The 2000s: Take 2
IR theory faced the challenge of combining or disentangling three threats to
the international order: the danger from global terrorism, as revealed by the attack
on the United States in 2001; the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as exposed in the
2002 turning point in the North Korean nuclear crisis; and the rise of a superpower
in opposition to the existing global system, as gradually became clear for China over
the decade. Some assumed that the first of these dangers would draw states closer,
since Russia, China, and India as well as the United States faced Islamist terrorist
threats. Others were optimistic that proliferation would rally the neighbors of North
Korea behind a common agenda, as seemed to be possible with the establishment of
the Six-Party Talks. Finally, China’s high economic stakes in the international system
raised hope that shared interests would temper its rise. While different grounds for
viewing the future positively pertained to each of these issues and the threats of this
decade far exceeded those of the 1990s, optimism mostly prevailed over the 2000s.
Linkages among the three types of threats complicated theoretical analysis. If
China’s rise loomed in the forefront, then its relations with North Korea or Pakistan
had to be considered when addressing proliferation and terrorism. At the start of
the decade reconstruction of the communist troika of the early Cold War period was
becoming a possibility, as Moscow rebuilt its ties to Pyongyang, Beijing resumed
frequent high-level meetings with Pyongyang, and Moscow and Beijing upgraded
relations. As U.S. unilateralism cast suspicion on how it was drawing a link between
terrorism and proliferation, Beijing and Moscow demurred in their support, seen in
2
their refusal to pressure Pyongyang. Theorists kept the focus on U.S. behavior often
without noticing China’s shift away from passivity as it drove change in the region.
The single, most important theme for IR theory in the first decade of the 21st
century was China’s accelerated rise and the responses it elicited in the region and
from other great powers, especially the United States. This theme subsumes issues
related to regionalism, North Korea’s challenge to the regional order, Russian aims
in regaining a foothold in East Asia, and Japanese and South Korean maneuvering
between their U.S. alliances and China’s increasing pressure for influence. Theory
had to address what kind of a power is China, how did other states find a balance
between engagement and containment, and what sort of regional architecture is
emerging under the shadow of China’s rapid ascent. While deductive arguments
ranged from pessimistic predictions of confrontation based on parallels with what
happened as earlier powers were rising to optimistic forecasts of cooperation in a
period of economic globalization, regional experts approached IR theory primarily
from the perspective of policies and perceptions expressed by the regional actors.
Given tumultuous changes over the decade, it behooves us to differentiate
periods when China’s policies and positions had a distinctive impact. Four can be
clearly separated: 1) 2001-02, a time of wary Sino-U.S. relations and an intensified
Chinese search for regional partners; 2) 2003-05, a period of improved Sino-U.S. ties
and rising Chinese assertiveness toward neighboring states; 3) 2006-08, the apogee
of Sino-U.S. cooperation amid generally amiable regional relations; and 4) 2009-10,
as China’s strategy grew newly assertive toward the United States and its allies as
well as regional partners. Starting with the finding that China was the driving force
3
in the region, even as the critical factor in determining responses to North Korea’s
belligerent moves, this chapter concentrates on IR theory related to a rising power.
The decade of the 2000s began on an optimistic note, as the deductive theory
of realists of rivalry, power balancing, and conflict was not confirmed while rapid
economic integration, in accord with liberal theory, furthered a shared normative
framework and supposedly a sustained common interest in a stable environment.i
Theorists seemed to favor analytical eclecticism to cover the diverse forces at work
in what was becoming a single wide-ranging security region, but by incorporating
many types of explanations without clarifying how to prioritize them and show how
change was proceeding, they were left with extrapolations of the 1990s. The main
change identified was the declining U.S. ability to press for values as regionalism
enshrined non-interference in internal affairs. If some theorists insisted that U.S.
power remained sufficient to do so, especially after Asian values lost credibility in
the late 1990s, they were confronted by others who saw little regional support.ii
Critics of the theoretical foundations of democratic peace and commercial
liberalism argued that they did not suffice at a time of growing talk of a China threat
and confusion on how to address the North Korean nuclear weapons program. They
proposed instead strategic reassurance on the assumption that the U.S. posture was
too aggressive without recognizing the hold of sovereignty, establishing a security
order that only gradually seeks to transform it based on trust, and accepting a need
for multilateralism that will address identity concerns.iii This eclectic mix for a time
filled a void, but as the decade proceeded, U.S. accommodation only briefly gave the
illusion that existing theory sufficed. The makeshift response was falling way short.
