The 2010s: Take 2
Whereas in the 1970s-80s there was great hesitation to review theories seen
as befitting the Cold War and in the 1990s-2000s the range of theoretical revisions
cautiously reflected overall confidence in Asian developments, IR theories faced new
skepticism in the 2010s, buffeted by challenges arousing growing pessimism. Unlike
the previous periods, Sino-U.S. relations are on a collision course, North Korea acts
with seeming impunity, Sino-Russian relations pose serious concerns, and divergent
efforts to reorganize Asia are advancing quickly and in opposition to each other. The
ferment is intensifying, and IR theories are lagging badly in interpreting its meaning.
In the current decade the Sino-U.S. relationship has taken on the trappings of
a new Cold War. Instead of a “G-2” through which the resurgent superpower and the
sole state widely expected to be the next superpower reach consensus on resolving
global and regional problems, a rivalry has ensued, marked by security, economic,
and cultural competition of an intensity not seen among the great powers since the
end of the Cold War. Summits between the two rivals captivate world attention as
did U.S.-Soviet summits. International meetings are scrutinized for how their sharp
divisions are widened or narrowed. With the United States welcoming membership
in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and China pressing for both a triangular FTA
with Japan and South Korea and an East Asian FTA centered on ASEAN and omitting
the United States, the lines were drawn for conflicting approaches to regionalism.
Of all themes in IR theory, none was more compelling in the 2010s than that
of a rising power, centering on China’s rapid ascent and the response in the United
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States and in neighboring states. This cut across nearly all discussions about China
linked to IR, whether about triangular relations, regionalism, or civilizations. Theory
is concerned not only with whether a rising power and hegemonic power can avoid
war, but also how other states position themselves with respect to the two powers.
For the principal antagonists, questions center on which conditions lead to greater
competition or cooperation. For other great powers, ideas about triangularity are
being tested, whether in the case of Russia the lingering goal of a strategic triangle
or in the case of Japan balance between the U.S. alliance and a rising Chinese claim
to regional leadership. Further questions about triangularity take notice of South
Korea, India, and ASEAN. As in the 2000s, theories must explain the complicated
course of regionalism from the EAS as the new umbrella association encompassing
all the great powers in the region to the precarious SCO dangling between expansion
and marginalization and the moribund Six-Party Talks serving as a framework for
bilateral discussions aimed at finding a path forward for North Korea. With China
more explicit in its civilizational challenge to the West, concerns about the impact of
culture on IR theory were increasing in importance beyond anything seen earlier.
In 2013 two clashing views drew on IR theories as well as different readings
of the situation in East Asia. One view was that the region was heading to a new Cold
War, driven by a more aggressive China, supported by Russia, aquiescent to North
Korean belligerence, and targeting Japan first of all. China’s calls for a new model of
great power relations, respectful of core interests, were driving Japan to bolster its
military budget and the U.S. alliance, while raising suspicions in numerous countries
that this was a screen for expansionism and a Chinese sphere of influence. If Chinese
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anticipated that this approach would drive a wedge between U.S. allies and expose
the United States as the hegemon unwilling to accommodate the rising power, more
likely was a firm U.S. response as allies and others drew closer strategically. Theory
was challenged to explain why this was happening and how states were responding.
The second view optimistically accepted the priority of economic objectives,
anticipating compromises that would revive the positive atmosphere of the 2000s.
On North Korea, it called for rewards to elicit trust, pretending that a soft line to the
North’s nuclear weapons and missiles as long as there was a freeze on tests did not
mean emboldening the North as a nuclear weapons state. On the territorial clash
between Japan and China, concessions to acknowledge that a dispute exists and to
start talks offered hope of alleviating tensions without explaining why China would
be patient if it did not achieve its desired goals quickly. Idealists fell back on logic of
the 1990s and 2000s without confronting the harsher realities of the past few years.
Optimists varied on which of many venues would achieve the breakthrough
that they anticipated. If Obama made a strong push for better Sino-U.S. relations, the
results would likely be promising, they argued. Once the Sino-Japanese-South Korea
FTA talks went forward, all-around relations would advance. Other ideas included a
new venue of Sino-U.S.-Japanese talks, but missing in such appeals was clarity on
what China was seeking and on how damaging was Chinese rhetoric equating Japan
with militarist Japan in the 1930s and the United States with the anti-communist
Cold War enemy of the 1960s. Confusing Japanese realism with revisionism and the
U.S. pivot with containment contributed to the backlash against China, destroying
the basis for idealism, rupturing ASEAN, and increasingly polarizing the region.
4
Boosters of national identity in the United States, China, and elsewhere were
intent on making IR theory consistent with their beliefs. The neoconservatives of the
early George W. Bush years had a chance to act on their theory, and in campaigns by
presidential candidates John McCain and Mitt Romney as well as in the hearings for
Barack Obama’s national security nominees of 2013, their IR thinking was further in
evidence. Rejecting liberal notions of benefits from multilateralism and economic
interdependence, they coupled belief in aggressive promotion of values with realist
certitude about the need for unilateral U.S. leadership backed by a “coalition of the
willing” to preempt threats. Still justifying the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while
denying the value of diplomacy through the Six-Party Talks and diplomacy with Iran
as well as the reset with Russia, the U.S. vulcans assumed an extreme version of the
“beacon on the hill” messianic identity complements an extreme interpretation of a
realist security posture, downplaying international diplomacy. Confronting China
sooner rather than later fit this theoretical viewpoint, opposing Obama’s IR policy.
