Why the idea of framework
propositions does not help
account for delusions
Tim Thornton
Professor of Philosophy and Mental Health
Institute for Philosophy, Diversity and
Mental Health, Uclan, UK
1
Structure of talk
1. The general problem of understanding
and delusions
2. Delusions as framework propositions
3. A problem with the proposal
2
Explanation and understanding
• According to Jaspers there are two kinds of
intelligibility relevant to psychiatry:
• Explanation of causal connections through
formulation of rules by experiment and collection
of numerous examples.
• Understanding: static (= phenomenology) and
genetic (the emergence of one state from
another). “We sink ourselves into the psychic
situation and understand genetically by empathy
how one psychic event emerges from another.”
[Jaspers 1997: 301]
3
Jaspers on static understanding
• Subjective symptoms cannot be perceived by the
sense-organs, but have to be grasped by transferring
oneself, so to say, into the other individual’s psyche;
that is, by empathy. They can only become an inner
reality for the observer by his participating in the
other person’s experiences, not by any intellectual
effort. [Jaspers 1912/ 68: 1313]
4
Jaspers on genetic understanding
• When the contents of thoughts emerge one from
another in accordance with the rules of logic, we
understand the connexions rationally. But if we
understand the content of the thoughts as they have
arisen out of the moods, wishes, and fears of the
person who thought them, we understand the
connexions psychologically or empathetically…
5
Jaspers on genetic understanding
• Only the latter can be called ‘psychological
understanding’. Rational understanding always only
enables us to say that a certain rational complex,
something which can be understood without any
psychology whatever, was the content of a mind;
empathic understanding, on the other hand, leads us
into the psychic connexions themselves. Whereas the
rational understanding is only an aid to psychology,
empathic understanding is psychology itself.”
[Jaspers 1913 / 74: 83]
6
The limits of understanding
• According to Jaspers, understanding lies at the
heart of psychiatry.
• But whilst all psychic events can – in principle –
be explained, understanding runs up against
limits. (Actually Jaspers implies all can be
understood in [Jaspers 1913/74: 86])
• Some psychopathological phenomena lie
outside the limits of understanding. They are ununderstandable. For them, only causal
explanation is available. [cf Jaspers 1997: 305-10].
• We can see some problems in the case of some
much discussed ‘high quality’ delusions.
7
Breakdowns of connections
between contingent beliefs
• Consider the following expression of a delusion
“I have a nuclear power station inside me”.
Suppose this is combined with these utterances:
• “I am less than 2 metres tall” and
• “Nuclear power stations have a smallest
dimension greater than 20 metres”.
• Can we say that they believe that they have a
nuclear power station inside them?
8
The problem
• The putative belief content - that they have a
nuclear power station inside them - carries
implications about relative sizes which are not
accepted by the subject.
• Although they say ‘I have a nuclear power
station inside me’ we cannot say that they
believe that they have a nuclear power station
inside them.
• They do not believe what we would have to
believe in addition to believe that.
9
Breakdowns exemplified in
impossible beliefs
• Some psychopathological phenomena appear to
involve impossible beliefs, for example, thought
insertion or Cotard’s delusion.
• What sense can we attach to the sincere report
that a subject is having someone else’s thoughts
(cf Jaspers) or the first person report that the
subject is dead?
• Both involve something more than a mere error
but a severing of the conceptual connections
which normally help constitute the apparent
content.
10
Breakdowns between beliefs and
actions
• One feature of at least some delusions is a
surprising weakness in their motivational force.
• For example, a subject whose laboratory work is
interrupted by the apparent presence of fire
breathing animals makes no attempt to alert
security or the fire brigade or does not prevent
her beloved niece venturing out into an ‘anthrax
explosion’.
11
The overall, modern, problem
• On the one hand, ‘high quality’ delusions still
look like beliefs (avowable, some rational /
meaning-based connections to other beliefs,
some connections to actions).
• And, on the other hand, they cannot be fitted into
our world view (too many broken connections).
