Judy Smith-Höhn
Rebuilding the Security Sector in Post-Conflict Societies:
Perceptions from Urban Liberia and Sierra Leone
Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF)
LIT
Judy Smith-Höhn
Rebuilding the Security Sector
in Post-Conflict Societies:
Perceptions from Urban Liberia and
Sierra Leone
LIT
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Tables and Figures
Abbreviations
Maps
vii
ix
xi
xiii
xvi
1
Introduction
2
On Security: Definitions and Theories
13
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
13
15
17
3
4
17
Methodology
43
3.1
3.2
45
58
The comparative method
Tools for comparison: a mixed-methods approach
Case Studies
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5
Post-conflict societies
Human security: A narrow definition
Peacebuilding
Security sector reform and reconstruction in
the post-conflict setting
1
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Comparison of cases
Multilevel comparison: A synopsis
Conclusion
71
71
78
86
142
157
Annex I:
Survey Poll
162
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Questionnaire: Liberia
Questionnaire: Sierra Leone
Data analysis: Frequencies Liberia
Data analysis: Frequencies Sierra Leone
162
169
175
198
Annex II:
Guidelines for Focus Group Discussion (excerpt)
224
About the Author
About DCAF
227
228
Preface
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
develops and disseminates policy-relevant research that contributes new
knowledge on issues related to security sector reform (SSR) and security
sector governance (SSG). As part of the DCAF Research Division’s strong
commitment to promoting innovative, empirically-grounded analysis from
different world regions, we are therefore delighted to publish Rebuilding the
Security Sector in Post-Conflict Societies: Perceptions from Urban Liberia
and Sierra Leone by Dr. Judy Smith-Höhn.
Applying a human security perspective, this volume raises important
issues relating to gaps between SSR ‘design’ and how individuals and
communities experience security in practice. It also constructively identifies
policy options that are particularly relevant given the long term nature of the
SSR processes in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. An analytical approach that
asks questions of individual citizens on how they experience security helps
to move the notion of human security from concept to lived experience.
Moreover, the prominence of the informal security sector in both settings –
from community watch groups to private security companies – provides
empirical evidence to support those analysts and practitioners that call for
the role such actors play in security sector governance frameworks within
many national settings to be properly acknowledged.1
This volume is published in parallel to another contribution in the
DCAF LIT series, Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone 1997-2007: Views
from the Front Line edited by Peter Albrecht and Dr. Paul Jackson. While
not conceived as companion volumes, they do offer complementary insights
and lessons. Albrecht and Jackson consider SSR from the perspectives of
influential national and international stakeholders; Smith-Höhn takes the
opposite approach in focusing on the perceptions of the ordinary citizens
who should be the beneficiaries of reform efforts. We hope that
disseminating and discussing the findings contained in these volumes will
provide insights that help to bridge top-down and bottom-up perspectives,
thus making a concrete impact on the design, implementation and
effectiveness of SSR policies and programmes.
1
See: Alan Bryden and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (Eds) Security Sector Transformation in Africa
(Münster, LIT Verlag, 2010). Available at www.dcaf.ch/publications/
viii
It would not have been possible to successfully complete this volume
without the invaluable support of a number of people. I would like to
acknowledge the excellent work of the author, Judy-Smith-Höhn, and thank
her for the opportunity to review and publish her research. DCAF colleagues
Fairlie Chappuis and Lynda Chenaf provided important assistance during the
editing process. In particular, I would like to thank Yury Korobovsky, Head
of DCAF’s Information Resources Unit, as well as his team for guiding the
publication process and liaising with our partners at LIT Verlag. Finally,
thanks go to Cherry Ekins for copy editing the draft volume with subtlety
and attention to detail.
The views expressed in this volume are those of the author alone and
do not in any way represent the views of the institutions or their
representatives involved in this project.
Alan Bryden
Deputy Head of Research
DCAF
Geneva, September 2010
Acknowledgements
This dissertation is developed from a research project funded by the German
Foundation for Peace Research. Without this financial support and without
the assistance and cooperation of a number of people to whom I owe many
thanks, I would surely not have been able to complete this study. I am deeply
indebted to Prof. Dr. Ulf Engel for always finding time to answer my emails,
and for his persistent encouragement and intellectual assistance as well as to
Dr. Andreas Mehler for his intellectual guidance, support and constant
advice on all project-related matters.
I am also very grateful to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) for their generous offer to publish this
book as a volume in their DCAF LIT Series and for taking such professional
care of publishing matters. In so doing, what was initially perhaps doomed to
gather dust on library shelves throughout Germany will now reach a much
wider audience than I could have possibly hoped for.
I would like to thank my interview partners in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, who found the time to answer my questions during my two field
visits in November 2005-February 2006 and April-June 2006. The
information obtained in the interviews is incorporated throughout this study,
but mainly in chapter 4. I also thank Dr. Heinz Jockers, who in his capacity
as the director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Liberia, established
essential contacts and allowed us to use the foundation’s facilities to conduct
research in what would have otherwise been a very difficult environment.
Special thanks go to Dr. Mats Utas, who shared not only his in-depth
knowledge on Sierra Leone and his valuable contacts, but also his home in
Freetown. I also thank Osman Gbla and his Centre for Security and
Development Analysis in Freetown, for providing us with competent
researchers to conduct the survey poll and for sending some of them off to
the hinterland with me on roads that turned out to be rather perilous. I must
also thank our moderators, Sunny George, Safie Sesay and Charlie J.
Hughes, for skilfully guiding the focus groups in the right direction.
I am grateful to my colleagues at the GIGA Institute of African
Affairs in Hamburg who always found the time to clarify doubts and give
advice but also to ask the right questions that made me think twice. I must
especially thank Dr. Matthias Basedau, who played a brief but crucial role as
a senior researcher in the research project, for giving me sound advice from
the very start. Dr. Daniel Lambach, for providing precisely the type of
x
support expected of a senior researcher. I thank Alexander Stroh, my office
buddy, for being in the same boat as I; several interns at the Institute for their
research assistance; and Sven Buth for help with the data analysis. I am
further grateful to the participants of several conferences, workshops, and
seminars, whose comments proved to be most helpful.
I want to express my heartfelt thanks to family and friends. I
particularly thank those friends who helped me through the most critical
stages in the last two years, especially Elena Meyer-Clement and AmandaLeigh O’Connell. My deepest gratitude goes to my brother, Neil Smith.
Thanks for the much needed moral and financial support while I was trying
to find my feet in what was then a foreign country to me. Last but certainly
not least, I owe love and thanks to my husband Bastian Höhn for his
unconditional support and love throughout this entire process.
Judy Smith- Höhn
Pretoria, September 2010
Tables and Figures
Table 2.1
Table 3.1
Table 4.1
Table 4.2
Table 4.3
Table 4.4
Table 4.5
Table 4.6
Table 4.7
Table 4.8
Table 4.9
Table 4.10
Table 4.11
Table 4.12
Table 4.13
Table 4.14
Table 4.15
Table 4.16
Table 4.17
Table 4.18
Table 4.19
Definitions of the ‘security sector’
Four purposes of comparing
General and personal security in urban
Liberia
General and personal security in urban
Liberia – Gender
General security in urban Liberia –
Ethnic group
General security in three urban centres of
Liberia
General security in three urban centres of
Liberia – Past and present compared
Security actors in urban Liberia – Most
important actors
Security actors in urban Liberia (%)
Security actors in urban Liberia – Biggest
threat
Changes in general and personal security
in urban Liberia – Past versus present
General and personal security in urban
Sierra Leone
General and personal security in urban
Sierra Leone – Gender
General security in urban Sierra Leone
– Religion
General security in urban Sierra Leone
– Ethnic group
General security in three urban centres
of Sierra Leone
Personal security in three urban centres
of Sierra Leone
Changes in general security in urban
Sierra Leone: Past and present compared
Changes in personal security in urban
Sierra Leone: Past and present compared
Security actors in urban Sierra Leone
– Most important actors
Security actors in urban Sierra Leone (%)
20
48
87
88
89
90
91
93
94
96
100
105
106
106
107
108
108
109
110
111
112
xii
Table 4.20
Table 4.21
Table 4.22
Table 4.23
Table 4.24
Table 4.25
Table 4.26
Figure 2.1
Figure 3.1
Figure 3.2
Figure 4.1
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.3
Figure 4.4
Figure 4.5
Figure 4.6
Figure 4.7
Figure 4.8
Current policing structures in Sierra Leone
Mines monitoring officers in three Sierra
Leonean cities compared (%)
Bike riders in three Sierra Leonean cities
compared
Sierra Leone – Mapping security actors
today
Sierra Leone – Security actors past and
present
General and personal security in urban
Liberia and Sierra Leone compared
Mapping security actors – Liberia and
Sierra Leone today
SSR and related activities
The case study method – A semantic
clarification
Comparative case studies – Levels of
comparison
Liberia today – Security actors and
their interactions
Liberia 2003 – Security actors and
their interactions
Sierra Leone today – Security actors and
their interactions
Sierra Leone 2002–2005 – Security actors
and their interactions
Sierra Leone today – Security actors and
their interactions
Sierra Leone in 2001 – Security actors and
their interactions
Liberia today – Security actors and their
interactions
Liberia and Sierra Leone today – Security
actors and their interactions
114
115
119
120
121
133
134
28
56
58
98
102
116
124
126
128
130
138
Abbreviations
ACPP
AFL
APC
AU
BCE
BICC
BIN
BTI
CCSSP
CDF
CDID
CDU
CISU
CMR
CPA
CSO
CWT
DAC
DCAF
DDR
DDRR
DEA
DFID
DSF
ECOMIL
ECOMOG
ECOWAS
EO
EU
FCO
FGD
FOHRD
GIGA
GOL
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool
Armed Forces of Liberia
All People's Congress (Sierra Leone)
African Union
Bureau of Customs and Excise (Liberia)
Bonn International Center for Conversion
Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation (Liberia)
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Programme
(Sierra Leone)
civil defence forces
Complaint, Discipline and Investigation Department
civil defence unit
Central Intelligence and Security Unit (Sierra Leone)
civil-military relations
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Liberia)
civil society organisation
community watch team
OECD Development Assistance Committee
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration
Drugs Enforcement Agency (Liberia)
Department for International Development (UK)
Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung (German Foundation for
Peace Research)
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS Monitoring Group
Economic Community of West African States
Executive Outcomes
European Union
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
focus group discussion
Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy
German Institute for Global and Area Studies
Government of Liberia
xiv
GRC
GTZ
ICG
ICGL
IDP
IMATT
ISU
JIU
LNP
LURD
MCP
MDSD
MNS
MoD
MODEL
MSSD
NBI
NCDDR
NCDDRR
NFS
NGO
NPFL
NPRC
NSA
NSC
NTGL
NTLA
OECD
ONS
OSD
PPB
PSC
RSLAF
RUF
SCSL
SILSEP
SLP
Governance Reform Commission
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
International Crisis Group
International Contact Group on Liberia
internally displaced person
International Military Advisory and Training Team (Sierra
Leone)
Internal Security Unit (Sierra Leone)
joint implementation unit
Liberia National Police
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
Monrovia City Police
most-different systems design
Liberian Ministry of National Security
Ministry of Defence
Movement for Democracy in Liberia
most-similar systems design
National Bureau of Investigation (Liberia)
Sierra Leone’s National Committee for Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration
Liberia’s National Commission for Disarmament,
Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
National Fire Service (Liberia)
non-governmental organisation
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
National Provisional Ruling Council (Sierra Leone)
National Security Agency (Liberia)
National Security Council (Sierra Leone)
National Transitional Government of Liberia
National Transitional Legislative Assembly of Liberia
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Office of National Security (Sierra Leone)
SLP Operational Support Division
Police Partnership Board (Sierra Leone)
private security company
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
Special Court for Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme
Sierra Leone Police
xv
SLPP
SSD
SSR
SSS
TRC
UK
ULIMO
UN
UN CIVPOL
UNAMSIL
UNDP
UNICEF
UNIOSIL
UNMIL
UNP
UNSC
US
WANEP
WIPNET
Sierra Leone People’s Party
Special Security Division
security sector reform
Special Security Service (Liberia)
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
United Kingdom
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
United Nations
UN Civilian Police
UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UN Development Programme
UN Children’s Fund
UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UN Mission in Liberia
UN Police
UN Security Council
United States of America
West African Network for Peacebuilding
Women in Peacebuilding Network
The boundaries and names shown and the designations
used on this map do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the United Nations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
April 2006, Monrovia. Thick smoke rises from burning tyres. Shop owners
have pulled down their shutters and residents have vacated the streets. A
group of discontented former soldiers stages protests in the streets, setting up
ad hoc roadblocks and effectively paralysing Liberia’s capital. The mayhem
is brought to an end when a contingent from the 15,000-strong UN
peacekeeping force fires shots in the air to disperse the angry mob.
A few thousand kilometres away, the UN-backed Special Court of
Sierra Leone, citing an inability to deal with major security threats, awaits a
response to its request to relocate the trial of former warlord and Liberian
President Charles Taylor to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Around the corner, a taxi driver who had just been involved in a car accident
refuses to leave his damaged vehicle at the police station for fear that it
might be stripped of all its parts during the night.
Both scenarios attest to the volatility of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and
expose the inability of the state security forces – both military and police –
to meet the security needs of their citizens effectively. Both countries had
only recently emerged from protracted periods of civil war, and the
international community has been involved in rebuilding – and in some
cases building from scratch – the various state institutions.
Following the end of the Cold War, international organisations and
coalitions of countries have increasingly engaged in what is commonly
labelled post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, particularly in
countries recovering from violent conflict that led to state failure.1
Peacebuilding has formed a core aspect of international intervention in postwar societies ever since then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
introduced the concept as key to successful preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking and peacekeeping. In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali
defined peacebuilding as the medium- to long-term process of rebuilding
war-affected communities through identifying and supporting structures to
consolidate peace so as to avoid a relapse into conflict.2 Over time, the
definition of peacebuilding has gradually expanded to become a
multidimensional construct that includes the process of rebuilding the
political, security and socio-economic dimensions of societies emerging
2
Judy Smith-Höhn
from conflict. Peacebuilding stretches from humanitarian relief through
transitional rehabilitation to long-term development efforts such as security
sector reform (SSR).3
In recognition of the fact that there can be no development without
peace, reconstruction efforts have focused heavily on reforming the security
sector in such post-conflict societies.4 Although some authors may not agree
with the statement that the (re)installation of an order of violence – that is,
freedom from violence and coercion through the provision of security – is an
unconditional prerequisite to any effective rebuilding process following a
decline in the intensity of armed conflict, most concede that security is a
crucial public good in post-conflict societies, though not necessarily the
most important one.5
Numerous efforts have been made to reconstruct or build from scratch
a security sector that can effectively provide for the physical well-being of
its citizens. Successes can be tallied, but there remains significant scope for
improvement. A few years following the official cessation of conflict in socalled post-conflict societies – usually once a relatively secure environment
has been maintained by external actors through international peacekeeping
operations – one can begin to analyse the progress made in the
(re)construction of the security sector. While acknowledging that SSR and
the demands and challenges faced in such processes are context-specific and
ever-changing, lessons that are learnt from such analyses can inform the
development of future reform strategies if conducted within a comparative
framework. Given that SSR forms part of a wider peacebuilding, conflict
prevention and post-conflict reconstruction agenda that obtains its primary
impetus from external actors, there is a need for a rigorous academic
analysis of this largely policy-dictated concept.
In the tradition of Max Weber, where the state is defined as – among
other things – ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly
of the legitimate use of physical forces within a given territory’,6 such
reform strategies focus on (re)installing the state’s said monopoly and taking
the security sector out of private hands and bringing it under the state’s
mantle. However, this approach ignores the fact that the post-colonial state
has itself often played a central role in causing and promoting the escalation
of violence. Strategies implemented by external actors to reform the security
sector should therefore include a consideration of whether the state should or
can be reconstructed into its pre-conflict shape, since the goal is the
establishment of a viable society capable of managing its conflicts without
resorting to violence. A notion such as this would then include, for example,
Introduction
3
alternative or traditional security models that coexist with the state structures
into the reform process.
Analogous to the often restricted focus of policy-makers on the role of
the state within the security sector, the academic focus has generally been
limited to the strategies undertaken by external actors to ensure the survival
of the local population through strengthening state security institutions,
while the efforts made by locals themselves to survive amid hostile
situations and resolve emerging conflicts have been given little attention.
Moreover, although current research goes beyond the focus on state
structures to include sub-state and transnational actors in the security sector,
there is a shortage of empirical evidence assessing the existence and
efficiency of all these external, state and non-state actors. Research on SSR
is a fairly recent phenomenon, which partly explains the scarcity of
empirical evidence from local expert observers, public officials, civil society
and members of the local society. Hence the security sector reform debate is
characterised by a disproportionate ratio between numerous general
recommendations on what could and should be done and specific
suggestions that are based on a thorough analysis of a particular post-conflict
situation.7
This study aims to overcome this discrepancy by combining the
wealth of theoretical insights on security sector reform and reconstruction
with empirical evidence gathered on the ground. Thus the primarily deskbased approaches towards defining key elements of post-conflict SSR will
be tested against empirical evidence gathered in the two post-conflict
societies of Liberia and Sierra Leone.
What, then, are the key issues that concern analysts of security sector
reform processes in post-conflict settings? Is there general agreement on the
most effective strategy, and do the numerous actors that are involved in such
processes coordinate their activities? Are current approaches towards
reforming post-conflict security sectors successful, and, most importantly,
are there tools to measure the effectiveness of these strategies?
The key objective of this particular study is to ascertain the suitability
of previous strategies for reforming and reconstructing the security sectors in
post-conflict societies, thus pointing to key challenges for policy-makers in
the development of their reform strategies.
Two overarching principles guided the selection of the two country
case studies. On the one hand, there was the recognition that an in-depth
empirical analysis of all instances of externally driven SSR in societies
emerging from conflict would require a large amount of human and financial
resources, hence the need to restrict the number of cases. On the other hand,
4
Judy Smith-Höhn
there was a need to select cases that were comparable, i.e. the cases needed
to share certain characteristics while displaying divergence in others. Liberia
and Sierra Leone fulfilled this latter criterion in that they displayed
divergence in the different reform approaches that were undertaken by the
(mostly international) implementing agencies in each case, with Sierra
Leone at a slightly more advanced stage of the reform process. On the other
hand, they displayed a number of contextual similarities, i.e. the two
countries shared certain background conditions. Both West African countries
witnessed protracted periods of violence during the 1990s. In fact, the civil
wars in both countries are closely linked: mercenaries surreptitiously crossed
the common border to fight in the other’s civil war, and each ruling class has
continuously meddled in the affairs of its neighbour. Charles Taylor’s role in
instigating violence and supporting rebel groups in Sierra Leone is the most
prominent case in point. Yet another contextual similarity between the two is
the extensive involvement of international and regional actors such as the
United Nations (UN) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) during the post-conflict phases. Also, the socio-economic
conditions are similar and there appear to be a number of different (types of)
security actors in both cases.
The overall approach to the analysis of security sector reform involves
both deductive and inductive reasoning. Firstly, current approaches adopted
by the leading international and regional agencies involved in SSR and
reconstruction are scrutinised, particularly those that focus on post-conflict
situations. This enables the identification of common criteria that can be
utilised to measure the efficacy of SSR strategies through empirical testing.
Drawing from the analysis of the empirical data and having tested the
validity of the criteria used to measure effective reform of the security
sector, the focus returns to the drawing board to formulate or amend existing
criteria for the successful implementation of SSR and make some general
observations regarding the efficacy of SSR strategies undertaken in postconflict environments.
In most cases, the reconstruction of the security sector involves the
rebuilding of domestic public security institutions, and particularly the reestablishment of a legitimate monopoly on the use of force.8 This book
challenges this normative axiom and suggests a broader understanding of the
security sector as an institution to include not only state actors, but also nonstate informal security actors that have proven to play a role in the security
arena as stipulated in the OECD DAC9 Guidelines on Security System and
Governance Reform. These guidelines define a broader security sector that
includes core security actors such as the armed forces and the police,
Introduction
5
security management and oversight bodies, and justice and law enforcement
institutions as well as non-statutory security forces such as liberation armies
and private security companies –donors rarely engage with the latter.10
Though most authors recognise the definition of the security sector or
system as stipulated by these guidelines, they tend to focus on the state
sector when analysing reform processes. This a priori exclusion of the nonstate players appears to be a key deficit in such studies: in many postconflict societies, non-state actors tend to play a far more significant role in
peacebuilding processes than presumed.
This limited focus, in part, contributes to some of the shortcomings of
SSR strategies. In post-conflict settings, years of civil war have often left
state security institutions in shambles. Hence these state actors usually
remain heavily dependent on external support even after the externals have
officially entrusted local authorities with the primary responsibility of
providing security to citizens. In the face of the state’s inability to hold a
monopoly on the use of force, the question therefore arises as to whether
alternative modes of security provision have emerged to fill this security
vacuum. Perhaps non-state actors often found in such environments should
be included in the security architecture? If the focus is no longer merely on
ensuring that the executive organs of the state are developed into an efficient
security sector, but instead on the inclusion of other relevant actors who are
bound by the same rules as all others, it might increase the prospects of
ensuring the long-term sustainability of security.
By exploring the mechanisms applied by the local population to
resolve their conflicts and by identifying the actors that are considered to be
involved in providing security at all levels – national and local, urban and
rural – one counters the policy bias of focusing mainly on external and state
actors, albeit that they are important. The issue of local ownership, a
commonly accepted prerequisite to effective security provision, plays a key
role here.
Having identified the salient issues and affirmed the need for an
empirical analysis of SSR strategies, what type of empirical data are required
to test the hypotheses? Simply put, who should be asked what and why?
Country data, such as crime statistics, are one source of empirical
information. However, there are two problems associated with the use of
such data: the reliability of the source; and the accuracy and currency of the
data. This is particularly so for countries that have recently emerged from
protracted periods of conflict, where there is a lack of infrastructure and
manpower to provide reliable statistical information. In the cases under
study, such data are only available for Sierra Leone, and their quality and
6
Judy Smith-Höhn
reliability are questionable. Although the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
monitors the security situation and gathers data on security-related matters,
the information was not publicly accessible at the time this analysis was
performed and could therefore not be used. Primary and secondary literature
are a second source of information. Though a comparative desk study may
certainly provide new insights, few academic analyses have been conducted
on SSR in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the empirical data, where available,
are generally not comparable due to the expected divergence in the research
designs of these various studies.
There was therefore a need to generate reliable, and more importantly
comparable, data on security-related issues in both post-conflict countries.
The question is then: what sort of empirical data can facilitate the
identification of the strengths and weaknesses of security sector reform
strategies in post-conflict societies?
