35 Thus, to the CCP,
electoral participation (voting) is not wholly concerned with building democracy or
sustaining a democratic polity alone because “one consequence of the universality of
the principle of popular sovereignty in the contemporary world is that consent has to be
popular consent, even when the rules of office rest on a non-democratic source of
authority.”36
If election indeed provides a platform for villagers to participate effectively in
politics, i.e. in exercising their right to choose their own leaders, given a choice of
candidates, the current research assumes that electoral participation rate is more likely
an outcome of villagers’ perceptions of procedural legitimacy. The underlying
assumption is that the higher the degree of procedural legitimacy, the stronger the
perception that (1) an election is legally valid based on the regulations stipulated in the
Organic Law, (2) rules of power are justifiable according to the shared belief about the
acquisition of power through fair and competitive election under the leadership of the
party. Most importantly, procedural legitimacy hinges on the contextual conditions that
villagers are granted a choice of candidates and election is competitive. Hence, the
stronger the degree of procedural legitimacy in elections is, the greater the likelihood
that villagers will participate in an election.
An Actors’ Oriented Framework
Chinese scholars have noted the revival of clan forces in China as having an effect
on elections. 37 Generally, when clan forces are too strong, it undermines procedural
32
Thurston, Authority and Legitimacy in Post-Revolution Rural Kwangtung, pp. 41-42, 8-10. The CCP
has traditionalized the charismatic appeal of the Party in the forms of Mao Zedong Thought and Deng
Xiaoping Theory. After Deng’s passing, Jiang Zemin’s theory of the Three Represents laid claim to
cultural legitimacy by emphasizing the elitist role of the Party as possessing superior knowledge in
leading Chinese modernization. See also Børge Bakken, “Norms, Values and Cynical Games with Party
Ideology,” in Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), Bringing the Party Back In (Singapore:
Marshall Cavendish International, 2004), pp. 22-56.
33
On the contrasting impacts of the expressive (mobilization) mode of consent and the contractual
(electoral) mode of consent in political participation, see Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, p. 27.
34
Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China,” Modern
China, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1996), pp. 28-61.
35
Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, p. 130.
36
Ibid., p. 131. Beetham provides the example of revolutionary France’s mixed political system existing
in transitional form.
37
Qian Hang and Xie Weiyang, “Zongzu wenti: Dangdai zhongguo nongcun yanjiu de yige shijiao” (The
clan problem: One vantage point for research on contemporary Chinese villages), Shehuixue (Sociology),
9
legitimacy. 38 In addition, the emphasis on procedural legitimacy in the Organic Law
also provides for sanctions against electoral frauds such as vote-buying, electoral
bribery. In order to take into account other mediating factors of procedural legitimacy
such as socio-cultural and procedural factors affecting electoral participation, I propose
a comprehensive analytical framework to investigate the degree of procedural
legitimacy as perceived by villagers and its impact on participation in elections (voting),
which has, to a certain extent, been neglected by most China scholars. 39 Procedural
legitimacy depends on a number of mediating factors—institutional (political), sociocultural and procedural—which can be constraining or enabling to villagers’ perception
and participation. The framework is inclusive and actor-oriented; it delineates the
mediating factors affecting villagers’ (voters’) perception of procedural legitimacy,
potentially constituting the breach of rules or illegitimacy40 according to the Organic
Law and their effects on participation.
Research Design, Measurement and Hypotheses
Research Design
The research design adopts a case-study approach by means of a quantitative
method supplemented by qualitative information gathered from the field to study and
compare participation rates in four Chinese villages in rural Anhui. 41 Based on the
above literature and the assistance from experts and researchers from the Anhui Centre
for Poverty Alleviation and Villagers’ Self-governance, a questionnaire survey was
constructed to gather information on rural institutions and participation in these Chinese
villages. Documentary research based on Chinese press cuttings serves to supplement
the information obtained in the field. The survey was conducted over a period of
slightly more than eight months from late February 2001 to mid-January 2002 in four
villages located in three counties within Anhui Province.
Anhui Province offers a potentially interesting site for testing the view that
elections tend to be well implemented in middle developed provinces. While it may not
No. 4 (1990), pp. 128-132; Mao Shaojun, “Nongcun zongzu shili manyan de xianzhuang yu yuanyin
fenxi” (An analysis of the present situation and causes of the spread of clan power in the countryside),
Shehuixue (Sociology), No. 3 (1991), pp. 110-115; Yin Zhaoqiang, “Nongcun gongzuozhong burong
hushi de jiazu wenti” (Not to overlook clan problem in our rural work), Shehuixue (Sociology), No. 6
(1992), pp.118-121; On family clans and lineage of secondary importance for voting decisions, see He
Baogang and Lang Youxing, Xunzhao minzhu yu quanwei de pinghen—Zhejiang sheng cunmin xuanju
jiangyan yanjiu (In Search of a Balance between Democracy and Authority—Study on the Experiences of
Zhejiang Province in Village Elections), (Wuhan: Huazhong shifan daxue chubanshe, 2002), p. 204; Dai
Lichao, “Gaoping cun xuanju diaocha” (Research on Gaoping village) in Li Lianjiang, Guo Zhenglin,
Xiao Tangbiao, Cunweihui Xuanju Guancha (Observations on Villagers’ Committee Elections), (Tianjin:
Tianjin Renmin chubanshe, 2001), pp. 1-23; Wang Keyue, “Cunmin xuanju de xintai guancha”
(Observations on Villagers’ Psychological Disposition During Elections), in Li, Guo, Xiao, Cunweihui
Xuanju Guancha, pp. 521-541; Xiao Tangbiao, Qiu Xinyou, Tang Xiaoteng, Duowei shijiao zhong de
cunmin zhixuan (Multiple perspectives of villagers’ direct election), (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue
chubanshe, 2001), pp. 80-89.
