International Relations Theory and Asia Studies: the 1990’s
2013/04/07, Kazuhiko Togo
Overview
In the five decades from the 1970’s to the 2010’s that this study is addressing, the
1990’s stand out as the decade which marked the turning point of these five decades. If
one is to choose one single event which transformed the world structure both globally
and in Asia in these five decades, one may agree that it is the end of the Cold War that
took place somewhere between 1989 to 1991.
Before this turning point, the global structure was characterized by the rivalry
between the two blocks, the capitalist block led by the United States and the Socialist
block led by the Soviet Union. The global peace was ensured by the super-power rivalry
between the United States and the Soviet Union, at the center of which lied the key
issue of nuclear parity, which took the form of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
system of nuclear weapons. But by 1989-1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated and the
Cold War ended. The Socialist bloc became the vanquished and the capitalist block
appeared as the victor and the United States became world’s only super power. The
post-Cold War world structure was first of all an outcome of this divide between the
victor and the vanquished. Policies adopted by the Cold War victor, that is the United
States, Korea and Japan and the Cold-War vanquished, the Soviet Union and China are
the results of this winner-loser difference.
But the international politics of the 1990’s were deeply influenced by not only the
facts that a country faced victory or defeat, but also how that country faced the victory
or defeat. Serious question has to be posed whether that country had a straight-forward
victory or defeat on all fronts, or whether there were other circumstantial events that
deeply affected each country’s situation.
First we need to understand the nature of Soviet defeat. The Cold War was a
combination of rivalry based on values and power. But there was no war that became
the cause of the fall of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union disintegrated itself. The
reasons of this disintegration are manifolds. But on the whole, since “disintegration”
and not “war victory” was the prime cause of Soviet’s fall, the whole event was
perceived as the victory of values. This became the major tenet in the general analysis
of international politics and victory of power has been considered as the second tenet.
As to South Korea, clearly belonging to the victor’s side, the predominance of
liberal values was conspicuous by several additional factors. The victory of democracy
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was not a gift from the change of international politics but a result which people of
Korea gained through their painful fight against military dictatorship. The democratic
victory of South Korea contrasted high with the failure of North Korea, which became
one of the most undemocratic countries of the world. South Korea’s rise was certainly
not disconnected with its rise of power, but the predominant theme for South Korea was
the strength of liberal values.
Coming to Japan, however, shared feeling of liberal-democracy’s victory did not
take place. Since Japan was perhaps the most successful show case of economic rise
based on market economy and democratic system starting from its defeat at WWII, this
absence of the feeling of victory is conspicuous. Two domestic situations, explosion of
bubble in 1991 resulting in unprecedented economic difficulty that left no room for
enjoying the benefit of market economy, and failure of political reform in 1993-94
under Ichiro Ozawa who aimed a creation of two-party system are a reason for this
complacency. But perhaps the most indicative factor that surrounded Japan was Japan’s
so called “defeat at the First Gulf War 1990-91” due to its excessive passive pacifism.
Overcoming this “defeat” became Japan’s major foreign policy agenda and realism was
the most important factor there. Thus realism, and not liberalism, became its major
vehicle of international politics.
In the vanquished side, the Soviet Union became the looser of the Cold War. It had
the straight-forward defeat, which resulted in halving its population and losing a quarter
of the territory. But this defeat resulted in the creation of a new state called the Russian
Federation. Thus exaltation of victory of the Russian Federation, represented by Yeltsin,
against the falling Soviet Union, symbolized by Gorbachev became the major tenet and
bitterness of defeat became only the sub-tenet of the decade. Thus, the victory of values,
i.e. democracy and market economy, were hailed even more strongly in Russia than in
the United States in the initial months, if not years, under President Yeltsin. But the
policy of reform, which identified Russia with democracy and market values, soon got
its backlash. Nevertheless, the Yeltsin era which lasted until the very end of 1999 should
be remembered as an era of reform when values which can be loosely framed as
liberal-democracy was the major tenet in running the society and international politics.
