Chapter 1
Mapping Security Sector Governance in
Francophone West Africa
Alan Bryden and Boubacar N’Diaye
Introduction
A resurgence in the very unwelcome phenomenon of coups d’état in West
Africa highlights the importance of security sector governance (SSG) in
shaping moves towards more democratic political systems. Transitions from
authoritarian rule to more transparent, participative governance frameworks
are by no means uniform across West Africa. Each state’s transition takes
place within its own unique context and at its own pace. The authoritarian
nature of many civilian as well as military regimes has resulted in security
sector institutions becoming instruments for regime security. In these cases,
exploitation, repression and in some cases the abuse of human rights have
characterised the relationship between the security sector and the population.
Yet the region also contains many examples of increasingly tolerant and
pluralistic political systems that oversee a fairly well-managed security
apparatus. However, across the region efforts to enhance democratic
governance of the security sector have lagged far behind advances in other
areas of public policy. If this state of play is perhaps inevitable under
authoritarian regimes, it has also proved to be the case even where
democratic transitions have taken root.1
While African states have often been the subject of detailed casestudies covering various aspects of their governance, little systematic
research has been dedicated to the nature of SSG across the West African
sub-region as a whole. In particular, the developments, challenges and
lessons particular to Francophone contexts have not been sufficiently
analysed. This knowledge gap has a number of causes and effects. On one
level, it highlights a pervasive reluctance among different national actors to
critically analyse the security sector and its relationship to state authorities
and citizens. In some cases, this reluctance is exacerbated by top-down
2
Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye pressure from elites with a vested interest in the status quo. In other cases,
there is a lack of capacity, resources and public space at the national level to
nurture a robust debate on questions of democratic security sector
governance. On another level, this knowledge gap reflects the perceived
Anglo-Saxon roots of the security sector reform (SSR) discourse. In West
Africa, comprehensive SSR programmes – understood explicitly as such –
have so far been limited largely to post-conflict Anglophone contexts such as
Liberia and Sierra Leone. As a consequence, the literature on SSR in West
Africa has developed a pronounced focus on these same cases. As this
Anglophone emphasis is beginning to change, especially with continuing
efforts to support SSR in Lusophone Guinea-Bissau and potentially
Francophone Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, there is a clear need for further
systematic research on SSG and SSR in non-Anglophone contexts in West
Africa.
This volume seeks to help fill this knowledge gap through promoting
a clearer vision of SSG dynamics across the region. Drawing on extensive
and varied personal knowledge and experience, contributors analyse SSG in
each of the nine Francophone West African states. This context-specific
analysis provides a systematic overview that is intended to feed into policy
relevant recommendations that will contribute to SSR efforts at national and
regional levels.
In order to introduce the range of different national contexts within
Francophone West Africa, this introductory chapter begins by providing a
brief summary of key issues highlighted in the various country chapters. It
then sets out an understanding of the SSG/SSR concepts and their evolution
in relation to West African specificities. Recent developments are considered
that are helping to crystallise the regional framework for SSR in West
Africa. This chapter concludes by underlining some of the policy objectives
that could be advanced through enhanced knowledge of the national contexts
analysed in this volume.
The importance of context
Understanding the nuanced realities of different reform contexts allows us to
recognise the challenges specific to each and identify potential entry-points
for SSR. Critical analysis that pays due consideration to the diversity of
experience from across the region is essential in order to bridge gaps
between strong normative regional policy frameworks and support to reform
efforts on the ground. Thus, in order to introduce the issues covered in the
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
3
various country chapters, a brief summary of context-specific SSG dynamics
is provided below.
Benin
From a particularly challenging backdrop of dysfunctional civil-military
relations, Benin’s transition to democracy has resulted in an
acknowledgement that human security should represent the guiding principle
for the security sector and its governance. However, in terms of
implementation, exogenous and endogenous security challenges including
increasing levels of domestic crime and trans-border threats exacerbated by
Benin’s geopolitical situation pose significant security risks. Théodore C.
Loko argues that this context translates into three sets of SSG challenges.
First, there is a need for security institutions to better recognise strategic
threats and address them within a holistic approach to security provision,
management and oversight. Second, there is a need to prioritise the
appropriate security sector responses and coordinate efforts on the ground.