Theory led to the conclusion that Obama was coddling rivals. Iran, North Korea,
China, and Russia were all on the list with scant concern about division among them.
Boosters of Chinese and Russian national identity are enamored of theory of
a strikingly different nature, which, in a modified form, attracted adherents abroad.
As in the case of U.S. vulcans, national sovereignty was sacrosanct. Desired IR results
are foreseen on the basis of aggressively defending it and threats, interpreted with a
broad brush. These boosters also have little room for positive implications of more
multilateralism and economic interdependence as forces for peace and stability. For
them, realism centers on pursuing a balance of power opposed to U.S. hegemonism.
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It also leads to blocking moves to support Western humanitarian intervention and
use of the United Nations Security Council to promote values associated with it. If
North Korea flexes its military muscle, then the theoretical basis for choosing more
engagement and greater incentives rather than more pressure or containment is its
insecurity in the face of the power and values diplomacy amassed against it. Rather
than acknowledge that support for North Korea is part of realist resistance to the
U.S. alliance system or a holdover from ideological commitment to the communist
bloc, the theoretical case is couched in the threatening U.S. strategy and ideology. If
theorists elsewhere do not start with the same logic, many agree on the realist twist
for further assurance to the North while adding a liberal element on multilateralism
as a force for building trust while also securing greater Chinese help in this crisis.
There was a common temptation to incorporate identities as little more than
a complicating factor in explaining the deviations from realist and liberal theories. If
historical memory exacerbated threat perceptions, then they distorted the impact of
realist considerations or slowed the pace of multilateral institutionalization. Holding
firm to one’s theoretical orientation was more comforting than trying out another
one, despite the inaccuracy of predictions and inability to account for rapid changes.
One problem in applying national identity theory is a lack of agreement on
what it is. If an identity is assumed to be a constant, then it seems to be of little use
in explaining changes in IR. Only conceptualizing national identity as changing and
offering a way to estimate the changes overcomes this problem. Moreover, treating
identity as if it were one-dimensional results in a fixation on narrowness. Ideology
may have predominated at times in the identity of communist states, and historical
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memory or the temporal dimension in bilateral relations with Japan recently has
taken center stage, but those two dimensions do not suffice for the larger picture.
Theorists were slow to grasp that China had become the driving force in the
region and that it prioritized a clash of narratives about history, civilizations, and
security. In the Obama years, even more than the early Clinton period known for
assertive advocacy of human rights toward China and the early George W. Bush
years known for an assertive, unilateral foreign policy, finding common ground with
China while reassuring it were hallmarks of U.S. policy. While some argued that
Obama’s “pivot” to East Asia or his “strategic patience” toward North Korea were
policies that led to a reactive Chinese diplomacy, others saw these as responses to a
lack of strategic transparency coupled with aggressive Chinese initiatives and the
clarification that denuclearization of North Korea is a low Chinese priority as acts of
aggression go publically uncriticized without serious Security Council sanctions. In
March 2013 a new sanctions resolution passed, showing that China wanted to check
North Korea’s threat to regional peace, but leaving in doubt how vigorously it would
be enforced after it had been watered down at China’s insistence. A critical issue in
theorizing remained to identity which country was causing the region’s problems.
In 2009-11 the Chinese national identity reconstruction took clear shape, and in
2012-13 its clashing conception of IR theory was repeatedly reiterated. Theorists
who avoided the theme of China’s transformation and its essence repeated stale
arguments about realism and liberalism, often seeing China responding to U.S.
initiatives. Once attention focused on China’s rhetoric and on the way issues in the
region were being interpreted, the prospect of revising IR theory was improving.
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Optimists suggested giving North Korea more regime security, then it would
be peaceful and opt for reforms. They proposed that Japan recognize a territorial
dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which would convince China
to revert to its “peaceful development” strategy of the 2000s and the agreement for
joint development of resources in the East China Sea. Many called on U.S. leaders to
reassure Russia after it was alienated in 2001-08, expecting the “reset” to transform
relations. The Six-Party Talks in 2003-08, Japan’s “thaw” with China in 2006-08, and
the “reset” in 2009-12 were premised on hopes placed on engagement and goodwill.
None succeeded. North Korea, China, and Russia bided their time and then, without
provocation except to the extent they could find a pretext, turned more hostile. The
impact on liberal theories of these and other setbacks is profound in the 2010s.
Future-oriented as theory is, it must look ahead to the regional architecture
of the 2020s or beyond. Terms that have been introduced and then allowed to lapse
offer clues to what is on the horizon. Will there be a Beijing consensus, whereby in
values, its model of development, and its approach to IR, China will gain stature as
the sole rival of the United States, and, if so, to what extent will this rivalry parallel
the U.S.-Soviet polarization over four decades? Answers require insight into what is
the will of China’s leaders, why they may choose this option, and which countries
they can rally in support. Realist theory would focus more attention on the role of
the United States, liberal theory more on the workings of multilateral organizations,
and constructivist theory more on China’s internal debates. All can shed light on the
way China has become the driving force, whose decisions may lead to a Cold War.
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A New Cold War?