Victor Azarya’s work on reordering state-society relations in Africa
provides some valuable insights into why local perceptions not only enable
an assessment of the performance of security actors, but are also relevant for
the future success of reform and reconstruction strategies.11 Azarya suggests
an alternative to the state-centred approach to studying state-society relations
in contemporary Africa by placing greater emphasis on societal responses to
state actions. In his attempt to explain the weakening of the state, Azarya
developed the notion of incorporation into and disengagement from the state
as ‘societal responses to state actions (or anticipated state actions) which
lead to a perceived change in the field of opportunities of given groups or
individuals’.12
Applying the concept of incorporation and disengagement to the
provision of security within society, with the state ideally dominating and
regulating the behaviour of all relevant actors within this realm, acts of
association with or distancing from the state by individuals or groups are
indicative of that sector’s efficiency. If the weakening of government
agencies can lead individuals and groups to devise alternative methods of
sustaining themselves economically, then surely the same can be said for the
pursuit of interests related to the provision of security. Thus if individuals or
groups perceive the state to be incapable of providing or managing security
in the country, they will disengage from this arena.13 As other structures gain
increased authority, state security structures weaken. Thus, in order to
determine whether security bodies exist that are capable of providing
security, or whether effective oversight mechanisms are in place, one can
consider society’s response to the state in this area. In other words, one must
question whether individuals or groups within society perceive the state as
Introduction
7
providing effective security, for example, or whether citizens tend to opt for
alternative means of security provision. To use Azarya’s terminology: do
citizens incorporate into or disengage from the state when it comes to
fending for their security needs? An analysis of the efficacy of the security
sector that is based on empirical evidence gathered on the ground must
therefore take into account the perceptions of the local population as regards
security-related matters.
Returning to the structure of this study, the approach is analytical,
empirical and interpretive. Chapter 2 outlines current concepts of security
sector reform and reconstruction as implemented by the leading international
agencies, particularly those that focus on post-conflict situations. A basic
definition of the terminology and key expressions used precedes the
discussion on SSR. The lack of consensus among scholars on the definitions
and descriptions of what comprises the security sector necessitates an initial
distinction between the various interpretations. A set of key criteria are
developed, which are used as guidelines for assessing the current
effectiveness of security sector reform efforts.
Having outlined the basic guideline for the analysis of SSR, Chapter 3
focuses on the methodology applied. It outlines the benefits of the
comparative method as it is – or at least should be – applied in the field of
political science. The point of departure for deliberations on the appropriate
research design is the recognition that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ blueprint.
Hence the chapter develops and elaborates on the research design most
suited for the analysis at hand, namely the comparative case study approach,
and a framework for analysis is developed, outlining the various levels of
analysis and identifying the cases to be compared. The chapter concludes
with a description of the qualitative and quantitative tools that were used for
data gathering. The study takes a mixed-methods approach to data gathering,
combining both quantitative and qualitative tools to collect empirical
information on the state of the security sector in the case studies. Field
research was conducted in both countries, extending over a period of three
months in each; and the findings are based on the combination of unique
empirical data from three sources: a survey poll of 700 respondents in three
urban areas in each country; four in-depth focus group discussions (FGDs),
each comprising six to eight participants; and 60 semi-standardised
interviews with elites and local and international experts. Where available,
non-conventional literature and other key documents such as internal reports,
fact sheets and crime statistics were gathered to substantiate the empirical
data. The comparison is structured and focused: it is focused in that it
considers a selected aspect of each case – i.e. the security sector – and it is
Judy Smith-Höhn
8
structured in that the same set of research questions were posed for both
cases.
Chapter 4 on the case studies comprises four sections that are
structured according to the framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3. The
first two sections provide a chronological overview of the development of
each conflict, as well as the SSR strategy adopted in each case. The next
section applies the comparative research design, comparing the security
sector reform of both countries. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of the
various comparative steps undertaken.
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the findings from the previous
chapters and a reflection on the implications of these findings for further
research.
1.1
Background
This volume is developed from a research project entitled ‘Legitimate
Oligopolies of Violence in Post-Conflict Societies with a Particular Focus on
Liberia and Sierra Leone’14 that was implemented by the GIGA Institute of
African Affairs in Hamburg, Germany. As part of the research team, the
author conducted the fieldwork in Liberia and Sierra Leone and used the
project as a framework for the development of a doctoral thesis.
The project recognised that little attention had thus far been given to
determining which state or pre-state institutions emerge during post-conflict
periods, when actors enjoy considerable leeway in the domain of security,
and when institutions, concepts of law and order and patterns of action are
challenged and renegotiated. It acknowledged the lack of empirical research
on the constellations of authority following the cessation of conflicts in
Africa, a shortcoming which corresponded to deficiencies on the level of
policy-making. It appeared that Western donors based their approaches to
post-conflict reconstruction on the wholly unchallenged assumption that
only the state could legitimately hold the monopoly on the use of force.
However, the project noted that such approaches should, in fact, be preceded
by questioning the pre-conflict state’s validity, for it was generally accepted
that the post-colonial state had often played an important role in the
persistence and escalation of violence. Hence, there should be prior
consideration as to whether the state can and should be reconstructed into its
pre-conflict shape.
The project’s primary goal was to determine which actors (the
traditional authorities, the remnants of state security, private entrepreneurs,
Introduction
9
international peacekeeping missions and so on) provide security in a
situation of fragmented authority and sanctioned violence and crime.
Moreover, the project sought to analyse the conditions under which different
groups within society considered these actors to be legitimate: some actors
might protect specific groups within the population while representing a
threat to others. In other words, the project sought to determine whether
oligopolies of violence exist in post-conflict societies, and, if so, how they
are constituted: whether temporal, homogeneous or heterogeneous, territorial
or functional.
These questions were addressed in empirical case studies of Liberia
and Sierra Leone and a desk study of six other post-conflict societies,
namely Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, Nigeria, Pakistan and
Somaliland. The case studies of oligopolies of violence in post-conflict
situations in Sierra Leone and Liberia complemented the general theoretical
insights gained from the literature and the subsequent desk study.15
Though not focused on security sector reform, the guiding questions
of the research project, in revealing the constellation and perceived
legitimacy of security actors in Liberia and Sierra Leone, also highlighted
the security sector as a whole and provided insights into the perceived
efficacy of this sector, particularly those actors involved in actually
providing physical security. Therefore, although the focus of the research
project was actor-centred, the data gathered could be adjusted and used
effectively to examine the entire reform process.
Notes
1
2
3
4
Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (2004) ‘Security sector reform and
post-conflict reconstruction under international auspices’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner
Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, pp. 121–
143; available at www.dcaf.ch/publications/bm_ssr_yearbook2004.cfm (accessed 13
February 2006).
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. New York: United Nations; available at www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/47/a47r120.htm (accessed 1 July 2005).
J. ’Kayode Fayemi (2004) ‘Governing insecurity in post-conflict states: The case of Sierra
Leone and Liberia’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction
of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, p. 2; available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/
FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=B0EA7833-62AD-2215-99BF-182ADF9F413A
&lng=en (accessed 13 June 2006).
Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Erhart (2005) ‘Post-conflict societies and the military:
Challenges and problems of security sector reform’, in Albrecht Schnabel and HansGeorg Erhart (eds) Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Tokyo:
10
Judy Smith-Höhn
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
United Nations University Press, p. 1; David M. Law (2006) ‘The post-conflict security
sector’,
DCAF
Policy
Paper
14;
available
at
www.dcaf.ch/_docs/
PP14_post_conflictss.pdf (accessed 12 December 2006); Heiner Hänggi (2004)
‘Conceptualising security sector reform and reconstruction’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner
Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, pp. 1–11;
available
at
http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=
0CD0E86D-F99B-3B67-0D75-2FFB3FB5CA3D&lng=en (accessed 13 June 2006);
Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, note 1 above.
Cf. Dirk Salomons (2005) ‘Security: An absolute prerequisite’, in G. Junne and W.
Verkoren (eds) Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, p. 19; Daniel Lambach (2007) ‘Oligopolies of violence in post-conflict
societies’, GIGA Working Paper Series, Hamburg, p. 1.
Max Weber (1958) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds H. H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 78.
See e.g. Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, note 1 above, p. 125.
Ibid., p. 121.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development
Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), henceforth referred to as the DAC.
OECD (2004) Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference
Series, pp. 20ff; available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf (accessed 13
January 2007).
Victor Azarya (1988) ‘Reordering state-society relations: Incorporation and
disengagement’, in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds) The Precarious Balance.
State and Society in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 3–21.
Ibid., p. 6.
Incorporation, on the other hand, would entail the integration of traditional, commercial
and other alternative security agencies into the state security sector.
The term ‘oligopoly of violence’ was coined by Andreas Mehler; it is defined as ‘a
fluctuating number of partly competing, partly co-operating actors of violence of different
quality’ and has stimulated controversial debate. The term ‘oligopoly’ is derived from
economy theory, where it denotes a market or industry that is dominated by a small
number of suppliers. Subsequently, an oligopoly with two suppliers is a duopoly, one with
many is termed a polypoly. Applied to the security context, an oligopoly of violence
signifies a security arena that is occupied by a few security actors providing either the
same kind of security (homogeneous oligopoly) or different kinds of security
(heterogeneous oligopoly). Mehler further distinguishes between three sub-types of
oligopolies: territorial oligopoly, based on an agreement between actors for control of
specific territories within states – within these borders, these actors may hold the
monopoly on the use of force; functional oligopoly – heterogeneous oligopoly comprising
various security actors that provide security to protect from a range of security threats;
and temporal oligopoly – displays seasonal variations (e.g. night and day). If understood
as an oligopoly where the roles of actors and their relative meaning within the oligopoly
can change over time, its temporary nature should be considered as a general
characteristic of all types of oligopolies. See Andreas Mehler (2004) ‘Oligopolies of
violence in Africa south of the Sahara’, Nord-Süd Aktuell, 18(3): 539–548; available at
www.giga-hamburg.de/content/staff/mehler/publications/mehler_nsa_04-3.pdf (accessed
5 August 2005).
Introduction
11
15
The cases were subjected to different models of comparison. First, the current situation in
both states was compared; second, Liberia as it was at the time of survey was compared to
Sierra Leone as it emerged from violent conflict at the turn of the millennium; and,
finally, a comparison is made on the timeline between the past and present situation in
each country. The conclusions drawn from these comparisons are then collated with the
results of a study on the organisation of security in 11 other post-conflict societies, which
was developed according to a uniform model of analysis. Finally, the project seeks to
establish criteria that permit an assessment of the prospects for goal-oriented cooperation
with non-state actors, a result which is of direct relevance for policy-making.
Chapter 2
On Security: Definitions and Theories
The concept of security is multidimensional, and those analysing the security
sector normally define security depending on their analytical purposes and
practical problems. The chapter sets out by defining key terms, such as postconflict, peacebuilding, security and security sector. It then provides a brief
outline of the various theoretical approaches to security sector reform that
will form the basis for the analysis of the efficacy of the security sector in
post-conflict societies. This is not exhaustive in its illustration of the various
approaches to SSR, but instead outlines the approaches of the lead
international agencies involved in these processes (the United Nations, the
OECD DAC, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and
the World Bank).
2.1
Post-conflict societies
The term post-conflict calls to mind a number of interrelated developmentoriented concepts, such as post-conflict reconstruction, post-conflict
recovery and post-conflict peacebuilding. However, there appears to be a
lack of consensus in both academia and policy-making circles as regards the
definition of a post-conflict situation. Usually, it describes the period when a
conflict is either interrupted or (temporarily) halted by means of a peace
agreement, the victory or defeat of a conflict party or the intervention of an
external actor.
Kumar and de Zeeuw, for example, define post-conflict societies as
those where the cessation of intra-state conflict is followed by the
international community’s recognition of the government as legitimate.1 In
other words, a ‘post-conflict society’ is one that has emerged from protracted
violent conflict either through externally brokered peace negotiations,
international military intervention or the victory of one warring faction over
another.2
Like most definitions, this implies that a post-conflict period is one
that is characterised by peace. Yet this is frequently not the case. In fact,
post-conflict phases are often marked by high levels of violence, and a
14
Judy Smith-Höhn
simplified concept of conflict versus post-conflict fails to describe
adequately the phenomenon of violent conflict. Similarly, during times of
war there are often long periods without any violent outbreaks.
As for many authors,3 the inaccuracy of Kumar and de Zeeuw’s
definition is a result of preconceived notions implicit in such definitions and
is semantic in nature: the prefix post implies that the conflict has ended and
the situation is returning to normal,4 hence the term indicates a supposed
unidirectional dynamic from a period of war to a period of peace. In other
words, the term post-conflict creates a false mental dichotomy between a
conflict and a post-conflict phase by attaching the temporal prefix ‘post’ to
the ‘conflict’, which, in fact, has no temporal meaning.5 These terms are then
used synonymously with ‘war’ and ‘peace’, respectively. In this dichotomy,
‘conflict’ denotes situations that are structured by violence carried out by
organised actors according to some dominant conflict narrative, while ‘postconflict’ implicitly signifies the end of such violence and the return to a
peaceful, ‘normal’ situation.6
As a result of such misconceptions, most studies on ‘post-conflict’
situations are still informed by the dichotomised understanding of conflict
versus post-conflict, with the level of violence acting as a benchmark:
There are few truly postconflict situations. Conflicts become more or less
violent, more or less manifest or latent, but they seldom stop altogether.
‘Postconflict’… is shorthand for conflict situations, in which open warfare
has come to an end.7
This definition upholds the dichotomy by equating post-conflict with the
cessation of open warfare. Lambach rightly points to the operational limits
of such an approach, since in most cases there is never an identifiable single
moment of cessation.8 Conflicts may either intensify or decline towards the
end, and research has shown that this is contingent upon the side that wins.
When state forces are losing, conflict is likely to intensify, whereas conflict
wanes when insurgent groups are defeated and they withdraw into remote
locations or hide among the population.9 The developments in Sierra Leone
in 2001/2002 following the formal declaration of the end of civil war are a
good example of this lack of a definitive ending of the conflict.10
The level of violence is also often used as an indicator of the end of a
conflict. Yet experience has shown that so-called post-war periods are often
marked by a decline in security.11
On Security: Definitions and Theories
15
As a result, post-conflict realities rarely bear much resemblance to what is
implied by their definition. Rather, death and injury rates often remain
comparatively high even after an armed conflict has come to an ‘end’.12
Lambach, among others, suggests an improvement to the definition of
a post-conflict situation by considering war to be ‘a state of mind shared
among participants’.13 By acknowledging that during times of war there are
often extended periods of non-violence, and contrarily, times of so-called
peace are often tainted by violent outbreaks, one can grasp situations of
conflict and post-conflict as social constructs – that is, ‘discursive
delimitations of the kind of behavior that is to be expected and allowed in a
given set of circumstances’.14
Lambach provides a concise definition of post-conflict as a ‘narrative
of peace’.15 In other words, when a violent outbreak is no longer explained
in terms of the dominant ‘narrative of conflict’, that conflict can be
considered to have come to an end. Violence that occurs in the aftermath of
a conflict is often labelled criminal violence, thus effectively assigning a
different quality to it than to the violence that transpires during civil war.16
Thus a post-conflict society is one in which the violence that is perpetrated
by the former warring factions is no longer carried out in terms of the central
narratives of the previous conflict.17 A conflict can therefore end ‘when the
narrative of violence changes or when the conflict parties are removed (or
remove themselves) from the scene’.18
A further conceptual clarification is needed for the term post-conflict
to characterise not a transitional period between war and peace, as is often
assumed in academic literature and political practice alike, but a distinctive
phase that follows its own logic.19 This would facilitate a better
understanding of post-conflict situations and inform and improve policymaking in this arena. By acknowledging, for instance, the depleted
absorptive capacity of state institutions during post-conflict periods,
development aid could be increased gradually and not disbursed en masse
during the first few years and then reduced, as is usually the case.20
2.2
Human security: A narrow definition
The 1990s witnessed the emergence of new security concepts such as human
security, indicating the paradigmatic shift from the dominance of national
(and international) security to the growing importance of transnational,
subnational and individual security.21
16
Judy Smith-Höhn
Whereas previously security had been defined as national security,
understood as the state’s ability to defend itself against external threats, it
now came to encompass the broader notion of human security, which moves
away from the state-centric approach to focus on the protection of
individuals. Despite consensus regarding this primary goal of human
security, proponents of the concept disagree on its scope – that is, the types
of threats individuals need protection from.22 The narrow understanding of
human security confines it to violent threats to individuals. According to
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, it is the ‘protection of
communities and individuals from internal violence’.23 Others advocate a
broader understanding of the concept, moving beyond protection from
violence to include protection from hunger, disease and natural disasters as
well as from economic insecurity and threats to human dignity.24
In its guidelines on helping prevent violent conflict, the OECD DAC
notes that security is:
increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and
communities live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the
governance of their countries, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights,
have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, and inhabit an
environment which is not detrimental to their health and wellbeing.25
This broader view of human security has many adherents, particularly as it
acknowledges the interrelatedness of such societal threats. However, from a
methodological and pragmatic perspective, the current study has focused on
the narrow understanding of human security. Methodologically, a concept
that groups together threats as diverse as genocide and affronts to personal
dignity runs the risk of becoming diluted. For, as has been noted elsewhere:
‘once a concept is defined so that it encompasses all the incidents that are
members of a given category… it ceases to enhance one’s ability to
explain’.26 Moreover, such concepts, though useful for advocacy, do not
facilitate policy analysis. This certainly explains, to some extent, why the
broad definition of human security developed by the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) in its often-cited Human Development Report 1994 has
rarely been used to guide research programmes.27
From a pragmatic perspective, the narrow definition of human
security as the protection of individuals from physical harm serves a very
practical purpose. The broader the concept, the more difficult it becomes to
gather data and formulate succinct questions for respondents to answer. In
turn, the narrower or more concise a concept, the easier it becomes to
On Security: Definitions and Theories
17
pinpoint its distinguishing features and hence pose questions which
respondents can answer in a few words. This is particularly crucial when
conducting a quantitative survey, where the interviewer poses a number of
brief questions which should be self-explanatory, i.e. the questions should
not require further elaboration.
2.3
Peacebuilding
As noted earlier, peacebuilding became a core feature of international
intervention in post-war societies when former UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the concept in An Agenda for Peace. Over
time, the concept has evolved and now applies not only to rebuilding in postconflict settings but also includes conflict prevention, conflict management
and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
Broader definitions of peacebuilding incorporate nearly all forms of
international assistance to societies that have suffered or are at risk of armed
conflict (government decentralisation, rural development, social investment,
fiscal reform, human rights, security and justice sector reform, nationbuilding). Others are more specific, yet focus attention on clarifying
international mandates rather than conditions for peace in the host country.
More recent approaches focus on the comparative value of international
peacebuilding efforts in relation to one another and in contrast to regional
and domestic efforts. Essentially, post-conflict peacebuilding can be defined
as a mammoth experiment in social engineering, with the goal of creating
conditions for sustainable peace within countries emerging from civil wars.
2.4
Security sector reform and reconstruction in the post-conflict
setting
As noted above, SSR forms part of a wider peacebuilding, conflict
prevention and post-conflict reconstruction agenda that obtains its primary
impetus from external actors. Post-conflict peacebuilding is a
multidimensional construct that stretches from humanitarian relief through
transitional rehabilitation to long-term development efforts such as justice
and security sector reform.28
As part of the peacebuilding agenda, one can identify certain basic
principles of SSR as implemented by the leading international agencies
involved in such processes (DFID, United Nations, World Bank) that are
18
Judy Smith-Höhn
considered relevant and applicable to all post-conflict settings. Both the
scholarly and practitioner-oriented work in this field is quite comprehensive
and hardly requires further elaboration. What is lacking, however, is an SSR
strategy that is context-sensitive – in other words, it takes into account the
local and potential regional peculiarities of a particular reform context. This
is the point of departure for the current study’s deliberations on security
sector reform and reconstruction, which will add to the knowledge base
context-specific empirical evidence of the success or failure of current
reform efforts.
2.4.1
Defining the security sector
The variance in the approaches adopted by external actors when
implementing SSR indicates a general divergence in their respective
understanding of the security sector. A comprehensive analysis of security
sector reform and reconstruction strategies therefore necessitates a prior
definition of the sector. Much like the concept of security, there are almost
as many definitions as there are scholars and institutional actors on the
notion of what comprises the security sector.29 Given the diversity among
actors within the development community, definitions are often shaped by
the domestic arrangements of these external actors. Such limitations
notwithstanding – for scholars cannot escape from the contexts within which
they develop their arguments – there appears to be little doubt regarding the
basic elements of the security sector among scholars and practitioners alike.
Much has been written on the subject, and the following discussion
will necessarily be brief. The purpose here is merely to set the context for
the description of key SSR strategies that have provided the framework for
such intervention in several, particularly African, countries. The core
elements that are discernible among the various interpretations of what
constitutes this sector will thus be identified.
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF) is one of the leading international institutions dealing with SSR
issues. Established by the Swiss government in October 2000, it collaborates
with governments and civil society to promote and support the democratic
and civilian control of security sector organisations such as police,
intelligence agencies, border security services, paramilitary forces and armed
forces.30 DCAF has acted in an advisory capacity to international
organisations like the United Nations, the European Union (EU) and the
OECD31 as well as governments and civil society actors. In addition to
policy advice, it conducts research on issues related to the security sector,
On Security: Definitions and Theories
19
going beyond the ‘democratic control of armed forces’. DCAF’s definition
of the sector and its approach to SSR can thus be viewed as a showcase for
the international donor community’s approach to the subject.
In Germany, the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) is
quite prominent in this field. Generally, its perspectives on security sector
reform and reconstruction are indistinguishable from those of DCAF, and
both have collaborated in conducting research and publishing work in this
area.32 BICC has also worked extensively with the federally owned Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Germany’s
international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development.33 In 2000
they co-published a monograph on SSR in developing countries wherein the
sector was defined as comprising the:
armed forces, paramilitary units, the police and gendarmerie, and the
intelligence service. It also includes the judicial and penal systems, as well as
civil society in general, which also plays a significant role in democratic
control.34
DCAF’s 2004 Yearbook on SSR acknowledges the fact that the
definition of what constitutes the security sector is a complex, evolving and
therefore unsettled matter.35 It argues for a broad understanding of the sector
and provides a useful overview of the key definitions as shaped by the
various perspectives adopted (Table 2.1 on page 20).
Table 2.1 shows that, but for one, definitions of what comprises the
security sector are broad. Definition A, one of the ‘older’ definitions, was
formulated by the Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and
Development Co-operation.36 Like the OECD DAC, Chanaa, in her study on
the issues, challenges and prospects for SSR, opted for a narrow definition of
the security sector to cover ‘those elements that have been granted a
legitimate and exclusive role in the exercise of coercive power in society to
deal with external and internal threat to the security sector and its citizens’.37
The security sector thus comprises all those organisations that have the right
either to use or order the use or threat of force, as well as the civil structures
responsible for their management. This would include military and
paramilitary forces, intelligence services, national and local police forces,
border guards and custom services, judicial and penal systems and the civil
authorities authorised to monitor and supervise these agencies. The key flaw
in this definition is that it is confined to the state sector. Non-statutory
security actors – such as liberation armies and private military and security
Judy Smith-Höhn
20
Table 2.1
Perspectives
Narrow
Broader
Definitions of the ‘security sector’
Definition
A
Definition
B
Definition
C
Definition
D
Security
forces
Groups with
a mandate to Core
wield
security
instruments actors
of violence
Organisations
authorised
to use force
Civilian
management
and
oversight
bodies
Institutions
with a role
in managing
and
monitoring
Security
management
and
oversight
bodies
Civil
management
and
oversight
bodies
Judiciary,
penal
system,
human
rights
ombudsmen
Justice and
law
enforcement
institutions
Justice and
law
enforcement
institutions
Nonstatutory
security
forces
Nonstatutory
security
forces
Nonstatutory
civil society
groups
Focus
Statecentric
Humancentric
companies – if not considered as part of the de facto security sector, must at
least be acknowledged as key actors that influence this sector.38
As for the literature particularly focused on SSR issues in the African
context, it appears that definitions of what comprises the sector are in line
with the norm. In their handbook on security sector governance in Africa,
Ball and Fayemi have a narrow understanding of the sector as such, defining
it as:
all the institutions of the state responsible for securing the state and its
population from fear of violence… the security sector is taken as consisting
of the armed forces, the police and intelligence services, the related ministries
On Security: Definitions and Theories
and departments,
organisations.39
paramilitary
forces,
and
governmental
21
oversight
The authors do, however, acknowledge that several other actors – both
official and non-official – form part of a ‘security community’ that affects
the quality of governance of the sector. Hence, an analysis of SSR should
focus on this entire ‘security community’ to include non-state security
organisations as well as non-statutory civil society bodies.40 Ball and Fayemi
distinguish between state and non-state security organisations by describing
the former as those groups ‘that can legally use force to protect the state and
its population’.41 Again, this is a state-centred approach.
