Chapter 11
Entry points for Security Sector Reform
in Francophone West Africa
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Introduction
This volume represents a first opportunity to analyse security sector
governance (SSG) dynamics within and across Francophone states in West
Africa. As reflected in Chapter 1, the framework of SSG provides new ways
of looking at these cases and, most importantly, of highlighting potential
avenues to support security sector reform (SSR). This, in turn, can assist the
important work of diverse national, regional and international stakeholders
seeking to promote more effective, well-managed and democratically
governed security sectors within these countries.
Sharing the French language, a common colonial history, inherited
institutions and similar political structures and cultures, these states can most
certainly be considered an important category for analysis in their own
right.1 Yet we also seek to move beyond the unhelpful notion of a ‘divide’ –
linguistic or otherwise – sometimes portrayed as running through the region.
Instead, this volume attempts to build bridges by shedding light on securityrelated issues that have not received attention within the countries in
question nor have they been the subject of critical analysis as part of the SSR
discourse.
In recent years, many states have become less able to provide basic
security to their population or to fend off opportunistic challenges by armed
groups. In addition to the more prominent crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, low
intensity armed conflicts persist in Mali, Niger and Senegal, despite
continuous efforts to resolve them. These conflict dynamics are exacerbated
by threats ranging from the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, an
increase in organised crime, cross-border trafficking in drugs, counterfeit
products, human beings and weapons. In effect, while many challenges
confronting West Africa cut across geographical and linguistic boundaries,2
unquestionably, certain dynamics may be particular to contemporary
256
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Francophone contexts. Three brief examples are illustrative. First, in Côte
d’Ivoire the delicate work of integrating two armies has been further
complicated by the bloody post-electoral crisis culminating in the overthrow
of former President Gbagbo in April 2011. Second, in the wake of political
turbulence and flagrant human rights abuses by elements of the security
sector, Guinea has become the focus of international attention to develop
options for SSR. Implementation of the recommendations contained in a
report submitted by a multi-stakeholder commission to the Guinean
authorities should guide the country in its SSR process. And third, after the
18 February 2010 coup d’état, which was justified by its leaders as a
legitimate response to the undemocratic practices of the former president,
Niger is now at least in a position to undertake the necessary reforms. The
new, democratically elected president must make SSR a priority in order to
break the vicious cycle of military intervention in national politics. These
snapshots highlight the complexity of reform settings in which technical and
political considerations are intertwined. SSG concerns are thus particularly
important as part of sensitive processes of democratic transition.
This concluding chapter begins by mapping key security actors
identified in the various country case studies. In order to move beyond
formalised notions of the security sector, particular emphasis is placed on
how individuals and communities experience security. It then considers how
the political dynamics of security sector governance impact on the space for
civil, democratic oversight over the security sector. Challenges to and entry
points for SSR are assessed. The chapter concludes by drawing out key
insights from this analysis and identifying elements of a future policy
research agenda.
Mapping the security sector in Francophone West Africa
A superficial overview of how security is provided in different Francophone
West African contexts would demonstrate a high level of uniformity across
actors, their mandates and roles. However, applying a people-centred
perspective leads to a qualitatively different set of questions and responses
by considering how men, women, girls and boys actually experience
security. This section considers evidence from the different case studies that
helps us to move beyond ‘blueprint’ notions of the security sector by
fleshing out the actual roles of state and non-state security actors in
providing security to citizens.
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
257
Understanding the security sector in a broad sense helps to highlight a
gap between the holistic concept outlined in the introductory chapter to this
volume and the reality that important security actors may be marginalised,
under-resourced or otherwise disempowered. This reflects a common trend
of governments investing in the armed forces (or a portion thereof) to fulfil
both external and internal security roles at the expense of domestic law
enforcement capacities and other key functions such as corrections and
customs services. The cause of this practice is the onus to shore up regime
security, resulting in the entrenchment of a political hierarchy in relations
between the army, gendarmerie and police (typically in that order) while
disregarding the security of individuals and communities.
The estrangement from the interests of communities and individuals
that results from the focus on regime security is aptly illustrated in
comparing police reforms in Mauritania with those in Benin and Burkina
Faso. In Mauritania, as N’Diaye notes, there has been additional investment
in the police, notably visible through increased recruitment levels. This
process has followed a logic based on racial (i.e. pro-Arab) and clan
affiliation. Additional capacities thus reflect and exacerbate the cleavages
within Mauritanian society, fitting the purpose of increasing the ability of the
police force to suppress political opposition.