The future of Sino-U.S. relations posed one of the primary IR concerns of the
2010s. From the perspective of a dominant power facing a rising power, one view is
that strategic reassurance is the most essential factor; yet when Obama launched his
presidency with Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg using this term to win
the trust of China the response was a sharp rebuff. Another view is that the ideology
of the two powers matters most. Chinese insisted that U.S. thinking remained anticommunist in a cold war mentality, but it was actually China that had reconstructed
the trappings of an ideology—mixing socialism, sinocentrism, and anti-imperialism.
A third perspective is that clashing territorial claims bring to the surface the rising
power’s expansionism and the hegemonic power’s rejection of that. Many expected
Taiwan to be the focus of this incompatibility, but in 2010-12 small islands in the
South China Sea and East China Sea produced the most serious divide. The islands
had been a subject of dispute for decades; so what changed was China’s decision to
raise tensions and even to threaten the use of force. Theorists were challenged to
explain why. The threat to China had not increased; so the only explanation, in the
midst of Chinese charges that the fault was renewed Japanese militarism or U.S.
pressure on Southeast Asian states as part of a containment strategy, was rising
confidence that brought the emerging Chinese national identity to the foreground.
Whether this was linked to worries about the legitimacy of the communist party or a
revival of sinocentrism in China’s traditional worldview could not be differentiated.
Liberal theorists faced the challenge of a China so confident of its power and
economic ascendancy that it had decided to use economic threats in order to press
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other states to back away from human rights challenges, such as hosting the Dalai
Lama, or security challenges, such as maritime territorial disputes. Instead of an
intensified level of economic interdependency leading to increased trust and the
institutionalization of bilateral and multilateral relations, it was giving confidence to
Chinese who believed that asymmetrical dependence gave China new leverage. For
realist theorists, another problem existed. Asian states were hesitant to oppose their
principal trading partner. They also preferred to sustain multilateral organizations
that obscured a strategic response to China or even North Korea. The nexus of both
economic-security ties and cultural-security ties did not fit prevalent assumptions.
We need to recognize that China as the rising power has a strategy to weaken
the United States, especially in East Asia, and split the alliances against it. At times
this has been directed against Japan-U.S. relations, especially in the 1990s, or South
Korean-U.S. relations, notably in 2003-07. In the face of new leadership in 2013 the
focus turned to Japan-South Korean relations, already deteriorating in 2012 over the
territorial dispute and the “comfort women” issue. In contrast to earlier sources of
tension, bilateral in nature or one hot spot at a time, China was taking advantage of
divided interests in responding to an immediate threat of conflict over North Korean
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and the Senkaku-Diaoyu dispute. In 2013
this double whammy was added to the volatile mix of tensions over Iranian nuclear
weapons development, Syrian civil war, and China’s disputes in the South China Sea.
U.S. responses to this complex environment included warning Japan not to arouse
South Korea and divert its attention, warning China on new sanctions against North
Korea that would follow new provocations, and warning China against provoking
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Japan into military clashes. At the same time, U.S. overtures to China called for more
cooperation, in line with the hopes of the countries appealing for U.S. intervention.
Only by grasping the national identity roots of these complicated maneuvers, finding
a balance between further East Asian regionalism and wider U.S. centered alliances,
would U.S. strategy, taking the entire region into account, likely find a path forward.
The United States was being dragged into three disputes, which threatened
to result in armed conflict or, at least, a Cold War atmosphere: North Korea’s nuclear
program, the Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea, and the Chinese dispute
with various maritime states in Southeast Asia over the South China Sea. As China
grew assertive over North Korea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, the
U.S. response was, indeed, realist in rebalancing and strengthening alliances and
defense partnerships. Yet, theorists grappled with what to combine with realism. If
it were U.S. national identity, then the response of demonizing North Korea to the
point of ruling out compromise could alienate South Korea as well as China, Russia,
and others, even Japan, that preferred more multilateralism with engagement still
on the table. If it were liberalism, then the message to allies might be that the North
Koreans would be recognized as a nuclear power and China the go-between for it.
China has made clear its opposition to the formation of a new world order in
which U.S. primacy would be recognized. Calls for stability are directed against U.S.
appeals to deal with long-term threats to stability, while also preempting U.S. moves
that could produce an immediate confrontation. Linking perceived U.S. containment
of China with U.S. threats to other states, Chinese limit their cooperation and save
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their empathy for the countries suffering from alleged U.S. “coercion.” This pattern
is conducive to regional polarization and Cold War, but North Korea remains a test.
Calls by U.S. and Chinese academics for the other to change direction actually
backfired. Appealing to China in 2006-08 to be more assertive and less passive in its
foreign policy in order to help to resolve problems rather than leaving them to U.S.
initiatives, U.S. voices got more than they bargained for from 2009 when China’s
policies shifted. Similarly, Chinese academics called on the United States to be more
self-confident in order to compromise more on international disputes, but Obama’s
confidence in U.S. leadership in Asia came back to haunt China. The reality was that
assertiveness or even confidence by either power brings clashing goals to the fore.
China strives to weaken the U.S. position by establishing a web of economic
dependencies on itself combined with minimal multilateralism. In a few years from
2009 it became more aggressive in support of North Korea and against South Korea,
Japan, maritime states in Southeast Asia, and the United States. Theorists need to
explain why this happened and its timing. If China’s arguments are accepted, then it
was provoked, as in the late 2012 Japanese “nationalization” of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
territorial dispute, but few agree that all or even any of the states targeted by China
took hostile measures prior to China’s aggressive moves. It was on the offense.
