iuédgenève
DCA F
Palestinian Public Perceptions
of Security Sector Governance
Summary Report (Geneva, 14 October 2005)
Riccardo Bocco
Luigi de Martino
Arnold Luethold
About the Authors
Riccardo Bocco is Professor for political sociology at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies. He is specialized in the Arab Middle East, with a particular research interest
in Palestine and Jordan.
Riccardo.Bocco@iued.unige.ch
Luigi de Martino is Research and Program Officer at the Palestinian Research Unit of the
Graduate Institute of Development Studies
Luigi.DeMartino@iued.unige.ch
Arnold Luethold is a Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces and Head of the Middle East North Africa (MENA) Program on Security Sector
Governance and Reform in the Middle East.
a.luethold@dcaf.ch
Copyright © 2005 by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and
the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED) Geneva
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................4
Key findings .................................................7
Conclusions ................................................14
Introduction
The Graduate Institute for Development Studies (IUED) in Geneva and the Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) conducted in July 2005 a
survey in order to measure public perceptions of Palestinian security sector governance. The survey involved 1,500 individuals living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and
East Jerusalem.
In this study, ‘security sector’ is the public sector that comprises all security forces and
the relevant civilian bodies needed to oversee them, including the judiciary. ‘Security
sector governance’, in a very general sense, refers to how this sector is run. It looks at
people, institutions, processes and practices that affect the functioning of the security
sector and its capability to deliver security in the broadest possible sense to the population. A successful security sector would effectively provide security for the greatest
number of people at affordable costs, in full transparency and in an accountable
manner. How well this is done in practice, however, is a matter of perception.
Thus, understanding how the public views the security sector and its activities is important for good governance. That is why public perception studies of security sector
governance are an important tool not only for assessing the quality of governance, but
also for evaluating the direction of future reforms. By giving the public a voice in the
discussion of their own future security, public perception studies are a step towards
greater inclusiveness in the management and over-sight of security issues. They are
also a mean for establishing public accountability of the security sector and involving
civil society in its governance. This in itself is an important element of any security
sector reform agenda, given that the security sector, more than any other public sector,
has a tendency to resist public input and oversight.
While many governments in the Middle East would be reluctant to authorize similar
studies, the Palestinian National Authority deserves credit for having made this
research possible.
The present summary report presents some key findings of the survey. A fully detailed
report will be published in winter 2005/2006.
Since 2000, the IUED regularly conducts public perceptions polls on the living conditions of the Palestinian
population and on aid delivered to the occupied Palestinian territories. The reports and the data of the 9
polls conducted so far are available at http://www.iued.ch/palestine
1
5
The Palestinian Security Sector
Security forces
Official PNA security
agents
personnel
Civil Police (Law enforcement)
Preventive Security (Internal security)
5500
Civil Defence (Emergency and rescue)
950
National Security Forces (Palestinian Proto-army)
Naval Police
Non-statutory forces
11000
900
Military Intelligence
Ca. 400
Presidential Security
2500
Military Liaison
Non-official PNA
security agencies
18500
+/- 100
General Intelligence
4200
Special Security
<100
Special Forces
1250
Joint Force Gaza
5000
Martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades (Armed wing of
Hamas)
Al-Quds Brigades (Armed wing of Islamic Jihad)
1000-1500
Several
hundreds
Al-Aqsa Brigades (Fatah-affiliated local militias and
armed groups),
500-700
Others (Fateh Volunteer Force, Fateh Hawks,
Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Battalions, National Resistance Brigade, Salah al-Din Brigade, various local
law-and-order groups)
unknown
The security sector usually includes the armed forces, the police and gendarmerie, intelligence services,
and judicial and penal institutions. It also comprises the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight, e.g. the executive and parliament. For a detailed description of the Palestinian Security Sector see Roland Friedrich, Security Sector Reform in the Palestinian Occupied Territories,
Passia: Jerusalem 2004.