4
The Strategic Triangle
IR theorists may have relegated Russia to a secondary status, but the Russian
leadership was intent on revitalizing the strategic triangle, which had lost vitality in
the 1990s. Many observers underestimated Russia’s intentions and misjudged what
was behind them. One reason was the assumption that economic and strategic goals
would not drive Russia to China. After all, the West was assumed to pose no threat
to Russia, while China’s humiliation in losing the Russian Far East and penetration
into Central Asia were deemed more serious challenges. Another reason was lack of
awareness of how complementary the Chinese economy, guzzling energy and other
natural resources, and the Russian economy would become over the decade. Yet, a
third reason was slowness to appreciate the national identity Putin constructed and
its role in steering foreign policy. Sino-Russian relations blossomed despite tensions
kept largely beneath the surface, manifested in the Six-Party Talks and U.S. relations.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) perplexed many IR theorists.
It was often dismissed as falling far short of the lofty rhetoric about it serving as a
model for future multilateralism. While it helped to manage differences in strategies
toward Central Asia, Russia’s determination to limit China’s FTA aspirations and its
security role in Central Asia seemed to be proof of how little the SCO could achieve.
If some analysts warned of observer states such as Iran joining the SCO and turning
it into an anti-Western bloc, most saw the anti-Western thrust of 2005-06 as a brief
consensus centered on fear of “color revolutions” in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Yet,
the endurance of the SCO amid further strengthening of Sino-Russian relations put
5
theory on the spot, pointing to the role of national identities even when conflicting
views of security and economics would seem to have led to greater confrontation.
The war on terrorism threatened to disrupt the Sino-Russian partnership as
it was strengthening and focusing on Central Asia, where U.S. bases to supply troops
in Afghanistan were established. With the United States and Russia both subjected
to terrorist attacks in a short span of time and China concerned about separatists in
association with the Taliban, some IR theorists anticipated a collective response. In
an age of increasing danger from terrorism, security globalization seemed poised to
join economic globalization. Yet, Russians recalled that U.S. support to the resistance
in Afghanistan in the 1980s had nurtured these same terrorist elements, while China
linked U.S. encouragement of dissent in Xinjiang to the danger of separatism. Doubts
about U.S. motives complicated both bilateral and trilateral cooperation after 2001.
One doubt was that the U.S. blamed Islam and was capitalizing on the terror
to prosecute a clash of civilizations, targeting Iraq and Iran and striving to rebalance
relations in the Middle East. Another was that the war was a pretense for unilateral
U.S. designs that would set back the path to multipolarity expected by other states. A
third was that U.S. plans involved dividing China and Russia, putting pressure on the
two rivals while offering little in return and disrupting their improved relations.iv
This triangle changed perceptively in 2004-05, due mostly to Russia’s turn to
China and away from the United States but also to China’s more emboldened stance
in opposition to the United States and Japan. Few predicted this rebalancing. Seeing
the September 4, 2004 Beslan massacre of hundreds of school children as causing
Putin to prioritize anti-terrorism and increased U.S. dependence on China in the Six-
6
Party Talks as leading toward a “responsible stakeholder” with possibility of a “G-2”
as China kept gaining ground and U.S. preoccupation with Southwest Asia led to
greater dependence on it. Yet, as Russian growth fueled by higher energy prices
accompanied rapidly rising trade with China and growing overlap in interests in
Iran and North Korea as well as Iraq, the color revolutions, notably that in Ukraine
in the election runoff on December 26, 2004, gave Putin, who had recently gained
unchecked power as well as broad popularity, reason to draw closer to China.
Assumptions about Russia and China proved misleading. In the case of Russia
its lingering distrust of China, aspirations for multipolarity in Asia, and desire to be
the pivot of the strategic triangle seemed to preclude joining closely with China
against the United States. As for China, its favorable security environment as well as
extraordinarily successful economic growth coupled with political stability led many
to expect growing cooperation with the United States, which Chinese leaders for
most of the decade kept saying was occurring as the most sensitive problem of
Taiwan was being handled more cooperatively. If particular problems arose, as in
Sino-Japanese relations in 2005, they were attributed to temporary or narrow
problems and to a few recalcitrant foreign leaders rather than to a deepening trend.
