Towards ‘Brexit’?
The Politics of
EU Referendum
Campaigns
15 March 2016
Kai Oppermann
54 EU Referendums
Triggering
Mechanisms
Governmental Discretion in
Triggering the Referendum (n=20)
No Governmental Discretion in
Triggering the Referendum (n=34)
Denmark 1986
France 1992, 2005
Luxembourg 2005
Spain 2005
Denmark 1992, 1993, 1998
Ireland 1987, 1992,
1998, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2009
Netherlands 2005
Accession to the EU
(n=20)
Åland Islands 1994
Cz ech Republic 2003
Finland 1994
M alta 2003
Norw ay 1972
Poland 2003
Sw eden 1994
Austr ia 1994
Croatia 2013
Denmark 1972
Estonia 2003
Hungary 2003
Ireland 1972
Latv ia 2003
Lithuania 2003
Norw ay 1994
Slov akia 2003
Slov enia 2003
Sw itz erland 1997, 2001
Specific Issues
(n=18)
France 1972
Britain 1975
G reece 2015
G reenland 1982
Italy 1989
Sw eden 2003
Sw itz erland 1972, 1992
Denmark 2000, 2015
Ireland 2012
Liechtenstein 1992, 1995
Sw itz erland 2000, 2005(2), 2009, 2014
Subject
Matter
Treaty Ratification
(n=16)
30 Discretionary Government Commitments
to EU Referendums
Referendums/
Referendum
Commitments
Referendums
Referendum Commitments
Treaty Ratification
Denmark 1986 (SEA)
France 1992 (Maastricht), 2005 (Constitutional Treaty)
Luxembourg 2005 (Constitutional Treaty)
Spain 2005 (Constitutional Treaty)
BRITAIN 2004 (CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY), 2010 (FUTURE
TREATY REVISIONS)
Portugal 2003 (Constitutional Treaty)
Czech Republic 2005 (Constitutional Treaty)
Poland 2005 (Constitutional Treaty)
Accession to the EU
Norway 1972 (Accession)
Finland 1994 (Accession)
Åland Islands 1994 (Accession)
Sweden 1994 (Accession)
Czech Republic 2003 (Accession)
Malta 2003 (Accession)
Poland 2003 (Accession)
Specific Issues
France 1972 (First Enlargement of EC)
BRITAIN 1975 (TERMS OF MEMBERSHIP)
Greece 2015 (Eurozone Bailout Package)
Greenland 1982 (Leaving the EC)
Italy 1989 (Constitution for Europe)
Sweden 2003 (Euro)
Switzerland 1972 (Free Trade Agreement), 1992 (EEA)
Subject
Matter
BRITAIN 1996 (EURO), 1997 (EURO), 2013 (MEMBERSHIP
OF EU)
France 2004 (Accession of Turkey)
Austria 2008 (Accession of Turkey)
The British ‘In or Out’ Referendum
in Comparative Perspective
 The EU is the “most voted-on issue” in the world (De
Vreese/Semetko 2004).
 The UK has seen more discretionary EU referendum
commitments than any other European country
o 1975 (Terms of membership), 1996 (Euro), 1997 (Euro), 2004
(TCE), 2010 (Future Treaty Revisions), 2013 (Membership)
o Strong domestic political incentives for governments to commit
to referendums
• Patterns of ‘open contestation’ on Europe: Public and
party-based Euroscepticism
• Permissive constitutional environment
 The only cases of ‘in or out’ referendums:
o The UK voted to remain in the EC in 1975
o Greenland voted to leave the EC in 1982
Six things we know about
EU referendum campaigns (I)
Referendum outcomes are hard to predict
 Current opinion polls do not allow
us to project the outcome.
 Referendum voting is less settled
than voting behaviour in general
elections.
 Party identification matters less,
campaign effects matter more.
 Of the 54 EU referendums: 12 went against the position
of the government.
 Expectations for UK ‘in or out’
referendum:
o Referendum campaign will update public information
about Britain in the EU.
Six things we know about
EU referendum campaigns (II)
Turnout matters
 EU Referendums have been won
or lost depending on the ability
of the two camps to mobilise.
o Examples: Irish referendums on Nice
(2001, 2002) and Lisbon (2008, 2009)
 Expectations for UK ‘in or out’
referendum:
o Strong mobilisation on both sides
o High turnout
o Unclear if ‘remain’ or ‘leave’ side will benefit from high
turnout
Six things we know about
EU referendum campaigns (III)
Establishment versus anti-establishment
 EU referendums tend to pitch the pro-European
establishment against the anti-establishment on the
Eurosceptic side.
 This binary structure tends to work
as a magnifying glass for the
Eurosceptic argument.
 Expectations for UK ‘in or out’
referendum:
o Establishment/anti-establishment
divide less clear cut than in most
previous EU referendums.
o The ‘leave’ camp still plays the anti-establishment card.
Six things we know about
EU referendum campaigns (IV)
Elite cues matter
 Elite cues matter more if camps are
united and if key figures are
well-trusted.
 Expectations for UK ‘in or out’
referendum:
o Conservative divisions weaken ‘remain’ cues.
o ‘Leave’ campaign divided over key message
and relationship to UKIP.
o Cameron is currently more trusted on the
referendum than key representatives of the
‘leave’ campaign.
Six things we know about
EU referendum campaigns (V)
Priming Effects
 Voters think about the question on the
ballot in terms of what is at the forefront
of their minds on voting day.
 Expectations for UK ‘in or out’
referendum:
o ‘Leave’ camp will benefit from high salience
of the immigration issue.
o ‘Remain’ camp will benefit from positive
economic outlook and general satisfaction
with the government (and if England does
well in the Euro 2016).
Six things we know about
EU referendum campaigns (VI)
Status quo bias
 Voters are risk averse and referendum
outcomes tend to be biased towards
the status quo.
 Expectations for UK ‘in or out’
referendum:
o Much of the referendum campaign will be about the
consequences of Brexit.
o The ‘remain’ side will emphasise the risks of leaving the EU.
o The ‘leave’ side will argue that change after Brexit will be
gradual and incremental.
o Voters will be more risk acceptant if they think they lose out
from the status quo.
Towards ‘Brexit’?
The ‘known knowns’ (and the ‘known unknowns’):
o Voting behavior in EU referendums is volatile: We
can’t predict the outcome from current opinion
polls.
o Turnout will be high: It is unclear whether this benefits
the ‘remain’ or the ‘leave’ side.
o The ‘leave’ campaign will try to portray the issue as
a debate between the establishment and the antiestablishment.
o Elite cues matter: The side which is seen as more
unified and which is more trusted benefits.
o The referendum outcome will be influenced by
whatever issue is most salient on voting day.
o Status quo bias: Much of the referendum debate will
be about the consequences and risks of Brexit.
Thank you!
K.Oppermann@sussex.ac.uk