2
6
Judiciary
Official judiciary
Magistrate Courts, District Courts and High Court. The judiciary also
includes State Security Courts and Military Courts
Non-official judiciary
Sharia Courts, clan-based law institutions
Civilian control and oversight
Executive control
President
Prime Minister
Ministry of Interior
National Security Council
Parliamentary oversight
Palestinian Legislative Council
• Interior Committee
• Committee for Oversight of Human Rights and Public
Freedoms
• Budget and Financial Affairs Committee
• Legal Committee
7
Key findings
Feeling of Security among the Palestinian Population
The feeling of security among the Palestinian population increased significantly from
October 2004 until July 2005. In July 2005, 52 percent of respondents in the Gaza Strip
said they felt secure, compared to only 8 percent in last November.
A majority of Palestinians perceive Israeli
occupation as the main
80%
threat to their security.
70%
Shortly
before
the
60%
July
03
Israeli
withdrawal
from
50%
40%
Oct 04
Gaza, 60 percent of
30%
July 05
Palestinians in the West
20%
Bank and 44 percent in
10%
Gaza, compared to 39
0%
percent in East JerusaGaza Strip Gaza Strip Jerusalem West Bank West Bank
lem, said Israeli occupaRefugee
outside
Refugee
outside
Camp
camps
Camp
camps
tion was the single most
important reason for
them to feel insecure. In all regions, the lack of socio-economic improvement was
listed as the second most important reason for the feeling of insecurity. Respondents
from the West Bank and Gaza refugee camps perceive their security more directly
threatened by armed groups than by settlements. 11 percent of Jerusa-lem respondents mentioned settlements as a reason for insecurity.
Feelings of Security (% of YES) July 03 - July 05
Reason for Insecurity by Place
West Bank outside camps
West Bank Refugee Camp
Jerusalem
Gaza Strip outside camps
Gaza Strip Refugee Camp
24%
17%
12%
59%
7%
69%
29%
25%
31%
6%
21%
10%
39%
42%
8%
No socio-economic improvement
Israeli military occupation
Armed Group
8
4%
1%
1%
11%
7%
49%
Regional insecurity
Settlements
Other
6%
9%
10%
2%
Palestinians place high trust in non-statutory forces
The survey results show that after the Civil Defense, non-statutory armed groups such
as the Al-Aqsa and Al-Qassem Brigades are the most trusted organizations amongst
Palestinian security organizations in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Trust in Security Sector Organisations Overall (o319 a-g) - July 05
27
Al-Aqsa Brigades
45
32
Al - Qassem Brigades
General Intelligence
19
National Security
19
39
43
Preventive Security
18
Civil Police
19
16
17
13
45
34
Civil Defense
8
8
22
11
43
42
20
8
13
49
12
23
11
My trust is high
I trust them to a certain extent
I do not trust them to a certain extent
I do not trust them at all
18
Organizations controlled by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), such as the
Preventive Security, General Intelligence, National Security and Civil Police scored
significantly lower trust levels. Preventive Security is the least trusted of all organizations, with 23 percent of respondents having no trust in it at all.
Al Qassem Brigades
Al Aqsa Brigades
Trust in security organizations
Trust in Armed Groups (o319f-g) by Place of Residence
seems to be related to both
34%
40%
5%
17%
Gaza Strip RC
the
socio-economic
and
Gaza Strip non camps
32%
41%
21%
educational level of the
Jerusalem
14%
48%
7%
29%
respondents: the higher the
West Bank RC
26%
48%
8%
15%
revenue or the educa-tion,
West Bank non camps
30%
44%
10%
11%
the lower the trust. The only
40%
33%
6%
18%
Gaza Strip RC
exception to this is the Civil
Gaza Strip non camps
41%
30%
3%
23%
Defense, where no correlaJerusalem
14%
49%
8%
27%
tion could be found between
West Bank RC
26%
46%
11%
14%
the educational level of
West Bank non camps
34%
40%
10%
12%
respondents and the trust
My trust is high
I trust them to a certain extent
placed in this organization. It
I do not trust them to a certain extent
I do not trust them at all
could be that the apolitical
nature of its mission (emergency and rescue services, including fire departments) has
prevented the Civil Defense from getting involved in political disputes and resulted in
higher trust and acceptance. Trust levels also vary with the area of residence. City
dwellers have generally lower levels of trust than residents of villages. Compared to
city dwellers, residents of refugee camps have higher trust in the Civil Defense and
lower trust in the General Security.