Finally, popular participation in security decision-making remains minimal,
perpetuating cleavages between security providers and citizens.
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso also faces a range of external and internal security challenges
from corruption and rising domestic crime rates to transnational trafficking
in drugs, gemstones and other commodities. A lack of clarity over national
defence and public security roles, a growing private security industry as well
as the absence of a culture of transparency and accountability in the security
domain represent further security sector governance challenges. Jean-Pierre
Bayala argues that better defining the respective roles of the state, the
security sector and the different actors responsible for democratic oversight
– in particular the National Assembly, the justice sector and civil society – is
essential in order to find sustainable solutions to these different challenges.
Côte d’Ivoire
The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates the challenges of improving SSG
through SSR in a post-conflict context. The 2010 elections supposed to
permit the country to move forward in fact exacerbated tensions, leading to
renewed conflict and further suffering. Raphael Ouattara contrasts Côte
d’Ivoire’s post-independence stability and prosperity with the political
4
Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye pressures that led to the 1999 coup and ultimately to civil war. With the
violent resolution of the post-election stand-off, interrelated DDR and SSR
activities will require a delicate balance that combines the reprofessionalisation of the security sector with the need to re-build trust
between the armed forces and citizens. Restoring democratic control of the
security sector and ensuring strict oversight over the use of force will be
particularly challenging given scale of the post-electoral violence coupled
with the array of state and non-state actors involved on both sides.
Guinea
Dominique Bangoura analyses a long history of politicisation of the security
sector that has contributed to Guinea’s current security sector governance
crisis. Two sets of challenges are identified: indiscipline within the armed
forces and repression of the civilian population. Widespread public
determination within the country, reinforced by the support of the
international community, may represent an opportunity for positive change.
However, a root and branch programme of SSR is essential in order to
support a wider process of political reform. Guinea thus provides an example
of the importance of SSR and SSG in relation to wider political transitions.
Mali
Mali’s democratisation process has proved a positive example of national
consensus building. Indeed, this political context has favoured the
development of a new national security policy framework that has been
characterised by broad civil society participation. Mali thus represents a
promising environment for SSR. However, Mahamadou Nimaga underlines
an important distinction between institutional reforms on the surface and the
absence of deep reforms that require significant additional political will to be
implemented in practice. A major challenge for Mali is thus to engage
stakeholders beyond the security forces themselves in a discourse on SSG
issues in order to ensure the legitimacy and sustainability of the reform
process.
Mauritania
The numerous coups or attempted coups that have marked Mauritania’s
post-independence history are evidence of deep rooted security sector
governance dilemmas within the country. At the heart of this challenge is a
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
5
dysfunctional relationship between security forces, public sector institutions
and citizens. In order to understand the state of SSG in Mauritania, Boubacar
N’Diaye argues that it is essential to shed light on historical dynamics of
politicisation and ethnicisation of the security sector that contributed to the
current situation. Only through addressing these deeply engrained divisions
can reform truly take root. Mauritania thus provides an example of the
possibilities and limits for SSR in a context of political resistance to change.
Niger
Niger’s February 2010 coup d’état ended another political stalemate among
the country’s political class and serves as a reminder that military
intervention is not a thing of the past. Our contributor’s analysis highlights
the challenges faced by Niger’s political system as well as its security sector
in all areas of the security apparatus. He argues that while the structure of the
security sector may not need any serious alteration, a genuine reform that
gives an appropriate role to traditionally excluded actors is essential, albeit
hard to achieve. Niger has now made the transition to a new republic under a
democratically elected president. The new constitutional order is fragile but
may offer a window of opportunity for the authorities to engage in an
overdue reform of the security sector.
Senegal
Senegal is the only state in Francophone West Africa that has never
experienced a coup. In contrast to many other contexts, the army plays an
important role in national life and benefits from a positive image among the
population. However, Niagale Bagayoko-Penone identifies weaknesses in
other parts of the security sector, notably the gendarmerie, judiciary and the
police. Police reform is identified as a particular priority given the troubling
relationship between a weak police role in the provision of public security
and a growing presence of private security providers in this field. More
broadly, a lack of public confidence in these institutions represents a
significant challenge.
