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International Relations Theory and the Rise of Asia, the 2010s
Ming Wan
(Preliminary draft: please do not cite or quote)
This chapter examines international relations theory and Asian studies in the
2010s, which presents both challenges and opportunities. It is particularly challenging to
study a moving target since we are only one quarter into the decade. At the same time, a
study of the present situation allows us to look back at our theoretical understanding of
East Asian international relations.
This edited book, as I understand it, analyzes how IR theories measure up to the
reality of East Asian international relations over time. So to highlight the marginal utility
of “my period” for understanding IR theory and Asia, I start with the assumption that a
dynamic status quo had been reached between IR theories and between IR theory and the
real-world Asia before my period. My task then is to examine whether the real world
developments in Asia constitute a shock to that equilibrium and how IR theories have
responded. The assumed equilibrium is a theoretical construct. The chapters on the
previous periods make it amply clear that there were evolving heated theoretical debates
and varying degrees of gap between theory and reality. At the same time, from a dynamic
perspective, it is not unreasonable to view a sort of theoretical stalemate indeed existing,
waiting to be shaken up by either theoretical advance or real world shocks. In this chapter
I focus on real world shocks while touching upon IR theory development.
The world does not make twists and turns neatly by decades. I see the main
current trends in Asia starting around 2008, corresponding to the Great Recession. I
examine the broad structural changes in the region. Several developments stand out in the
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region. First, Asia has fared relatively better in the Great Recession that has hit the
United States and Europe hard. At the same time, it has become clear that the Asian
economic growth is ultimately contingent upon the economic health of the advanced
economies. Second, China has continued to rise and has also become more assertive in
foreign relations, triggering serious territorial disputes with some neighboring countries.
Third, the United States has “pivoted” back or “rebalanced” to Asia partly in response to
China’s rise and to a changing power equation in Asia. Fourth, while the Sino-U.S.
dynamic casts shadow on almost all important issues in Asia, other countries continue to
pursue their own interests based on their perceptions and identities. As a case in point,
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are scoring some technical successes, which
has a predictable large impact on East Asian international relations. There are also surely
developments that may escape the attention of the contemporary observers. In fact, fear
of greater uncertainty is a key driver for foreign policy calculations in Asia at present.
Do all these developments add up to a shock to the assumed status quo? My view
is that real Asia has indeed raised enough questions for theorists but this is not a once-ina-life-time shock if we compare the 2010s to the previous decades in the postwar era and
if we compare Asia to some of the other regions, particularly the Middle East and
Europe, in the same decade. And Asia’s rise and China’s rise are known quantities.
How does IR theory explain all this? The short answer is that we are yet to see
new theories due to the long cycle of research and publication in the United States and
the hesitancy of most theorists to study a moving target without ready data. Equally
important, since theorists view their work as having relevance across cases and over time,
they would and do argue that the new developments are consistent with or vindicate their
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earlier arguments. In particular, some realists argue that their early warning about a SinoU.S. conflict is proving correct.
I argue that some IR theories look stronger now than before, namely balance of
power, balance of threat, power transition and security dilemma. But it is too early to
conclude that non-realist theories are discredited. We can continue to make the case that
while economic interdependence can and has been partly the source of tension, the East
Asian security environment would have been far more severe without it. And the
intensely emotional nature of the territorial disputes in the shadow of historical
grievances makes studies of national identities more salient. More fundamentally, for
many IR scholars, a theory remains viable if it continues to generate new research
questions and meaningful scholarship, which is clearly the case for liberal institutionalist
and constructivist research programs for Asian studies.
We see a continuous welcome trend of “mainstream” IR theorists migrating to
Asian studies, viewing Asia as the most salient world region to try out arguments in a
game for “big boys”. However, with some strong scholars who bridge IR and Asian
studies as exceptions,1 the gap between theories--if defined as abstract, universal,
explanatory rather than specific, analytical, descriptive--and real world developments has
enlarged in the 2010s in my assessment. As a case in point, domestic politics has become
1
For recent books, see for examples Gilbert Rozman, ed., National Identities and Bilateral Relations:
Widening Gaps in East Asia and Chinese Demonization of the United States (Stanford: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2013); Gilbert Rozman, ed., East Asian National Identities:
Common Roots and Chinese Exceptionalism (Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford
University Press, 2012); Carl J. Dahlman, The World Under Pressure: How China and India Are
Influencing the Global Economy and Environment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); Avery
Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield, eds., The Nexus of Economics, Security, and International Relations
in East Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012); Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the
United States and Power Balancing in East Asia (Stanford University Press, 2012); Thomas J. Christensen,
Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2011); Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian
Regionalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
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even more important and identity-driven emotions have grown more potent than before,
but theorists who have limited knowledge of the region push for more theoretical
scholarship even when we need to rethink what questions to ask and to enhance or even
rebuild our knowledge base for what is happening on the ground. Most IR theorists are
tacit scientific realists, scientific realism being a school of philosophy of science that
maintains that our best theory approximates the real world and that theories refer also to
the unobservable. But some influential IR theorists take a conscious anti-realist position
that a theory should be constructed deductively with assumptions and concepts that may
not refer to the reality.2 A scientific realist research program that takes descriptive
inference seriously would be more accommodating of Asian studies and the changing
reality of Asia.
This chapter includes three sections. The first section examines East Asian
international relations for the past few years. The next section matches that to IR theory.
The last section concludes the chapter.
Asia Keeps Rising
In this section, I will examine a few main trends that point to both Asia’s
continuous rise and more apparent tensions in the region.