38
Anne F. Thurston, Muddling toward Democracy (Washington D. C.: United States Institute of Peace,
1998), p. 35.
39
Although Yang Zhong and Jie Chen’s research took into account participation rate, they did not relate it
to the legitimacy issue and qualify it. Zhong and Chen, “To Vote or Not to Vote,” pp. 686-712.
40
I adopt this term from Beetham, The Legitimation of Power, p. 20.
41
Case study can be quantitative or qualitative or a combination of both. See Robert K. Yin, Case Study
Research: Design and Methods (3rd ed.) (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2003).
10
be representative of all China, it comes close to those considered as middle developed
provinces. The province might appear to be relatively poor compared to other
provinces. This is not actually the case. Anhui's population is the 8th largest in China. It
ranked 14th place in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product and ranked 8th place
for its Total Agricultural Gross Output Value among the provinces due to a large
agricultural population (85 percent).42 Although Anhui Province’s industrial sector may
not be as strong as those provinces in the coastal region, Anhui belongs to the middlerange.
The villages are cases for meaningful comparison as they are located in a single
province.43 The four villages in my research were chosen in an opportunistic manner
due to institutional constraints in doing survey research in rural China. 44 In addition, I
utilized the lottery method 45 on individual households employed by student-helpers
trained in the Centre of Poverty Alleviation and Villagers’ Self-governance in
administering the questionnaires.46 Since we did not deliberately choose to include or
exclude any segments of a village or any villagers from the sampling frame, this
sampling method satisfies the principle of a probability sample, which allows for each
unit of the population in question to have a nonzero chance of being selected.47 Thus the
sampling design is considered reliable. A total of 480 questionnaires were administered.
Due to the household survey method, 92 percent of the questionnaires were completed.
Thus the sample size was a total of 440 respondents, 110 respondents in each village.
My research data include two villages (V1 a relatively wealthy village and V2 a well-todo village) located in an economically middle-developed county as well as a designated
demonstration county for implementing the Organic Law (Wuhe county), a relatively
wealthy village (V3) located in a county-level poor county (Funan county), and a poor
village (V4) located in a state-level poor county (Yuexi county) (See Appendix for
detail on the socio-economic profile of the villages).
Measurement
The measurement of procedural legitimacy was a self-developed scale based on the
above discussion on mediating factors and contextual conditions in village elections.
The items were selected because they were primarily institutional, socio-cultural and
procedural in nature, related to villagers’ perception of procedural legitimacy.
42
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojiatongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001 (China Statistical
Yearbook 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001), pp.311, 324, 363.
43
For the findings from another project carried out in Anhui province with a large sample size based on
selected households, see Qingshan Tan and Xin Qiushui, “Village Election and Governance: Do Villagers
Care?” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 16, No. 53, pp. 581-599.
44
See Lianjiang Li, “Support for Anti-corruption Campaigns in Rural China,” Journal of Contemporary
China, Vol. 10, No. 29 (2001), pp.573-586. Li conducted a survey in six provinces on the reasons for
peasants’ wish to see Mao-style anti-corruption campaigns. The survey was conducted in an opportunistic
manner without probability sampling.
45
Elizabethann O’Sullivan and Gary R.Rassel, Research Methods for Public Administrators (3rd
ed),(New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 135-136.
46
See Tianjian Shi, “Economic Development and Village Elections,” pp. 35-37. In research with the
official list and designated respondents involving many villages, villagers might lie in interviews about
village election to avoid political trouble. In a 1993 nationwide survey on political culture and political
development, Shi instructed the interviewers not to contact local officials before interviewing designated
respondents in villages.
47
O’Sullivan and Rassel, Research Methods for Public Administrators, pp. 134-135.
11
Respondents were read 10 different statements and asked, for each statement, if they
had felt this way “disagree, unsure, or agree” (responses were coded one, two and three
respectively). The statements were:
(1)
Village election was mere formality;
(2)
Before election, higher level government fixed the criteria of nominees in terms
of their preferred candidates;48
(3)
Before election, villagers discussed among themselves to decide their preferred
candidates;
(4)
Before election, nominated candidates approached villagers privately to canvass
for support;
(5)
During election, there were vote-buying incidents;
(6)
Elected candidates were based on clan influence;
(7)
Village party secretary decided who should be the villagers’ committee elected
candidates;
(8)
Villagers did not quite understand the significance of election;
(9)
Villagers had doubts on vote counting and disclosure procedures;
(10)
Village election campaign meetings were too long and unbearable.
These items were scored so that increase in the scale represents an increase in the
negative perception of procedural legitimacy and a decrease in the scale represents a
positive perception of procedural legitimacy.
The reliability of the scale was measured using internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha)
and Guttman split-half reliability. In this study, the scale has a high internal reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.836 and Guttman split-half reliability = 0.805). Test-retest
reliability was not possible because respondents were observed only once. As this was
a self-administered scale, it was not possible to determine inter-rater reliability.
Other measures
Contextual variables such as socio-demographic and economic factors are also taken
into account in the examination of voting behavior and included in all modeling
equations: gender, age (18 – 31, 31+), education (with secondary education or above),
income ( 5,000 yuan), occupation (Related to agricultural), family size ( 5 persons),
work outside, party affiliation, geographical variations (locations in different villages).