Togo
Comi Toulabor describes the case of Togo, showing how the security sector
governance framework has been distorted over many years by the
imperatives of regime security. Politicisation and ethnicisation of security
6
Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye institutions represent a major obstacle to the strengthening of democratic
governance. Despite a number of ongoing SSR initiatives within the country,
the absence of effective oversight and accountability mechanisms
undermines hopes for a security sector that is transparent, accountable to
public authorities and trusted by Togo’s citizens.
In summary, the security sectors analysed within this volume have
been shaped by very different national trajectories. They reflect highly
specific cultural, political and socio-economic dynamics. Yet a number of
common features also emerge. First, popular participation in matters relating
to security is very limited. This results in a widespread lack of public
confidence in, or understanding of, security actors. Second, and relatedly,
very few examples can be found of processes that have sought to forge a
genuinely national vision of security. This lacuna is reflected in an
imbalance between preponderant external security capabilities and weak
domestic security provision (thus providing additional impetus to the growth
of private security actors offering public security). And finally, we see that
sectoral reforms (e.g. army, police or gendarmerie) have not been matched
by a commensurate emphasis on enhancing security sector governance.
Where SSR programmes are evident, a lack of emphasis on management,
oversight and accountability therefore risks to undermine the legitimacy and
sustainability of these efforts.
Addressing knowledge gaps
Progress has already been made in West Africa to reduce the distance
between the Anglophone and Francophone spheres on matters of SSG and
SSR. The growing consensus around the need for SSR in West Africa has
been supported by developments in the Francophone world. France issued its
own policy paper on the concept: Security System Reform: France’s
Approach.2 By embracing the core principles and objectives of the SSR
approach and making it ‘a key component of France’s strategic action,’
many of the suspicions around the concept in Francophone Africa have been
laid to rest. Similarly, the Organisation International de la Francophonie
(OIF) also embraced SSR. Specifically, OIF members committed to
becoming involved in ongoing SSR debates. The October 2008 Quebec
Declaration reiterated the direct links between stability, democracy and
peace already highlighted in the Bamako Declaration, emphasising the need
to support democratic governance of the security sector within the
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
7
Francophone world. The OIF can serve as an important bridge between
internal processes within member states and the support of the international
community. These developments have increased the space for public
discourse available to Francophone countries in West Africa and contributed
momentum to the development of a more integrated regional discourse on
SSG and SSR.
Despite the labelling of SSR as an Anglo-Saxon concept, the roots of
what is now understood as SSR in West Africa can actually be found in the
national conferences held in Benin and Mali during the early 1990s. As
elaborated in the relevant case study chapters, these events were significant
less for the specific reforms that followed and more for the tipping point they
represent in re-orienting civil-security relations in these two countries. Yet
while SSR activities with and without external support are increasingly
evident in Francophone countries such as Mali or Senegal, both knowledge
and dialogue on the security sector and its governance remain limited. A lack
of appreciation of contextually-specific cultural, political, economic and
security dynamics can have significant consequences. At worst, failure to
consider the contextual elements of SSR runs the risk of engaging in reforms
that cause more harm than good because they fail to adequately account for
the very factors that make reform necessary or exacerbate existing tensions
and dysfunctions.
The lack of focus on the SSR/SSG discourse in Francophone West
Africa points to the need to promote a common language in relation to key
concepts. Although there are no universally accepted definitions of the
security sector, SSG or SSR, this section will attempt to highlight and
analyse a number of shared principles commonly discernible in the
frameworks developed by influential international, regional and national
actors in this area.3 These approaches share the need to move beyond the
optic of state security by delivering on the underpinning objective that the
security sector should respond to the security needs of individuals and
communities.
The security sector
The democratic governance rationale is critical to our analysis of the nature
of the security sector and the need for SSR in different Francophone West
African states. In particular, this approach requires a broad understanding of
the security sector.4 Three categories of actors sit within a governmentfocused notion of the security sector:
8



Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye Organisations legally mandated to use force: armed forces; police;
gendarmeries and other paramilitary forces; coast guards; territorial
border guards; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces,
national guards, presidential guards, official militias); military and
civilian intelligence services; customs and other uniformed bodies
such as secret services.
Justice and law-enforcement organisations: judiciary; correctional
services; criminal investigation and prosecution services; customary
and traditional justice bodies.
