How Deep is the Annuity Market Participation Puzzle? Joachim Inkmann, Tilburg University, CentER and Netspar Paula Lopes, London School of Economics and FMG Alexander Michaelides, London School of Economics, CEPR and FMG The Future of Pension Plan Funding LSE/FMG 7-8th June, 2007 1 The Annuity Market Participation Puzzle Life annuities offer protection against mortality risk Theoretical results indicate that consumers should annuitize all their wealth under certain conditions – Yaari (1965): risk aversion – Davidoff et al (2005): complete markets Empirical evidence suggests that voluntary annuity demand is very small. This is the puzzle! – increasing life expectancy – a trend towards occupational pension arrangements which do not require (full) annuitization of pension wealth at retirement age (DC plans like 401(k)) 2 Possible Explanations for the Puzzle: A number of theoretical explanations have been given which may contribute to solving the puzzle – Lack of actuarial fair pricing (Mitchell et al, 1999) – Bequest motives (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990) – Habit formation (Davidoff et al, 2005) – Compulsory annuitization in the public and private pension system (Bernheim, 1991, Brown et al, 2001) – Minimum purchase requirements (Lopes, 2006) – Lack of flexibility (Milevsky and Young, 2002) 3 Contribution of this Paper We start from data to get the benchmark right – Which households demand voluntary annuities? – Conditional on participation, how much annuities? – Surprisingly, such a detailed empirical analysis of annuitization still seems missing in the literature We then built a simple life-cycle model – Captures the sign. empirical causes of annuitization – Saving, portfolio choice and annuitization Finally, we can quantify the depth of the puzzle – Feed wealth distribution from data into model 4 – Generate predicted annuity demand and compare with empirical results Findings of this Paper Factors which significantly affect voluntary annuity demand in the data – Education – Life expectancy – Compulsory annuitization – Possible bequest motive for surviving spouse – Financial wealth – Stock market participation These factors also appear relevant in the life-cycle model – Model replicates all factors except education The puzzle might not be as deep as previously thought – For reasonable preference parameters we can generate theoretical predictions, which resemble data 5 Empirical Analysis Data: English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) – First two waves: 2002/03 and 2004/05 – Individuals aged 50 and over – Information on public pensions, private (personal or occupational) pensions and voluntary annuitization – “Annuity income is when you make a lump sum payment to a financial institution and in return they give you a regular income for the rest of your life.” Sample selection – Households with at least one retired person – Financial unit level (N = 5,233) – Age < 90 (since data is truncated at 90) 6 Annuity (& Stock) Market Participation Annuity market participation: 5.9% Among stockholders: 9.6% (sign. diff.) 2002/ 04 2002 2004 A=0 A=1 A=1 Total 2917 65 31 3013 (Row-%) (96.8) (2.2) (1.0) (100.0) (Total-%) (55.7) (1.2) (0.6) (57.6) 2007 142 71 2220 (Row-%) (90.4) (6.4) (3.2) (100.0) (Total-%) (38.4) (2.7) (1.4) (42.4) 4924 207 102 5233 (94.1) (4.0) (1.9) (100.0) S=0 S=1 Total (Total-%) 7 Financial Wealth and Income Financial wealth measured before annuitization Annuity market participants much more wealthy than non-participants: mean diff = 85,000 GBP Conditional on annuity market participation, stock market participants demand higher annuities. All A=1 A=0 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Financial wealth 55031 15800 135017 65000 50011 14200 Annual pension 9328 7305 12182 9036 9149 7228 Annual public pension 4796 4732 4945 4940 4787 4723 Annual private pension 4532 1440 7236 3200 4362 1350 Annual annuity income 179 0 3032 984 - - Stock share percentage 16 0 24 14 16 0 A = 1 and S = 1 S=1 S=0 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Financial wealth 173619 99300 101937 47586 20470 5000 Annual pension 14142 11660 11523 9132 7711 6315 Annual