Chinese Currency Revaluation - Is the Chinese currency significantly undervalued? MGMT 6350 International Business April 2005 Weilong Zhang Thesis Statement There seems little doubt that Chinese currency, the yuan or renminbi (RMB) is currently under pressure for appreciation. This view could be supported by the massive inflow of foreign direction investment (FDI), significant current account surplus and rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in recent years. There seems to hard to dispute that China’s effective peg to the US dollar has recently led to a decline of the RMB exchange rate against other major international currencies, particularly the euro, and yen. However, these do not indicate that the Chinese currency is significantly undervalued. Nor does the evidence advocated for RMB revaluation constitute a sufficient condition for a RMB revaluation although some do put upward pressure for a RMB revaluation. Abstract Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate issue has been recently the focus of world attention, with many foreign trading partners urging China to either revalue its currency or move to a flexible exchange rate regime. The RMB exchange rate regime is also a key factor in China’s ongoing economic reform efforts. In this paper, RMB revaluation issue was discussed on the basis of the question whether Chinese currency is significantly undervalued or not. It is admitted that the RMB may be on the undervalued side, but this is by a fairly small margin, not dangerously so as some claimed. The evidences used for the RMB revaluation argument are unpersuasive, misinterpreted, and some even totally wrong although some do help produce the pressure for the RMB revaluation. 1 Introduction Since late 2002, China has been under mounting pressure from the United States, Japan, and the European Union to revalue its currency, the renminbi (RMB) because of their concern that the decade-long pegged RMB/US exchange rate has given China an unfair comparative advantage in international trade. Despite persistent pressure for it to revalue, China has so far insisted that it will not resort to any quick and large scale of the RMB revaluation but agreed that a flexible exchange rate regime is the long-term goal of China’s ongoing reform on foreign exchange administration system to achieve complete convertibility, and thus pledged to gradually improve the exchange rate forming mechanism so that the RMB exchange rate is completely determined by supply and demand in the market. This paper consists of three parts. The first part provides a brief introduction of China’s current exchange rate regime (from 1994 to present). The second part argues whether RMB is significantly undervalued. The third part examines the flawed arguments for the RMB. China’s exchange rate regime China’s exchange rate regime has experienced several phases since China started its economic reform and opening-up policy in 1978. The RMB current exchange rate, a market-based, unified, and managed floating exchange rate regime was introduced in 1994 when China started its foreign exchange system reform. Under the current regime, certain banks are designated to sell and purchase foreign exchange. In 1996, the RMB became convertible under current account. It should be pointed out that China was very optimistic about full convertibility of the RMB in 1996 and early 1997, and was planning to open its capital account in the next 5 years or so following the full current convertibility in 1996. However, the outbreak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis has held its plan for capital account liberalization. Up to today, China still maintains foreign 2 exchange control on capital account, but stated that China will gradually open its capital account in 2005 [1]. By many measures, China’s current exchange rate regime can be regarded as very successful and effective, particularly in term of price stability (inflation control) and economic growth for the past decade. As shown in Fig. 1, China’s average annual economic growth has been maintained above 9% while the inflation rate has been under the control (much less than 5%). Another strong evidence for its success of China’s exchange rate policy during that period is that China was able to weather the Asian financial crisis storm relatively unscathed. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China was faced international pressure for the RMB devaluation. In a bid to prevent the crisis from spreading further, China made a commitment to its policy of non-devaluation, keeping the $8.28 pegged RMB/US dollar exchange rate. Without any exaggeration, China has made a great contribution to the stability and early recovery of the economy in the region and in the whole world. Since joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China’s economic integration with the World has been accelerating. China’s integration with the world is reflected in its rapidly growing role in international trade. China’s strong export growth, expanding market shares in major trade partners countries, particularly the record of the trade surplus with the United States, and rapid increases in foreign exchange reserves have raised the questions about whether the decade-long pegged RMB/US dollar exchange rate may have resulted in an undervaluation of the Chinese currency. The RMB exchange rate issue has quickly turn into a unique, and heated debate on whether the RMB is undervalued, and whether China should revalue or float its currency immediately. On one side, those who accused China is manipulating its currency to make its exports much cheaper argue that RMB is undervalued, urge China to revalue or float its currency. Those on the other side of the debate warn that a RMB revaluation or floating will destabilize the world economy as well as the China’s 3 economy. One of the key questions from this debate needs to be firstly clarified is whether the Chinese RMB is significantly undervalued. Is the Chinese currency RMB significantly undervalued? It is true that the RMB has been pegged to the US dollar since 1994. However, the RMB had appreciated against the US dollar by 6.7% from 1994 to the end of 2003, in nominal terms. The real RMB appreciation was as large as 20.1% if inflation is taken into account. It is also true that China’s effective peg to the US dollar has recently led to a decline of the RMB exchange rate against other major international currencies, particularly the euro, and yen. However, this is simply in the nature of a currency peg. There is no clear indication that the RMB is significantly undervalued. First, the real effective exchange rate, which is calculated by taking into account the multiliteral interaction of RMB exchanges with different foreign currencies, is the most import factor judging the value of the RMB. As compared to 1998, the real effective exchange rate (REER) has stayed roughly at the same level while the real effective exchange rate based on the consumer price index (CPI) is depreciated, but by only about 5-6%. Such a slight appreciation is also confirmed by the small gap observed between the official exchange rate and the blackmarket rate in China. Second, alternative analysis of the one-year non-deliverable forward (NDF) RMB-US dollar rate (Fig.2) shows a similar result that the RMB has a only slight undervaluation (less than 5%) against the current 8.28 RMB-US dollar pegged rate. Third, it is widely agreed that determining “equilibrium” exchange rates is a very difficult task, and no one knows for sure how much any currency is over or under valued. There are many techniques available to estimating “equilibrium” exchange rates. However, there is no conclusive result with regard to the “equilibrium” exchange rates of the RMB. There is such a substantial degree of 4 uncertainty associated with each of those estimate of the RMB undervalued range from 10% to 40%. It is difficult to draw a conclusion. It may be because of that, in 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that “most Directors noted that there is no clear evidence that RMB is substantially under valued at this juncture.” [3]. More recently, in its recent release of Staff Report for the 2004 Article IV Consultation with the People’s Republic of China, IMF estimated that in the first five month of 2004, China’s real effective exchange rate have appreciated by 2.7% [4]. Given the above reasons, it does not seem to indicate that the RMB-US dollar exchange rate is too far away from its current pegged rate. While it may be said that the RMB is currently on the undervalued side, this is by a very small margin, not significantly. Once it is clarified that the RMB is not significantly undervalued. Next, let’s examine the arguments for the RMB revaluation. Argument for RMB revaluation What is evidence for arguments that Chinese currency is undervalued? Those who advocate an immediate revaluation of RMB quite often list the following five reasons to support their arguments. Exporting deflation The higher RMB purchasing power parity, and Big Mac Index Large surpluses both on China’s current account and capital account The rapid increase of foreign exchange reserves Overheating of China’s economy due to mass domestic credit expansion by “undervalued” RMB Exporting deflation “Exporting deflation” was advocated by Japan in December 2002, arguing that China was spreading deflation “through export growth and a combination of domestic price deflation and an exchange rate pegged to the dollar.” [5]. The “exporting deflation” argument for RMB’s revaluation stems from the fact that 5 from 1998 to 2002 (see Fig.1), China had seen mild deflation even though its average economic growth rate of 7.6% was much above the world’s (average less than 3.0%). Chinese exports were not only substantial, but also were growing voraciously. However, the basis of the argument can not stand by the fact that China’s share of exports is still too small to effect deflation to any