Civil management and oversight bodies: President/Prime Minister;
national security advisory bodies; legislatures and legislative
committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs, justice and foreign
affairs; office of the president/prime minister; financial management
bodies (ministries of finance, budget offices, auditor’s general’s
offices);
national
security
advisory
bodies;
relevant
regional/provincial and local authorities, including customary and
traditional authorities; statutory civil society organizations such as
human rights ombudsmen, police commissions, public complaints
commissions.
Two further categories of actors – non-state security organisations and nonstate civil society bodies – reflect a wider, governance-driven approach to
the security sector:


Non-statutory security organisations: liberation armies; guerrilla
armies; traditional militias; political party militias; self-defence
organisations, including those based on regional, ethnic or religious
affiliations; and private security companies.
Non-statutory civil society bodies: professional organisations,
including trade unions; research/policy analysis organisations;
advocacy organisations; the media; religious organisations;
membership organisations; other non-governmental organisations; and
the concerned public.
Understanding the roles and influence of different private security actors is
particularly relevant to the realities of SSG in Francophone West Africa.
Private security actors pose a number of qualitatively different dilemmas.
Across the region, non-statutory security organisations have emerged to fill
gaps created by the state’s inability (or unwillingness) to provide security.
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
9
This poses a challenge to state security. Armed non-state groups undermine
the state’s monopoly over the use of force while the growth in commercial
security provision raises important questions about the state’s ability to
effectively regulate and oversee the activities of such actors. From a peoplecentred perspective, the fact that security needs are increasingly being met
by private commercial actors also highlights the troubling reality – which if
not new may well be a growing problem – that security is a privilege of the
wealthy rather than a public good. At the same time another repercussion of
the state’s inability or unwillingness to provide security is the fact that this
need is often met by self-organising non-state actors in the form of vigilante
or neighbourhood-watch groups, who may have a tenuous understanding or
respect for human rights.
Security sector governance
If ‘government’ describes political authority engaged in decision-making
about policy at the level of the state, then ‘governance’ represents a broader
concept that comprises all of the structures and processes that affect the way
in which policy decisions are made. Governance therefore includes diverse
actors – both private and public – while reflecting the reality of fragmented
political authority, which may differ substantially from the theoretical
distribution of political power at local, national and international levels.5
This shift in emphasis makes ‘governance’ rather than ‘government’ a
particularly appropriate optic through which to examine the intertwined
dynamics of security and insecurity in Francophone West Africa.
A security sector governance approach aptly reflects the significant
roles within the security field played by actors above and below the level of
the state. Reform efforts need to extend well beyond security sector agencies
and their interactions with the executive, legislative and judiciary. On the
one hand, this highlights the role of regional and international stakeholders
in these processes. On the other hand, it focuses on the key roles played by
non-state actors, particularly civil society, as both central participants but
also the ultimate beneficiaries of reform processes. The importance of an
inclusive reform process that works across national, regional and
international levels and includes a wide range of stakeholders reflects the
emerging consensus that a governance-driven approach to SSR is essential.
While security sector governance provides a useful analytical
approach to security challenges at a number of levels, a SSG approach
specifically focuses on actors empowered to use coercion by extension of the
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Where these powers are not
10
Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye exercised effectively and efficiently, challenges can be directly linked to the
absence of a robust framework of civilian democratic control and oversight.
SSR focuses on SSG challenges by seeking to address both security and
democratic deficits that contribute to insecurity at the level of the state and
its citizens. The effectiveness of security provision is therefore intrinsically
linked to concerns of security sector oversight and accountability. This
relationship is critical and highlights two sets of tensions. First, if reform of
security institutions does not improve democratic oversight then there is a
risk that security actors may become more effective and efficient in their use
of force but remain either detached from or represent a threat to the state and
its citizens. This is a central challenge in many regions of the world where
reforms take place but do not constitute ‘SSR’ according to the holistic
understanding outlined above, since they focus on effectiveness without
reference to the imperatives of democratic governance. Indeed a recent
lessons-learned report on donor practice in SSR identified a lack of focus on
governance dimensions, notably parliamentary oversight of the security
sector, as a critical gap in current international support to SSR.6 Second,
inherent to this approach is the reality that while individual activities may be
technical in nature, the SSR agenda is inherently political because it seeks to
change relationships of political authority related to the use of coercive
force. Thus, efforts to support democratic transitions in the sensitive area of
security inevitably produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ Therefore, resistance to
change is a key factor that must be taken into account.