The Cheney and Obama approaches to East Asia reflect distinct theoretical
approaches. Cheney’s strong hand in Bush’s first term assumed that a hegemon
must flex its muscles, spread its values, act unilaterally, and preempt the rise of a
strategic competitor. It held that compromise invites contempt. Bush’s approach
later changed, but it was Obama who brought clarity to what had already emerged
as conditional engagement: testing China on its responsible behavior, as in dealing
7
with North, offering a G-2 approach to an increasing number of global problems if
China would play a more active, constructive role; broadening U.S. ties to India and
welcoming closer partnerships among maritime states such as Japan and Australia;
and keeping a carrot in front of North Korea even as preparation to rely on a stick
continued. Whether the divide in U.S. policy toward East Asia is put at 2005 (some
would choose 2007) when Bush changed course in his second term or 2009 when
Obama took office, a new orientation tested theoretical arguments about how the
United States was driving change, while revealing how much China was the driver.
Growing Sino-Russian closeness, it was found, depended less on U.S behavior than
on forces within these two countries in support of a new world order. Russia aimed
for a new balance of power, but it was China that increasingly reshaped the triangle.
China’s Rise
Both rational choice and liberal theorists stumbled in explaining China’s rise
as well as the two prior cases of rising powers after World War II. The Soviet choice
in 1969 of suppressing the Prague Spring came at a time when U.S. policy stressed
détente, as Washington sought help in extricating itself from a deteriorating struggle
in Vietnam, and Japan was raising expectations of economic ties that would energize
the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia. Soviet ideological rigidification, as seen in
the way the centennial of Lenin’s birth was handled in 1970 and in the deterioration
in Sino-Soviet relations and in the vitriolic rhetoric that failed to prepare for Mao’s
death, demonstrated that no balance of power strategy stood behind the growing
hostility to the West. The leadership was not beleaguered at home, as its narrative
8
about national identity drove it into increasing isolation that contributed to more
imbalance toward military spending and economic stagnation without reform.
The Japanese redirection in 1989 as the end of the Cold War contributed to a
growing gap between a “Japan that can say no” and its sole ally, which makes little
sense in rational choice or liberal theory. The long-perceived Soviet threat to Japan
was fading rapidly, and the United States expected increased reliance on Japan to
reflect the shifting balance in economic power. Many were saying that Japan was the
big winner in the Cold War, having spent relatively little on its military and reaping
the fruits of a new economic environment centered on the rise of Asia. Optimism
was high about Japan’s economic prospects integrating more closely with Asia, and
about Japan’s prospects with China, which needed it more after the reverberations
from its June 4 repression. Yet, Japan decided that this was the time to widen the
identity gap with the United States, casting doubt on its thinking about a new world
order and even its management of the Soviet retreat. The appeal of Asianism mixed
with revisionism in national identity failed to placate neighboring nations; so it was
not proceeding strategically in overly optimistic overtures to North Korea and China
and in blaming the United States for Japan-bashing rather than coordinating further.
Observers were distracted in 2003-08 from China’s change of course as its
power was growing. In 2002-03 China’s image was as positive as it had been since
the repressive shift on June 4, 1989. China conveyed support for multilateralism
with ASEAN in the center, “new thinking” toward Japan reflected in criticisms of
excessive negativity toward postwar Japan, closer relations with South Korea as that
country turned ever friendlier toward China, and cooperation with the United States
9
in the war on terror. Yet, as many criticized Bush’s unilateralism and Koizumi’s trips
to the Yasukuni Shrine, it was easy to overlook China’s changing direction: drawing
closer to North Korea even as Bush clarified a U.S. shift away from regime change;
vilifying Japan and orchestrating large demonstrations against it after silencing the
visible advocates of “new thinking”; discarding the value of soft power in relations
with South Korea by encouraging claims for Koguryo as a Chinese state; and making
common cause with an increasingly anti-American Russia. Obscuring these shifts in
2006-08 in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics was a deceptively modest tone about
“peaceful development,” a “thaw” with Japan, support for regionalism, and closer
cooperation with the United States in the Six-Party Talks. Critics of China found it
difficult to specify what China was doing that warranted their warnings. Theorists
fell back on realist principles in opposition to liberal ones, while few looked closely
at evidence about evolving Chinese national identity as seen in internal discussions.
China in 2009 took its turn at calibrating a rising power’s relationship to the
established world power and to states on its borders. It too had the opportunity of
increased U.S. eagerness for cooperation, even a kind of G-2 in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis. Obama’s priority on ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
while dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran or further
instability in Islamic states offered China the prospect of closer security ties. After
the triumph of the Beijing Olympics, China faced scant danger of internal instability.