Plan of Quantitative Analysis
In hierarchical (logistic) regression analysis, the order of entry of the variables at each
step of the regression model is specified by the researcher based on theoretical
48
Higher level government refers to township and county government.
12
grounds.49 In addition to providing an overall R for the entire model (i.e. the percentage
of variance explained in the dependent variable by the collection of the predictor
variables), hierarchical regression analysis allows for more precision and flexibility in
model specification and evaluation.
In order to demonstrate the mediating effects of procedural legitimacy on geographical
variation in voting behavior, as well as, the relationship between socio-economic factors
and voting behavior, two groups of regression equations: 1) voting behavior was
regressed on socio-economic factors, locations in different villages and procedural
legitimacy; 2) procedural legitimacy was regressed on socio-economic factors and
locations in different villages. A comparison of the resulting coefficients from these
equations could demonstrate any mediating effects.50 Bivariate analysis was added to
clarify some of these variables and their effect on participation.
Hypotheses
My major hypothesis is that villagers’ perception of procedural legitimacy has an
impact on participation rates in elections. However, an investigation of procedural
legitimacy in context necessitates the incorporation of qualitative information gathered
from the field to substantiate the impact of institutions on the significance of procedural
legitimacy as perceived by villagers and how it impacts on their voting behaviour. Thus
the second major hypothesis is that local party officials’ attempts to control and
manipulate elections by imposing unpopular candidates are likely to undermine
procedural legitimacy. These attempts can take many forms, such as determining the
criteria of nomination, overturning electoral result, interfering with villagers’ discussion
of the nomination, clan influence, vote-buying, bribery, and vote counting problems (i.e.
miscounting of ballots). Villagers’ perception of the extent of local party officials’
attempts to control and manipulate elections may reduce the probability of voting.
Hence, villagers abstain from voting when they perceive a lower probability of having a
choice of candidates and hence a lower degree of procedural legitimacy.
The hypothesis for statistical testing of individual intervening or mediating
variable constituting political legitimacy is: the stronger the perception of procedural
legitimacy constituted by these mediating factors (i.e. higher level government’s
support of unpopular candidates; village party secretary’s authoritative role in
influencing election outcome; clan influence on electoral outcome etc.) the lower the
probability that villagers perceive themselves as having a choice of candidates; hence, a
lower degree of procedural legitimacy. If villagers’ perception of procedural legitimacy
tends to be lower, they are less likely to vote.
49
Barbara G. Tabachnick, Linda S. Fidell, Using Multivariate Statistics 4th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
2001); Wampold, B. E., & Freund, R. D, “Use of Multiple Regression in Counseling Psychology
Research: A Flexible Data Analytic Strategy,” Journal of Counseling Psychology, Vol. 34 (1987), pp.
372 382.
50
Reuben M. Baron and David A. Kenny, “The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in SocioPsychological Research: Conceptual, Strategic, and Statistical Considerations,” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, Vol. 51, No. 6 (1986), pp. 1173-1182.
13
Empirical Findings
Profile of Respondents in Survey
The majority of the respondents were men (82 percent) between the ages of 32
and 45 (48 percent) with either primary education (31 percent) or lower secondary
education (45 percent), who identified their occupation as “farmer.”51 Overall, very few
respondents were illiterate (11 percent). However, in general, the educational standard
of respondents was not high. Only 13 percent of all respondents had had an education
reaching upper secondary level or above; this category includes those who had upper
secondary education and vocational training but not tertiary education. Most of the
respondents (78 percent) were not Communist Party members. The majority of the
respondents (82 percent) in the survey registered “farmer” as their occupation. There
were very few agricultural workers (3 percent) or small business owners or
entrepreneurs (8 percent) in these villages. Similarly, very few respondents (13 percent)
had had working experience outside their villages during the past ten years; there were
slightly more respondents in V4 (25 percent) who had had such experience. In terms of
total household income levels last year, the majority of the respondents (56 percent)
indicated that they had a relatively low total household income level of 1,000-4,999
yuan last year. About a third of the respondents had a slightly higher total household
income level of 5,000-9,999 yuan. There were very few respondents who had had a very
low total household income below 1,000 yuan (4 percent) or a very high total household
income level of 10,000 yuan or more (9 percent). The majority of the respondents (67
percent) had a household size of three to four members. Very few respondents had a
very small household size (1-2 members, 8 percent) or a very large household size (> 6
members, 3 percent).
Elections in Rural Anhui and Participation Rates
The Anhui provincial government had taken an active role in implementing
election throughout in a top-down fashion. 52 Similar to elections elsewhere, the
provincial government held preparation meetings prior to elections to provide detailed
guidelines for implementation. 53 During the election period, which usually lasted
slightly more than a month, village election became the focus of government work at
the county, township and village level. Key county and township officials were
dispatched to monitor elections, and Party secretaries chaired the election organization
committees at these different levels. In 1996, from January to March, the third turnover
election was carried out in Anhui Province.54 The fourth turnover election was carried
out from November 1998 to May 1999.55 Official reports claimed that the participation
rate was 90 percent; 97.8 percent of 30,342 administrative villages had held the fourth
turnover elections and 34 million villagers participated in these elections.56
Although election is mandatory and involves relatively low costs, the high
participation rate reported in the official press must be taken with caution. Official
51
There were more male respondents than female respondents as this reflected a gender bias in terms of
the proactive and domineering role of men in the households surveyed. As Tan and Xin also explained in
their survey research, over-sampling of male respondents in the survey was due to Chinese customs, see
Tan and Xin, “Village Election and Governance,” p. 598.