Hendrickson, among others, defines the security sector in a slightly
broader context to include not only ‘groups with a mandate to wield
instruments of violence’ and those institutions that have managing and
monitoring responsibilities, but also the judiciary, penal system and human
rights ombudsmen.42
The OECD DAC’s earlier attempts to define the security sector, or to
use its terminology the security system, encompassed the traditional set of
actors associated with the sector, namely the security forces and the relevant
civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them:
state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the
state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed
forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and
similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions; and the elected and duly
appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g.
Parliament, the Executive, the Defence Ministry, etc.).43
The OECD DAC has since revised this definition to encompass four sets of
actors as stipulated in Definition C.44
The broadest definition of the sector is provided by the UNDP
(Definition D).45 In addition to the four sets of actors identified by the
OECD DAC, the UNDP includes non-statutory civil society groups –
professional groups, the media, research organisations, advocacy
organisations, religious organisations, non-governmental organisations,
community groups – as an integral part of the security sector.46 Though this
definition moves away from the state-centric approach, it tends towards the
other extreme by allowing the inclusion of all sorts of actors, thus running
the risk of becoming too diffuse.
22
Judy Smith-Höhn
Rocklyn Williams provides a second ‘African’ approach to defining
the security sector.47 According to Williams, the security sector can be
defined in terms of either a maximalist (Definition D), minimalist
(Definition A) or pragmatic approach, the author himself favouring the
latter. The pragmatic approach views the security sector:
as being constituted out of the traditional statutory instruments of statecentred security – the armed forces, the police, paramilitary organisations and
the intelligence services as well as such institutions as guerrilla forces
(where such forces are eligible for eventual integration into new national
security institutions and/or demobilisation), and indigenous military
organisations that have played a positive role in contributing to the physical
security of communities (civilian defence forces in Sierra Leone, and selfdefence units in South Africa, for example).48
This definition is unique in that it considers both the statutory and nonstatutory actors actively involved in the provision of physical security to
comprise the security sector, barring the civilian oversight bodies from
inclusion. Although this restriction may prove useful in that it would confine
an analysis of the sector to fewer actors, it fails to acknowledge the role of
justice and law enforcement institutions, for example.
The most commonly cited definition – by scholars and practitioners
49
alike – is that provided by the OECD DAC guidelines on security system
reform and governance (Definition C).50
1.
2.
3.
Core security actors: armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary
forces, presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both
military and civilian), coastguards, border guards, customs authorities,
reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards,
militias).
Security management and oversight bodies: the executive, national
security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative select committees,
ministries of defence, internal bodies (finance ministries, budget
offices, financial audit and planning units) and civil society
organisations (civilian review boards and public complaints
commissions).
Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary, justice ministries,
prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights
commissions and ombudsmen, customary and traditional justice
systems.
On Security: Definitions and Theories
4.
23
Non-statutory security forces, with whom donors rarely engage:
liberation and guerrilla armies, private bodyguard units, private
security companies, political party militias.51
While most authors recognise the definition of the security system as
stipulated by these guidelines, their analyses tend to focus on certain aspects
of that sector, mostly the state side.52 Though the limitation of an analysis to
a particular set of actors within the security sector is understandable
considering the multitude of actors identified as being relevant, the a priori
exclusion of non-state actors is, in the author’s opinion, the problem with
such studies, as in many post-conflict societies non-state actors tend to play
a far more significant role in peacebuilding processes than presumed by
(mostly international) observers, as will be shown in Chapter 4.
So which of these definitions should be applied in this analysis?
Undoubtedly, the security sector cannot be viewed as isolated from other
government sectors or as a singular entity detached from the society within
which it operates. However, this does not imply that all sorts of actors are
included in the equation: this would render an empirical analysis of the
sector difficult, if not impossible.
A useful distinction can be made between the various approaches by
considering the different perspectives from which the sector is defined,
namely either from a security or a governance perspective.53
From a security perspective, the sector includes both statutory and
non-statutory security forces.54 In other words, in addition to the state
institutions with the formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its
citizens (e.g. armed forces, police, intelligence and secret services, justice
and penal institutions), the sector encompasses private and other nonstatutory security actors (e.g. private military and security companies,
liberation armies).55 From the governance perspective, the sector also
includes those state actors responsible for managing and controlling the
security forces (e.g. executive government, ministries of defence and
interior, parliament, judiciary) as well as non-statutory civil society groups,
since these play a role in the democratic governance of the security sector.56
By adopting a security perspective in his definition of the sector,
Williams maintains that it provides a focus within which the complex issue
of SSR can be managed.57 Though he rightly argues for inclusion of
indigenous military organisations such as civil defence forces, his definition
is still limited to those actors that are relevant for the provision of security at
a national level. A definition that not only considers the, let’s call it,
‘national-level’ security sector but also encompasses the local or
24
Judy Smith-Höhn
community-level security sector would allow for the inclusion of legitimised
organisations or groups of actors on the community level and would surely
be more appropriate to an analysis of SSR strategies, particularly in a postconflict environment.
The development perspectives prove to be more inclusive. However,
there is the danger of incorporating far too many actors into the analysis.
In sum, notions on what comprises the security sector have undergone
radical changes since the end of the Cold War era. Whereas earlier
definitions focused on the core security actors only, i.e. those state bodies
with the legitimate mandate to use force, more recent approaches have come
to consider a very broad range of actors. By and large, there appears to be a
consensus that the security sector must be understood in the broader context
of governance. For the purposes of this study and in recognition of the
widespread application of the OECD DAC guidelines on security system
reform and governance, the security sector shall be defined as comprising
core security actors, civilian security management and oversight bodies,
justice and law enforcement institutions, and non-statutory security forces.
2.4.2
Security sector reform, reconstruction and transformation:
A jumble of terminologies or necessary distinctions?
A review of the extensive bulk of academic and practitioner-oriented
literature reveals that there remains a lack of consensus among researchers
and development practitioners on the terminology to be used to describe this
process. While some refer to security sector reform, others consider security
system reform as more appropriate terminology. Still others speak of security
sector reconstruction or transformation. This variety of terms is not
necessarily a result of a fundamental difference in perceptions of the security
sector per se, as the concepts – much like the definitions of the sector – often
overlap. For the sake of uniformity, the term security sector reform will be
used to describe such processes.
Though it has become a popular area of research for academics, SSR
by definition is primarily not an academic exercise but an issue of practical
policy-making. By and large, external actors – for it is they who initiate
these processes – generally have broad ideas concerning the instruments best
suited to a particular reform context. These are often moulded by their
perceptions of the respective arrangements in their own countries. Since
these ideas differ among major international actors, there is, of course, a lack
of policy coherence.58 This lack of consensus on the use of basic concepts
On Security: Definitions and Theories
25
and terms notwithstanding, there appears to be an identifiable set of basic
principles of security sector reform upon which all agree.
Rather than delivering a comprehensive overview of the numerous
works on the concept, this section will provide a summary of the literature
categorised according to the various approaches adopted. First, it will put the
discourse on SSR into historical context. Having shown how the approach to
reform has evolved from focusing only on military-related programmes to
regarding the process in the wider context of governance, i.e. including ‘civil
elements’, it then outlines the various contexts within which SSR takes
place, invariably influencing the focus of reform efforts. In a final step, SSR
and reconstruction in the post-conflict context are addressed.
History of a concept: the multiple origins of security sector reform. Not only
is the terminology used to describe the (relatively new) concept of SSR
contested, but the literature also reveals a discrepancy as regards its origins.
Most authors contend that the concept was originally introduced by
development donors.59 Others claim that it stems from two main areas,
namely the development community – as an essential requirement for
economic development and democratisation –and the field of civil-military
relations (CMR), where, following the end of the Cold War and due to the
developments in Central and Eastern Europe, analysts began to think more
holistically about key aspects of the CMR debate.60 A third, and more
accurate, approach is a division into three main categories, grouped
according to particular sets of actors and concerns: the United Nations and
its role in peace settlements and international administrations; the EU,
NATO and the eastward extension of the European security community; and
the development agencies and their extensive involvement in influencing
policy within developing countries.61 The latter approach elucidates the
diversity in priority-setting of SSR approaches. Naturally, the various origins
of the concept invariably have an influence on how it is defined and which
elements of the reform process receive more emphasis.
Leading international agencies’ approaches to security sector reform. The
United Nations can probably be considered as the leading international
agency in terms of implementing peacebuilding strategies. In the first half of
the 1990s global disarmament and regional peace initiatives brought about a
number of peace accords that specified the course of action to be taken in
reducing troop numbers and reintegrating former combatants into the formal
economy.62 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)
programmes, which were usually developed alongside UN peacekeeping
26
Judy Smith-Höhn
operations, were widely acknowledged as a key component of peacebuilding
strategies. Later, however, in recognition of the fact that there appeared to be
no positive correlation between a reduction of forces and military budgets
and the success of development, there were calls for more holistic
approaches than the DDR programmes undertaken by UN missions.63 One
mechanism put in place to avoid cases where underdeveloped SSR
programmes could contribute to increased political instability was the UN
Civilian Policing Department (UN CIVPOL), established in 1992 to support
the reform of police forces in countries emerging from civil war.64 In a
recent report on SSR, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon notes that,
despite extensive experience in assisting countries to re-establish security,
support for SSR has largely been provided on an ad hoc basis.65 Hence the
United Nations lacks a system-wide approach to delivering UN support in
the countries where it is currently active.66
Notwithstanding such shortcomings, the United Nations recognises
five common features of effective and accountable security sectors.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
They have a legal and/or constitutional framework that provides for
the legitimate and accountable use of force consistent with universally
accepted human rights norms and standards.
An institutionalised system of governance and management is in
place: these oversight mechanisms can include systems of financial
management as well as the protection of human rights.
They have the capacity – personnel, equipment and resources – to
provide effective security.
Mechanisms are in place to facilitate interaction among the various
security actors.
There is a ‘culture of service’ that promotes unity, integrity,
discipline, impartiality and respect for human rights among security
actors and affects the manner in which these actors carry out their
duties.67
DFID identifies seven key entry points for supporting SSR: building
public awareness and engagement; building strategic planning capacity;
strengthening legal and constitutional frameworks; strengthening civil
oversight mechanisms; strengthening financial management systems;
facilitating war-to-peace transitions; and improving human resource
management.68 It acknowledges that entry points vary depending on the local
context for reform and notes that, in countries emerging from war, ‘root-and-
On Security: Definitions and Theories
27
branch’ reforms are needed that involve broad restructuring of the security
sector and the transformation of mechanisms for civil control.69
The World Bank’s SSR agenda includes several key elements:
promoting judicial independence through improved appointment, financing
judicial administration; training judges and court personnel; strengthening
good governance (including finding corruption); building capacity in public
agencies, supporting bar associations and legal education; and supporting
civil society organisations.70
In the case of Sierra Leone, for example, the Bank provided technical,
financial and capacity-building support. Financial support was provided
mainly through a multi-donor trust fund (of US$31.5 million) and direct
financing through emergency recovery credits, budget support and a postconflict fund grant.71 The Bank provided technical advice to both the DDR
programme and community-driven recovery efforts. Capacity-building
initiatives supported the government in taking a lead in DDR efforts.72
The OECD may have extended its definition of what comprises the
‘security system’ (see 2.3.1), but its approach to its reform has remained
unchanged. Accordingly, security system reform still describes the
transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their
roles, responsibilities and actions [collaborating] in a manner that is more
consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance,
and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.73
Figure 2.1 on page 28 illustrates how the various areas of SSR are
interrelated.
More specifically, according to the OECD SSR involves the
achievement of four overarching objectives:
i) Establishment of effective governance, oversight and accountability in the
security system, ii) Improved delivery of security and justice services,
iii) Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process and
iv) Sustainability of justice and security service delivery.74
The OECD DAC uses the term to describe a policy agenda, making an effort
to distinguish it from security sector reform policies, which, according to the
OECD DAC, concern only the armed forces or the system of actors working
on security-related issues.75 A review of the work done in this field reveals
Judy Smith-Höhn
28
Figure 2.1
SSR and related activities
Source: OECD (2005) Security System Reform and Governance, p. 20.
general recognition of the wider security agenda; hence this distinction
seems unnecessary, particularly in light of the fact that the authors
themselves use the terms interchangeably. More important in this context is
not the label, but the content of what comprises security sector reform.
In their handbook, Ball and Fayemi advocate the use of the alternative
term of transformation. The authors argue that security sector reform
represents
[p]iecemeal, stand-alone changes to the security sector, often limited to
doctrinal changes, operational effectiveness and cost-cutting drives,
occurring as by-products of other state reform initiatives and often without
‘buy-in’ from critical stakeholders and thus subject to reversal depending on
power structures of the state.76
According to Ball and Fayemi, the more holistic approach of security sector
transformation is more capable of affecting the power relations within the
sector that may inhibit change. This transformation occurs through
civil/constitutional control to transform institutional culture, promot[ing]
professionalism, improv[ing] resource utilisation and operational
effectiveness… of the security forces, better policy management… of civil
authorities, in tandem with accountability and respect for human rights and
international law and involving inputs from a wide range of stakeholders and
role-players.77
On Security: Definitions and Theories
29
As in the case of the OECD DAC, this distinction of terminology does not
appear to be necessary, particularly since other approaches also adopt a more
holistic agenda. Furthermore, the terminology is unsuitable for the postconflict environment, where a security sector, as such, needs to be built from
scratch. The term construction or reconstruction would certainly be more
appropriate in the latter case.
Clingendael et al. use the terms transformation and reform
interchangeably. They describe ‘security sector reform’ as the
‘transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective,
legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and
internal security for their citizens’.78 The objectives of this process are
‘strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector;
professionalisation of the security forces; demilitarisation and peacebuilding; and strengthening the rule of law’.
Of the seven yearbooks published by DCAF since 2003,79 the second
volume on the reform and reconstruction of the security sector contains
contributions from both academics and practitioners – on the conceptual
bases and practical realities, respectively – and provides a sound overview of
the complex dynamics of SSR in various regions of the world, focusing
particularly on challenges faced in post-conflict environments.80
Since its emergence in the late 1990s, the SSR concept has come to
include a plethora of issues and activities concerning the reform of those
segments of the public sector assigned with providing both external and
internal security. Though there is general consensus that no ‘one-size-fitsall’ model for effective SSR exists, Hänggi provides a useful differentiation
into three broad SSR contexts – each reflecting a different rationale for
reform – which in turn allows isolation of those SSR theories that are
relevant to this thesis:81 the developmental context; the post-authoritarian
context; and the post-conflict context.82 Accordingly, SSR can refer to
strategies adopted:
i)
ii)
iii)
by international development donors as a means to improve the
efficiency of development assistance
in post-authoritarian states as a tool to enable the practical
coordination and conceptual integration of defence and internal
security reforms
in failed or post-conflict states as an instrument to facilitate postconflict reconstruction.83
30
Judy Smith-Höhn
Though the context within which SSR occurs is different in each case,
they do have one common feature, namely that external actors are involved
to a greater or lesser extent. Though they may not always be the primary
actors in reform, they are certainly always the initiators.84 Moreover,
regardless of the context, two normative elements are key to SSR efforts: the
need for inexpensive security bodies capable of providing security, and the
development of effective oversight mechanisms consistent with democratic
norms. The post-conflict context is faced with a third and certainly urgent
objective of addressing the legacies of the past conflict. DDR of former
combatants, issues of transitional justice and proliferation of small arms and
light weapons fall under this set of priorities.85
Post-conflict security sector reform. More interesting for this study than the
differentiation between security sector reform and transformation (see
above) is the differentiation between SSR and security sector
(re)construction, as the latter is often used in a post-conflict context. The
case studies in this book have both emerged from civil war in the past three
to five years.
David Law differentiates between post-conflict settings where a
security sector has to be reconstructed and one where it needs to be built
from scratch, appropriately applying the term security sector
(re)construction.86 In his paper on the post-conflict security sector, Law
identifies six distinctive features of the post-conflict environment,
particularly from the perspective of external actors.
Above all, the top priority in a post-conflict setting is the need to
focus on security provision, a necessary precondition for the successful
implementation of security sector programmes.
Secondly, the restructuring of the security sector generally has to
proceed before any legitimisation of the process through elections takes
place. In non-conflict countries the process is reversed, with the reform
effort gaining legitimacy through the preceding democratic elections.
Thirdly, security sector programmes in post-conflict settings are often
dominated by troop-contributing donor countries; accordingly, they have a
strong military element and a weaker civilian one. This echoes the perpetual
need to attend to the security situation as (re)construction efforts commence
and recognises the ability of the military to develop programmes to create or
reorganise armed forces. It may, however, also lead to the neglect of the
(re)construction of other security sector actors in favour of defence capacitybuilding projects.
On Security: Definitions and Theories
31
The often extensive responsibilities of the intervening forces is a
fourth characteristic of the post-conflict environment. The context is
generally one of little rule of law and no democracy – ruined state, social
and civil infrastructure, compromised or uncooperative local elites – and
there may also be fierce resistance to the (re)establishment of a state
monopoly on security.
A fifth feature of this specific environment is the need for donor
agendas to focus on demanding issues rarely addressed in security sector
programmes in non-conflict situations – e.g. DDR of combatants – and,
consequently, such external actors require special skills and experience that
may not be readily available.
Finally, Law points to the disparate desired outcomes of security
sector programmes in these different settings. Whereas, for example, the
post-conflict setting demands a focus less on building national institutions
and more on creating the conditions that make this possible, institutionbuilding issues tend to dominate donor programmes in the security sector of
non-conflict environments.87
Notwithstanding these differences, Law rightly argues that donor
countries ‘need to follow the same basic principles as they do in non-conflict
environments’ when analysing what must be done in the security sector.88
One of these three basic principles is that any analysis of the sector should
be based on a thorough understanding of its ‘characteristics, procedures and
interactions’.89 In addition, they need to ensure that the security forces – be
they domestic or foreign – can provide the required security. Finally, they
need to ensure ‘that the population has confidence in the actions of security
forces, for if it is lacking they will not be able to operate efficiently and will
fail in their mission to provide security’.90 Law notes the expeditious
engagement of local authorities in this process as crucial. Local ownership
has been noted as vital by several authors working in the field.
Although Law provides an insightful overview of the uniqueness of
the post-conflict environment that external intervening actors face and
highlights the basic principles that apply to any situation, his approach
remains state-centred. It is the state security actors that are relevant on the
local level. In narrowing his focus, Law joins most academic researchers in
their analysis of the security sector, limiting themselves to studying merely
the state actors in this field.
However, despite his narrowed focus, Law’s deliberations can
contribute to an overall framework for analysis of post-conflict security
sector (re)construction. Generally speaking, the goals of SSR, and
particularly so in the post-conflict setting, are very ambitious. To speak of an
32
Judy Smith-Höhn
initial focus on activities in this field to include the restoration of the state’s
monopoly on the legitimate use of force – as several authors do91 – is farfetched, if not an impossible goal. Should strategies not be more realistic and
cater not to what sounds good, but what appears feasible in the respective
context? The analysis of empirical data gathered in post-conflict settings can
provide answers to this and other related questions. Such an analysis requires
a guideline, which can easily be developed by summarising the key elements
outlined by leading authors and organisations working in the field and
commonly considered to be central to the success of SSR efforts.
Perceptions matter: Azarya’s model of incorporation and disengagement.
Before moving on to a guideline for analysis, it is necessary to elaborate on
the question of the type of empirical data that can facilitate identification of
the strengths and weaknesses of SSR strategies in post-conflict societies.
Victor Azarya suggests an alternative to the state-centred approach to
studying state-society relations in contemporary Africa by placing greater
emphasis on societal responses to state actions.92 In other words, instead of
explaining deficits in the state by focusing on how the state acts upon
society, he proposes an analysis of how society behaves irrespective of or
despite certain actions of the state as a means of explaining state failure or
weakness.
Azarya developed his concept in response to the overwhelmingly
state-centred approaches towards explaining state weakness or failure, some
of which attribute it to structural weaknesses, or to the colonial legacy of
authoritarian rule, or even to international dependency of African states. He
points out that the focus has generally been on how the state acts upon the
society, with little attention being paid to how societies cope with the state.
Azarya’s approach draws greater attention to the response of various groups
and sectors within society to the state’s ability or inability to meet a
particular need.93
When the focus is shifted from the state to the society, incorporation
and disengagement are in a sense analogous to state consolidation and
decline.94 According to Azarya, incorporation is ‘the process whereby large
segments of the population associate with the state and take part in its
activities in order to share its resources’.95 In other words, many individuals
and groups perceive an expanded field of opportunities in having close ties
with the state. Examples of incorporation include population migration from
rural to urban areas, from remote regions to economic and communication
centres, greater receptivity to mass media, an increase in the production of
goods and services and so on.96 In cases of incorporation, government
On Security: Definitions and Theories
33
employment is highly valued, with many seeking public administrative
positions as another means of accumulating resources.97
The incentive to engage in such activities is always the same: the state
is perceived as the centre of attraction and a superior channel for the
distribution of resources, whether economic, symbolic or otherwise.98
Although society’s incorporation into the state does not necessarily create a
better social environment – nor is it free from inter-group tensions or social
unrest – it does point to the importance of society in enhancing the position
of the state as a component part of that society. The state is defined as ‘an
organization within the society where it coexists and interacts with other
formal and informal organizations, from families to economic enterprises to
religious organizations’.99 The state is distinct from other organisations
within the society, in that it seeks predominance over them. Its goal is to
establish binding rules vis-à-vis the other organisations’ activities, or, as
Azarya puts it, ‘to authorize (i.e. to delegate power to) the other
organizations to make such rules for themselves’.100
At the other end of the scale there is disengagement, which Azarya
describes as the ‘tendency to withdraw from the state’ in response to its
increasing instability and dwindling resources.101 As members of a society
become increasingly sceptical of the competence and legitimacy of state
actions, they respond by means of ‘popular evasion and dissimulation’, thus
effectively undermining these actions.102 According to Azarya, the state’s
incapacity is the end result of disengagement of social forces from the public
sphere.103
Disengagement is a response to the vulnerabilities – both economic
and social – that stem from the declining capacities of the state. Society
members are focused on contriving ways to guard themselves from the state
or somehow to manage if they are unable to disengage.104
Hence, only if people incorporate into the main state policies, inter
alia into security sector reform, is there the likelihood of more broad-base
support and success of reform efforts. Adapting Azarya’s thinking to the
subject of this study may mean that donor-driven and state-centred
programmes – including those undertaken in the SSR field – that fail to
attain at least a modicum of participation will lead to the alienation of large
sections of society, thus fostering disengagement instead of incorporation.