• But, according to much late C20 philosophy,
mentality is essentially public (Quine, Davidson,
Wittgenstein, Heidegger?). The main criterion of
belief-hood is fitting into our shared world-view.
(Fusing of horizons.)
12
How interpretative tools might
address the problem
• Understanding / interpretation may still be
possible (and hence the publicity of mentality
accommodated) if …
• …within the larger context of a shared worldview some utterances can be re-interpreted as
(merely):
– Metaphorical
– Empty speech acts (Berrios)
– Expressions of a philosophical thesis (Sass)
– Deviant framework propositions (Campbell)
13
(The dilemma for Maher)
• If the basic model is that of an understandable response
to an abnormal experience then given the bizarre quality
of the delusions in question two adjustments can be
made to try to capture that quality.
• Either the experience is bizarre and the response to it is
understandable (as in the case of thought insertion). In
which case, how can we understand the experience?
This is, in effect, a problem of static understanding.
• Or the experience is at least continuous with normal
experiences but the response to it is not (as in the case
of the café tables and the end of the world). In which
case, how can we understand the transition? This is, in
effect, a problem of genetic understanding.
14
2: Delusions as framework
propositions
• The suggestion is that delusions share
characteristics with the ‘framework’ or ‘hinge’
propositions described by Wittgenstein in On
Certainty.
• Both delusions and framework propositions have
the same fundamental epistemic status.
• They constrain and structure other empirical
beliefs whilst being held immune from testing
and thus certain themselves.
15
Delusions as framework
propositions
• The idea that delusions are deviant framework
propositions looks to help us ‘solve
simultaneously for understanding and utter
strangeness’ [Eilan 2000: 97]
• It places them on the borderline of
understanding whilst preserving their strange
nature.
16
Framework propositions in
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
• I have a telephone conversation with New York. My
friend tells me that his young trees have buds of such and
such a kind. I am now convinced that his tree is… Am I
also convinced that the earth exists?
• The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole
picture which forms the starting-point of belief for me.
• Does my telephone call strengthen my conviction that the
earth exists?
Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the
traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.
[Wittgenstein 1969 §208-210]
17
Framework propositions in
Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
• All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a
hypothesis takes place already within a system. And
this system is not a more or less arbitrary and
doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no,
it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument.
The system is not so much the point of departure, as
the element in which arguments have their life.
[Wittgenstein 1969 §105]…
18
Campbell on delusions as
framework propositions
• In On Certainty, Wittgenstein talked about the
epistemological status of propositions like ‘There are
lots of objects in the world’, ‘The world has existed
for quite a long time’, ‘There are some chairs and
tables in this room’, ‘This is one hand and this is
another’, and so on. Wittgenstein said that beliefs
expressed by such propositions are not ordinary
factual beliefs, but rather form the background
needed by any inquiry into truth or falsity…
[Campbell 2001: 96]
19
Campbell on delusions as
framework propositions
• In these terms, an obvious question to raise about
delusions is whether the delusional beliefs do not
have, for the subject, the epistemological status of
Wittgenstein’s framework propositions. The kind of
status that we ordinarily assign to propositions like
“The world has existed for quite a long time” … is
assigned by the deluded subject to propositions like “I
am dead” or “My neighbour has been replaced by an
imposter.” That is, they are treated as the background
assumptions needed for there to be any testing… at
all. [Campbell 2001: 96]
20
Eilan on delusions as framework
propositions
• Our framework beliefs are those fundamental beliefs
we do not question, and which globally constrain our
inferences and our interpretation of our experiences…
The suggestion is that primary paranoid beliefs, such
as that the IRA is out to get one, should be treated as
constraining one’s reasoning and interpretation of
one’s experience in an analogous manner. They are
resistant to counter-evidence because of their
fundamental framing role…
21
Eilan on delusions as framework
propositions
• (But contra the noise option, this does not render their
expression senseless.)
• The main difference between this proposal and the
‘strange experience plus rational response’
proposal… is that it focuses on a structural feature
which could indeed capture at least one sense in
which one might want to say, with Jaspers, that the
schizophrenic’s worlds are different. [Eilan 2000:
108-9]
22
3: The problem with the proposal
• The proposal is supposed to extend
understanding, rather than explanation, but it
cannot because ascription of framework
propositions presupposes agreement on them.