The way China faced this situation was much more complex. In terms of the Cold
War structure, China was a country rivaling the Soviet Union within the Socialist block.
Since the rivalry with the Soviet Union was a more predominant factor than the global
East-West rivalry except the very initial years, the demise of the Soviet Union did not
mean at all for China sharing the same bitterness of defeat. Quite to the contrary, Den
Xiaoping, who was almost a decade ahead in his reform policy of “Reform and
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Opening” than Gorbachev’s “Perestroika”, was watching very closely the situation
developing in Russia. This resulted in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident and this
incident dictated Chinese policy over the 1990’s, and key factor was to restrict the area
of liberal reforms exclusively in the economic area based on greater freedom of
activities, but strictly monopolizing political power within the auspices of the
Communist Party of China (CPC). Thus realism and not liberalism became the
predominant tenet of the decade for China. Unlike the Korean case, Taiwan’s success
for democratization could have become another factor making cautious to political
liberalism.
Constructivist thinking, or identity pursuit became another factor for the decision
making process of the five countries. But in any country it took the leading tenet of the
decade like liberalism in case of the U.S., South Korea and Russia or realism in case of
Japan and China. The role of constructivist thinking varied in each country depending
on the specific circumstance which surrounded each one. Perhaps it has occupied the
position of the second tenet in Korea (as search for unification with the North) and
Japan (as its pursuit for the reconciliation with Asia). In case of Russia, since the
backlash against liberal reforms was first-of-all reflected in realist power thinking,
constructivist factor, though important, may best be placed as a third factor (as its
pursuit for Russian identity). In case of the United States, values and power that made
the U.S. were almost identical with American identity, so in that sense there was no
room for bringing in constructivist identity thinking. In case of China, “keep your
profile low” was the major tenet of realism and China’s identity thinking has not
appeared on the surface.
Thus in terms of the international relations theory, this paper does not take an
approach of viewing the world with a single tenet, either liberalism, realism or
constructivism. It takes an eclectic approach of looking into the process of decision
making of each country from liberal, realist and constructivist approaches and evaluate
which factor has played the major, second, or third, or practically very little role in each
country.
Table 1: East Asia and International Relations Theory in the 1990’s
America
South
Korea
Japan
Russia
China
Values
(Liberalism)
Major tenet
Major tenet
Third tenet
Major tenet
Second
tenet
Power
Second
Third tenet
Major tenet
Second
Major tenet
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(Realism)
tenet
Identity
----(Constructivism)
tenet
Second
tenet
Second
tenet
Third Tenet
-----
The United States
Historian might argue when did the Cold War end? This paper argues that we can define
the years from 1989, when the Berlin wall fell and Bush–Gorbachev meeting in Malta
declared the end of the Cold War, till 1991, when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the
Russian Federation was created, as the period which marked the end of the Cold War.
Why did the Cold War end? On the one hand, the disintegration of the Soviet system
came from the fact that Soviet system could not achieve the dynamism which its society
required. That failure was largely due to the defect of socialist-Marxist
values/ideologies which were the basis of the society. It could also be understood by
Soviets’ failure in power-politics, such as its disastrous entry into the war in Afghanistan,
combined with Reagan’s successful power politics to squeeze the Soviets with the
Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI).
So it is clear that both the elements of values/ideology and of power politics played
an important role for the demise of the Soviet Uniuon. But because the major factor
which propelled the fall of the Soviet Union was its “disintegration” from within its
society and not “defeat” from the power struggle with outside forces, the end of the
Cold War is generally perceived in the United States, which clearly emerged as its victor,
and elsewhere in the world, that the prevailing factor which led this victory was values/
ideology which can loosely be defined as the victory of liberal- democracy. Thus
liberalism can be considered as the major tenet to gauge the era in the United States.
Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History and the Last Man” was perhaps the most
representative analysis from that perspective.
