第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 The Efficient Markets Hypothesis The Demise of the Demon of Chance? Stephen J. Brown NYU Stern School of Business The 19th Annual Conference on Pacific Basin Finance, Economics, Accounting, and Management 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Major developments over last 40 years Portfolio theory 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Major developments over last 40 years Portfolio theory Asset pricing theory 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Major developments over last 40 years Portfolio theory Asset pricing theory Efficient Markets Hypothesis 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Major developments over last 40 years Portfolio theory Asset pricing theory Efficient Markets Hypothesis Corporate finance 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Major developments over last 40 years Portfolio theory Asset pricing theory Efficient Markets Hypothesis Corporate finance Derivative Securities, Fixed Income Analysis 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Major developments over last 40 years Portfolio theory Asset pricing theory Efficient Markets Hypothesis Corporate finance Derivative Securities, Fixed Income Analysis Market Microstructure 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Major developments over last 40 years Portfolio theory Asset pricing theory Efficient Markets Hypothesis Corporate finance Derivative Securities, Fixed Income Analysis Market Microstructure Behavioral Finance 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 The EMH was responsible for the GFC “Neo-liberal policy prescriptions flow from the core theoretical belief in the superiority of unregulated markets - particularly unregulated financial markets. These claims ultimately rest on the "efficient-markets hypothesis", which, in its strongest form, claims that financial-market prices, like stock-market prices, incorporate all available information, and therefore represent the best possible estimate of asset prices. It follows, therefore, that if markets are fully efficient and prices fully informed, there is no reason to believe that asset-price bubbles are probable; and if these do occur, markets will self-correct; and that there is therefore no justification for government intervention to stop them occurring” Kevin Rudd The Monthly 42 (February 2009) 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 The EMH was responsible for the GFC “The incredibly inaccurate efficient market theory was believed in totality by many of our financial leaders, and believed in part by almost all. It left our economic and government establishment sitting by confidently, even as a lethally dangerous combination of asset bubbles, lax controls, pernicious incentives and wickedly complicated instruments led to our current plight. ‘Surely, none of this could be happening in a rational, efficient world,’ they seemed to be thinking. And the absolutely worst part of this belief set was that it led to a chronic underestimation of the dangers of asset bubbles breaking.” Jeremy Grantham (quoted in the New York Times June 5, 2009) 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Grantham’s performance over GFC Sharpe Ratio Alpha (market benchmark) Alpha (Fama French 3 factor) GMO US Equity Allocation Fund; Class III Shares -0.284 -0.00288 (-0.94) -0.00264 (-0.80) GMO Tobacco-Free Core Fund; Class III Shares -0.268 -0.00215 (-0.71) -0.00261 (-0.81) GMO US Quality Equity Fund; Class VI Shares -0.245 -0.00113 (-0.31) -0.00043 (-0.11) GMO US Quality Equity Fund; Class V Shares -0.245 -0.00112 (-0.30) -0.00041 (-0.10) GMO US Quality Equity Fund; Class IV Shares -0.246 -0.00116 (-0.31) -0.00045 (-0.12) GMO US Quality Equity Fund; Class III Shares -0.247 -0.00121 (-0.33) -0.00050 (-0.13) GMO Tax-Managed US Equities Fund; Class III Shares -0.318 -0.00473 (-1.62) -0.00435 (-1.40) GMO US Growth Fund; Class M Shares -0.276 -0.00258 (-0.86) -0.00339 (-1.15) GMO US Core Equity Fund; Class M Shares -0.301 -0.00388 (-1.46) -0.00392 (-1.37) GMO US Core Equity Fund; Class VI Shares -0.295 -0.00353 (-1.32) -0.00355 (-1.23) GMO US Core Equity Fund; Class IV Shares -0.295 -0.00357 (-1.33) -0.00359 (-1.24) GMO US Core Equity Fund; Class III Shares -0.296 -0.00362 (-1.36) -0.00363 (-1.26) GMO US Intrinsic Value Fund; Class III Shares -0.353 -0.00736 (-2.44) -0.00708 (-2.30) GMO US Small/Mid Cap Growth Fund; Class III Shares -0.306 -0.00591 (-1.24) -0.00894 (-2.21) S&P500 Market -0.236 Data from August 07 – May 09 from CRSP Mutual Funds Database 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Efficient Markets Hypothesis No trader’s information gives them an advantage E rt | it , t E rt | t 0 If information zit is already incorporated in price E rt E rt | t zit 0 t 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Examples of EMH applications E rt E rt | t zt 0 t Weak form Efficient Markets Hypothesis 1 zt 0 1 Example: trading rule tests Does active management outperform passive benchmark? 