Belief Systems and Information Search in International Relations:

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Belief Systems and Information Search
in International Relations:
An Experimental “Information Board” Study
David L. Rousseau
Department of Political Science
University of Pennsylvania
17 November 2003
Threat Perception In International Relations
• Realism
• Liberalism
• Constructivism
Do both ideas and material factors matter?
If so, can you determine the relative power of each?
Sequential Decision Strategies
Version A
Q1: Do we have
different identities?
Version B
No
None
Yes
High
Yes
Q2: Do they have the
capacity to hurt my country?
No
No
Q2: Do they have the
capacity to hurt my country?
Low
Medium
Yes
Yes
Q3: Do our countries have a
history of armed conflict?
No
Q3: Do our countries have a
history of armed conflict?
No
Medium
Low
Yes
Q1: Do we have
different identities?
No
Yes
High
None
Hypotheses
H1:
H2:
H3:
H4:
H5a:
H5b:
H6:
H7:
Strong Realist Beliefs
Strong Realist Beliefs
Strong Realist Beliefs
Non-Realist Beliefs
Strong Realist Beliefs
Non-Realist Beliefs
Averaging Decision Rule
Sequential Decision Rule
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
Threat Perception
Seek Material Information
Seek Balance of Forces Info
Seek Regime Type Info
Exit After Balance of Forces Info
Exit After Regime Type Info
Number of Panels Viewed
Updating After the First Panel
Beliefs in International Relations:
Liberals vs. Realists
• Utility of Military Force
• Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism
• States: Aggressive vs. Status Quo
• Goals: Competing vs. Complementary
• Effectiveness of International Organizations
• Trustworthiness of States
• Equitable vs. Power Maximizing Solutions
• Fungibility of Power
Liberal-Realist Index From Survey
• 10 Survey Questions Administered Two Weeks Prior
• Theoretic Range: -20 to +20
• Mean: -2
• Sensitivity Analysis: ¼, ⅓, and ½
.12
Percentage in the Interval
.1
.08
.06
.04
.02
0
-10
-5
0
Liberal (low)-Realist (high) Index
5
10
Decision Boards
A1:
Containment
D1:
Political
D2:
Military
D3:
Economic
D4:
Diplomatic
A2:
Do
Nothing
A3:
Sanctions
A4:
Use of
Force
From Mintz et al. 1997
Results for H1
Table 1: Beliefs and the Initial Assessment of Threat
Initial
Assessment
Not a Threat
Threat
Total
Belief System
Non-Realist
Realist
------------77%
73%
23%
------100%
Chi Square=0.44, Probability =0.507
27%
------100%
(n=264)
Results for H2
Table 2: Beliefs and the First Box Accessed From the Information Board
First
Box
Ideational
Material
Total
Belief System
Non-Realist
Realist
------------53%
47%
47%
------100%
Chi Square=0.73, Probability =0.394
53%
------100%
(n=264)
Results for H3
Table 3: Beliefs and Accessing Balance of Forces Information
First
Box
Other
Balance of Forces
Total
Belief System
Non-Realist
Realist
------------78%
68%
22%
------100%
Chi Square=2.75, Probability =0.097
32%
------100%
(n=264)
Results for H4
Table 4: Beliefs and Accessing Regime Type Information
First
Box
Other
Regime Type
Total
Belief System
Non-Realist
Realist
------------65%
88%
35%
------100%
12%
------100%
Chi Square=12.37, Probability <0.001
(n=264)
Results for H5, H6, and H7
H5a: Reject: Strong Realists do not exit immediately after Power.
H5b: Reject: Non-Realists do not exit immediately after Regime Type.
H6: Strong Support: Subjects visit the same panels.
H7: Weak Support: First panel is important but not decisive.
Problems with Current Study
Need More Pressing Time Constraints
Information Search is Too Manageable
Explore with Non-Computer Format
Remove Radio Buttons From Update Panel
Vary Information Using Split Ballot Design
.4
Percentage in the Interval
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
.3
.2
.1
0
0
5
10
15
20
Number of Panels Access By Subject
25
30
Conclusions
• No Support for Sequential Model
• Both Ideas and Material Factors Used in Decision
• Interim Report: More Extensive Testing Required
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