1. Economic trends
Asia continues to rise despite the Great Recession, as shown in Figure 1. I use
nominal GDP because that is what most people think about and because a comparable
real GDP dataset for GDP per capita annual growth rates from 1961 to 2011 is
2
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,1999), pp. 47-91. For works on scientific realism, see Michael Devitt, “Aberrations of the Realism
Debate,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 61, Nos. 1-2 (February 1991), pp. 43-63; Geoffrey Hellman, “Realist
Principles”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 50, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 227-249; Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific
Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
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unavailable. As shown in Figure 1, East Asia and Pacific region that include China and
Japan grew faster than the world average, the European Union and the United States
almost continuously from 1961 on, the starting year of available data from the World
Bank. East Asia’s absolute growth rate has slowed down, but it is relatively faster than
the world average, the European Union and the United States in 2008-2011. Within East
Asia, Japan has experienced a lengthy period of economic slowdown since the early
1990s and China has been growing at a fast pace for the past three decades. Russia
experienced a sharp decline in the 1990s but enjoyed strong economic growth in the
2000s fueled by rising energy and commodity prices. Russia has suffered from the Great
Recession as badly as the advanced democracies. India, not included in the East Asian
and Pacific category in the World Bank database, began a period of faster economic
development in the early 1990s and is now growing faster than the East Asian region
although still not as fast as China. At the same time, the weakened Asian economy in
2011 shows clearly that Asia remains contingent upon the economic health of the
advanced market economies.
Figure 1: Asia Rising (nominal GDP)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online
We need to know who in Asia is rising and who is not. This is important for intraAsia international relations, which also affects world politics. To gauge accurately power
distribution, we can look at the sizes of the economy of the countries involved,
particularly those of the great powers. This chapter examines the “big five”, namely
China, India, Japan, Russia and the United States. Unlike some earlier chapters, India is
an emerging great power by the 2010s, the focus of this chapter.
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Figure 2 uses nominal GDP in current US$ from 1960 to 2011 to trace the power
distribution among the big five, using their shares of world total GDP. Shares of world
GDP allow us to compare the size of the great powers and to have a sense where these
countries stand in the world hierarchy. Figure 2 shows that Asia is moving to a multipolar
system if we exclude the United States, different from the previous period when Japan
alone was an economic superpower. This is not a China-dominant system. If we include
the United States and consider the fact that Japan is still more technologically advanced
than both China and India, that simple fact should be even clearer. Asia and the world
remain dominated by the United States.
Figure 2: Distribution of Power (nominal GDP)
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators online
Nominal GDP does not measure well countries’ real economic development due
to distortion of often volatile exchange rates and different prices in non-tradable goods
and services. In particular, nominal GDP tends to underestimate the real economic
welfare of developing countries like China and India. Figure 3 uses purchasing power
parity (PPP)-based GDP data for the five great powers. We should also look at PPP
because people began to talk about China’s rise in the early 1990s when the international
financial institutions released PPP-adjusted GDP information that showed that China was
more powerful economically than the nominal GDP would indicate. Indeed, China and
India look much stronger measured in real GDP as shown in Figure 3. But the basic
picture of a multipolar system among the Asian powers holds. One should also note that
the United States has experienced a relative decline since 2008 and China a sharp
increase in the same period due to the Great Recession. However, that should be a
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temporary change of fortunes for the two countries since the United States will eventually
recover from the crisis and China may have its own financial crisis at some point.3
Figure 3: Distribution of Power (real GDP)
Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development Indicators online
2. Security trends
Asia is spending more on defense expenditure. The SIPRI military expenditure
database show, as in Figure 4, that East Asia has grown significantly faster than all the
other regions except North America since the end of the Cold War. Not surprising, the
Soviet Union collapse sank dramatically Russia’s defense expenditure. European military
expenditure also decreased visibly. North America decreased on a similar pace as Europe
in the 1990s but grew sharply after 911.
Figure 4: Defense Spending: Asia versus the Rest
Source: SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
Turning to the Big Five, Figure 5 shows the overwhelming military presence of
the United States. The United States spent three times the combined military spending by
the other four in 1992 and almost two and half times in 2011. Thus, the big picture is U.S.
preeminence and the others playing catch-up if so desired. China’s rise is visible but the
country still pales next to the United States. At the same time, China’s military
expenditure has been increasing faster than Japan, India and Russia. SIPRI makes its own
estimate of the Chinese defense expenditure, which is much larger than China’s official
defense budget. There is also much expectation in the U.S. policy community that China
has the intention and capacity to match the United States in the foreseeable future. The
Ming Wan, “The China Model and the Great Recession: A Historical Comparison,” in Dali L. Yang, ed.,
The Great Recession and China’s Political Economy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 223-42.
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late 2000s and the early 2010s represented a turning point when China came to be viewed
as within reach of a near competitor to the United States militarily and that the United
States now faces tougher budgetary pressure.4 China is acquiring capabilities to deny
U.S. military intervention in its neighborhood. The Obama administration in its second
term is expected to reduce defense budgets by $500 billion over ten years. Thus, the
defense expenditure gap between China and the United States should close somewhat in
the coming years.
Figure 5: Military Expenditure among China, Japan, India and the United States
Source: SIPRI, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
More than simply military expenditure, if one follows the strategic studies, policy
statements, military doctrines and procurement in Asia, there is a visible trend among
some Asian countries to gradually shift to hedging and even hard checking on China.
Intra-Asia arms race has been partly disguised by the dominance of the United States: the
countries that worry about China could freeride on the United States. But with severe
fiscal challenges facing the United States, there are signs that the countries having
disputes with China will increase their military capabilities. As a case in point, the Abe
government made it clear at start of 2013 that Japan might increase defense spending and
the size of the Self Defense Forces in light of China’s perceived aggressiveness, the first
increase since 2002. In addition, the Japanese government decided in early January, 2013
to spend an extra ¥180 billion for missiles, fighter planes and helicopters for the next few
For some U.S. assessment of U.S.-China military balance, see Dan Blumenthal, “Sino-U.S. Competition
and U.S. Security: How Do We Assess the Military Balance,” NBR Analysis, December 2010. For
authoritative U.S. assessment of China’s military capabilities, see the annual report “Military and Security
Developments involving the People’s Republic of China” by the Pentagon mandated by Congress starting
in 2000. The most recent issue came out in May 2012.
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months as part of the supplementary budget, with China and North Korea identified as
the reason.5 Arms race in East Asia is on.
China, Japan, Russia and India are currently not involved in any actual military
conflicts. Japan has not fought in any war since WWII. China fought its share of wars
prior to the early 1980s, with its last combat occurring in a border conflict with Vietnam
in 1987. The Indian army engaged in a skirmish with Pakistan in 1999.6 Russia fought a
war against Georgia in August 2008.
