The Myth of Entangling Alliances
Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts
Michael Beckley
APPENDIX
Cases are drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset
4.01.
Information presented in the columns labeled “DATES,” “COW #,” and “PARTICIPANTS”
are taken from the COW dataset. “COW #” coincides with the dispute numbers listed in the
COW dataset.
“ALLY” denotes the effect of alliances on U.S. involvement in each conflict and is coded
according to the following scheme:
0=
Alliances reduced the level of U.S. involvement
1=
Alliances are unnecessary to explain the observed level of U.S. involvement and there is
no evidence that they played a role in U.S. decisionmaking.
2=
Alliances are unnecessary to explain the observed level of U.S. involvement but alliance
concerns featured in U.S. decisionmaking.
3=
Alliances are necessary to explain the observed level of U.S. involvement.
“INV” denotes the extent of U.S. military involvement in each conflict and is coded according to
the following scheme:
0=
U.S. forces were uninvolved.
1=
U.S. forces were placed at a higher risk of attack but did not take actions of their own.
2=
U.S. forces were involved in non-military operations (e.g. resupply operations, transport,
preplanned exercises etc.).
3=
U.S. forces were involved in military operations (e.g. shows of force, blockades, combat).
Note that the purpose of this coding effort is not to create a database suitable for statistical
analysis, but rather to aid in identifying potential cases of entanglement for further processtracing.
“DESCPRIPTION” provides a narrative for each case. General information for each case
comes from Clodfelter (2008), Cohen (2013), Herring (2008), LaFeber (1994), Leffler and
Westad (2010), government documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)
series, and news articles from Proquest’s Historical Newspapers database. For many cases, I
consulted additional sources, which are cited in the text and listed at the end of this appendix.
NAME
DATES
COW
#
PARITICPANTS
ALLY
INV
DESCRIPTION
Berlin Blockade
21 Mar 1948 25 Jul 1949
26
UKG, FRN,
USR
1
2
The only alliance that the United States was a member of at the
time of the Berlin crisis was the Organization of American
States (OAS), which did not influence U.S. decisionmaking.
Instead, U.S. actions were driven by relative power concerns. A
sharp increase in Soviet relative power between 1946 and 1948
caused the United States to abandon a sphere-of-influence
policy toward the Soviet Union in favor of containment (Avey
2012). Part of this strategy entailed rejecting Soviet proposals
for establishing a unified Germany.
Korean War
27 Jun 1950 27 Jul 1953
51
NEW, PHI,
NTH, GRC,
BEL, COL,
THI, ETH, CAN,
FRN, AUL,
TUR,
UKG, CHN,
ROK, PRK
2
3
By January 1948, the United States and Britain were
establishing governing bodies within their respective zones in
Berlin and, in July, the United States announced plans for
currency reform in the Western occupation zones, a step toward
a West German state. In response, the Soviet occupation
authorities blockaded Berlin. The Truman administration,
wanting to deter future Soviet aggression and contain Soviet
expansion without catalyzing a war, chose to pursue an
“unprovocative” but “firm” response by airlifting supplies and
food to the Western districts of Berlin (George Marshal quoted
in Fish 1991, 204). For eleven months, U.S. planes flew 250
missions per day, moving an average of 2,500 tons of food, fuel,
raw materials, and goods into Berlin. German anger at the
Soviets undermined Soviet hopes of preventing the division of
Germany. In the spring of 1949, Stalin backed down. The
blockade added urgency to western European calls for a military
alliance linking the United States to western Europe and led to
formal talks in Washington in July 1948, which Folly (1988,
75) describes as "the crucible in which NATO was formed."
South Korea was not an American ally in June 1950, and during
the previous year the Truman administration had explicitly
excluded South Korea from the U.S. “defensive perimeter” in
Asia and withdrawn all U.S. forces from the peninsula, actions
that we now know encouraged North Korea to attack
(Christensen 2011, ch. 2).
Nevertheless, entanglement
dynamics may have featured in the U.S. decisionmaking
process (McMahon 1991, 459-460). Specifically, declassified
2
documents show that U.S. officials worried that inaction would
“cause significant damage to U.S. prestige in Western Europe,”
(quoted in “Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates
Group,” June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 148-154) where
the United States had recently signed the North Atlantic Treaty,
and that losing the war would “handicap efforts to maintain
U.S. alliances” (CIA report quoted in Matray 1979, 319).
Yet, alliance politics were neither necessary nor sufficient to
explain U.S. actions. First, alliance ties were unnecessary to
cause U.S. involvement in the Korean War. Instead, U.S.
intervention was driven primarily by perceptions of relative
decline and a pervasive sense of insecurity. Historians have
characterized the U.S. decisionmaking environment in 1950 as a
“crisis atmosphere,” (Kaufman 1986, viii) a “short fuse period,”
(Gardner 1983, 58) and a “time of increasing alarm” (Stueck
1995, 41) set off by a “vortex” (Accinelli 1996, 57) of emerging
security threats. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested a nuclear
bomb and China fell to Communism, and in 1950 the two
powers formed an alliance and supported communist insurgents
throughout Asia. These developments fueled an already
widespread belief in Washington that the United States was
experiencing rapid relative decline (Avey 2012).
To reverse these trends, the Truman administration drew up
NSC-68, a “blueprint for waging the Cold War,”(LaFeber 2008,
105) which entailed a massive military buildup and a firm
commitment “to check and to roll back the Kremlin’s drive for
world domination” (On NSC-68, see Trachtenberg 1988/89, 1118. On containing the USSR in Asia, see NSC 48/2, “The
Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” December
30, 1949, FRUS, Vol. VII, 1215-1220). Although NSC-68 was
not official policy in June 1950, it was at the very least a
“policy in search of an opportunity” (LaFeber 2008, 105).
When that opportunity arrived on June 25, U.S. officials “barely
hesitated before taking extensive military action” (Stueck 1981,
173). In a meeting that night, Truman and his top advisors
agreed that the North Korean invasion was a Kremlinorchestrated test of U.S. resolve and that the United States had
3
to intervene militarily to deter further Soviet expansion in
Eurasia (“The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary
of State,” June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 139-140;
“Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group,” June
25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 148-154; “Memorandum of
Conversation,” June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 157-161;
Paige 1968). They also “had the lessons of Munich on their
minds”(Leffler 1992, 361) and were determined to counter an
attack that they characterized as Hitler-style aggression (May
1973, 52-86). Given these concerns, “large-scale military
intervention was the logical and – in retrospect – the predictable
[U.S.] response to North Korean action” (Stueck 1981, 1973).
Security concerns also explain the U.S. decision to cross the
38th parallel.
Specifically, U.S. officials believed that
conquering North Korea would deal a strategic and
psychological blow to the Soviet Union, deter future
Communist aggression, and reduce long-term U.S. security
burdens in Asia (Matray 1979; Foot 1985, 70-74). They also
believed that China would not intervene (Foot 1985, 74-87).
Thus, when U.S. forces landed at Inchon in September 1950 and
split North Korean forces half, the temptation to press on and
destroy North Korea once and for all became “nearly
irresistible” (Stueck 1981, 231).
In the absence of these security considerations, it is doubtful
that alliance ties would have been sufficient to spur U.S.
involvement in Korea. In June 1950, the United States had no
treaty allies in Asia, and NATO was “in no sense a functioning
organization” (Foot 1985, 40). NATO had little funding, no
unified command structure or joint military planning, and
“nothing automatic about the cooperation expected under the
treaty” (Kaplan 2013, 151. See also, Kaufman 1986, 62; Stueck
1995, 349). Perhaps for this reason, U.S. officials did not
explicitly discuss NATO or any other formal alliance
commitments when they decided to intervene in Korea. Instead,
policy discussions focused overwhelmingly on the need to
maintain a reputation for resolve vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
Far from entangling the United States, NATO allies actually
4
7th Fleet to
Taiwan Strait
27 Jun 1950 27 Jul 1953
633
TAW, CHN
2
3
U.S.-China
Battles in Korea
16 Feb 1951 16 Oct 1952
2052
CHN, TAW
0
3
YugoslavHungarian
skirmishes
16 Apr 1951 24 Nov 1951
1286
USR, BUL,
HUN, RUM,
YUG
1
3
sought to extricate the United States from the conflict and
prevent it from escalating the war. From November 1950 until
the end of the war, U.S. officials repeatedly considered striking
the Chinese mainland with nuclear weapons. NATO allies,
however, discouraged the Truman and Eisenhower
administrations from acting on these impulses, arguing that
escalation would, at best, bog the United States down in Asia
and, at worst, start World War III by prompting a Soviet attack
in Western Europe. By persistently opposing U.S. escalatory
measures and dragging their feet on various UN resolutions that
would have imposed punitive measures on China, “the allies
were a major deterrent to an expanded war” (Foot 1985, 242.
See also, Ibid., 99, 123-127, 136-137, 148, 152, 154 159, 215219; Stueck 1995, 130-138, 142, 148-152, 172-175, 181-182,
283-303, 320-325, 331; Tierney 2010).
This MID was part of the Korean War. In response to North
Korea’s invasion of South Korea, Truman ordered the 7th Fleet
into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the Korean conflict from
spreading into China. See the analysis on the Korean War
above on the decisionmaking process.
This MID was also a direct outcome of the Korean War. After
U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel and pushed on toward the
Chinese border, China intervened, resulting in massive battles
between U.S. and Chinese forces. America’s European allies
played a major role in encouraging the United States not to
escalate the war by attacking the Chinese mainland with nuclear
weapons. See the analysis on the Korean War above on the
decisionmaking process.
When border clashes erupted between Yugoslavia and Hungary
in 1951, the United States provided limited economic and
military aid to Yugoslavia. In November, a U.S. C-47 transport
plane flew off course and was fired on by Hungarian forces and
disappeared. Relative power concerns drove U.S. involvement.
Specifically, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman
administration struck up a military relationship with Yugoslavia
in order to create a schism within the Communist bloc and deny
eastern Europe to the Soviet Union (Leffler 1992: 417-418).
5
First Taiwan
Straits Crisis
11 Feb 1953 19 Jan 1956
50
CHN, TAW
3
3
See main text
Czech MIG
incidents
10 Mar 1953 31 Mar 1953
208
USR, CZE,
UKG
1
3
U.S. Downs
Soviet Plane
1 Aug 1953 2 Sep 1953
2035
CHN, USR
1
3
Korean War
cease-fire
violations
1 Feb 1954 –
10 Nov 1956
2244
TAW, ROK,
PRK
2
3
A Czech MIG-15 shot down a U.S. Air Force F-84 over
Germany. The U.S. government claimed the plane was
patrolling the U.S. zone of Germany when attacked. The State
Department issued a formal protest to the Czech government,
but the United States did not take additional action. Days
earlier, another MIG-15 had shot down a British Royal Air
Force bomber in the Berlin-Hamburg air corridor.
U.S. fighters shot down a Russian transport plane flying over
northern Chinese territory. The Soviet government issued a
formal complaint, but the U.S. State Department replied by
blaming the Soviet Union for allowing its plane to fly over a
war zone.
U.S. and South Korean planes and troops skirmished with North
Korean forces several times between 1954 and 1956 over or in
the newly established DMZ.
China Downs
British Airliner
23 Jul 1954 27 Jul 1954
2033
CHN
1
3
Nicaragua-Costa
Rica Border
Dispute
1 Aug 1954 1 Aug 1954
1193
NIC, COS
2
2
Chinese patrol planes shot down a British airliner near Hainan
island. In response, the United States, which by this point was
intent on containing China and countering perceived Chinese
aggression, sent two aircraft carriers to the South China Sea.
The Chinese government later apologized, claiming the Chinese
fighter pilots mistook the British plane for a Chinese Nationalist
plane.
On August 1, 1954, Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza
sent a force of several hundred troops made up of Costa Rican
exiles toward the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border, where they
allegedly engaged in skirmishes with Costa Rican forces. On
January 11, 1955, this same group of exiles entered Costa Rica
in an attempt to overthrow the government. The invasion
stalled just beyond the border, and the conflict was referred to
the OAS, which set up a security zone on both sides of the
border and orchestrated a withdrawal of the exile forces. To
help deter further attacks and thereby preserve stability in the
Western Hemisphere, the United States sold Costa Rica several
fighter planes but ruled out U.S. military intervention (Aydin
2012, 103).
6
Swiss Jet Incident
4 Oct1954 4 Oct1954
3209
SWZ
1
3
U.S.-Chinese Air
Battle
11 May 1955
11 May 1955
19 Apr 1956 19 Apr 1956
22 Aug1956 23 Aug 1956
2032
CHN
1
3
2843
EGY
1
3
53
CHN
2
3
6 Nov1956 6 Nov 1956
200
FRN, UKG,
USR, EGY, ISR
1
0
DC-3 Incident
China Shoots
Down U.S. Plane
Suez Crisis
Swiss fighters pursued a U.S. F-80 jet that violated Swiss air
space and chased it back across the border. The U.S. plane was
patrolling the Western defense line against potential Soviet
incursions.
U.S. fighters engaged and shot down three Chinese MIG jet
fighters. The Chinese government claimed the U.S. planes had
violated China's air space.
An Egyptian military plane forced a U.S. DC-3 transport plane
flying from Tehran to Cairo to land in the Suez Canal Zone.
Chinese air force planes shot down a U.S. navy patrol plane off
the coast of China. The Chinese government claimed that
Chinese pilots mistook the plane for a Chinese Nationalist plane
and expressed regret for the attack, which killed all sixteen
members of the crew. The attack did not lead to escalatory acts
by either side.
In July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser
nationalized the British-run corporation that managed the Suez
Canal. The move threatened Britain’s oil supplies and a vital
international transit route. Britain rejected U.S. attempts to
resolve the dispute via an international consortium and formed a
secret military plan with France and Israel to attack Egypt and
take the canal. On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt in
the Sinai and Gaza while Britain and France launched air and
naval attacks. The Eisenhower administration worried that the
attacks would stoke Arab nationalism and catalyze Soviet
intervention in the Middle East. To halt the attacks, the U.S.
threatened to impose sanctions on Israel and refused to bolster
British currency reserves and oil supplies. The Eisenhower
administration also sought UN condemnation of Israel’s actions
and sent Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion a note
demanding immediate withdrawal from all Egyptian territory
(Little 2008: 91). In a speech before the UN, U.S. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles dissociated the United States from
Britain, France, and Israel and proposed a cease-fire and the
withdrawal of all forces. All three states eventually withdrew
under U.S. pressure (Louis 1990: 152-158; Hahn 1991: 200213)
7
Jordanian and
Syrian Crises
25 Apr 1957 19 Nov1957
607
JOR, EGY
IRQ, USR, TUR,
SYR
1
3
On January 1, 1957, the Eisenhower administration determined
that the November 1956 withdrawal of French and British
forces from the Middle East had greatly increased the danger of
communist encroachments throughout the region. Eisenhower
requested that a joint resolution be passed by Congress that
would provide economic assistance to non-communist
governments in the Middle East and authorizing the President to
use force in the area in the event of communist aggression.
Eisenhower announced the policy in a speech on January 5, and
the congressional resolution, which became known as the
Eisenhower Doctrine, extended the policy of containment in the
Middle East to the countries directly flanking the Soviet
Union’s southern border (George and Smoke 1974, 309-362).
The first major test of this Doctrine occurred in Jordan (George
and Smoke 1974, 329-333). When Britain withdrew from the
region in 1956, the Jordanian government lost its main source of
economic and military support. Within Jordan, the popularity
of anti-Western parties, including the National Socialists, rose,
and in October 1956, these parties made large electoral gains in
parliament and formed a new government headed by Sulei-man
Al-Nabulsi, who advocated closer relations with Egypt and
Syria. However, the Jordanian King, Hussein bin Talal,
concluded that Egypt and Syria could not fill the fiscal vacuum
left by British withdrawal and that they would attempt to use
their aid to dominate Jordan politically. Hussein was also
alarmed by the policies of the al-Nabulsi Cabinet, which called
for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the
acceptance of Soviet aid. Hussein dismissed Nabulsi on April
15, 1957, precipitating political unrest. To garner U.S. support,
Hussein claimed publicly that the integrity of Jordan was
threatened by “international communism.” On April 24, the
Eisenhower administration responded to this call, announcing
that the independence and integrity of Jordan was a vital U.S.
interest. On April 26, the U.S. Sixth Fleet sailed to the eastern
Mediterranean to show U.S. support for King Hussein. And on
April 29, the administration granted $10 million in emergency
aid to Jordan. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Iraq mobilized
troops and pledged to intervene if Syria or Egypt entered
Jordan’s domestic political struggle. Syria, Egypt, and the
8
Soviet Union did not intervene, and King Hussein suppressed
political opposition and consolidated his power within Jordan.
In Washington, the incident was widely viewed as a successful
application of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
As the crisis in Jordan subsided, the Eisenhower administration
turned its attention to Syria, which was cultivating close
relations with the Soviet Union. In early August, the Syrian
Defense Minister visited Moscow and received a large loan
package from the Soviet Union. The Soviets also announced
that they would help supply the Syrian military. On August 13,
the Syrian government expelled three U.S. diplomats living in
Damascus after allegedly discovering an American plot to
overthrow the Syrian government. A few days later, the Syrian
army’s Chief of Staff was replaced by a general suspected by
the Eisenhower administration of being a communist. As
Eisenhower explained, “the entire action was shrouded in
mystery but the suspicion was strong that the Communists had
taken hold of the government” (Quoted in George and Smoke
1977, 333).
