Brexit, Migration, and Mobility
James Hampshire
Senior Lecturer in Politics
University of Sussex
8 March 2016
Britain in Europe
• Not in Schengen
= border controls
• Opt-in to JHA measures
= join EU migration policy on a case-bycase basis
• As part of EU single market
= free movement
• The difference the deal makes?
• In-work benefit; child benefit
• Unlikely to reduce migration
(Child benefit change may even
incentivise whole family movement)
Public opinion on immigration
• Public attitudes on immigration in general are:
• Negative: approximately ¾ of people in Britain favour reducing immigration.
• Salient: immigration is consistenly one of the top two most important issues
• Public attitudes to EU free movement are negative:
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51% of the British public want to end the free movement of people in the EU
59% want to stop EU migrants from accessing the NHS for free
68% favour reducing EU migrants’ access to welfare benefits
47% think the EU is ‘undermining Britain’s distinctive identity’
Source: British Social Attitudes, Curtice, How Deeply does Britain’s Euroscepticism Run?
2015
Source: Transatlantic Trends Immigration 2014
Net migration by nationality, 1991-2015
Immigration by nationality, 2014
Socio-demographic characteristics of A8 and
A2 migrants
• A8 migrants to the UK are:
• young: 53% <30, 85% <40 (Labour Force Survey)
• more highly educated than the British population
• high levels of employment (Drinkwater et al., 2009)
• mobile: high levels of return and circulation (Pollard
et al. 2008)
• highly responsive to labour market conditions, more
so than previous settlement migration
• disproportionately likely to be employed in low-skill,
low-wage sectors e.g. elementary trades or services
The Polski Sklep effect, or
Is it the economy, stupid?
• Are we barking up the wrong tree?
• Is this a matter of material interests or something
else? Perceptions and identity?
• Analysis of public attitudes on immigration in
general find that:
• identity is more important than interests as a
determinant of anti-immigrant attitudes (Sides and
Citrin 2007, Ivarsflaten 2005);
• to the extent that economic factors are important, it is
more socio-tropic concerns about the overall economy,
rather than egocentric concerns about an individual’s
own economic standing that influence attitudes.
• Information is very important: publics
overestimate the number of migrants by wide
margins, which hardens attitudes
• Is opposition as much about the perceived threat
of social and cultural change as economic impacts?
Source: Transatlantic Trends Immigration 2014
Culture and economics
• Many Britons perceive the EU as a cultural threat:
• 40% think the EU is ‘undermining Britain's cultural identity’
• Briton’s also have a weak sense of European identity (only 16%)
• But they are unpersuaded that leaving makes economic sense
• Impact on Britain's economy if Britain leaves the EU:
• Positive 24%, negative 40%
• Among those who think positive 72% support leaving, among those who think
negative just 6% support leave
• Concern about identity is the strongest predictor of ‘leave’
Source: British Social Attitudes, Curtice, How Deeply does Britain’s Euroscepticism Run? 2015
Migration after a Brexit
• Outside the EU, but in the EEA =
continued free movement for EU citizens.
• Very unlikely free trade without free
movement
• Outside EU and EEA = no free movement
• EU citizens treated as other immigrants
(NB EU15, A8 and A2)
• UK would have to loosen immigration policy
(Tiers 1-3) or accept reduced skilled
immigration levels in potentially damaging
ways (expect strong lobbying by business)
• And what about the 1.2 million Brits in the
EU? Bilateral negotiations would have to take
place on their residency rights.
• How would EU member states respond?