A guideline for analysis. Having provided an impression of the plethora of
views and theories on the SSR concept, it is apparent that there is hardly a
need for another preconceived concept of SSR. What is missing, however, is
empirical evidence that these concepts can be implemented and that they are
34
Judy Smith-Höhn
effective at all. This is the starting point for this study, which, instead of
attempting to redefine the security sector or develop a new approach to
reform, builds on those issues that have been identified as key components
of effective SSR through an analysis of unique empirical data gathered on
the ground.
The assessment of the successes and failures within a given postconflict setting will need an actor-centred approach. From the above
elaborations, effective SSR should meet five requirements:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
presence of security bodies – domestic or foreign – that are capable of
providing security
existence of effective oversight mechanisms
sufficient consideration of the specific characteristics, procedures and
interactions of the security sector by the international implementing
agencies
confidence of the population in the ability of the security forces to
provide security
adequate attention to the legacies of the past conflict in order to avoid
a relapse into conflict.
The guideline for the analysis of SSR efforts in the empirical section
of this study is based on these five requirements. It goes without saying that
some questions cannot be answered definitively at an early stage of reform
efforts. Whether effective mechanisms have been put in place to oversee the
security sector can hardly be judged while international actors are still
actively involved in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts on the ground. Such
is the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which some analysts consider to be
UN protectorates.105 In the case of Sierra Leone, one may be able to draw
conclusions regarding the presence of oversight mechanisms since the UN
mission withdrew the last of its forces in December 2005, a few months
prior to the field trip. Such conclusions, however, remain tentative due to the
continued presence of the UK, through DFID and IMATT (International
Military Advisory and Training Team), which will continue their
development partnership with Sierra Leone presumably until 2012.106
Furthermore, one can hardly expect such mechanisms to be in place at all at
an early stage of reform efforts.
The analysis of the successes of SSR and the challenges that are faced
will therefore focus more on the other four items on the checklist.
Adapting Azarya’s understanding of states in society to the security
sector, one means of assessing the efficacy of security bodies is by
On Security: Definitions and Theories
35
determining whether the population integrates into or disengages from the
state for the provision of security. Such reactions can be observed by
drawing from local perceptions; in other words, by asking the population
whether they believe security bodies exist that are capable of providing
security or not. Determining whether the population decides to integrate or
disengage with the state, in turn, reveals whether they have any confidence
in the ability of security forces to provide security, or whether they resort to
alternative channels for their security provision.
The significance of the need to address the legacies of the past cannot
be overstated, as the events and circumstances that led to the conflict in the
first place must be dealt with in order to avoid a repetition. However, such
issues are complex, and it is often difficult to determine where to begin.
Moreover, as with the putting in place of effective oversight mechanisms,
addressing and eradicating the causes of conflict are a timely endeavour.
That they are crucial for sustainable peace is beyond doubt, but it is doubtful
that these can be done adequately and speedily. Furthermore, one needs to
question whether this issue can be addressed by the external implementing
actor, or whether it is a matter for the local leadership, who have yet to
perform their functions without the aid of the externals. This problem will be
tackled in more detail in Chapter 4.
To sum up, of the five elements outlined as the key criteria for
assessing SSR, four can be addressed in this study:
1)
2)
3)
4)
whether security actors exist and what their future potential is for
providing security
whether the context-specific characteristics, procedures and
interactions of the security sector have been adequately considered by
the international implementing agencies
whether the legacies of the past have been adequately addressed so as
to avoid a relapse into conflict
whether the population has confidence in the ability of security actors
to provide security, determined by means of local perceptions.
These guidelines will shed light on the effectiveness of current SSR
efforts and reveal the particular significance and hitherto lack of approaches
that focus on the actors involved and address the challenges faced. Having
outlined the basic guideline for the analysis of SSR, the exact methodology
to be applied will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Judy Smith-Höhn
36
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Krishna Kumar and Jeroen de Zeeuw (eds) (2006) Promoting Democracy in Postconflict
Societies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 2.
Ibid.
See for example Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Erhart (2005) ‘Post-conflict societies
and the military: Challenges and problems of security sector reform’, in Albrecht
Schnabel and Hans-Georg Erhart (eds) Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 1–16. The authors do not
clarify their understanding of the term ‘post-conflict’. In their work on SSR and postconflict peacebuilding with a particular focus on the military, the authors provide a
definition of post-conflict peacebuilding as ‘a complex and multidimensional, genuinely
political process of transformation from a state of war or violent conflict to one of
stability and peace’ (emphasis added). As in many studies of societies with a recent
experience of internal war, this lack of clarity leads the reader to assume that it is a selfexplanatory concept.
Jeff Crisp (1999) ‘Post-conflict societies: The hidden agenda’, Crosslines, 34.
Daniel Lambach (2007) ‘Oligopolies of violence in post-conflict societies’, GIGA
Working Paper Series, Hamburg, p. 9.
Ibid.
See e.g. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (eds) (2005) Postconflict Development:
Meeting New Challenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Lambach, note 5 above.
Ibid., p. 10.
Though peace agreements had been signed and the United Nations had already begun
sending in peacekeeping troops, the violence continued, and even drew in the external
forces when 500 UN peacekeepers were abducted by the insurgent group known as the
Revolutionary United Front, culminating in the intervention of British troops.
Guatemala is a case in point, where death rates have, in fact, increased since the 1996
peace agreement was signed. See Lambach, note 5 above, p. 10.
Small Arms Survey (2005) Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 289.
See Lambach, note 5 above, p. 10.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 11.
Ibid.
World Bank (2003) ‘Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy’,
World Bank Policy Research Paper, Washington, DC, p. 83; Nicholas Sambanis (2001)
‘Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical
inquiry (part I)’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(3), p. 847. Quoted in Lambach, note 5
above, p. 5.
Lambach, ibid., pp. 5ff.
Heiner Hänggi (2003) ‘Making sense of security sector governance’, in Heiner Hänggi
and Theodor H. Winkler (eds) Challenges of Security Sector Governance. Münster: LIT,
p. 5; available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=
0CD0E86D-F99B-3B67-0D75-2FFB3FB5CA3D&lng=en (accessed 13 June 2006).
On Security: Definitions and Theories
37
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
See e.g. Human Security Centre (2005) Human Security Report 2005. War and Peace in
the 21st Century, p. vii; available at www.humansecurityreport.info/content/view/28/63/
(accessed 6 January 2006); Jakkie Cilliers (2004) ‘Human security in Africa: A
conceptual framework for review’, African Human Security Initiative; available at
www.africanreview.org/docs/humsecjun04.pdf (accessed 20 September 2005); Dan Henk
(2005) ‘Human security: Relevance and implications’, Parameters, 35(2), pp. 91ff.
Kofi Annan (2000) ‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.
New York: United Nations, p. 43; available at www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm
(accessed 18 June 2006).
Human Security Centre, note 22 above, p. vii.
OECD (2001) DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, p. 38; available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/54/1886146.pdf (accessed 13 January 2007).
Amitai Etzioni (1988) The Moral Dimension: Towards a New Economics. New York:
Free Press, p. 27.
Human Security Centre, note 22 above, p vii; UNDP (1994) Human Development Report
1994. New Dimensions of Human Security. New York: UNDP; available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/ (accessed 5 October 2007).
J. ’Kayode Fayemi (2004) ‘Governing insecurity in post-conflict states: The case of Sierra
Leone and Liberia’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction
of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, p. 2; available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/
FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=B0EA7833-62AD-2215-99BF182ADF9F413A&lng=en (accessed 13 June 2006).
Heiner Hänggi (2004) ‘Conceptualising security sector reform and reconstruction’, in
Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector.
Münster: LIT, pp. 1–11; available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?
serviceID=DCAF&fileid=0CD0E86D-F99B-3B67-0D75-2FFB3FB5CA3D&lng=en
(accessed 13 June 2006).
For more on DCAF, visit its website at www.dcaf.ch/.
In 2006, for example, DCAF was instrumental in the drafting of the OECD’s Handbook
on Security System Reform. See OECD (2007) OECD DAC Handbook on Security System
Reform: Supporting Security and Justice. Paris: OECD; available at www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf (accessed 20 May 2007). It assisted the EU in shaping and
implanting its SSR strategy in South-Eastern Europe along the guidelines of the EU’s
overarching policy framework for security sector reform. DCAF also collaborated with
the United Nations and its agencies, namely the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and the UNDP, in conducting a study on SSR in UN integrated missions. See
DCAF (2006) DCAF Annual Report 2006. DCAF: Geneva. For further DCAF activities
see the DCAF website.
See BICC/DCAF Security Sector Governance and Conversion Studies Series.
GTZ (2007) ‘GTZ profile’; available at www.gtz.de/en/unternehmen/1698.htm (accessed
30 June 2007).
Herbert Wulf (2000) Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries. Bonn: BICC/GTZ,
p. 15; available at www.bicc.de/publications/other/gtz_studien/sicherheitssektor/
securitysector.pdf (accessed 12 July 2007).
Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (2004) Reform and Reconstruction of the Security
Sector. Münster: LIT; available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID
=DCAF&fileid=0CD0E86D-F99B-3B67-0D75-2FFB3FB5CA3D&lng=en (accessed 25
August 2006).
38
Judy Smith-Höhn
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (2000)
Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing
Policy Coherence. Paris: OECD, p. 8.
Jane Chanaa (2002) Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Adelphi
Paper 344. New York: Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic
Studies, p. 7.
Hänggi, note 29 above, p. 6.
Nicole Ball and J. ’Kayode Fayemi (2004) Security Sector Governance in Africa: A
Handbook, p. vii, emphasis added; available at www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFNSSR-SecuritySectorGovernanceInAfrica-AHandbook.pdf (accessed 16 February 2007).
Ibid., pp. 15ff.
Ibid., p. vii.
Dylan Hendrickson (1999) ‘A review of security sector reform’, Working Paper No. 1,
Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, University of London, p. 29; available at
http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk/Publications/assets/PDF%20files/Working%20paper%20number%2
01.pdf (accessed 15 July 2007); Owen Greene (2003) ‘Security sector reform, conflict
prevention and regional perspectives’, Journal of Security Sector Management, 1(1), p. 2;
Clingendael, International Alert and Saferworld (2002) ‘Towards a better practice
framework in security sector reform. Broadening the debate’, Occasional SSR Paper No.
1, p. 1; available at www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=
Pdf&id=90 (accessed 15 July 2007).
OECD, note 25 above, p. 38.
OECD (2005) Security System Reform and Governance, DAC Guidelines and Reference
Series, pp. 20ff; available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf (accessed 13
January 2007); Andrzej Karkoszka and Dylan Hendrickson (2002) The Challenges of
Security Sector Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 179.
UNDP (2002) ‘Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace’, in Human
Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, p. 87.
Ibid.
Rocklyn Williams (2000) ‘Africa and the challenges of security sector reform’, in Jakkie
Cilliers and Annika Hilding-Norberg (eds) Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the
New Millennium. Pretoria: ISS.
Ibid.
For the UN definition of the security sector, see Ban Ki-Moon (2008) ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on “Securing peace and development: The role of the United Nations
in supporting security sector reform”’, UN Doc. A/62/659–S/2008/39, 28 January, p. 6;
available
at
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2008/39&Lang=
E&Area=UNDOC (accessed 13 February 2008). DFID also considers these four sets of
actors to comprise the security sector. See DFID (2002) ‘Understanding and supporting
security sector reform’, p. 7; available at www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/
supportingsecurity.pdf (accessed 13 January 2007).
OECD, note 44 above; OECD, note 31 above.
OECD, note 44 above.
See e.g. Schnabel and Erhart, note 3 above, p. 7; David M. Law (2006) ‘The post-conflict
security sector’, DCAF Policy Paper 14, pp. 12–15; available at www.dcaf.ch/_docs/
PP14_post_conflictss.pdf (accessed 12 December 2006).
Hänggi, note 29 above, pp. 5ff.
On Security: Definitions and Theories
39
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
Ibid.
See e.g. Williams, note 47 above.
Hänggi, note 29 above, pp. 5ff; See e.g. OECD, note 44 above; Ball and Fayemi, note 39
above; Clingendael et al., note 43 above.
Williams, note 48 above.
Michael Brzoska and Andreas Heinemann-Grüder (2004) ‘Security sector reform and
post-conflict reconstruction under international auspices’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner
Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, p. 127;
available at www.dcaf.ch/publications/bm_ssr_yearbook2004.cfm (accessed 13 June
2006).
Ibid., p. 123; Law, note 52 above.
Timothy Edmunds (2003) ‘Security sector reform: Concepts and implementation’, in
Wilhelm N. Germann and Timothy Edmunds (eds) Towards Security Sector Reform in
Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment. Baden Baden: Nomos, p. 11;
available at www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?q279=security+sector+reform
&ord279=title&lng=en&id=20278&nav1=4 (accessed 15 June 2006).
Chanaa, note 37 above, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 17.
Ibid.
Ban Ki-Moon, note 49 above, p. 1.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 6.
DFID, note 49 above, p. 19.
Ibid.
Chanaa, note 37 above, p. 22.
World Bank (2002) ‘Sierra Leone: Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
(DDR)’, Findings: Africa Region No. 81, World Bank, Washington, DC, p. 1.
Ibid.
Compare OECD, note 25 above, p. 38; OECD, note 44 above, p. 20; OECD, note 31
above.
OECD, note 31 above, p. 21.
OECD, note 44 above, pp. 29ff.
Ball and Fayemi, note 39 above, p. vii.
Ibid.
Clingendael et al., note 42 above, pp. 1ff.
Heiner Hänggi and Theodor H. Winkler (eds) (2003) Challenges of Security Sector
Governance. Münster: LIT; Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) (2004) Reform and
Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT; Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi
(eds) (2005) Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Münster: LIT; Alan
Bryden and Marini Caparini (eds) (2006) Private Actors and Security Governance.
Münster: LIT; David M. Law (ed.) (2007) Intergovernmental Organisations and Security
Sector Reform. Münster: LIT; Timothy Donais (ed.) (2008) Local Ownership and
Security Sector Reform. Münster: LIT; Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabel (eds) (2009)
Security Sector Reform in Challenging Environments. Münster: LIT.
Bryden and Hänggi (2004), ibid.
There have been other attempts at categorising SSR. Edmunds, for example, drawing
from analyses of SSR in post-authoritarian states, distinguishes between first- and second-
40
Judy Smith-Höhn
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
generation SSR. See Edmunds, note 60 above, pp. 16ff. First-generation SSR involves the
‘establishment of new institutions, structures and chains of responsibility for the security
sector’, whereas second-generation SSR concerns the ‘consolidation of previous reforms,
and the effective and efficient operation of institution and procedures at a sustainable cost
for the state and society’. Edmunds notes that in Central and Eastern Europe, SSR
occurred concurrent with other transformation processes – e.g. establishment of market
economies and wider political reform – which governments and societies considered as
more urgent priorities. The consequent lack of political commitment and resources for
SSR has compelled governments to prioritise their activities in this area, leading them to
emphasise issues of democratic control of the security sector rather than the effective
operation of the sector itself. Edmunds’s design is particularly adapted to the postauthoritarian environment of Central and Eastern Europe; his approach has not been
implemented in the countries of interest for this particular study, and is therefore not
suited as a framework for the analysis of post-conflict SSR.
Hänggi, note 29 above, p. 11.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 9.
Law, note 52 above, p. 1.
Ibid., pp. 2ff.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See for example Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, note 58 above, p. 128; Schnabel and
Erhart, note 3 above.
Victor Azarya (1988) ‘Reordering state-society relations: Incorporation and
disengagement’, in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (eds) The Precarious Balance.
State and Society in Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 3–21.
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7
Ibid., p. 6.
Ibid.
Identity and legitimacy, for example, can also be understood as cultural and political
resources, respectively.
Azarya, note 92 above p. 10.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid.
Standard forms of disengagement include a retreat from the state-cash nexus to either a
subsistence economy or alternative channels such as black markets and smuggling, i.e.
channels less easily regulated by the state. Society members fail to comply with stateenacted laws and decrees as the judiciary system forfeits its credibility.
Azarya, note 92 above, pp. 7ff. Activities aimed at controlling the state and modifying its
actions according to an alternative set of values and interests are not acts of
disengagement: ‘disengagement does not include active opposition to the regime with the
objective to replace either the rulers and/or change government policies’.
On Security: Definitions and Theories
41
105
106
See e.g. Wolf-Christian Paes (2005) ‘Eyewitness: The challenges of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration in Liberia’, International Peacekeeping, 12(2), p. 97.
DFID (2004) ‘Poverty reduction agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of
Sierra Leone’, p. 2; available at http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/search/proxy/cs.html?url=
http%3A//www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/sierraleone-prf-arrangement.pdf&qt=hmg&col=&n
=172 (accessed 11 April 2007).
Chapter 3
Methodology
To identify the potential challenges to SSR in post-conflict societies
according to the guidelines developed in Chapter 2, two post-conflict
societies – Liberia and Sierra Leone – have been selected, and the progress
made thus far in reforming their respective security sectors will be tracked
by way of a multi-method research design of comparative case studies
combining both quantitative and qualitative tools for data gathering.
The research design is comparative and case-oriented. Unlike other
methods of enquiry – such as the experimental method and statistical
analysis – the comparative method is uniquely suited for analysing complex
causality, i.e. the fact that a particular social phenomenon is probably
affected by several economic, political, cultural and/or socio-economic
factors.1 Comparative analysis is qualitative; it considers cases as wholes
and compares one with another. In other words, unlike a quantitative
statistical or variable-centred analysis, the comparative method can
simultaneously consider a broad range of factors within a particular
historical context which varies over time.2 The analysis of the efficacy of
SSR in post-conflict societies, which depends on the range of factors
developed in section 2.4.2, necessitates precisely such an approach.
Moreover, comparative analysis facilitates an understanding of the
relationship between and among these various influencing factors.3
Case study analysis pays particular attention to the historical context;
a single-unit case can be divided into two separate time periods, facilitating
an understanding of the change in the phenomenon under scrutiny between
these two periods. This is commonly termed within-case or within-unit
comparison. Furthermore, and in keeping with Sartori’s assertion that ‘he
who knows one country only knows none’,4 comparison across cases (or
units of analysis) enables a better understanding of individual cases.
To gain an exhaustive understanding of any phenomenon, one would
ideally consider all instances where it manifests and, if applicable, also those
instances where it does not occur. In this case, one would want to analyse all
post-conflict societies that have attempted to reform their security sectors, as
well as those post-conflict societies where there have been no such efforts.
The latter can be ruled out, since all post-conflict societies have in some way
44
Judy Smith-Höhn
or another attempted to implement this process. Further, such an allencompassing analysis is unfeasible for two reasons. Firstly, there is the
dichotomy of scope versus depth, since research designs are regularly
confronted with a choice between knowing less about more and knowing
more about less.5 On the one extreme lies the single case study approach,
which has the benefit of depth of analysis to the detriment of the scope of
causal arguments. Cross-unit analyses are situated on the other extreme;
these provide scope – boundedness of inferences – at the cost of thinness.
The research questions of this particular study necessitate an in-depth
analysis of SSR efforts, yet at the same time the study requires a degree of
universal validity. By opting for a comparative approach studying two cases,
the research design positions itself between the two extremes. The limitation
to two cases (units of analysis) enables the in-depth analysis that is the virtue
of the case study method. The comparison of the units of analysis, on the
other hand, allows more broad-based inferences as regards the efficacy of
SSR strategies. A second viable argument against an all-encompassing
sample of units of analysis (i.e. all post-conflict societies) is of a more
pragmatic nature. Such a comprehensive study would require a significant
amount of resources, both financial and human, and more than what was
available for the study at hand. It would have required the employment of
more researchers to collect data during the same period of time, as this
concurrence is needed for such data to remain comparable.
In the past there has been a good deal of disagreement over
appropriate social science research methods, with the basic divide drawn
between qualitative case study methods on the one hand, and statistical and
formal methods on the other. More often than not, these lines of contention
arose because they affected opportunities for funding, teaching positions and
publication outlets. It meant that scholars with essentially similar interests
had grouped into separate communities along methodological lines. More
recently, however, social science research methods are entering a new stage
of development that is conducive to cross-method collaboration and multimethod studies.6
In addition to such collaboration, many scholars nowadays are trained
in or at least exposed to more than one methodology, allowing easier
interpretation between the various methods that are generally restricted by
inherent epistemological limits.7 George and Bennett maintain that most
cross-method collaborative work has occurred sequentially. Researchers
have applied the methods in which they are most adept, but have also drawn
on the findings of those using other methods. Cross-method collaboration
Methodology
45
has thus not been duly appreciated because, until recently, it rarely involved
the application of different methods for one publication.8
In recognition of the benefits of such collaboration, the research
design adopted here will make use of both quantitative and qualitative tools
for gathering data. In addition to semi-standardised interviews and focus
group discussions (qualitative), this study incorporates a survey poll
(quantitative).
This chapter outlines the benefits of the comparative method as it is,
or at least should be, applied in the field of political science. The next
section elaborates on the comparative case study approach as the most
appropriate research design for the analysis at hand. Having developed the
framework of analysis – outlining the various cases to be compared – the
chapter concludes with a description of the tools used for data gathering.
3.1
The comparative method
The following will illustrate the suitability of the comparative case study
method, as opposed to other methods (e.g. statistical, formal, experimental),
in determining the efficacy of SSR strategies in post-conflict societies.
3.1.1
The case for comparing
It is often held that comparisons can be implicit, or that the scientific
approach is in itself intrinsically comparative.9 From this viewpoint it
follows that the notion of an independent comparative method is redundant
or synonymous with scientific method in the social sciences in general.10
The disadvantage of such viewpoints is that they fail to distinguish between
the various methods applied in the social sciences. Of course, a comparison
is made at one point or another regardless of the method used (statistical,
experimental, etc.) and the comparative strategies applied by comparativists
are not, in principle, different from the comparative strategies used by other
political scientists, economists or sociologists. However, to claim that all
methods are comparative reduces the distinctiveness of the application of
each method in research. The true distinctive feature of comparative politics
is its explicit and direct focus on the comparative method – as opposed to
merely comparing.11
Some authors have attempted to narrow the definition of the
comparative method as one that compares a limited number of justified cases
and is applied in studies where other methods, namely the statistical and
46
Judy Smith-Höhn
experimental, cannot be employed.12 Lijphart defines the comparative
method as a qualitative comparison of a few cases, which stands in contrast
to the statistical, and hence quantitative, method of comparing a large
number of cases (‘cross-national studies’).13 Whatever the case may be, the
choice to proceed with a comparison precipitates the need for
methodogically sound reasoning.14 This method can be defined as the
systematic comparison of cases, mostly employed to generate empirical
generalisations and test hypotheses.15 More specifically, the comparative
method seeks to investigate causality and attempts to isolate those factors
that cause (independent variable) a particular outcome or phenomenon
(dependent variable).16
By and large, there is a clear lack of consensus over the reasons for
applying the comparative method. While some authors claim the key goal of
comparison to be controlling, that is verifying or falsifying whether
generalisations hold across the cases,17 others consider control to be one of
three, four or even five functions of the comparative method.18
Lim summarises the three purposes of comparing as an answer to the
general question as to why one compares, namely to control, to understand
and to explain.19
The control function, as mentioned above, is applied as a means of
checking whether statements about particular phenomena are valid by
controlling for, or holding constant, certain variables.20 Though actual
control variables are not used, different types of comparisons allow the
researcher to consider a range of similarities or differences as control
variables.21 This enables the researcher to dismiss a number of potentially
significant factors and focus on those variables he/she considers to be most
important.22 Landman and Nohlen label this the hypothesis-testing function23
and it is what Sartori called the ‘control purpose’ of a systematic comparison
of two or more cases.24 Comparative checking enables the control of
hypotheses by way of eliminating conflicting explanations about particular
events, actors, structures, etc. as a means of developing more general
theories.25
The second purpose of understanding applies to those comparativists
who, instead of testing theories or hypotheses, apply theory in order to
interpret the cases compared.26 Such exercises are based on the recognition
that context matters; in other words, countries or other macrosocial units all
have a unique story to tell and comparative analysis can enable a better
understanding of these individual stories.27 Here the comparison serves not
to verify or falsify larger arguments, but to facilitate in-depth understanding
by observing what other cases reveal about a specific case or country that is
Methodology
47
of primary interest. The comparison serves as a heuristic analysis of a
particular case in comparison to others.28 Landman describes this function as
contextual description in that it interprets a particular case by drawing from
the various experiences with other cases through either quantification or
qualification.29
A more pragmatic approach to comparison acknowledges the
complexity of real-world cases and the difficulties associated with applying
the control function. It therefore endeavours to build theoretical
generalisations by collecting case-based knowledge; in other words, it wants
to explain. Each case or each small-n comparison gives the comparativist
another piece to work into a larger puzzle.30
Although the three purposes outlined above are indeed key reasons for
comparison, Lim overlooks one other key function of comparison, namely
that of prediction.