In reality the major part of the 1990’s for the United States under President Clinton
1993-2000 was very far from the end of the history. Despites overwhelming victory of
liberal democracy, the world moved into an era of hot wars from cold war. The most
symbolic war that took place was the Gulf War of 1990-91, and successive wars that
took place in former Yugoslavia most importantly at Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo from 1991 till 1999. But looking these events from the perspectives of values
and power, it is clear that a strong push came from the perspectives that certain right of
minor states for independence has to be respected against strong powers which wanted
to dominate them. Such was the case of Kuwait against powerful Iraq under Saddam
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Hussein, and cases in Yugoslavia, smaller ethnic minorities fighting their independence
against Serbia, the most powerful ethnic group of former Yugoslavia. In another case,
alleged atrocities committed by one powerful group became casus belli for intervention
under the new values of humanitarian intervention, the most representative case being
NATO’s intervention into the Kosovo war.
Admittedly real politics and power balance were inseparable in these new wars.
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait cannot be dissociated with such issues as who
control the oil or whose power will become predominant in the Middle East. Wars in
former Yugoslavia cannot be dissociated with such factors that historically and
geopolitically Serbia was the closest to Russia and some other groups such as Croatia or
Bosnia-Herzegovina more supported by Germany and other European states.
Nevertheless a strong tenant of fundamental values such as minority’s right or
humanitarian consideration was the leading factor in international politics.
The question of war and peace was more or less the same in East Asia. The
difference was that unlike the Middle East or Yugoslavia hot war were avoided in East
Asia. But the logic of U.S. intervention to the potential military conflicts was very much
the same. The first real crisis took place in 1993-94 around North Korea’s intention to
hold nuclear weapons. North Korea by then was the most oppressive, undemocratic and
failed state in East Asia and this country holding nuclear weapons was impermissible.
The evilness of the system based on value-judgment became the leading factor for the
U.S. not to allow North Korea to hold nuclear weapons. It goes without saying that
whole change of power balance and possible security threat to the United States, if not
immediate but in future, was a combined tenet of U.S. thinking, but these realists
thinking were underlying factors rather than frontal factors.
The second crisis took place at Taiwan Strait in 1995-96, and the value of
democracy was probably even more apparent than the North Korean case. Here the
focal point was Taiwan which became the stunning example of success in the strenuous
efforts toward democratization. The rise of Lee Denhui, a Taiwan born citizen under
Japanese occupation from within Kuomintang and his eventual seizure of power in 1988
and rising to the position of the president in 1990, preparing its way to a democratically
elected president in 1996 was a spectacular process of democratization in East Asia.
Since democratization meant a natural process of Taiwanization, and the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), whose officially declared objective was to achieve
independence, was waiting to win over Kuomintang in a not too distant future, China’s
concern on free democratic election was rising high. Cross strait missile launching
exercises that took place in 1995-96 reflected well that concern and the sending of
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American aircraft career to the vicinity of the Strait reflected strong American concern
that the democratic process that began in Taiwan should not be stopped. It has naturally
realist concern to curb China’s expansive influence in East Asia, but likewise North
Korean cases, these realists thinking were underlying factors rather than frontal factors.
South Korea
South Korea was a member of the capitalist block in East Asia, thus naturally belongs to
the club of winners after the end of the Cold War. But South Korean victory should be
looked at much more from the perspectives of its own process of democratization rather
than an outcome of the changes that happened in the Soviet Union. Post-war Korea after
Japan’s defeat and liberation from its occupation suffered from two unexpected turmoil:
divided occupation and the Korean War. South Korea that was formulated became a
country governed by Lee’s dictatorship succeeded by decades of military dictatorship
under three military-presidents. But social friction under military dictatorship reached to
its height by students’ movement after President Park’s assassination in 1979 leading to
President Chun Doo-hwan’s Kwangju massacre in 1982. President Roh Tae-Woo’s
assumption of power in 1988 was conditioned by his Declaration of Democratization of
June 29, 1987. Thus President Roh became the last president selected from the military,
and a full democratic election took place thence onwards to elect civilian presidents.
Thus the two non-military candidates who run unsuccessfully for the election in 1972
first President Kim Young-sam 1993-97 and President Kim Dae-Jung 1998-2002 were
successively elected in the 1990’s.