In contrast, Loko points to the significance in Benin of the
development of a national security vision document that places strong
emphasis on public service delivery in the role of the police. A direct
outcome of this human security-driven approach was the elaboration of a
policy of decentralisation with the goal of building up municipal police
capacities closer to the needs of communities. A similar approach – also
consciously adopting the language of human security – is reflected in the
creation of Burkina Faso’s police de proximité.
Beyond state security providers, a profusion of armed non-state actors
including private security companies (PSCs), militias, vigilantes, or even
religiously inspired terrorist groups, as recently observed in Mauritania,
demonstrate the inherent complexity of national security architectures. In
Côte d’Ivoire a generalised sense of insecurity has favoured the exponential
rise of largely unregulated security companies in addition to often
ideologically driven or ethnically based militias. This diversity of, at best
loosely coordinated, actors complicate any solution to the crisis. In Guinea
under Sekou Touré, Bangoura links the creation of the first popular militia to
the need to provide balance against potential plotters in the armed forces. In
Togo, like Côte d’Ivoire, university students’ associations have been
politicised and securitised, reinforcing the central role in providing regime
258
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
security played by the armed forces and further blurring the boundaries of
the de facto security sector. The post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire has
starkly illustrated the grave consequences of instrumentalising the country’s
youth in this way.
In other countries, even with lower levels of insecurity than the cases
described above, PSCs have proliferated. In general, this development has
been welcomed as a commercial means to fill gaps in public security. Yet
across the region these entities – whether nationally or foreign owned –
operate in a regulatory vacuum. Details of their size, activities and work
methods are unclear so it is impossible, for better or worse, to gauge their
impact.
Informal and commercial actors present challenges for security sector
governance. Yet, it is evident that across the region non-state actors play an
important role in providing security to citizens in the absence of such
provision by the state. From a human security perspective, complementarity
as opposed to approaches that ignore legitimate non-state security provision
therefore offers a more promising principle that reflects the hybrid nature of
many societies.
Finally, if the state is unresponsive to the security needs of its citizens,
it is inevitable that they will take measures into their own hands through
commercial or informal arrangements. However, although only anecdotal
examples are cited by some contributors, references to the growth of mob
justice and vigilantism are nonetheless significant. Public lynching of thieves
is perhaps a logical response to the vulnerabilities experienced by citizens
(sometimes at the hands of the security sector itself). But it is also indicative
of a wider breakdown in national governance systems.
Political dynamics of security sector governance
If the nine cases studied in this volume reflect political, economic and social
trajectories that are, of course, distinct, our main (although not exclusive)
focus is on post-authoritarian democratic transitions. Some states retain
highly authoritarian political systems while others are governed by more
democratic dispensations. If a number of states were spared the devastation
of armed conflict, others are recovering from war and instability or are
struggling to prevent the start or aggravation of latent conflicts.
Nevertheless, there is also a remarkable consistency across the nine cases in
relation to the political dynamics underpinning security sector governance.
One basic reason is that SSR, through challenging the status quo in this most
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
259
sensitive area of public policy, inevitably implies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
Contributors closely in touch with local realities identify resistance to
change among national elites as the key obstacle to meaningful SSR
processes at the national level. In order to better understand these dynamics,
this section focuses on questions of political will for and against reform
across the nine cases.
From the early years of independence, West African states struggled
to be reconciled to their newly formed status within an international system
with its own dynamics and logic. This was evident when choices had to be
made on the very form of the state, economic development strategies and so
forth. Then as now, a particular challenge has been in the degree of
commitment shown by political leaders to carry out reforms that challenge
the vested interests of national elites. With respect to security, arguably the
central issue for many African states, these difficult steps include reversing
policies, practices and privileges that serve key actors within the security
sector. For this reason, the nature of national security decision-making has
consistently disempowered citizens. While this has proved a constant feature
of a number of states that became captured by authoritarianism or cycles of
conflict, it is also significant that this has been the case for others, despite
wider processes of democratisation that began in the 1990s. Thus, the
establishment of democratic security sector governance has remained an
elusive aspiration across most of the states analysed in this volume.
In many contexts, politicisation and the manipulation of ethnicity
within the security sector pose significant challenges. In states with
ethnically plural societies and armies with historical legacies of
politicisation, ethnic or regional rivalries, this problem has been particularly
acute. The consequences of such a Faustian bargain are illustrated by
Raphael Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire. Civilian elites who came to control the
state have politicised and instrumentalised the armed forces. In return, the
regime is captured by the same interests that keep it in power. Consequently,
there has been no imperative within the government to reform the security
sector since the start of the rebellion in 2002. Following the end of
hostilities, the various agreements to conduct disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration (DDR) and SSR have not been matched by a genuine
political commitment to relinquish tight executive control of the security
establishment. The presidential election supposed to end the long term
political stalemate was finally held but only served to throw back the crisis
into violent conflict. This dynamic makes SSR even more necessary. It
remains to be seen whether President Ouattara and his government will at
last initiate this process and make it a national priority.
