Chapter 9 - War Powers Resolution
The War Powers Resolution
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Parse each provision of the War Powers
Resolution - figure out what each part means and
be prepared to explain it.
What is the purpose of the Resolution?
What is Congress claiming about its right to
control presidential powers?
When can the president use troops?
What is the ambiguity in #3?
SECTION 3 [§1542]. CONSULTATION
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The President in every possible instance shall
consult with Congress before introducing United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and after every such introduction
shall consult regularly with the Congress until
United States Armed Forces are no longer
engaged in hostilities or have been removed from
such situations.
Consultation with Congress
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What does Congress want consultation to mean?
What do presidents think it means?
SECTION 4 [§1543]. REPORTING
REQUIREMENT
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(a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States
Armed Forces are introduced—
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply,
replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in
writing, setting forth—
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction
took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
Reporting - Continuing duty
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(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional
responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and to
the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this
section, the President shall, so long as such Armed Forces
continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to
the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or
situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities or
situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often
than once every six months.
Reporting
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What triggers reporting?
Who does the president report to?
What must the report contain?
Is this a continuing duty to report?
What does Congress do with the report?
When Must the President Report?
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What is the clock that the report starts ticking?
How long is it?
What is supposed to happen if Congress does not
act before the clock runs out?
What tolls the clock, allowing the troops to stay?
SECTION 5 [§1544]. CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
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(a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title
shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on
the same calendar day. Each report so transmitted shall be
referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate for appropriate action. If, when the report is transmitted, the
Congress has adjourned sine die or has adjourned for any period
in excess of three calendar days, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if
they deem it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the
membership of their respective Houses) shall jointly request the
President to convene Congress in order that it may consider the
report and take appropriate action pursuant to this section.
SECTION 5 [§1544]. CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
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(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is
required to be submitted pursuant to section 1543(a)(1) of this title,
whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of
United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was
submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1)
has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such
use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such
sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of
an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period
shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the
President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that
unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United
States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such Armed
Forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such
forces.
SECTION 5 [§1544]. CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION
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(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b) of this section, at any
time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in
hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its
possessions and territories without a declaration of war
or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be
removed by the President if the Congress so directs by
concurrent resolution. [Sections 6 & 7, §§1545-1546,
Congressional Priority Procedures for Joint Resolution or
Bill, and for Concurrent Resolution, respectively, provide
for expedited consideration of measures to approve the
President’s actions under §1544(b) or disapprove them
under §1544(c).]
SECTION 8 [§1547]. INTERPRETATION OF
JOINT RESOLUTION
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(a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities
or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred—
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before
November 7, 1973), including any provision contained in any
Appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of this chapter; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty
is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction
of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations
and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this chapter.
Savings Clause
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(d) Nothing in this chapter—
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the
Congress or of the President, or the provisions of
existing treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the
President with respect to the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations
wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances which authority he would not have had
in the absence of this chapter.
Is it Worth Talking to Congress?
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Other critics ask what good it would do to consult with
Congress about most questions of national security or
foreign relations: its members are allegedly parochial,
partisan, poorly informed, preoccupied with re-election,
and, in a word, collectively unwise about national
security and foreign affairs. Indeed, involving them may
effectively amount only to involving their staffs, with a
substantially increased risk of leaks that will compromise
national security. See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Repealing
the War Powers Resolution 110 (1991). If this critique is
correct, does it bear on the constitutionality of the
Effect on Treaties
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How does it attempt to turn all mutual defense treaties
into non-self-executing treaties?
Is there a constitutional problem with this?
What treaty military actions did it leave unaffected?
 unless such treaty is implemented by legislation
specifically authorizing the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such
situations and stating that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
this joint resolution.
The Veto
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Why did Nixon veto the War Powers Resolution?
Did it pass anyway?
Why did Nixon's veto undermine the original intent of the
resolution?
Why did Nixon say it would undermine the president's
ability to conduct foreign policy?
Have any subsequent presidents agreed to be bound by
it?
What did Clinton do that violated it?
Strategic and Constitutional Issues
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How might it encourage an enemy to keep
fighting?
Why is the 60 day clock a constitutional problem?
Why is this exactly why Congress wanted it?
Why doesn't Congress want to vote on cutting off
presidential action?
What was the first WPR report?
What was the "tanker war"?
Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1987)
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Tanker war started in 1987, not 88 - type in book
Who did the plaintiffs represent?
What did the plaintiff say was the effect of the
president failing to file a report about the tanker
war?
Statutory Problems
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What did the court say was missing in the Act that made
it impossible to resolve the case?
 First, and most importantly, the very absence of a
definitional section in the Resolution, coupled with
debate suggesting that determinations of ‘‘hostilities’’
were intended to be political decisions made by the
President and Congress, suggest to this Court that
fixed legal standards were deliberately omitted from
this statutory scheme.
Without out this, who did the court say would have do
decide if the act was triggered?
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th
Cir. 1992) - FTCA
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Who are the plaintiffs?
Why aren't they blocked by this exception: (k) Any claim
arising in a foreign country. ?
Why doesn't the US claim it was a discretionary action?
What exception is the court reviewing?
 Acts of War
What did Lowry say about the court deciding if there were
hostilities going on?
What did this court say?
Are they answering the same question?
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 901
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983)
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What did the court say about whether courts
should be ordering the president to pull out
troops?
What are the problems with a court-ordered troop
withdrawal?
Should the court assume that a majority of
Congress opposed the use of force?
Is the WPR Just Political Cover: The Free
Pass
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[T]he defect at the heart of the WPR is that it has given both the
President and Congress a putative free pass. In the actual
contemporary exercise of war powers, perception has become
reality as both the media and many members of Congress overlook
the WPR’s disclaimer of authority [§8(d)(2), 50 U.S.C. §1547(c)(2)
(2000).] Thus, some proponents of unilateral presidential action
invoke the putative sixty-day free pass as license to use force
abroad without constitutionally required advance authorization
from Congress. Congress, for its part, takes false comfort that it
has somehow fulfilled its constitutional duty to decide on uses of
force abroad by doing nothing.
Should/Could Congress revise the War Powers
Resolution to make it more effective?