The U.S. has engaged in wars and covert operations against radical Islamists
around the world since 2001, with two major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is in that
context that the U.S. government sought a rebalancing to the Asia Pacific. It is happening
but the U.S. continues to be pulled elsewhere, with the Arab Spring, the nuclear issue
with Iran and radical Islamist insurgencies in Africa. The United States also faces fiscal
challenges worsened by a political paralysis reflecting a more polarized domestic politics.
The second-term Obama administration is sending a strong signal that the
president wants to focus on domestic agenda and rebuilding rather than foreign
adventures. His new secretary of state and secretary of defense were Vietnam War
veterans who have learned from that dramatizing experience. At the same time, as it is
often the case, the development in Asia or elsewhere would continue to pull the United
States in whatever the administration would rather do.
3. Trends in regionalism
“¥180 billion in extra defense outlays eyed,” Japan Times, January 9, 2013, accessed on January 9, 2013,
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20130109x1.html>.
6
Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Whelon Wayman, Resort to War 1816-2007 (Washington, D.C.: CQ
Press, 2010), pp. 579-594.
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East Asia has been engaging more actively in regional cooperation since the early
2000s. What has been discussed most is whether East Asian regionalism is really
meaningful, typically with European integration as the standard. What is less discussed is
a gap between economic regionalism and the security architecture in Asia. The United
States that is at the center of Asian security alliance structure was not included in any
serious regional economic cooperation scheme once the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum (APEC) lost its leadership role.
A major development in the 2010s is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP), which seeks to align U.S. economic and security interests in the region, a move
welcomed to different degrees by most Asian countries. It is still early whether the
United States will be able to reconcile the two. Even if the TPP is created successfully,
most TPP countries are or will be in numerous regional groups that include China. They
can thus shop between different groups to maximize their gains.
China continues to promote regionalism in its own preferred sequencing.7 The
current regional economic trend continues to favor the country even though production
costs are rising fast in the country. China’s growing market gives the country greater
leverage. Equally important, foreign countries get greater benefits from high-end exports
from Chinese, an important reason that they are interested in China in the first place. East
Asia’s rise is largely based on an expanding regional and global production network,
which continues to be important. We already have much anecdotal evidence that only a
small proportion of values is added in China for some high-tech products such as iPhone.
A recent systemic study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD) shows
Ming Wan, “The Great Recession and China’s Policy toward Asian Regionalism,” Asian Survey 50, 3
(May/June 2010), pp. 520-38.
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that China’s trade surplus with the United States for 2009 should be reduced by a quarter
if we adopt a value-added basis.8 It is also significant that China is not seeking to build a
security structure to complement its economic advance.
4. Trends in domestic politics
Domestic politics has always been important in Asia as elsewhere. We have seen
power transitions in various Asian countries. And rising nationalism is compounding the
power transition challenge in the region. Asian nationalism is now uglier than before and
may be uglier still in a downward spiral feeding off on competing countries in the region.
The power transition in the region started in North Korea due to the law of nature.
Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, after 17 years in power. His young son and
designated successor Kim Jong Un took over and now seems to be in firm control of the
country. Kim Jong Un is being portrayed as a more likable leader than his father and has
shown some willingness for change. At the same time, North Korea launched a satellite
into orbit on December 12, 2012, clearly meant to shore up the young leader’s rule a few
days before the first anniversary of the death of his father. North Korea’s third nuclear
test conducted in February 2013 made that even clearer.
Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou won his presidential reelection in January 2012,
welcomed by Beijing. Cross-Strait relations stabilized in Ma’s first term and should
continue to improve. At the same time, pro-independence forces are alarmed by the
integrating cross-strait economies and people-to-people exchange.
Howard Schneider, “New Trade Measurements Lower U.S. Deficit with China,” The Washington Post,
January 17, 2013, A16.
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Vladimir Putin returned to presidency in Russia’s presidential election in March
2012, continuing his domination in Russian politics since 2000 as a president and then a
prime minister. Putin has since voiced strong criticism of the United States.
The United States held its presidential election on November 7, 2012, a
constitutionally determined schedule that anyone in the world can find out if so desired.
The election gave Obama a second term at the White House.
As a reflection of political progress in China, the world also knew well ahead of
time that a formal power transition would take place in China although the exact date was
not known until shortly before the meeting. Xi Jinping took over the top party post from
Hu Jintao in early November 2012, assuring ten years of leadership if the pattern of the
past two decades is held. The Bo Xilai scandal before the 18th party congress added
drama and uncertainty about the party center and China’s future. Like many top Chinese
leaders, Xi’s own ideological orientation and personality are not well known but he is
generally viewed as more confident than Hu Jintao at the same stage.
With a new prime minister every year since 2006, Japan held its lower house
election on December 16, 2012. The LDP party platform announced in November 2012
called for strengthening the alliance with the United States through constitutional
revisions to allow collective self defense. Abe Shinzo, is widely viewed as highly
conservative inside and outside Japan, made hawkish remarks on China during the
election campaign. Students of American foreign policy are familiar with the pattern of
presidential candidates using strong rhetoric to differentiate from others but would revert
to a more pragmatic approach when they actually win the election. The Japanese
politicians did not use to use hawkish foreign policy rhetoric in elections that much
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before. Now rightwing politicians may gain public support or at least do not get penalized
over their stringent remarks.
Park Geun-hye became South Korea’s first female president, winning the election
on December 19, 2012. Her campaign slogan was “economic democratization”, which
means reducing the power of the business conglomerates and creating a welfare state.
Similar to the Japanese voters, the South Koreans were concerned about the economy,
but different from their Japanese counterparts, the majority of the South Korean voters
wanted a softer line on North Korea in rejecting current president Lee Myung-bak’s hardline policy. Due to history and territorial dispute, it is difficult to see any breakthrough in
Korea-Japan relations even though the United States wants to see that happen.
India will not have a national election until 2014 but the political parties are
already positioning themselves for the election. On December 20, 2012, Narendra Modi,
a controversial Hindu nationalist politician and the chief minister of the state of Gujarat,
won his third term in the state election. His Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won 115 out of
182 seats in the state assembly. He allegedly played a role in the Hindu mob attacks that
killed over 1,000 Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. Modi is now expected to become a
national leader to head the opposition party BJP in the 2014 national election.9
International Relations Theories
My discussion above is mostly description of the current events, sprinkled with
some analysis. Students of Asia and IR scholars have written much about Asian
international relations about all the issues I have discussed and then some. Has China
Rama Lakshmi, “Hindu Nationalist’s Win in Indian State Stirs Talk of Prime Minister Bid,” The
Washington Post, December 21, 2012, A14.