260
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
In Mauritania, the distinct ethnic/cultural overtones that the security
sector displays and the thorough politicisation and Arabisation of the
military hierarchy likewise present a major obstruction to any effort to
introduce serious reforms. The strong ethnic bias towards the president’s
clan in the Togolese military – a consideration which shapes all promotions
and turns the official military hierarchy on its head – is particularly tenacious
because it taps into deeply rooted historical prejudices. Thus, according to
Toulabor, ethnic bias is legitimised as ‘the North’s turn’ after perceived
favouritism towards ethnic groups from the South of the country under
earlier heads of state.
Unsurprisingly, all contributors point to a conspicuous lack of political
will to truly carry out necessary reforms in the security sector and its
governance. Mauritania and (until recently) Guinea, are clear cut examples
of military regimes. N’Diaye and Bangoura argue that reform is stymied
because the military leaderships do not necessarily see reform as in their
narrow interests. In Togo, where a civilian leader has succeeded his long
reigning father, General Eyadema, Toulabor finds continuity in the tight
links between the Togolese security establishment and the political regime.
Yet although still hard to clearly discern, he identifies movements toward
altering the status quo and addressing the problematic nature of regime
security dynamics within a country that claims to be democratic, or at least
in a process of democratisation.
In Burkina Faso, a country that has remained mostly stable, the regime
has succeeded in the delicate balancing act of projecting the image of a
tolerant and open democratic political system while not ceding an inch on its
unquestioned control over the security sector. Positive dynamics can also be
found. Bayala explains the general ethnic harmony found in Burkina Faso as
in large part due to a culture of preserving good relations between different
groups through customary means.
The absence of inter-ethnic or political tensions within Benin and Mali
represent an important advantage according to Loko and Nimaga. These
positive dynamics seem to echo the South African experience with its
emphasis on transforming the ‘culture’ of security. Common to these cases is
that difficult political decisions were accepted as a result of a genuine
willingness among political and security elites as well as citizens to accept
change in a spirit of wider national interest. Thus, the 1990 national
conference in Benin was not just a forum for constitutional change but
involved the conscious withdrawal of the armed forces from political life as
a vital pre-condition for multiparty democracy. This is quite in contrast to
the ‘controlled’ democratic openings briefly experienced in Guinea and
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
261
Togo. However, even in countries such as Benin and Mali, where progress
toward more accountable government has been noticeable, it has remained
remarkably difficult to carry out far reaching SSR.
Senegal is conspicuous as the only country to have avoided overt
praetorianism, demonstrating a long tradition of remarkably good civilmilitary relations and the cultivation of a certain level of democratic
accountability. Yet within this propitious institutional framework,
Bagayoko-Penone points out that the country has witnessed unmistakable
authoritarian tendencies that have tended to instrumentalise security organs.
In the case of the national intelligence service, although changes have been
brought to its structure and orientation, she observes that reforms were
enacted without input from the parliament under the tight control of the
president. Bagayoko-Penone also points to the suspicion that a political
militia may have been formed by security services affiliated with the party of
President Abdoulaye Wade. Thus, even though Senegal is undeniably
progressive in its approach to security sector governance, close ties between
the executive and key security actors exist that are incompatible with the
necessary democratic control of the security sector.
In summary, despite significant changes in the political landscape of
the Francophone part of the sub-region, a conception of security continues to
predominate that conflates the security of the regime in power (or more
narrowly that of the head of state) with national security. Important moments
have in some cases been seized to reshape relationships and build confidence
between different stakeholders. Yet, in large part, a lack of participation in
security decision-making has only served to perpetuate cleavages between
executives, security providers and citizens.
The space for democratic oversight
Evidence from across the cases points to a singularly weak culture of free
speech on security issues, translating into a deficient knowledge base on
SSR and SSG. The limited discourse in many Francophone countries
coupled with a residual suspicion toward the SSR concept make it necessary
to raise awareness and create opportunities for dialogue between different
national stakeholders in order to build trust and avoid stereotype perceptions.
This section builds on insights into the political dynamics of security sector
governance by focusing on the character of security sector oversight and
accountability in Francophone West African states.