In this amazing process for strengthening its democracy, South Korea marked series
of diplomatic successes which could symbolize the power of democracy and
market-economy. Under President Roh Tae-woo it held successfully the 1988 Olympics
game. President Roh continued to make a staggering diplomatic success at the end of
the Cold War by way of opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and
with China in 1992. Under President Kim Young-sam South Korea joined the OECD in
1996, as the second country from Asia following Japan. When the Asian financial crisis
struck South Korea in 1997-98, one of the achievements made by President Kim
Dae-jun was to follow strictly IMF’s rigorous policy of economic reform which became
a key factor to strengthen Korean economic performance thence onwards. Kim’s policy
to enter into various type of partnerships with its surrounding countries in 1998 and
1999 can also be considered as reflecting the quality of Korea’s development, so should
also be considered his initiative to take the leadership role of East Asian regionalism.
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In considering Korean policy of this period, there is one more factor, which played a
critical role in shaping its strategic objectives. That is Korean search for its identity, in
concrete terms its pursuit of final unification. It is difficult to theorize the problem of
unification either from the point of view of liberal values or from the point of view of
realist power consideration. Unification is best explained as identity consciousness of
the Korean people. Immediately after the end of the Cold War under President Roh
Tae-woo, a surge of several activities took place. The first leaders’ meeting after the
divide at prime-ministers level took place in September 1990 and thenceforward the
eight rounds of talks resulted in “Agreement concerning the Reconciliation,
Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North” in
December 1991 and “Joint Declaration concerning Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula” in February 1992. The North and the South joined the United Nations
simultaneously in September 1991. This heightened mood for rapprochement cooled off
considerably by the 1993-94 North Korean attempts to hold nuclear weapons, and by
Kim Young-sam’s inability to cope with the situation leaving the role of key actor to the
United States. But a surge of identity search took place under President Kim Dae-jung
in his sunshine policy which resulted into the June 2000 North-South Summit which has
ever taken place after the split between the two Koreas. The 2000 North-South Summit
and Kim Dae-jung’s pursuit of sunshine policy may remain in the history as his greatest
achievement. One may argue that since North Korea has one of the worst records on its
democracy, there is an inherent tension on Korean zeal for democracy creation and its
search for unification.
Naturally the success of Korean foreign policy cannot just be considered as the
result of pursuit of liberal values or constructivist values of unification. Pursuit of
Korean power underpins all pursuit of above-mentioned goals. But in relations to the
liberal values, we do not see some fundamental contradiction between liberal and realist
values. But in relations to North Korea, because North Korea became one of the
harshest military states which increasingly is basing its security on nuclear weapons,
South Korean unification policy as was labeled as Sunshine Policy in this decade, could
meet to some fundamental contradiction.
Japan
As the result of the end of the Cold War, Japan should have appeared as the second
victor next to the United States. Japan’s economic might as was perceived at the end of
the 1980’s made this country even the greatest threat for the United States after the end
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of the Cold War. But interestingly, the 1990’s did not bring about that feeling of victory
in Japan.
The first reason is probably due to the fact that the two fundamental powers which
made Japan’s economic might somehow started to dysfunction after the end of the Cold
War. Japan’s capitalist economy faced an unprecedented strife by the explosion of the
bubble economy in 1991 and the whole 90’s remained as the decade of economic
stagnation. The political reform that started in 1993 aiming to create a two-party system
under the initiative of Ichiro Ozawa proved to be short-lived, and the LDP regained
some power as early as in 1994 and full power in 1996. The fall of authority of the
Ministry of Finance by political scandal weakened bureaucracy, one of the foundations
of post-war Japan’s economic successes. All these did not crown Japan with success and
victory at the wake of the Cold War.