Relations with Japan and South Korea were upbeat in 2007 or 2008, the prospect of
Taiwan sparking a crisis had diminished, and China’s ties with ASEAN were positive.
Yet, with no prospect of diminishing external threats or gaining economic benefits,
10
China opted to widen the identity gap with the United States, Japan, South Korea,
and states in Southeast Asia and heighten tensions in the region. Rekindling the
spirit of sinocentrism, China succumbed to the illusion of Asian regionalism. Only
theories focusing on the internal dynamics of national identity account for China’s
transformation, as well as for the earlier transformations of the other rising powers.
In the 2000s optimism about China’s rise paralleled that about Japan’s rise a
quarter century earlier. Yet, there was also an undercurrent of doubt, which pointed
to the urgency of reform to change the model of development and put a break on
overconfidence. Japan succumbed to vested interest groups and party calcification,
making increased globalization and political renewal difficult. Its model was prone
to rigidification as it allowed little scope for individualism, civil society, and crossnational networks. Similarly, China’s rapid growth contributed to overconfidence, as
political reform was stalled, monopoly industries served corruption more than
innovation, and vested interests became more entrenched. Interest in learning from
the outside world declined. Far more than Japan, China saw itself as unique, kept a
lid on political reform, and defied international pressure. Although the WTO gave it
a better foundation of international integration, its prospects also were dimming.
North Korea was the test case in the 2000s for Sino-U.S. management of the
security uncertainties of a new era. While some theorists were focusing on futuristic
issues, such as global governance and Asian regionalism, the most immediate matter
was how to forestall a new Cold War between the rising power and the hegemon in
East Asia in recent times. Some analysts saw only realist competition, assuming that
ideology no longer mattered. Confused by China’s repudiation of Maoist ideology of
11
class struggle, they dismissed political education and Chinese narratives on national
identity gaps with the United States and its allies. Other analysts showcased liberal
themes of growing economic integration and broadening dialogue without fixing on
China’s rhetoric about how these developments must be prevented from impacting
strategic competition or cultural protectionism. The Six-Party Talks fostered the
illusion of growing strategic trust, when they were actually a valiant attempt to keep
a serious strategic divide from widening dangerously. China’s economic strategy to
make North Korea dependent on it contradicted idealistic aspirations of a regional
strategy to revive and integrate North Korea’s economy to the extent it cooperated
in denuclearization and military stability. The failure in 2009-10 of the Six-Party
Talks signaled the failure of Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation, leaving a slippery slope
for the 2010s toward a Cold War. Observers grasped for straws to find a reason that
this would not happen: North Korean leadership succession, as Kim Jong-il’s stroke
in 2009 left him little time, would either bring factionalism with the prospect of a
more moderate course or succession by a younger Kim Jong-un with a new outlook;
China’s leadership succession, as fragmented vying for support from the military or
other hard-line elements would be set aside by a more reform-minded Xi Jinping; or
Chinese concern with soft power would leave it wary of crossing South Korea,
ASEAN, and other states and regional associations. Few focused on the pattern of
China’s strategic thinking, the evolution of its national identity, or its debate in 2009.
North Korea
12
Two approaches to North Korea were in the forefront early in the decade and
continued to vie for support through 2010, even as circumstances changed abruptly.
The first was to engage North Korea more fully, in line with the Sunshine Policy, as a
means to reduce tensions and reassure the North that regime change and pressure
would be taken off the agenda. This would require closer U.S. coordination with the
South Korean government, led by progressives, and with China, nervous that North
Korea would collapse. Such an approach would be in line with IR theory that ample
economic rewards and trust-building measures backed by multilateral inclusion are
a successful strategy to turn an isolated “rogue” state, in stages, into a cooperative
partner. The second approach was to ramp up the pressure on North Korea in line
with George W. Bush’s initial thinking to make developing nuclear weapons more
costly and increase the likelihood of internal dissent leading to policy change. This
outlook was popular among realists, who foresaw a U.S.-led coalition pressuring
first South Korea and then China to tighten pressure on North Korea and who took
from Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric branding the Soviet Union an “evil empire” evidence
of hard-line determination forcing the weaker side to yield. The two approaches did
not agree on North Korea’s goals and internal forces of change, and they disagreed
on the dynamics of multilateral maneuvering over the North. By 2003 alternative
approaches were also informing diplomacy on how to manage North Korea’s moves.