262
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Following the example of Senegal discussed above, it is objectively
the case that for every one of the nine countries considered in this volume,
intelligence services remain shrouded in the most opaque veil of secrecy. It
would be a suspicious breach of protocol to even invoke them and, even
worse, propose subjecting them to some level of transparency and
accountability as would be perfectly normal in a democracy. By the very
nature of their work, intelligence services are inevitably the most obscure
branch of the security sector. However, it is nonetheless indicative of a much
wider malaise that the promotion of democratic oversight can be not only a
somehow inappropriate occupation but also hazardous. Culturally ingrained
patterns of security sector non-governance are thus major considerations that
seem particularly prevalent in Francophone contexts.
National parliaments are widely acknowledged as key actors in
holding the security sector, and the executive branch as a whole, more
accountable to citizens. This is particularly true in respect of the rule of law
and human rights. Oversight of the use of funds is an important weapon in
the arsenal of parliamentary oversight functions over the security sector.
Through an inherent lack of transparency, the security sector is notably
vulnerable to accusations of corruption in relation to weapons and equipment
acquisitions for the armed forces.
Contributors identify a number of weaknesses in the actual oversight
role played by parliaments. Essentially, responsibility for security issues has
largely been left to the discretion of the executive branch. This is evident as
an issue of impunity (parliamentary committees rarely take the executive to
task on security issues) and as a fiscal issue (no real power of the purse is
held by parliaments). These challenges are evident in all the countries
studied. If the withdrawal of parliamentary immunity on the say of the
executive may explain this dynamic in Togo, even Senegal, a country with
an otherwise deep-rooted parliamentary culture, has essentially abdicated
this responsibility in the security sphere.
A lack of influence is compounded by the capacity and resource gaps
faced by parliaments. On one level, many parliaments suffer from
inadequate budgets and a lack of parliamentary staffer support. On another,
it must be acknowledged that an absence of security literacy may in some
cases be less a problem than analphabetism (or a lack of understanding of the
French language).
Judicial oversight is also constrained through both political
interference and resource constraints. Toulabor points to the debilitating
effect of the appointment of very junior party loyalists to senior positions
within the Togolese judiciary. Bangoura highlights how the credibility of the
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
263
Guinean judiciary was undermined by the fact that no independent judicial
inquiries followed the acts of murder and rape committed by members of the
armed forces against unarmed civilian protesters in September 2009.
Civil society organisations in many parts of the world contribute
expertise on security issues while also playing important security sector
oversight roles. National civil society organisations and the media in
Francophone West Africa have not focused on SSR. However, human rights
abuses and other examples of mistreatment of citizens by the security sector
are a frequent preoccupation, especially in strongly authoritarian regimes.
This issue therefore provides a potential entry point for discussions on SSR.
According to Nimaga, an image of the armed forces as endemically
corrupt is widely held in Mali, notwithstanding its positive record of civilmilitary relations. Increasing transparency and moving beyond the reflexive
utilisation of ‘secret defense’ can thus help re-orient negative perceptions of
the security sector. It is also important to acknowledge that both civil society
and media organisations have sometimes themselves been politicised and
instrumentalised to ‘justify the unjustifiable’ as Ouattara describes the
situation in Côte d’Ivoire. In the more propitious environment of Senegal,
Bagayoko-Penone notes that political influence has eroded the ability of the
media to question government behaviour. The re-orientation of values and
roles must therefore involve security providers, management and oversight
bodies.
Windows of opportunity for security sector reform
The analysis of the nine Francophone West African states makes it evident
that SSR processes are not likely to ‘just happen’. It is also clear that for
SSR to become a reality, a well-judged sense of timing and shrewdness in
seizing opportunities are required. Some entry points are therefore contextspecific and time bound. This section addresses entry points that require the
seizing of such a propitious moment.
A military coup took place in Niger in February 2010 as this volume
was being completed. This was justified by parts of the military as a means
to ‘save’ the country from political stalemate. Paradoxically, it may also
provide a unique opportunity to carry out, or at least to initiate reforms as a
crucial part of wider efforts to address the conditions that led to the coup in
the first place. In order to move on, the military transitional regime could
have critically examined the culture of coups d’état that seems to have taken
root in Niger’s security sector. This did not happen. It is now for the new,
264
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
democratically elected authorities to acknowledge and act on the need for
SSR which recent events certainly demonstrated as necessary.
In Mauritania, N’Diaye points out that unravelling the August 2008
coup by General Ould Abdel Aziz was a pre-condition for SSR to have a
chance of success. Mauritania’s window of opportunity therefore seems to
be closing with the legitimisation of the authors of the coup that ended its
democratic experiment. However, one entry point could be the prime
minister’s recent declaration about the willingness of his government to
carry out ‘a modernisation and professionalisation of armed and security
forces’ of the country.3 While it is not clear what was meant by the phrase in
the context of a regime led by a former commander of the state security body
(the BASEP),4 such a declaration of intention should certainly be seized
upon as a possible entry point to engage Mauritania on the road to a much
needed SSR process.