The second reason is probably due to what we usually call “Japan’s defeat of 1991”
at the first Gulf War. When Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait in August 1990, Japan’s
long-time engrained passive pacifism prevented to act effectively. Initial reactions
proved to be effective, but overall economic assistance, which rose to 1.4 billion grant
assistance was labeled as “too little and too late.” The parliamentary debate to discuss a
bill to send the SDF for non-combat activities in the fall of 1990 collapsed due to the
inability of the government officials to adequately explain why this troop could legally
be sent under the Article 9 of the Constitution. When the government of Kuwait made a
full page message to thank the nations that helped liberating it from Hussein’s invasion,
Japan’s name was not included in it. The inability of act effectively at the first Gulf war
thus became a national humiliation, particularly among policy makers and
defense-security related officials. How to act more responsibly on issues related to war
and peace and how to overcome Japan’s lost confidence in the United States and other
international community became Japan’s major theme of foreign policy.
Liberalism thus lost ground in Japan to dominate its strategic thinking in the 1990’s.
It occupies only the third tenet in Japan’s strategic thinking. Realism instead, or as Mike
Green defined famously, “Reluctant Realism” became Japan’s major tenet of the 1990’s.
Three more issues surrounding Japan’s defense–security environment in the middle of
the 1990’s gave further push toward Japan’s realism. First, the North-Korean nuclear
crisis in 1993-94 made U.S. and Japan’s defense and security experts realize that if in
case the worst happens in the Peninsula between the United States and North Korea,
Japanese SDF may even not be in a position of assisting US troops for their rear area
support due to the lack of necessary legislation. Second, in September 1995 a primary
school girl was raped by an American soldier in Okinawa. Okinawa’s public opinion
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exploded and concrete measures needed to be introduced to remedy the relationship.
Third, the Taiwan missile crisis of 1995-96 shook Japan to realize how the situation
across the Taiwan Strait could be precarious.
 Thus in 1994 the International Peace Cooperation Law was adopted and Japan
began sending SDF troops to U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Participation to U.N.
Cambodian mission in 1994 became a break-through event.
 The Okinawa incident resulted in the establishment of the Special Action
Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) in November 95, and the
December 1996 SACO agreement drew conclusion to relocate the Futenma Base
from the position where it was currently located.
 The North Korean crisis combined with rising tension at the Taiwan Strait resulted
in the overall reassessment of the alliance, and in April 1996, upon the visit of
President Clinton to Japan, “The Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance
for the 21st Century” was adopted.
 Based on this Joint Declaration, the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation were
adopted in September 1997. In order to enable these Guidelines to work within
Japanese domestic legal structure, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace
and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” was adopted in
May 1999.
 On a completely different tenet, on Russia, Japan’s slowness in grasping realist
opportunity failed to resolve the disputed territorial issues with Russia in its
1991-92 historic opportunity, but its realization of realist need to strengthen ties
with Russia brought the two countries very close in 1997-98. Unfortunately the two
sides failed to grasp this opportunity either.
As the realist thread became the first tenet of Japanese political thinking in the 1990’s,
perhaps we need to explain Japan’s reconciliation with Asia, and notably with China
and Korea, by constructivist thinking, which may be the second tenet of this decade.
The first half the 1990’s were crowned with several distinctive successes from that
perspective. In October 1992 the Emperor Akihito visited Beijing for the first time after
the end of the WWII. Perhaps as seen below, from China’s perspective the invitation
was made largely from realist perspective to bring China’s position back to the
international fora after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. But from Japan’s
perspective, this was a decisive action for the reconciliation. In relations to Korea,
comfort women issue was brought to the center of the relationship at the end of
President Roh Tae-woo towards the first years under President Kim Young-sam. Kono
Statement was issued in 1993 and based on that statement the Asian Women Fund was
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established in 1995.