The engagement approach left unclear the timetable for meaningful change,
the degree of reciprocity required by North Korea, and the relative priority of joint
action as opposed to unilateral pursuit of the North. Much depended on the extent to
which the critical states in this process agreed on the priorities in negotiations and
13
on their ultimate objectives. IR theories that posed the challenge in starkly realist
terms or idealistically liberal rhetoric were prone to deception from statements to
the effect that since the most concerned parties apart from North Korea agreed on
denuclearization, the line-up was five vs. one, or that since these same five states
increasingly agreed on rewarding the North for steps toward regional stability and
denuclearization, the prospects for a breakthrough were high. Those who disagreed
with these reasons for optimism offered instead the options of pressuring China to
take a hard-line stance or of unifying China, South Korea and Russia in persuading
the United States to take a much softer stance in order to convince a skeptical North.
Realist theory became associated with the idea that the United States is able
to control North Korea by superior force, multilateral diplomacy with its neighbors
all opposed to the threat of its nuclear weapons program, and minimal reassurance
that its goal was not regime change that would pose an existential threat to the Kim
family enterprise. Under these circumstances, why would a country endanger itself
with no chance of success when it had the option of reform and multilateral support
for its reforms and integration into the international community? Sustaining these
assumptions was the claim that the Six-Party Talks signified 5 vs. 1. Yet, for China
and Russia the North’s nuclear weapons impact was secondary to balancing U.S.
power and alliances, driven by identity more than security concerns. Also, North
Korea calculated that its ability to wreck unfathomable damage on the Seoul area
and beyond and that nuclear weapons serve more than a deterrent purpose: they
give it blackmail capability as its uses lesser force or prepares for proliferation.
14
Those intent on denying North Korea’s threat capacity could fall back on the
crutch long used to reject compromise with the Soviet Union and Red China, which
was to predict regime collapse without outside intervention. The theory of unstable
authoritarian rule, particularly for the cruelest regimes failing to deliver economic
well-being, proved convenient. When the North relaxed some controls, allowing for
small-scale markets and cell phones mostly unable to reach the outside world, this
suited another version of the theory: repressive states beginning to open up are in
danger. One way of salvaging the 5 vs. 1 argument was to posit Chinese fear of the
spread of nuclear weapons to Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan as well as the
threat of regional instability lowering economic growth. These concerns, however,
proved secondary in the light of China’s opposition to reunification of the peninsula
under South Korean aegis and U.S. success in remaining the prime power in Asia.
Advocates of liberalism found a way to incorporate events related to North
Korea to reaffirm their theories too. They could shift the blame to the United States
or, after 2008, South Korea for failing to offer the necessary incentives. Supposedly,
Clinton accepted the Agreed Framework not intending to fulfill its commitments as
North Korea’s economy collapsed in famine. Bush’s penchant for un-diplomatic talk
and unilateralism was reportedly what prevented agreement in the Six-Party Talks.
If Obama was harder to criticize from this perspective, Lee Myung-bak was readily
targeted as a hard-liner standing in the path of expanded economic cooperation and
the trust that would lead to stability and North Korean cooperation on security. The
case for liberalism was rooted in the assertion that North Korea’s leaders would be
amenable to denuclearization if measured rewards and a sense of security loomed.
15
Yet, evidence kept mounting that these leaders saw much greater benefit in raising
their threat capacity than in reforming their economy, while seizing opportunities as
they arose to capitalize on the financial assistance and inter-state divisions to gain
the time required. Theories proved flexible enough to interpret the facts appearing
to refute them in a manner that confirmed them, at least until shocks in 2009-10.
One view of U.S.-North Korean relations was that the North was anxiously
seeking security in the face of a U.S. ideological obsession with global dominance
and regime change. Claiming the mantle of regional stability and linking the Bush
war in Iraq and the crusading neoconservative rhetoric with what was viewed as a
rigid negotiating stance, adherents of this logic put the onus for a resolution of the
nuclear crisis on change in the U.S. posture as they optimistically viewed the SixParty Talks and China’s role. Another view saw North Korea as a challenge to U.S.
alliance management as well as to multilateral diplomacy involving China. Seeing
little prospect of denuclearization and recognizing China’s resistance to pressure,
the initial challenge was to coordinate the responses of South Korea and Japan. In
theory, these front-line targets of North Korean military build-up should have given
full support to their superpower ally. Yet, their different notions of regionalism and
clashing national identities left theoretical explanations stumbling in the 2000s.