Fearing that Syria was falling to Communism, the Eisenhower
administration compelled Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan to mobilize
their armed forces on the Syrian border in an attempt to
destabilize the Syrian regime (Walt 1987, 70). The United
States also sent the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and
redeployed some aircraft from Western Europe to Turkey. The
Syrian government, however, remained in power and continued
to receive Soviet assistance. Moreover, Soviet leaders made
public statements supporting Syria, and two Soviet warships
visited the Syrian port of Latakia as a signal of Soviet
commitment. In response, Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan pulled their
forces back.
At a press conference on September 10, Dulles announced that
the administration would not take further actions against Syria
and expressed his belief that the situation would work itself out
peacefully (George and Smoke 1974, 336). He also outlined
three requirements that would have to be met before the
Eisenhower Doctrine would be implemented:
the
9
China Fires on
U.S. Jets
12 Jun 1957 13 Jun 1957
2049
TAW, CHN
1
3
Czechoslovakian
Air Space
Violation
Chilean Fishing
Dispute
29 Jul 1957 29 Jul 1957
2849
CZE
1
2
13 Dec 1957 18 Dec 1957
2845
CHL
1
0
Korean
demilitarized zone
(DMZ) Incidents
1
7 Mar 1958 17 Oct 1961
2187
ROK, PRK
2
3
administration had to have clear evidence that a regime was
dominated by international communism, there had to be an act
of aggression by that country, and there had to be a request by
the country attacked for U.S. aid.
Chinese forces fired on U.S. fighter jets off the Chinese coast.
China claimed the U.S. planes were violating Chinese airspace,
U.S. officials maintained that the aircraft were 8 miles off
China's coast and conducting a routine training flight.
Czechoslovakia accused the U.S. Air Force of violating Czech
air space and spying on Czech military installations.
The U.S. warned Chile against any attempt to interfere with
U.S. fishing vessels on the high seas after the Chilean
government announced it was sending armed ships after a group
of U.S. vessels that allegedly invaded Chilean waters.
After the Korean War, South Korea became a central piece of
the U.S. anti-communist forward defense zone and a base for
U.S. forces in Asia (Levin and Sneider 1983). As Secretary of
State Dulles explained, the United States would not again
“make the mistake of treating Korea as an isolated affair. The
Korean war forms on part of a worldwide effort of communism
to conquer freedom” (quoted in Roehrig 2006, 130). This
perceived link between South Korean security and the U.S.
global containment strategy persisted throughout the 1950s, as
did the large U.S. presence in South Korea and operations along
the DMZ.
The resulting close contact between U.S. and North Korean
forces led to several serious incidents. The first occurred on
March 7, 1958, when North Korean forces shot down a U.S.
fighter plane that had strayed over North Korean territory. On
June 16, two MIG fighters, believed to be either North Korean
or Chinese, attacked a U.S. Navy patrol plane, which managed
to return to Japan despite being badly damaged. On March 10
1961, and again on April 22, 1961, U.S. and North Korean
guards engaged in fistfights at Panmunjon. On September 16,
1961, a UN patrol boat sunk a North Korean vessel that was
reportedly attempting to land spies in South Korea. Over this
time period, the UN Command accused North Korea of
10
hundreds of truce violations, most involving North Korean
soldiers stepping over the DMZ line.
Lebanese Civil
War
14 May 1958
24 Oct 1958
125
IRQ, USR, UKG
1
3
The civil war in Lebanon in 1958 was fought between the
largely Maronite Christian government of Lebanon and Muslim
rebels who supported the Pan-Arabism of Nasser of Egypt. The
Lebanese government was one of the staunchest supporters of
the Eisenhower Doctrine and had issued a joint communiqué
with the United States on March 16, 1957 declaring that the two
countries were in full agreement on resisting the spread of
international communism in the Middle East. When civil war
erupted on May 8, 1958, therefore, the Eisenhower
administration viewed it as part of a communist plot (Walt
1987, 74). As Eisenhower later explained, “Behind everything
was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were
principally responsible for the trouble” (quoted in George and
Smoke 1974, 342). On May 13, therefore, the administration
began to supply the Lebanese government with tear gas and
small arms, moved the Sixth Fleet into the eastern
Mediterranean, and announced that it was considering whether
to send American troops to defend the Lebanese regime.
The civil war dragged on until July 14, when the Iraqi
monarchy, which was the linchpin of the anti-communist
Baghdad Pact and financial backer of the Lebanese regime, was
overthrown. The Eisenhower administration concluded that the
Iraqi coup would bolster the rebels in Lebanon and jeopardize
U.S. influence in the region. Thus, when the Lebanese
President requested U.S. assistance hours after the Iraqi coup,
Eisenhower responded by landing 13,000 U.S. troops in
Lebanon the next day (Little 2008, 134-135). The U.S.
intervention met no resistance and effectively suppressed the
fighting. The United States then negotiated a compromise
agreement with Lebanese rebels that allowed for a special
election on July 31 in which a candidate amenable to both sides
was elected. The U.S. military operation (Blue Bat) is generally
regarded as the first major military intervention carried out
under the Eisenhower Doctrine.
11
East Germany
Detains U.S.
Soldiers
Second Taiwan
Crisis
8 Jun 1958 19 Jul 1958
2854
GDR
2
3
East Germany detained nine U.S. Army officers after their
helicopter was forced down over East Germany.
22 Jul 1958 19 Dec 1958
173
USR, TAW,
CHN
2
2
On August 23, 1958, China resumed shelling Jinmen and Mazu.
The United States avoided direct clashes with Chinese forces,
but provided naval escorts for Nationalist resupply vessels
headed to Jinmen. On September 6, the PRC requested
diplomatic talks with the United States, and on October 6 the
PRC declared the siege over. As in 1954/55, U.S. involvement
was driven by security interests, and Nationalist attempts to
entrap the United States ultimately failed.
There is little mention in U.S. government documents of
alliance concerns. Policymakers worried about maintaining
U.S. credibility as a resolute actor, but it was credibility vis-àvis China, the Soviet Union, and “small countries along the
Sino-Soviet periphery” (e.g. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya,
Cambodia, Laos, Burma), not vis-à-vis U.S. treaty allies, that
most preoccupied Eisenhower and his advisors (“Memorandum
From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to
Secretary of State Dulles,” August 20, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960,
Vol. 19, p. 63). In fact, according to some scholars, alliances
may have “acted as a constraint on [U.S.] decisionmaking” and
“contributed to Eisenhower’s aversion to the use of nuclear
weapons and his attraction to an amphibious lift deal” (Accinelli
2001, 139). Western allies, especially Britain, New Zealand,
Australia, and Canada, pressured the United States to stay on
the sidelines, and U.S. intelligence assessments warned that the
United States would “probably not have the endorsement of [its]
main allies and would severely strain [its] alliances [by
intervening]” (“Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of
State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles,”
September 3, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 122-123).
As in the 1954/55 crisis, the Nationalists tried to entrap the
United States by deploying a large chunk of their forces on
Jinmen and Mazu, but this time the Eisenhower administration
did not commit to defending them. The United States provided
escorts for Nationalist supply ships, but only in international
12
waters at least three miles from China. At the same time, U.S.
officials discouraged the Nationalists from bombing the
mainland (Garver 1997, 136) and reminded them that the
United States would not defend Taiwan if they instigated further
conflict (FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 154, 160, 179, 253254, 274-275). In late September, Dulles, without consulting the
Nationalists beforehand, announced that the United States
favored withdrawing Nationalist forces from the islands in
exchange for a ceasefire, and in October Dulles compelled the
Nationalists to back this bargain by removing 15,000 troops
from the islands and issuing a statement promising not to use
force against the PRC (Garver 1997, 139).
If China had escalated its attacks, the United States might have
been sucked into a larger conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) advocated striking the Chinese mainland with tactical
nuclear weapons if China invaded Jinmen or Taiwan.
Eisenhower, however, never authorized such plans and
expressed disapproval of any contingency plans that involved
nuclear weapons (Memorandum of Meeting, August 29, 1958,
FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 96-99) or strikes against the
Chinese mainland (Change 1990, 189). More important,
declassified Chinese documents reveal that China never planned
to invade the islands or Taiwan. As Thomas Christensen has
shown, Mao launched the attacks to mobilize domestic support
for his ambitious economic policies (ie. the Great Leap
Forward); he and wanted a crisis, but not a war (Christensen
1996, ch. 6). The risk of escalation, therefore, was always low.
As in 1954/55, U.S. involvement in the 1958 crisis was driven
primarily by a long-standing perceived U.S. interest in
containing the PRC (Accinelli 2001, 139; Eliades 1993, 344;
George and Smoke 1974, 364). In 1958, the Eisenhower
administration “remained hostile to the PRC and persisted in its
hard-line policy of military containment combined with
diplomatic and economic isolation”(Accinelli 2001, 108).
Intelligence analysts consistently depicted China as a rogue
state (NIE 13-57, “Communist China Through 1961,” March
19, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 3, pp. 498, 505; NIE 13-2-57,
“Communist China’s Role in Non-Communist Asia,” December
13
3, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 3, pp. 649-652; NIE 13-58,
“Communist China,” May 13, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19,
pp. 25-26) and described the U.S.-China relationship as one of
“semi-warfare” (“Address by Secretary of State Dulles in San
Francisco,” June 28, 1957, FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. 3, pp. 558573). The peace talks from the 1954/55 crisis failed to ease the
Sino-American antagonism. In fact, in the eyes of the
Eisenhower administration “the first crisis confirmed that
Communist China was the most dangerous power in Asia and a
continuous threat to U.S. interests in the Far East” (Zhang 1992,
238). Throughout the period between the two Taiwan Straits
crises, U.S. policy documents consistently depicted Taiwan as a
vital strongpoint in America’s anti-Communist containment
barrier,( NSC 5723, “U.S. Policy toward Taiwan and the
Government of the Republic of China,” October 4, 1957, FRUS,
1958-60, Vol. 19) and Eisenhower signed off on numerous
Nationalist raids against the mainland (Garver 2001, 135-136).
When China began shelling the offshore islands in 1958, U.S.
officials assumed it was the opening salvo in a Sino-Soviet plot
to bully the United States out of Asia and determined that U.S.
action was necessary to deter Chinese and Soviet expansion
(“Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower,”
August 12, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, p. 50;
“Memorandum Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles,”
September 4, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, p. 131-134;
SNIE 100-11-58, “Probable Chinese Communist and Soviet
Intentions in the Taiwan Strait Area,” FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.
19, pp. 205-206; Zhang 1992, 243).
In sum, Alliance politics featured in U.S. decisionmaking
during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, but are unnecessary to
explain U.S. involvement, which was itself quite limited.
Instead, U.S. decisionmaking was driven by a perceived
national interest in containing China, and Nationalist attempts to
extract U.S. security guarantees for the offshore islands failed.
In fact, the Eisenhower administration called publicly for a
Nationalist withdrawal from the islands and a renunciation of
the use of force. Had China invaded Jinmen or Taiwan, the
United States might have retaliated by striking the Chinese
mainland, although it is not clear that Eisenhower would have
14
approved such measures. Regardless, Mao never planned to
launch an invasion and, in fact, went to great lengths to avoid
escalation. The risk to U.S. forces and, therefore, the potential
extent of U.S. entanglement were always minimal.
1958 Berlin Crisis
7 Nov 1958 23 Jun 1959
608
FRN, UKG,
USR
0
1
In November 1958, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev demanded
that West Berlin be made a free city (governed autonomously
under international agreement) and claimed that if the Western
allies did not comply within six months, he would conclude a
separate peace with East Germany that would terminate the
four-power division of the city and leave the question of access
to West Berlin in the hands of the East German government. In
effect, Khrushchev was demanding that Western soldiers leave
Berlin and that access to the city be controlled by East
Germany.
Scholars have identified two main motives for Khrushchev’s
demand (Gavin 2012, 62): first, he wanted to stop thousands of
skilled workers from fleeing East Germany via West Berlin; and
second he wanted to pressure western powers to prevent West
Germany from becoming too powerful and acquiring a nuclear
arsenal. As Trachtenberg (1999, 253) explains: “a strong
Germany – and that meant a nuclearized Germany – was a
danger…The western governments needed to be made to feel
the brunt of Soviet displeasure. So the Soviet leadership
decided to put pressure on the western powers where they were
most vulnerable, and where the level of tension was easiest for
the Russians to control – and that, of course, meant Berlin.”
The resulting crisis would last until 1962. Both the Eisenhower
and Kennedy administrations decided to stand firm in the face
of Soviet demands and risk escalation to nuclear war because
they viewed the crisis as an important test of U.S. resolve and
worried that U.S. capitulation would embolden the Soviet
Union to expand its sphere of influence in Europe
(Trachtenberg 1999, 256-263). They also believed that the
United States had nuclear superiority and could thus coerce the
Soviet Union through nuclear threats and, if necessary, defeat it
in a nuclear war (Gavin 2012, 65-70). As Trachtenberg (1999,
15
258) explains, U.S. military leaders “wanted a confrontation
with Russia over the issue,” because they believed a “showdown” with Russia was inevitable and that it was preferable to
have it while the United States enjoyed nuclear superiority, and
“the consensus view [in late 1958], shared by both military and
civilian leaders, was that America’s whole position in Europe
depended on her willingness to defend her rights [in Berlin],
and that the country therefore had to be prepared in the final
analysis to risk general nuclear war over the issue.”
NATO allies, however, objected to these plans and resisted U.S.
demands to make preparations to implement them (Press 2005,
103-110; Trachtenberg 1999, 258-274).
The British in
particular insisted that no ground operations could be launched
without the full consensus of all NATO members and the
British Commonwealth and with full NATO mobilization, a
process that British leaders knew would take several months
and would therefore buy the western powers time to deescalate
the crisis. As Trachtenberg (1999, 256, 258) concludes, “the
U.S. government was in the final analysis far more willing than
any other western power to fight a general nuclear war rather
than capitulate over Berlin”; the Eisenhower administration
considered moderating its policy because “the western alliance
had to be kept together, the views of the major European
countries had to be taken into account, and the fact was that
those governments were leery of military action.”
Ultimately, Eisenhower did not wholly adopt the moderate
positions favored by allies, explaining that if the United States
was unwilling to risk nuclear escalation over Berlin, “we would
first lose the city itself and, shortly after, all of Western Europe.
If all of Western Europe fell into the hands of the Soviet Union
and thus added its great industrial plant to the USSR’s already
great industrial might, the United States would indeed be
reduced to the character of a garrison state if it was to survive at
all” (quoted in Green 2012, 30). As a result, the crisis persisted
in varying degrees of intensity until the end of 1962 (Gavin
2012, chap. 3; Trachtenberg 1999, chaps. 7-8).
16
Swiss Air Space
Incident
19 Mar 1959 20 Mar1959
2870
SWZ
1
2
Bay of Pigs
22 Apr 1960 26 Apr 1961
246
USR, CUB
1
3
U-2 Crisis
(USSR)
1 May 1960 18 Jul 1960
253
1
3
U-2 Crisis
(China)
2002
1
3
Austrian Air
Space Incident
27 May 1960
27 May 1960
8 Oct1960 8 Oct 1960
PAK, JPN,
NOR, TUR,
USR
CHN
2876
AUS
2
2
Laotian CounterCoup
Jan 1961 20 Apr 1961
1363
LAO, DRV,
THI, CHN, USR
0
0
Swiss fighter jets escorted a U.S. reconnaissance plane to
Zurich airport after it drifted into Swiss air space. The plane
was patrolling the western defense line against Soviet
incursions.
The United States attempted to overthrow the communist Cuban
government led by Fidel Castro. This attempt culminated in the
failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961.
Soviet surface-to-air missiles brought down a U.S. U-2 spy
plane. Turkey, Pakistan, and Norway provided bases for the
plane as it flew missions over the Soviet Union.
China charged that a U.S. naval patrol plane violated Chinese
airspace.
A U.S. military helicopter based in West Germany accidently
violated Austrian airspace and landed in Austria. The crew of
three was held for a day before being released.
Under Eisenhower, the United States had backed a proAmerican regime in Laos under Phoumi Nosavan. By the end
of 1960, the Phoumi government faced imminent military defeat
by the communist-backed Pathet Lao. In January 1961, John F.
Kennedy became president. In a meeting the day before
Kennedy’s inauguration, Eisenhower stressed to Kennedy the
strategic importance of Laos, calling it the “cork in the bottle”
preventing Southeast Asia from falling to Communism (quoted
in Herring 2008, 708). “It would be fatal,” Eisenhower warned,
“for us to permit Communists to insert themselves into the
Laotian government” (quoted in Logevall 1999, 23). Once in
office, however, Kennedy spurned the advice of Eisenhower
and many of Kennedy’s own advisors and decided against
sending U.S. ground forces to Laos, opting instead for a
diplomatic solution. In making this decision, Kennedy was
influenced “by the misgivings expressed by America’s leading
allies,” who helped convince Kennedy that the West’s stake and
chance of success in Laos were minimal (Logevall 1999, 24).