As if to synthesize all these actions for reconciliation Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama’s Statement, the most decisive statement of apology ever pronounced in
Japan and probably in the world, was pronounced in August 1995. There was a certain
feeling in Japan that this statement may mark “the end of history” with Asia. China’s
reaction under Jiang Zemin soon proved to be that reconciliation is still a long-term
objective, but Kim Dae-jun’s visit in October 1998 marked the height of post WWII
Japan-Korea reconciliation. Even Jiang Zemin’s visit in November 1998, much
criticized in Japan for his “preaching” about Japan’s need for further apology, adopted a
Joint Declaration which underlined the need for future-oriented relations. Prime
Minister Obuchi’s encouragement in the course of 1999 to let China join the WTO was
also considered as continued policy of reconciliation with China In 1999 Obuchi’s
endeavor for reconciliation was also embodied in his initiative to hold
Japan-China-South Korea summit meeting within the auspices of ASEAN Plus Three
(APT) meeting that started in 1997.
Russia
The disintegration of the Soviet Union is a subject which needs to have a full scope
analysis: the formation of the Soviet Union, its development and its fall. This is a task
outside the scope of this paper, but a few words on Gorbachev’s policy of Perestroika is
necessary because that policy triggered the end of the Cold War. The Russian word
Perestroika is constructed with two parts: “pere---” means “re---” and “stroika” means
“construction”. It meant “reconstruction” of socialism. Gorbachev saw stagnation zastoi
in the Soviet society, so he decided to “reconstruct” socialism and wipe out that
stagnation. The key factor he wanted to introduce was human factors. He introduced
glasnostj which meant transparency. In real terms this meant mobilization of intellectual
thinking and debates to bring in ideas and proposals for changes. One of Perestroika’s
definitions was “Socialism with Human Face”. So things began from political shaking,
and this shaking was believed to introduce effective economic changes. Activated
economic policy should have brought a strengthened socialist system. In that sense,
Gorbachev’s policy was profoundly liberal, in his belief in the system of socialism and
in his belief in the good nature of human beings. In reality, things turned around into
complete opposite direction. Free debates based on Glasnostj brought about hundreds of
ideas on political and economic reforms, but it first of all brought about total economic
confusion. Then Gorbachev’s belief in delegation of power from the Communist Party
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of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to a presidential system under the notion of liberal
socialism resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, triggered by the minority
ethnic rights for independence.
For those who have observed the Soviet Union and argued that the concentration of
power to the CPSU and its autocratic political and economic policy may sometimes lead
into its disintegration, the peaceful transfer of power from the Soviet Union to the
Russian Federation was almost a miracle. The alchemy to transform Soviet defeat into
Russian victory could only be explained by the extraordinary power relationship
between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Yeltsin’s rise to power in that sense has a critical
importance. Born in 1931, first became a construction engineer at Sverdlovsk, entered
the CPSU in 1961, became full time party apparatchik in 1968 and member of the
Central Committee in 1981. After Gorbachev’s rise in 1985, Yeltsin first became a
strong supporter of Perestroika, but in 1987, his radical reform lines went into collision
first with CPSU conservatives and then with Gorbachev himself and Yeltsin resigned
the post of Politburo in November, known to have become a radical reformer. Yeltsin
made his comeback, in March 1989 to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet
Union, and then in April 1900 to the Congress of People’s Deputies of Russia, finally to
the Chairmen of that Congress in May of that year.
Yeltsin’s political instinct to gather reformists’ power in the Russian Federation, to
crush the conservatives as well as Gorbachev’s supporters after the August 1991 Coup,
to dissolve the Soviet Union and to oust Gorbachev through friendly parting with other
republics, starting with Ukraine and Kazakhsan in December 1991, and finally to realize
the creation of an autonomous Russian power was simply amazing. That Russian
Federation incarnated the principle of reform based on democratic system and market
economy. It was an art of real political genius. In contrast to Gorbachev, whose realist
political instinct was so weak that it led only to the demise of his own position, Yeltin’s
realist instinct for power lead him stronger step by step, finally leading to the President
of the Russian Federation. But at the same time, what is conspicuous in Yeltsin was that
from the time he became Gorbachev’s perestroika supporter and then strong critique of
Ligachev and other conservative CPSU members, he supported liberal values to make
Russia a democratic country. With his realist instinct, Yeltsin was never indifferent with
his power position. But his policy as the President of the Russian Federation has always
been geared to liberal values.