Regionalism
If talk of East Asian regionalism in the 1990s appeared to be a pipedream of
Japanese idealists and some newly confident leaders in Southeast Asia, it turned into
a prominent IR theme in the 2000s. Theorists were challenged to explain the linkage
16
between economic integration, security assurances, and cultural understanding as
proliferation of new organizations offered hope of an East Asian community. While
calls for forging a community agreed on the merits of multilateralism, they failed to
reach consensus on what that means or on the order of steps to achieve it. One view
came be summarized as the theory of economics first, setting aside other issues as
trade and investment result in mutual entanglements that have a powerful spillover
effect. ASEAN + 3 replaced APEC as the venue that mattered most, suggesting that
ties exclusive of the United States would drive regionalism. A second view may best
be labeled security is decisive, focusing during the decade on the way states worked
together in meeting the challenge of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. With
the Six-Party Talks taking center stage from 2003 to 2008, Sino-U.S. relations stood
at the forefront in determining how regionalism would proceed. A third outlook put
culture first, as disputes linked to history grabbed much of the attention. Tensions in
Japan’s relations with China and South Korea raised doubt about whether a regional
community was feasible, and beginning with the Koguryo historical dispute between
China and South Korea the cultural focus was turning to rising signs of sinocentrism.
A persistent theme in the 2000s was how to institutionalize economic ties in
a manner that would strengthen trust, assure security cooperation, and eventually
result in cultural understanding leading to a sense of community. Many important
countries seemed to be caught in between West and East, searching for regionalism
even as they claimed to support the U.S.-led international community. ASEAN stood
in the forefront of this balancing act, but Japan and South Korea at times were seen
17
as supportive. Theorists offered guidance on how to proceed, weighing the U.S. role
in the region against the forces striving to embrace China in a regional community.
One question faced by those who sought ways to reconcile internationalism
and regionalism was how to resolve differences over leadership. At the beginning of
the decade many argued for joint Chinese and Japanese leadership. Later there was
more emphasis on full U.S. participation as the only way to balance China’s growing
power. It would only be in the following decade when the whole idea of regionalism
beyond limited economic ties would be called into doubt by an unbridgeable divide.
As early as 2008 Chinese were showing signs of impatience at the limits on
regionalism with ASEAN, indicating a shift from a passive to an active strategy and a
determination to end what was called the region’s “one-sided dependence” on the
West, as during the Cold War.v Acknowledging new aspirations toward at least
equidistance and new problems, many associated with disputes over the South
China Sea, Chinese called for deepening bilateral relations as a means to forging a
regional identity linked to building a “harmonious East Asia.” Well before charges of
Obama’s provocative “rebalancing” toward Asia, Chinese were insisting that rising
mutual dependence of China and states in Southeast Asia were opening the door to a
new China-centered regionalism. This was not based on optimism about ASEAN, but
on China’s ability to change attitudes through bilateral ties while blaming resistance
on U.S. interference and refusal to accept China on equal terms or regional identity.
East vs. West Civilization
18
Theories of civilizations were sidetracked during the Cold War by the prism
of a life-and-death struggle between communism, which claimed to be nothing less
than a civilization that sweeps everything out of its way, and the free world, an ideal
with similar pretensions to transform all that preceded through free elections, free
markets, and freedom as a way of life. In the 1990s IR theorists began to recognize
that as countries engaged in debates over their national identity rival claims about
the superiority or victimization of one’s civilization had important implications for
international relations.
Having denounced Japanese particularism as a threat to the global order in
the late 1980s, dismissed it as a recipe for stagnation despite the urgency of reform
in the late 1990s, and ignored it as a nuisance in the face of urgent challenges in the
late 2000s, Western critics fueled a Japanese backlash against a civilizational divide.
Resentful of Bush’s unilateralism centered on the Islamic world without solving the
problems deemed most pressing in Japan, many Japanese saw a comeuppance in the
global financial crisis. Yet, as much as the DPJ took power in 2009 in an atmosphere
of skepticism about the civilizational overlap of Japan and its ally, it had no answers
at a time of a sharply widening civilizational divide with China. In place of the prior
image of a U.S. administration torn between ideologues and career types incapable
of steering foreign policy in a straight line came an image of the executive branch
blocked at every turn by the Congress without the capacity to resolve differences.