52
Anhui Ribao (Anhui Daily, hereafter AHRB) 11 February 1999 p.3.
53
Zhong and Chen, “To Vote or not to Vote,” pp. 686-712.
54
AHRB 11 February p.3.
55
AHRB 15 June 1999 p.3.
56
Ibid.
14
reports in the press claimed that the fourth turnover village elections in Anhui managed
to achieve three significant changes in formalizing the procedures of election: (1) direct
election by villagers who were eligible to vote (zhijie xuanju) instead of a representative
who voted on behalf of each household as in previous elections (jianjie xuanju) (2)
election was competitive due to the requirement to have more candidates for the posts
up for election rather than having equal-quota as in previous elections (3) elections were
based on secret ballot at designated voting booths set up specifically for voting rather
than consensus and negotiation among different groups or individuals within the village
to determine which candidates would be elected.57
In China, high turnout rates usually reported in the press have sometimes been
achieved with the assistance of poorly regulated proxy voting or were simply
manufactured.58 Recent research findings by Anhui’s eminent sociologist Xin Qiushui
also highlighted the problems of proxy voting and roving ballots used in some village
elections.59 Article twenty-one of the Anhui Villagers’ Committee Election Regulations
(AVCER) allows for proxy voting for up to two persons. 60 Proxy voting in Anhui
Province may be subject to manipulation and its reliability is questionable; proxy voters
may inflate the participation rate since there is no clear specification on the
requirements for authorization. Thus Zhong and Chen’s research takes voting at the
central polling station as an indicator for turnout as officials try to mobilize peasants to
the polling station to listen to campaign speeches and vote; a poor showing is viewed as
an indicator of a lack of effort on the part of village party officials.61
However, I consider voting at the central polling station might indicate turnout rate
but not participation rate; participation rate should include voting at the central polling
station and voting by legitimate means sanctioned by the Organic Law even though
these means may not be so reliable and are subject to manipulation. My survey research
therefore takes into account this problem by asking how villagers cast their votes in the
recent turnover elections in Anhui Province from November 1998 to May 1999:
Table 1
Participation Rates in Elections from November 1998 to May 1999
V1 (n=110)
V2 (n=110)
V3 (n=110)
V4 (n=110)
Did not vote
14%
24%
36%
36%
Voted
86
76
64
64
Source: Survey Research 2001 (Q. Did you participate in the last election?)
χ²=18.645 df=1 p<.001
57
Total (N=440)
28%
72
AHRB 7 July 2000 p.1.
Barrett L. McCormick, “China’s Leninist Parliament and Public Sphere: A Comparative Analysis,” in
Barrett L. McCormick and Jonathan Unger eds., China after socialism: in the footsteps of Eastern Europe
or East Asia? (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 41.
59
Xin Qiushui, “Shiwunian cunmin zizhi shijian zongjianyan” (Report on implementing 15 years of
villagers’ self-government in rural Anhui), (Anhui Sheng Wenhua Fupin yu Cunmin Zizhi Yanjiu
Zhongxin (Anhui: Centre of Poverty Alleviation and Villagers’ Self-governance, 2004), pp. 1-15.
60
See AHRB 31 December 2001, p. A3 for the amended version of the AVCER and the amended version
of the Anhui revised Organic Law.
61
Zhong and Chen, “To Vote or Not to Vote,” p. 692.
58
15
Table 2
Different Ways of Voting
V1 (n=94)
V2 (n=84)
V3 (n=70)
V4 (n=70)
1. At the designated 96%
96.4%
77%
94.3%
voting booth
2. Someone cast it on 0
0
6
0
my behalf
3. By mail
3
1.2
0
1.4
4. Through mobile
1
2.4
17
4.3
ballot boxes
Source: Survey data 2001 (Q. How did you cast your vote in the recent election?)
χ²=40.614 df=9 p<.001
Total (n=318)
91%
1
2
6
My data indicates that most villagers who took part in the last elections cast their
votes at the designated voting booth in the polling stations (Table 2, 91 percent). None
of the villages has the participation rate of 90 percent as publicized by the press. 62
Villages (V1 and V2) situated in an economically middle-developed demonstration
county for implementing self-government have had higher participation rates than
villages (V3 and V4) located in poor counties (see Table 1 above). Although V3 and V4
have similar participation rates, a lower percentage of the respondents in V3 cast their
votes at the designated voting booth (see Table 2 above). Almost a quarter (23 percent)
of the voters in V3 cast their votes through proxy voting and mobile ballots. These
figures on participation rates are more likely to underestimate rather than overestimate
voting absenteeism. As Shi points out, voting is a socially desirable behaviour and
interviews with people who fail to comply may create psychological tension. 63 Thus
respondents may lie about their voting behaviour in order to get away from the social
stigma of not conforming to social norms.64 Shi considers non-voters as “the population
at risk” who might be penalized by a repressive regime for their deviant behaviour.
Effect of Socio-Economic and Demographic Factors
In my research, the majority of respondents are male farmers (82 percent) with a
low educational level (87 percent at or below lower secondary education) and low
annual total household income level (60 percent with an annual income level below
5,000 yuan). My findings on the effect of socio-economic and demographic variables on
participation in election substantiated the arguments in the works of Tianjian Shi:
modernist arguments as well as mobilization theory do not apply to the context of
electoral reforms and elections in China. 65 My findings concur with Tianjian Shi’s
nationwide survey in December 1990 on the generational effect on voting behaviour in
China among the youngest generation.66 Among the socio-economic and demographic
62
AHRB 15 June 1999 p. 3.
Shi, “Voting and Nonvoting in China,” p. 1124.