public pension 4943 4948 4521 4628 4999 4784 Annual private pension 9199 6600 7002 4145 2712 500 Annual annuity income 3656 1200 351 0 53 Stock share percentage 35 28 38 32 - 8 0 - Participation over Wealth Distribution (5, 10, 20, 30, 20, 10, 5)% of observations 1800 20 1600 18 1400 16 14 1200 12 1000 10 800 8 600 6 400 4 200 2 0 0 0.1 0.7 3.3 15.8 53.3 131.2 % (A = 1); '000 GBP/a (Pension) Number Observations (All, S = 1) (2.5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, 97.5)% wealth percentiles 348.8 Wealth Distribution ('000 GBP) All S=1 A=1 Pension 9 Pension Income Decomposition (5, 10, 20, 30, 20, 10, 5)% of observations (2.5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, 97.5)% wealth percentiles 21 18 '000 GBP 15 12 9 6 3 0 0.1 0.7 3.3 15.8 53.3 131.2 348.8 Wealth Distribution ('000 GBP) Public Pension Private Pension Voluntary Annuity 10 Participation by Household Background Differences in education, health and life expectancy All A=1 A=0 Age / 10 6.93 6.82 6.94 Female 0.53 0.42 0.54 Married 0.56 0.57 0.56 Number of children 2.04 1.98 2.04 Low education 0.59 0.34 0.61 Medium education 0.30 0.41 0.30 High education 0.10 0.25 0.10 Survival probability 0.52 0.57 0.52 Objective GAD probability 0.53 0.56 0.53 Bad health condition 0.19 0.14 0.19 Medium health condition 0.62 0.60 0.63 Good health condition 0.19 0.27 0.18 11 Subjective & Objective Survival Probs Underestimation below average sample age (69) Difference between self-reported and GAD survival probs. 12 Survival Probability, Health & Annuities Difference between self-reported and GAD survival probs. 13 Econometric Analysis: Annuity Demand Voluntary annuity market participation Probit Variable estimate Log annuity demand Marginal effects t-value estimate cond. on participation t-value estimate t-value Intercept -2.6844 -5.82 - - 3.7977 2.33 Age / 10 -0.0637 -1.35 -0.0061 -1.28 -0.1720 -1.42 Female -0.2189 -3.38 -0.0175 -3.11 -0.1609 -0.87 Married -0.3240 -4.49 0.0407 3.61 0.0689 0.36 0.0244 1.24 0.0024 1.22 0.0406 0.69 Low education -0.2325 -3.31 -0.0183 -2.98 -0.0144 -0.07 High education 0.1773 2.07 0.0198 1.90 -0.0323 -0.17 Survival probability 0.1896 1.71 0.0182 1.71 0.4047 1.18 Log public pension 0.0171 3.11 0.0016 2.76 0.0154 1.20 Log private pension -0.0038 -0.88 -0.0004 -0.86 -0.0257 -2.32 Log financial wealth 0.1608 5.20 0.0155 4.59 0.3406 2.41 Stockholder (S) -0.8674 -1.88 0.0152 1.78 -2.9970 -1.77 S x log wealth in stocks -0.0569 -1.90 - - -0.2501 -3.07 S x log financial wealth 0.1437 2.66 - - 0.5045 2.74 Number of children Number of observations Fit of the model 5233 309 Correct predictions: 94.10% R-square: 27.95% 14 Summary of Empirical Findings Variables affecting voluntary annuity market participation: + Education** + Life expectancy* - Possible bequest motive for surviving spouse** + Financial wealth** + Stock market participation* Variables affecting conditional voluntary annuity demand: - Compulsory annuitization** + Financial wealth** + Stock market participation** (**: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level) This is the benchmark for any theory of annuitization 15 Implications of a Life-Cyle Model Life-cycle model of savings and portfolio choice Starts at retirement age 65 (t = 1); max. age = 100 (T = 35) Mortality risk reflected by cond. survival probabilities p Available assets: – real annuity that can be purchased at t = 1 – stocks (equity premium 4%, std.dev. 18%) – risk-free asset Household already receives pension L (mandatory annuity) Every period household decides on optimal consumption C and (for stockholders) the share of savings to invest in stocks subject to a budget constraint for cash-on-hand X: 16 Annuity Pricing At time t = 1 household decides to buy an annuity that makes an annual payment A EPDV = Expected Present Discounted Value P = Load factor (Mitchell et al (1999): 8%-20%) 17 Preferences and Data Input The household has Epstein-Zin preferences – with : coefficient of relative risk aversion : elasticity of inter-temporal substitution b: strength of the bequest motive We take the following inputs from the data – Wealth distribution (described by 20 percentiles) by stock