Instead of the U.S. war on terror, which turned into an obsession against the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, rallying China and Russia into a joint campaign, it
was twisted in these nations into an anti-communist or Cold War style crusade with
containment of their own country the ultimate objective. Their focus centered not
on denuclearization, which they professed to support, nor on the shared danger
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from Al Qaeda and its affiliates, but on the necessity of U.S. concessions to ensure
regime security and renounce criticism centered on universal values in order to win
the confidence of these antagonists, even if there was scant reciprocity from them.
Only by accepting its own decline and refraining from efforts to reshape the world
would U.S. policies satisfy Chinese and Russian leaders. Rather than rallying states
such as South Korea and Turkey to join in pressuring North Korea or Iran to agree to
denuclearization, U.S. policy should agree to their rising reliance on China or Russia.
Many themes in this decade reflected the rise of Asia. Talk of a G-2, prospects
for a wide-ranging East Asian Summit, talks for a Trans-Pacific Partnership coming
at the same time as talks for China-Japan-South Korea FTA were new developments
of the 2010s. All were part of reorganization in Asia that threatened to produce a
new Cold War, which could lead to polarization, driving countries into one camp or
the other. Yet, there were test cases that remained unsettled and potential swing
states whose choices remained to be decided. North Korea was the first key test.
The Strategic Triangle
The balance between the United States and China was changing in China’s
favor, given the greater gap in economic growth after the global financial crisis and
the rapid military modernization of China. Moreover, China’s growing assertiveness
along its borders, although not toward Russia and Central Asia, aroused concern in
some circles in Russia. With Medvedev in 2009-11 pursuing a “reset” policy with the
Obama administration, there was reason to expect some rebalancing of the triangle
in which Russia was clearly the weakest power. Theorists were challenged to argue
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if Russia would refocus its foreign policy and whether China or the United States
were prepared to entice it in order to shape the triangle to its advantage.
In the forefront in analysis of China’s rise was the U.S. response. In Chinese
publications there was little doubt that this response was unprovoked containment.
Writings in Russia echoed this argument, taking little care to distinguish responses
to China’s actions from offensive measures rooted in persistent Cold War thinking.
One factor driving Russia and China closer was the weakness of their states
as forces that could coordinate policies and international relations. Corruption was
rampant, factionalism widespread, and ministries often served as bailiwicks hard to
manage. China lacked a national security council, its military reported only to the
Communist Party leadership, and the 2012 generational turnover revealed horse
trading that might finally be corralled due to a smaller Political Standing Committee
and greater power concentration in the faction of Jiang Zemin led now Xi Jinping. In
Russia after the collapse of communist rule, personalized power stood in the way of
strong institutions. This arrangement depended heavily on the image of Putin and
the success of a reward system that contained conflict at the top and kept a lid on
social discontent from below. Fear that this formula for social cohesion is losing its
ability to prevent fragmentation as well as failing to generate timely reforms could
not be dispelled in 2012, when leadership transitions heightened public anxiety. The
fear that regimes were becoming more vulnerable widened concern that the United
States would press for democratization, exposing extreme cases of corruption and
fueling popular discontent. The upshot was a triangle of widened gaps with the main
source of concern and further reluctance to do anything to harm Sino-Russian ties.
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Theories that dwell on IR without consideration of national identities would
have a difficult time accounting for the forces shaping the strategic triangle. Russia
calibrated its relationship with the United States to the personalized concern of its
leadership for regime legitimacy and survival. Blocking the formation of a society
able to participate in politics through interest groups as would ordinarily follow the
modernization process, Russian as well as Chinese leaders are bent on skewing the
national identity in ways that focus self-esteem overwhelming at the state level even
as they leave the state weak apart from personalized executive power. Management
of IR reflects an obsession with this distorted goal of intensifying national identity.
Russia’s dependency on China in the 2000s-2010s resembles the dependency
of China on the United States in the 1970s-80s. In the 1990s, as in the 1960s, a weak
state convulsed by internal struggles was struggling without little prospect of using
triangular relations to its strategic advantage. Eventually, China sought a balanced
triangle, focusing on equidistance with the presumed goal of becoming the pivot.
Similarly, Russia can be expected to reposition itself. Mao’s identity obsession in the
1960s and Putin’s, as still seen in 2012, delayed this adjustment. Theories that pay
no heed to identity have failed to explain this delay and then how it was overcome.
The Sino-Russian relationship strengthened in 2012-13, as both states drew
a sharper line against the United States. Signs of increased political challenges from
domestic problems drove decisions to oppose the United States more vigorously as
well as to draw closer together. In 2006-08 Putin had sought closer ties with China,
and in 2009-11 China’s leaders had pressed for closer Russian ties. In this new age
as Putin renewed his earlier tone and Xi Jinping intensified China’s recent rhetoric
15
conditions were ripe for closer ties, diplomatically, militarily, and economically. In
the national identity narratives of the two states the case was drawn for new IR ties.
This convergence was rooted in the legacy of communist great power identities.
Igor Zevelev at the end of 2012 pointed to the limits of realism and liberalism
in accounting for this triangular relationship, noting that Russia’s perceptions of the
West are heavily influenced by national identity while its views of China are oddly
removed from discourse about identity. Particularly, in 2012 he found this trend
exacerbated with rising anti-Western rhetoric, opposing an imaginary an abstract
West and refusing to consider the changing balance of Sino-U.S. power.i
Other Triangular Frameworks
Japan could be the most important target of triangular maneuvering, but in
the 2010s China lost interest and Russia was struggling to find a way to express its.