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really risen or has the United States really declined?10 Has China become more assertive
in recent years and why?11 How about the U.S. pivot or rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific?12
How are other Asian countries responding to the new Sino-U.S. dynamic?13 How far has
Asian regionalism advanced and what are its basic features?14 Is nationalism rising in
Asia and why?15
However, mainstream IR scholars want to go beyond analytical answers to
specific questions and seek grander theories to explain those real-world developments. As
noted by Hans Morgenthau,
See for examples Michael Cox, “Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?”
International Relations, vol. 26, no. 4 (December 2012), pp. 369-388; David Shambaugh, China Goes
Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Christopher Layne, “This Time
It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 1
(March 2012), pp. 203-213.
11
Gilbert Rozman, ed., China’s Foreign Policy: Who Makes it, and How is it Made (Seoul, Korea: Asan
Institute for Policy Studies, 2012); Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy
(Harvard University Press, 2012); Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China:
Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 5467.
12
Hugh De Santis, “The China Threat and the ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” Current History, vol. 111, no. 746
(September 2012), pp. 209-215; “Roundtable: Turning to the Pacific: U.S. Strategic Rebalancing toward
Asia,” Asia Policy, no. 14 (July 2012), pp. 21-49; Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s
New Asia Policy is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 6
(November/December 2012), pp. 70-82.
13
“Roundtable: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Strategic Rebalancing,” Asia Policy, no. 15 (January 2013),
pp. 1-44.
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Vinod K. Aggarwal and Kristi Govella, eds., Linking Trade and Security: Evolving Institutions and
Strategies in Asia, Europe and the United States (New York: Springer, 2013); Vinod K. Aggarwal and
Seungjoo Lee, eds. Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions
(New York: Springer, 2011); Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds., Routledge Handbook of Asian
Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 2012), Amitav Acharya, “Engagement or Entrapment? Scholarship
and Policymaking on Asian Regionalism,” International Studies Review, vol. 13, no. 1 (March 2011), pp.
12-17); Shaun Breslin, “Comparative Theory, China, and the Future of East Asian Regionalism,” Review of
International Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (July 2010), pp. 709-729; John Ravenhill, “East Asian regionalism:
Much Ado about Nothing?” Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no. SI (February 2009), pp. 215-235;
Mireya Solís, Barbara Stallings and Saori N. Katada, eds., Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the
Pacific Rim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
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J. Edward Mallot, Memory, Nationalism, and Narrative in Contemporary South Asia (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in
Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Robert S. Ross,
“Chinese Nationalism and its Discounts,” National Interest, no. 116, (November/December 2011), pp. 4551; C. Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
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“International politics embraces more than recent history and current
events. The observer is surrounded by the contemporary scene with its
ever shifting emphasis and changing perspectives. He cannot find solid
ground on which to stand, or objective standards of evaluation, without
getting down to fundamentals that are revealed only by the correlations of
recent events with the most distant past and the perennial qualities of
human nature underlying both.”16
IR scholars since Morgenthau largely accept his view about the need for a
rigorous theory while arguing over the scope of the field and the best approach for
explanation. I cannot do justice to a wide range of approaches in the discipline here.
Rather, I focus on some influential thinkers in this chapter.
Kenneth Waltz has had a profound impact on the discipline. In his 1979 book
Theory of International Politics published, Waltz argues that a theory is a theoretical
construct that does not have to correspond to the real world and should be judged mainly
by whether it explains some big and important things in world politics better than
alternative theories.17 For Waltz, a theory is a creative process that goes beyond merely
connecting dots. Most other IR scholars do not go that far. John Mearsheimer, for
example, argues that the assumptions for theory should be sound empirically while theory
building should be done deductively.18 While pushing a liberal institutionalist research
agenda, Robert Keohane agrees with Waltz that causal analysis is difficult at the unit
16
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York:
Alfred A. Knoff, 1973), p. 17.
17
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
18
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 30.
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level because of the presence of idiosyncratic factors.19 This chapter focuses on theories
understood on that abstract level, whether they are built deductively or inductively.
Similar to the previous chapters, I examine realism, liberal institutionalism and
constructivism in this chapter. In addition, I will examine emerging studies of nonWestern concepts and theories for explaining East Asian international relations. I call that
approach “neo-traditionalism”. All this research is limited to the English-language
scholarship in the United States and elsewhere.
My empirical research comes from four sources. First, I have done research on
and taught East Asian international relations and have a general sense of what is
important. Second, I have conducted library database search, namely Social Sciences
Citation Index (SSCI) and Academic Search Complete dated back to start of 2010, to
look at broadly anything written about Asian international relations. For SSCI, I have
used the following key words: Asia international relations, China (refined to international
studies), and Japan (refined to international studies). For Academic Search Complete, I
search the topics of China, Japan, Asia, and international relations. Third, I have checked
several leading international relations journals starting in 2010, namely World Politics
(WP), International Organization (IO), International Security (IS) and International
Studies Quarterly (ISQ). Fourth, I have checked the books published since 2010. My
chapter is not meant to be a survey of the field.20 So I have not tried to be thorough and
all-inclusive.
19
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 25-26.
20
For such a survey, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (if anything) Does East Asia Tell us about
International Relations Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 15 (June 2012), pp. 53-78. For IR
studies in some Asian countries, see Muthiah Alagappa, “International Relations Studies in Asia:
Distinctive Trajectories,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 11, no. 2 (May 2011), pp. 193-
17
My search of the academic database shows, not surprising for anyone familiar
with the sociology of knowledge in the field, that there is a direct relationship between
the prestige level of the academic journals and how theoretical they are. When it comes
“down” to analytical writing, there has been much produced over all the current events
and trends discussed in the previous section and then some. I have provided sample
citations for some of this scholarship at the start of this section. There are some new
analytical insights for Asian studies such as interesting writing about various “middle
powers” in recognition of an emerging rivalry between great powers like the United
States and China.21 But I doubt much of this analytical scholarship will be noticed that
much in the discipline of International Relations.
