GAL COMPETITION PROJECT
UNITED STATES
Institutional Performance Norms
Harry First, Eleanor Fox,
and Daniel Hemli
February 5, 2011
OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY


Overall investigations
Merger review: a regulatory system




agency clearance
second requests: streamlining the process
non-HSR reviews
Litigation time



FTC: too slow? new 2009 rules
DOJ: too slow? few cases, no criticism
no internal data
2
EXPERTISE

Staff




Leadership



large staffs
economists: well-trained; integrated
DOJ: sometimes hires out for litigators
DOJ: no formal qualifications
FTC Commissioners: sparse representation of
economists or business executives
ALJs: appointment not controlled by FTC
3
TRANSPARENCY

Ex ante




Ex post



guidelines
public workshops and speeches
advisory opinions/business review letters
settlements: consent decrees/orders
closing statements
But what do you see?
4
ACCOUNTABILITY


Data availability
Executive branch control



Congressional control




removal of appointees
sporadic review of DOJ activities
legislation
budget
oversight
Judicial control: “the shadow of the law”
5
RULE OF LAW

Criminal enforcement


Civil enforcement



Constitutional constraints
variability when Administrations change
dominance of economics
Political concerns


political elections
political values
6
FLASHPOINTS


Merger review
Declinations



use of closing statements
Qualifications: ALJs
Institutional restructuring


DOJ as criminal cartel prosecutor
FTC as administrative agency
7