market participation status – Median pension level (sum of public and private) by stock market participation status – GAD survival probabilities for ELSA gender mix 18 Policy Functions: Annuity Demand Baseline results: = 3, = 1/3 (CRRA), b = 0 Annual Annuity Income (000's £) 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Wealth at Retirement (000's £) Stockholders Non-Stockholders With access to the stock market, a higher level of initial wealth is required to purchase an annuity 19 Comparative Statics: Non-Stockholders Annual Annuity's Income (000's £) Bequest: b = 1; RRA: = 5; EIS: = 0.8 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Wealth at Retirement (000's £) Base Bequest RRA EIS Increase in bequest motive has negative demand impact, increase in 20 RRA and EIS positive Comparative Statics: Stockholders Annual Annuity Income (000's £) Bequest: b = 3; RRA: = 5; EIS: = 0.8 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 Wealth at Retirement (000's £) Base Bequest RRA EIS Increase in bequest motive has negative demand impact, increase 21in RRA and EIS positive Simulation: Average Consumption 11.0 Consumption (000's £) 10.5 10.0 9.5 9.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 7.0 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Age Actuarially Fair Load Factor Simulation = evaluating policy functions (of wealth) at the ELSA wealth distribution 22 Simulation: Annuity Demand (S = 0) If participation increases, the average level of annuity demand tends to decrease since less wealthy households join b γ 2 0 3 5 2 1 3 5 ψ Voluntary annuity demand Voluntary annuity market participation Share of wealth annuitized Wealth Equivalence Measure 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 5.79 4.57 2.93 2.10 3.62 2.73 2.10 2.09 2.42 2.06 2.09 2.08 6.15 12.80 34.50 66.75 22.10 41.05 66.50 67.10 51.00 66.95 67.10 67.30 34.12 37.73 54.16 92.96 44.30 62.30 93.31 92.49 68.98 89.18 92.53 92.16 99.89 99.76 99.34 97.75 99.75 99.54 99.14 98.64 99.67 99.51 99.38 99.28 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 3.17 3.39 3.21 0.65 5.15 5.19 5.29 5.55 3.47 3.23 3.03 3.61 3.90 4.00 3.75 1.05 9.25 10.05 10.05 6.95 25.30 29.40 31.75 22.10 15.59 16.73 15.41 2.51 35.35 37.61 38.41 31.94 48.47 50.69 47.90 40.41 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.99 99.89 99.89 99.89 99.95 99.82 99.78 99.78 99.86 23 Simulation: Annuity Demand (S = 1) b γ 2 0 3 5 2 1 3 5 ψ Voluntary annuity demand Voluntary annuity market participation Share of wealth annuitized Wealth Equivalence Measure 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 2.79 3.14 4.71 5.58 4.45 4.68 4.83 5.12 4.92 4.97 4.96 4.96 5.45 7.05 9.85 18.40 17.00 20.60 28.90 40.80 43.25 47.95 57.00 69.25 11.62 13.36 21.10 28.50 23.12 25.94 30.33 38.15 39.04 42.26 47.81 56.53 99.96 99.94 99.84 99.56 99.87 99.81 99.69 99.48 99.69 99.62 99.52 99.36 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.80 2.16 2.52 3.37 3.98 4.06 4.34 4.82 5.25 4.89 4.92 4.86 4.92 4.30 4.70 5.30 6.10 13.20 14.25 15.40 12.30 39.25 43.25 49.25 40.80 8.68 10.14 13.54 15.88 19.25 21.00 23.52 23.46 36.57 38.65 40.36 35.83 99.98 99.98 99.96 99.94 99.92 99.90 99.88 99.91 99.74 99.69 99.64 24 99.75 So, how deep is the puzzle? Perform Method of Simulated Moments to select parameters: • • • : coefficient of relative risk aversion; : elasticity of inter-temporal substitution; b: strength of the bequest motive; To match selected moments in the data with model: • • • Annuity market participation; Amount of annuity demand (conditional on participation); Share of wealth annuitized. 25 Conclusion: How Deep is the Puzzle? Non-Stockholders Voluntary Voluntary Share annuity annuity market of wealth demand participation annuitized 3.95 4.25 20.37 Data 1.65 3.1 36.61 (s.e.) (4.57) (17.57)) (31.57) Model Estimate s b 0.2 γ 1.53 ψ 0.47 26 Conclusion: How Deep is the Puzzle? Stockholders Voluntary Voluntary Share annuity annuity market of wealth demand participation annuitized 5.30 10.40 24.00 Data 3.66 9.59 26.27 (s.e.) (9.58) (29.45) (25.77) Model Estimate s b 2.2 γ 0.59 ψ 0.10 27 Conclusion: How Deep is the Puzzle? Maybe not too puzzling, after all … Thank you. 28