The higher prestige journals do not cover East Asia as well as they should.
Alastair Iain Johnston concluded in his content analysis of some leading IR journals up to
2011 that mainstream IR scholars do not use the Asian experience that much and often
use Asian cases incorrectly, which hurts the healthy development of IR theory. 22 My own
examination of the four leading IR journals since 2010 shows that the coverage of Asia
has noticeably increased, particularly in IS. But substantively, I view a continuous and
even larger gap between IR theory and Asian studies.
East Asian international relations at present are a moving target. As such,
mainstream IR theorists are hesitant to focus on the current events because they seek long
shelf life for their scholarship and most argue that their previous theories stand the test of
230; David Shambaugh, “International Relations Studies in China: History, Trends and Prospects,”
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 11, no. 3 (September 2011), pp. 339-372.
21
Lief-Eric Easley, “Middle Power National Identity? South Korea and Vietnam in US-China Geopolitics,”
Pacific Focus, vol. 27, no. 3 (December 2012), pp. 421-442; James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil,
“China’s Rise and Middle Power Democracies: Canada and Australia Compared,” International Relations
of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 12, no. 2 (May 2012), pp. 199-228.
22
Johnston, “What (if anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about International Relations Theory.” He
conducted content analysis of International Organization and International Security.
18
time anyway. More importantly, some theorists insist on treating theoretical development
as the end objective while discounting “headline chasing”. By contrast, the moving target
itself is most interesting for students of Asia and policymakers and we do need more
knowledge. In some ways, those with area knowledge thrive in the real world whether or
not their scholarship is appreciated by the theoretically-inclined. Anecdotal evidence also
suggests that policy analysts are now often turned off by highly quantitative IR
scholarship prized by many fellow IR scholars.
There is also a deeper philosophical reason for the gap between IR scholarship
and Asian studies. Alexander Wendt has pointed out rightly that some leading scholars in
the IR field maintain the position that a scientific theory should be built deductively with
theoretical constructs that do not have to correspond to the real world as long as they help
explain what is unobservable such as the state or the international system. He also noted
rightly that in practice most IR scholars are tacitly scientific realists, those who hold that
a real world exists beyond our theories and that mature theories approximates the real
world, including the observable.23
A scientific realist position, in my view, is better suited for Asian studies or any
area studies. It says that what we study is real, independent of our conceptualization, that
it is knowable, and that our knowledge is cumulative if done carefully. All that plays to
the advantage of the area specialists who spend more time observing what is happening
on the ground. It also means that they are being scientific when thinking inductively
rather than deductively. Any good theorists necessarily combine inductive and deductive
23
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 47-91. For works on scientific realism, see Michael
Devitt, “Aberrations of the Realism Debate,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 61, Nos. 1-2 (February 1991), pp.
43-63; Geoffrey Hellman, “Realist Principles”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 50, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 227249; Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
19
thinking and want their explanations to be both logically consistent and corresponding to
the real world. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be reminded that deductive theorizing
should not be viewed as THE right way to conduct research in the discipline of
international relations and that scientific realism is actually the more dominant thinking
in natural sciences that many social scientists seek to emulate.
Now let me examine different IR theories. Again, it is impossible to give justice
to our diverse field in a short chapter. I will focus on four schools of thinking, namely
neo-traditionalism, realism, liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. I will also
discuss international relations versus comparative politics.
Neo-traditionalism: When it comes to IR theory and Asian studies, I view efforts
at non-Western theories as creating the most fundamental tension even though it is not
currently the dominant topic for IR scholars and Asian studies scholars. For what is
worth, I view these theoretical efforts as belonging to “neo-traditionalism” since they
draw from the practice and theories of ancient East Asian international relations,
paralleling similar efforts in some other non-Western regions.
Similar to other main schools of thought, neo-traditionalism is a big camp that
includes various thoughts often at odds with each other. Students of Asia know that
intellectual projects for going back to cultural roots or adapting traditions to the modern
conditions have existed in various parts of East Asia from the start of serious contacts
with the West. Such sentiment in Japan caught attention in the West in the 1980s, partly
resulting from Japan’s rise that anchored Asia’s rise. Mainstream scholars largely
managed that challenge by demonstrating how their theories offered better explanations
for contemporary Japan and Asia than the traditional Asian concepts. And Japan was a
20
modern state, with an electoral democracy and a market-oriented economy. By contrast,
China’s rise has given neo-traditionalism a bigger boost because China was largely at the
center of the East Asian international order for two millenniums and the country is not
part of the West even though it is part of a globalizing world. The 2010s sees a
continuation of the debate over the Euro-centric theory and the alternatives. Asia’s
continuous rise gives this development some momentum. The rise and fall of a nonWestern region provides the real world background for theoretical thinking and
intellectual incentive structures.
We also have no choice but to engage in studies of Chinese and Asian traditions
since invocations of Chinese traditions for explaining why China behaves the way it does,
often in a deterministic, Chinese exceptionalist framework, are already everywhere with
us. Henry Kissinger, for example, put great emphasis on China’s “singularity”.24
Kissinger has been dealing with Chinese leaders for decades now, acquiring unique
insight into the Chinese government. By contrast, much of the invocation of supposedly
Chinese traditions is far less than nuanced or accurate.25 Better scholarship on Chinese
traditions is badly needed.
Some IR works have used contemporary Western concepts and theories to
examine the Asian traditional practices in international relations to correct and enrich
Western IR theories.26 There is no logical reason to resist such intellectual efforts and
mainstream scholars may take issue mainly with how strong a case can be made. Who
24
Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011), pp. 5-33.
William A. Callahan, “Sino-speak: Chinese Exceptionalism and the Politics of History,” Journal of Asian
Studies, vol. 71, no. 1 (February 2012), pp. 33-55.
26
David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for new Analytical Frameworks,” International Security
27: 4 (Spring 2003) pp. 57-85; David C. Kang, East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and
Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in
Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
25
21
wants to be biased?27 There is indeed much richness to tap in that area. As a case in point,
there was several hundred years of long peace among the Confucian states in Asia before
the Western arrival, which constitutes a major anomaly for realism that draws its
fundamental pessimism partly from the war-torn experience of Europe.28 Some also argue
that postwar Asian experience shows that while hegemony was a source of stability in
Europe it mainly caused confusion and tension in Asia, showing the limitation of the
hegemonic stability theory.29 To utilize the traditional and modern Asian international
relations experience we need to understand it better, which would draw more attention to
the works done by the students of Asian studies, a good thing too if we want to encourage
top students to study Asia or other non-Western regions.