After thirteen months of negotiations, Phouma and the Pathet
Lao concluded a power-sharing agreement and established a
“neutral and independent Laos.”
17
Dominican Crisis
2 May 1961 25 Nov 1961
1801
DOM
1
1
1961 Berlin Crisis
25 Jul 1961 28 Oct 1961
27
CZE, POL,
UKG, FRN,
GDR, USR,
GFR
0
1
After the assassination of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo,
U.S. Naval units were placed on “increased alert” status in case
they needed to evacuate American citizens and to provide
stability while the OAS investigated the assassination.
At the Vienna summit in June 1961, Khrushchev renewed the
six-month ultimatum and threat of a separate peace with East
Germany that he had issued in 1958. Kennedy, who’s
reputation had been badly damaged by the Bay of Pigs fiasco
and his decision not to intervene militarily in Laos, was
determined to respond firmly to Khrushchev’s demands. “If he
thinks I’m inexperienced and have no guts” he told his advisors
“we won’t get anywhere with him” (Herring 2008, 709).
On July 25, Kennedy delivered a speech making clear the U.S.
determination to defend Western rights in Berlin and proposing
a major hike in defense spending, an increase in draft calls, and
extended enlistments in the armed forces. Khrushchev
denounced Kennedy’s speech as a “preliminary declaration of
war” and decided to resume nuclear testing and build a wall to
seal off East Germany from West Berlin. Construction began
on August 13.
As in the 1958 Berlin crisis, NATO allies pressured the United
States to soften its stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and adopt a
policy of gradual pressure that would avoid forcing Russian
leaders to choose between total capitulation and total war (Press
2005, 106). Unlike in 1958, however, U.S. officials in 1961
worried that U.S. nuclear superiority was waning and that the
Soviets might not back down if confronted with the prospect of
nuclear escalation (Press 2005, 106-107).
In August 1961, therefore, the Kennedy administration began to
moderate its contingency plans for Berlin. By September, the
United States had abandoned the notion of forcing the Soviets
to decide between backing down and nuclear war in favor of
plans involving non-military means to break a potential Soviet
blockade of Berlin. Nuclear war was still considered, but the
new contingency plans entailed a more drawn out process of
crisis escalation.
18
Initial Military
Support for South
Vietnam
Berlin Tensions
Dec 1961 26 Feb 1962
3361
DRV, USR,
CHN
3
3
3 Dec 1961 14 Aug 1962
2219
USR, GDR,
GFR
2
3
Cuban Missile
Crisis
28 Jan 1962 12 Dec 1962
61
USR, CUB
1
3
1962 Taiwan
Strait Crisis
25 Feb 1962 19 Dec 1962
172
TAW, CHN
2
0
Throughout the crisis, the United States drove NATO policy
rather than the other way around. The Kennedy administration
acted as an “executive agent” for NATO and “set [Berlin]
policy for the West as a whole” (Trachtenberg 1999, 304).
Indeed, as Press (2005, 110) explains, the United States
displayed “astonishing callousness with regard to the well-being
of the European allies,” drawing up nuclear war contingency
plans that deliberately sacrificed European lives to increase the
chances saving American lives by substituting strikes on Soviet
medium-range nuclear delivery systems for strikes on Soviet
long-range nuclear systems. Press (2005, 110) concludes: “the
U.S. willingness to pursue policies that would obliterate its
allies…is shocking in its total departure from the image of
friendly democratic allies cooperating together in a spirit of
community.”
See main text
After the construction of the Berlin Wall, the United States sent
troops to garrison its side of the wall and engaged in talks with
the Soviet Union to resolve West Berlin’s political status.
Border guards shoot and kill several refugees.
A U.S. U-2 aircraft found Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The
Kennedy administration considered attacking Cuba via air and
sea, but decided on a military blockade instead.
In early 1962, Taiwan began prepare forces on the offshore
islands for a military attack against mainland China. By June,
the preparations had alarmed the Chinese government, which
alerted the country for an invasion from Taiwan. To reassure
the Chinese and restrain Taiwan, the United States told the
Chinese government (via their ambassador in Warsaw) on June
26, that the United States would not support “any Nationalist
attempt to invade the mainland.” The Taiwanese government
then determined that American resistance to the use of force
was irreversible and refrained from attacking the mainland
(Gordon 1985: 656-658).
19
Intervention in
Laos
12 May 1962
15 Feb 1973
1353
THI, DRV,
LAO, NEW,
UKG, AUL,
USR, CHN
1
3
Korean DMZ
Incidents 2
2 Jun 1962 22 Nov 1962
2188
ROK, PRK,
2
3
Yemeni
Revolution
15 Nov 1962
15 Nov 1962
1108
SAU, JOR,
EGY, YAR
1
3
U.S. military operations in Laos were driven by U.S.
involvement in Vietnam (Herring 2002, 340-341). I discuss the
role of entanglement dynamics in the Vietnam War in the main
text. The flimsy Laotian coalition government discussed above
was nominally neutral during the Vietnam war, but the North
Vietnamese used Laotian territory with virtual impunity for
their infiltration routes into South Vietnam and provided the
communist Pathet Lao with supplies and soldiers. From 1962 to
1973, the United States backed the Laotian government and
waged a secret war against North Vietnamese positions in Laos.
In February 1971, President Nixon approved a major ground
operation into Laos involving South Vietnamese troops backed
up by U.S. air power to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines.
When the two South Vietnamese divisions crossed the border,
they were attacked by 36,000 North Vietnamese troops
supported by Russian-made tanks. After six weeks of bloody
fighting, the South Vietnamese forces retreated back into South
Vietnam. By 1973, the United States had dropped more than
two million tons of bombs on Laos while the CIA sponsored
attacks carried out by Hmong militias against North Vietnamese
forces on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. When the United
States withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973, the Pathet Lao
assumed power and slaughtered 100,000 Hmong tribespeople.
In July, seven North Korean soldiers fired on a South Korean
work detail in the DMZ. In September, South Korean forces
killed six North Korean troops on the south side of the DMZ.
Available sources do not indicate that American troops were
involved in either skirmish.
Forces loyal to Abdullah as-Sallal overthrew the newly crowned
Yemeni Imam and declared Yemen a republic. The new regime
was supported by Egypt, which sent 70,000 troops into Yemen,
and the Soviet Union. The U.S. military, concerned about
instability spreading throughout the region, conducted shows of
force, but recognized the new regime and refrained from direct
involvement in the fighting.
20
Haitian Crisis
28 Apr 1963 3 Jun 1963
1002
UKG, CAN,
DOM, HAI
1
3
Korean DMZ
Incidents 3
17 May 1963
15 Jan 1964
2189
ROK, PRK
2
3
Soviet Fighters
Down U.S. Planes
28 Jan 1964 27 Mar1964
2220
USR
1
3
Vietnam War
23 Feb 1964 27 Jan 1973
611
CHN, USR,
NEW, AUL,
ROK, RVN,
THI, PHI, CAM,
DRV
3
3
The Kennedy administration cut off U.S. aid to Haiti in 1962
after accusing the regime, led by Francois Duvalier of stealing
funds and of brutalizing its own people. As a result, the Haitian
economy deteriorated, and the Kennedy administration feared
that a collapse of the regime would result in a Communist takeover (Herring 2008, 717). Kennedy considered but ultimately
ruled out sending U.S. marines to Haiti to stabilize the
government. Instead, the United States deployed a navy task
force to the vicinity of Haiti and gave Duvalier an economic aid
package in return for Haiti’s vote to expel Cuba from the OAS.
Throughout the 1960s U.S. intelligence estimates consistently
reported that Korea and Southeast Asia were at risk of falling to
Communism (Roehrig 2006, ch. 2). In July 1961, the Soviet
Union and China signed security agreements with North Korea,
which the U.S. State Department in a statement to the press
characterized as another “military link in the Communist
colonial empire” and a “sign of ‘militancy’ shown by the
Communists throughout the world” (Roehrig 2006, 44). At the
same time, incidents between North Korean and South Korean
forces along the DMZ increased steadily and peaked in 1968 at
629. U.S. troops were involved in several of these incidents.
The first major incident occurred on May 17, 1963, when North
Korean forces shot down a U.S. helicopter violating North
Korea's airspace, took the two pilots hostage, and refused to
return them for months.
On January 28, a U.S. training plane was shot down by Soviet
fighter planes over East Germany. On March 10, a U.S.
reconnaissance plane was shot down by a Russian fighter over
East Germany.
See main text
21
Cambodia-South
Vietnam Border
Dispute
19 Mar 1964 25 Oct 1964
1213
CAM, RVN
1
3
Korean DMZ
Incidents 4
9 Aug 1964 19 Oct 1969
1379
PRK, ROK
2
3
Chinese MIG
Incident
9 Apr 1965 9 Apr 1965
251
CHN
1
3
North Korea
Attacks U.S. Spy
Plane
28 Apr 1965 2 May 1965
2916
PRK
1
3
As in Laos, U.S. military involvement in Cambodia stemmed
from the war in Vietnam, which I discuss in the main text. In
March 1964, the Johnson administration conducted a major
policy review of its Indochina policy and concluded that the
United States must preserve a stable, non-Communist South
Vietnam and, to accomplish that goal, needed to conduct
“border control” operations in Cambodia and Laos (Herring
2002, 139). In October, South Vietnamese forces strafed a
Cambodian village purportedly because Cambodia was
providing refuge for Viet Cong forces that were attacking across
the border into South Vietnam. On October 22, the U.S.
government claimed that Cambodian troops crossed over into
South Vietnam and seized a U.S. officer, who was found dead
several days later just inside South Vietnam. On October 26,
Cambodian forces shot down a U.S. Air Force C-123 cargo
plane that had accidently strayed over Cambodian territory.
Eight U.S. soldiers were killed.
Sporadic clashes among North and South Korean forces along
the DMZ. Much of the fighting stemmed from North Korea's
efforts to ignite an insurgency in the South. According to UN
Command reports, the number of incidents along the border
increased from 50 in 1966 to 543 in 1967 and peaked in 1968 at
629 (Roehrig 2006, 46). The most serious infiltration occurred
on January 21, 1968 when 31 North Korean commandos
attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park at his
residence in Seoul. The frequency and intensity of these clashes
declined dramatically in 1969 after North Korea largely
abandoned its hopes of igniting an insurgency in the South.
U.S. and Chinese fighter jets skirmished over the South China
Sea. No planes were shot down, but one Chinese fighter was
damaged. China accused the United States of violating its
airspace; the U.S. government insisted the American planes
were in international air space and were clearing the way for
bombing raids in North Vietnam.
Two North Korean jet fighters attacked and damaged a U.S. spy
plane over international waters in the Sea of Japan. The plane,
though damaged, landed safely at the Yokota Air Base in Japan.
The U.S. government said the plane was part of routine
patrolling outside the borders of Communist countries by the
22
United States.
?
12 Jun 1965 12 Jun 1965
5 Oct 1965 23 Nov 1967
2910
USR
2929
CHN
1
3
Cambodian
Border Dispute
26 Dec 1965 2 Aug1966
1216
CHN, CAM,
RVN, THI
1
3
Airstrikes on
North Vietnam
5 Feb 1967 24 Feb 1967
1217
CAM, ROK,
RVN,
1
3
Soviet Fishing
Dispute 1
Soviet Ships
Incident
Six-day War
2 Mar 1967 22 Mar 1967
28 Apr 1967 28 Apr 1967
10 Jun 1967 19 Jun 1967
2934
USR
1
2
2931
USR
1
3
345
ISR, USR
2
3
China Air Battle
?
Chinese air force planes shot down an American fighter plane in
a dogfight near the China-Vietnam border. The U.S. fighter
was part of a bombing raid on North Vietnam.
U.S. and South Vietnamese forces clash with North Vietnamese
forces along the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia.
These clashes were direct outcomes of the war in Vietnam,
which I discuss in the main text.
U.S. planes bombed targets in North Vietnam, including a
North Vietnamese army barracks near Hanoi and infiltration
routes on the Vietnamese borders with Laos and Cambodia.
See main text for U.S. decisionmaking process.
A U.S. Coast Guard cutter seized a Soviet fishing boat accused
of violating U.S. territorial waters.
U.S. air force plane buzzes two Soviet navy ships in the
Karpathos Strait
On June 5, 1967 Israel attacked Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt,
the latter of which had mobilized forces near the Israeli border
and announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli
shipping in late May.
Although U.S. policymakers were concerned that an Arab
victory would enable Soviet encroachments in the Middle East,
they were confident that Israel would win the war and thus
decided to stand on the sidelines of the conflict. The United
States failed to fulfill its 1957 pledge to guarantee Israel’s
access to the Straits of Tiran (Walt 1987, 101). When Israeli
leaders implored Johnson to honor the U.S. security
commitment and reopen the Straits of Tiran, Johnson rebuffed
them, explaining that Congress would not allow him to order a
U.S. intervention and that he would instead work with the UN
to establish a multinational flotilla to reopen the Straits (Quandt
1977, 53). The Johnson administration’s subsequent efforts to
organize such a flotilla “proceeded, if at all, at a snail’s pace”
(Gat 2003, 147). A recent study concludes that U.S. policy
23
during the war “boiled down to throwing the onus of resolving
the crisis on to the shoulders of someone else” Gat (2003, 133).
Several factors explain the lack of U.S. action. First, the
Johnson administration and, in particular, the Pentagon, was
focused on Vietnam and reluctant to get bogged down in
another military conflict (Pressman 2008, 95). In addition,
Johnson was mindful of the furor over his handling of the Gulf
of Tonkin incident in 1964 after which he had ordered the use
of force without a formal declaration of war by Congress
(Quandt 1977, 45). Finally, U.S. officials generally believed
Israel could fend for itself without any U.S. assistance (Gat
2003, 143).
Operation MENU
and the
Cambodian
Incursion
18 Jan 1968 28 Apr 1969
1806
CAM, RVN,
CHN
1
3
Consequently, “unilateral U.S. action was ruled out without
much consideration” (Quandt 2001, 29), and the United States
“remained an intensely interested bystander throughout the brief
conflict” (Walt 1987, 102). The only exception occurred on
May 10. That day, a cease-fire went into effect, but Soviet
leaders feared that Israeli forces were still fighting in Syria and
were planning to invade Damascus. The Soviet government
sent a message at 9am (EST) to Johnson warning they would
take necessary actions, “including military,” if Israel did not
halt its advance. Johnson responded by assuring the Soviets
that Israel would abide by the cease-fire and by ordering the
U.S. Sixth Fleet to sail toward the Syrian coast in order to deter
the Soviets from carrying out their threat. By noon (EST) the
cease-fire went into effect, and the Sixth Fleet stopped its
eastward movement.
A direct outcome of the Vietnam War. Throughout 1968, North
Vietnamese forces used Cambodia as a supply route and base
camp. In March 1969, the United States began an intensive
bombing campaign (Operation MENU) in Cambodia, dropping
more than 100,000 tons of bombs in 15 months, to destroy
North Vietnamese sanctuaries (Herring 2008, 276). After a
coup in Cambodia in March 1970 in which a pro-American
clique led by Prime Minister Lon Nol overthrew the neutralist
Prince Sihanouk, Nixon sent U.S. ground forces into Cambodia,
again to destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries and to sustain a
24
USS Pueblo
Incident
23 Jan 1968 22 Dec 1968
347
PRK
1
3
Egyptian Plane
Incident
13 Feb 1968 13 Feb 1968
2924
EGY
1
3
non-Communist government.
As Herring (2002, 293)
concludes: “from beginning to end, the Nixon administration
viewed its new ally as little more than a pawn to be used to help
salvage the U.S. position in Vietnam.” Nixon pulled U.S.
troops out of Cambodia in late June 1970 but continued to bomb
Viet Minh sanctuaries.
On January 23, 1968, North Korea seized the U.S. intelligence
ship Pueblo in the Sea of Japan and imprisoned its officers and
crew. The ship had left with orders to intercept and conduct
surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the Tsushima Strait and
to gather signal and electronic intelligence from North Korea.
The capture occurred only a week before the start of the Tet
Offensive in Vietnam and ignited an 11-month prisoner drama
between the United States and North Korea. North Korea stated
that the Pueblo strayed into their territorial waters, but the
United States maintains that the vessel was in international
waters at the time of the incident. On January 24, the U.S.
ambassador to South Korea advised the South Korean
government “in strongest terms against any attempt at action
against North Korea” for the seizure or the January 6 North
Korean raid on the Blue House in which North Korean
commandos attempted to assassinate President Park and killed
his wife (Lee 2006, 57). The United States then initiated secret
negotiations with the North Koreans. In response, President
Park urged the United States to launch air strikes on North
Korean naval ships and expressed his willingness to cooperate
in such an attack, and the South Korean National Assembly
issued a statement denouncing the United States for conducting
the “diplomacy of humiliation” and warning that such a “sellout” would be an open invitation to future Communist
aggression (Nahm 1999, 107). The Johnson administration,
however, preoccupied by the Vietnam War, rejected President
Park’s request and maintained peaceful negotiations with the
North Korean government. North Korea eventually freed the
crew, but the Pueblo is still held by North Korea today and used
as a museum.