64
See also Barbara A. Anderson, and Brian D. Silver, “Measurement and Mismeasurement of the Validity
of Self-Reported Vote,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1986), pp. 771-785.
65
Shi, “Electoral Reform in Rural China,” pp. 7-8.
66
Social scientists, in computing age in statistical analysis, differentiate between life-cycle effects and
generational effects. Life-cycle effects refer to changes endemic to life-cycle in terms of shifting
responsibilities, opportunities, and needs that accompany the aging process. Generational effects apply to
birth cohorts who have undergone a shared community of experiences under roughly similar
circumstances at pivotal, impressionable ages within a generation that can be called a generation unit. See
63
16
variables (e.g. sex, age, education, occupation, annual total household income, and party
membership), only age, party affiliation and those with working experience outside the
villages have had an impact on participation .
In addition, age is negatively correlated to participation (i.e. voting). Voting
behaviour of the youngest generation is due to the generational effect rather than the
life-cycle effect. This is particularly the case in V3, where younger people are less
likely to vote than older people (an epsilon or difference of 36 percentage point).67 The
socio-political experiences of different generations have an impact on electoral
participation. 68 The changes brought about by economic development in a more
liberalized environment have also led to the CCP’s tolerance of non-compliance by
younger people in electoral participation.69
Table 3
Relationship between Age and Participation Rate
18-31 32-45 46-59 >59
Total (N=440)
Did not vote
41%
21%
25%
26%
28%
Voted
59
79
75
74
72
Source: Survey Research 2001. *percentage difference
χ²=15.454 df=3 p<.001 Cramer’s V= .187 (weak association)
Epsilon*
15
15
Party members tend to be more confident in their ability to understand and
participate in politics (internal efficacy). 70 My findings also show that Party
membership has a positive but weak association with participation. Party membership
has an impact on the voting behaviour of respondents, but the effect on voting or nonvoting is a difference by an epsilon of 10 percentage points. Although party
membership has a relatively weak association with participation in V4, the epsilon
between voting and non-voting is larger (i.e. 21 percentage points). This is indicative of
influence due to a strong village party institution or leadership in V4.
Table 4
Relationship between Party Membership and Participation Rate
Not Party member
Party member
Total (N=440)
Did not vote
30%
20%
28%
Voted
70
80
72
Source: Survey Research 2001 (Data collated for analysis).
χ²=15.454 df=3 p<.05 Cramer’s V= .097 (weak association)
Epsilon
10
10
the application of generational effects in the case of Chinese politics by Tianjian Shi, “Generational
Differences in Political Attitudes and Political Behaviour in China,” E.A.I. Occasional Paper, No. 17
(Singapore: World Scientific Press: Singapore, 1999), pp. 1-35. See also Anne F. Thurston, Muddling
toward Democracy (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace), p.37. Thurston’s report on Fujian
elections also showed that non-voters were generally younger and apathetic.
67
Epsilon is a simple statistic often used to summarize percentage difference. See Earl Babbie and Fred
Halley, Adventures in Social Research (London: Pine Forge Press, 1998), p. 103.
68
In my survey, the youngest generation refers to those in the age group 18-31 year-old, the initial reform
generation refers to those in the age group 32-45 year-old, the cultural revolution generation refers to
those in the age group 46-59 year-old, and those who are older than 59 year-old are the pre-cultural
revolution generation.
69
Shi, “Generational Differences in Political Attitudes and Political Behaviour in China,” p. 26.
70
Shi Tianjian, “Cultural Values and Democracy in People’s Republic of China,” The China Quarterly,
No.162 (June 2000), p.555.
17
28 percent of all respondents have had experience working outside the village during
the past 10 years. Those who were exposed to the outside world tended to be more
critical of elections. This is particularly so when they suspect that election is mere
formality; they are more likely to abstain from voting than those without such working
experience outside the village.
Table 5
Relationship Between Those Who Worked Outside the Village Before
and Participation Rate
Worked outside the village before during the past 10 years
Yes
No
Total (N=122)
Did not vote
53%
24%
28%
Voted
47
76
72
χ²=20.267 df=1 p<.05 Cramer’s V= .215 (moderate association)
The Impact of Institutions in Village Elections
Overall, my findings show that, firstly, socio-economic and demographic variables
are not as significant as villagers’ perception of procedural legitimacy for explaining
variation in participation rates, and these perceptions are due to the effect of various
intervening variables—political (institutional), socio-cultural and procedural
variables—in explaining the differences in the participation rates among the villages.
In general, my major findings show that the stronger the villagers’ perception of (1)
higher level government’s influence on the nomination of candidates, (2) Village party
secretary’s influence on the electoral outcome or the choice of candidates, (3) Clan
influence on electoral outcome, (4) Electoral bribery, (5) Vote-buying incidents during
election, and (6) Vote-counting problems in past elections, the lower the probability that
villagers perceived themselves as having a choice of candidates; hence, a lower degree
of procedural legitimacy which leads to a lower participation rate. Conversely, the
stronger the perception of voters’ discussion among themselves about the nomination of
candidates, the higher the probability that villagers perceive themselves as having a
choice of candidates, hence, a higher degree of procedural legitimacy which leads to a
higher participation rate.
While Party cadres’ influence on the nomination of candidates or the electoral
outcome does have an impact on procedural legitimacy, not all my case studies
demonstrate this linkage. In fact China’s villages are so diverse and complicated that, in
some cases, Party cadres’ influence varies, as my villages showed. One cannot overgeneralize the extent of Party cadres’ influence in elections because, as my data shows,
there are other variables at play, such as (1) clan influence, (2) electoral bribery, (3)
vote-buying, (4) vote counting problems, and (5) voter’s choice. My findings showed
that institutional (political) variables are more likely to pose a constraint on electoral
legitimacy and participation rates in villages (V3 and V4) located in poor counties than
villages (V1 and V2) located in an economically middle-developed county.