Neo-traditionalism goes beyond the Asian international practice-based IR
thinking discussed above. It is recognized that it is virtually impossible to build a nonWestern IR theory when one uses the Western epistemology.30 Thus, some have made
bold attempts in a different direction.31 The Chinese government has often invoked the
traditional Chinese concepts such as harmony to explain their foreign policy approach
and preferences. Some Chinese scholars have also sought to illustrate a Chinese
conception of the world based on traditional concepts such as Tianxia (all under heaven).
That strand of Chinese thinking has been commented upon in some English-language
27
For arguments against the Eurocentric bias, see John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World
Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012);
Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., Non-western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and
beyond Asia (New York: Routledge, 2010).
28
Robert E. Kelly, “A ‘Confucian Long Peace’ in pre-Western East Asia?” European Journal of
International Relations, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 2012), pp. 407-430.
29
Timo Kivimaki, “Sovereignty, Hegemony, and Peace in Western Europe and in East Asia,” International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 12, no. 3 (September 2012), pp. 419-447.
30
Ching-Chang Chen, “The Absence of Non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered,” International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 11, no. 1 (January 2011), pp. 1-23.
31
For examples on non-Chinese attempts, see Alan Chong, “Premodern Southeast Asia as a Guide to
International Relations between Peoples: Prowess and Prestige in ‘Intersocietal Relations’ in the Sejarah
Melayu,” Alternatives, vol. 37, no. 2 (May 2012), pp. 87-105.
22
literature.32 Some of neo-traditionalist arguments come from the state or nationalists,
which weaken their intellectual appeals.33 The scholarship on Tianxia is currently weak
viewed either from a Western IR perspective or from a traditional Chinese perspective.
From a Western IR perspective, the current discourse on Tianxia is just that since there is
no theory for comparison and testing. From a traditional Chinese perspective, I imagine
the ancient Chinese thinkers would find the Tianxia discussion only superficially familiar
since it is detached from the traditional Chinese natural philosophy.34
While neo-traditionalism has made limited advance, one cannot dismiss this
agenda out of hand. Ironically, Western IR would face a greater challenge since many
take an anti-scientific realist position, which means that a paradigm change may take
place even if it is difficult. Since these Asian traditional concepts were once used, they do
not even need that much baptizing. For those taking a postmodern view of the world, they
can argue, often critically, that the Western thinking has constituted the contemporary
world. But logically, it is also possible for the world to be reconstituted, difficult though
it might be. By contrast, if one takes a scientific realist position, one may realize the far
greater difficulty facing neo-traditionalism because one may argue that the Western
theories approximate the real world reasonably well and have room to improve and that
the real world in Asia is drastically different from the ancient world. The West is an
integral part of Asia and no one can logically deny that the Western concepts and theories
Allen Carlson, “Moving Beyond Sovereignty? A Brief Consideration of Recent Changes in China’s
Approach to International Order and the Emergence of the Tianxia Concept,” Journal of Contemporary
China, vol. 20, no. 68 (2011), pp. 89-102.
33
Gilbert Rozman, “Invocations of Chinese Traditions in International Relations,” Journal of Chinese
Political Science, vol. 17, no. 2 (June 2012), pp. 111-124.
34
Ming Wan, “China and International Cooperation on the Environment: Historical and Intellectual Roots
of Chinese Thinking about the Environment,” in “The United States, China, and World Order: Alternative
Visions of Sovereignty, Institutions, Security, and Cooperation,” led by G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi and
Zhu Feng.
32
23
at least partially reflect the contemporary world in Asia. A completely different nonWestern theory would then be logically absurd. For the same reason however, we can
also argue that there is indeed intellectual space to examine the traditional theories and
concepts because East Asia has evolved from its historical origin. Moreover, it would be
intellectually fruitful if neo-traditionalism seeks to approximate the contemporary world,
which would put healthy competitive pressure on the Western IR theories.
Realism: Realism looks strong given the current situation in Asian international
relations. Some influential realist scholars who predicted trouble ahead in Asia after the
end of the Cold War may rightly feel somewhat vindicated.35 In particular, offensive
realism represented by John Mearsheimer seems prescient. Mearsheimer argued in his
2001 book that engagement with China would fail because as China rises economically it
would build up its military capability and challenge for dominance in East Asia whether
or not it becomes democratic and because the United States and some other countries
would create a balancing coalition against China.36 However, we cannot give the trophy
to offensive realism because we are still in the early stage of an emerging U.S.-China
rivalry and offsetting forces for collaboration remain strong. And Mearsheimer was
convincingly wrong when he predicted earlier that the NATO would cease to exist. A no
and a maybe do not make a strong score card. Moreover, as Jonathan Kirshner has
observed, Mearsheimer offers one and not the only realist perspective on China’s rise and
35
Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia
(New York: Norton, 2011).
36
Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 4.
24
his offensive realism is wrong and dangerous. By contrast, classical realism that
considers history and politics offers a better realist analytical approach.37
Looking at some other realist schools of thought, Kenneth Waltz remains
consistent with his basic arguments. One is that bipolarity is more stable. To determine
whether bipolarity exists, he observed that the challenger needs only to be about half of
the capacity of the dominant power.38 As Figure 3 shows, China’s PPP-based GDP
exceeded half of the American GDP in 2007 and was three fourths of the American GDP
in 2011. In terms of nominal GDP, as shown in Figure 2, China was almost half of the
American GDP in 2011. Thus, China could now be a second great power if that economic
base could be translated into greater overall national power. Waltz thus argues that the
world is “unipolar for the time being, but it’s unstable in the sense that we can expect a
second great power [China] to emerge in the relatively near future. So the structure of the
system is unstable.”39 Maintaining that nuclear-armed countries do not fight each other,
he argues that China’s rise will mainly make it more difficult for the United States to
intervene in the world as it pleases, a good thing too since an unchecked great power
always abuses.40 This take is more comforting for those who want to avoid direct conflict
between China and the United States but not so for those who worry about China and
want the United States to intervene on their behalf. Equally troubling for many students
of Asia is Waltz’s well-known position on nuclear proliferation. In the same interview, he
argues that it is impossible to rid the world of nuclear weapons, that more countries like
Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,”
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 2012), pp. 53-75.