Security sector reform
Fundamentally, ‘good’ SSG is understood as the effective and efficient
provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic
governance, while SSR describes efforts taken to achieve this goal.7 The
definition of SSR applied throughout this volume embraces this approach by
focusing on concerns of democratic governance. SSR is closely linked to the
human security discourse because both concepts are based on a vision of
people-centred security. Addressing how individuals and communities
experience security is therefore essential in order to account for the different
security needs and perceptions of women, men, boys and girls. Giving a
voice to communities and civil society groups in national debates on SSG
issues fulfils a dual purpose: it helps to ensure that diverse interests are taken
into consideration in designing and implementing reforms; it also contributes
to demystifying the security sector and its status in the eyes of citizens and
thus to re-building trust between them.
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
11
Human security has become increasingly visible in the language of
African regional organisations; for example, one of the objectives of the
African Union’s Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development
(PCRD) is that ‘the promotion of human security be at the basis of all PCRD
activities.’8 Similarly, the strategic vision of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) envisages a transformation from an
‘ECOWAS of states’ to an ‘ECOWAS of the peoples’.9 This change of
attitude towards security may be considered due recognition of the past and
current role played by many African security forces as agents of insecurity.
This shift in the definition of security goes a long way in explaining why
SSG and SSR have become so significant.
Better understanding the nature of the security sector and its
governance in different contexts can clarify both challenges and potential
opportunities to address them through SSR. Consequently, particular
emphasis is placed throughout this volume on unpacking highly contextspecific SSG dynamics.
An important set of issues surrounds the relationship between the
state, the security sector and actors involved in democratic oversight
(parliament, the judiciary, the public, etc.). Understanding the de facto roles
assumed by these stakeholders is essential in order to determine entry points
for reform. Mapping the range of state and non-state actors that play a role in
the provision of security represents a first step to defining SSR initiatives
that can contribute to an efficient, professional security sector accountable
for its actions and respectful of civil authorities.
SSR shares with other areas of public policy the need to choose
between competing priorities when faced with limited resources. The costs
of reform in financial and political terms therefore need to be carefully
assessed. It is important to identify the most urgent problems that reform
efforts should tackle and establish how success can be measured. If
numerous policy frameworks exist that detail generic SSR good practice,
relevant criteria or indicators of success at national and local levels are often
absent.
Given the sensitive nature of SSR, political concerns must be at the
heart of recommendations for reform. Where a broad SSR programme is not
feasible, graduated measures may be more realistic. Sensitivity is required to
understand how dialogue can be initiated on delicate issues such as the
politicisation or ethnicisation of the security sector. This can help to identify
and address potential spoilers. In the face of resistance to change it is also
important to consider the consequences of avoiding or delaying reform.
12
Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye The evolving regional framework for SSR in West Africa
A number of important SSR-related initiatives are underway in West Africa.
They reflect a growing consensus around the centrality of dysfunctional SSG
to recurring political crises and conflicts that spread beyond national borders.
At the continental level the African Union (AU) has committed to supporting
its member states in carrying out reforms by developing an AU framework
for SSR.10 Significantly, it draws a direct link between SSR as a means to
promote a culture of democratic SSG and the need to reverse the resurgence
of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.11 ECOWAS has
strongly endorsed this approach, stating that for member states there shall be
‘zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional
means.’12 If these prescriptions are to be realised in practice, the
development of AU capacities and joint strategies with regional economic
communities that are sensitive to different national contexts represent key
priorities.
Among the regional economic communities, ECOWAS has made
distinct progress in developing a comprehensive set of norms and standards
in the area of SSG. Indeed, acknowledgement of the relationship between
security and democratic governance underpins the regional normative
framework for peace, security and development constructed by ECOWAS.
The 2001 Dakar Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance
supplementing the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security adopted in
1999 is particularly significant in this regard. The protocol encompasses key
SSG concerns by situating the need for well-trained, apolitical,
democratically governed security actors within a broader framework of
human rights and the rule of law. Another important addition to the regional
security governance architecture has been the development and adoption
process for a West African Code of Conduct for Armed and Security Forces.