Researchers may use the comparative method as a means to generate
hypotheses from the units that have been studied. Such hypotheses enable
prediction of the likely outcomes in countries not included in the original
comparison, or outcomes in the future given the presence of certain factors.31
Comparisons can therefore serve to generate or modify hypotheses.32 Such
hypotheses can and should again be tested in other comparative studies, with
the research process having thus gone full circle.
Table 3.1 on page 48 summarises the four general purposes outlined
above, providing an overview of the emphasis placed by the various authors.
Although the various functions have been listed separately here, it is
important to note that these functions are not disjunctive and comparisons
can indeed have a multifunctional purpose.33
Returning to the research focus of this study, what purpose does the
comparative method serve? The key objective is to determine the efficacy of
SSR strategies in post-conflict societies by submitting the theory of SSR to
empirical scrutiny. The advantages of the comparative method are evident. A
single case study would perhaps enable a description of SSR strategies in a
given society. Yet the interest is not in a single case, but in post-conflict
societies in general, therefore ruling out the function of understanding. The
study also does not seek to control, that is verify or falsify, the hypotheses
developed by scholars in the field. For this study, comparison serves the two
closely related purposes of explanation and prediction. Firstly, a comparison
of cases enables the inductive analysis of SSR, which then necessitates
strengthening or modification of the existing theory. Secondly, this
facilitates the development of hypotheses relating to SSR, possibly in other
post-conflict societies. Indeed, predictions about other cases can hardly be
Judy Smith-Höhn
48
Table 3.1
Four purposes of comparing
General purpose
Comparing to
control
Comparing to
understand
comparative
checking ab
hypothesistesting cd
interpretation b
analytical
contextual
induction b
c
description
heuristic analysis
development of
hypotheses cd
Logic or
approach to
comparative
analysis
Researcher uses
a range of cases
as a way to ‘test’
(verify or
falsify) a
specific claim,
hypothesis or
theory
Researcher is
primarily
interested in a
single case and
uses different
cases or general
theories as a way
to learn more
about the case
being studied
Researcher uses
cases as a way to
build stronger
theoretical
explanations
Cases are used in
a ‘step-by-step’
manner, with
each case
contributing to
the development
of a general
theory
Researcher uses
a range of cases
as a way to
‘generate’,
(develop) a
specific claim,
hypothesis or
theory
Example
Begin with a
Begin with a
claim, then ‘test’ case (and issue),
the claim
then use existing
theories and/or
other cases to
understand the
case better
Begin with a
general theory,
then use cases to
develop or
strengthen
(modify) the
theory
Begin with a
number of cases,
then identify
similarities or
differences
between these in
order to make
claims
Basic strategy
or purpose
Comparing to
explain
Comparing to
predict
d
a = Sartori 1994; b = Lim 2006; c = Landman 2003; d = Nohlen 2004
Own modification
Source: Adapted from Timothy C. Lim (2006) Doing Comparative Politics. An Introduction
to Approaches and Issues. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, p. 23
made through the analysis of a single case study. For how is one to know
whether a hypothesis generated from the observation of a particular
characteristic is not precisely that, namely characteristic for this case only?
Methodology
3.1.2
49
What is comparable? Identifying cases
Having identified the various functions of the comparative method, the
question is now how to determine what, exactly, is comparable. Authors on
comparative methods often respond to the common argument that one
cannot compare apples and oranges (or apples and pears) with a
counterargument, namely: how can one know unless one has compared
them?34
Let us, for a moment, take this argument literally. To a certain extent,
apples and oranges are indeed comparable: both are fruit, both grow on trees
and both are edible. In other words, any two or more entities are comparable
with respect to the properties they share, and it follows that they are
incomparable with respect to the properties they do not share. Apples and
oranges would therefore be incomparable in their colours. If entities have
nothing in common, a comparison is of no interest. Logically, if two or more
entities share all the same characteristics, then they are a same entity. In
sum, a fruitful comparison is both the assimilation and the differentiation of
two or more entities to a point.
This part of the process is crucial, as it affects the quality and extent of
the findings. The comparativist does not choose countries according to
personal preference; instead s/he must be guided by relevant criteria.35
Classification provides so-called ‘data containers’ into which empirical
evidence can be organised.36 A specific number of items are ordered into
categories that are mutually exclusive and altogether comprehensive.37
Classification does not imply real sameness, as Sartori puts it, but groups
entities together according to the similarities they share with respect to the
selected criteria, and indicates that these entities are more similar among
themselves than to the entities that fall into other classes.38 Elsewhere,
classification has been categorised as one of the key functions of
comparison.39 However, this implies that a researcher may or may not
choose to classify the units s/he intends to compare and, as Sartori points
out, classification ought to precede any analysis.
When classifying cases, three factors can lead the analyst down the
wrong path and towards false concepts: parochialism, misclassification and
conceptual stretching.40
Parochialism refers to single-country studies conducted in vacuo that
disregard existing categories established by either general theories or
comparative frameworks of analysis. Such studies tend to invent ad hoc,
self-tailored terminology.41 Sundquist’s article on coalition government in
the United States is a good illustration of this approach.42 The term ‘coalition
50
Judy Smith-Höhn
government’ denotes parliamentary systems – in other words, not Americantype presidential systems – in which governments are elected into office and
supported by parliaments, and are not single-party governments. Sundquist’s
parochial definition of coalition governments does not include any of these
characteristics, his mislabelling thus interfering with what is generally
known of coalition governments.43 The present study comprises two country
cases and the terminology used is based on existing definitions and
established categories. Although various analysts may highlight different
elements of security sector reform, for example, there is a general consensus
as regards the basic understanding of this process to describe the creation of
a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction
and the growth of democratic states and institutions based on the rule of law.
The second source of false classification is that of misclassification,
that is the creation of pseudo-classes. If we subsume a number of cases into
one class that is not derived from a single criterion, then we cannot, for
example, test hypotheses based on this classification.44 The study at hand
runs no risk of misclassifying cases, since the term post-conflict – albeit
delivering a somewhat inaccurate description of such societies, as elaborated
in Chapter 2 – denotes a particular type of society, namely one that has
emerged from a narrative of conflict, and where the violence that is
perpetrated by the former warring factions is no longer carried out in terms
of the central narratives of the previous conflict.
The third reason for erroneous classification results from conceptual
stretching. In other words, when the definitions of particular terms are too
broad, hypotheses cannot be tested. For example, if all societies are
considered to be pluralistic in some sense, then one can no longer claim that
‘pluralism falls and stands with democracy’.45 This study has taken
particular care not to define terms too broadly. Human security is defined in
a narrow sense to avoid this problem. Moreover, it was imperative that the
understanding of security be operationalised in such a manner as to make it
practical to gather empirical data in the field.
3.1.3
Dimensions of comparison: Developing a research design
Taking care not to make any of the above mistakes, the comparative
scientific enquiry can be conducted according to one or more of four aspects:
object, context, space and time.46 The most important criteria are the number
of cases and the ratio between context variables (parameters or constants)
and operative variables, i.e. dependent and independent variables to be
examined. Some authors define operative variables as ‘those allowed to vary
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51
in order to assess their influence upon the dependent variable(s)’.47
However, this causes ambiguity as regards the distinction between
dependent variables and context variables, so this distinction will not be
made here.
Unlike a scientific experiment, the outlying conditions cannot be kept
at a constant, and one can only assume that the context variables remain
constant to a certain degree. Depending on its aims and objectives, a
comparative study of two cases can prove more fruitful than a large-N
quantified statistical study. Both types of comparison have their merits and
demerits. An increase in the number of cases generally brings a decrease in
the qualitative elements of the analysis, i.e. a hypothesis becomes more
universally applicable at the expense of losing information. This dichotomy
is inherent in the comparative method.48
The four aspects outlined by Nohlen are not mutually exclusive, as
they can often overlap and each must be taken into account when developing
the appropriate method of comparison:
1)
2)
3)
4)
object: can be either large entities (e.g. societies, political systems) or
segments (e.g. parties, unions)
context: can be either homogeneous or heterogeneous
space: is differentiable according to four features – state, intrastate,
suprastate and global
time: can be either diachronic, synchronic or diachronic-binary.49
A diachronic comparison is one that is longitudinal and occurs over a
certain time frame. The number of cases is usually small, mostly applied
within one country, and the contextual variables are relatively constant, with
the advantage that historical factors can be taken into consideration. The
availability of data can pose a problem here. Synchronic comparisons are
horizontal and refer to simultaneous occurrences. The comparison can be
between (a large number of) countries, or even between regions within one
country, but the contextual variables are more difficult to control and the
comparison is made mostly between homogeneous cases or by means of an
area approach. The diachronic-binary comparison is a hybrid of the former
two types of time-sensitive comparisons, employed for example to compare
industrialisation and import substitution as they occurred at different times in
different countries. The number of cases varies, but is mostly binary, and the
context variables are homogeneous.
The case studies of Liberia and Sierra Leone are classified as follows.
First and foremost, both are post-conflict societies as defined in section 2.1.
52
Judy Smith-Höhn
Secondly, Liberia and Sierra Leone are comparable since they share certain
contextual similarities,50 but are at different stages of reform. The
comparison shall not be made according to the object or space aspects, and
while it considers the context aspect to be more or less homogeneous, this
research will focus on the time aspect. Furthermore, post-conflict Liberia
and Sierra Leone present an opportunity to test the potential for institutional
design. The deinstitutionalisation and informalisation of the security sector
before, during and immediately after the conflict provide ‘that space for
altering the relations of power within the sector in the direction of
civil/constitutional control’.51 In other words, the question as to how the
security sector should be reconstructed and what issues need to be
considered can be addressed with a view to actually being relevant and
practicable.
Let us now turn to the well-established research designs employed in
comparative politics. As noted above, there is no ideal research design for
conducting analyses in political science, though some authors claim
otherwise.52 Two general comparative strategies in the field are a mostsimilar systems and a most-different systems design (MSSD and MDSD,
respectively). Perhaps the commonest strategies of comparative analysis
today, these designs are both based on the logic of John Stuart Mill’s
classification in his seminal work A System of Logic, where he differentiated
between a ‘method of agreement’ and a ‘method of difference’.53 The former
compares different instances in which a phenomenon occurs, the latter
compares instances that are similar in other respects, but that differ in
outcome.54 The terminology used to differentiate between the various
research designs has often led to confusion, but most can more or less be
categorised under Mill’s two-way classification.55
The MSSD – method of difference – comprises systems that are as
similar as possible in as many features as possible in order to single out
differences. In other words, the parameters – i.e. context conditions – are
similar, but the (dependent and independent) operative variables differ.56 The
assumption is that the factors that are common to these homogeneous cases
can be ruled out as an explanation for their differences. The MSSD can be
considered synonymous with Mill’s method of difference in that it aims to
identify difference and compare cases ‘in which the phenomenon does
occur, with instances in other respects similar in which it does not’.57 The
MSSD allows the researcher to explain a particular social or political
phenomenon (the dependent variable) by identifying a significant
dissimilarity between two or more systems, which can then be submitted as
the causal factor or key independent variable.58 In other words, the
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53
independent variable is causal and affects the dependent variable.59 The key
limitation of the MSSD is that no comparison of two or more cases can
provide exhaustive proof of a particular causal relationship. Firstly, a
comparison of a limited number of cases cannot provide a strong enough
empirical basis for verifying wide-ranging claims; secondly, no matter how
similar two or more systems appear to be, there are bound to be numerous
potentially relevant differences and it would not be possible, in strict
methodological terms, to determine precisely which differences possess
causal significance and which do not.60
The MDSD – akin to Mill’s ‘method of agreement’ – compares
systems that differ as much as possible and yet do not differ on the
phenomenon under investigation. The operative variables are similar, while
the context varies. Hence, the isolation of another similar variable would
serve as a possible explanation for this similarity.61 There are two major and
interrelated shortcomings of the MDSD. Firstly, the findings on causal
relationships in such a research design are not indisputable. In other words,
discovering similarity in one variable across most-different systems does not
qualify it as the root cause of a particular phenomenon, as there can be
another unidentified factor, i.e. variable, influencing the relationship.62 In
fact, and this is the second shortcoming, the MDSD cannot adequately deal
with multiple causation.63 More precisely, one cannot assume that a
particular phenomenon is the product of one and only one cause.64
It is not the outlined shortcomings that make the MSSD and MDSD
unsuitable for the study at hand, however, for any comparative research
design has its limitations. Neither design enables an in-depth analysis of a
particular phenomenon,65 which is a key objective of this particular study.
While both may attempt to control for a particular phenomenon by way of
testing hypotheses, the main interest here is not to identify pre-determined
causal relationships between SSR and the factors that affect its efficacy, but
to illuminate the SSR strategies in each case and then identify other possible
factors that play a role in effectively reforming the security sector in postconflict societies. In other words, the goal is to explain and predict.
Moreover, the most-similar and most-different systems designs do not allow
a precise differentiation between the various ‘cases’ that need to be analysed,
as will become more apparent below (see section 3.1.4). The case study
method provides a better basis for comparison,66 if defined correctly and
properly distinguished from other methods.
A brief digression is called for before continuing with a
comprehensive outline of the case study method. There is potential for
confusion among the terms ‘comparative method’, ‘case study method’ and
54
Judy Smith-Höhn
‘qualitative method’. Some authors consider the comparative and case study
methods to be two distinct methods where the former involves the
comparison of a number of cases, whereas the latter only focuses on the
internal examination of distinct cases.67 This assumption is based on the
notion that, when employed, the case study method is usually a single-case
investigation. Similarly, earlier definitions of this method characterised it as
a small-n study, in contrast to a large-N, statistical (quantitative) study.68
However, given the growing consensus that the most effective means of
drawing inferences from case studies is by using a combination of withincase analyses and cross-case comparisons in a single study or research
programme, case study methods can indeed be comparative, as they can
include both within-case analyses of single cases and comparisons of a small
number of cases.69 The elaborations below illustrate the suitability of the
comparative case study method for the analysis of SSR strategies in postconflict societies.
3.1.4
The case study method as a method of comparison
The term case and the numerous terms linked to the idea of case analysis,
despite widespread usage, are ill-defined in social science.70 As a research
method, there is no fixed definition as to what exactly a case study is.
Though it is widely practised, its status as a method in the discipline of
political science is ambiguous: a study which focuses on one example of a
broader phenomenon can only be considered a ‘mere’ case study, hence
methodologists’ circumspect view of this method.71
This is not to say that no attempts have been made to define the case
study as a research approach. In fact, the literature abounds with such
definitions. The reference to a work as a case study might indicate that the
method applied is qualitative and small-n;72 that the research is ethnographic,
clinical or participant-observation;73 that the research is characterised by
process tracing;74 that the research analyses a single phenomenon, instance
or example – this is the most common usage;75 or that the research examines
the properties of a single case.76 The first three items listed above appear
erroneous, as each implies a significant ‘shift in meaning relative to
established usage’.77 To substitute case study for qualitative, ethnographic or
process-tracing research is to limit the case study to one of its subtypes, for
each definition describes a certain kind of case study, and not the general
phenomenon. The fourth option may not be false, but it is certainly
ambiguous. The terms phenomenon, instance or example are simply too
broad to define the limits of what a case study is and is not. Finally, equating
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55
a case study with the study of a single case (n = 1) is, as Gerring puts it,
‘simply wrong’.78
Gerring proposes an alternative definition, effectively capturing the
uniqueness of the case study as a research method without becoming so
specific as to limit its application. He defines the case study as ‘an intensive
study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of
(similar) units’.79 A unit represents a spatially confined phenomenon, such as
a nation-state, a political party, an election and so on, observed at a single
point in time or over a delimited period of time. Chronological boundaries
may not always be explicit, but they are at least implicit. Gerring provides a
particularly useful definition of the case study by further clarifying the
relationship of the study to other terms in this semantic field. The author
defines a population as consisting of a sample (studied cases) as well as
unstudied cases. A sample comprises several units, and each unit is analysed
at distinct points in time, forming cases. A case contains several relevant
dimensions (variables), each of which is developed from an observation or
observations.80 This clarification facilitates more accuracy in designing a
research approach because the precise definitions of all the terms can be
modified depending on the proposition and corresponding research design.
In other words, depending on the research focus, a country may be a case, a
unit, a population or a case study – thus effectively reducing the risk of
methodological confusion. Unlike the MSSD or MDSD, the comparative
case study research design permits a clear delineation of the various levels of
comparison, particularly on the timeline, as it enables both the within-unit
and cross-unit analyses that are required for this study, as will be described
in more detail below. The preference for the comparative case study research
design, however, does not suggest that context conditions are irrelevant for
selecting the units of analysis. On the contrary, analysis of the context is
crucial, and the logic that underlies such a two-unit comparison is exactly
the same as that of the MSSD or MDSD.81
Having specified what a case study is, Gerring moves on to elaborate
on the ways in which case study research can be conducted. To do so, one
must examine the various ways in which a covariational relationship can be
established within any research design; in other words, observing how X
causes Y. Of the seven ways in which covariation can be observed, the
single case study research design applies to the first three:
i)
ii)
iii)
in a single unit diachronically
within a single unit synchronically
within a single unit diachronically
Judy Smith-Höhn
56
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
across units synchronically
across units synchronically and diachronically
across and within units synchronically
across and within units synchronically and diachronically82
The first type of case study examines variation in a single unit over
time (i), the second type divides the primary unit into subunits that are
examined synchronically for covariation, while the third type subjects the
subunits to a diachronic covariational analysis.83 Of the other cross-unit
research designs (iv–vii), the comparative case study is closest to the final
method which utilises all forms of covariation in a single research design
that is ‘comparative-historical’. Here, a small number of units are subjected
to in-depth analysis. Such an intensive study is tantamount to a combined
series of case studies with cross-unit analysis.84
Applying Gerring’s definition and bearing in mind the aspects to be
considered when using the comparative method as outlined by Nohlen,85 the
research design of this study can be visualised as in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 The case study method – A semantic clarification
POPULATION
Post-Conflict Societies
CASE 1
before 2003
SAMPLE
UNSTUDIED
Sierra Leone and Liberia
Other Post-Conflict Societies
UNIT
UNIT
Liberia
Sierra Leone
CASE 2
2003-06
CASE 3
before 2001
CASE 4
2001-05
CASE 5
2006
Methodology
57
This framework reveals two units of analysis that together comprise
five cases. This is a crucial distinction, as the division into five time-bound
cases enables a more clear-cut comparison within and across cases. The
inferences drawn from the comparison are thereby more accurate. Basically,
there are three types of comparisons: diachronic, diachronic-binary and
synchronic.
The diachronic comparison occurs on the timeline between the past
and the present situation in each country (cases 1 and 2 for Liberia and cases
3, 4 and 5 for Sierra Leone). This is based on the notion that, to determine
the efficacy of the SSR efforts implemented in the two countries since the
end of their respective civil wars, one must know the state the security sector
– if intact at all – was in before such efforts were undertaken. This enables
one to determine the relative progress that has been made in each country.
Moreover, within-unit comparisons can potentially reduce the well-known
inferential errors that may arise from employing cross-unit comparisons
alone.86
The first level of comparison is therefore within-unit, i.e. a diachronic
comparison: Liberia just before the end of the civil war in 2003 compared to
the period 2003–2006 during the so-called peacebuilding phase, and Sierra
Leone before the end of its civil war in 2001 in comparison to both the
period 2001–2005 (the peacebuilding phase with heavy international
involvement until the withdrawal of the last UN troops) and the period after
the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force in 2006.87 These will be dealt
with in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, respectively.
The diachronic-binary comparison is cross-unit, and refers to the
comparison of both countries just as they emerged from violent conflict (the
immediate post-conflict phases signified by cases 2 and 4). A cursory note
on the diachronic-binary comparison of cases 2 and 4: it is necessarily brief,
as sufficient data could not be gathered in Sierra Leone. The analysis can
only be based on the interviews and one of the four focus group discussions
that had looked at this time period, while the survey poll provides no
information in this regard. This points to a flaw in the planning and
implementation of the field research.
The third and final level of comparison is synchronic and compares
the current situation, i.e. the SSR efforts, in both countries (cases 2 and 5).
The two cross-unit comparisons are dealt with in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the intended approach, with the arrows indicating
the comparisons that will be undertaken within and between the cases.
In their work on Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences,88 George and Bennett dedicate an entire chapter to the comparative
Judy Smith-Höhn
58
case study research design.89 Although their definition of case study
research90 covers only one of the subtypes of such research, their elaboration
on the essential components of a comparison of case studies remains valid –
it is both simple and straightforward.91 In fact, the statement applies to any
comparison, namely that it requires structure and focus.92 The method should
be structured, in that the same set of research questions are posed for each of
the case studies to guide and standardise data collection, thus facilitating a
systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases. It should
also be focused, in that it considers a selected aspect of each of the cases or
units.
Figure 3.2 Comparative case studies – Levels of comparison
Liberia
Sierra Leone
CASE 1
CASE 3
before 2003
before 2001
CASE 2
CASE 4
2003–2006
2001–2005
CASE 5
2005
3.2
Tools for comparison: A mixed-methods approach
In general, despite most authors now calling for a mix of methods, their
designs and elaborations on particular methods either do not permit any
integration of methods or their narrow definitions of research strategies limit
the potential for a mixed-methods design. George and Bennett are no
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59
exception when defining the case study as a uniquely qualitative method.
Though they call for the use of more than one method, their discussion
provides no insights as to how such a multi-method approach should or
could be structured.93
George and Bennett’s elaborations on the benefits of case studies and
their distinction between case studies, statistical studies and formal
modelling may obscure the fact that case studies can incorporate both
qualitative and quantitative methods for data collection. As Yin noted in his
later works, a case study should be defined as a research strategy:
an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life
context… The case study inquiry… relies on multiple sources of evidence,
[benefiting] from the prior development of theoretical propositions.94
This all-encompassing method can include both single- and multiple-case
studies and the data can include, and even be limited to, quantitative
evidence. More specifically, Yin notes that case studies should not be
confused with qualitative research, and indicates that they can be based on
any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence.95
Research on mixed methods is still evolving, and there is an ongoing
discussion as to how to define such studies. Though most writers concede
that a mixed-methods approach is one that includes both a qualitative and a
quantitative sub-study, there is a lack of consensus on how the two substudies are related to each other. Basically, one can distinguish between
mixed methods as the collection and analysis of two types of data
(qualitative and quantitative) and mixed methods as the integration of two
approaches to research (quantitative and qualitative). While the former
focuses more closely on methods, the latter hones in on methodology. One
thus needs to distinguish between studies that employ two types of data
without serious integration, and those that integrate findings from qualitative
and quantitative elements of a project. This study mixes methods by
applying two types of data-collection procedures: a survey poll
(quantitative), and focus group discussions and semi-standardised interviews
(both qualitative).