An Egyptian Air Force plane buzzed a U.S. Navy intelligencegathering ship in the Mediterranean 50 miles north of
Alexandria.
25
EC-121 Incident
15 Apr 1969 27 Apr 1969
2941
USR, PRK
1
3
China Nuclear
Threat
19 Sep 1969 4 Oct 1969
2936
CHN
1
0
North Korea shot down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane
flying 60 miles from the North Korean coast in the Sea of Japan
on April 15, 1969. The 31 crewmembers were based in Japan
and conducting electronic surveillance and gaterhing
intelligence about North Korean troops movements along the
east coast of North Korea at the time of the attack. North Korea
claims the plane had intruded deep into North Korean air space,
while the United States maintains the plane was at least 90
miles offshore. The U.S. Department of Defense immediately
suspended all reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union,
China, Cuba, and the Mediterranean Sea. Nixon, who was
seeking a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam War and
preparing to issue his so-called Guam Doctrine lowering the
U.S. military profile in Asia, condemned the attack and resumed
reconnaissance flights with fighter escorts, but made clear that
the Untied States would make a greater effort for peaceful
coexistence with its communist adversaries and would not be
solely responsible for peace and stability in East Asia (Nahm
1999, 109). The administration did not demand an apology
from North Korea or threaten retaliation (Lee 2006, 66).
Following the voices of moderates in the U.S. Congress, Nixon
first reduced the size of the Task Force 71 and then withdrew it
from the Sea of Japan because of “cost effectiveness” (Nahm
1999, 109-110). On July 25, Nixon announced the Guam
doctrine, stating that the United States would not be “dragged
into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam” and “is
going to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled
by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations
themselves” (Levin and Sneider 1983).
President Park
indirectly criticized Nixon’s handling of the EC-121 incident
and the Guam doctrine in August, stating that “superior
strength” and the “principle of responsive actions” were
necessary to contain Communism in Asia (Lee 2006, 67-68).
The Chinese government released a statement denouncing U.S.
and Soviet nuclear proliferation and claiming that aggression by
either power against China would be met with a worldwide
revolutionary war.
26
Jordanian Black
September Crisis
11 Jun 1970 26 Sep 1970
1039
USR, UKG,
IRQ, JOR,
SYR, ISR
1
3
Soviets Hold Two
U.S. Generals
21 Oct 1970 10 Nov 1970
2221
USR
1
2
Operation Lam
Son 719
9 Feb 1971 9 Mar 1971
2947
CHN
1
3
Since 1967, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader
Yasser Arafat had established a virtual Palestinian state within
Jordan from which he staged raids against Israel and
assassination attempts against Jordan’s pro-Western King
Hussein. Fearing that the end of the War of Attrition would
bring about a peace deal between Egypt and Israel, a radical
PLO faction hijacked three airliners to Jordan and blew them
up. In response, King Hussein initiated a thorough crackdown
against the PLO in Jordan. During the week of fighting that
followed, Syrian armored units invaded Jordan. Nixon,
interpreting Syria’s actions as a direct challenge from Moscow
(Quandt 1977, 105, 114-115), dispatched naval and airborne
forces into the area and asked Israel to ready its forces in the
Golan heights and its air force for strikes along the Syria-Jordan
border. Jordanian forces, however, repulsed the Syrians without
American or Israeli assistance, and the Soviet Union did not act;
in fact, Soviet officials assured U.S. officials that they were
trying to restrain the Syrians (Walt 1987, 113).
A U.S. transport plane holding two generals and a Turkish
official strayed off course and was forced to land in Soviet
Armenia because of poor weather. The officials were held for
several weeks before being released.
Another MID directly related to the Vietnam War. South
Vietnamese forces backed by American logistical, aerial, and
artillery support invaded southeastern Laos to disrupt North
Vietnamese supply lines (the Ho Chin Minh trail). The Nixon
administration also hoped to use the operation to demonstrate
the ability of South Vietnamese forces to defend their nation
and thus pave the way for a U.S. withdrawal from South
Vietnam. In debating the operation, Nixon officials recognized
that U.S. allies would oppose the operation (“Tab A:
Tchepone,” FRUS, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972, Vol. 7,
343), but Kissinger encouraged Nixon to go ahead in order to
reestablish his control over the foreign policy bureaucracy
(“Diary Entry by the White House Chief of Staff,” FRUS,
Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972, Vol. 7, 344-345). China
denounced South Vietnam's invasion of Laos and said it would
provide assistance to Laos. It also accused the United States of
sending ground troops.
27
Cuban Fishing
Dispute
24 Feb 1971 6 Jul 1971
2946
CUB
1
3
Cuban Gunboat
Attack
15 Dec 1971 28 Dec 1971
2943
CUB
1
3
Soviet Fishing
Dispute 2
17 Jan 1972 22 Jan 1972
2949
USR
1
2
U.S. Sinks
Chinese Boat
22 Aug 1972
22 Aug 1972
2948
CHN
1
3
October War
6 Oct1973 31 Oct 1973
353
SYR, ISR,
EGY, USR
2
2
The U.S. Coast Guard seized three Cuban fishing boats accused
of fishing in U.S. waters. The boats were later released for lack
of evidence.
A Cuban gunboat strafed and seized a U.S. freighter. In
response the U.S. warned Cuba that it would take "all measures
under international law" to protect American and other ships in
the Caribbean from any new attacks by the Cubans.
U.S. coast guard boats escorted two Soviet fishing vessels to a
U.S. naval base after they violated U.S. waters off the coast of
the Aleutian islands.
Related to Vietnam War. U.S. planes sank a Chinese lifeboat
off the Vietnamese coast. The U.S. military command in
Saigon issued a statement explaining that the boat was a 30-foot
water supply craft carrying supplies to North Vietnam. China
did not pursue the dispute further.
Since the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union had increased
considerably its support for Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, providing
these countries with loans, arms shipments, and military
advisers and basing Soviet air and naval units on their territories
(Walt 1987, 105-118). Nixon and Kissinger both believed that a
strong U.S. relationship was “the key to combating Soviet
influence in the Arab world,” (Quandt 1977, 106. See also,
Walt and Mearsheimer 2007, 51-52), but they also believed that
the Arab-Israeli conflict “drove the Arab need for Soviet
support and arms” and that an Arab-Israeli peace settlement
would help limit Soviet influence in the region (Pressman 2008,
104; Quandt 2002, 69-70, 92-94).
During the October War, therefore, the administration attempted
to walk a fine line between supporting Israel and avoiding
antagonizing Arab countries (Quandt 1977, 170-176).
Confident in Israeli military superiority, the Nixon
administration, led by Kissinger, initially restrained Israel from
striking preemptively and withheld all forms of military
assistance for the first week of the war (Pressman 2008, 100105). When Israeli leaders complained to Kissinger about the
lack of U.S. support, Kissinger blamed it on the reluctance of
the Defense Department to intervene (Quandt 1977, 175).
28
Between October 9 and October12, however, U.S. policy began
to shift as Arab military gains exceeded expectations, Egypt
rejected a U.S. cease-fire proposal, and the Soviet Union
initiated a massive airlift of military supplies to Egypt and
Syria. As Quandt (1977, 184) explains, the main driver of the
shift in U.S. policy was the perceived need “to demonstrate to
the Kremlin that the United States was capable of matching
Soviet military deliveries to the Middle East.” Indeed,
Kissinger underlined this objective by arguing that U.S. forces
should send at all times 25 percent more equipment than the
Soviets were sending (Quandt 1977, 187).
On October 14, the United States began to airlift supplies to
Israel. Over the course of the war, the U.S. Air Force delivered
a total of 22,300 tons of materiel, including 19 M-60 tanks, at a
cost of $2.2 billion (Parker 2001, 7). To avoid direct U.S.
involvement in the conflict, however, the supplies were dropped
at Tel Aviv airport and then transported by Israeli units to the
frontlines on the Sinai (Parker 2001, 7).
On October 22, the United States and Soviet Union arranged a
cease-fire. On October 24, Egypt asked both superpowers to
send troops to uphold the cease-fire, and the Soviet Union
warned that if the United States did not enforce Israeli
compliance that the Soviet Union would take “appropriate steps
unilaterally” to do so. The historical record suggests the Soviet
Union had no intention of intervening unilaterally, but this
threat convinced Kissinger to raise the alert status of U.S. forces
from DefCon IV to DefConIII, which indicates a state of
increased readiness but not a determination that war is likely
(Boyne 2002, 253).
Kissinger later claimed to have
orchestrated a “deliberate overreaction” to send a stern message
to the Soviets. The Soviet Union did not take additional
actions, and on October 25 the UN Security Council passed a
resolution calling for an immediate and complete cease-fire and
creating a UN Emergency Force composed of nonpermanent
members of the Security Council to monitor compliance. The
cease-fire took hold and the war officially ended.
However, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
29
Draft Evader
Arrest
14 Sep 1974 –
14 Sep 1974
2952
CAN
1
0
Mayaguez
Incident
12 May 1975
15 May 1975
356
CAM
1
3
Kim Il Sung
Speech
18 May 1975
20 Nov 1975
1472
PRK, ROK
2
1
Puerto Rican
Independence
17 Aug 1975
-
2954
CUB
1
0
Countries (OAPEC) retaliated for the U.S. airlift to Israel by
initiating an oil embargo against the United States, Britain,
Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. The embargo lasted until
March 1974 and quadrupled the price of oil, imposing major
economic costs on the United States and its allies.
U.S. Customs officials arrested an American draft evader living
in Canada at the border (Fordham and Sarver 2001, 459).
The new revolutionary government of Cambodia seized the
Mayaguez, a U.S. merchant ship, claiming that it had ventured
into its territorial waters. Suffering from the loss of South
Vietnam and haunted by memories of North Korea’s capture of
the Pueblo in 1968, Ford and his advisers agreed to act
decisively: There “wasn’t a dove in the place,” one official
recalled (Herring 2008, 823). Kissinger argued that the United
States needed to “look ferocious” (Herring 2008, 824).
President Ford declared the seizure an act of piracy and sent 220
U.S. marines on a rescue mission and bombed Cambodia. U.S.
and Khmer Rouge forces engaged in heavy fighting in which 41
U.S. marines were killed. The navy recovered the Mayaguez,
and when the marines landed in Cambodia the government
released the prisoners. It was the only known engagement
between U.S. ground forces and the Khmer Rouge.
As South Vietnam fell, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung
travelled to China and delivered a bellicose speech in which he
alluded to a North Korean invasion of the South. U.S.
policymakers were concerned that Kim was in Beijing seeking
Chinese backing for such an invasion. Chinese leaders in turn
for the first time recognized North Korea as the sole legitimate
sovereign state of the Korean nation. However, Chinese leaders
also communicated to U.S. leaders that they would not condone
or assist a North Korean invasion of the South. In November,
Kim backtracked from this rhetoric and announced that North
Korea would not invade the South, but also called for the
immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea as a
precondition for the reunification of Korea.
The UN, under U.S. pressure, agreed to put off consideration
indefinitely of a Cuban-sponsored proposal to grant Puerto Rico
30
Dispute
22 Aug 1975
?
2 Sep 1975 –
2 Sep 1975
7 Jan 1976 7 Jan 1976
2953
CAN
2958
CUB,
1
0
Axe Murder
Incident
18 Aug 1976
31 Aug 1976
362
PRK, ROK
2
3
Saudi and Iranian
Arms Sale
Reduction
31 Aug 1976
6 Sep 1976
2335
ISR
2
0
Cuban Baseball
Boycott
self-determination.
?
The U.S. canceled an exhibition baseball game between all-star
teams of the U.S. and Cuba because of Cuba's involvement in
the Angolan civil war.
On August 18, 1976, a group of North Korean guards attacked
with axes U.S. and South Korean soldiers that were trimming a
tree on the UN side of the joint security area. Two U.S. soldiers
were killed and several UN soldiers were wounded. The United
Nations Command immediately sent another work crew to cut
down the tree in a show of force. The United States, along with
South Korea, placed its forces on full alert, dispatched several
squadrons of F-4 Phantom fighters and F-111 bombers to South
Korea and a naval task group to Korean waters. The U.S.
government stressed that the moves did not foreshadow military
retaliation but were aimed to deter possible North Korean
military action. Four hours after the incident, Kim Il-Sung sent
a letter of regret to the UN Command at the Korean Military
Armistice Commission meeting and offered a conciliatory
proposal for new security measures in the neutral area (Lee
2006, 80). The United Sates then called back its additional
military forces. The incident was “generally regarded as an
isolated event caused without high-level authorization by an
extremely anti-American North Korean officer” (Nahm 1999,
115). The South Korean reaction was angry, and President Park
declared: “our patience is limited. From now on, if they
commit unlawful provocations against us, we will have to take
immediate punitive actions, whether small or large, and all
responsibility for this shall be borne by North Korean
Communists themselves” (Lee 2006, 80). The United States
rejected these measures and excluded South Korea from a
negotiated settlement of the crisis between the United States and
North Korea (Lee 2006, 80).
The U.S. substantially reduced the volume of missile sales to
Saudi Arabia and Iran after Israel and members of the U.S.
Congress strongly criticized the original arms package for
arming enemies of Israel.
31
North Korean
Reconnaissance
Incident
Soviet Fishing
Dispute 3
North Korea
Helicopter
Incident
Soviet Ray Gun
Threat
15 Oct 1976
15 Oct 1976
9 Apr 1977 10 Apr 1977
13 Jul 1977 17 Mar 1978
2960
PRK
2
2
North Korea accused the U.S. of conducting reconnaissance
flights over its territory.
2222
USR
1
3
2192
ROK, PRK
2
3
19 Nov 1978
2 Jan 1979
10 Mar 1979 27 Mar 1980
2223
USR
1
0
The U.S. military seized two Soviet fishing vessels within 200miles of the U.S. eastern seaboard.
North Korean forces shot down a U.S. helicopter that had
strayed over North Korean territory, killing three of the four
crewmembers.
Reports indicate that the Soviet Union was developing ray
weapons that could destroy nuclear-armed missiles.
2193
PRK, ROK
2
2
Soviet Sea Border
Dispute
9 Aug 1979 10 Aug 1979
2224
USR
1
0
?
13 Aug 1979
13 Aug 1979
31 Aug 1979
20 Nov 1979
3021
LIB
2225
CUB, USR
1
3
South Korean
Military Exercises
1
Soviet Troops in
Cuba
North Korea charged that United Nations (UN) military
exercises in South Korea showed that the UN Command had
clear intentions to start a war. The U.S. government declared
that U.S.-led United Nations military exercises in South Korea
would continue despite strong North Korean protests. In
February 1980, the North and South resumed talks, begun in
1972, on potential Korean reunification.
The Carter administration announces that U.S. ships and planes
will challenge coastal sea claims that exceed 3 miles. Soviet sea
claims extend 12 miles from Soviet shores.
?
In September 1979, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
chairman Frank Church of Idaho, facing a strong conservative
challenge for reelection, announced that he had discovered a
brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba. In fact, the troops had been
there since 1962. Carter, who’s political reputation was being
sullied by the ongoing Iranian hostage crisis, decided to show
toughness toward the Soviets and increased U.S. military forces
in the Caribbean. This move infuriated the Soviets and
undermined the SALT talks.
32
Iranian Hostage
Crisis
4 Nov 1979 21 Jan 1981
3020
IRN
1
3
Carter Condemns
Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan
4 Jan 1980 4 Jan 1980
2227
USR
1
2
Export Controls
on USSR
13 Mar 1980 19 Mar 1980
2226
USR, UKG,
NTH,NOR, ITA,
GFR, CAN
1
0
Soviet Airliner
Incident
12 May 1981
14 May 1981
2228
USR
1
3
USSR Arms Cuba
17 Jul 1981 30 Jul 1981
14 Aug 1981
14 Aug 1981
18 Aug 1981
21 Aug 1981
2972
CUB
1
0
2971
PRK
2
3
3099
EGY, LIB
1
3
9 Nov 1981 6 Dec 1981
3098
SOM, LIB
SUD, OMA,
1
3
SR-71 Incident
(North Korea)
Libya Air Battle
Libyan
Assassination
The new revolutionary Iranian government seized 66 Americans
from the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held them hostage for
more than a year. On April 24, 1980, the U.S. military
attempted a rescue operation, which failed and resulted in the
deaths of 8 U.S. soldiers and the destruction of two U.S.
aircraft. On July 27, 1980, the former Shah died, and in
September, Iraq invaded Iran. These events encouraged the
Iranian government to release the hostages, which it did minutes
after Ronald Reagan was sworn into office on January 20, 1981.
In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter gave a
speech in which he condemned Soviet “aggression” and warned
of the danger to Persian Gulf oil fields. Over the next year he
took a number of steps against the Soviets, including stepping
up U.S. covert aid to the mujahedeen rebels and approving PD59, which increased military spending.
The Carter administration tightened controls on high-tech
exports to the Soviet Union.
U.S. law enforcement agents detained a Soviet plane at Dulles
International airport and seized several items of its cargo on
suspicion of violation of export-control laws. It was later
determined that the radio navigation equipment seized by the
agents had been properly licensed.