Yet, operation tomodachi provided massive assistance by the U.S. military to the
victims of the March 11, 2011 tsunami and nuclear accident and steady support in
19
Obama’s rebalancing to Asia. While Abe took office focused on asserting Japanese
civilization in opposition to Asian critics, he would not narrow the U.S. divide.
The Chinese civilizational challenge came suddenly at the end of the decade.
Rejection of Western civilization was longstanding, but demonization of it in all
periods accompanied by glorification of Chinese civilization came suddenly. For a
time Hu Jintao’s notions of “harmonious society” and “harmonious world” drew
commentaries about how China was reassuring others of its “peaceful development”
and contrasting its legacy to the Bush administration’s belligerent unilateralism, a
reflection of a different type of civilization. Yet, the Beijing Olympics brought forth a
more assertive cultural posture, and in 2009, reflecting newfound confidence after
the United States had plunged the world into a financial crisis, rhetoric acquired a
more ominous tone. The rise of Asia, led by China, would end the imperialist and
war-filled interval of Western cultural dominance, changing the global system.
In 2005 national identities drew more attention from IR theorists. Relations
between China and Japan suddenly seemed to hinge primarily on clashing handling
of historical memory. Japanese-South Korean relations were abruptly set back by
historical memories linked to a territorial dispute. Even Sino-South Korean mutual
trust was shaken by the historical memory clash over the Koguryo state. Theorists
were inclined to minimize these disruptions. If only Koizumi would promise not to
visit the Yasukuni Shrine, Sino-Japanese relations would presumably return to what
they had been. Roh Moo-hyun became an object of such scorn that many assumed a
more measured South Korean leader would find a way to resume the momentum of
improving relations that had largely prevailed from 1998. Furthermore, it was often
20
argued that the Koguyro dispute was little more than a misunderstanding, a result of
local overly zealous academics extending further back the history of their locality in
the absence of attention from Beijing officials. Such rationalizations enabled many to
dismiss the growing impact of national identities in the region as of no consequence.
A theoretical concern has been how to balance criticism of human rights with
cooperation on security. In U.S. relations with China, North Korea, and Russia, this is
a recurrent theme, and it matters in South Korea’s engagement with North Korea
too. Some assume that no trade-off is necessary, even suggesting, as Victor Cha does
for Bush’s policy toward Pyongyang, that no price is paid by pursuing both at once.vi
Others argue that security takes precedence, and human rights must be set aside in
the meantime. This was essentially the position of the Roh administration before
Lee Myung-bak changed course. For liberals who emphasize the priority of forging
economic relations to build trust rather than to prioritize human rights and realists
who seek to build coalitions rather than proceed unilaterally, there is a trade-off. In
practice, U.S. administrations have generally accepted the need for this, but theory
may be influenced by the lack of acknowledgment of the trade-off to pay it no heed.
After eight years of Bush unilaterally and narrowly defining universal values,
Obama offered hope of reinvigorating the search for shared global aspirations. After
Islam served as the focus in critiques of opposition to globalization or intransigence
in the Soviet Union, Obama stressed finding common ground, including with China.
Yet, theories that emphasized U.S. overtures at reassurance failed to appreciate the
growing assertiveness of China, North Korea, and Russia. Obama’s overtures quickly
were doomed. Moreover, across East Asia there were diverse reservations, given
21
ASEAN’s insistence on its centrality without acknowledging any split with China and
India’s hesitation to embrace universal values as well as reluctance to highlight any
values divide with China as if it were gratuitous in managing a complex relationship.
Only at the end of the decade did it become clear that determination to avoid riling
China about values did not reverberate in China’s reciprocal behavior. Liberals who
pressed for more overtures and realists who ignored the complexity of rallying the
countries of East Asia behind a shared strategy were swayed by their theories.
Conclusion
Theoretical blinders appeared to have little down side in the 1970s-1990s. In
the 1970s, U.S. policy and theorists found reassurance in how the strategic triangle
was transformed in the U.S. favor, while Japanese modernization strengthened the
forces pressing against the Soviet Union and the socialist model. In the 1980s both
the capitulation of the Soviet Union and the implosion of China’s political order as its
economic order grew more open bolstered confidence in theoretical righteousness.