Stronger than it had been when it had wooed Japan at times over the previous three
decades, China decided that Japan was too allied with the United States to be worth
further overtures. If a weaker China could find benefit in raising interest in Japan in
a more balanced triangle, a China that still trailed the United States in power did not
see enough advantage from a triangle still skewed in the U.S. favor to proceed. From
a theoretical perspective, this is not explicable by realist geometrical analysis, but by
the particular value of Japan to Chinese national identity in support of the legitimacy
of the Communist Party. Demonizing Japan as the unrepentant heir to imperialist
aggression trumps cultivating Japan as a peace-oriented state since 1945 ready to
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welcome China’s rise as a cooperative neighbor. With the spike in China’s identity
gathering force from 2008 to 2010, targeting Japan was a natural byproduct.
For Russia, Japan’s promise was more continuous despite frequent denials. It
served as an occasional “whipping boy,” as in Medvedev’s visit in 2011 to one of the
four islands in dispute, while it also loomed as a possible target of multipolarity. In
Russian national identity Japan had receded into a secondary role, allowing room for
more flexibility. At times it had figured into the triangle with the United States, but
as Putin refocused on a long-term strategy in the Asia-Pacific the triangle with China
had greater relevance. In late 2012 agreement was reached on rekindling the spirit
of the Irkutsk summit of 2001, as hopes were rising for Japanese investment in the
Russian Far East aimed primarily at energy exports to Japan.
Realist theories have not necessarily fared any better. They do not provide
guidance on how to forge multilateral coalitions that go against immediate economic
interests. Strengthening the U.S. alliances into trilateralism with Japan and South
Korea, each facing increased danger from North Korea, is a case in point. Neither
country approaches the other by prioritizing realism over historical vindication.
Even the longstanding U.S. attitude of remaining aloof from their squabbles apart
from urging both sides to keep calm was proving more difficult as ads in U.S. papers
and memorials on U.S. streets as each side considered escalating the conflict flew in
the face of deepening common threats from North Korea and China.
At opposite ends of East Asia are North Korea and Myanmar, whose changing
posture in the 2010s posed challenges to Sino-U.S. relations. China drew closer to its
ally, North Korea, from 2010, despite the North’s provocative behavior, and defiant
17
of the understandings with the United States in 2007-08, which had led to the Joint
Agreement in the Six-Party Talks. IR theory had to address the role of a belligerent
third country in the triangle encompassing the world’s two leading powers. In the
case of Myanmar, its shift toward the United States in 2012 set back relations with
China, while offering promise for broader integration into Southeast Asian as well as
global markets and political circles. This too raised theoretical questions regarding
triangularity and diversification beyond dependence on one power.
The North Korean Challenge
North Korea posed an unprecedented challenge to states active in Northeast
Asia and to IR theory. One response was to predict a fortuitous regime collapse that
would spare other states the difficulty of coordinating to remove the threat. Wishful
thinking about the unsustainability of and extremely oppressive regime able to offer
few economic benefits and facing dynastic leadership change preempted IR analysis.
A second response was to presume that shared interests in economic growth and
regional stability would translate into a joint strategy through the Six-Party Talks.
An alternative perspective focused on North Korea’s advantage maneuvering among
states with conflicting security priorities and identities. If the most important divide
was between China and the United States, other differences relevant to theory were
between South Korea and both the United States and Japan. Opinions differed on the
relative priority of denuclearization, non-proliferation, regional stability, alliance
maintenance, and alliance disruption.
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North Korea remained a critical test of Sino-U.S. relations to avert a Cold War.
China’s lack of cooperation on denuclearization, putting the bulk of the blame for the
failure of the Six-Party Talks on the U.S. negotiating position, aroused great distrust.
At the end of 2010, China’s blasé response to North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong
island led to a warning from Obama that U.S. support would be given to South Korea
in its pledge to retaliate in the event of another attack. China took the warning to
heart, although the January 2011 Hu-Obama summit made only minimum headway
in finding wording to suggest that the two powers were narrowing their differences
on this issue. As Chinese trade with the North grew rapidly and North Korea tested
long-range missiles with scant response in the UN Security Council, to the chagrin of
the United States, tempers over this critical security issue continued to simmer. For
U.S. policymakers, a more imminent showdown with Iran over its nuclear weapons
development and strong indications of Iranian-North Korean cooperation, as in the
improvement in the North’s long-range missiles in 2012, made countenance of the
North’s nuclear weapons more difficult, despite China’s insistence that this should
be the first stage of relaxing regional tensions that might win North Korea’s trust. In
the case of Chinese policymakers, linkage between North Korea and Taiwan loomed
in the background with some suspecting that the end of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
and a posture more amenable to reunification would lead to Chinese moderation on
North Korea. The Chinese priority for Taiwan in national identity paralleled the U.S.
priority for Iran in national security as a factor adding to tensions over North Korea.
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In 2013 as North Korea threatened to unleash war, repeated U.S. warnings of a large
military build-up put China on the spot either to pressure the North and appear to
do the U.S. bidding or to stand by and appear to abet the breakdown of Asian order.