U.S. Secretary of State Haig announced that Soviet arms
shipments to Cuba had increased sharply.
North Korea fired a surface-to-air missile at a U.S. SR-71 high
altitude spy plane.
U.S. Navy jets flying exercises over the Gulf of Sidra shot down
two Libyan jets after being attacked. Libya claims the Gulf area
as Libyan territory, the U.S. maintains that it was international
waters. The United States had conducted the exercises to
challenge Qaddafi's claim to a 120-mile "Zone of Death" off
Libyan shores.
A Libyan gunman fired six shots at the U.S. charge d'affaires in
Paris. The diplomat was unhurt. The U.S. linked the attack to
33
Attempt
EGY
North Korean Air
Space Dispute
Libyan Airliner
Incident
9 Jan 1982 9 Jan 1982
3 Feb 1982 3 Feb 1982
2979
PRK
2
0
2978
LIB
1
0
Nicaraguan
Bridges Incident
F-16s Dispute
17 Mar 1982 17 Mar 1982
30 Sep 1982 24 Jan 1983
2977
NIC
1
0
2229
JPN, USR
2
2
Exercise in Oman
3 Dec 1982 7 Dec 1982
3613
YPR, OMA
1
3
South Korean
Military Exercises
2
AWACS
Deployment
(Egypt)
1 Feb 1983 10 Feb 1983
2195
ROK, PRK
2
2
17 Feb 1983 20 Feb 1983
3072
EGY, LIB, SUD
1
3
Lebanon Embassy
Bombing
26 Feb 1983 26 Jul 1983
3071
IRN
1
3
Libya. In November, Libya's leader announced that he would
send a force of 4,000-11,000 troops to any Arab country that
needed it to counter the United States. In December, the U.S.
government announced it had hard proof that Libyan agents had
entered the U.S. with plans to assassinate President Reagan and
other senior U.S. officials.
North Korea accused the United States of violating its airspace
with a high-altitude SR-71 reconnaissance plane.
Libyan government radio accused two U.S. jet fighters of
buzzing a Libyan jetliner over Greece. The U.S. government
denied the accusation claiming that the two F-14s did not get
close to the airliner.
Nicaragua placed its forces on full alert after accusing the U.S.
CIA of dynamiting two bridges in Nicaragua.
The U.S. announced that it would deploy up to 50 F-16 fighterbombers on the main Japanese island of Honshu, 375 miles
from the Soviet Pacific coast, in 1985 to confront the Soviet
Union more directly. The Soviet government called the
decision a "hostile and provocative act."
About 2,500 U.S. soldiers held maneuvers in Oman, testing
defense in the event of a Soviet or other foreign attack on the
Persian Gulf region.
North Korea put its entire armed forces on a "semi-war state"
after the United States and South Korea started a major military
exercise involving 188,000 troops in the South.
Egyptian and U.S. government officials learned that Libya was
plotting to overthrow the Government of the Sudan. President
Mubarak of Egypt asked the U.S. for help in stopping the
Libyan actions, and the U.S. responded by dispatching four
AWACS planes to Egypt and positioning an aircraft carrier to
waters off Egypt and Libya.
A suicide bomber bombed the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing
63 people, mostly embassy and CIA staff. It was the deadliest
attack on a U.S. diplomatic mission up to that time. A proIranian group calling itself Islamic Jihad Organization claimed
responsibility.
In May 1983, a U.S. District Court in
Washington, D.C. determined that the bombing was carried out
by Hezbollah militants with the approval and financing of
34
senior Iranian officials.
Contra Rebellion
1
Mar 1983 6 Jun 1985
2347
HON, NIC
1
2
In 1979, the leftist Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua.
Although they professed commitment to a pluralist democracy,
they often took vocal anti-U.S. positions. Reagan officials
expressed grave concerns about a new “Soviet beachhead” in
the hemisphere and “another Cuba” (Herring 2008, 886). In
February 1981, the State Department released a white paper
purporting to contain “definitive evidence” that Nicaragua,
Cuba, and the Soviet Union were making El Salvador a Cold
War battleground. The administration increased military aid to
El Salvador to $25 million and launched a major military
buildup in Honduras in order to defeat the leftist insurgency in
El Salvador. Military assistance grew to more than $196
million in 1984. Even with this aid, however, the Salvadoran
military could gain no more than a stalemate.
In December 1981, Reagan authorized $20 million for a covert
operation to organize and train in Honduras a 500-man army of
Nicaraguan “contras.” The stated purpose was to interdict
Sandinista assistance for the Salvadoran insurgents, but
documents show that the administration also intended to topple
the Sandinista government.
The war against Nicaragua
expanded steadily from 1981 to 1984.
Reagan came to see Nicaragua as the major front in a global
struggle “to repeal the infamous Brezhnev Doctrine, which
contends that once a country has fallen into Communist
darkness, it can never be allowed to see the light of freedom”
(Herring 2008, 889). The contra force grew to ten thousand, but
never threatened the Nicaraguan government. The CIA took
over operational control in 1982, and the U.S. military in the
summer and fall of 1983 conducted military operations in
Honduras involving 4,000 troops in an effort to intimidate the
Sandinistas. Americans, skeptical of the urgency of the alleged
Sandinista threat, strongly opposed deepening involvement in
35
Nicaragua.
Cuban Spy
Dispute
Greek Base
Protests
19 Apr 1983 19 Apr 1983
20 May 1983
10 Mar 1984
2981
CUB
1
0
2176
GRC, TUR
2
0
Libya Air Battle 2
1 Aug 1983 10 Aug 1983
3065
SUD, LIB
1
3
In October 1982, the Congress forbade the use of U.S. funds to
overthrow the Sandinistas. The administration dismissed this
restriction by insisting that was not its intention. In October
1984, Congress passed another measure effectively cutting off
funding for the contras. Reagan responded by instructing his
subordinates to “do whatever you have to do to help these
people keep body and soul together” (Herring 2008, 890). NSC
staffer Oliver North solicited $50 million from friendly
governments (e.g. Taiwan, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia) and from
right-wing U.S. citizens and diverted funds from arms sold to
Iran in order to finance the contras. This funding scheme was
exposed on 1986. The war in Nicaragua ended when the Costa
Rican president, a staunch anti-Communist, devised a plan in
which Nicaraguan would be democratized and outside aid for
insurgents would be stopped. The Reagan administration hoped
the Sandinistas would reject the proposal, but they accepted, as
did the contras, who had few options after the U.S. Congress
again rejected aid for them. Despite U.S. efforts at sabotage, a
cease-fire was approved in March 1988.
The U.S. accused two Cuban diplomats in the UN delegation to
the U.S. of spying and ordered them to leave the country.
Greek and U.S. officials bicker over the future of U.S. bases in
Greece. The Greek government demanded assurances that
Turkey would not receive greater military support from the
United States than Greece.
Libya was supporting rebel forces in Chad to overthrow the
government. In response, the U.S. sent military forces to the
eastern Mediterranean and supplied Chad's army with
antiaircraft guns. On August 2nd, U.S. Navy F-14s chased
away two Libyan MIG-23s from the vicinity of the carrier
Nimitz.
36
AWACS
Deployment
(Sudan)
2 Aug 1983 24 Aug 1983
3634
ZAI, FRN,
LIB, CHA
1
2
Lebanon
Peacekeeping
Mission and
Marine Barracks
Bombing
3 Sep 1983 1 Apr 1984
3062
SYR
2
3
Libya rushed troops to Chad to help rebels attempt to topple the
government in what was announced as part of Libyan leader
Muammar Qaddafi's goal of unifying all African Muslims under
the Libyan banner. The U.S. supplied military aid to Chad's
government and flew two AWACS reconnaissance planes to the
Sudan for possible use if France, which has a security treaty
with Chad, decided to commit fighter planes in defense of its
former colony. The planes carried out a single training flight
before being withdrawn on August 24.
Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 to eliminate the bases of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and rollback
Syrian influence there. As Israeli forces besieged the capital of
Beirut, U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib negotiated an agreement
calling for all parties to withdraw forces from Beirut and
establishing a multinational peacekeeping force made of
hundreds of soldiers from the United States, France, Italy, and
Britain. The peacekeepers arrived in Lebanon in late August.
After each of the belligerents began to withdrawal their forces,
the peacekeepers withdrew to ships in the Mediterranean Sea.
However, on September 14, Lebanese President-elect Bachir
Gemayel was assassinated by the Syrian Social Nationalist
Party (according to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation)
and hostilities resumed. Israeli-backed Christian militias killed
hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Palestinian refugees in Beirut
ostensibly in retaliation for Gemayel’s assassination. This
massacre prompted Reagan to organize another peacekeeping
force with France and Italy to stabilize Lebanon and ensure the
full withdrawal of all the parties, both of which would hopefully
pave the way for an enduring Arab-Israeli peace settlement.
The U.S. presence in Lebanon, however, became a target of
terrorist attacks. On April 14, 1983, the U.S. embassy in West
Beirtu was bombed, killing 63 people. Then, on October 23, a
truck bomb destroyed barracks in Beirut housing U.S. and
French soldiers. 241 American soldiers and 58 French soldiers
were killed. The incident ignited calls in the United States for
the withdrawal of peacekeepers. Reagan, however, delayed the
withdrawal until February 1984. During that time, U.S. fighters
patrolling Lebanese airspace exchanged fire with Syrian antiaircraft batteries. Two U.S. planes were shot down and one
37
American pilot was killed. On December 4, 1983, eight U.S.
Marines were killed when Syrian-backed militias shelled their
observation post, and on December 14, a battleship in the U.S.
6th fleet fired on targets in Lebanon.
Why was the United States involved in this conflict? Historians
generally conclude that U.S. senior officials (most notably
Reagan and his Secretary of State Alexander Haig) viewed the
Lebanese conflict through the prism of the Cold War and
believed they could “piggy-back” on Israel’s invasion, using it
as an opportunity to expel Soviet influence from the Middle
East. For example, Hallenbeck (1991, 139) concludes that U.S.
involvement was driven by a belief that orchestrating a peace
settlement “would result collectively in an outcome highly
advantageous to U.S. regional and strategic interests. Put
simply, a successfully negotiated compromise would
significantly advance the Middle East peace process and would
do so under terms that would increase U.S. influence with all
parties at the expense of Soviet influence.” Hallenbeck (1991,
9) further points out that U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig
tacitly sanctioned Israel’s invasion and then pushed for U.S.
involvement because he “was predisposed to viewing the
Israeli-PLO-Syrian-Lebanese conflict as an indivisible whole,
with implications for the future of U.S. Soviet influence in the
Middle East.” As a top State Department official explained, the
Arab-Israeli conflict should be put in a “strategic framework
that recognizes and is responsible to the larger threat of Soviet
expansionism” (quoted in Herring 2008, 871). Reagan officials
reasoned that Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia could be
united in a “strategic consensus” to check Soviet advances in
the region (Schoenbaum 1993, 273-274).
Similarly, Glad (1988, 200, 223) concludes that “Reagan’s
emphasis on the Soviet threat” spurred U.S. involvement;
specifically Reagan and his aides “saw [Israel’s] invasion of
Lebanon as opening up new strategic opportunities.
Ideologically inclined to see the Soviets as the source of all
disturbances in the area and the PLO and the Syrians simply as
their surrogates, the Reagan administration could not refrain
from taking advantage of early Israeli military victories.” Thus,
38
Reagan ultimately “f[e]ll in with Haig’s view that the civil war
in Lebanon was the result of Soviet meddling via its support of
Syria and the PLO” (Glad 1988, 211).
Although Israel instigated the conflict by invading Lebanon in
1982, after tepid attempts by the United States to restrain Israel
from invading (Pressman 2008, 106-109), it is doubtful that the
U.S.-Israeli tacit alliance would have been sufficient to compel
U.S. intervention in the absence of the strategic concerns
discussed above. After all, the United States intervened in large
part to prevent further Israeli military routs of Arab forces and
in the face of explicit Israeli opposition (Hallenbeck 1991, 13,
16, 35). Moreover, with the exception of Haig, most Reagan
officials (e.g. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and
National Security Advisor William Clark) favored “rebuking
Israel in the clearest possible terms” by getting the UN to
condemn the Israeli invasion and by suspending U.S. arms sales
to Israel (Hallenbeck 1991, 8-9). Reagan himself pressured
Israel to abide by various ceasefires and proposed a peace
initiative calling for an immediate freeze on Israeli settlements
in contested areas and Palestinian self-government in the West
Bank and Gaza strip, all while strengthening ties with Arab
regimes (Hallenbeck 1991, 12, 16-17; Glad 1988, 212-213, 216219). Ironically, U.S. policymakers’ discussions of U.S.
“credibility” revolved Lebanon, not Israel; once U.S. forces
were deployed, U.S. policymakers felt they had to stand by the
Lebanese government to avoid a humiliating U.S. retreat
(Hallenbeck 1991, 144). This U.S. support for Lebanon, and
partial opposition to Israeli policies, suggest that formal alliance
ties were neither necessary nor sufficient to generate U.S.
credibility concerns or compel U.S. involvement in the conflict.
Grenada Invasion
21 Oct 1983 1 Nov 1983
3058
SLU, BAR,
DMA, JAM,
SVG, AAB,
CUB, GRN
1
3
The American military intervention in 1983 unfolded against a
background of high U.S.–Soviet tensions (For a succinct
summary of U.S. decisionmaking on Grenada, see Hall,
Hendrickson, and Polak 2013, 38-43. See also Raines 2010).
Upon assuming office in 1981, the Reagan administration
adopted a “roll-back” strategy in which the United States aimed
to topple communist regimes. Given this new strategy, the
39
Collapse of SALT
II
24 Nov 1983
1 Nov 1983
2231
USR, GFR, CZE
1
0
political orientation of Grenada came to be viewed as a
potential threat to U.S. national security. In 1979, Maurice
Bishop, a self-proclaimed communist, overthrew Grenada’s
democratically elected Sir Eric Gairy, forged a close
relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba, and initiated
programs aimed at bolstering Grenadine military capabilities,
including building a runway with Cuban aid and granting
permission for the Soviet Union to use it. As a result, many
U.S. officials became concerned that the Grenadine government
would invite the Soviet Union to establish military bases in
Grenada (Schultz 1993, 324) and turn the island into a “Soviet
beachhead” in the Caribbean (Herring 2008, 888). These
American fears were fueled when communist extremists in the
Grenadine government arrested Bishop on October 12, 1983
and then executed him on October 19. On October 25, the
Reagan administration decided to invade Grenada with several
thousand U.S. troops to rescue American citizens (mostly
students) stranded on the island and to install a pro-Western
democratic regime.
Nearly all of America’s allies opposed the intervention and
issued statements criticizing the American decision to use force.
The Carter administration had re-escalated the Cold War after
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Reagan administration
further fueled this process, openly repudiating détente. In a
1983 speech, Reagan branded the USSR “the evil empire” and
accused it of being the “focus of evil in the modern world.”
The administration took an especially hard line on arms control.
Reagan refused to resubmit to the Senate a “fatally flawed”
SALT II agreement and he openly rejected the doctrine of
mutual assured destruction in favor of a strategy of deterrence
through military superiority. The administration increased
defense spending by 7 percent per year from 1981 to 1986, a
hike which enabled improvements in existing missiles and
delivery systems, the addition of new systems such as the MX
mobile land-based missile, the B-1 bomber, and a six-hundred
ship navy capable of attacking Soviet ports. Regarding
intermediate nuclear forces (INF) stationed in Europe, the
administration proposed an agreement that was “loaded to
Western advantage and Soviet disadvantage” and “was clearly
40
Iranian Frigate
Incident
19 Feb 1984 20 May 1984
3541
IRN
1
3
Libya Bombs
Sudan
19 Mar 1984 19 Mar 1984
3051
SUD, EGY, LIB
1
0
South Korea
Military Exercises
3
Soviet Shooting
1 Feb 1985 6 Feb 1985
2196
PRK, ROK
2
2
24 Mar 1985 7 Sep 1985
2232
GDR, UKG,
USR
1
3
?
24 Sep 1985 30 Sep 1985
3620
LIB, EGY
Iran Searches
U.S. Ship 1
16 Nov 1985
14 Mar 1986
3625
SAU, UKG,
IRN, KUW
1
1
not a basis for negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement”
(Garthoff 1985, 1024). The proposal set forth a so-called zero
option, exchanging a U.S. pledge not to deploy intermediaterange missiles in Europe if the Soviets would dismantle their
intermediate-range missiles aimed at Western Europe. British
and French missiles were exempted, as were all sea- and airbased missiles, where the United States had a huge advantage.
When the United States went ahead and deployed intermediaterange missiles in Europe in late 1983, the Soviets walked out of
the talks.
A U.S. destroyer fired warning shots at an Iranian frigate and an
Iranian patrol plane that had come within 2.5 miles of the
destroyer in the Straits of Hormuz. Iran had earlier threatened
to close the Strait if Iraq attacked its oil resources.
Libya bombs Omdurman, Sudan's main city. In response, the
U.S. and Egypt consider an emergency airlift of military
equipment to Sudan.
U.S. and South Korean forces performed military exercises;
North Korea denounced them as a "war rehearsal" and cancelled
reunification negotiations with South Korea.