Institutional (Political) factors are decisive in determining the degree of procedural
legitimacy and its association with participation. Due to the proactive and strong
leadership role of the county government in dealing with reform problems in Wuhe
county, the local state at the township and village level worked as an enabling factor in
18
implementing semi-competitive elections as seen in V1 and V2, particularly the latter.71
This implies that leading cadres at the township and village level in V1 and V2 were
adaptive and proactive in implementing semi-competitive elections. The negative
effects of socio-cultural variables such as clan influence and electoral bribery and the
negative effects of procedural variables such as vote-buying incidents and vote counting
problems are not so strong as to undermine procedural legitimacy and participation as
seen in V3 and V4. In V3 and V4, the county governments were more likely to be
concerned with poverty alleviation and disaster relief work since Funan and Yuexi are
both relatively poor counties with track records of natural disasters such as drought and
flood.72 It is not very likely that implementing semi-competitive elections is their top
priority.
Finally and most importantly, economic factors alone are not decisive in
determining the degree of procedural legitimacy and participation. As my findings
show, political (institutional) factors are of paramount importance in V4 (a poor
village), while political (institutional) factors and socio-cultural factors (clan influence)
in V3 played a more important role in affecting procedural legitimacy and participation.
Apart from having a semi-hegemonic clan structure, information gathered from the field
indicated that in V3, the village party secretary was also the Assistant Director of Civil
Affairs at the township level and the villagers’ committee chair was the Assistant
village Party secretary. Moreover, they have the same surname. Here, political factors
and socio-cultural factors are intertwined. Hence, clan influence may also shape party
cadres’ behaviour.73
As pointed out above, institutional (political) variables are more likely to pose a
constraint on procedural legitimacy and participation rates in villages (V3 and V4)
located in poor counties than villages (V1 and V2) located in an economically middledeveloped county. It must be emphasized that, in general, V1 and V3 are relatively
wealthy villages. Moreover, in V1, although the local state at the township and village
71
On the success of the county government in reducing peasant burdens and petitions see AHRB 16
March 1999, 22 February 2000, 14 May 2001 p. B3, 28 September 2001 p.B1, 17 October 2000. On tax
reform, downsizing bureaucracy, reduction of peasant burdens, see AHRB 23 November 2000, 28 March
2001 p. B2, 18 July 2001, 4 June 2002 p. A1. On legal education, see AHRB 4 January 2000. On
maintaining a clean county government, see AHRB 19 January 1998, p. 1. On improving the quality of
cadres, see AHRB 22 February 2000 and 23 May 2001, p. A. In order to improve the quality of cadres,
local authorities allowed the recruitment of better qualified personnel from the town and township
governments as well as county government to serve as village Party secretaries in the villages as part of
the public service system. See AHRB 8 May 2001 p. B3, 24 May 2001, 21 September 2001. Since 1998,
Wuhe county government has also instituted open and democratic management by regular disclosure of
government revenue and expenditure, policies and management issues. In Wuhe, village, town or
township governments have also begun implementing open management practices. On Wuhe County’s
open management practice, see AHRB 13 December 1998 p. 1, 16 February 2000. On Wuhe’s villages
and open management practice see AHRB 3 January 2000, p. 1; on township and town governments and
open management practice see AHRB 5 June 2000.
72
On poverty alleviation in Yuexi, see AHRB 8 January 1998, 3 February 1999 p. 5, 4 Mar 1999, 7
August 1999, 12 October 1999; On Yuexi County’s poverty alleviation, see AHRB 8 January 1998. On
severe flood in Funan County and relief work, see AHRB 4 October 1998 p. 2, 26 July 2000 p. A2. On
severe flood in Anhui Province, AHRB 3 August 1998, p. 1 On Funan County’s poverty alleviation, see
AHRB 8 April 1998. On poverty alleviation in Anhui Province itself, AHRB 2 February 1998, p. 1. On
raising peasant income level, see AHRB 26 January 2000, p. 1.
73
An excellent piece of work on this aspect is Wang Keyue’s research in Anhui and Zhejiang villages,
Wang, “Cunmin xuanju de xintai guancha,” in Li Lianjiang, Guo Zhenglin, Xiao Tangbiao, Cunweihui
Xuanju Guancha (Observations on Villagers’ Committee Elections) (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin chubanshe,
2001), pp. 523-530. Wang showed that even within group of same surname, different factions exist in the
struggle and interference with elections.
19
level may appear to intervene in the election more than the local state in V2 (a well-todo village), such as by influencing villagers’ discussion among themselves about the
nomination of candidates, my data show that the effect of party cadres’ attempts to
control and manipulate election due to various intervening variables is not strong
enough to undermine procedural legitimacy and severely affect electoral participation
rate in V1.
Table 6 What is your main reason for not participating in the last election?
V1 (n=16)
V2 (n=26)
V3 (n=40)
1 Election was
56%
46%
80%
formality
2 Because of work
19
50
10
3 No real benefit; it 25
4
10
did not matter
who was elected
Source: Survey Research 2001 (Note: Data collated for analysis).