Efforts to end the political and military crisis in Côte d’Ivoire seem to
present national actors as well as the wider international community who
played an unprecedented role in the resolution of the 2010/2011 postelectoral crisis with an opportunity to integrate SSR as a necessary part of
any enduring political settlement. Certainly, a reorientation of the mission,
objectives and values of the security sector within a new national and
regional security policy framework is a critical requirement. Restating the
internal and external security roles of different formal actors and standing
down the various informal ‘patriotic’ militias will be essential. Most
importantly, there is an urgent need to initiate a national dialogue process in
order to build confidence and heal divisions that have emerged in all walks
of national life.
Peace agreements can help to resolve crises through introducing the
necessity of SSR as a logical corollary to DDR.5 Even in low intensity
conflicts that still afflict parts of Mali, Niger and Senegal, political solutions
can be designed that include an SSR component. In Guinea, thanks to the
providential 15 January 2010 Ouagadougou Declaration that afforded the
country a way out of its political and security crisis, a blueprint for SSR was
arrived at with the help of the international community.6 This document,
adopted by all stakeholders after an inclusive national debate, constitutes a
ready entry point for all willing to help its implementation.
States such as Benin and Mali were able to gain a head start on SSR
by taking advantage of a balance of power favourable to reformers during
their respective conférences nationales. Assisted through the critical role
played by civil society, they were able to create antecedents that still help
shape the role, management and oversight of the security sector. While these
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
265
countries also have their own SSR needs, the dynamic created by this
propitious environment should be emulated, for example taking advantage of
the états généraux de la sécurité Francophone states organise when a
security crisis or malaise warrant it. The political opening and rearrangement
that seems to be taking place in Togo could certainly benefit from the
experiences of Benin and Mali in altering the relationship between the
military and the political class and civil society more broadly.
SSR entry points
Many dynamics across the nine cases offer opportunities to build synergies
in promoting SSR across the countries of the sub-region. This sub-section
draws on the different contributions to highlight broader entry points for
SSR in Francophone West Africa.
1.
Expanding the SSR knowledge base
As many contributors have pointed out, there is a need to foster a broader
discourse on SSR issues at the national level. Gaps in knowledge and
appreciation represent a serious challenge to any attempt to mainstream SSR.
Francophone African countries have already lost ground on their
Anglophone counterparts through a hesitation to acknowledge the pertinence
of the SSR discourse. A clear French policy position on this issue was only
forthcoming in late 2008, closely followed by the Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). Since then, most Francophone West
African states have embraced SSR, at least in principle.
Misunderstandings by opponents and supporters alike remain a serious
impediment to SSR taking a more prominent place in national political
discourse. Opponents continue to misrepresent SSR as an externally imposed
construct that disempowers those best equipped and prepared for security
decision-making. Some supporters misconstrue SSR as an opportunity to
demonise the security sector. They too fail to acknowledge the necessity of a
sound security apparatus that is efficient and accountable yet enjoys respect
and a certain degree of autonomy. Mainstreaming a governance-driven
approach to SSR can help to bring these actors together and thus move
beyond ‘stovepiped’ approaches to different elements of the reform agenda.
The essential task of education and sensitisation can be supported by
the increasing number of think tanks and academic organisations and
institutions that are networking their support for SSR. Francophone West
266
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Africa may lack research and advocacy capacity specialising in security and
defence matters. However, a large number of civil society organisations have
accumulated valuable experience in human rights and international
humanitarian law matters. While not understood as ‘SSR’, the work of civil
society in these areas point to opportunities to shape curricula for training
and development to focus on the ethics of professionalism and service to the
citizen. Such activities thus constitute valuable entry points to support an
SSR agenda. Sponsorship and capacity building can help carry out activities
that include security sector education, sensitisation, and training.
2.
Building space for oversight
The need to build trust between state institutions, security services and
citizens is a common theme that runs through all the country case studies.
Contributors unanimously identify empowering formal and informal
oversight bodies as a means to embed a wider appreciation of security sector
governance concerns in the national political discourse. A critical institution
still struggling to narrow the knowledge, skill, and capacity deficits in many
areas vis-à-vis the executive branch, the parliament is a natural conduit for
SSR language, programmes, and activities. Indeed, its constitutionally
defined role makes it an indispensable entry point. Results from the training,
sensitisation and needs assessment programmes in West Africa carried out
by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) in conjunction with the OIF
point to wider opportunities within the sub-region. Similar efforts can be
undertaken to target ECOWAS parliamentarians and help the pursuit of SSR
at the regional level.
