SYRAS & QMAS Applications Examples Bob Bea National Science Foundation 1 RESIN PROJECT P[F] = P[FI|E] P[E]+P[FI|E]P[E]+P[FE|E]P[E] due to intrinsic causes with no error due to intrinsic causes with error due to extrinsic causes with error 2 Quality Attributes SYRAS© Durability Safety QA / QC Design Phase QA / QC Construction Phase Compatibility Serviceability Lifecycle Task Organization Operations Phase Task Organization QA / QC Maintanence Phase Task Organization Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Base Rates Base Rates Base Rates Base Rates Base Rates Base Rates Influencing Factors Influencing Factors Influencing Factors Influencing Factors Influencing Factors Influencing Factors 3 4 5 6 Example QRA/PRA 7 Proactive - Robustness = damage tolerance defect in tolerant defect tolerant Intensity of damage or defects 8 9 Independent & Dependent Errors Detection Analysis QA/QC •lack of expertise •resource deficiencies •excessive authority gradients •communication malfunctions •management breakdowns •rejection of information •violations Errors Correction 10 Probability of uncorrected extrinsic cause P(E): Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QA/QC) P(D)=1-P(D), P(A)=1-P(A), P(C)=1-P(C) D = Detection A = Analysis C = Correction P( E ) P( E ')[1 P( D) P( A) P(C )] Base rate of Extrinsic ‘malfunction’ 11 12 Probability of Error: P(E) . Mean Probability of Human Error per Activity 1 new or rarely performed task extreme stress, very little time severe distractions & impairments 10 -1 highly complex task considerable stress, little time moderate distractions & impairments 10-2 complex or unfamiliar task moderate stress, moderate time little distractions & impairments 10 -3 difficult but familiar task little stress, sufficient time very little distractions or impairments 10-4 simple, frequently, skilled task no stress, no time limits no distractions or impairments 10 -5 13 14 15 Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) P(Ejkm) P(E' jkm) PSF Ejkm 1.0 Operators Structure Organizations Interfaces Procedures Hardware Environments 16 SMAS Grade 1 Minor negative influence Moderate negative influence Extreme negative influence 1 1E1 1E2 1E3 4 5 6 7 Below average Poor Very poor does not meet any standards or requirement s Moderate positive influence Extreme positive influence Negligible influence 3 1E- 1 Good, average exceeds all standards and requirements 1E- 2 Minor posit ive influence 2 Very good 1E- 3 Excellent Outstanding exceeds all standards and requirements SYRAS PSF 17 SMAS/QMAS© • • • • Assessment instrument Assessment protocol Assessment team development Follow-up 18 QMAS components Operating Teams Factors Structural Factors Organizational Factors Interfaces Factors Environmental Factors Hardware Factors Procedural Factors 19 QMAS components, factors, attributes 20 QMAS factors Operating Teams Process Aud iti ng Safety Culture Ris k Perception Emergen cy Preparednes s Command & Controls Training Communications Requisit e Variety Equip ment Design gu idelines and specification s Materials Demand systems Power systems Configurations Control systems Operators & other Organ izations & other Orga nizational Process Aud iti ng Safety Culture Ris k Perception Emergen cy Preparednes s Command & Controls Training Communications Resources Structure Design gu idelines & specs. Materials Loadings Structure configura tion Computer programs Research, development and testing background Interfaces Procedur es & other Envi ronmental & other Proce dures Operating Maintenance QA/QC Contractor selection Pre-start up review Emergen cy response Manage ment of change Validations Environmental Externa l ( Weather) Internal Social External (Regu latory, Society)_ Social (Internal) (Within organ ization and operating team) Equip me nt & other Structure & other 21 22 QMAS gradings 23 Components QMAS mean results Interfaces Environments Highest mitigation priorities Structure Equipment Procedures Organizations Operators 0 1 2 3 4 Grades 5 6 7 24 QMAS assessors • QMAS counselor • QMAS assessors – Facility operators – Facility management • QMAS training program – HOF background – QMAS operations – QMAS applications 25 QMAS assessors: THE MOST IMPORTANT PART! • Experienced – Facility – Process auditing • • • • • Respected Integrity Motivated Observant Thoughtful, insightful 26 QMAS applications 27 Sleipner A Platform Failure (U.S. $1 billion) Contributing •Loss of corporate memory •Cut-back in QA/QC Initiating •Error in FEA sank during construction Compounding •Ineffective QA/QC design •Ineffective QA/QC construction 28 Sleipner FEA caused failure Interfaces Env ironment Structure Equipment Procedures Organizations Operators 1 2 3 4 Grades 5 6 7 29 All design phase accidents PSF’s Interfaces 2.0 E4 to Environment Structure 7.9 E5 Equipment COV’s Procedures 1.4 to Organizations 2.1 Operators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Grades 30 31 32 33 34 Diver Incident or Fatality (Ascent and decompression phase) 1.5E -1 Detect ion and Correct ion by dive Buddy or Standby Diver [1-P(D)P(C)] P(UE)= 4.1E-1 2.6E -1 Decompression Situation Fails to follow decompression schedule Exceeds ascent rat e Accidental BC inflation 1E-2 (11) (1.3) 1E-3 (11) (1.3) 1E-3 (11) (1.3) Low on Air / Out of Air Situation Misreads Pressure gauge 1E-2 (11) (1.3) Exceeds time limit 1E-3 (11) (1.3) Exceeds planned dive dept h 1E-2 (11) (1.3) 35 I-QMAS design assessment Cost - $ billions • Innovative system • Innovative design • Value Improvement Program (VIP) 1.0 0.75 0 Time - months 12 36 I-QMAS assessment team • • • • • • Engineers from design contractors (DC) Engineering managers from DC Engineers from owner / operator (O/O) Engineering managers from O/O Outside engineers and managers HOF training program 37 Materials Initial review new little experience standard good experience Construction (procedures, systems) Structure • Complicated procedures • Low level engineering experience • Debates with management • Advanced technology • Lack of evaluation of results of VIP on reliability Design (procedures, systems) Construction (personnel, management) Design (personnel, management) Technology Financial Resources sufficient insufficient Personnel Resources Tim e Resources Quality Incentives 38 PRONE TO LOW QUALITY PRONE TO HIGH QUALITY Q/SMAS components, factors, attributes 39 I-QMAS review results Interfaces Environm ents A Structure Equipment Procedures Organizations Operators 0 1 2 3 4 Grades 5 6 7 40 I-QMAS recommendations • Methods to evaluate reliability effects of VIP alternatives (SYRAS + QMAS) • Implement challenge process for design procedures • Assign experienced design engineers • Temporarily assign construction & operations personnel • Develop robustness design program 41