X2=18.393 df=6 p<.001
V4 (n=35)
Total (n=117)
66%
65%
20
14
23
12
The lack of procedural legitimacy means that villagers perceived that they were in
fact not being given a choice of candidates. If elections were mere formality, villagers
would abstain from voting. When villagers who did not vote at the last election were
probed as to the main reason for not voting, the majority indicated that the election was
mere formality as cadres had been pre-selected (Table 6, 65 percent). This is most
clearly the case in V3 (80 percent) and V4 (66 percent). Thus elections in V3 and V4
did not serve to legitimize power based on the Organic Law. The lower degree of
procedural legitimacy led to villagers’ abstinence from voting. Abstinence from voting
or non-voting is not merely a form of protest; it constitutes electoral delegitimation.
Logistic Regression Results
Equation 1 of table 1 shows the effects of the eleven independent variables on voting
behavior. Our results indicate that age (< 32), work outside, party affiliation and
locations were significant factors of the likelihood of voting. Equation 2 of Table 1
estimates the effects of mediating factors / intervening variables on procedural
legitimacy into the model presented in equation 1. The explanation power of the model
is increased from 0.171 (equation 1) to 0.250 (equation 2). Procedural legitimacy seems
to have a sizable mediating effect on geographical variations in voting behavior, but not
on the relationship between socio-economic factors and voting behavior. Of the four
significant factors of voting found in equation 1, only location in village 1 is reduced to
non-significance, nevertheless, there are no changes found in the effects of the
remaining three factors. In order to illuminate this relationship, we run regression on
the perceptions of procedural legitimacy on locations and socio-economic factors in
equation 3 of table 1. Equation 3 clearly confirms the suspected mediating effects of
procedural legitimacy on geographical variation in voting. There is significant
geographical variation in procedural legitimacy.
20
In reviewing the table, our results suggest that villagers’ perception of procedural
legitimacy is not only associated with voting, but also mediates geographical variation
of voting behavior (i.e. different locations of the villages).
Table 7
Logistic Regression Analysis (Impact of Villagers’ Perceptions on Participation Rates)
Conclusion
This paper attempts to study the dynamic of village elections, building on the
works of China scholars and basing on an historical institutionalist approach. The
approach takes into account the path dependence of one-party state and its role in
Chinese village elections. The Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees “enshrined” the
domineering role of the party, while at the same time proffered to implement elections
based on legal-rational principles. This paradox delineates the permissible boundary of
village elections as ultimately resting on the traditional basis of authority and
perpetuates the norms and values of the leading role of the party in China’s economic
and political development at the grassroots level. The interplay of formal and informal
rules in elections is reflected in the dynamic interactions of strategic actors in the
struggle over the legitimizing basis of authority through electoral participation.
21
Institutional factors are paramount in determining the possibility of instituting semicompetitive elections. As my research shows, villages in a designated demonstration
county for implementing the Organic Law yielded a higher level of participation, given
the institutional incentives and support rendered by cadres who perceived their enabling
role as relevant to their political career and advancement. Similar to other research
findings, demonstration counties tend to be located in economically better developed
counties. However, economic factors alone cannot account for the variation in
participation rates. Moreover, my findings show that socio-economic or demographic
factors are not as significant as procedural legitimacy in explaining variation in
participation rates. Villagers as strategic actors in elections tend to participate in
elections, given a choice of candidates. This is demonstrated through the degree of
procedural legitimacy mediated by institutional or political, socio-cultural, procedural
factors. The lower degree of procedural legitimacy led to villagers’ abstinence from
voting. Abstinence from voting or non-voting is not merely a form of protest; it
constitutes electoral delegitimation. As my data indicates, villagers’ perception of
procedural legitimacy is not only associated with voting, but also mediates geographical
variation of voting behavior (i.e. different locations of the villages).
22
Appendix
Table 1
The Socio-economic Profile of the Villages
V1
(Relatively Wealthy)
Located in
Wuhe County
Village Population
1467
Work outside village
100 (7%)
Number of Households 380
Clan Structure
Multi-polar (A)
Arable land
707 mou
Village Gross Output
$3.3
Value (in million)
Agricultural
Wheat, oat
Products
barley, paddy
Annual Per Capita
$1750
Net Income
Per Capita Gross
$2249
Output Value (Village)*
V2
V3
(Well-to-do) (Relatively Wealthy)
Wuhe County
Funan County
1120
1340
400 (35%)
120 (9%)
284
301
Multi-polar (A) Semi-Hegemonic
80 mou
2068 mou
$2.1
$2.7
V4
(Poor)
Yuexi County
2138
200 (9%)
538
Multi-polar (A)*
1078 mou
$3.2
Paddy,
barley, bean
$1900
Wheat,
sesame,
$2000
Wheat,
barley
$1200
$1875
$2015
$1497
Source: Information collected from village records for year 2000.
*Classification adapted based on information from the field and Chinese scholars’ research discussed in
Alan P.L. Liu, Mass Politics in the People’s Republic: State and Society in Contemporary China
(Colorado: Westeview Press, 1996), p. 72. Liu’s table is adapted from Wang Huning, Dangdai Zhongguo
Cunluo Jiazu Wenhua (The Village and Clan Culture of Contemporary China), (Shanghai: Renmin
chubanshe, 1991). A unipolar clan structure has a single surname for the entire village. A hegemonic clan
structure has members of one clan constituting over 70 percent of the village population. A multi-polar
(A) clan structure has near equal distribution of population among all the clans. A multi-polar (B) clan
structure has one medium-sized clan (for example 17 percent of the population) and a number of smaller
clans. A nonpolar clan structure has an entire village consisting of small families.