Contributors highlight support for civil society organisations as a
critical entry point. This can introduce and institutionalise the language and
policy of SSR at the national level as well as at the regional level where the
concept has already gained some traction. Civil society actors have been
active in pushing for more accountability from the security sector, often at
great risk to their individual members. The September 2009 massacre in
Guinea is perhaps the most visible recent example of the cost of protest. Yet
as Bangoura notes, it is also important to recognise that the national
assembly subsequently lifted the state of emergency through fear of
repercussions from citizens. In other words, there is power within civil
society even in the most constrained environments.
In many Francophone countries, civil-military relations commissions
or committees exist that are active in furthering dialogue and interface
between civilians and members of the armed forces. Often led by former
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
267
high-ranking military officers, they are trusted by the executive and security
sector hierarchies. These bodies often lack means to function and could be
supported as assets for the development of an SSR agenda.
3.
Filling public security gaps
While acknowledging the key responsibility of states in initiating and
guiding SSR processes, it becomes evident, particularly the further one
moves from capital cities, that non-state actors play a major role in providing
security and justice services to citizens. As discussed above, the positive
development of creating municipal police units in Benin and Burkina Faso
that can bridge formal and informal sectors at local level is undermined in
practice by the lack of available state funding. While acknowledging the
practical challenges of democratic oversight in relation to informal security
actors, seeking ways to link up these actors with state security providers may
be both cost-effective and offer the greatest pay offs in terms of improving
the security of individuals and communities.
A number of issues must be addressed in order to identify synergies
between state and non-state security actors as a component of SSR policies
and programmes. First, there is an insufficient level of detailed information.
Mapping the range of influential security and justice providers is therefore a
necessary precondition for designing effective reforms. Second, in some
cases a laissez-faire attitude to commercial security providers is apparent: if
private security companies fill gaps left by the state then this represents a
useful service. Such facile assumptions need to be critically examined
through additional focus on the accountability and oversight of PSCs. This
may point to the need for tighter national regulation or training. And third,
while solutions will always be context specific, approaches that seek to
promote the human security of individuals and communities must avoid a
commercial logic that establishes islands of safety for those that can pay,
surrounded by wider insecurity for those that cannot.
4.
Recasting national security frameworks
SSR processes need to be embedded within relevant policy and legal
frameworks. New national security policies, sectoral reviews, the revision of
existing but inadequate legislation and inter-agency cooperation mechanisms
all fall under this category. This is a challenging undertaking because where
policy frameworks do exist they have often remained frozen due to the sheer
complexity of the law making process, public sector inertia and, more
268
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
specifically, the reluctance of parliamentarians to engage in the security
field.
Revised policy frameworks are particularly important in order to
facilitate changes in security sector governance in contexts where authority
has traditionally been narrowly channelled through the head of state. Yet
even where this has not been the case, as in Burkina Faso and Mali,
executive organisational capacity for security sector management and
oversight is inadequate. Long traditions of security sector ‘self-control’ have
resulted in passive parliaments, executives unused to oversight and
disengaged civil societies.
It is critical that the roles of the various components of the security
sector are clearly delineated, codified and respected. A result of the mutually
dependant relationships that have developed between executive authorities
and different security actors is the absence of cooperation and coherence
across security sector entities. Blurring of roles and responsibilities as well
as unequal resource allocation has contributed to dynamics of animosity or
competition particularly prevalent between armed forces, gendarmerie and
police. In Benin and Burkina Faso this has resulted in an unhealthy spirit of
competition between the army and public security forces. Such dysfunctional
relations reached their nadir in Guinea with the armed forces used to
aggressively suppress protests by the police over terms and conditions.
5.
Investing in professionalisation
The civilian political class has a critical role to play in building an apolitical,
professional security sector. This means resisting the temptation to appeal to
the military to resolve political disputes and abstaining from injecting ethnic
manipulation or other patronage-based approaches into their relations with
the security sector. If the pernicious effects of politicisation and ethnicisation
within the security sector are to be reversed, there is a need to focus on
professionalisation at all levels. Criteria for recruitment must be reviewed in
nearly all the countries studied.