There are distinctively two periods within Yeltsin’s presidency, when his liberal
policy direction was shown most vividly. The first period is from December 1991 till
October 1993, when his initial policy of economic reform was implemented under the
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guidance of Prime Minister Guidar. The initial year of its foreign policy could be
defined as the year of Atlanticism, when Russia’as attention was directed to major
Western countries, including the United States, Europe and Japan. In Asia, Japan
became the representative of Western values, embodying the success of market
economy and democracy. Russia-Japan relations then saw a historic opportunity for a
break through.
But this short-lived period of Atlanticism is dabbed as the period of euphoria.
Guidar’s radical economic policy created a hyper-inflation and economic turmoil,
resulting in arms conflicts with his opponents in October 1993. When this bitter conflict
ended with Yeltin’s bloody victory, Yeltsin sought to implement a policy of social
harmony and gradual economic reform, and through this “appeasement policy”
successfully won the election for his second presidency in July 1996. But due his health
problem he stayed out from politics until March 1997. Meanwhile, in the area of foreign
policy, the age of Atlanticism was over, and Kremlin began to shed greater attention to
the Eurasian Continent, first of all to former Soviet Republics, and then to Asia, notably
in improving relations with China and also with South Korea.
Yeltins’ physical recovery and re-appearance in Russian domestic and external
politics in March 1997 revived for about a year the vigor of initial year of reform period.
The implementation of foreign policy was assisted by Yefgeny Primakov as foreign
minister from January 1996 till September 98. Yeltsin’s attention to Japan rose again
during this period symbolized by the meetings with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
in Krasnoyarsk in November 1997 and in Kawana in April 1998. This time Yeltsin’s
interest to Japan has a stronger geo-political connotation. It could be understood as a
continuation of Eurasianism particularly in responding to NATO’s eastward expansion.
NATO decided, in summer 1997 to invite Poland, Hungary and Czech to become its
member and the actual enlargement took place in March 1999.
Yeltsin’s foreign policy which wavered in this period from Atlanticism to
Eurasianism cannot be separated from his thinking on identity. Right from the period of
Peter the Great, Westerners or Slavophiles is the key issue which haunted all Russian
intellectuals to this day. The present–day debate between Slavophiles and Westerners is
taking place in the geographic form of Atlanticism and Euracianism. But this shift from
Atlanticism to Eurasianism can be better understood first from realist power
consideration and then from constructivist identity point of view.
China
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The way China faced the end of the Cold War in 1989 was very different from the way
the Soviet Union saw its defeat. In case of the Soviet Union the socialist system which
sustained the nation collapsed and Russian Federation decided, at least for a certain
period, to create a nation with totally different values and system.
China’s case was very different. China’s reform had already started in 1978 under
Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “Reform and Opening”. The structure was very clear.
Introduce a capitalist oriented economy based on market mechanism, but keep CPC’s
political power intact. One may attribute the former as economic liberalism and the
latter as realist power consideration. But China’s failure erupted on June 4 1989 at the
Tiananmen Square when harmonious development of economic liberalism and political
realism completely broke. Deng’s decision was to keep the ascendency of political
realism and crush the students who were seeking greater freedom. It goes therefore
without saying that the major tenet for China was to base its thinking on realism and
ensure that CPC’s power should not be derogated.
Relatively tough foreign policy under Jiang Zemin in all fronts can well be
explained because of its tense political situation. On Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait Crisis of
1995-96 to engage in series of missile launching exercises in responding to Lee
Deng-hui’s initiative to hold direct presidential election is the first example. Tough
policy of rebuking Japan on historical memory issues particularly in the latter part of the
1990’s, when the Japanese side has displayed high degree of apology policy in the first
half of the 1990’s is the second example. As stated above Jiang Zemin’s 1998 visit to
Japan and his policy of preaching Japan to remember and apologize for history is fresh
in the memory of the Japanese. China’s sharp criticism against the United States at the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and tense debate on “peace
and development” and “US-China Cold War” that developed in this period was another
example.