If China’s goal is sinocentrism, which shakes loose South Korea’s dependence
on the United States as well as the U.S. alliance system in Asia, then North Korea can
serve China’s strategy. If the Korea collapsed and was absorbed by the South or even
if it agreed to a peaceful strategy of denuclearization without posing further threats,
then China’s aspirations would be frustrated. North Korean reforms would lead to
its destabilization, and U.S confidence would be bolstered as alliance partners felt
reassured. If, instead, North Korea veered between provocations and negotiations,
the United States and, especially, South Korea would be inclined to seek stability in a
manner that reinforces China’s leverage. North Korea is accustomed to playing one
rival off against another, as in three decades of manipulating the Soviet Union and
China during the Sino-Soviet split. If it found a new balance in a renewed Cold War
atmosphere between two adversaries, that would be welcome. For China, it would
be preferable as a path toward sinocentrism and leverage on South Korea to a weak
North Korea losing its clout in destabilizing a regional order that China aims to alter.
Regionalism
Regionalism remains a test for IR theory centered on Asia. In the 2010s the
East Asian Summit expanded to include the United States and Russia, raising the
prospect for wide-ranging regionalism, while China pressed harder for exclusive
regionalism focused on ASEAN or at most ASEAN + 3. With competing ideals of the
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range and function of regionalism, theorists were challenged to predict the course of
this quest. Multiple answers were given. One postulated the primacy of economic
reasoning, as states pursued economic integration when other factors proved to be
unfavorable. With China’s rapid economic rise and increasing primacy in the region,
the expected outcome was China-centered regionalism. Another hypothesized the
priority of security, arguing that confidence in improved security is decisive. This is
a prescription for U.S. leadership at China’s expense. A third answer focused on the
assumed aspiration for balance in great power leadership as the best guarantee of
security. This would lead to attempts to find equilibrium between powers. Finally, a
fourth response emphasized identity, requiring a shared vision of the fit between
national, regional, and global identities. The likelihood of finding complementarity is
low; so that regionalism would advance slowly, if at all, if this answer applies. The
EAS, ASEAN + 3, the SCO, CJK, and the Six-Party Talks were all tests of regionalism.
Many interpretations of regionalism are based on arguments about economic
integration serving as a driving force in community formation. They posit increased
trust through mutual dependence. Yet, developments that demonstrate the benefits
of regional FTAs do not necessarily translate into shared understanding of security
or overlapping values that forge community awareness. Moreover, membership in a
region raises the question of how to determine who is included or excluded. Theory
may focus on degree of economic interaction, but even that is subject to alternative
views, given the mixture of investments, markets, production networks, and formal
agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Economics alone does not
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make a community, as seen in challenges facing China, Japan, and South Korea in the
search for a CJK FTA or ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 6 in a quest for an East Asian FTA.
Theorists faced the challenge of recognizing how much China had changed
from the 2000s to the 2010s and why. Many continued to focus on the United States
as the driving force in East Asia, overstating the impact of what it might do to boost
ties with China or to forge opposition to China. Simplistic answers put little weight
on triangular relations, national identities, and situations such as North Korea’s new
belligerent posture that had no easy solutions. One source of simplification was to
argue that domestic conditions oblige regimes to change in the desired direction,
whether the yearning for freedom or an escape from poverty in North Korea or the
rise of civil society in China and Russia. Wishful thinking was common in theories.
Another source of simplification was to focus on quick ways to build trust as if the
symbols of distrust were the actual causes. Many argued that Japan’s mishandling of
sensitive historical issues, such as visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and disputes over
islands and textbooks, were the principal reasons for distrust. Genuine contrition
would supposedly provide the reassurances needed in China and South Korea. In
these arguments, advocates were repeating the assumptions of the Cold War era:
communist regimes would collapse from uncompromising responses (realism) or
wide-ranging reforms (realists); and countries burdened by historical memories
opposed to each other would ameliorate their differences through apologies and
common security concerns as well as economic interdependence. If previously
solutions were not found, the conclusion was to redouble mutual efforts. More
integration, such as the China-Japan-South Korea (CJK) FTA would be the answer.
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East vs. West Civilization
In the first years of the 2010s national identities were growing more intense.
IR theory lacked an explanation for why this was happening and how it was altering
bilateral relations. China was in the forefront, as few doubted that Xi Jinping played
on this emotionalism more than Hu Jintao, whose final years had seen a spike in all
dimensions of national identity. In place of the moderation on identity themes of
Medvedev, Putin returned to the presidency trumpeting identity themes. In Japan,
Abe Shinzo, the leader best known for his obsession with national identity, gained
the prime minister’s post for a second time advertising this passion as a remedy for
two decades of malaise and newfound pressure from its neighbors. Progressives did
not regain the presidency in South Korea in 2012, but their candidate narrowly lost
after it had been widely assumed after a resounding defeat five years earlier that the
strong identity message of Roh Moo-hyun had alienated the public. While tea party
boosters in the United States in 2010-12 did not control the executive branch, they
similarly revealed the susceptibility of the public to an extreme, emotional message.
Explaining the widespread readiness to take refuge in claims to superiority of
one’s nation, observers could point to rising insecurity in the wake of globalization
and a world financial crisis that raised doubt about longstanding assumptions. Also,
the degree to which dependency on the United States had satisfied nations had to be
reassessed, as did U.S. soft power at a time of repeated self-inflicted wounds. The
less confident people felt that their state controlled its own destiny, the more eager
they became to embrace claims about the uniqueness or superiority of their nation.