A U.S. Army Major on a reconnaissance mission in East
Germany was fatally shot by a Soviet guard near a Soviet
military installation. Soviet officials asserted that the officer
had been in a prohibited area and had been shot after he
disregarded warnings to halt. The U.S. rejected the Soviet
account, calling the shootings totally unjustified, but still
planned to attend talks with the Soviets on closer ties.
?
Iranian sailors stopped and searched an American merchant ship
in international waters near the Persian Gulf on suspicion that
the ship was carrying arms for Iraq. The U.S. did not protest
the search and no weapons were found. Iranian sailors also
searched ships
41
Iran Searches
U.S. Ship 2
13 Jan 1986 14 Jan 1986
2578
IRN
1
1
Libyan Bombing
13 Jan 1986 15 Apr 1986
3636
LIB
1
3
Contra Rebellion
2
Nuclear Test Ban
Dispute
Iran Detains U.S.
Journalist
SR-71 Incident
(Cuba)
Feb 1986 Mar 1988
13 Mar 1986 13 Mar 1986
27 Jan 1987 3 Jul 1988
1 May 1987 1 May 1987
2353
HON, NIC
1
2
2233
USR
1
0
2740
IRN
2
0
2742
CUB
1
0
Stark Incident
17 May 1987
18 May 1987
2739
IRQ
1
3
Prelude to
Invasion of
Panama
Iranian Airliner
Incident
24 Sep 1987 8 Aug 1988
2741
PAN
1
3
2 Jul 1988 2 Jul 1988
2834
DEN, IRN
1
3
Libyan Chemical
Weapons Threat
30 Dec 1988 4 Jan 1989
2775
LIB
1
0
Armed Iranian sailors stopped and searched an American
merchant ship for more than an hour in international waters near
the Persian Gulf. There were no injuries or loss of property in
the incident.
U.S. warplanes bombed multiple Libyan targets, described by
President Reagan as an act of self-defense and proportionate to
the sustained use of terror against Americans by Qaddafi's
Libya.
See dispute #2347
The U.S. government rejected Soviet calls for it to agree to stop
testing nuclear weapons.
Iran detained an American journalist, accusing him of being a
"spy of the Zionist regime."
Cuba accuses the U.S. of sending an SR-71 reconnaissance jet
streaking over Cuba in early December during Cuban military
exercises.
In May 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, an Iraqi aircraft
mistakenly attacked the USS Stark, killing 37 sailors. The
United States had sent an armada of roughly thirty ships to the
Persian Gulf to defend the freedom of the seas, keep the oil
flowing through the Gulf, and deflect Soviet influence from the
region (Herring 2008: 879-880).
U.S. sends more than a thousand soldiers to Panama, joining
10,000 troops already on the ground to threaten the Panamanian
government and attempt to force Noriega to step down.
A U.S. cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus a day after two
Iranian F-14s flew within seven nautical miles of another U.S.
Navy ship. All 290 passengers and crew aboard the Iranian
airliner were killed.
The U.S. accuses Libya of building a chemical weapons plant.
42
Invasion of
Panama
12 Jan 1989 22 Dec 1989
3901
PAN
1
3
Iranian
Kidnapping
2 Aug 1989 2 Aug 1989
3903
IRN
2
3
Cuban Freighter
Incident
31 Jan 1990 May 1990
3950
CUB
1
3
U.S.-Panamanian relations deteriorated in the late 1980s. In
1988, Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, accused by the U.S.
of drug-trafficking, appeared to shift his Cold War allegiance
towards the Soviet bloc, receiving military aid from Cuba,
Nicaragua, and Libya.
In 1989, Noriega declared the
Panamanian election null and void after results suggested that
his party lost the election. President Bush called on Noriega to
honor the will of the Panamanian people and started to increase
forces in the Canal Zone. In October 1989, Noriega survived a
coup attempt by members of the Panamanian Defense Forces.
On December 16 four U.S. military personnel were stopped at a
roadblock in Panama City. Panamanian security forces claimed
the U.S. soldiers were on a reconnaissance mission and opened
fire on them as they attempted to flee, killing one of the
soldiers. On December 20, U.S. force invaded Panama to,
according to President Bush, safeguard the lives of U.S.
citizens, defend democracy and human rights, combat drug
trafficking, and protect the integrity of the Torrijos-Carter
Treaties, which mandated Panamanian neutrality with respect to
the Panama Canal. Some scholars dispute the importance of
these strategic factors and instead argue that Bush intervened to
boost his domestic political standing (Cramer 2006).
On February 17, 1988 a U.S. Army officer was kidnapped by
Lebanese Hezbollah and tortured. A year and a half later, a
video of his body hung by the neck was released. In August
1989, the U.S. and Israel made overtures to the Iranian
Government and pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon to secure the
release of other prisoners. Iran rebuffed the request, saying the
kidnappings had nothing to do with Iran.
Cuba accused the U.S. Coast Guard of firing on a Cubanchartered freighter off the coast of Mexico. The U.S.
Government claimed the attack was intended to disable the
Panamanian-registered vessel after it refused to stop for a drug
search. The freighter was hit twice but managed to steam into
Mexican waters and the Coast Guard stopped its pursuit.
43
Gulf War
24 Jul 1990 3 Mar 1991
3957
JOR, TUR,
SIE, SEN,
PAK, NIR,
MOR, BNG,
NTH, ARG,
SPN, BEL,
GRC, GMY,
QAT, OMA,
AUL, BAH,
SYR, CAN,
UAE, UKG,
EGY, FRN,
ITA, SAU,
KUW, IRQ
1
3
Iraq Air Battle
15 Mar 1991 31 Dec 1991
3974
IRQ, FRN
UKG
1
3
Iranian Boat
Incident
21 May 1991
21 May 1991
3973
IRN
1
3
Canadian Fishing
Dispute
29 Jul 1991 –
29 Jul 1991
3972
CAN
1
3
In the spring of 1990, the Iraqi regime was short of cash after an
eight-year war with Iran and accused Kuwait of exceeding
production quotas and driving down the price of oil. In a
miscalculation, the Bush administration guessed that Saddam
would refrain from rash actions, and in July, the U.S.
ambassador to Iraq told Saddam that the United States had “no
opinion” on its border dispute with Kuwait. Iraqi forces quickly
seized the Kuwaiti capital in August, giving Saddam control of
20 percent of the world’s oil supply. The United States
responded forcibly, first slapping sanctions on the Iraqi regime
and then assembling a large coalition to remove Iraq from
Kuwait. Throughout the fall of 1990, the Untied States
mobilized in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf a massive array
of air, sea, and land power. On November 29, the UN Security
Council approved a resolution authorizing the use of “all
necessary means” if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by January 15,
1991. On January 12, the U.S. Congress endorsed the use of
force to uphold the UN resolution, and on January 16, the U.S.led coalition attacked Iraq and within a hundred hours, the
Iraqis were defeated. The Bush administration did not depose
the Iraqi leader and allowed much of his Republican Guard to
escape, instead choosing to contain Saddam.
The U.S. threatened to attack Iraqi military targets if Iraqi units
attacked rebels or violated the ban on Iraqi military flights. On
February 27, a U.S. F-15 shot down an Iraqi fighter plane to
enforce the ban. In March, the U.S. shot down several more
Iraqi jets but ruled out help to rebels.
A U.S. naval vessel exchanged fire with two Iranian boats in the
Persian Gulf. The incident took place where Western vessels
were enforcing the embargo on Iraq and came four days after
Iran announced it had begun naval exercises in the gulf.
The U.S. Coast Guard seized a Canadian fishing vessel
(Fordham and Sarver 2001, 459).
44
Bosnian War
16 Jul 1992 2 Oct 1996
3551
BEL, CAN
DEN, FRN
GMY, GRC
ITA, NTH
POR, RUM
SPN, TUR
UKG,
YUG
3
3
See main text
Iraqi Inspections
Dispute
27 Jul 1992 23 Dec 1993
3552
IRQ, UKG,
FRN, KUW,
RUS, SAU
1
0
U.S. Strikes Iraqi
Radar
11 Jan 1993 20 Jan 1993
3568
IRQ, KUW,
FRN, UKG
1
3
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein repeatedly refused to allow a UN
inspections team access to sites suspected of housing
information about Iraq's ballistic missile program and weapons
of mass destruction programs.
On January 21st, two U.S. warplanes struck a radar for an Iraqi
surface-to-air missile after concluding that the radar was
directed at allied planes patrolling the northern no-flight zone.
Iraqi antiaircraft batteries fired at the planes. During the prior
two weeks, U.S. and allied forces had struck targets in Iraq: a
U.S. cruise missile struck an Iraqi indsutrial complex eight
miles south of Baghdad in response to Iraq's attempts to impose
conditions on the flights of weapon inspectors; U.S., British,
and French warplanes attacked antiaircraft guns and missiles in
the air-exclusion zones over northern and southern Iraq.
45
North Korea NPT
Crisis
3 Mar 1993 24 Mar 1993
4021
PRK, ROK
1
1
Iraq Cruise
Missile Strikes
26 Jun 1993 28 Jun 1993
4299
IRQ
1
3
Upon assuming office, the Clinton administration elevated nonproliferation to a vital U.S. national interest. As Lee (2006,
159) explains, in early 1993 the administration “expressed its
firm commitment to halting the spread of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen the functions
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to
enforce strong sanctions against governments that violated
international agreements…the United States believed that if a
country successfully withdrew from the NPT system without
incurring any cost, it might encourage other signatories to
follow suit and might eventually destroy the integrity of the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty that the United States had
assiduously nurtured since 1968.” North Korea delivered the
first direct challenge to this policy when it rejected an IAEA
request to inspect suspected nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and
announced on March 12, 1993 that they would withdraw from
the NPT. On April 1, the 35-member IAEA Board of
Governors found North Korea in noncompliance with its
obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreement. The North
Koreans rejected the IAEA’s request for inspections. On April
8, the president of the UN Security Council issued a statement
expressing concern and reaffirming the importance of the NPT,
and on May 11 the Council adopted a resolution asking North
Korea to reaffirm its NPT commitments. Meanwhile, the
United States pursued a dialogue with North Korea and sought
to employ a “carrot and stick” approach, offering economic
assistance and the cancellation of U.S.-South Korean military
exercises in exchange for commitments to abjure nuclear
weapons. These talks resulted in a joint statement on June 11,
in which the United States and North Korea disavowed hostile
intention towards each other and committed themselves to a
nuclear-free Korean peninsula (backed up by “full-scope
safeguards”) and the goal of peaceful reunification.
On June 26, the U.S. launched a missile attack against Iraq in
retaliation for an attempt to assassinate former President George
Bush while he visited Kuwait in April. U.S. ships in the Red
Sea and Persian Gulf fired 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the
main headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service in downtown
Baghdad. Three days later an American warplane fired a
46
missile at an Iraqi antiaircraft artillery site as Iraqi forces
continued to interfere with U.S. patrols of the no-flight zone in
southern Iraq.
Haitian
Intervention
18 Oct 1993 29 Sep 1994
4016
HAI, ARG,
CAN, DOM,
FRN, NTH,
UKG
1
3
On September 30th, 1991, Haiti’s first democratically elected
president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a bloody
coup led by General Raoul Cedras. This happened to be poor
timing on the part of the generals, because just a few months
earlier members of the Organization of American States (OAS)
had met in Santiago, Chile and pledged to protect all democratic
governments in the region from internal and external
subversion. Not surprisingly, Aristide used the OAS to rally
international support behind the use of coercive measures to
restore his regime to power. Over the next two years, the
international community, led by the United States, ratcheted up
pressure on the illegitimate military government in Haiti,
eventually imposing sanctions. While the sanctions had little
effect on the generals’ resolve to hold onto power, they
decimated Haiti’s economy causing thousands of Haitians to
seek a better life
in
the
United
States.
As the economic and humanitarian situation worsened, and with
thousands of refugees drifting towards the United States, the
UN Security Council unanimously adopted (China and Brazil
abstained) resolution 940 on July 31st 1994, authorizing the
United States to “use all necessary means” to remove the
military leadership. On September 17, as the initial deployments
of the American invasion force were on their way to Haiti,
former President Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Join
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and Senate Armed Services
Committee Chairman Sam Nunn persuaded the junta to give up.
The coup leaders were forced to leave Haiti, and Aristide
returned to power in mid-October.
47
Agreed
Framework Crisis
5 Nov 1993 2 Nov 1994
4022
AUL, CAN,
JPN, ROK,
PRK
2
2
NATO Airstrike
Threat
23 Apr 1994 5 May 1994
4046
MAC, YUG
1
3
On November 5th, 1993, President Clinton announced that he
would seek to impose sanctions on North Korea via the UN
Security Council if North Korea refused to allow inspections of
its nuclear facilities. North Korea agreed to limited inspections
at Yongbyon, and the United States and South Korea suspended
their annual “Team Spirit” military exercises, but subsequent
negotiations failed to produce a deal. On March 21, 1994, the
IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution holding North
Korea to be in “further non-compliance” with its safeguards
agreements and referred the matter to the UN Security Council.
On March 31, the Security Council asked North and South
Korea to renew discussions for implementing a joint declaration
on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. North Korea
denounced the statement as containing “unjustifiable demands”
and threatened to regard sanctions as a declaration of war. In
May, the United States resumed joint military exercises between
U.S. and South Korea, augmented U.S. offensive capabilities
based on South Korea, and updated a war-plan for surgical
strikes on Yongbyon and a massive U.S. and South Korean
attack to capture Pyongyang (Lee 2006, 170). In June, the UN
Security Council drafted a resolution to impose economic and
diplomatic sanctions against North Korea. North Korea initially
threatened to wage war than yield to international pressure, but
Chinese leaders, alarmed at the escalating crisis, urged North
Korea to resume negotiations with the United States and
suggested that it might refrain from vetoing the sanctions
resolution. In mid-June, former president Jimmy Carter
traveled to Pyongyang with the Clinton administration’s tacit
approval and negotiated a deal in which the United States would
commit not to launch a nuclear attack against North Korea and
provide light-water reactors in exchange for a North Korean
pledge to freeze its nuclear program and allow inspectors to
remain at Yongbyon. U.S.-North Korean negotiations resumed
in Geneva and culminated in the Agreed Framework signed by
both sides on October 21.
NATO allies warned Bosnian Serb forces that they would face
air strikes within a 12-mile radius of the Bosnian city of
Gorazde unless they immediately stopped their attacks. See
analysis of Bosnian War in main text for description of U.S.
48
decisionmaking process.
Iraq Coercion
2 Aug 1994 9 Oct 1995
4269
IRQ, BAH,
FRN, KUW,
OMA, UAE,
UKG
1
3
Iraq Ships
Incident
1 Dec 1994 1 Dec 1994
4270
IRQ
1
3
North Korea
Helicopter Attack
17 Dec 1994 Jun 1999
4087
JPN, ROK, PRK
2
3
1995/96 Taiwan
Straits Crisis
Syria Bombings
19 Dec 1995 28 Mar 1996
Jun 1996 Jun 1996
4064
TAW, CHN
3
3
4190
TUR, SYR
1
0
Iraq Invades
Kurdish Region
30 Aug1996 4 Nov1996
4271
IRQ, KUW,
UKG
1
3
U.S. policy moved from containing Iraq to one of outright
strangulation and attempting to topple Saddam Hussein. The
change in policy included stepping up military maneuvers and
sending U.S. diplomatic delegations to try to persuade Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait to help isolate Iraq. These countries
refused to close their border with Iraq, and meanwhile Saddam
Hussein reorganized his Government, shifting some power from
his family circle to old figures of the governing Baath party.
The U.S. Navy stopped and boarded two Iraqi vessels in the
Persian Gulf suspected of violating the embargo imposed after
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. After the Iraqi vessels refused to
stop, U.S. commandos forced their way on board. The two
ships were not carrying oil or contraband and were let go.
A U.S. helicopter strayed over North Korea and was shot down,
killing one of the two pilots. North Korea refused to release the
surviving pilot, leading to a diplomatic standoff, which
threatened to undermine the ongoing nuclear negotiations.
After 13 days, the pilot was released after the U.S. signed an
apology for violating North Korea’s territory. The U.S.
government claimed the helicopter had inadvertently veered off
course into North Korean airspace; North Korea accused the
United States of spying.
See main text
Syria denied that there were a series of explosions in Damascus
in May, which U.S. and other countries' diplomats said took
place. There was speculation that the blasts were carried out by
people loyal to Turkey.
After detecting threatening movements by Iraqi troops against
Kurdish districts in the north, the United States stepped up its
military activity in the region on August 30th, ordering its
forces to be ready to deploy if needed. Intelligence reports
suggested that Iraq had amassed 30,000 to 40,000 troops inside
the Kurdish zone in northern Iraq, which is under United
Nations protection. On August 31st, Iraqi armored divisions
49
Russian Nuclear
Test
15 Aug 1997
15 Feb 1998
4174
RUS
1
0
Iran-Iraq Crisis
3 Oct 1997 3 Oct 1997
4216
IRN
1
3
2003 Iraq War
10 Oct 1997 2 May 2003
4273
IRQ, TUR
EGY, FRN
GMY, GRC
ITA, JOR
NTH, UAE
ISR, KUW
SAU, UKG
ISR, KUW
AUL, UAE
SAU, BAH
NTH, OMA
QAT, POL
1
3
seized an important city in the Kurdish enclave. President
Clinton sent in U.S. reinforcements on the 31st, and U.S. forces
began launching missile strikes against Iraq's southern air
defenses days alter (For a brief analysis of U.S. decisionmaking
in this crisis, see Hall, Hendrickson, and Polak 2013, 43-46).