significant degree to the world economy. It is estimated [6] that China’s merchandise exports as a share of the world total, despite its fast growth, were only about 6.8%, less than 1% of world GDP, less 1.5% of Japan’s GDP, and less than 1.3% of US’s GDP, respectively in 2002. Given such a small share in the world trade, China’s contribution to the world deflation is overstated. Another fact is that Japan have had deflationary problem for more than 10 years. There is no link between the RMB undervaluation and Japan deflationary problem. The higher RMB purchasing power parity (PPP), and the Big Mac Index The higher RMB PPP and the Big Mac Index have been cited as another evidence for the RMB revaluation argument. Using the purchasing power parity (PPP) model, some people calculated that the “equilibrium” exchange rate of RMB against the US dollar would stand at 2:1, about four times more appreciated than the current 8.28 RMB/US dollar peg rate [7]. Similarly, the “Big Mac Index” suggests that the RMB is undervalued by over 50% against US dollar [8]. However, both the purchasing power parity and “Big Mac index” should not be taken as a reliable guide for currency valuation. First, the theory of PPP is based on the “law of one price”. Some recent studies [9] has shown that how sizable are departure from the “law of one price” for industrial countries. As admitted by The Economist that the PPP and “Big Mac Index” is not a totally serious exercise and reliable way of evaluating real exchange rate. There has been no evidence on the validity of PPP in the literature for developing economics like China where substantial structural changes can make the underlying relationships unstable. 6 Second, this is common for all developing countries that the purchasing power parity of the RMB is higher than its official exchange rate. For example, the same ratio for India and Russia are 5.33 and 4.18 respectively. If based on purchasing power parity, the Russia ruble would have appreciated by over 50% since 1997 instead of experiencing a persistent fall against the US dollar from 6:1 at the end of 1996 to the current level of 31:1. Furthermore, more and more empirical studies show that PPP theory often tends to overvalue the exchange rate of the developing countries. In fact, one recent analysis conducted by IMF concluded [10] that it is difficult to arrive at any firm and robust conclusion about whether a currency is undervalued or overvalued in developing economics like China using existing techniques. As Kenneth Rogoff, chief economist of the International Monetary, pointed out: “it is impossible to determine whether the pricing of RMB is too high or too low, since capital account and interest rates are both under control in China.” [11]. Large surpluses both on China’s current account and capital account Should large trade surpluses both on China’s current account and capital account dictate a revaluation of the RMB? From the theories on international balances of payments, it does suggest that the RMB should appreciate if China wants to restore balance of payment and when supplies of foreign currencies surpass demands. Also, it is true that these are signs, in a poor country, that the currency is undervalued. However, in case of China, they do not necessarily justify for a revaluation of the RMB although do help build some pressure for the RMB appreciation. There are several “Chinese characteristics” for that. First, the Chinese save heavily instead of spending. China has the highest saving’s rates (more than 45% of GDP) in the world. Meanwhile, options for investment are very limited due to China’s underdeveloped financial market. Such a huge amount of household savings deposits makes it quite possible for China to record a certain amount of trade surplus, as implied by this equation EX(Export)-IM(Import)=S(Saving)-I(investment) from an international finance 7 textbook. Second, majority of Chinese may still favor the US dollar over the RMB due to historical reason, particularly, for those wealthy Chinese who transfer their assets abroad and finance their Children’s education overseas take up a very high percentage of the China’s household savings. It should be pointed out that the recent insistency for a RMB revaluation is essentially motivated by bilateral trade surplus China has with the US. The US trade deficit with China in 2003 recorded to $124 billion, or 23.2% the total US deficit. This leads to a perception that China’s exports are the major factor to the growing US trade deficit and to the loss of US manufacturing jobs. However, this is misunderstood. The basic principles of economics tell us that exchange rates are not the only factor affecting trade balance. First, the large US-China trade deficit is fundamentally determined by US large savings and investment imbalance. Second, the increasing US-China trade imbalance is mainly the results of the triangular regional trade patterns among China, the US, and the rest of the East Asia [12]. A unilateral