The height of U.S. triumphalism came along with an upsurge in arrogance that IR
theory could marginalize with area studies in the 1990s. The Asian financial crisis,
the U.S. “unipolar moment,” and globalization on the basis of U.S. principles were
confirmation that the world conformed to what theorists anticipated, even if some
room remained for regionalism as long as it was bereft of “Asian values” and signs of
“balance of power.” Only in the decade of the 2000s did doubts about IR theory rise
to the level of mass consciousness in the academic community, just as the departure
of George W. Bush gave a reprieve to reconsideration since he was widely faulted.
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Theorists in the second half of the twentieth century became accustomed to
seeing the United States as the driving force in Asia as elsewhere. In the 2000s this
proved to be problematic. ASEAN insisted on its centrality on regionalism, North
Korea had a transformative effect through its policies over the decade, and, most of
all, China was increasingly assertive, obliging U.S. policy to be reactive in a context of
its priority for the Iraq, Afghanistan, and even Iran. Exaggerating the U.S. role served
to salvage arguments steeped in realism and liberalism, even as they defied reality.
Whereas in the 1990s the theme of globalization took precedence, putting
economic change in the foreground, in the 2000s regionalism drew more attention
in East Asia, still with economic relations taking precedence even as security and
culture were intruding into the discussion. Some optimists about regionalism saw it
as reinforcing globalization, despite dissenting arguments.vii Other optimists
stressed progress in Sino-U.S. relations, detailing progress in managing North Korea,
keeping the history issue in bilateral relations with Japan from growing more
serious, and anticipating that the hegemonic order under the United States would
remain stable.viii Through much of the decade, even as awareness rose of the need
for theoretical modification, there was still anticipation that the foundation would
remain intact.
By late in the decade theoretical doubts were growing rapidly. What theory
showed the way to managing North Korea’s challenge to stability? China’s abrupt
shift from roughly the time of the Beijing Olympics defied predictions that dealt with
both its “lying low” and its sudden assertiveness. Russia’s transformation over the
decade clashed sharply with expectations. Whether in revised thinking about how
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regionalism was proceeding, unexpected awareness of the power of historical
symbols, or startling reawakening about the limits on U.S. leverage despite the surge
of appeals for greater U.S. leadership in East Asia, the decade ended with rethinking.
Why was optimism excessive in the 2000s? The first reason was reluctance
to consider the existence of a Chinese multi-stage strategy. Given the absence of a
clear ideology, as in Mao or Brezhnev’s time, and the repetition of slogans such as
“peaceful development,” many were disposed to overlook signs of assertiveness.
There were arguments such as: fearing loss of popular support, leaders diverted the
public with more emotional criticisms of the outside world, but they did not really
mean them; fragmentation of authority meant that more actors were pressing their
narrow interests, but no central strategy was behind their aggressive posturing; or
China’s relative passivity was interrupted by situations beyond its control, but each
resulted in a separate response without any coordinated approach. Foreign leaders
drew some of the blame, whether Bush for preemptive unilateralism, Koizumi for
provocative Yasukuni Shrine visits, or Lee Myung=bak for a hard-line stance toward
North Korea. Making excuses for China was standard in Chinese publications, and it
also proved convenient for many critical of other governments for their policies.
A second reason for optimism is the empowerment it promised to countries
and multilateral institutions championed by many academics, NGOs, and even state
officials at local and national levels. Local boosterism held out hope for the transfer
of resources in centralized states. Regionalism meant escape from dependency on
the United States that continues to grate on many, even in allied countries. Others
were tempted by affirmation of theories that they were championing. Evidence in
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the 2000s was ambivalent, and the most serious refutations of optimistic scenarios
were in sources rarely translated into English. It was easier to confirm one’s hopes
than to dig deeply into sources that would be inconclusive in this decade of change.
i
Muthiah Alagappa, “Preface,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order:
Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and Issues,”
ii
in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order, pp. 70-105.
iii
Chung-in Moon and Chaesung Chun, “Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian
Concept and Implications for Regional Security,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian
Security Order, pp. 106-37.
Yevgeny M. Primakov, A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-first
iv
Century (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center and Brookings Institution, 2004).
v
Wang Yuzhu, “Zhongguo Dongmeng guanxi zhongde xianghu yilai yu zhanlue
suzao,” Guoji wenti luntan, Fall 2008, pp. 54-66.
vi
vii
Victor Cha, The Impossible State: (2012).
Martina Timmermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., Institutionalizing Northeast
Asia: Regional Steps towards Global Governance (Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 2008).
viii
G. John Ikenberry, “The Political Foundations of American Relations with East
Asia,” in G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon, eds., The United States and Northeast
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Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 1937.