A comprehensive definition of mixed methods describes it as
‘research in which the investigator collects and analyzes data, integrates the
findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative
approaches or methods in a single study or a program of inquiry’.96 A key
element of this definition is integration.
60
Judy Smith-Höhn
What, then, are the benefits of mixing methods for the research design
developed above? In the field of political science, the research paradigm of
mixed methods has proven to be a contentious issue.97 Undoubtedly,
merging of quantitative and qualitative findings has the potential to offer
insights that could otherwise not be gathered: by drawing from the two sets
of findings, the researcher can consider whether they suggest interesting
contrasts that require further investigation or whether they help to clarify
each other.98 The challenge is to overcome the practical difficulties that may
impede such an integration of methods.
Bryman published a revealing article on this issue, noting that the
development of mixed-methods research was being hindered by the
tendency for qualitative and quantitative findings either not to be integrated
at all or to be integrated only to a limited extent.99 The author elaborates on
the various factors that bring about this lack of integration,100 and concludes
by formulating a question that can be used to guide the researcher when
conducting mixed-methods research:
Has my understanding of my quantitative/qualitative findings been
substantially enhanced by virtue of the fact that I also have
qualitative/quantitative findings, and have I demonstrated that enrichment?101
Bryman also points to a significant deficit in mixed-methods practice,
namely the lack of literature on how to present mixed methods in such a way
that the qualitative and quantitative findings are genuinely integrated. Hence
there are very few guidelines upon which to draw when writing up findings
that employ a mixed-methods research design. Elliott, like Bryman and other
leading authors in the field, laments the fact that the qualitative and
quantitative elements within a research project are often still
‘compartmentalized into separate chapters’ and not integrated as they might
be.102
To overcome this barrier, a fully integrated mixed-methods
framework was developed for the current study. Instead of presenting the
findings according to the datasets available, i.e. dividing the chapters
according to the sets of qualitative and quantitative results drawn from the
fieldwork, this study uses the checklist developed in Chapter 2 as a
framework. The various comparative steps for the analysis are therefore
guided by the four criteria for assessing SSR in post-conflict societies:
1)
whether security actors exist and what their future potential is for
providing security
Methodology
2)
3)
4)
3.2.1
61
whether the context-specific characteristics, procedures and
interactions of the security sector have been adequately considered by
the international implementing agencies
whether the legacies of the past have been adequately addressed so as
to avoid a relapse into conflict
whether the population has confidence in the ability of security actors
to provide security – the existence of these actors can be determined
by means of local perceptions.
Integrating the data-gathering tools for analysis
One can briefly elaborate on the benefits of the methods of data gathering
employed, and underline the value of each method in providing answers to
the questions posed in the checklist as well as their potential to complement
each other.
Field research was conducted in both countries for a period of three
months in each country.103 Three methods were used for data gathering.
i.
ii.
iii.
A survey poll was carried out in three urban areas in both countries.
Eight in-depth focus group discussions were conducted, zooming in
on security perceptions and including issues such as security actors
involved and the relationships between these actors.
Approximately 60 focused, semi-structured interviews were
conducted with elites and experts – local and international – with the
information gathered from experts serving as the more ‘objective’
perception of the security arena in each country.
Where available, non-conventional literature and other key documents
(also known as grey literature, e.g. internal reports, government documents,
newsletters, factsheets, crime statistics) were gathered to substantiate the
‘objective’ performance of security actors.
3.2.2
Survey poll
The survey poll is a typical quantitative data-gathering tool which enables
the generalisation of findings to the population from which the sample was
drawn, with the samples generally being larger than that for qualitative
research.
A total of 700 respondents were interviewed in three urban areas in
each country. In Liberia, the capital Monrovia (500 respondents) and two
62
Judy Smith-Höhn
secondary cities, Tubmanburg and Buchanan (200 respondents each), were
selected. In Sierra Leone, interviews were conducted in the capital, Freetown
(500 respondents), and in Makeni and Koidu Town (200 respondents each).
Due to practical considerations, fieldwork was limited to urban areas; thus
the figures reflect the perceptions of both countries’ urban population.
However, people who had migrated from the hinterland participated in the
focus group discussions and interviews were also conducted with a number
of key stakeholders from rural areas, thus furnishing some impressions of
rural conditions. But given this inherent caveat, results are interpreted
bearing in mind the urban bias of the research design.
To ensure that the survey sample is representative, four suburbs were
selected within each city which together were identified as representing the
demographic composition of each city. In addition, interviewers applied a
randomised technique for the selection of the interviewer teams, starting
points and households. To guarantee a gender balance, every second
respondent had to be a woman.104
The survey was intended to give an impression of the perceptions of
general and personal security of urban citizens in each country, as well as
revealing citizens’ assessment of different security actors as regards their
role in public and personal security. The questionnaire included items on the
socio-economic background of respondents, allowing a more differentiated
analysis of security needs and perceptions in terms of various criteria, such
as age, gender, ethnic group, religion and occupation.
Data from the survey poll were interpreted using SPSS,105 a software
package developed specifically for statistical data analysis.106
3.2.3
Focus group discussions
Focus groups are best known for their use in the marketing sector as a means
of determining consumer habits. In other areas, focus group discussions have
been used as a tool for what is termed social marketing. Here, focus groups
facilitate the evaluation of programmes dealing with, for instance, substance
abuse or curricular reform, and identify potential targets of such
programmes.107 Focus group discussions are defined as a research technique
that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the
researcher.108 They can thus be understood as a data-collecting tool that
utilises the interaction in a group discussion as a source of data, with the
researcher playing an active role in creating the group discussion for datagathering purposes.109
Methodology
63
Given this broad definition, it is helpful to understand what focus
groups are not. The term can sometimes falsely signify groups whose
primary purpose is not research, but rather therapy, decision-making,
education or even behaviour change. Furthermore, procedures that utilise
multiple participants without interactive discussion should not be confused
with focus groups.110 Such procedures are more aptly termed group
interviews, and offer a time-saving alternative to conducting individual
interviews.111 Finally, focus groups should be distinguished from methods
that collect data from naturally occurring group discussions where no one
functions as an interviewer.112 The latter distinction is crucial to the focus
group discussion method, as it points to one of the key strengths of this
method, namely that the discussion is guided by the researcher’s interests.113
As a technique of collecting qualitative data, focus group discussion
thus has two defining features which render it ideal for this particular
analysis: the reliance on the researcher’s focus and the group’s interaction.114
The former enables the researcher to collect concentrated amounts of data on
precisely the topic of interest, in this case SSR, while the latter uses the
group’s interaction to produce data and insights that would otherwise be less
accessible.
In comparison to the participant observation method often applied by
anthropologists, which involves a variety of techniques including informal
interviews, collective discussions and life histories, the focus group method
enables the researcher to observe a large amount of interaction on a
particular topic in a limited period of time based on his/her capacity to
assemble and direct the group sessions.115 The downside of such control is
that it inevitably means focus groups occur in unnatural social settings, thus
reducing the range of data that can be collected, inhibiting the scope of
interactions among participants and preventing an open discussion of the
research topic.116 However, as the interest here is not to collect data on social
actions but rather on the discussion of these activities, the focus group is the
more appropriate method. Moreover, the naturalistic settings required for the
participant observation method are often difficult to locate and gain access
to.117
The two defining features of the focus group technique point to the
two key issues that must be considered during the planning phase: the
researcher’s ability to communicate the topic of interest to the participants in
such a way as to assemble and direct group sessions (moderation), and the
composition of the members of the group.
As regards the issue of moderating the focus groups, the
distinctiveness of the settings under study – subject sensitivity, language
64
Judy Smith-Höhn
barrier (local dialect) – meant that no researcher from the core team
occupied the role of moderator. Instead, a local experienced moderator was
employed. Careful consideration was also given to the intended composition
of the groups. In both countries, four focus group discussions were held,
each having six to eight participants. Discussants were chosen according to
two criteria: the members of each group had to be homogeneous and virtual.
The first criterion denotes similarities among group participants in terms of
their social, educational and economic background. Hence one focus group
comprised people from the educational sector (teachers and students), group
two’s members were all (previously) employed in the health sector (health
workers), the third discussion was conducted among market women, while
members of the last group were either community or youth leaders. The
second criterion – that the groups had to be virtual as opposed to real –
merely meant that discussants within each group should not be familiar with
each other. The composition of the focus groups was intended to reduce the
risk that status-related barriers or entrenched roles would unduly influence
participants’ responses.
Each round of discussion lasted one day, during which time it was
possible to explore the assumed motivation and legitimacy of security actors
as well as other issues relevant to the security sector. A systematic
comparison with the security situation in the past – more specifically, the
period prior to the end of the civil war – was undertaken in order to map the
extent of the transformation in the configuration of the various security
actors.
The key outcome of the focus group discussions was a graphical
mapping of security actors which depicts the identity and relative
significance of, as well as the interactions among, these various actors.
3.2.4
Focused, semi-structured interviews with elites and experts
The semi-structured interview is perhaps the classic form of data collection
used in the social sciences. Interviews are conducted with a relatively open
framework allowing for focused two-way communication.
Unlike a survey containing detailed questions that are formulated prior
to the interviews, semi-structured interviews usually comprise a set of
general questions or topics to be discussed. These form the basis for more
specific questions that arise during the interview, permitting flexibility to
probe a variety of issues depending on the knowledge and expertise of the
interviewee and, of course, the interests of the interviewer.
Methodology
65
Interviews were conducted with local elites as well as local and
international experts – these included security actors such as representatives
of the national security forces, traditional societies and private security
companies. Unlike the specific questions posed in the survey, the interviews
were guided by a set of open-ended, semi-structured questions. Conducting
interviews with elites, such as local government representatives, traditional
authorities and key representatives from civil society, enabled a comparison
of perceptions ‘from above’ with those ‘from below’, i.e. the perceptions of
the local population gathered by means of the focus group discussions and
the quantitative survey. The expert interviews, as mentioned above, add a
more objective view on the security sector in each country.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Rueschemeyer, quoted in Timothy C. Lim (2006) Doing Comparative Politics. An
Introduction to Approaches and Issues. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, p. 26.
Lim, ibid.
Ibid., p. 27.
Giovanni Sartori (1994) ‘Compare why and how. Comparing, miscomparing and the
comparative method’, in Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil (eds) Comparing Nations:
Concepts, Strategies, Substance. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 16.
John Gerring (2004) ‘What is a case study and what is it good for?’, American Political
Science Review, 98(2), p. 348.
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development
in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, p. 3. According to Bennett et al., this
is generally evident in the mix of methods in leading political science journals since the
mid-1980s, with 49 per cent of articles sampled having used statistics, 46 per cent cases
studies and 23 per cent formal modelling, and roughly one in five of these having used
more than one method. See Andrew Bennett, Aharon Barth and Kenneth R. Rutherford
(2003) ‘Do we preach what we practice? A survey of methods in political science journals
and curricula’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 36: 373–378, p. 374. Regardless of the
accuracy of these figures, and despite its regional bias, with a sample of 1,000 articles in
ten journals the survey is considered as representative.
George and Bennett, ibid., p. 5.
Ibid.
Sartori, note 4 above, p. 15; Dieter Nohlen (2004) ‘Vergleichende Methode’, in Dieter
Nohlen and Rainer O. Schultze (eds) Lexikon der Politikwissenschaft. Theorien,
Methoden, Begriffe, Vol. 2, C. H. Beck: Munich, p. 1042; Alfred Grosser (1974) Politik
Erklären: Unter Welchen Voraussetzungen? Mit Welchen Mitteln? Zu Welchen
Ergebnissen? Frankfurt/Main: Ullstein, p. 19.
Harold D. Laswell (1968) ‘The future of the comparative method’, Comparative Politics,
1(1), p. 3; Gabriel A. Almond (1966) ‘Political theory and political science’, American
Political Science Review, 60(4): 877ff, quoted in Nohlen, ibid., p. 1042.
66
Judy Smith-Höhn
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
See e.g. Lim, note 1 above, p. 19; Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1042; Sartori, note 4 above,
pp. 15–34.
Arend Lijphart (1971) ‘Comparative politics and the comparative method’, American
Political Science Review, 65: 682–693.
Ibid.
Though this may seem an obvious statement, Giovanni Sartori, speaking of comparative
politics in the United States, observed that the field is often defined as the study of ‘other
countries’, and in most cases only one. See Sartori, note 4 above, p. 14; Lim, note 1
above, p. 29, n7. In other words, while the field is defined in terms of a particular method
– i.e. comparison – several scholars of comparative politics have no interest, notion nor
training in comparing. See Sartori, note 4 above, p. 15.
Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1042.
Ibid., p. 1043.
Sartori, note 4 above, p. 15.
Lim, note 1 above; Nohlen, note 9 above; Todd Landman (2003) Issues and Methods in
Comparative Politics: An Introduction. London: Routledge.
Lim, note 1 above, pp. 20ff.
Ibid.
Both Lim and Sartori concede that the experimental and statistical methods are better
methods of control. In the social sciences, however, the experimental method has limited
pertinence and the statistical method requires many cases, which research in this field is
generally short of. Hence, researchers often have to opt for the second-best method of
control. See Lim, note 1 above, p. 22; Sartori, note 4 above, p. 16.
Lim, ibid., p. 21.
Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1044; Landman, note 18 above, p. 4.
Sartori, note 4 above, p. 16.
Landman, note 18 above, p. 4.
Charles C. Ragin (1989) The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, p. 11.
Lim, note 1 above, p. 22.
Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1044.
Landman, note 18 above.
Lim, note 1 above, p. 22.
Landman, note 18 above, p. 4.
See e.g. Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1044; Landman, note 18 above, p. 4.
Nohlen, ibid.
See e.g. ibid., p. 1043; Sartori, note 4 above, p. 16.
Dogan, quoted in Nohlen, ibid., p. 1044.
Sartori, note 4 above; Landman, note 18 above, p. 4.
Sartori, ibid., p. 17.
Ibid.
Landman, note 18 above, pp. 4ff.
Sartori, note 4 above, p. 19.
Ibid.
James L. Sundquist (1988) ‘Needed: A political theory for the new era of coalition
government in the United States’, Political Science Quarterly, 103(4): 613–635.
Sartori, note 4 above, pp. 19ff.
Ibid., p. 20.
Methodology
67
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
Ibid., p. 21.
Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1044.
See e.g. Sartori, note 4 above, p. 22.
Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1045; Lim, note 1 above, p. 55.
Nohlen, ibid., p. 1044.
Both West African countries have witnessed protracted phases of violence, and the civil
wars in both countries are closely linked: mercenaries fought in the civil wars; the ruling
class continuously meddled in the affairs of neighbouring countries; and Charles Taylor’s
involvement in the Sierra Leonean civil war is now known to most as a result of his
ongoing trial in the Hague. Further similarities include the far-reaching involvement of
international actors during the post-conflict phases, the prevailing socio-economic
conditions and the presence of a number of different (types of) security actors. A detailed
description of the similarities between the case studies is provided in Chapter 4.
J. ’Kayode Fayemi (2004) ‘Governing insecurity in post-conflict states: The case of Sierra
Leone and Liberia’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction
of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, p. 179; available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/serviceengine/
FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=B0EA7833-62AD-2215-99BF182ADF9F413A&lng=en (accessed 13 June 2006).
Lim, note 1 above, p. 2.
John Stuart Mill (1868) A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive; Being a
Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation,
7th edn. London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer.
Ibid,, p. 425.
See for example Neil J. Smelser (1976) Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences.
Princeton, NJ: Prentice-Hall; Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy (1990) How to
Compare Nations. Strategies in Comparative Politics. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, pp.
111ff; Adam Przeworski and Henry J. Teune (1970) The Logic of Comparative Social
Inquiry. New York: John Wiley & Sons; Sartori, note 4 above, p. 22. What these have in
common is the agreement that the (similar or dissimilar) dependent variable is known, the
independent variable is what is to be determined and neither heterogeneous nor
homogeneous contextual factors are to be considered.
Lim, note 1 above, pp. 34ff.
Mill, note 53 above, p. 425.
For a detailed discussion of independent and dependent variables in social science
research, see Lim, note 1 above, p. 35.
Ibid., pp. 34ff.
Ibid., pp. 38ff.
See e.g. ibid., pp. 41ff; Nohlen, note 9 above, pp. 1046f.
Lim, ibid., pp. 43ff.
Ragin, note 26 above.
Lim, note 1 above, p. 44.
Ibid., pp. 50ff.
Lim’s elaboration on the case study as a comparative method, particularly his reference to
the binary analysis, i.e. comparison of two units (cases), is synonymous with the MSSD,
and hence provides little additional insight into this particular research design. See ibid.,
pp. 44ff.
See e.g. Sartori, note 4 above, p. 23.
George and Bennett, note 6 above, p. 17.
68
Judy Smith-Höhn
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
Ibid., p. 18.
Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker (eds) (1992) What Is a Case? Exploring the
Foundations of Social Inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.
See e.g. Stanley Lieberson (1992) ‘Small n’s and big conclusions: An examination of the
reasoning in comparative studies based on a small number of cases’, Social Forces, 70(2):
307–320; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing Social
Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press; Lijphart, note 12 above.
E.g. Robert K. Yin (1994) Case Study Research. Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage; Joe R. Feagin, Anthony M. Orum and Gideon Sjoberg (eds) (1991) A Case for
the Case Study. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina.
Yin, ibid.
George and Bennett, note 6 above.
Gerring, note 5 above.
Harry Eckstein (1975) ‘Case study and theory in political science’, in Fred I. Greenstein
and Nelson W. Polsby (eds) Handbook of Political Science,. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.
Gerring, note 5 above, p. 342.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid
Lim, note 1 above, p. 53.
Gerring, What Is a Case Study, p. 343.
Gerring, note 5 above, p. 343.
Ibid
See James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds) (2003) Comparative Historical
Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. This typology
has shown that, for case study research design, the comparison is conducted according to
the time aspect – time, object, context and space are the four ways in which a comparison
can be carried out. See Nohlen, note 9 above, p. 1044. As Lim argues, a single case study
can be explicitly comparative when time is taken into account. See Lim, note 1 above.
Nohlen, ibid.
See e.g. George and Bennett, note 6 above, p. ix.
2006 serves as the cut-off point for analysis as the data were collected during that year.
Though there may have been changes in the SSR processes in both countries in 2007,
these are believed to be minimal. Institutions are not easily susceptible to change and,
more often than not, such change is slow. Moreover, it is believed that the inferences
drawn from the analysis retain their relevance for SSR inasmuch as they are generalisable,
and particularly they are yet to be considered closely by stakeholders in policy-making.
The volume draws from the work of several authors in the field of case study methods,
including Alexander George’s structured, focused comparison of cases; Arend Lijphart
and Harry Eckstein’s descriptions on the various theory-building types of case studies;
Charles Ragin’s analysis of interaction effects and comparative methods of studying
them; and Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba’s work on scientific
inferences in qualitative research. See Lijphart, note 12 above; Eckstein, note 76 above;
Ragin, note 26 above.; King et al., note 71 above.
George and Bennett, note 6 above.
Methodology
69
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
George and Bennett (ibid., p. ix) define case study research as a qualitative exercise that
typically involves a combination of within-case analyses and cross-case comparisons
through process tracing and congruence testing, respectively.
Since it is not of immediate relevance to the comparative method, here is a brief note on
the explanations given by various authors concerning the reasons for and advantages of
employing the case study method. Basically, case studies are employed for five reasons:
configurative/atheoretical ideographic (Eckstein); interpretive (Lijphart); hypothesisgenerating (Lijphart); crucial (Eckstein), i.e. theory-confirming or disconfirming
(Lijphart); and deviant (Lijphart). See Eckstein, note 76 above; Lijphart, note 12 above.
According to George and Bennett (ibid., p. 19), case studies have four advantages over
statistical methods and formal models in testing hypotheses and developing theory,
namely the potential for achieving high conceptual validity; strong procedures for
fostering new hypotheses; the value as a useful means to examine closely the
hypothesised role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and the
capacity to address causal complexity.
Alexander George developed the method of structured, focused comparison of cases as
one that ‘outlines process-tracing and other within-case modes of analysis as key
complements or alternatives to controlled comparison of cases’. George and Bennett,
ibid., p. ix.
Ibid.
Yin, note 72 above, pp. 13ff.
Ibid., p. 14.
Abbas Tashakkori and John W. Creswell (2007) ‘Editorial: The new era of mixed
methods’, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(1): 3–7, p. 4; available at
http://mmr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/1/1/3 (accessed 27 November 2006).
See for example Henry E. Brady and David Collier (eds) (2004) Rethinking Social
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Discourse resulted from an ensuing publication: see Henry E. Brady, David C. Collier and
Jason Seawright (2006) ‘Toward a pluralistic vision of methodology’, Political Analysis,
14(3): 353–368; Henry E. Brady, David C. Collier and Jason Seawright (2007) ‘Sources
of leverage in causal inferences’, paper presented at American Political Science
Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 29 August–2 September; Nathaniel Beck (2006)
‘Is causal-process observation an oxymoron?’, Political Analysis, 14(3): 347–352;
Nathaniel Beck (2007) ‘Causal process “observation”: Oxymoron or old wine’, paper
presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 29
August–2 September.
See e.g. Alan Bryman (2007) ‘Barriers to integrating quantitative and qualitative
research’, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(1): 8–22; available at
http://mmr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/1/1/8.pdf (accessed 27 November 2007).
Ibid.
For a detailed outline of possible barriers to integrating qualitative and quantitative data
see ibid.
Ibid., p. 20.
Jane Elliott (2005) Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative
Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 185.
Fieldwork in Liberia was carried out from late November 2005 to mid-February 2006;
field research in Sierra Leone followed a few months later, from early April to the end of
June 2006.
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Judy Smith-Höhn
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
The guidelines for randomising the survey sample are provided in Annex I.
Statistical Products and Service Solutions.
For detailed instructions on how to use SPSS see e.g. George A. Morgan, Orlando V.
Griego and Gene W. Gloeckner (2001) SPSS for Windows: An Introduction to Use and
Interpretation in Research. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates; George A.
Morgan, Nancy J. Leech, Gene W. Gloeckner and Karen C. Barrett (2004) SPSS for
Introductory Statistics: Use and Interpretation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Lengua and Hendershott, cited in David L. Morgan (1996) ‘Focus groups’, Annual
Review of Sociology, 22(1): 129–152.
Morgan, ibid., p. 129; David L. Morgan (1997) Focus Groups as Qualitative Research.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, p. 6.
Morgan, note 108 above, p. 129.
For a review of other group techniques such as nominal or Delphi groups, see David W.
Stewart and Prem N. Shamdasani (1990) Focus Groups: Theory and Practice. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 153ff.
Peter Loos and Burkhard Schäffer (2001) Das Gruppendiskussionsverfahren.
Theoretische Grundlagen Und Empirische Anwendung. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, p. 12.