RMB revaluation will not help reduce the large US-China trade deficit. For example according to a research paper by Goldman Sachs, a 10% revaluation of the RMB has almost no effect on the US trade deficit reduction. The rapid increase of foreign exchange reserves The recent surge in China’s foreign exchange reserves has been misinterpreted as another evidence for RMB’s undervaluation. However, some recent research shows that the increase in reserves appears to have been significantly influenced by inflows of international short-term “hot money”, suggesting that the evidence on whether the RMB is dangerously undervalued in term of fundamental is far from conclusive. In fact, the speculation on RMB revaluation has already fueled big inflows of hot money into China and hided in its currency reserves. It is reported [x] that until 2002, almost all of the balance-of-payments surplus could be accounted for by foreign direct investment (FDI). However, FDI took up only 40% of the surplus in 2003. 8 Overheating of China’s economy due to mass domestic credit expansion The undervalued RMB is also hypothesized as a cause of the overeating economy in China. It is true that China’s economic overheated economy over the last two years is due to mass domestic credit expansion. Some have mistakenly attributed the overheating to an undervalued RMB by the textbook explanation. In reality, it had little to do with the RMB undervaluation. According to the international business textbook, on one hand, China’s undervalued currency raises the expectation of a near-term revaluation of the RMB, which then attracts large capital flows into the country, and therefore causes the monetary base to expand, leading to mass domestic credit expansion in China. On the other hand, the dollar pegged RMB also makes it hard to cool the overheated economy as it can not raise the interest rate much higher than US rates. Otherwise, even more dollars would flow in as Chinese companies boosted borrowings of cheaper money from abroad, which will in turn cause the monetary base to expand further. As a result, the only way out is to revalue the RMB. However, above textbook explanation on the cause of China’s current economic overheating needs some reality verification. The real situation in China is that the recent mass domestic credit expansion was brought about by increased bank lending. The reasons for the large increase in bank lending include that the China’s banks want to lower their non-performing ratios in order to get listed in stock market, and that local government push ahead with large development projects for local development and job creation, resulting a rapid growth in fixed capital investment. In short, all above five evidences that have been advocated as the argument for the RMB revaluation are unpersuasive, misinterpreted, and some are even totally wrong although some do help create the pressure for the RMB revaluation. 9 Conclusions No evidence either indicating that the RMB is significantly valued, nor constituting a sufficient condition for a RMB revaluation. References 1. China to open capital account in 2005, Feb. 26, 2005, China Daily News 2. China Monetary report, Quarter 4, 2004, The People’s Banks of China 3. IMF 2003 Article IV Consultation with People’s Republic of China, PIN. No. 03/136, Nov. 18, 2003. 4. IMF 2004 Article IV Consultation with People’s Republic of China, July 6, 2004. 5. Kuroda and Kawai, “Time for a Switch to Global Deflation”, Financial times, Dec. 2002. 6. P. Ryan, “Is China Exporting Deflation Globally, Hollowing –Out Japan?” Economic Research Institute, Japan ,March 2003 7. Barry Bosworth, “Valuing the RMB”, Tokyo Club Research Meeting, Japan, Feb. 2004. 8. Big Mac Index 9. Scott Bradford, and Robert Lawrence, “Has Globalization Gone Far enough?”, Institute for International Economics, Washington USA, 2004 10. Tao Wang, “China: Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations”, IMF Policy Discussion Paper WP/04/18, Feb. 2004 11. Pete Engardio, “Untying the Yuan would Get China Out of a Bind”, Business Week, Oct. 18, 2004. 12. International Business: Competing in the Global Marketplace, 5th Edition, By Charles W.L. Hill (2005) 13. A symposium of view: “Is the Chinese currency, the renminbi, dangerously undervalued and a threat to the global economy?”, The International Economy, Spring 2003. 14. Li-Gang Liu, China’s Role in the Current Global Economic Imbalance, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-010, March 2005 15. Morris Goldstein, Adjusting China’s Exchange Rate Policies, 16. P. Ryan, “Is China Exporting Deflation Globally, Hollowing –Out Japan?” Economic Research Institute, Japan (March 2003) 17. Daniel R. Joseph, The Coming China Crisis: Fact or Fiction? Ceramic Industry (Sept. 2004) 18. Tom Holland, The day of the Renminbi, Far Eastern Economic Review, Nov. 30, 2003 10 78 80 85 90 94 00 Figure 1 China Economic Growth and Inflation Rate Since 1978 [2] Figure 2 Non-Deliverable Forward RMB-Dollar Rate 11 04