Three points support this:
– Framework propositions are identified from ‘within’ a
world-view.
– There is a close relation between their fundamental
epistemic and their sense-giving roles.
– There are no ‘external’ criteria for framework
propositions.
23
i) Framework propositions are
identified from ‘within’ 1/3
• I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand
fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the
axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not
fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the
movement around it determines its immobility.
[Wittgenstein 1969 §152]
24
i) Framework propositions are
identified from ‘within’ 2/3
• In one’s own case, framework propositions are
identified through an articulation of what serves
as a reason for what and what is not held up to
question.
• This presupposes the possibility of
understanding the ‘space of reasons’ from
within. It is an internal perspective.
• In other cases, such propositions are shown
(see below). But still available to a shared
perspective.
25
i) Framework propositions are
identified from ‘within’ 3/3
• But I know that it would be nonsense to say “I know
that the law of induction is true”. Imagine such a
statement made in a court of law! It would be more
correct to say “I believe in the law of …” where
‘believe’ has nothing to do with surmising.
• Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in
the end logic cannot be described? You must look at
the practice of language, then you will see it.
[Wittgenstein 1969 §500-501]
26
ii) The relation of the fundamental
and sense-giving roles. 1/3
• Framework propositions are akin to grammatical
rules or the logic of language.
• Like grammatical rules / logic, they partially
constitute the rules of inquiry.
• Whilst the negation of grammatical rules is
nonsense, the negation of framework
propositions approaches nonsense: it requires
recontextualisation. The denial of a framework
proposition in its normal context makes no sense
ie we do not know what to do with it. It has no
clear role.
27
ii) The relation of the fundamental
and sense-giving roles. 2/3
• ‘The question doesn’t arise at all.’ Its answer would
characterise a method. But there is no sharp boundary
between methodological propositions and
propositions within a method.
• But wouldn’t one have to say then, that there is no
sharp boundary between propositions of logic and
empirical propositions? The lack of sharpness is that
of the boundary between rule and empirical
proposition. [Wittgenstein 1969 §318-9]
28
ii) The relation of the fundamental
and sense-giving roles. 3/3
• The proposal trades on the epistemic role of
framework propositions.
But that role goes hand in hand with a sense
giving / logical role.
And that undermines the prospect of using
deviant framework propositions to increase
understanding.
29
iii) The lack of ‘external’ criteria for
framework propositions 1/3
• The label ‘framework’ and ‘hinge propositions’
suggests a mechanical model of the structure of
thought.
• If we could identify a structure of mental
representations and determine - syntactically –
their relations, we could perhaps identity
framework propositions from the outside…
30
iii) The lack of ‘external’ criteria for
framework propositions 2/3
But:
1. That presupposes the possibility of the
reduction of mental content. And,
2. It goes against the repeated suggestions
that many framework propositions are not
propositional attitudes at all.
31
iii) The lack of ‘external’ criteria for
framework propositions 3/3
• If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his
apples without any reason, for the sake of being
certain about everything, why doesn’t he have to
investigate his investigation? And can one talk of
belief here (I mean belief as in ‘religious belief’, not
surmise)? All psychological terms merely distract us
from the thing that really matters. [Wittgenstein
1969 §318-9]
32
Conclusion 1/2
• Whilst there is something plausible about the
idea that delusions are form part of a breakdown
of common sense, the further articulation of
delusions as framework propositions fails.
• The ‘uber’ problem is that there are no external
criteria for framework propositions. But deviant
framework propositions resist assimilation into
shared internal criteria.
• (There are no third person criteria for mental
states, only shared first person plural criteria.)
33
Conclusion 2/2
• Perhaps the problem is that a condition of
adequacy of an interpretative approach is
that it should depict the utter strangeness
of at least some central
psychopathological phenomena and that is
an impossible task.
• Interpreting or understanding but still
finding utter strangeness are incompatible
goals.
34