Cooperation and conflict within
couples:
The gendered distribution of
entitlement to household income
ESPE Conference, Seville
11-13 June 2009
Jérôme De Henau and Susan Himmelweit
1
Motivation
• Entitlements: legitimate command over resources that
give rise to opportunities (Sen)
• Indicator of autonomy (current or future)
• Cooperative-conflict model: Cooperation to increase
household resources but still can be conflict of interest
about division of resources
 Identifying determinants of entitlements
 Capturing gendered effects
2
Change in male and female answers to
satisfaction with household income
Change in
male satis.
Change in
female satis.
Male
remains in non full-time/non work
non full-time to full-time job
remains in full-time job
full-time job to non full-time
-0.07
0.62
0.00
-0.60
0.00
0.47
0.00
-0.52
Female
remains in non full-time/non work
non full-time to full-time job
remains in full-time job
full-time job to non full-time
0.00
0.27
-0.02
-0.10
0.04
0.34
-0.04
-0.25
no child <0-4y
from no child to child <0-4
keep child <0-4
from child <0-4 to older child
0.01
-0.18
0.01
-0.07
0.01
-0.32
0.03
0.06
Man loses his job 
both dissatisfied
Woman loses her job
 both dissatisfied too
but less, and man less
than woman
Young child  woman
more dissatisfied than
man
3
Why such gender differences?
• Different personality traits and attitudes to change
• Different valuation of money (trade-off with other
domains such as leisure, social life)
• Different entitlements, access to underlying resources
and burden of costs because of different
– Fall-back positions in case cooperation breaks down
– Perceived contributions (what each member brings into the
household and how it is valued)
– Perceptions of interest (e.g. individualistic versus family-based)
• These aspects can be gendered (influence of gender
norms)
4
Our model
• Satisfaction is influenced by entitlements and other
factors
– Household entitlements (result of cooperation)
– Relative entitlements (division of fruits of household cooperation)
• Entitlements (both elements) are influenced by
– Current and future resources and contributions
– Individual elements have different impact according to gender
• Our aim: disentangling gendered and non-gendered
determinants of household and relative entitlements
5
Our model specification
• Linear framework (with ordered benchmark for
comparison)
• Variables influence both partner’s satisfaction in the
same direction on average: average scores of
satisfaction as dep. var. (indicating impact on household
entitlements)
• Variables influence one partner’s satisfaction and the
other in opposite directions: difference in scores of
satisfaction as dep. var. (indicating impact on relative
entitlements)
6
Our model specification (2)
• Sample: working age couples with or without children
• Use of BHPS in its panel form to strip out effects of
unobserved time-invariant factors (such as personality
traits) – Hausman specification test rejects RE
• Control for overall satisfaction with life (to focus on
financial aspects of entitlements and avoid trade-offs
between different domains)
• Examples of explanatory variables are income level,
income source, employment status, earning share,
potential wage, housework time and presence of young
children
7
Gendered pattern
• Factors that affect entitlements may do so in symmetric
and gendered ways for both cooperation and conflict
• Cooperation can be achieved by partners adopting roles
that are partially symmetric and partially gendered:
– e.g. valuing both partners’ employment but putting more weight
on the man's than the woman’s
• Similarly for the conflictual element
– e.g. if being the higher earner gives either greater entitlement
but has more effect for one sex than the other
8
Results
Average satisfaction
fct of hh entitlement (Eq. 7)
Coeff
Std err
Household variables
Log of household income
Prop. benefits >0% of hh income
Prop. benefits >50% of hh income
Prop. benefits >95% of hh income