The code sets out a number of common standards for the treatment and
behaviour of armed and security forces in the region and provides further
evidence of the commitment of ECOWAS in this area. However, as
important as the specific provisions is the overarching goal to use the code as
a confidence-building measure to reinforce relations between civilians and
security sector institutions within the region.
The latest element in regional progress towards improved SSG is the
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) which was endorsed by
Member States in January 2008 and places a strong premium on democratic
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
13
SSG as a key element of the region’s human security architecture.
Specifically, the ECPF stipulates that ‘Member States shall adopt and
implement security sector governance reforms to ensure that the practice of
security agencies and prison services are in strict conformity with the
requirements of human rights and the rule of law and are subject to
democratic control.13 This process has led to the development of a draft
ECOWAS SSR framework and plan of action. The focus of ECOWAS on
operationalising the security governance component of the ECPF puts this
process at the heart of regional SSR efforts in West Africa. In order to
achieve the goals set out in the ECPF, generating political will within
Member States will be critical. Deepening the knowledge base on SSG
dynamics across the region thus represents an essential point of departure for
engaging states undergoing very different types of transitions on these
politically sensitive issues.
At the global level, the development of the United Nations’ approach
to SSR has drawn heavily on African experience and expertise. This was
highlighted at the international workshop held in Cape Town in November
2007 on ‘Enhancing United Nations Support for Security Sector Reform in
Africa: Towards an African Perspective’14 which addressed some of the
opportunities and challenges for the UN in supporting SSR in countries in
the region and contributed directly to the development of the first UN
Secretary-General’s report on SSR.15 The relationship between the UN, the
AU and ECOWAS has been identified as critical to further enhancing the
range of UN support to nationally-led SSR processes in Africa.
Widely different attitudes to SSR can be discerned among
Francophone West African states. Positive examples of internally generated
SSR processes can be found. Yet even in the best cases, earlier research has
highlighted lethargy in undertaking necessary reforms.16 At the other
extreme, authoritarian regimes offer few openings for SSR activities that
support democratic SSG. And while it might seem counter-intuitive, the
condition of state collapse through conflict and subsequent post-conflict
peacebuilding efforts has in some cases resulted in the most serious efforts at
SSR.
Beyond African states and multilateral institutions, individual experts
have been instrumental in shaping the SSG/SSR discourse in West Africa. It
is particularly significant that African civil society expertise is coalescing
within networks and thus integrating more readily into national, regional and
international SSR efforts. Networks such as the African Security Sector
Network17 (ASSN) and the West African Network on Security and
Democratic Governance (WANSED) can provide impetus to reforms at the
14
Alan Bryden & Boubacar N’Diaye national level but also reinforce the capacities of multilateral institutions and
bilateral donors involved in supporting SSR. Such networks provide an
alternative regional platform for discussion on important SSG issues that
may be very sensitive in some national contexts.
Another example of the clustering of SSR expertise is the Association
for SSR Education and Training18 (ASSET) which brings together experts in
the area of SSR training and capacity building. Organisations with African
expertise are strongly represented in this voluntary association that supports
more coherent approaches to developing SSR capacity within governments,
security sector institutions, parliaments, civil society and multilateral
organisations.
Together, these developments offer important opportunities to ensure
that SSR processes draw on a range of expertise from within the region in
which activities take place. This can only help to address criticism over a
lack of local ownership frequently levelled at externally supported SSR
while also ensuring that national-level efforts benefit from South-South
experience-sharing.
Conclusion
A sustainable SSR agenda for West Africa as envisaged by ECOWAS in its
conflict prevention framework cannot be mapped out without close
knowledge of the dynamics of SSG in the region. Equally, the current level
of progress can only be properly understood in relation to context-specific
cultural, social and political dynamics and their deep historical roots which
have shaped the security sector and its governance in different national
contexts. The contributions to this volume are therefore intended to add to
the state of knowledge of SSG in Francophone West Africa with the goal of
supporting the development of a sustainable SSR agenda for the region as a
whole.