Russian detonated a nuclear weapon on a remote Arctic island
in spite of its support for an international moratorium on nuclear
tests. Russian officials denied having tested a weapon, but U.S.
scientists reported a seismic event that could not be explained as
a natural phenomenon, such as an earthquake.
To prevent a war between Iran and Iraq, the U.S. sent an aircraft
carrier to the Persian Gulf ahead of schedule. The Clinton
administration described the move as a warning to Iran against
launching another round of air attacks on Iraq in violation of an
American-enforced no-flight zone over southern Iraq.
On March 19, 2003, U.S. and British forces launched Operation
Iraqi Freedom, an invasion intended to remove Saddam
Hussein’s regime from power. Since the mid-1990s, the United
States had sought to weaken Saddam’s regime through
sanctions, occasional bombings, and financing of various Iraqi
opposition movements. After the terrorist attacks on 9/11,
however, the administration concluded that Saddam’s regime,
believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction,
constituted a vital threat to the United States.
Numerous studies attempt to explain why the Bush
administration launched what is generally regarded as a costly
war of choice, though none characterize it as a case of
entanglement. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007, ch. 8), argue that
pressure from the “Israel lobby” was a critical factor in pushing
the United States to invade Iraq. In this view, prominent Israeli
officials joined forces with American neoconservatives in
government (e.g. Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feithe, Richard
Perle, Kenneth Adelman, John Bolton, David Wurmser, Elliot
Abrams, and Scooter Libby) and in the media (e.g. Robert
Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, and William Kristol) to help sell
the invasion to the Bush administration and the American
people by lobbying members of Congress and by writing
intelligence reports, open letters, and op-eds that hyped Iraq’s
50
nuclear weapons program and portrayed Saddam Hussein as
irrational and undeterrable. This activity increased significantly
in the spring of 2002, but Mearsheimer and Walt also show that
many of these same figures had worked assiduously since the
1990s to bring U.S. pressure on Iraq and to make regime change
there official U.S. government policy.
According to
Mearsheimer and Walt, it was the efforts of the Israel lobby
combined with the shock of 9/11 that explains why President
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney became strong
proponents of invading Iraq. The Israel lobby was thus a
necessary, though not sufficient, cause of the Iraq War.
Mearsheimer and Walt do not characterize the Israel lobby’s
influence as a form of alliance entanglement, but one could
argue that the lobby is an appendage of the de facto U.S.-Israeli
alliance and that the existence of the alliance itself made it
easier for the lobby to sell the Bush administration on invading
Iraq.
On the other hand, it is not clear that Mearsheimer and Walt
themselves would agree with such a characterization. After all,
they point out that the neoconservatives, who they regard as the
“driving force behind the Iraq war” (Mearsheimer and Walt
2007, 238), genuinely believed that their grand strategic
worldview served U.S. interests: “The prowar faction believed
that removing Saddam would improve America’s and Israel’s
strategic position and launch a process of regional
transformation that would benefit the United States and Israel
alike…to be clear, the individuals and groups that pushed for
war believed it would benefit both Israel and the United States,
and they certainly did not anticipate the debacle that ultimately
occurred.” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 230-231).
Subsequent studies have reinforced this claim by showing that
neoconservates prioritize U.S. national interests over the
concerns and interests of other countries, including U.S. allies
(Flibbert 2006; Lind 2012). Waxman (2009, 5-6), for example,
surveys neoconservative literature as well as secondary studies
on the evolution of the neoconservative movement and
concludes:
51
“While neoconservatives are deeply committed to
Israel’s security and well-being—as are many other
Americans of different political orientations (especially,
most American Jews)—this does not mean that the
foreign policies they favor are derived from this
commitment. The ‘‘war for Israel’’ critique exaggerates
the importance of Israel to neoconservatives, placing
Israel’s security at the top of the neoconservatives’
foreign policy agenda. This is a serious
misunderstanding of the neoconservative worldview.
Israel is not the focus of neoconservative thought
(Jewish or otherwise). However much neoconservatives
may care about Israel, it is American interests rather
than Israeli ones that matter most to them.
Neoconservatism is a profoundly American political
ideology. It is concerned above all with the United
States, its interests, values, power, and global role. It is
based upon a belief in American goodness and in
America’s global mission (in a moralistic sense). It
regards the United States as the ‘‘benevolent global
hegemon’’ with unrivaled power which is must wield—
unilaterally and forcefully if necessary—to spread its
values around the world.”
Moreover, while Mearsheimer and Walt claim that the Israel
lobby played a necessary role in convincing Bush and Cheney
to invade Iraq, subsequent research suggests that Bush and
Cheney wanted to invade Iraq all along and needed little
convincing to do so after 9/11 (Slater 2012; Betts 2006; Gelb
2007; Jervis 2003; Record 2008). Recent studies do not agree
on why both leaders were intent on removing Saddam from
power – some stress Saddam’s pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction (Debs and Monteiro 2014; Jervis 2010; Jervis 2012;
Lake 2010/11); others stress Cheney’s longstanding interest in
asserting U.S. primacy (Cramer and Duggan 2012b), still others
emphasize Bush’s personal characteristics, such as his personal
grudge against Saddam for trying to assassinate his father,
George H.W. Bush, his desire to “finish the job” that his father
started, and his belief that God had put him on earth to
transform the Middle East (Lake 2010/11, 27; Jervis 2006, 15;
52
Haar 2010 979-980; Renshon 2005; Rothkopf 2005), still other
studies stress oil interests (Klare 2012; Duffield 2012. For a
critique, see Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 253-255), and finally
others focus on American liberal culture (Monten 2005; Desch
2007). All of these studies, however, conclude that Bush and
Cheney had been interested in toppling Saddam’s regime for at
least a decade before coning to power and that 9/11 was
sufficient to cause them to prioritize this goal and enable them
to rally public and congressional support for an invasion (On
9/11 as a sufficient condition for causing Bush and Cheney to
push for invasion, see Recchia 2011, 368-376).
Further casting doubt on the relevance of entanglement in the
Iraq case is the fact that many pro-Israel groups and the Israeli
government did not lobby the Bush administration particularly
hard for an invasion. As Mearsheimer and Walt (2007, 241242) point out, “there was disagreement [among pro-Israel
groups in the United States] about how vocal they should be in
backing [a U.S. invasion of Iraq]. The main concern was the
fear that too open support for an invasion would make it look
like the war was being fought for Israel’s sake…Organizations
like AIPAC and the ADL also supported the war, but they did
so with minimum fanfare.” Some Israeli government officials,
such as Shimon Peres and Ariel Sharon, also limited their
support for an invasion because they did not want to create the
perception that Israel was pushing the United States into a war
and, perhaps, because they felt Iraq provided a valuable
counterweight to Iran, which posed a much greater threat to
Israeli security at the time (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 235).
Several studies have corroborated these points (Slater 2012,
106-109; Waxman 2010). For example, Waxman (2009, 9)
concludes:
“There was no effort made to rally the legions of proIsrael activists and no concerted media campaign to
drum up support for the war. Instead, there were a few
public state- ments in favor of war made by prominent
individuals in the American Jewish community and
allegedly some quiet behind-the-scenes lobbying of
53
members of Congress to vote in favor of the resolution
authorizing the use of force against Iraq in October
2002 (this has been denied by AIPAC officials; Frankel
2006). This hardly amounts to a major attempt to push
for war. At most, American Jewish organizations and
the pro-Israel Lobby gave their backing to the Bush
administration’s Iraq policy in the run-up to the war;
they were not responsible for this policy, nor did they
convince Congress, let alone the American public, to
support it... Israel’s attitude toward the Iraq war,
however, was actually more ambivalent than the ‘‘war
for Israel’’ critique suggests. Instead of being a
‘‘cheerleader’’ for a war with Iraq, Israel was a
halfhearted supporter. To be sure, some Israeli leaders
publicly advocated the need for regime change and a
pre-emptive military attack against Iraq; yet, privately,
Israeli officials counseled caution to their American
counterparts and tried to shift their attention to the
threat of Iran. Unlike the Bush administration, the
Sharon government was not fixated on Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq. Iran, not Iraq, was of much greater
concern for Israel. Nevertheless, perceiving the Bush
administration’s determination to overthrow Saddam
Hussein’s regime, Sharon’s government supported the
war out of a combination of loyalty and hope. All the
while, Israel harbored serious doubts and misgivings
about the U.S. plan for regime change in Iraq. It went
along with the war, but it certainly did not actively seek
it.”
In sum, the existing literature on the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq
focuses overwhelmingly on the threat perceptions of the Bush
administration after 9/11 rather than alliance concerns. The
editors of a recent volume on the war conclude that the
literature
“has largely moved on from a focus on
neoconservatives to a “second draft” of history, much
more concerned with understanding the top leaders of
Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush, including their strong
54
desires to invade Iraq prior to 9/11….From our view
today we believe that while there was significant
support for Israel lobby-type arguments in 2006 and
beyond, this support seems to have significantly
faded…It is not that Israel was not important to many
neoconservatives, it is more that assessments of the
importance of the top leaders of Cheney, Rumsfeld and
Bush has increased, especially as it has become clear
that the top leaders likely very much wanted to invade
Iraq prior to 9/11 and were thus not likely persuaded by
neoconservatives after 9/11 to invade. Instead, it
appears the top leaders did not have a way to build
support for this project before 9/11, and 9/11 created an
opportunity” (Cramer and Thrall 2012a, 3, 13).
Kosovo
Intervention
3 May 1998 10 Jun 1999
4137
YUG, CZR,
HUN, LIT,
POL, RUS,
GRC, LUX,
MAC, BEL,
CAN, DEN,
FRN, GMY,
ICE, ITA,
NOR, NTH,
POR, SPN,
TUR, UKG,
ALB
3
3
See main text
Sudan Cruise
Missile Strikes
20 Aug 1998
20 Aug 1998
4217
SUD
1
3
Afghanistan
Cruise Missile
Strikes
20 Aug 1998
20 Aug 1998
4227
AFG
1
3
The U.S. launched roughly 75 cruise missiles from ships in the
Arabian and Red Seas at targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan.
The targets were terrorist bases and a factory near the Sudanese
capital that the Clinton administration maintained produced
important components for making chemical weapons.
The U.S. launched roughly 75 cruise missiles from ships in the
Arabian and Red Seas at targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan.
The targets were terrorist bases and a factory near the Sudanese
capital that the Clinton administration maintained produced
important components for making chemical weapons.
55
Liberian Leader
Crisis
Sep 1998 Nov 1998
4254
LBR
1
1
Korean Fishing
Dispute
16 Jun 1999 18 Jul 1999
4125
ROK, PRK
2
3
Chinese Missile
Test
30 Jul 1999 Mar 2000
4088
TAW, CHN
3
0
Russian Tanker
Incident
2 Feb 2000 26 Apr 2000
4213
RUS
1
3
A Liberian opposition leader took refuge in the American
embassy compound, setting off a weeklong standoff in which
Liberian troops sprayed the embassy with gunfire. U.S.
officials had the opposition leader airlifted out of the country.
South Korean Navy ships attempted to push North Korean
fishing boats from South Korean to North Korean waters. After
a standoff lasting several days, South Korean ships sank a North
Korean torpedo boat and killed at least 20 North Korean sailors.
The U.S. sent an Aegis-class cruiser and a guided-missile
destroyer to the region in a display of force.
China announced that it successfully test-launched a new type
of long-range missile, and then it excoriated the United States
for selling military equipment to Taiwan in the middle of a
major diplomatic crisis, started on July 9 when Taiwanese
President Lee Teng-hui asserted that Taiwan would only talk
with China on the basis of special "state-to-state relations."
Two U.S. warships enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq seized a
Russian tanker in the Persian Gulf after boarding it and
discovering evidence that it might be smuggling oil out of
southern Iraq.
56
NATO threatens
to abandon
Albanians
21 Feb 2000 3 Apr 2000
4186
YUG, AUS,
AZE, BUL,
EST, FIN,
GRG, IRE,
JOR, LIT,
MOR, POR,
RUS, SLO,
SLV, SWD,
SWZ, UAE,
UKR, BEL,
CAN, CZR,
DEN, FRN,
GMY, GRC,
HUN, ICE,
LUX, NOR,
SPN, TUR,
UKG, ARG,
ITA, NTH,
POL, RUM
1
0
This MID stems from the Kosovo War, which I discuss in the
main text. Eight months after the NATO alliance claimed
victory in halting Serbian repression of Kosovar Albanians,
Kosovo was succumbing to an increase in violence and tension.
U.S. officials accused Albanian leaders of failing to stem ethnic
violence and hinted that NATO support for peace was
weakening as violence increased. The U.S. did not undertake
any military action.
Yugoslav
Elections
26 Sep 2000 29 Sep 2000
4298
CRO, YUG
1
0
?
17 Oct 2000 9 Nov 2000
21 Oct 2000 21 Oct 2000
4220
RUS
This MID stems from the Kosovo War, which I discuss in the
main text. The Clinton administration welcomed the election of
the Yugoslav opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, and
suggested that U.S. sanctions could be dropped, but warned that
it expected Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic to step down
peacefully.
?
4261
VEN
1
0
The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry accused two U.S. Coast
Guard cutters of incursions into Venezuela's waters. The U.S.
Embassy denied the accusation, saying that both ships, which
were used in counter-narcotics operations, were operating in
accordance with international maritime law.
Venezuelan Naval
Incident
57
Russia Espionage
Incident
26 Nov 2000
Dec 2000
4197
CAN, RUS
1
0
EP-3 Incident
1 Apr 2001 3 Jul 2001
4280
CHN
1
3
Taiwan Arms
Sales
25 Apr 2001 17 Aug 2001
4281
TAW, CHN
3
0
Afghanistan War
15 Sep 2001 15 Nov 2001
4283
AFG, GMY,
GRC, NTH,
POR, SPN,
TAJ, CAN,
FRN, TUR,
PAK, RUS,
UKG, UZB,
AUL
1
3
North Korean
Ship Searched
10 Dec 2002 11 Dec 2002
4451
SPN, PRK
1
2
A Moscow judge sentenced a U.S. businessman to 20 years at a
hard labor camp for spying. The man was a former naval
intelligence officer and was accused of obtaining secret plans
and technical reports for Russia's rocket-propelled torpedo. The
verdict marked the first espionage conviction against a
Westerner in Russia since the end of the Cold War. The Clinton
administration condemned the decision, and orchestrated the
prisoner's release a month later.
A U.S. Navy spy plane on a routine surveillance mission near
the Chinese coast, about 50 miles southeast of China's Hainan
island, collided with a Chinese fighter jet. The U.S. plane and
its 24 crew members made an emergency landing in China; the
Chinese jet crashed and the pilot was killed. The American
crew was held until the U.S. Government delivered a statement.
The phrasing of the statement was intentionally ambiguous,
allowing both sides to save face and defusing a potentially
volatile situation.
The Bush administration decided to offer Taiwan a range of
advanced weapons, including eight diesel submarines and four
guided-missile destroyers that China had long sought to block.
The U.S. did not offer the Taiwanese Aegis-equipped
destroyers.
In retaliation for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
U.S., British, Australian, French, and Afghan Northern Alliance
forces launched an invasion to dismantle the Al Qaeda
organization and topple the Taliban regime from power.
Two Spanish warships stopped a North Korean vessel suspected
of carrying Scud missiles to Yemen. The Spanish warships
escorted the ship to a Yemeni port where it was searched by the
US Navy. The ship was released after it was cleared by US
officials.
58
Afghan-Pakistan
Border
Skirmishes
30 Dec 2002 22 May 2005
4552
AFG, PAK
1
3
North Korean Air
Space Violation
21 Feb 2003 23 Sep 2003
4455
PRK
1
3
Iranian Air Space
Violation
22 Mar 2003 Jul 4 2003
4512
UKG, IRN
1
3
Indonesian
Waters Violation
3 Jul 2003 - 3
Jul 2003
4460
INS
1
2
Turkish Arrests
5 Jul 2003 - 6
Jul 2003
4516
TUR
1
3
The Afghanistan-Pakistan border was a source of tension for
Pakistani forces and Afghan-American forces. In several
instances, the Afghan military deployed additional troops to the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border to secure the frontier against
incursions by rebels from Pakistan. These border troops
periodically exchanged small-arms fire with Pakistani troops,
but it appears the localized conflicts were simple exchanges of
hostilities and not part of larger offensives. At the end of 2002,
the US military became increasingly involved, deploying its
own troops to the border with Pakistan and beginning direct
attacks against rebels in Pakistani territory.
Tension between the US and North Korea increased over North
Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The US military increased
its naval presence around the Korean peninsula with several
additional warships. North Korea responded with its own shows
of force in the waters of the Yellow Sea. In one incident, North
Korea mobilized several planes to chase off American planes
that had entered North Korean airspace.