HH receives investment income
HH receives transfer income
Home owned on mortgage
Home owned outright
No of children aged 0-4
No of children aged 5-11
No of children aged 12+
Constant
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1
R-sq (within / between)
No of (obs. / groups)
Prob>F
Joint stat. sig. fixed-effects (p-value)
0.273
-0.103
-0.077
0.145
0.088
-0.073
0.111
0.239
-0.076
-0.016
-0.032
1.100
0.028
0.035
0.071
0.091
0.023
0.042
0.044
0.066
0.023
0.021
0.024
0.139
0.201
11818
0.000
0.000
0.427
2314
***
***
***
*
**
***
***
***
Difference in satisfaction
fct of rel. entitlement (Eq. 7)
Coeff
Std err
0.003
0.045
0.080
-0.038
-0.013
-0.074
-0.020
-0.001
0.038
-0.012
-0.012
-0.195
0.022
0.028
0.056
0.071
0.018
0.033
0.035
0.052
0.018
0.016
0.019
0.109
0.058
11818
0.000
0.000
0.197
2314
**
**
*
9
Average satisfaction
fct of hh entitlement (Eq. 7)
Coeff
Std err
Individual variables
Symmetric effect
Share of earnings 75-100%
Share of non lab. inc. 75-100%
Essex score
Working part-time
Inactive (care or other)
Unemployed
Long term disabled
Reporting poor health
Providing care for others within hh
Providing care for others outside hh
Weekly hours of housework
Weekly hours of housework squared
Overall satisfaction
Gendered effect
Share of earnings 75-100%
Share of non lab. inc. 75-100%
Essex score
Working part-time
Inactive (care or other)
Unemployed
Long term disabled
Reporting poor health
Providing care for others within hh
Providing care for others outside hh
Weekly hours of housework
Weekly hours of housework squared
Overall satisfaction
0.192
-0.063
0.044
-0.345
-0.431
-1.461
-0.616
-0.239
-0.015
-0.033
-0.016
0.000
0.431
0.061
0.040
0.009
0.061
0.079
0.089
0.146
0.059
0.096
0.046
0.004
0.000
0.013
***
-0.148
-0.061
0.015
-0.099
-0.164
-0.624
-0.399
-0.065
-0.133
0.069
-0.006
0.000
0.052
0.057
0.031
0.010
0.062
0.081
0.094
0.151
0.060
0.129
0.058
0.004
0.000
0.015
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
Difference in satisfaction
fct of rel. entitlement (Eq. 7)
Coeff
Std err
0.068
0.024
0.015
-0.113
-0.143
-0.246
-0.457
-0.109
0.052
-0.022
-0.008
0.000
0.240
0.044
0.024
0.008
0.049
0.064
0.074
0.119
0.047
0.101
0.046
0.003
0.000
0.012
-0.087
0.005
0.008
-0.052
0.027
-0.110
-0.103
0.005
0.059
0.021
-0.002
0.000
0.015
0.048
0.032
0.007
0.048
0.062
0.070
0.115
0.047
0.076
0.036
0.003
0.000
0.010
*
**
**
***
***
**
**
**
***
*
10
Cooperative aspects of
entitlements
Variables that affect this:
• Household level:
– Household income (+), unequal earnings (+), investment income
(+), House ownership (+), Children aged 0-4 (-)
• Individual level (symmetric):
– human capital (+), full-time employment (+), poor health (-),
housework hours (-)
• Individual level (gendered):
– woman higher earner(+), man unemployed (-), man long-term
disabled ()
11
Conflictual aspects of
entitlements
• Household level:
– Household receives transfer income (woman +/man -)
– Children aged 0-4 (woman -/man +)
• Individual level (symmetric):
– Full-time employment (+); Unemployment and disability (-) poor
health (-); Hours of housework (-)
• Individual level (gendered):
– Higher earner (+ for woman)
12
Reflections
• Source of contributions and gender of position matter 
challenge to income pooling and unitary models
• Not only division of current resources matters
– future autonomy/security is also reflected in partners’
assessment of their current situation
• Importance of accounting for gender effects:
– Direct and indirect gender effects (gendered distribution of
characteristics such as employment, earnings, caring
responsibilities, etc.)
– perceptions matter  need to explore gender norms outside hh
13
Conclusion
• Simple model that can easily be reproduced in other
countries and with additional explanatory factors (e.g.
external factors and gender norms)
• Extension to other domains of entitlement (such as time
and social life)
• Refining Sen’s model by accounting for interdependence
and relational aspects of care (see Lewis and Giullari
2005)
14