In Gaza, non-statutory armed groups obtain very similar trust levels from residents
inside and outside the refugee camps, whereas in the West Bank, they are more trusted
by people living outside the refugee camps. Trust in the Al-Qassem brigades is particularly strong in the Gaza Strip.
9
High trust in Sharia courts and customary law institutions
Organizations responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law, such as the courts, the
correctional system, and bodies tasked with the oversight of human rights are important for a functioning security sector. When asked about their trust in several institutions of the judiciary, respondents said they trusted most the Sharia courts.
50 percent said to have
very high trust in Sharia
37
39
11 14
Palestinian clan-based customary law
courts and another 39
percent said to have some
29
48
12 12
PNA Correctional system
trust. Palestinian clanbased customary law
50
39
6 6
Sharia Courts
institutions were ranked
State Security Courts and Military
second. The compara19
47
14
20
Courts
tively lower rating of the
26
50
11 13
Official court system
official PNA institutions is
hardly surprising. The
My trust is high
I trust them to a certain extent
official judiciary has often
I do not trust them to a certain extent I do not trust them at all
been described as the
weakest link in the governance structure of the Palestinian National Authority. The
Palestinian legal system is influenced by legislation of various origins (British, Ottoman, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli) and, institutionally, is characterized by a proliferation of judicial organizations with overlapping mandates. It also struggles with serious
shortages of funds and trained personnel. Unlike the official judiciary, Sharia courts
and customary law institutions offer easy access and are present in all regions. They
also may appeal to people not only for the values they represent, but also because they
deal mostly with civil cases.
Trust in the Judiciary System Overall (o321 a-e) - July 2005
Three factors appear to influence respondents’ trust in the judiciary: revenue, the area
of residence and the level of education. Respondents above the poverty line show
lower levels of trust than those below the poverty line and those considered as “hardship cases”. City dwellers seem to have generally lower levels of trust than residents
of villages or refugee camps. Trust also seems to be inversely dependent from the level
of education, except for the Sharia courts for which trust levels are not significantly
affected by the level of education.
Trust in Sharia Courts (o321c) by Place of Residence - July
05
Gaza Strip Refugee Camp
55%
38%
Gaza Strip outside camps
55%
35%
Jerusalem
West Bank Refugee Camp
West Bank outside camps
10
20%
60%
42%
52%
42%
37%
My trust is high
I trust them to a certain extent
I do not trust them to a certain extent
I do not trust them at all
The place of residence is a key factor for explaining trust in Sharia courts: Between 42
and 55 percent of respondents in Gaza and the West Bank reported to have ’high trust’
in the Sharia courts, compared to only 20 percent in East Jerusalem, where the comparatively lower trust can be explained by better access to regular (Israeli) courts.
The availability or
Trust in Clan-Based Law (o321e) by Place of
non-availability
of
Residence - July 05
satisfactory alternatives may also explain Gaza Strip Refugee Camp
39%
40%
8% 12%
the
considerable
42%
37%
15%
variations in the trust Gaza Strip outside camps
Jerusalem 6%
66%
13% 15%
levels for the clanbased customary law West Bank Refugee Camp
35%
34%
22%
9%
insti-tutions. Only 6
39%
35%
12% 14%
West Bank outside camps
percent of respon% within place
dents in Jerusalem
My trust is high
I trust them to a certain extent
said to have ‘high
I do not trust them to a certain extent I do not trust them at all
trust’ in clan-based
judicial institutions, compared to 39 to 42 percent in Gaza and the West Bank, respectively, where Sharia courts and customary law institutions are easily accessible and
deal predominantly with civil law cases.