The villages in my survey are considered well-to-do or relatively wealthy
(average) agricultural villages, not rich villages because although they come close to the
national average, they are not rich when compared to villages in Shanghai, Beijing or
Zhejiang. Although they are not rich, they vary in terms of their economic standing and
are parallel to other villages in other provinces where there are variations between rich
and poor. In 2000, Anhui Province's urban and rural net disposable per capita incomes
ranked 19th ($1,935) among the provinces.74 Comparison at the national level and with
the relatively better provinces and poorer provinces showed that the national rural net
disposable per capita income was $2,253, Shanghai's $5,596.37 (ranked first), Beijing's
$4,604 (ranked second), Zhejiang's $4,254 (ranked third), Guizhou's (2nd lowest)
$1,374, and Tibet's (lowest of all provinces) $1,331. Hence, the villages selected are
comparable to other villages in other provinces in terms of rural net disposable per
capita income.
Unlike in southern China, clan forces are not so strong in Anhui Province.75
None of the villages in my research is a single-clan village or has a multi-polar (A)
structure (i.e. one medium-sized clan and a number of smaller clans). Information from
74
Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojiatongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001 (China Statistical
Yearbook 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001), pp.311, 324.
75
On revival of clan forces and problems, see Anhui Fazhibao (Anhui Legal News, hereafter AHFZB) 14
October 1999, p. 3. A theoretical piece of writing on clan forces and its dangers appeared in AHFZB 28
December 1997, p. 1.
23
the villages indicates that V1, V2 and V4 have near equal distribution of population
among all the clans.76 V3 used to be a single-clan village in the long distant past, but it
is no longer so; now, it has one big clan and several smaller families in the village. This
classification takes after Alan P.L. Liu’s classification based on the research of Chinese
scholars on 14 villages across China. According to Liu, a single-clan village has a
unipolar clan structure and shares a common habitat known as the “natural village”
(zirancun), while a village with a hegemonic clan structure consists of one clan or a
powerful “big family” (dahu) constituting over 70 percent of the village population.77
V1, V2 and V4 are considered villages with multi-polar (A) clan structure, while V3 has
a semi-hegemonic clan structure. A hegemonic clan structure has member of one clan
constituting over 70 percent of the population. This classification of the patterns of clan
structure will be helpful for our empirical analysis of the data from the villages
surveyed—the impact of clan influence on procedural legitimacy and its effect on
electoral participation in the villages.
Table 2 Economic Performance at the County Level
Year 2000
China
Anhui Wuhe
Funan
Yuexi
Per capita rural net income
Per capita GDP
Per capita AGOV
Per capita IGOV
$1398
1829
1941
209
$1387
2729
1594
1359
$2253
7078
$1935
4867
1955
5400
$2152
3437
2953
439
Source: Adapted from Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojiatongjiju, Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001
(China Statistical Yearbook 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001), p. 311 (Per capita
income in urban residents by source and region), p. 324 (Per capita net income of rural households by
region), p. 49 (China’s Per Capita GDP) and p. 59 (Anhui’s Per Capita GDP); see Anhui sheng tongjiju,
Anhui Tongji Nianjian 2001 (ATJNJ 2001) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2001)pp. 682-683 for
counties’ Per Capita Gross GDP, p. 51 (Anhui’s per capita GOVA and GIOV), pp. 686-687 for per capita
net income of rural residents, counties’ per capita gross GOV, pp. 67 and 69 for per capita GDP of
counties, pp. 684-685 for per capita gross industrial output value.
Level of Economic Development. In terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
in 2000, Wuhe county (at 3,437 yuan) reported a much higher figure than Funan county
(1,829 yuan) and Yuexi county (2,729 yuan), although it was still much more lower
than the national per capita GDP (7,078 yuan) and Anhui Province’s per capita GDP
(4,867 yuan). Since none of the four villages has any industry, comparison using per
capita GDP as an economic indicator might not be appropriate as per capita GDP takes
into account per capita gross output value of agriculture (per capita AGOV), which
includes farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, and per capita gross output value
of industry (per capita IGOV). Hence per capita AGOV in the three counties might be
better indicators for comparing the level of economic development. Similar to the trend
seen in the rural PCI, the per capita AGOV of Wuhe county (2,953 yuan) was higher
than the per capita AGOVs in Funan county (1,941 yuan) and Yuexi county (1,594
yuan).
Official estimates of village PCI indicated that V4 had the lowest PCI level
($1,200) among the four villages. Although V3, similar to V4 in Yuexi County, also
76
Student helpers administering questionnaires were also asked to collect basic information of the
villages in the survey.
77
Liu, Mass Politics in the People’s Republic, p. 72.
24
belongs to a poor county (Funan), it reported a higher PCI level ($2,000), which is
better than villages (V1 and V2) located in an economically better developed county
(Wuhe). It must be noted that the case of V3 is not typical of villages in Funan. V3
happened to be located in a township known nationwide for its successful plantation of
red pepper; this resulted in a higher PCI.78
In terms of rural PCI and per capita AGOV, V1 is a relatively wealthy village and
V2 is a well-to-do village located in the same county (Wuhe) with an average level of
economic development; whereas, V3 is a relatively wealthy village located in a county
with a poor level of economic development (Funan), and V4 is a poor village located in
another county (Yuexi) with a poor level of economic development (Table 1). Although
Funan County’s per capita AGOV was almost on a par with Anhui Province’s per capita
AGOV, its relatively lower rural PCI rendered it less developed economically (Table 2).
Funan County is classified as a poor county at the provincial level, and Yuexi County is
a poor county at the national level.
78
Anhui Ribao (Anhui Daily, hereafter AHRB) 24 April 2000.