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Advocates of genuine globalization were hard to find in the growing backlash
of the 2010s. Obama had played down this theme and his support for climate change
legislation during his 2012 campaign. The “global Korea” hoopla of Lee Myung-bak
was little in evidence in the campaign to succeed him in 2012. Instead of inspiration
in resolving urgent global problems, leaders were consumed with satisfying popular
grievances over perceived historical injustices. Widening national identity gaps with
neighbors or others, they catered to aroused domestic constituencies at the expense
of diplomatic pragmatism. The sources of the downward spiral in the international
environment were, first of all, China, which in the early 2010s decided to demonize
the states with which it had constructed a wide identity gap, and, second, the United
States, which through a combination of causing the world financial crisis and failing
to agree on responsible and timely decisions to manage its aftermath, undermined
confidence in the management of the world economic system. IR theories did little
to explain U.S. dereliction of duty even as some tried to explain China’s behavior in
realist terms despite the limitations of shortchanging the impact of national identity.
What made the downward spiral in relations most serious from 2012 is that
in the thinking of each state the various disputes had become joined—to concede
ground on one meant that one’s nation would become much more vulnerable on the
others. The need to hold the line was growing. Indeed, going on the offense was now
seen as an effective way to rally one’s base in the face of what were seen as growing
pressure and victimization. In China, Russia, and Japan Xi, Putin, and Abe seized the
moment to take assertive approaches that few anticipated only a year or two before.
Xi led China’s new Political Standing Committee to pay homage at a history museum
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as the symbolic beginning of a new era. Putin broke sharply with the West, renewing
the historical mindset of the communist era coupled with a sharper divide between
tsarist Russia and Western civilization. Abe broke taboos present since Japanese had
embraced defeat in the late 1940s. Each leader appeared to be saying the time had
come to overcome an era of historical shame and silence.
A rising power can pose a civilizational challenge as well as a strategic one. IR
theory may ignore culture, treat it as peripheral, or make it a centerpiece in analysis.
It was customary when Japan was the foremost threat in Asia to acknowledge a role
for civilizational divides, but the postwar period saw a backlash against claims to be
civilizing the world, which extended to hesitation against charging other states with
such intentions. Chinese writings have no such compunctions, as much is written on
the negative nature of Western civilization in contrast to the harmonious legacy of
China’s heritage. While many studies of IR still eschew the civilizational theme, it is
present in writings about Chinese national identity and its impact on foreign policy.
Theoretical coverage of Sino-U.S. relations veered between parallels with the
Soviet-U.S. clash in the Cold War and recollection of the Japanese-U.S. competition at
the end of the Cold War. In the first case, concentration on ideologies obscured other
differences linked to national identities, while in the second case second thoughts on
how apparent cultural differences appeared to have been exaggerated led to calls to
avoid similar excesses. Both types of lessons mitigated against serious analysis of
the civilizational variable in Sino-U.S. relations.
In the 1960s-70s the Sino-Soviet dispute was characterized by far-reaching
mutual accusations of incompatible civilizations. What began as an exchange of
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narrow charges about ideological differences became venomous denunciations of
each other’s essence from time immemorial, deviating from some allegedly normal
course of development. In the 2010s Chinese demonization of the United States,
Japan, and South Korea followed a similar trajectory, attacking differences related to
security or regime character as the result of nothing less than a fundamental divide
between a conflictual civilization, given to war and imperialism, and a harmonious
civilization that produced a model regional order and is ready to duplicate that if not
for containment policies stirring trouble near its borders. IR theory explaining that a
single world civilization is taking shape as middle-class societies inexorably share
the same tastes and values fail to account for the widening gap in Chinese rhetoric.
Chinese were driving discussions of a civilizational divide, which accounts for
foreign policy conflict. Not only did they repeatedly argue that Eastern civilization,
represented by China, and Western civilization, embodied by the United States, must
diverge on human rights and “universal values” because of civilizational factors, not
Communist Party rule, but they charged that Sino-Japanese antagonism originates in
a civilization gap in the East and that Sino-South Korean relations are burdened by
the impact of Western civilization on the South. North Korea is spared such analysis,
and Russian civilization is mostly treated as separate from the West, lacking those
negative features that are driving the East-West conflict.
After the establishment of the G-20 China referred to the globalization of
bilateral relations and identified itself as the defender of the developing world in
opposition to the agenda of the United States in protecting an unjust distribution of
world power for the one-sided benefit of the existing powers, which, as seen in the
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global financial crisis, is causing great damage and needs to be change. The upshot
of this worldview is that China and the United States will find cooperation in the G20 very difficult. China will champion the case for governance reform, changing the
share distribution and voting structure as well as the reserve security system and
other features that do not reflect changes in the distribution of economic power. If
both countries value the G-20 and are prepared to make further compromises there,
this is unlikely to be the venue for the most serious clashes between them. Economic
dialogue here and in bilateral meetings is proceeding more smoothly than strategic
dialogue. Yet, the civilizational theme shadows economic relations too
Deciding that communism must be saved by Chinese civilization, after it lost
in the Soviet Union through a flawed connection to Russian civilization, Chinese saw
the fact that Russia had long seen itself as part of the West and Soviet leaders had
reaffirmed their support for humanism as differences that could work in China’s
favor. Since the primary threat was U.S. soft power, this had to be resisted by all
means possible. This meant maximizing the divide, insisting that human rights are a
tool for the dismemberment of China by weakening its unity and cohesion. Support
for the Dalai Lama and religious freedom were divorced from principled humanism.