1 Example: Event studies zt 0 What information releases are material to investors? 1 Semi-strong form EMH Empirical asset pricing sell hold buy bad news no news good news Example: Orthogonality condition in GMM zt "instruments " Can we explain cross sectional dispersion in required return? 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Efficient Markets Hypothesis E rt E rt | t zt 0 t Tests of Efficient Markets Hypothesis Does the market efficiently process information? What is information? Estimation of parameters Does the market efficiently price risk? What determines the cross section of expected returns? 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Efficient Markets Hypothesis E rt E rt | t zt 0 t 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Random Walk Hypothesis E rt E r rt 0 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Random Walk Hypothesis E rt E r rt E r 0 “The series looks like a ‘wandering’ one, almost as if once a week the Demon of Chance drew a random number from a symmetrical population of fixed dispersion and added it to the current price to determine the next week’s price” Kendall (1953) 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Random Walk Hypothesis E rt E r rt E r 0 Serial Correlation tests Variance ratio tests 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Random Walk Hypothesis E rt E r rt rt 0 Zero investment portfolio Serial Correlation tests Variance ratio tests Momentum 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Random Walk Hypothesis E rt E r rt 0 Well established statistical properties Strong assumption of stationarity Time varying conditional expectations not allowed Neither necessary nor sufficient for EMH 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Trading rule tests of EMH E rt E rt | t zt 0 t 1 zt 0 1 sell hold buy Timmerman (2007) survey Naïve models using past sample means hard to beat Recent financial data is most relevant Short lived episodes of limited predictability Predictability is not profitability Necessity: Do not consider all possible patterns of returns Sufficiency: Cannot profit if all markets rise and fall together 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Examining profitability Appearance of short term profitability .. Portfolio Nick Leeson Société Générale Jan 2008 Jérôme Kerviel Benchmark at the expense of significant downside risk (Goetzmann et al. 2008) 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 An important seminal reference … 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Trading Rules: Cowles 1933 Cowles, A., 1933 Can stock market forecasters forecast? Econometrica 1 309-325 William Peter Hamilton’s Track Record 1902-1929 Classify editorials as Sell, Hold or Buy Eˆ [rt E rt | t ] t 3.5% Return on DJI Novel bootstrap in strategy space 1 t 0 1 41 sell 74 hold 140 buy 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Trading rule predicting sign of excess return January 1970 - December 2005 Trading rule value S&P500 value Factor-augmented AR logit based on prior 120 month rolling window 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Cowles Bootstrap Jan 1970-Dec 2005 Annualized excess fund return Sharpe ratio of fund Sharpe ratio of S&P500 Peseran & Timmermann (1992) p-value Cowles bootstrap p-value 2.203% 0.063 0.049 4.83% 6.32% 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Standard Event Study approach EVENT rt1 u01 u11u21 … EVENT rt2 u02 u12u22 … EVENT rt3 u03 u13u23 … EVENT EVENT rt4 u05 u15u25 … u04 u14u24 … 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 t 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Fama Fisher Jensen and Roll Cumulative residuals around stock split Cumulative average residual - Um 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 Month relative to split - m 30 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 FFJR Redux Cumulative residuals around stock split Cumulative average residual - Um 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 Month relative to split - m 30 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 Bottom line: is EMH useful? For whom is the EMH true? Uninformed investors with limited capital? Large well informed and well endowed investors? Does it have practical implications? Benchmark comparisons for fund investors? What information is material to investors? Useful measures of risk and investment risk premia? 第十九屆亞太財務經濟會計及管理會議 The EMH was not responsible for GFC Banks invested in beta, thinking it was alpha They borrowed to invest in market risk Significant debt exposure at cusp of crisis Banks failed to predict the collapse of the market A direct implication of the EMH