First and foremost, it is essential to instil a sense of professionalism
and apolitical attitude and behaviour among the senior ranks within the
security sector to avoid recurring military coups and the involvement of high
ranking officers, formally or informally, in the partisan political process. As
Toulabor points out, in Togo a silent majority of soldiers, gendarmes and
police exist that are deeply unhappy about the erosion of professionalism as
a result of politicisation. The exposure of ever increasing numbers of West
African soldiers to external influences through training abroad or
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
269
participation in peacekeeping missions also lends a fresh perspective to
conditions at home. This represents fertile ground from which to build
reforms.
On a different level, professionalisation has been adversely affected
by the absence of decent and fair working and living conditions for security
sector personnel. Particularly within the lower ranks, dismal working
conditions are often rationalised to explain unprofessional behaviour and
poor treatment of citizens. It is therefore essential that both national
authorities and international partners make every effort to ensure the
financial sustainability of reform programmes.
6.
Mainstreaming gender
Gender inequalities continue to be a major challenge throughout West
Africa. Therefore, mainstreaming gender considerations in SSR can provide
an important contribution to reform processes that reflect the human security
needs of all elements of society. To be sure, there are wide disparities when
it comes to taking this issue seriously into consideration.7 Uniquely,
Mauritania does not yet have a single female in the armed forces or the
gendarmerie and only recently started recruiting female police officers. All
the countries studied still have much in common, however, in part because
of the cultural traditions of society at large as well as, more importantly,
because of the institutional cultures of the security sector bodies themselves.
For example, while Cape Verde recently appointed a female minister of
defence and Liberia is making significant steps forward in mainstreaming
gender within the armed forces and police, the prospect of such
developments does not seem imminent in any of the Francophone countries
in the sub-region.
Differentiating the security needs of men, women, girls and boys is
essential in order to understand the causes of insecurity in a given context as
well as to identifying the wide range of actors (including women’s’
organisations and traditional security providers) that should be understood as
part of the security sector. Security sector sensitisation and training activities
are required to emphasise the practical benefits for coherence, morale and
effectiveness of utilising the full range of available human resources,
regardless of gender. In this respect, South-South experience sharing with
African security actors that have made steps forward in gender
mainstreaming can provide an important avenue to help shift entrenched
attitudes.
270
7.
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Operationalising a regional approach to SSR
Sub-regional harmonisation of the language, expectations and objectives of
SSR can help reinforce this agenda at the national level. All West African
states (with the notable exception of Mauritania, which withdrew from the
organisation in 2000) have taken steps towards a coherent regional security
framework within the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). While the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)
contains an explicit commitment to SSR, its implementation requires
political commitment at the national level.
A significant force multiplier effect of regional norms and standards
can be in helping to expand the space for discussion by reform advocates at
the national level. The ECOWAS Code of Conduct for Armed and Security
Forces offers important pay offs because of its integrationist dynamic. The
Code can help address key challenges identified in this volume through its
emphasis on fostering relations between armed and security forces as well as
on confidence building between civilians, the media and security actors.
With both the code and the ECPF moving from policy development to
operational phases, practical implementation of national political obligations
within states is essential.
Regionalism in West Africa has often foundered in the past on the
fraught relations between individual states. The ECPF provides a means to
reinvigorate a more coherent regional approach based on addressing
common security needs and challenges. Moreover, the commitment of the
OIF to the SSR/SSG agenda could provide a vehicle to promote a common
regional language that cuts across linguistic or other boundaries.
Conclusion
The case studies in this volume confirm that the challenges of security sector
governance facing Francophone countries are real, numerous and in some
instances, daunting. But they can and must be met. Even with the requisite
political will to engage in SSR, capacity gaps have meant that a
comprehensive, sustainable reform process could not be constructed without
the material and financial support of development partners. Yet no SSR
process, regardless how well supported by donors, will be sustainable if not
locally owned and driven.8 The SSR approach therefore should be
understood as representing a break from past forms of security assistance
that have focused more narrowly on training and equipping security
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
271
providers. A shared characteristic of Francophone countries in West Africa
is that since their independence, France, as the former colonial power, has
played a key role in their external and internal security policies. In some
cases, this role went well beyond cooperation and assistance to influence the
orientation and the choices made in the security domain.9 This highlights a
frequent tension between sovereignty and intervention that can undermine
externally-supported SSR. While local ownership remains a contested
concept,10 at a minimum it means that national stakeholders have the
opportunity and capacity to design and implement the SSR process. A major
challenge is to find a convergence between ownership and appropriate
international support. Obstacles to achieving this balance in practice are both
political and technical. The bottom line is that development partners must
apply SSR principles in practice and focus on capacity building activities
that can contribute to more transparent, accountable and effective security
sectors.