Preempting efforts to join Confucianism and humanism leaders insisted on shaping
a bastardized Confucianism that they tethered to communism. Although desperate
moves to channel growing despair over rampant corruption and loss of ideals into
anti-Americanism echoed Soviet moves of the 1970s, China’s leaders intensified
them on the assumption that they had found a different formula able to work even
as economic growth slowed and social problems deepened. When Obama visited
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China in late 2009, he was prevented from speaking to the Chinese people over
television as U.S. presidents had been permitted previously from concern that he
projected charisma, which can cast doubt on the civilizational divide leaders wanted
citizens to accept. After all, Gorbachev in May 1989 had won a Chinese following.
When the entire newly chosen Politburo Standing Committee visited the
renovated National Museum to view an exhibition on “National Revival,” Xi Jinping
praised its expression of the “great national spirit,” trumpeting the “Chinese Dream”
and making “national rejuvenation” his theme.
The Japanese-South Korean downturn in relations in the early 2010s added
to the perplexity of IR theorists in explaining this relationship over half a century. If
Abe’s call in 2013, at last, to forge a complete military alliance with the United States
confirmed realist theories, his stubborn insistence on retracting the 1993 apology
on “comfort women” damaged relations with South Korea deemed vital for the U.S.
alliance system to the complete dismay of IR theorists. Failing in 2012 to conclude a
deal for basic intelligence sharing and left with little prospect of coordination on the
ballistic missile defense system deemed vital for regional security, especially in the
face of North Korea’s progress in missile technology, the two “virtual allies” defied
the logic of security requirements widening an identity gap fixated on a bygone era.
In the 2010s the notion that IR could ignore historical memory appeared
increasingly far-fetched. East Asian states strove to reinforce their national identity
with greater pride in their history. Compromise on matters of historical symbolism
grew more difficult as redemption meant taking action that angered other states.
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If market economies do not bring democracy and an information glut does
not lead to convergence of thinking, then what will result in increased trust? The
prospect of facing common threats such as climate change and Islamic terrorism is
not having this effect. Increased frequency of dialogue accompanied by assurances
from savvy diplomats is not building trust. Youth exchanges and study abroad does
not mean that the younger generations are less susceptible to virulent accusations
against another country. Appeals for more trust are rarely accompanied by efforts to
understand the reasoning of the other side that accounts for the distrust. Symbols of
humiliation are eclipsing markers of diplomatic progress. Demonizing supposed
adversaries was the hallmark of traditional communism, and it has resumed in the
states heir to this tradition, reverberating to a degree in the states being demonized.
With China’s penchant to present the contrast as East vs. West and the U.S. habit of
contrasting universal values to authoritarianism a civilizational dichotomy ensues.
Conclusion
Two extreme positions fit best with theoretical traditions: readiness to see a
new Cold War over the horizon, narrowing concerns to the realist perspective that
prevailed at the time; and optimism about institutionalization of mechanisms that
would boost the impact of economic integration, fixating on the liberal framework
that gained popularity in the 1990s. Neither position struck a balance appropriate to
the ups and downs of China’s relations with other states, notably the United States.
When priorities were under consideration, theories that left little room for
compromise were called into question. In 2013 as the priorities of the wars in Iraq
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and Afghanistan were being replaced with new ones during Obama’s second term,
some under the sway of realist theory insisted on tough policies toward China and
Russia that might have jeopardized their cooperation on Iran, North Korea, and
Syria. Still enamored of liberal theory, others clamored for further incentives to
North Korea and China that would jeopardize relations with South Korea and Japan
while also exposing weakness in U.S. policy unnerving to many other states. In the
complex atmosphere of relative dangers from some countries exceeding those due
to other countries, at the least in the short run, theories redolent of the Cold War do
not seem adequate. With certain allies, such as Poland and Japan at times, eager for
a tough U.S. response to Moscow or Beijing, and others, such as France and Australia
at times, seeking a more accommodating U.S. response, finding a balance is not easy,
especially given the theoretical inadequacies of specifying what it may look like.
Massive leadership change in 1992-93 raised hopes for a new era of amity on
terms favorable to democratization, human rights, and all-around globalization. In
2001-02 another mass turnover came with more ambivalence about its impact. The
third wave of post Cold War leadership renewal in 2012-13 exacerbated identity
gaps. IR theory faced the challenge of explaining why familiar names were topping
the leadership ranks in one state after another. As Hillary Clinton loomed as the
early favorite for 2016, Putin reclaimed Russia’s presidency, Abe returned as prime
minister in Japan, Park Geun-hye returned to the Blue House a generation after her
father’s assassination, and Xi Jinping gained China’s top spot a generation after his
father had returned from exile as one of China’s leadership group. Democracies or
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not, nations were seeking security through familiarity. This was linked with hopes
for reassurance about national identity in a period of deepening challenges.
i
Igor Zevelev, “A New Realism for the 21st Century: U.S.-China Relations and Russia’s
Choice,” Russia in Global Affairs, Dec. 27, 2012.