38
Kenneth Waltz and James Fearon, “A Conversation with Kenneth Waltz,” Annual Review of Political
Science, vol. 15 (June 2012), pp. 1-12.
39
Ibid., p. 7.
40
Ibid..
37
25
North Korea will acquire nuclear weapons, and that more countries with nuclear weapons
means greater peace since nuclear states do not fight each other given our experience of
the superpower rivalry during the Cold War.41 The way I see it, we got lucky with the
Cold War. If one follows realism to its logical conclusion, there is no reason to rule out
use of nuclear weapons, which were actually used by the United States and threatened to
be used by both superpowers in Asia. More to the point, if we keep tempting the fate, we
will increase the odds of nuclear disaster taking place.
Balance of threat theory fits nicely with the recent development in Asia because
more countries are balancing against China rather than a stronger United States because
of their sense of threat. But that sense of threat is not structurally determined. The bulk of
the actual research will have to be conducted on the ground.
Power transition has become a theory of choice for explaining East Asian
international relations. In fact, as Steve Chan observes rightly, while realists often invoke
balance of power theory when discussing China’s rise they often implicitly accept the
power transition premise, reflected in the fact that they are seeking U.S. preeminence and
not balance against a weaker China assuming that the U.S. leadership is positive for East
Asian international relations.42 I view power transition as basically a realist theory
because it is power-based and structural even though some power transition theorists
view the approach as different from realism.43 While power transition is indeed a good
41
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
Chan, Looking for Balance, pp. 165-166.
43
Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, “The Power Transition Research Program: Assessing Theoretical and
Empirical Advances,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., The Handbook of War Studies II (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 133.
42
26
theory any scholars of Asia should read carefully, it is not structurally deterministic. It is
an empirical question whether China is a status quo country or a challenger.44
Liberal institutionalism: One now often hears criticism of the liberal
institutionalist approach given the deteriorating security environment in Asia. But that
criticism is misplaced. Postwar liberal institutionalists are not Norman Angell, who was
often assumed to have made a deterministic prediction of end of major conflicts given
growing economic interdependence among nations, a naive view of the world destroyed
by WWI.45
Looking back at my own writing on economic interdependence and security order
in Asia,46 I would now be less sanguine about the pacifying impact of economic ties but
will maintain that the basic arguments I made still hold. Like many postwar
interdependence thinkers I argued that economic interdependence makes military conflict
less likely, not impossible. We can argue that even though economic interdependence has
not been able to prevent greater security tension things could have been far worse without
it. Close economic ties between China and the United States are clearly an important
reason that a second Cold War is difficult to be realized even though it is not impossible.
Liberal institutionalism is more than economic interdependence and is focused on
international cooperation as its central research concern, assuming that cooperation is
difficult to achieve. Thus, the fact that cooperation is eroding in East Asia is within the
See for example Scott L. Kastner and Phillip C. Saunders, “Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State?
Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities,” International Studies Quarterly,
vol. 56, no. 1 (March 2012), pp. 163-177.
45
For a rebuttal of that line of argument, see Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu, “Trading on Preconceptions:
Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence,” International Security, vol. 36, no. 4
(Spring 2012), pp. 115-150.
46
Ming Wan, “Economic Interdependence and Economic Cooperation: Mitigating Conflict and
Transforming Security Order in the Asia-Pacific,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order:
Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 280-310.
44
27
research domain of liberal institutionalism. For that matter, balance of power theory also
does not predict that balancing will actually lead to peace and merely why countries want
to balance.47
Aside from acute security issues, for which realism has a comparative advantage,
liberal institutionalism offers analytical tools for many other pressing issues in Asia. In
particular, as discussed in the previous section, domestic politics has driven Asian
international relations, including the acute security issues. International political
economy, the home for many liberal institutionalism, offers the best available tools for
understanding domestic-international linkage.48 By contrast, some of the recent
developments in Asia discussed in the previous section are fundamentally foreign policy
issues, namely China’s greater assertiveness in dealing with some other countries starting
around 2009 and America’s pivot or rebalancing. For influential theorists like Waltz,
their theories have little specific to say about foreign policy issues.
Regionalism remains an important topic, which attracts some liberal
institutionalists. Interesting work is ongoing and much comparative study of regionalism
remains to be done.49 The real world development makes studies of regionalism more
important, not less. After all, the U.S. rebalancing to Asia includes the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP), a cross-regional free trade agreement, which is fully
consistent with the institutionalist argument about locking in one’s advantage through
entanglement which should also constrain the initiator. And it is liberal as well, consistent
Avery Goldstein, “Balance-of-Power Politics: Consequences for Asian Security Order,” in Muthiah
Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2003), pp. 197-198.
48
Jeffry Frieden and Lisa L. Martin, “International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions,”
in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2002), pp. 118-146.
49
Philippe De Lombaerde, Fredrik Soderbaum and Francis Baert, “The Problem of Comparison in
Comparative Regionalism,” Review of International Studies, vol. 36, no. 3 (July 2010), pp. 731-753.
47
28
with John Ikenberry’s liberal order argument.50 Some have argued that China is joining
the global system because it is under competitive pressure to do so.51
Ironically though, while International Political Economy remains highly relevant,
that is not reflected in academic journals. As Johnston noted, IO had very limited
coverage of Asia and IS had done much better in that area.52 IO has improved in Asian
coverage since Johnston made his assessment.53 But it remains the case that the flagship
journal for IPE is less “hospitable” to Asian studies than the flagship for International
Studies (four versus almost twenty since 2010). WP has carried a few more articles on
Asia than IO and ISQ is about the same as IO.