It is certainly evident that policy frameworks are becoming better
established and more capacities are being developed to support the SSR
agenda in Francophone West Africa. The operationalisation of the security
governance component of the ECPF through a regional framework and plan
of action could be a catalyst for change if stakeholders fall in behind a
common SSR strategy. However, all of the initiatives discussed above share
a common challenge – implementation at the national level. In this respect, it
is clear that if norms and principles of democratic governance have gained
ground across the West African region, in many cases their practical
Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa
15
application remains far more limited. The analyses provided by the country
case study authors are therefore important because they identify entry-points
that can help to bridge this critical gap between policy and practice.
Perhaps the most meaningful contribution of this volume can be to
support vocal and vigorous critical discussions on SSG in West Africa at the
local, national, regional and international levels, and within and between
Francophone, Lusophone and Anglophone contexts. Bringing the security
sector into the light and dispelling deeply engrained perceptions of the
security sector as la grande muette19 is an essential step in fostering political
will at the national level for much needed security sector reforms.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye and 'Funmi Olonisakin, Security Sector Governance in
West Africa: Turning principles to Practice, DCAF Policy Paper, No. 8 (Geneva: DCAF,
2005). Available at www.dcaf.ch
The guide, developed by the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on SSR, is
available at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/12-Aug-MAEE-RSS-final.pdf
For example: OECD DAC, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform,
Supporting Security and Justice (Paris: OECD DAC, 2007); Council of the European
Union, EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform, 12566/4/05 REV 4
(Brussels, 13 October 2005); European Commission, a Concept for European Community
Support for Security Sector Reform, COM (2006)253 Final, (Brussels, 24 May 2006);
Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security
Sector Reform, 2736th General Affairs Council Meeting (Luxembourg, 12 June 2006);
United Nations Security Council, Securing Peace and Development: the role of the
United Nations in supporting security sector reform, Report of the Secretary-General,
Document No. S/2008/39, 23 January 2008.
The description of the security sector and the security community here is taken entirely
from the definitions provided in Nicole Ball and Kayode Fayemi (eds.), Security Sector
Governance in Africa: A Handbook (Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development,
2004). The same description is also contained in the UNDP Human Development Report,
2002, 87.
Heiner Hänggi, ‘Approaching Peacebuilding from a Security Governance Perspective,’ in
Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, eds. Alan Bryden and Heiner
Hänggi, 7 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005).
See Alan Bryden and Rory Keane, ‘Security System Reform: What Have We Learned?’
OECD, 2009. Available at: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/44/44391867.pdf
See Heiner Hänggi, ‘Security Sector Reform’ in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon,
ed. Vincent Chetail, 337 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
African Union Policy Framework on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development. Doc.
EX.CL/274 (IX), adopted in Banjul, The Gambia, June 2006. The purpose of the
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) is to ‘serve as a reference for the
ECOWAS system and Member States in their efforts to strengthen human security in the
region’. ECPF, Section II (5).
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ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), paragraph 4.
In February 2008, the African Union Assembly ‘encouraged the African Union
Commission to develop a comprehensive policy framework on SSR’.
(Assembly/AU/Doc.117 (X)).
‘Towards an African Union Policy on SSR’, Address by H.E. Mr. Ramtane Lamamra,
Commissioner for Peace and Security, African Union Commission, at the African
Regional Workshop on Security Sector Reform, Addis Ababa, 23 March 2009.
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), Article 1(c).
ECPF, Article 57(1).
International Workshop on ‘Enhancing United Nations Support for Security Sector
Reform in Africa: Towards an African Perspective’, co-hosted by South Africa and
Slovakia, Cape Town, 7-8 November 2007.
United Nations Security Council, ‘Securing Peace and Development: the role of the
United Nations in supporting security sector reform,’ Report of the Secretary-General,
Document No. A/62/659 – S/2008/39, 23 January 2008.
See Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye and ‘Funmi Olonisakin, eds., Challenges of Security
Sector Governance in West Africa (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2008).
See www.africansecurity.org
The Association for SSR Education and Training (ASSET) is a professional association of
education and training organizations that supports the development of SSR capacity
within governments, donors, security sector institutions, parliaments, civil society and
international/regional organizations. Its membership spans the Americas, Africa, Asia,
Europe, and the Middle East. See: www.asset-ssr.org
In Francophone contexts, the armed forces are sometimes referred to as ‘the silent one’.