The cases analysed in this volume demonstrate a number of common
features in relation to institutional frameworks and organisational design.11
However, perhaps the most striking feature common to all West African
contexts is a culture of security sector ‘non-governance’. Regardless of the
available political space, which of course varies significantly from context to
context, there is a general lack of engagement by parliaments, the media,
civil society organisations and citizens on security matters. At the same time,
Francophone states offer significant, under-analysed examples of
transformation in relations between the security sector and citizens. This
apparent contradiction points to the need to further develop a discourse on
security sector governance within the region as a necessary pre-condition for
reform. Concretely, this means reinforcing the knowledge base and
capacities of those same formal and informal oversight actors that have not
played their rightful role to date in promoting transparency and
accountability in the security domain. It also means engaging in confidence
building activities that seek to bring citizens and security actors closer
together.
SSR requires the manifestation of political will in individual countries.
It also takes the collective determination of states to operationalise and
rapidly start implementing the pertinent dispositions of the ECPF, singularly
its article 72 which explicitly lays down objectives regarding security sector
governance. These objectives are determined to be:
272
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
[i] to eliminate threats to individual and group rights, safety, life, livelihoods,
and property, and the protection of the institutions and values of democratic
governance, human rights and the rule of law under a human security
umbrella; [ii] to orient the focus and capacities of individuals, groups and
institutions engaged in the security system to make them responsive and
responsible to democratic control and adhere to basic human rights and the
rule of law; [iii] to ensure the emergence and consolidation of accountable,
transparent and participatory security systems in Member States.
There is no doubt that these are indeed commendable objectives and that the
sub-region is in dire need of a political and security environment in which
they are genuinely and vigorously pursued. Supporting the national level
implementation of the ECPF and related initiatives such as the ECOWAS
Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces represent important steps
towards realising these objectives.
While primarily seeking to understand dynamics particular to
Francophone contexts, this volume underlines both old and new security
sector governance challenges for the region as a whole. The burgeoning top
down and bottom up privatisation of security represents a phenomenon
whose effects are neither recognised nor addressed across West Africa. A
necessary first step is therefore to map these actors and their roles in
different national contexts. This analysis will help to identify specific
requirements and options that may run from regulation to relationshipbuilding between public and private security providers.
An individual and collective sense of urgency is required and must be
reflected in determined efforts by West African stakeholders. This will
determine the success of SSR. However, the donor community, which has a
stake in SSR as a conflict prevention and political stabilisation mechanism,
must be involved. Concrete support will also be critical, even as it
acknowledges the imperative of local ownership. All actors must seize on
entry points that empower local actors and facilitate the start of pertinent,
timely processes and activities. Small and steady victories will contribute
towards the ultimate goal: a durably stable and peaceful West African
community of states and peoples with democratically governed security
sectors.
Entry points for Security Sector Reform in Francophone West Africa
273
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
See Boubacar N’Diaye, ‘Francophone Africa and Security Sector Transformation: Plus
Ça Change…’ African Security 2, no. 1 (2009): 1-29.
See Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye & ‘Funmi Olonisakin, Challenges of Security Sector
Governance in West Africa (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008).
See ‘Le premier ministre présente la Déclaration de Politique Générale du gouvernement
devant l'assemblée nationale’. Available at : http://www.mauritania.mr/fr/
Battalion pour la Sécurité Présidentielle.
See Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., Security Sector Reform in Challenging
Environments (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2009).
An SSR evaluation team of experts supervised by General Lamine Cissé on behalf of
ECOWAS and led by Professor Boubacar N’Diaye hammered out a consensus report that
was formally and officially handed to General Sékouba Konaté, Head of State and
President of the Transitional Authority that resulted from the Ouagadougou Declaration.
The report outlines a comprehensive, far-reaching security sector program for Guinea. Its
full implementation awaits the end of the transition.
See Miranda Gaanderse, Security for All : West Africa’s Good Practices on Gender in the
Security Sector, DCAF Report (Geneva: DCAF, 2010). Available at: www.dcaf.ch
For an authoritative definition of and argument for local ownership, see Laurie Nathan
‘The Challenge of Local Ownership of SSR: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice’ in Local
Ownership and Security Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais, 19-36 (Zurich: Lit Verlag,
2008).
See N’Diaye, ‘Francophone Africa…’, 2009.
Timothy Donais, ‘SSR Ownership: Theory and Practice’ in Local Ownership and Security
Sector Reform, ed. Timothy Donais, 9 (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2008).
For a detailed analysis of Francophone African institutional and organizational
particularities see: Kossi Agokla, Niagele Bagayoko and Boubacar N’Diaye, eds., La
Réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Organisation
Internationale de la Francophonie, 2010.