Strong and widespread support for security sector reform
A strong message in support of change appears in the answers to questions related to
security sector reform. When asked to rate the importance of eleven concrete security sector reform measures, a sweeping majority of respondents (82 to 97 percent)
considered all proposed measures as either ‘very important’ or ‘rather important’.
Reform of Security Sector Organisations(o320 a-k) - July 05
HR training of police and security forces
73
Fight corruption and nepotism
Independent institutions visiting all places of detention
18
26
21
68
Have an ombudsman investigating citizens' complaints
75
60
33
35
26
32
53
Dissolve non-official armed groups
56
Replace security officials
57
Unify Security Services
24
78
Improve training of police and security forces
Increase the control of the Palestinian Legislative Council
13
70
Trial security personnel responsible for HR violations
Strengthen PA supervision over the security apparatus
23
84
73
Very important Rather Important Rather Unimportant
22
Very Unimportant
11
Fighting corruption and nepotism seen as the top priority
Fighting corruption and nepotism has the highest approval rate, with 84 percent
considering it as ‘very important’ and another 13 percent as ‘rather important’. Legal
persecution of security personnel responsible for human rights violations and establishing an ombudsman to investigate citizen’s complaints are judged to be equally important. Such strong and widespread support for in-depth reform suggests that the security sector has largely failed to meet the Palestinian people’s expectations and finds
itself in a major crisis of confidence and legitimacy.
Strong support for dissolution of armed groups
Considering the high level of
Dissolve Armed Groups (o320c) by Place of
trust given to non-statutory
Residence - July 05
armed groups, such as the AlAqsa
or
the Al-Qassem
69%
23%
6%
brigades, it should be noted Gaza Strip Refugee Camp
that a majority of respondents Gaza Strip outside camps
51%
22%
11% 16%
are in favor of dissolving them.
Jerusalem
45%
32%
18%
56 percent of all respondents
con-sider the dissolving of
West Bank Refugee Camp
56%
25%
17%
armed groups a very important
measure. It may be surprising West Bank outside camps
57%
27%
9% 7%
that support for dissolving
Very important Rather important Rather unimportant Very unimportant
armed groups is highest in the
refugee camps in Gaza, with
69 percent approving it as a ‘very important’ measure. The combination of high trust
in armed groups and the strong support for their dissolution in an area that has a reputation for having served as a recruitment pool for armed groups raises a number of
questions that would deserve further analysis. It could be that the camp population has
suffered disproportionately because of the presence of armed groups and sees in their
disbanding an occasion for increasing security. Among residents of refugee camps in the
Gaza Strip, 10 percent listed the existence of armed groups as one of the main reasons
for their insecurity. It could also possibly indicate a willingness of members of armed
groups to join the statutory forces, if they were offered the opportunity to do so. In
recent months, many have sharply criticized the Palestinian National Authority for its
partisan management of the security forces and have demanded that recruitment and
selection be done on a non-factional basis.
Strong demand for accountability and increased oversight
The support for particular security sector reform measures varies according to the
place of residence. Gaza residents and respondents living in refugee camps, for
example, attach a higher importance to the legal prosecution of security officials
responsible for human rights violations. A majority of respondents in all areas wanted
the Palestinian Legislative Council to increase oversight of the security apparatus.
Support for this measure was particularly high in the refugee camps of the West Bank,
where 66 percent rated it as ’very important’.