During the USA-IRQ war of 2003 (MID 50202), there was a
concurrent MID between USA, UKG, and IRN. The MID began
on 3/22 when two USA missiles landed in Iranian territory and
US planes violated Iranian airspace while conducting combat
operations. This was met with the Iranian response that it would
use military force to repel any further incursions or
transgressions against the state. Later, on June 1, Iranian
authorities detained four US soldiers and 2 boats overnight.
About a month later, US forces detained two Iranian reporters
due to suspicious activity, which was protested by Iran. It is
unclear when or if the reporters were released.
On July 3, USA warships and planes briefly violated Indonesian
waters near the island of Java.
USA arrested 11 Turkish soldiers who were allegedly planning
to attack a Kurdish governor in northern Iraq. The soldiers were
released to the Turkish military the next day.
59
Iraqi-Syrian
Border
Skirmishes I
? Mar 2004 16 Apr 2004
4518
SYR
1
3
US forces in Iraq exchanged fire with Syrian border troops over
the Iraq- Syria border. No one was killed in the clash. A few
days later, US military forces increased the US troop presence
along the Iraq-Syria border to prevent incursions into Iraq by
Syrian troops and foreign fighters.
U.S.-Iranian
Skirmishes
14 Mar 2004 14 Mar 2004
4519
IRN
1
3
While questioning potential smugglers near the Iraqi town of
Tikrit, US forces were fired upon by Iranian border troops from
Iranian territory. US forces returned fire, killing one of the
Iranian troops.
U.S.-ROK Air
Defense
30 Apr 2004 30 Nov 2004
4465
PRK
3
2
Iranian Territory
Violation
19 Aug 2004
- 1 Jan 2005
4524
IRN
1
2
Drone Attack in
Pakistan I
8 May 2005 8 May 2005
4568
PAK
1
3
The US deployed new air defense batteries to the Korean DMZ
and sent a squadron of fighter jets for training. North Korea also
accused the US of repeated airspace violations by American spy
planes.
The underlying issue of this MID is the increasing hostilities
between the US and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program. In
August 2004, US warplanes violated Iranian airspace,
apparently to test the sensitivity of Iran’s anti- aircraft defense
system. In November, both a US cruiser and US warplanes
simultaneously violated Iranian territorial waters and airspace
briefly. In January 2005, US warplanes violated Iranian airspace
near Afghanistan, apparently spying on potential Iranian nuclear
sites. This prompted the Iranian military to threaten force to
repel all future incursions into Iranian territory.
US military drones attacked a suspected Al-Qaeda site in the
Waziristan region of northern Pakistan, resulting in multiple
militant and civilian casualties.
60
Iraqi-Syrian
Border
Skirmishes II
15 Jun 2005 22 Jul 2005
4527
SYR, IRQ
1
3
Drone Attack in
Pakistan II
30 Nov 2005
- 14 Jan 2006
4571
PAK
1
3
Drone Attack in
Pakistan III
30 Oct 2006 17 Dec 2010
4575
PAK
1
3
Raid on Iranian
Consulate
11 Jan 2007 11 Jun 2007
4535
IRN
1
3
Pakistani Air
Space Violation I
22 Jan 2007 27 Feb2007
4577
PAK
1
3
This MID is largely comprised of border skirmishes between
Syrian troops and US/Iraqi border forces, and various border
violations and shows of force by US forces hunting Iraqi
terrorists in Syria. In April, 2005, US and Iraqi forces clashed
with Syrian border troops who were apparently attempting to
provide covering fire for terrorists crossing the border into Iraq.
Following this incident, the US stepped up its operations in
Syrian territory, which resulted in both sides massing troops at
the Syrian-Iraqi border to stop crossings from either side. In
July 2005, US and Iraqi forces again clashed with Syrian border
troops briefly across the border, possibly mistaking the Syrian
troops for terrorists.
US military drones attacked several suspected Taliban and AlQaeda sites in the Waziristan region of northern Pakistan,
resulting in multiple militant and civilian casualties.
In a continuation of MID 4571/70509, US military drones
routinely attacked suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda sites in the
Waziristan region of northern Pakistan. These attacks resulted
in multiple militant and civilian casualties, but no military
fatalities.
This MID is largely comprised of a continuation of the
underlying issue between the US and Iran over Iran’s proposed
nuclear program. On January 11, US forces raided the Iranian
consulate in Iraq, seizing five of its staff and confiscating
documents. It is unknown when or if the Iranian officials were
released. Later, in March 2007, the US conducted combined
troop, naval, and aerial operations in the Persian Gulf as a show
of force against Iranian military operations in the area. A few
days later, on April 1, two US planes flew over southwestern
Iran at low altitudes.
American warplanes violated Pakistani airspace on two
occasions in operations against rebels based in Pakistan. During
one of the violations, the planes bombed Pakistani territory,
killing a paramilitary soldier.
61
U.S. Arrests in
Iraq
28 Aug 2007
- 29 Aug
2007
4538
IRN
1
3
Drone Attacks in
Afghanistan
29 Jan 2008 12 Mar 2009
4581
PAK
1
3
AC-130 Attacks
in Somalia
2 Mar 2008 2 Mar 2008
4397
SOM
1
3
Iraqi-Syrian
Border
Skirmishes II
26 Oct 2008 26 Oct 2008
4540
SYR
1
3
US helicopters and troops fired at several buildings five miles
inside Syrian territory near Syria’s border with Iraq in a bid to
root out insurgents operating in the region. According to Syrian
reports, several civilians were killed in the attack.
Iranian Drone
Incident
25 February
2009 - 25
February
2009
9 Mar 2009 19 Mar 2009
4543
IRN, IRQ
1
3
US forces in Iraq shot down an Iranian drone that violated Iraqi
airspace for over an hour.
4486
CHN
1
3
8 Jan 2010 –
8 Jan 2010
4506
VEN
1
2
Chinese vessels harassed a US oceanographic survey ship,
prompting the US to deploy a destroyer to escort and protect the
survey ship. In response, China deployed several warships to
both follow the US vessels and patrol the larger South China
Sea.
On 1/8/2010, Venezuela scrambled military jets to intercept a
U.S. military plane that it claimed violated Venezuelan airspace
for a total of 34 minutes on two occasions.
USS Impeccable
Incident
Venezuelan
Airspace
Violation
US forces in Iraq detained 8 Iranian men in Baghdad due to
their possession of unauthorized weapons. The men were
invited to Baghdad to discuss the building of a power plant. The
weapons were confiscated by US forces and the men were
released the next day following questioning. Iran protested the
seizure as an act of US aggression toward Iran.
During 2008 and 2009, US forces carried out several attacks
against suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda hideouts in the
mountainous regions of Pakistan near the Afghanistan border.
These attacks were mostly carried out through unmanned
drones, although, in some rare instances, the attacks were
conducted by manned helicopter gunships. On a few occassions,
Pakistani troops fired at these aerial forces, resulting in brief,
but deadly, clashes.
On March 2, 2008, US AC-130 gunships launched a missile
attack on a suspected Al-Qaida hideout in Doblai, Somalia,
killing 4 civilians.
62
Cheonan/Yeonpy
eong Incident
25 Jul 2010 26 Nov 2010
4483
ROK, PRK
3
2
Pakistani Air
Space Violation II
27 Sep 2010 26 Nov 2010
4598
PAK
1
3
The impetus of this particular MID was the joint US-ROK
military maneuvers in 2009, which North Korean strongly
protested. However, the larger underlying issues remain the
demarcation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and
continuing tension around the DMZ between PRK and ROK
(see MID 30201 and 30802). The majority of incidents involve
shows of force by North and South Korea, mostly via North
Korean warships crossing over the NLL. Several threats were
also made about increasing hostilities should such shows of
force happen. The MID reached a height when North Korean
forces shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, killing
several soldiers and resulting in an artillery clash between the
two sides. Ultimately, the hostilities between the countries
subsided to their normal level of intensity.
NATO air forces routinely entered Pakistan to launch air strikes
on suspected Taliban hideouts. In one incident, a NATO
helicopter engaged Pakistani soldiers at a border outpost after
the soldiers began firing, killing 3.
63
REFERENCES
Accinelli, Robert. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill,
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
———. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill, N.C.:
University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
———. ""A Thorn in the Side of Peace": The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands
Crisis." Chap. 4 In Re-Examiing the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, edited by
Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang, 106-40. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Avey, Paul C. "Confronting Soviet Power: U.S. Poliy During the Early Cold War." International Security
36, no. 4 (Spring 2012).
Aydin, Aysegul. Foreign Powers and Intervention in Armed Conflicts. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2012.
Bassett, Lawrence J., and Stephen E. Pelz. "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of
War." Chap. 9 In Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, edited by Thomas
Paterson. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Betts, Richard K. "The Political Support System for American Primacy." International Affairs 81, no. 1
(January 2006): 1-14.
Boyne, Walter J. The Two O'clock War: The 1973 Yom Kippur Conflictd and the Airlift That Saved
Israel. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002.
Chang, Gordon H. Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990.
Chang, Gordon H., and He Di. "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and
Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?". American Historical Review 98
(December 1993): 1500-24.
Christensen, Thomas J. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American
Conflict, 1947-1958. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
———. Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia. Princeton
Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011.
Clodfelter, Micheal. Warfare and Amred Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other
Figures, 1494-2007. 3 ed. New York: McFarland and Company, 2001.
Cohen, Warren I. The New Cambridge History of Foreign Relations. Vol. 4, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013.
Cramer, Jane Kellett. ""Just Cause" or Just Politics? U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Quantitative
Tests for Diversionary War." Armed Forces and Society 32, no. 2 (January 2006): 178-201.
Cramer, Jane K., and A. Trevor Thrall. "In Pursuit of Primacy: Why the United States Invaded Iraq."
Chap. 10 In Why the United States Invaded Iraq, edited by Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall.
N.Y.: Routledge, 2012.
———. "Introduction: Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?". Chap. 1 In Why Did the United States
Invade Iraq, edited by Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall. N.Y.: Routledge, 2012.
Debs, Alexandre, and Nuno P. Monteiro. "Known Unkowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War."
International Organization 68, no. 1 (January 2014): 1-31.
Desch, Michael C. "America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S.
Foreign Policy." International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007): 7-43.
Eliades, George C. . "Once More Unto the Breach: Eisenhower, Dulles, and Public Opinion During the
Offshore Islands Crisis of 1958." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 2, no. 4 (Winter 1993):
343-67.
Finkelstein, David M. Wasghington' Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-50: From Abandonement to Salvation.
Fairfax, V.A.: George Mason University Press, 1993.
Fish, Steven M. "The Berlin Blockade of 1948." In Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, edited
by Alexander L. George. Boulder, Colo.: University of Colorado Press, 1991.
Flibbert, Andrew. "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War."
Security Studies 15, no. 2 (April-June 2006): 310-52.
Folly, Martin H. "Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States, and the Genesis of the North
Atlantic Treaty." Diplomatic History 12 (Winter 1988).
Foot, Rosemary. The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 19501953. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985.
Fordham, Benjamin O., and Christopher C. Sarver. "Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Uses
of Force." International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 3 (September 2001): 455-66.
Fravel, M. Taylor. "Power Shifts and Escalation Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes."
International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 44-83.
Gallichio, Marc S. The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese
Empire. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
Gardner, Lloyd. "Commentary." In Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953,
edited by Bruce Cummings. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983.
Garver, John W. The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in
Asia. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.
Gavin, Francis J. Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age. New York: Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012.
Gat, Moshe. Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003.
Gelb, Leslie H. "Dual Loyalties." New York Times, September 23 2007.
George, Alexander L., and Richard Smoke. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
Glad, Betty. "The United States and Ronald Reagan." In Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East,
edited by Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin. N.Y.: Praeger, 1988.
Gordon, Leonard H.D. "United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait, 1954-1962." Journal
of American History 72, no. 3 (December 1985): 637-60.
Haar, Roberta. "Explaining George W. Bush's Adoption of the Neoconservative Agenda after 9/11."
Politics & Policy 38, no. 5 (October 2010): 965-90.
Hahn, Peter L. Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961.
Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.
Hall, Brett, Ryan C. Hendrickson, and Nathan M. Polak. "Diversionary American Military Actions?
American Military Strikes on Grenada and Iraq." Comparative Strategy 32, no. 1 (February 2013):
35-51.
Hallenbeck, Ralph A. Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon,
1982-1984. N.Y.: Praeger, 1991.
Hering, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. 4th ed. New York: McGrawHill, 2001.
Herring, George C. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
Jervis, Robert. "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4
(December 1980): 563-92.
———. "The Compulsive Empire." Foreign Policy, no. 137 (July/August 2003): 83-89.
———. "The Remaking of a Unipolar World." Washington Quarterly 29, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 7-19.
———. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2010.
———. "Explaining the War in Iraq." Chap. 2 In Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? , edited by Jane
K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall. N.Y.: Routledge, 2012.
Kaplan, Lawrence S. Nato before the Korean War, April 1949-June 1950. Kent, Ohio: Kent State
University Press, 2013.
Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. New York: Knopf,
1986.
Lafeber, Walter. The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750. Vol.
2, New York: Norton, 1994.
———. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006. 10th ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2008.
Lake, David A. "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War."
International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/11): 7-52.
Lee, Chae-Jin. A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas. Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2006.
Leffler, Melvyn P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the
Cold War. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992.
Leffler, Melvyn P., and Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. N.Y.: Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
Levin, Norman D., and Richard L. Sneider. "Korea in Postwar U.S. Security Policy." In The U.S.-South
Korean Alliance, edited by Gerald L. Curtis and Han Sung-joo. Lexington, Mass.:
LexingtonBooks, 1983.
Lind, Michael. "Neoconservatism and American Hegemony." Chap. 6 In Why Did the United States Invade
Iraq?, edited by Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall. N.Y.: Routledge, 2012.
Little, Douglas. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945. Chapel Hill,
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2008.
Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.
Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999.
Louis, William Roger. "Dulles, Suez, and the British." In John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold
War, edited by Richard H. Immerman. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1990.
Matray, James I. "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel
Decision in Korea." Journal of American History 66, no. 2 (September 1979).
May, Ernest. "Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
McMahon, Robert J. "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar
American Diplomacy*." Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (October 1991): 455-72.
Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. 1st ed. New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.
Monten, Jonathan. "Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S.
Strategy." International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 112-56.
———. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Grand
Strategy." International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 112-56.
Nahm, Andrew C. "United States and North Korea since 1945." Chap. 7 In Korean-American Relations,
1866-1997, edited by Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New
York Press, 1999.
Offner, Arnold A. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Oren, Michael B. . Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002.
Paige, Glenn D. The Korea Decision, June 24-30, 1950. New York: Free Press, 1968.
Parker, Richard B., ed. The October War: A Retrospective. Gainsville, Florid.: University Press of Florida,
2001.
Press, Daryl Grayson. Calculating Credibility : How Leaders Evaluate Military Threats. Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Pressman, Jeremy. Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics. Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.
Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967. 3rd ed.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2002.
Raines, Edgar F. The Rucksack War: Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983. Washington, D.C.: Center
of Military History, 2010.
Recchia, Stefano. "Limited Liability Multilateralism: The American Military, Armed Intervention, and
Ios." Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2011.
Record, Jeffrey. "Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq: Making Strategy after 9/11." Strategic
Studies Quarterly 2, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 63-92.
Renshon, Stanley A. "Presidential Address: George W. Bush's Cowboy Politics: An Inquiry." Political
Psychology 26, no. 4 (August 2005): 585-614.
Roehrig, Terence. From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea.
Lanham, M.D.: Lexington Books, 2006.
Rothkopf, David J. "Inside the Committee That Runs the World." Foreign Policy, no. 147 (March 2005):
30-40.
Schaller, Michael. The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1990.
Schoenbaum, David. The United States and the State of Israel. N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Schultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power, and the Victory of the American Ideal.
N.Y.: Macmillan, 1993.
Slater, Jerome. "Explaining the Iraq War: The Israel Lobby Theory." Chap. 5 In Why Did the United
States Invade Iraq?, edited by Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall. N.Y.: Routledge, 2012.
Stolper, Thomas. China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1985.
Stueck, William. The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950.
Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
Stueck, William The Korean War: An International History. Princetone, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1995.
Stueck, William. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1995.
Tierney, Dominic. "Multilateralism: America's Insurance Policy against Loss." European Journal of
International Relations 17, no. 4 (October 2010): 655-78.
Trachtenberg, Marc. "A "Wasting Asset": American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 19491954." International Security 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988/89): 5-49.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs of Harry S. Truman. Vol. 2, New York: Da Capo Press, 1956.
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992. New YOrk: Twayne,
1994.
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1987.
Waxman, Dov. "From Jerusalem to Baghdad? Israel and the War in Iraq." International Studies
Perspectives 10, no. 1 (February 2009): 1-17.
———. "The Israel Lobbies: A Survey of the Pro-Israel Community in the United States." Israel Studies
Forum 25, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 5-28.
Weathersby, Kathryn. "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War." Cold
War International History Bulletin 5 (1995).
Westerfield, H. Bradford. Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea. New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1955.
Zhang, Shu Guang. Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1948-1958.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992.