As for China’s liberal economic policy, after the Tiananmen Square incident, there
emerged certain period of uncertainty. But the renowned visit by Deng Xiaoping to
Southern Provinces in 1992 unambiguously established that China’s liberal economy
could and shall remain as the decisive pillar of its economic policy. Despites sometimes
severed relations with the US, China’s willingness to join the WTO remained basically
un-wavered. China’s membership to the WTO was finally approved in November 2001.
China’s identity related issues stayed much subdued. After the Tiananmen
Square incident, China’s US policy became embodied in 24 words, where “keep your
profile low” was the major tenet of realism. For China of the 1990’s, pronouncement of
identity was too early and perhaps we need to wait this position for another two decades
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until the 2010’s.
International Relations Theory and Asian reality
If one looks at the reality of international politics in East Asia and how policy makers
mind could be understood by three theoretical International Relations theory, one can
reasonably say that the three frameworks of realism, liberalism and constructivism, if
used eclectically, give reasonable ground for understanding what has taken place. The
Overview section and all subsequent analyses regarding five countries give reasonable
evidence for the successful adaptation of East Asian reality to the theoretical
framework.
But if one tries to analyze how decision making was made in East Asia and whether
decisions made by certain theoretical framework actually produced some outcome,
which may meet or not meet the strategic requirement to maximize that country’s
national interest, one is left with a real question: would not a better grasping of
International Relations theory help implementing a country’s policy more effectively to
achieve maximum strategic objective?
In case of the United States, one question which occurs immediately is whether the
sense of victory of democratic values has not weakened US realist ability to
comprehend and adjust its policy to the reality in East Asia. Did the United States
sufficiently understand Russia’s need for greater realism after the initial period of
Euphoria was over? How much attention was given in the United Sates after the 1989
Tiananmen Square Incident about China’s necessity of shifting to a realist policy of
concentrating its political power within the CPC? How much attention was given to
Japan in the 1990’s to really appreciate the weight of what was happening there, when
its shift to realism was nonetheless slow and when its constructivist reconciliation
efforts were obscured by some domestic opposition which caught much of media
attention?
In case of South Korea, the crux of the matter does not depend on the application of
a theory. For policy makers the choice, theoretical and real, is clear. The contradiction
between the constructivist urge for national unification on the one hand, and the realist
need to ensure its own security and the liberal needs to strengthen democratic values on
the other, is deeply engrained in the policy choices among Korean leaders.
Retrospectively one may always argue that certain choice at certain period did not hit
the optimal balance. But at least that dilemma was cognizant in Korea.
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So was the dilemma cognizant in Japan. The choice is clear but the situation is so
complex and unity of choices do not appear easily. Although I consider the
characteristics of this decade as a greater realism and stronger reconciliation efforts with
Asia, that direction was taken not without controversy. For some policy makers with
realist orientation, the realism introduced in this period was too slow and too reluctant.
For other policy makers with pacifist orientation, the change was too harsh and too
dangerous. For some policy makers with reconciliation orientation, the Murayama
Statement and other measures introduced were a minimum and more efforts are needed
to do. For other policy makers reconciliation policy introduced in this decade was too
apologetic and harmed the honor of forefathers. These difficult policy choices were
there in addition to the difficult policy choices on democratic and economic system.
In contrast it seems that Yeltsin’s policy of achieving greater policy with liberal
values with his instinct on power politics seemed to have hit a reasonably balanced
position. One may naturally argue that his absorption in liberal values, hence his
attachment to the Atlanticism in the initial year was theoretically misguided approach.
But retrospectively that lasted for one year only and the Eurasianism oriented policy for
Russia may best suit Russia’s realist and identity interest.
For China, The policy choice is very difficult, likewise in Korea and Japan. But
perhaps the policy choice between liberally oriented economic policy based on market
economy and realist oriented political policy based on the unification of power under
the CPC, is almost impossible to resolve. This may not be an era where the three
International Relations theory of three frameworks of International Relations theory is
not able to give an adequate answer. One can assume that some constructivist efforts
await China to get a breakthrough.
(END)
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