My own observation is that IPE has become even more focused on deductive
theorizing than International Security, which gives greater salience to Eurocentric
scholarship. While IPE has produced some solid research, some scholars, including some
founders of the field, have expressed disappointment at the state of the field. Benjamin
Cohen has observed that the IPE journals have become “boring”.54 He attributes this
phenomenon to the increasing tendency for IPE scholars to model after neoclassical
economics, emphasizing formal modeling and sophisticated mathematics. Robert
Keohane has also argued that the new IPE has become less creative and “is remarkably
50
G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
51
Quddus Z. Snyder, “Integrating Rising Powers: Liberal Systemic Theory and the Mechanism of
Competition,” Review of International Studies, vol. 39, no. 1 (January 2013), pp. 209-231.
52
Johnston, “What (if anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about International Relations Theory,” pp. 54-55.
53
For the IO articles see Jessica Chen Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist
Protest in China,” International Organization, vol. 67, no. 1 (January 2013), pp. 1-35; Erik Ringmar,
“Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order,” International
Organization, vol. 66, no. 1 (January 2012), pp. 1-25; M.E. Sarotte, “China's Fear of Contagion:
Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example,” International Security, vol. 37, no. 2 (Fall
2012), pp. 156-182; Jarrod Hayes, “Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India,
and the Ties that Bind,” International Organization, vol. 66, no. 1 (January 2012), pp. 63-93.
54
Benjamin J. Cohen, “Are IPE Journals Becoming Boring?” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 54, no.
3 (September 2010), pp. 887-891.
29
reluctant to focus on major changes taking place in world politics” such as China’s rise.55
For students of Asia however, it seems that China’s rise is on everyone’s lip for at least a
decade now.
One remedy Cohen has proposed is for the IPE journals to organize more special
issues. If we look at some edited volumes created from joint research projects, the
situation is not as bleak. Nevertheless, too much focus on formal modeling and
mathematics means that only topics that happen to have good data get to be studied and
potentially published in strong venues while thinking about broader issues becomes
riskier research topics.
Constructivism: While realism seems to be stealing the show at the moment, this
is also a golden period for constructivist research in Asia. Any observer of East Asian
international relations would recognize the emotions involved in the territorial disputes in
the long shadow of the past.56 National identities and nationalism are more important
drivers of East Asian international relations than before.57
As discussed before, Wendt’s version of constructivism is highly relevant for
Asian studies. Moreover, the English school of international relations remains important
for Asian studies.58 Much of the discourse in Asia at present is framed in terms of
international order and international rules. Constructivist research has been conducted on
Robert O. Keohane, “The Old IPE and the New,” Review of International Political Economy, vol. 16, no.
1 (2009), pp. 34-46.
56
See for examples Yinan He, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations
since World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and
World Politics after World War II (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
57
See for examples Rozman, National Identities and Bilateral Relations; Rozman, East Asian National
Identities.
58
Linda Quayle, “Bridging the Gap: An ‘English School’ Perspective on ASEAN and Regional Civil
Society,” Pacific Review, vol. 25, no. 2 (2012), pp. 199-222. As a comparison, see Barry Buzan and Ana
Gonzalez-Pelaez, eds., International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional
Level (New York: Palgrave, 2009).
55
30
topics such as regionalism.59 There is also continuous research interest in comparative
strategic cultures.60
IR versus comparative politics: There has already been much advocacy for
breaking down the academic burrier between international relations and comparative
politics. IR scholars who also have expertise in area studies already know that they have
to know both international relations and comparative politics. In fact, one may argue that
the real question about Sino-U.S. relations is not so much the shifting balance between
them but what they represent from a historical development perspective. We know the
importance of political legitimacy underlying the foreign policy of many Asian countries,
an important reason for Chan’s critique of the balance of power theory.61
It is so far mainly rational choice scholars who seek explicitly to unify
international relations and comparative as well as American politics following that
approach. For other scholars, they rely on methodological eclecticism.62 There is clearly
room for theoretical development in this area.
Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that East Asian international relations have continued
to evolve in the 2010s. Asia is rising and China is rising in Asia and beyond. An arms
race is taking shape. Asian countries continue to push for regionalism, with the United
States now charging ahead with its own ambitious plan.
59
See for example Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?: Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
60
See for example George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior:
Growing Power and Alarm (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
61
Chan, Looking for Balance.
62
Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2005).
31
Do the real world developments in Asia constitute major anomalies for one, some
or all the existing IR theories? Asia makes some IR theories, particularly power transition
theory, appear more salient than others. But real-world Asia does not destroy the existing
IR theories, many built deductively. Whether these theories accurately reflect what is
going on in Asia does not knock out any particular theory since the discipline requires
that a clearly better theory has to be presented. In practice, IR theories virtually never die.
They just wait for their turn.
The gap between IR theory and Asian studies has enlarged despite strong efforts
by scholars from both sides and from those who bridge the two areas. This is due to the
sociology of knowledge that rewards theorizing and due to the dominant anti-scientific
realist philosophical inclination in the field. Asia has received far more coverage in the
leading international security journals than in the international political economy ones
because more IPE scholars than IS scholars have sought to model after neoclassic
economics focusing on formal modeling and sophisticated mathematics, which can be
more challenging when data are less available in Asia than in the West.
32
Figure 1: Asia Rising, 1961-2011
20
15
GDP per capita annual growth rates
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61
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64
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67
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70
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79
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-15
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-30
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels)
China
Japan
India
Russia
European Union
United States
World
33
Figure 2: Power Distribution among the big five (GDP current US$)
45.0%
40.0%
30.0%
25.0%
Japan
China
20.0%
India
United States
Russia
15.0%
10.0%
5.0%
0.0%
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00
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08
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10
Percentage of world total
35.0%
34
Figure 3: Power Distribution among the big five, 1980-2011 (PPP constant 2005 US$)
25.0%
15.0%
Japan
China
India
United States
Russia
10.0%
5.0%
20
10
20
08
20
06
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02
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00
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82
0.0%
19
80
Percentage of world total
20.0%
35
Figure 4: Military Expenditures in Different World Regions
800.0
700.0
500.0
400.0
300.0
200.0
100.0
0.0
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Constant 2010 US$ billion
600.0
East Asia
South Asia
North America
Europe
Middle East
Africa
South America
Russia
19
88
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89
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91
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06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Constant 2010 US$ billion
36
Figure 5: Big five military expenditure
800
700
600
500
China
Japan
400
300
200
100
0
India
United States
Russia