Such naturally occurring group discussions are often used as a means of data gathering
when the researcher is less interested in the content of discussions and more in the
dynamics and structure of the conversations. In ethnographic research, such ‘informal
interviews’ are used as a means of gathering information about a particular segment of the
culture under study. See ibid., pp. 12ff.
Morgan, note 108 above, p. 129.
Morgan, note 109 above, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 8.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 9.
Chapter 4
Case Studies
Before comparing each of the cases according to the research design (section
3.1.4), the case studies will be put into historical context. An analysis of the
security sector and the reform efforts thus far undertaken in both countries
facilitates an understanding of the setting within which the actors have been
implementing their strategies. It will also illuminate the causes of the
conflicts, enabling an assessment of whether the pertinent issues have been
adequately addressed so as to prevent a relapse into violence or they remain
unresolved. The key focus will be on the countries’ post-colonial history,
and the chapter will proceed with one caveat: a detailed analysis of the
causes of conflict in each country warrants a study all on its own, and no
attempt is made here to illustrate the multifaceted nature of conflicts in
general.1 A description of the dynamics of a particular conflict that
differentiates between various types of causes – triggers, prolonging and
accelerating factors and root causes – goes beyond the scope of this study.
However, these dynamics shall be kept in mind when elaborating on these
legacies of the past and, where necessary, will be referred to in so far as they
have a bearing on the extent to which a factor can have a negative effect on
SSR efforts.
The historical contextualisation is followed by the within-case
analyses, the leitmotiv being the four guiding questions formulated in
Chapter 2.
4.1
Liberia
4.1.1
Background2
Liberia was founded as a settlement for freed American slaves of African
descent, with executive power initially vested in a governor appointed by the
American Colonization Society. Although they made up only a fraction of
the Liberian population, the American-born Africans, known as AmericoLiberians, and their descendants dominated political life from Liberia's
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Judy Smith-Höhn
independence in 1847 until April 1980, when Samuel Doe overthrew the
government in a bloody military coup.
The coup was the result of decades of exclusion suffered by the
indigenous African population of Liberia. The Doe regime was initially
multi-ethnic and participatory in nature, but during the second half of the
1980s this gave way to a new and equally exclusive patronage system, with
members of Doe’s own ethnic group, the Krahn, as well as the Mandingo
being recruited to key posts in government and the military. From then on,
the regime's chief features were the ethnicisation (and brutalisation) of rule
and the personalised use of the security apparatus, which was also a common
trait of the previous regimes. Liberia has never had a truly national army
dedicated to defending the common good.
In 1989 a former government official, Charles Taylor, launched an
armed uprising. His forces, known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), soon seized control of 95 per cent of the country. Only the
intervention of the military arm of ECOWAS prevented Taylor from
capturing the capital, Monrovia. ECOWAS negotiated a peace settlement
among the two rebel groups and the government, and installed an interim
government led by Amos Sawyer. Yet Taylor's force, with military aid from
Libya and Burkina Faso, continued its military campaign, began a siege of
Monrovia in 1992 and engaged in fighting with ECOWAS forces. AntiTaylor groups, among them Doe partisans, joined forces as the United
Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) and declared war
against Taylor. Alongside the three conflict parties (government troops,
NPFL and ULIMO), their various factions and local civil defence forces, the
ECOWAS troops soon became part of the local constellation of violence in
Liberia. The ensuing civil war lasted eight years, claiming more than
200,000 lives and threatening to destabilise the entire West African region.
Although ECOWAS had sent troops in 1990, it was only after 14 peace
agreements and the establishment of ECOMOG in 1996 that the civil war
was brought to an – albeit temporary – end. The elections held under the
peace agreement in 1997 resulted in a victory for Charles Taylor, who
secured 75 per cent of the vote, largely because he threatened to continue the
violence if he lost the election.
Like Doe, the warlord-turned-president pursued the tradition of neopatrimonial rule and installed an authoritarian, repressive regime, looting
Liberia’s resources. The only difference was that in Taylor's case the
apparatus of repression was recruited mainly from the NPFL. The peace
agreements were not upheld, and renewed fighting soon erupted between
Taylor’s government forces (Armed Forces of Liberia – AFL) and a rebel
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group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), which
was backed by Guinea. Two years after the elections, civil war broke out
anew and persisted for years, escalating in March 2003 when LURD
advanced to within 10 kilometres of Monrovia. At the same time, the newly
formed Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), backed by Côte
d'Ivoire, launched an offensive from the south. The fighting claimed more
than 10,000 lives. Once again, peace talks were initiated, but the fighting
was only brought to a halt when ECOWAS deployed 3,500 peacekeepers in
August 2003 and a weakened Taylor was forced to agree to exile in Nigeria.
On 18 August 2003, a week after Taylor’s departure, the three warring
factions (government forces, LURD and MODEL) signed the ECOWASbrokered Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana.
The elaborations above show, that in the case of Liberia, international
actors played a considerable role in the developments of its civil war. As
fighting escalated in 2003, there were calls for the United States, as a nation
with historical ties to Liberia, to send peacekeeping forces. ECOWAS took
the initiative and together with the International Contact Group on Liberia
(ICGL) – comprising ECOWAS, the United Nations, the African Union
(AU), the EU, France, the UK, the USA, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria and
Senegal – organised peace talks with the parties involved. Despite the initial
cease-fire agreement of June 2003, LURD continued its march towards the
capital. The 3,550 ECOWAS troops – the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
(ECOMIL) – were later relieved by a multinational UN peacekeeping force,
UNMIL, which began with a troop strength of 15,000. The presence of US
Marines offshore to act as a rapid response force may well have exerted a
deterrent effect as well, and helped bring the conflict under control.
In August 2007 UNMIL had just over 15,000 uniformed personnel,
including 207 military observers and 1,146 police officers. The mission also
employs around 500 international civilian staff and more than 900 local UN
workers as well as 232 UN volunteers.3 In view of the significant role played
by UNMIL in Liberia’s political arena, some observers even claim that
Liberia has in effect become a UN protectorate.4
The peace agreement of 2003 established an interim administration
that took to power in October 2003. This National Transitional Government
of Liberia (NTGL), headed by Gyude Bryant, comprised representatives
from all parties present at the peace talks – the warring factions, 18
opposition political parties and five civil society movements. Hence the
transitional administration consisted of a number of former fighters, many of
whom were less concerned for the welfare of the nation and more interested
in carving out rent-seeking opportunities from their allocation of utilities and
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parastatals. The transitional Liberian state was effectively a partnership
between UNMIL, which had broad executive and administrative powers, and
a transitional government made up of ex-warlords and their proxies.5
Security-related provisions in the CPA included the introduction of a
disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR)
programme for the combatants of all warring factions, the establishment of a
truth and reconciliation commission and transition processes. Part 4 of
Liberia’s CPA is devoted entirely to SSR.6
The effects of the 14-year civil war were devastating. By the time the
CPA was signed, the state had effectively collapsed, taking the economy and
society with it. The war had claimed some 250,000 lives, half of them
civilians. In addition to 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), more
than 80 per cent of the population were unemployed, with 75 per cent living
on less than a dollar a day.7 Even during the transitional phase, after the
cessation of war, the national context within which post-conflict
reconstruction was being implemented was characterised by deprivation and
a lack of opportunity, largely as a result of poor governance.8
In 2005 a democratically elected government under President Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf replaced the interim administration. Beginning in 2006,
Liberia’s political institutions were significantly restructured. Shortly after
her inauguration, Johnson-Sirleaf selected her new cabinet and allocated
other senior government positions. The number of civil servants within all
ministries was drastically reduced following personnel audits to determine
technical competency. However, since then there have been few changes of
staff in central offices and many of those who were involved in the civil war
still play a role in the country’s political landscape. Former Taylor associates
and other warlords, for example, were elected into parliament in 2005, in the
first legislative elections since the end of the war. The most prominent
position – House speaker – was at one point held by Taylor's former son-inlaw, Edwin Snowe. Also in a prominent post is former secretary-general of
the now-defunct rebel group LURD, Isaac Nyanebo, who was chosen as the
leader of the Senate. Liberia therefore remains a difficult environment for
post-conflict reconstruction and reform.
4.1.2
Liberia’s security sector reform strategy
SSR efforts in Liberia leave much to be desired. After 14 years of civil war
and the signing of the CPA in Accra, Liberia was one of the most
challenging contexts for post-conflict reconstruction since the end of the
Cold War.9 This comes as no surprise: of all aspects of institutional design in
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Africa, reconstruction of the security sector has proven to be the most
difficult, complex and delicate task in post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.10
As it is relatively early in the reform process, few authors have written
on SSR issues in Liberia, and even fewer have provided a comprehensive
overview of the efforts made thus far. This is not an indication of a lack of
zeal on the part of authors, but more a reflection of the failure of the
country’s transitional government under Guyde Bryant to develop a
discernable national security and defence strategy in its period of rule from
2003 to 2005. This, predictably, meant that a coherent and comprehensive
framework for the reconstruction of the security sector was lacking.11
Instead, the reform process has been compartmentalised, a situation evident,
for example, in the emphasis on reforming the police without developing a
corresponding reform strategy for the judiciary and correctional service, with
the result that the latter two institutions are overburdened and inundated.12
While the detailed provisions of the CPA have set a high standard, it appears
that the practical implementation of these policies has proven to be very
difficult.
Part 4 of Liberia’s CPA makes three key provisions regarding SSR:
the disbandment of all irregular forces; the restructuring of the AFL with a
new command structure and forces ‘which may be drawn from the ranks of
the present GOL13 forces, the LURD and the MODEL, as well as from
civilians with appropriate background and experience’; and the immediate
restructuring of the national police force, immigration, the Special Security
Service (SSS), customs security guards and other statutory security units.14
The CPA called on ECOWAS, the UN, AU and ICGL to provide advisory
staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the security reform
effort. In addition, the agreement stipulated that the USA should play a
leading role in organising the military restructuring programme.
While the CPA constitutes the major legal reference for the SSR
process in Liberia, two other legal frameworks also make mention of
security sector reform, namely the 1986 constitution of Liberia and UN
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1509. These conflicting legal
frameworks impede progress towards effective reform of the sector.15
With the inauguration of Johnson-Sirleaf in January 2006, the
constitutional provisions that had been suspended during the transitional
phase of 2003–2005 were restored.16 Article 54(e) of the 1986 constitution
stipulates that the president, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
‘appoints members of the military from the rank of lieutenant or its
equivalent above; and field marshals, deputy field marshals and sheriffs’.17
The constitution further provides that the national legislature has broad
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responsibilities regarding security issues. According to Article 34(b)–(c), for
instance, the legislature has the power:
to provide for the security of the Republic and to provide for the common
defense, to declare war and authorize the Executive to conclude peace; to
raise and support the Armed Forces of the Republic, and to make
appropriations therefor provided that no appropriation of money for that use
shall be for a longer term than one year; and to make rules for the governance
of the Armed Forces of the Republic.18
UNSC Resolution 1509 stipulates that the SSR process shall be
supported by UNMIL, which will:
assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring
the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a
civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of
civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations,
and interested States.19
The resolution further notes that UNMIL, in cooperation with ECOWAS,
international organisations and interested states, will assist the NTGL ‘in the
formation of a new and restructured Liberian military’.20 Whereas the CPA
was specific about the role of the USA in restructuring the army, the UN
resolution refers only to ‘interested States’ and is specific only about the role
of UNMIL in training the Liberia National Police (LNP).
To date, though the legal frameworks vary in focus and emphasis, the
question as to which should be the defining document for the SSR process
has not been posed. Unlike in the past, when the Taylor leadership, despite
the fragile security environment, invoked the Liberian constitution in order
to abandon the SSR process prematurely by asking ECOMOG, the recently
elected government is not prepared to revert to this old practice.21
The overall understanding of the security sector by those involved in
the reform process is that it ‘comprises security agencies and civilian
oversight bodies that promote and protect the national security interests of
the people and the state’.22 As such, the security sector includes intelligence,
paramilitary and military bodies as well as civilian institutions that have
oversight responsibilities over these security agencies. Liberia’s security
sector comprises 11 institutions: the AFL, LNP, National Security Agency
(NSA), National Bureau of Investigation, SSS, Drugs Enforcement Agency,
National Fire Service, Ministry of National Security, Bureau of Immigration
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and Naturalisation, Bureau of Customs and Excise and the Monrovia City
Police.23
The USA has seconded the programme to rebuild the AFL as a small
professional force of 2,000 to the private security company Dyncorp, while
UNMIL has taken up the training of the local police through CIVPOL.
Dyncorp, a company which has worked with the USA on similar
programmes in Iraq and Afghanistan, has already begun implementing the
$35 million programme in Liberia. However, several civil society
organisations (CSOs) have raised concerns about the efficacy of employing
private security companies to train the national army, citing the lack of
transparency and accountability in terms of the training procedure as key
problems in this area.
Unlike the US approach, the UN has employed non-commercial
means to retrain the Liberian police force through the UN Police: UNMIL’s
training of local police recruits began in 2004, and some are already
deployed with international teams of civil police operating throughout the
country.24 The training programme was designed for new recruits, existing
police officers and those undergoing specialised training, and was targeted to
train a total of 3,500 police officers by June 2007. This approach has also
met with criticism, with the selective retraining of existing LNP officers
causing grievances among those – mostly older LNP staff – who were not
selected.
These elaborations reveal that the SSR process in Liberia has had a
narrowed focus on the AFL, the LNP and the SSS. The other security
agencies have not benefited as much; the Bureau of Customs and Excise and
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation, for example, have received
capacity-building training from BIVAC International and UNMIL,
respectively, while the Ministry of National Security and other agencies
have merely undergone a vetting procedure.25
In 2003, as part of the CPA, the Governance Reform Commission
(GRC) was established to set up a ‘national integrity framework… to
promote transparency, accountability and the rule of law’.26 In 2006 the
commission initiated nationwide consultations with key players, including
district commissioners, chiefs, representatives of security agencies in the
counties, UNMIL and CSOs. The problems associated with the GRC are a
useful indication of the problems encountered when dealing with issues of
local ownership. Whereas the GRC members perceive themselves as an
independent body, the UN thinks otherwise; this became apparent in
comments made by a senior UN staff member regarding the GRC’s
independence.27
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78
In recognition of the need to deal with the legacies of the past as a key
prerequisite for effective SSR, the issue of transitional justice was addressed
in the Liberian peace process. Part 6 of Article XIII of the 2003 CPA
stipulates the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC), which officially began its work on 22 June 2006. The commission –
comprising nine Liberian and three international members – is mandated to
investigate human rights violations committed between January 1979 and
October 2003. The investigative process is scheduled to take a maximum of
two to three years. Several international and local CSOs are involved in this
process. Amnesty International, for example, together with a steering group
of local organisations, monitors the commission’s work on a regular basis.
Established under the auspices of the CPA, Liberia’s National
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and
Reintegration falls in line with the broader SSR approach that focuses on the
need to deal with the legacies of the past (see Chapter 2).28 The commission
was to coordinate all DDRR activities. However, following UNMIL’s
deployment, a joint implementation unit – comprising UNMIL’s DDRR
Unit, the UNDP and the NTGL – was established to implement the DDRR
process and coordinate DDRR activities.29 This unit did most of the actual
planning and subcontracted local service providers, such as Monrovia-based
offices of the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Norwegian Refugee
Council, which mostly carried out the technical and educational aspects of
the cantonment process.30
In sum, the Liberian peace process is exemplary for the UN modus
operandi developed since the end of the Cold War. The approach follows a
consecutive series of activities, with the peacebuilding process implemented
according to an operational checklist starting with a peace agreement,
followed by the deployment of peacekeepers, DDR of former fighters, the
repatriation and return of refugees and IDPs, judicial and security sector
reform (the latter focusing primarily on the military and the civilian police)
and concluding with the organisation of elections.31
4.2
Sierra Leone
4.2.1
Background32
Founded in 1787 as a settlement for freed slaves and recaptives,33 Sierra
Leone became a British protectorate34 in 1896 and achieved full
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independence in 1961 under Prime Minister Milton Margai. Since then, six
general elections have taken place – as well as five military coups.
As in Liberia, here too the descendants of former slaves (Creoles or
Krios) formed the elite class during the colonial period, dominating the civil
service. After independence, however, the animosity between the indigenous
population and the Krios was soon overlaid by political rivalries between
various ethnic groups, most notably between the Temne group in the north
and the Mende of the south and east. Due to the reinforcement of tribal
patriotism through colonial education, for example, appeals to ethnicity
became one of the easiest ways to gain support during post-independence
elections.35
Moreover, much like Liberia, Sierra Leone is marked by a tradition of
patrimonial rule, which has its origins in the pre-colonial period when
warrior chiefs who controlled rival trade networks developed large
followings of retainers and protected clients, many of whom were first
acquired as slaves in war.36 With the British-supervised indirect rule, this
form of patronage was perpetuated by the chiefs in the hinterland. Since the
chiefs formed the backbone of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP),
which became the ruling party in 1961, the new multi-party system of
governance was sustained by patronage networks that extended from the
state house and parliament down to the chieftaincies, sections and villages.37
As a system of sponsorship whereby solidarity with a patron was ensured by
the big man’s support for his so-called people, this vertically integrated
hierarchy often takes on ethnic colourings.38 The increasing clamour for
inclusion in this dysfunctional system and the consequent marginalisation
and exclusion of large sections of the population from socio-economic
advancement were key factors in the outbreak of a civil war that left over
50,000 dead and 300,000–400,000 internally displaced. The desire to benefit
from the primary economic resource, namely high-quality alluvial diamonds,
was but a perpetuating factor.39
The violent seizure of power by the All People’s Congress (APC) led
by Siaka Stevens in 1967–1968 marked the start of a series of military
coups. From 1985, Stevens’s self-proclaimed successor, Major-General
Joseph Saidu Momoh, governed the country – which was plagued by
economic crises and political unrest. The civil war erupted in 1991 when a
rebel insurgency group under former army corporal Foday Sankoh, the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which was supported and armed by
Charles Taylor, initiated a campaign against President Momoh, capturing
towns on the border with Liberia. In 1992 Momoh was overthrown in a
military coup staged by a group of young army officers led by Captain
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Valentine Strasser, who then went on to head the National Provisional
Ruling Council (NPRC). The NRPC coup-makers had apparently received
support from the RUF in overthrowing the APC’s one-party regime on the
understanding that the NPRC and RUF would form a coalition government.
Strasser, however, strengthened by a second Nigerian battalion and more
Guinean troops, attempted to crush the RUF by re-equipping the army and
forcing it to engage with rebel troops in the provinces.40
But many of the poorly trained and underpaid government troops
deserted and defected to the RUF as a response to the state neglect of their
material and security needs prior to and during the war. Aptly dubbed
sobels,41 their atrocities against the civilian population and involvement in
the illicit diamond trade prompted Strasser to hire the now-defunct
Executive Outcomes (EO), a private military company, to supplement his
troops and liberate the most important areas from RUF’s control. Although
EO was extremely effective in fulfilling its directive, its involvement
revealed weaknesses in government by exposing the incompetence of its
own armed forces to manage the situation, consequently arousing their
resentment, and also led the latter to assume that the mercenaries were there
not only to defeat the RUF but also to protect the government from its own
army. In 1996 Strasser was ousted by a military coup led by his former
defence minister, Brigadier-General Julius Maada Bio. Bio fulfilled his
promise of a return to civilian rule when he handed power over to the newly
elected president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the SLPP, in early 1996.
Kabbah's government signed a peace accord with Sankoh's rebels later
that year, yet rebel attacks continued, again aided by Charles Taylor.
During the civil war, so-called civil defence forces (CDF) emerged in
response to community-level security problems that were not being
addressed by the national security forces. These local self-help measures
proved effective in safeguarding security, albeit confined to the community
level. Unlike the community-driven efforts in neighbouring Liberia, such
measures were carried out in a more organised manner, the CDF having
traditionally been managed through various forms of local and customary
authority. Civilians organised themselves into civil defence groups that were
usually led by traditional hunters. Thus the CDF, commonly referred to
under their Mende name kamajors,42 were formed amid fears of threats from
both the rebels and government troops. Again, in contrast to Liberia, these
traditional institutions – as part of the Poro system of secret societies – were
key players during the civil war. Later, however, certain elements within the
CDF resorted to extortion and acts of brutality.
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There appears to be some ambiguity as regards the role of the chiefs,
depending mostly on the respective chief’s personal ambitions to protect
either his people or his own life. Thus while some chiefs deserted their
people in the rural areas and fled to other parts of the region, others played
an instrumental role in recruiting and funding kamajors.
In 1997 a coalition of army officers led by Major-General Johnny Paul
Koroma and members of the RUF forced Kabbah to leave office. The UN
reacted by imposing sanctions in October that year, impeding the supply of
arms and petroleum products.
Kabbah was reinstated in March 1998 after the Nigerian-led
ECOMOG force successfully ousted the junta, but the fighting continued in
many parts of the country and the RUF reclaimed parts of the capital from
regional peacekeeping force. Ultimately the rebels were defeated, and the
UN intervened and organised a cease-fire agreement between Kabbah and
Sankoh’s RUF in 1999. Terms of the agreement included the rebels
receiving posts in a new government and a general amnesty from
prosecution for war crimes for all forces. The government had largely ceased
to function effectively and with at least half of its territory remaining under
rebel control, fighting continued despite the arrival of the first UN troops.
When in May 1999 nearly all Nigerian forces had left and UN forces were
attempting to disarm the RUF in eastern Sierra Leone, Sankoh’s forces
clashed with the UN troops, and some 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage
as the peace accord effectively collapsed.43
In May 2000 the RUF appeared to be on the verge of capturing
Freetown, whereupon the British government decided in favour of military
intervention. British troops were initially deployed to evacuate foreign
nationals and restore order; later, they also provided support for the UN
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) contingents, so that in 2001 the UN
troops were able to deploy peacefully in rebel-held territory. Rebels were
now being disarmed and the new British-trained Sierra Leone Army began
deploying in rebel-held areas.
After several failed peace agreements in 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000,44
Sierra Leone finally emerged from 11 years of civil war in 2002 with a Joint
Declaration of End of War between the RUF, the Sierra Leone Army and the
quasi-official CDF, with the government and the UN agreeing to set up a
special war crimes court. Within a year of signing the peace accord, Kabbah
and his party again won landslide victories in the parliamentary and
presidential elections, consolidating Kabbah’s position of power by securing
a majority in parliament. The country’s progress towards peace was
considered so significant that the UNAMSIL troops withdrew in December
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2005. In January 2006, the UN Security Council authorised that UNAMSIL
be succeeded by an assistance mission, the UN Integrated Office in Sierra
Leone (UNIOSIL).
Upon emerging from war in 2002, the key tasks for the Sierra
Leonean government included capacity-building for state structures and
public administration. Such goals could only be reached with the help of
external actors, particularly the UN and the UK.
Like Liberia, the Sierra Leonean government continues to be plagued
by rampant corruption and lack of accountability, and although Sierra Leone
has succeeded in instituting some democratic structures and holding
transparent elections, there are still major shortcomings concerning issues of
corruption, mismanagement and low state institutional capacities. The UK,
as the former colonial power, is the key benefactor of Sierra Leone’s postconflict reconstruction reform. According to the Bertelsmann
Transformation Index (BTI), the government’s fundamental administrative
infrastructure now covers the entire country.45 However, the administration
remains heavily dependent on external assistance and cannot function
effectively without the support of external actors.