12
Support for changes in the judiciary
Improvement of Rule of Law - Measures (o322 a-h) - July 05
Improve salaries of judges and prosecutors
48
30
% of answers
Improve training of judges and prosecutors
74
Deal with the case backlog
69
Professionalize court administration
Abolish state security courts
23
27
66
29
39
26
19
Unify the court system
69
27
Strengthen the independence of the judiciary
69
27
Unify Palestinian legal code
79
18
Very important Rather Important Rather Unimportant Very Unimportant
Respondents also perceive a strong need to improve the rule of law. Measures aiming at
strengthening the legal framework and improving the functioning of the judiciary were
usually seen as ‘very important’, with peaks of 79 percent in sup-port of the unification
of the Palestinian legal code and 74 percent for improving the training of judges and
prosecutors.
The abolishment of the state
security and military courts is
the most controversial of the
proposed remedies. InterestGaza Strip Refugee Camp
42%
23%
16%
20%
ingly, “only” 39 percent of the
Gaza Strip outside camps
27%
17%
17%
39%
interviewees strongly support
Jerusalem
50%
37%
8% 5%
this measure, despite the fact
that a mere 19 percent of the
West Bank Refugee Camp
44%
22%
21%
13%
respondents said to have high
West Bank outside camps
41%
29%
18%
12%
trust in these courts. Respondents living in the Gaza Strip
Very important Rather important Rather unimportant Very unimportant
outside the refugee camps are
the least inclined to support the abolishment of state security courts, while residents
of East Jerusalem expressed the strongest support. Most in favor of the abolishment of
the state security courts were interviewees above the poverty line.
Abolishment of State Security Courts by Place of
Residence
13
A majority of Palestinians believes that salaries for judges and prosecutors should be
increased, (as a means of fighting corruption in the judiciary). 54 percent in the West
Bank, and even 64 percent of the refugees living in camps in the West Bank, attach
high importance to this measure. In Gaza however, one in four respondents considered
the measure as ’very unimportant’.
Improving Salaries of Justice Sector (o322h) by Region July 05
54%
48%
32%
25%
41%
9%
West Bank
Very important
38%
9%
Jerusalem
Rather important
Rather unimportant
25%
12%
Gaza Strip
Very unimportant
Conclusions
While Israeli occupation impacts on Palestinian perceptions of security and imposes
severe constraints on the Palestinian authorities, it does not explain the limited trust
the Palestinian population has in the security sector. It appears that rather the governance of these institutions and their legitimacy are questioned.
Domestically, the Palestinian National Authority and the official security organizations
are confronted with a major legitimacy deficit. Unless confidence in the official institutions is restored, popular support for substitute organizations, such as private
militias and parallel court systems, is likely to grow. This could further undermine the
already weak confidence in the public system. It could also widen the gap between
residents in Jerusalem and residents in the West Bank and Gaza and eventually be
detrimental to Palestinian unity and the nation-building process. From a Palestinian
perspective, improving security sector governance should therefore be a matter of
high national interest.
The strong and widespread popular demand for an in-depth reform of the whole security sector indicates dissatisfaction with the present situation. But it is also expresses
broad-based willingness to strengthen official institutions and improve their performance, which provides a foundation of political capital upon which the political leadership can build.
The challenge for the Palestinian National Authority will be to build a nationally-owned
and led vision of how the security sector should be reformed and to map and implement
a government-wide strategy for security sector reform that can deliver tangible results
to Palestinian citizens, such as a substantial reduction in corruption and nepotism and
enhanced respect for human rights.
14
While the Palestinian National Authority can count on overwhelming support in the
population for disarming and disbanding the militias, it will unlikely be able to achieve
this objective unless it succeeds in strengthening its own legitimacy. Representative
institutions and a well-governed security sector would help the Palestinian National
Authority gather the support needed to take on riskier tasks.
The challenges of Palestinian security sector governance illustrate the overlapping
problems of development and security and highlight the need for integrated development and security policies. In the Palestinian context, international development assistance and humanitarian aid should increasingly be judged on its capability to respond
to the challenges posed by poor security sector governance. A failure to address this
fundamental problem risks to reduce the impact of aid and fuel frustrations that, in the
long run, may be difficult to control.
15