Generating a simple yet comprehensive theory of public opinion as evaluated
through survey response is by no means an easy task. John Zaller and Stanley Feldman
hope to do just this while supporting their assumption that respondents to surveys do not
have defined preferences but “respond to survey questions on the basis of whatever ideas
are at the top of their heads at the moment of answering.” (579) Although Zaller and
Feldman’s work may seem plausible and was certainly within the skeptical nature of the
public opinion cannon at the time it was written, the authors are too quick to deem their
results indicative of personal conflict among attitudes held by the general public. Zaller
and Feldman’s results certainly indicate that Americans are ambivalent
on some questions that are relatively broad in scope, but the article
alone cannot prove much beyond that, also leaves itself susceptible to
criticisms of response bias. This is the thesis or topic sentence; it lays out the
course the rest of the paper will take, as well as my main argument, that the author’s
conclusions are not generalizable, and may be flawed due to response bias (response
bias, in a survey, occurs when respondents change their answers to questions in order to
please the person who is asking them).
The authors begin by questioning interpretations of traditional public opinion
research. Particularly Zaller and Feldman tease out the conflict between response
instability, which denotes the component of randomness in survey responses, and
response effects, which argues that survey questions do not simply shape public opinion
but also measure it. Zaller and Feldman conclude that the interplay between these two
public opinion phenomenon must be settled by “devis[ing] a theory that accommodates
both response instability and response effects.” (583) A series of axioms are then
constructed to support their overarching theory. These axioms, that most people are
ambivalent about issues, that responses are determined by immediate salient
considerations, and that a recent considerations are more likely to influence results, are
then verified with data and, in turn, lead the authors to conclude that individuals do not
hold true attitudes, but a series of inconsistent and often autonomous reactions that
change depending on questions asked.
Although Zaller and Feldman’s argument is persuasive, it seems
that, at its best, it is only a conditional argument. (This is my thesis or topic
sentence for this paragraph. Notice that it supports my thesis in the first paragraph,
notably, “Zaller and Feldman’s results certainly indicate that Americans are
ambivalent on some questions that are relatively broad in scope, but the article alone
cannot prove much beyond that.” This paragraph, therefore, will posit the conditional
nature of the study is responsible for its limited scope. It seems logical to assume, for
instance, the average American citizen does not hold stable preferences on relatively
abstract issues, such as the government making sure every person has a good standard of
living. However, it would seem foolish to extend this theory to more individual level
preferences, such as weather a citizen likes rap music more than rock or prefers classical
music to either one. To extend this simplistic model of public opinion to politics, it may
seem perfectly natural that one may hold conflicting opinions about their duty to help the
needy, but have very clear ideas about which presidential candidate (Republican or
Democrat) they will vote for. Therefore, it is not logical to conclude that the public holds
arbitrary opinions about all subjects. This final sentence is a conclusion of this topic.
This paragraph claims the authors did not account for the fact that abstract political
preferences may be more heavily influenced by response bias than simple political
questions.
Underscoring the conditionality of Zaller and Felman’s argument
is their limited methodology in terms of questions. The topic sentence in the
third paragraph indicates this argument will further explain the one presented in the
paragraph above. All of the questions asked dealt with social issues that, very often, are
seen as racially coded. These questions included inquiries into subjects’ feelings
regarding aid to blacks, and their thoughts concerning the government letting each person
get ahead on their own. There is nothing uncommon about the assumption that people
change the expression of their preferences based on their social situation. It is not
uncommon to think that racist whites, for example, would utilize a certain semantic at
home or with their white friends at a bar, and a different semantic coding when on the bus
with many people of mixed race. Even politicians give different responses to different
questions in front of different audiences. Now the paper is beginning to narrow its focus
while critically attacking very specific issues within the text. Furthermore, real world
examples are being introduced to further illustrate problems with the authors’ theory.
Applying this logic to A Simple Theory of the Survey Response, would lead one to
conclude that it would be perfectly natural for respondents to change their answers when
responding to questions regarding “letting each person get ahead on their own,” or that
these responses would change on the heels of other questions pertaining to black issues.
It seems natural for respondents to change their answers to be more socially acceptable at
the time. Therefore, it seems completely plausible that the ambivalence demonstrated by
Zaller and Feldman was generated by a response bias because of the limited nature of the
questions. To further investigate this issue, a study could be conducted that utilized the
same methodology but broadened the diversity of questions beyond those discussed in the
article. The paper does not end with a conclusion about the article, or how I feel about
it. Instead, it ends with concrete suggestions of how the study could be improved, or
ideas for further research.
Works Cited