4.2.2
Sierra Leone’s security sector reform strategy
Before the war, Sierra Leone’s security sector was largely based on ethnic
and patrimonial alliances, and stagnated in what Ebo has aptly termed a
‘comatose state’.46 The benchmarks for recruitment and promotion within
this sector, as with all other components of the public sector, were party
political, ethnic and inter-personal relations, and not objective professional
performance. Moreover, inadequate and irregular remuneration exacerbated
corruption and abuses of office. Security sector governance was shaped by a
focus on state and regime security, and alternative security institutions were
established in order to guarantee their loyalty to the respective ruling party,
effectively impeding operational coherence and accountability. Moreover,
the consequent inter-institutional rivalry precipitated the self-defeat of the
security sector within the state.47 After the first coup attempt in 1967–1968,
during the one-party rule of Siaka Stevens, the regime consciously started to
weaken state security through the creation of an alternative security system;
at first through the Internal Security Unit (ISU) and later through an ISU
subsidiary, the Special Security Division.48 The overthrow of the APC rule
in a military coup in 1992, a year after the onset of rebellion in the diamond
region, was precisely a result of this systematic deinstitutionalisation of the
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state, for Momoh was left with little or no capacity to confront the rebellion
that removed him from office.49
The considerable influence of colonial history, and in this case British
colonial rule, on the security sector in Sierra Leone is typical of many West
African states.50 During colonial times, the authorities had established the
security forces in order to protect British interests and contain resistance
against the colonial administration through the suppression of the local
population. The Sierra Leone Frontier Police, from which the Sierra Leone
Police (SLP) originate, had been created not to defend the population against
threats to their security, but to protect the interests of the colonial
administration.51 Thus, despite the country’s independence from its colonial
ruler, there continued to be a gap between ordinary citizens and the security
institutions that were created for their protection but which, in fact, often
served to threaten their well-being.
Following the cessation of the civil war, and in keeping with the
historical relationship between Sierra Leone and the UK, the former colonial
power became the key benefactor of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict
reconstruction agenda. More specifically, the UK has been involved in the
reform of the country’s security sector through four institutions, namely
DFID,52 the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) and the British-led International Military Advisory and
Training Team (IMATT).53
Sierra Leone’s perception of the security sector currently encompasses
the military, police, correctional, fire-fighting and intelligence services,
relevant line ministries, CSOs and international stakeholders.54 In 2002 the
National Security and Central Intelligence Act was passed as part of the SSR
process, leading to the establishment of the Office of National Security
(ONS) and the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) under section
11.1 of the Act.55 The ONS serves as the secretariat of the National Security
Council, which, according to section 4.1 of the Act, is ‘the highest forum for
the consideration and determination of matters relating to the security’ of the
country.56
As noted above, the UK has been the major contributor towards
rebuilding the country’s security sector, and as such, has developed a
number of programmes to facilitate this process.
The Sierra Leone Security Sector Reform Programme (SILSEP), for
instance, was initiated in 1999 as a medium-term programme funded and
managed by DFID, which was initially designed with three main objectives:
to develop the Ministry of Defence; to support capacity-building within the
ONS under the national security co-ordinator; and to rebuild the
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effectiveness of the CISU.57 IMATT, on the other hand, took the lead in
training the government’s armed forces.58 Both activities began
implementation in 1999.
As for the reform and reconstruction of the SLP, the UK and UN have
taken a combined role in training senior staff in strategic and operational
planning through the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security
Programme (CCSSP) and the civilian police section of UNAMSIL
(CIVPOL).59 The CCSSP aims to establish the SLP as an ‘effective and
accountable civilian police service that focuses on local needs-based
policing based on the full involvement of civil society’.60 The objective was
to establish a police force which is fully staffed, trained and equipped to
maintain law and order without military support after UNAMSIL’s
withdrawal.61 The SLP was also supplied with radios, weapons, uniforms
and vehicles. Until recently, most police reform efforts were conducted
through the CCSSP, with the Commonwealth Police Development Task
Force shaping the SLP restructuring programme.62 Britain’s role vis-à-vis the
SLP was executive and intrusive; from 1999 to 2003 the SLP was even led
by a British national, Keith Biddle, as the inspector-general of police.63
During this period a number of new initiatives were developed, namely the
Community Relations Department, the Complaint, Discipline and
Investigation Department and family support units. As of June 2006, the
police reform efforts were absorbed into SILSEP.64 At the time of writing,
SILSEP was in its fourth phase, and had undergone an annual review in
April 2007.65
In 2001, in an effort to consolidate the separate efforts by the FCO,
DFID and the MoD in conflict prevention activities, the UK created the
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool.66
The UN has also played a considerable role in Sierra Leone. At its
peak, the UNAMSIL peacekeeping force numbered 17,300 troops; it
maintained the peace after the end of the civil war in 2002. In compliance
with recommendations not to exit immediately after the holding of elections,
UNAMSIL forces gradually withdrew, and disengaged completely by
December 2005.
Notwithstanding the major role played by the UNAMSIL force in
maintaining a stable security environment, British involvement in Sierra
Leone has probably had the most significant impact on the country’s security
sector. In addition to the training of government armed forces through
IMATT, the British government has committed itself to an ‘over-thehorizon’ guarantee to intervene within 48–72 hours in the event that
sustained fighting were to break out.
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As an essential tool in addressing the legacies of the past, Sierra
Leone’s DDR programme, after nearly five years of operation, was
considered by some observers to have been relatively successful.67 Others,
such as the former head of the UNDP in Sierra Leone, Alan Doss, were less
optimistic. Doss pointed out that the former combatants ‘have joined
another, a larger army of young people who are seeking gainful
employment… [they] must now compete with all other citizens for any
assistance or support provided by the government’.68
In a report on the state of Sierra Leone’s security and governance,
the International Crisis Group (ICG) highlighted that many ex-combatants
were dissatisfied with the reintegration programme and their prospects for
employment in the formal economy remained bleak.69 Nearly four years
after the ICG report, the situation remains unchanged, with numbers of
former combatants battling with unemployment.70
Upon completion of Sierra Leone’s National Committee for
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme for more than
70,000 civil war combatants in 2004, UNAMSIL handed primary
responsibility for security in the capital over to the local police and armed
forces. The reintegration phase comprised a choice of vocational training,
formal schooling or tools for various trades as well as farming.71
As another urgent objective towards effective SSR in the post-conflict
context, there have been efforts to address the issues of transitional justice
and reconciliation in Sierra Leone, such as the establishment of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission as stipulated in the Lomé peace
agreement.72
In addition to the TRC, the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) was established to try ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility’ for
the country’s civil war.73 The concurrent operation of these two very
different transitional justice mechanisms proved to be problematic,
particularly as there were no rules regulating their interactions with regard to
key concerns such as information-sharing. Although just under 8,000
statements were collected during hearings carried out in 2003–2004, the
majority of the population did not participate in this process for a variety of
reasons, the most prominent being that they favoured ‘social forgetting’ as
opposed to dealing with the past violence – reproducing, denouncing and
overcoming – through public speech.74 In addition, civil society and human
rights groups criticised the government’s subsequent white paper on the
Truth and Reconciliation Project for not committing it to any concrete steps
on the issues raised in the report, such as the need to improve governance
and tackle corruption.75
86
Judy Smith-Höhn
The work of the SCSL has become increasingly controversial. Not
only do some local media brand it as ‘white man’s justice’, but the ordinary
population also view it as a process that has no impact on their lives, and
understandably so.76 Indeed, in its final report in 2004 the TRC questioned
the SCSL’s contribution to lasting peace in Sierra Leone:
The international community has signalled to combatants in future wars that
peace agreements containing amnesty clauses ought not to be trusted and, in
so doing, has undermined the legitimacy of such national and regional peace
initiatives.77
International actors spearheaded both processes, most prominently
among them the UN agencies. In the case of the TRC there was more local
involvement through civil society groups, such as the Freetown-based
Campaign for Good Governance.
4.3
Comparison of cases
4.3.1
Assessment of SSR: Within-unit comparison of Liberia
As elaborated in Chapter 3, one level of comparison will be within-unit, and
this section will draw a binary comparison of Liberia’s security sector just
before the end of the civil war in 2003 with the period 2003–2006 during the
so-called peacebuilding phase, enabling a first assessment of the efficacy of
these sector reform efforts.
This section begins with a focus on the first of the four criteria for
determining effective SSR, namely the existence of security actors that are
providing security. The question as to whether the overall security situation
has improved will be addressed, as this gives an indication of the
performance of the security actors during the reform phase. In other words,
is the presence of security actors in fact leading to a positive or improved
perception of the general security situation? Undoubtedly, the mere presence
of security actors does not necessarily imply that the security situation is
favourable and conducive to effective reform. Once a general conception of
the security situation and the actors operating within this arena has been
established, the focus can be directed towards assessing whether the contextspecific characteristics of the particular post-conflict environment have been
taken into consideration by the various stakeholders implementing the
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87
reforms. The question as to whether the legacies of the past have been
addressed concludes this section.
Security and security actors in Liberia: Changes over time
Has the security situation improved since the end of the civil war, and if so
which actors have been key players in that improvement? The survey poll
provides some answers.
One of the goals of the survey was to determine whether the Liberian
population consider the country to be safe at all. Respondents were asked to
rate the extent to which they considered it to be safe.78 The rating was made
on a four-point scale, thus compelling respondents to make either a negative
or positive assessment of the current security situation. Results were
generally positive, with more than 60 per cent of respondents rating the
situation as okay or very safe. Just over a third felt differently; and 10.5 per
cent still thought the country was not safe at all.
To ascertain whether there was a variance in perceptions of personal
versus general security, respondents were asked to rate their personal
security according to the same four-point ranking, as shown in Table 4.1.
The results reveal that personal security is rated slightly more positively than
general security, yet the overall tendency is similar. Most Liberians have a
positive outlook on the overall security situation.
Table 4.1
General and personal security in urban Liberia
General security (%)*
Personal security (%)**
Very safe
20.3
25.6
It’s okay
40.1
43.7
Fairly unsafe
26.9
23.5
Not safe at all
10.5
6.2
No answer/don't know
2.2
1.0
N = 698
* Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
** Question: ‘How safe do you feel personally in the country today?’
Judy Smith-Höhn
88
The poll also revealed whether perceptions differed among various
groups within Liberian society; in other words, whether socio-economic
factors influenced the responses, e.g. whether women felt less secure than
men, or whether the 10.5 per cent of respondents who did not feel safe at all
belonged to a particular ethnic group. The correlation of security perceptions
according to gender is shown in Table 4.2.79
Table 4.2
General and personal security in urban Liberia – Gender
General security (%)*
Personal security (%)**
Female
Male
Female
Male
Very safe
19.0
22.5
25.4
26.5
It’s okay
39.2
42.8
43.0
44.7
Fairly unsafe
29.8
25.0
24.6
23.3
Not safe at all
11.9
9.7
7.0
5.6
General security: N = 672 (female = 352; male = 320)
Personal security: N = 680 (female = 358; male = 322)
It appears that, in this case, gender did not influence responses to both
questions. This would indicate that, taken from these results alone, security
and insecurity do not have a gender dimension in Liberia as both men and
women feel equally secure or insecure in their respective environments. This
assumption needs qualification, which can be provided by the results from
the focus group discussions, particularly that conducted with the group of
market women.
A comparison of security perceptions and ethnic group produced
slightly different results. Members of certain ethnic groups viewed both
overall and personal security situations in a more negative light than other
groups (Table 4.3).
However, the validity of these results is diminished by the fact that in
some instances only a handful of respondents were found to belong to one of
the 18 ethnic groups listed in the questionnaire. In the case of the Mandingo
and Americo-Liberians, where the total numbered less than 20 individuals,
the relative percentages can hardly be considered representative. During the
planning phase the research team had made particular provisions to enable a
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Table 4.3
89
General security in urban Liberia – Ethnic group
Not safe
at all
Fairly unsafe
It’s okay
Very safe
Total
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Tribe
Kpelle
8
9.3
34
39.5
31
36.0
13
15.1
86
100
Bassa
14
14.4
28
28.9
44
45.4
11
11.3
97
100
Gio
1
3.7
13
48.1
8
29.6
5
18.5
27
100
Kru
14
17.1
25
30.5
31
37.8
12
14.6
82
100
Grebo
5
7.1
21
30
32
45.7
12
17.1
70
100
Mano
7
24.1
6
20.7
8
27.6
8
27.6
29
100
Krahn
3
11.1
8
29.6
9
33.3
7
25.9
27
100
Gola
6
12.2
12
24.5
20
40.8
11
22.4
49
100
Gbandi
4
11.4
4
11.4
20
57.1
7
20.0
35
100
Loma
5
14.7
7
20.6
15
44.1
7
20.6
34
100
Kissi
2
5.1
13
33.3
15
38.5
9
23.1
39
100
Vai
1
2.4
5
12.2
22
53.7
13
31.7
41
100
Mandingo
0
0.0
2
18.2
3
27.3
6
54.5
11
100
Americo0
0.0
0
0.0
3
75.0
1
25.0
4
100
Liberians
Congo
2
9.5
5
23.8
4
19.0
10
47.6
21
100
Other
1
3.3
4
13.3
15
50.0
10
33.3
30
100
Total
73
10.7 187 27.4 280 41.1 142 20.8 682 100
N = 682
Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
focus on the Mandingo ethnic group, who appeared to be generally
ostracised from the rest of Liberian society. One of the suburbs pre-selected
to implement the survey was known as being populated by this particular
group and it was expected that the sample of Mandingo respondents should
total approximately 100. Despite these measures, however, only 11 of the
altogether 700 respondents were listed as Mandingo. Perhaps the research
team underestimated the extent of the isolation of this particular group in
that it required interviewers, none of whom was Mandingo, to conduct these
interviews.
Judy Smith-Höhn
90
Given the fact that during the civil war, the intensity of the war and
the extent of the damage it inflicted on each city and its inhabitants varied
across all three cities, there was a need to determine whether the experiences
and perceptions of security differed across these cities (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4
General security in three urban centres of Liberia
Public security (%)
Buchanan
Monrovia
Tubmanburg
Total
Very safe
14.0
20.1
28.0
20.3
It’s okay
44.0
38.4
45.0
40.1
Fairly unsafe
28.0
27.9
21.0
26.9
Not safe at all
14.0
11.2
3.0
10.5
No answer/don’t know
0.0
2.4
3.0
2.2
N = 698
Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
A significant variance in the results of each city would perhaps give
an indication of the relevance of former violence actors (‘Gewaltakteure’),
since each was a stronghold for one of the warring factions: the port city of
Buchanan was seized by MODEL in July 2003, while Tubmanburg was a
stronghold of the rebel faction LURD during the final throes of the civil war
in 2003.80
The comparison of the relative frequencies obtained for this question
per city revealed that perceptions of general and personal security were
much the same for Buchanan and Monrovia, while Tubmanburg residents
had a decidedly more positive perception of the general security situation. In
order to ascertain more accurately the impact – whether positive or negative
– of the presence and activities of these former warring factions on these
communities, one must also factor in the extent to which the respective
residents consider the general and personal security situation to have
improved or worsened since the end of the civil war in 2003. Table 4.5
illustrates the results for this particular question.
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Table 4.5
91
General security in three urban centres of Liberia –
Past and present compared
Public security (%)
Buchanan
Monrovia
Tubmanburg
Total
Much better
36.0
32.3
38.0
33.7
Somewhat better
57.0
51.0
47.0
51.3
No change
6.0
5.6
10.0
6.3
Worse
1.0
5.0
5.0
4.4
Much worse
0.0
3.6
0.0
2.6
No answer
0.0
2.4
0.0
1.7
N = 702
Question: ‘In your opinion, compared to before the end of the last war, what is the general
state of security like in the country today?’
Two inferences can be drawn from these results.
i)
ii)
Residents of Tubmanburg have a markedly more positive perception
of the current security situation than those living in the other two
cities (compare results in Table 4.4.).
In the comparison of past and present security situations, there was
little deviation in the results, illustrating that the withdrawal of the
various armed factions perhaps had the same positive effect in all
three instances.
The positive perception of Tubmanburg respondents (Table 4.4) is
partly clarified when one considers the historical context. During the civil
war the LURD rebel movement was considered to have established a degree
of stability in its stronghold, whereas MODEL was far less organised and
more brutal.81 What one may be witnessing is the after-effects of the more
positive role played by the LURD insurgents in Tubmanburg; 10 per cent
even considered their security situation to have remained the same since the
end of the civil war. It is therefore logical that Buchanan respondents
considered their security situation to have improved most since the end of
the war (93 per cent much/somewhat better) following MODEL’s departure.
92
Judy Smith-Höhn
These results are, however, inconclusive. If the survey poll had an added
question relating to the various rebel factions specifically, it would have
been possible to determine more accurately their respective impact on these
three cities.
Thus, according to the survey poll results, LURD appears to have had
a conspicuously positive impact on the perception of the residents of
Tubmanburg.
A juxtaposition of these results with those from the four focus group
discussions serves two purposes. First, it enables the verification of the
survey results with those from the focus groups – in this case, whether
discussants generally have a positive perception of the security situation.
Second, it facilitates a more in-depth enquiry into the particular reasons for
why general and personal security were rated as they were. The focus groups
confirmed the overall positive perception of the security situation. Most
discussants were of the opinion that Liberia had become a relatively safe
country to live in; they were generally more optimistic about their personal
security than the overall state of security in the country. Undoubtedly, it was
the presence of the large international peacekeeping force, UNMIL, which
contributed greatly to this favourable perception, as one discussant stated:
‘UNMIL is here to bring peace’.82 However, discussants all agreed that the
national security situation remained unstable, a view that partly reflects the
more negative assessments of just over a third of all survey poll respondents
(as shown in Table 4.1).83
Both international and local experts interviewed confirmed that
despite the large international presence and a by-and-large positive outlook,
there remained broad scepticism that there was still potential for large-scale
violence. An UNMIL civil affairs officer maintained that the security
situation had improved drastically, as evidenced by the reduction of UN
highway checkpoints throughout the country: ‘The security situation is very
much improved… From Buchanan to Greenville there is no UN checkpoint
because things are safe.’84 Yet he conceded that were ‘UNMIL… to leave
immediately, the result would be chaos’.85
This points to the significance of the international peacekeeping force
in the provision of security in Liberia. As for other security actors and their
ability to provide security, the quantitative and qualitative data present a
wealth of empirical evidence that gives insights into the situation on the
ground and the efficacy of SSR strategies implemented.
A first indication of the relevant security actors and their relative
importance is shown in Table 4.6. Survey respondents were asked to specify
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Table 4.6
93
Security actors in urban Liberia – Most important actors
Actors
%
UNMIL
75.9
Liberia National Police (LNP)
17.9
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)
2.0
Ex-combatants
0.1
ECOWAS
0.1
Poro/Sandee
0.1
Vigilante teams
0.1
Family
0.1
No answer/don’t know
3.4
N = 698
Question: ‘We have spoken to many Liberians and they all have different feelings about
which groups in the country protect them and which are a threat to them. Could you please
tell us which group is the most important one for your personal safety?’
which actor they considered to be the most important provider for their
personal security.86
It comes as no surprise that most respondents afforded UNMIL this
key function: 75.9 per cent of respondents consider the international actor to
play a crucial role in guaranteeing security. The second most frequently
named organisation was the LNP (18.4 per cent), followed – by a
considerable margin – by the AFL. Other actors were cited far less
frequently (in each case less than 1 per cent of responses). However, the fact
that these are not considered the most important actors does not imply that
they are insignificant (see below). Because the research was limited to urban
areas, these figures reflect the perceptions of Liberia's urban population.
However, people who had migrated from the hinterland participated in the
focus groups, enabling the research team to gain some impressions of
conditions in the rural areas. The general consensus on the importance of the
UN troops among participants in the discussions suggests that, in this respect
at least, there is no clear rural-urban divide.
The figures in Table 4.6 are based on an open-ended question; the
survey question was designed in such a way as to encourage respondents to
Judy Smith-Höhn
94
name the most important group or set of actors in each case without being
influenced or guided towards any particular answer. If respondents had been
asked to choose from a list of specific actors, one may have unwittingly
excluded certain actors who, from the respondents’ perspective, play a key
role in security. These results were tested with a second, closed question:
through multiple-choice options, respondents were asked to rate each listed
actor according to its level of importance in their security. Table 4.7 thus
provides a more detailed illustration of a number of relevant security actors,
with each rated according to its impact – both positive and negative – on
Table 4.7
Security actors in urban Liberia (%)
Very/
somewhat
important to
personal
security
Types of actors
International
State
International/
commercial
non-state
Domestic nonstate
Does not
affect my
personal
security
Somewhat/
a big threat to
personal
security
UNMIL
94.9
2.0
1.4
LNP
91.9
4.6
2.9
AFL
64.8
23.8
9.3
Private security
companies
38.3
52.2
3.8
Community
watch teams
56.6
17.9
15.5
Poro/secret
societies
15.7
46.4
26.1
Political party
militias
7.2
36.3
42.8
Street boys
0.4
6.3
78.6
Ex-combatants
3.3
6.9
86.8
N = 698; percentages of ‘don’t know’ and ‘no answer’ responses are not shown.
Question: ‘Now, I’m going to read out a list of groups which are said to affect security in one
way or another. For each one, could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened by
them or not?’
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95
security. Little difference was found between the two sets of answers as
regards the relevance of the international and state security actors.
Again, UNMIL received the most positive rating. Yet when one
considers the fact that, at the time of survey, it was the only viable, armed
security actor around, a rating of around 75 per cent of respondents claiming
UNMIL to be the most important security provider (Table 4.6) is no longer
as positive.
Some results from the focus group discussions underline this point.
Though three of the four groups rated UNMIL as being positive, one group
(youth and community leaders) noted it as being neutral/disputed, signifying
that it was not always considered as contributing towards security,
particularly on the community level, where it was said to have little or no
presence.87 In the Liberian capital Monrovia, for example, UNMIL troops
essentially patrol the main thoroughfares and show little if any presence in
outlying areas of the city. The results for UNMIL may be even more
dramatic in rural areas, where there is hardly any UN presence. Hence,
although there is no doubt that the peacekeepers are perceived to be the main
guarantor of security, there is certainly still scope for improving their public
image.
Certainly one of the more remarkable findings was the relatively
favourable perception of the state security actors – the LNP and the AFL –
given their current reorganisation and history of violence against citizens in
the past. The fact that the AFL was regarded as an important security actor
suggests that people’s perceptions are coloured by wishful thinking. The
AFL was dissolved after the civil war and, at the time of questioning, was in
fact non-existent. Conversely, when asked which group they felt to be the
biggest threat to them personally, 1.1 per cent of respondents named the stilldefunct AFL. This may have been a reference to former members of the
armed forces or deserters, i.e. ex-combatants, given that 59.5 per cent of
respondents regard this latter group as the biggest threat to their personal
security (Table 4.8).
Private security companies (PSCs) were generally awarded a
relatively positive rating of 38.3 per cent (Table 4.7). More importantly, a
majority of Liberians (52.2 per cent) felt unaffected by PSCs, which points
to the fact that they provide security mainly for wealthier segments of
society.
The perception that political party militias pose a threat (‘is a
big/somewhat a threat to my personal security’) is partly due to the elections
which took place in October and November 2005. Still, only 7.2 per cent
96
Table 4.8
Judy Smith-Höhn
Security actors in urban Liberia – Biggest threat
Actors
Ex-combatants
Street boys
Criminals (armed robbers)
LNP
Political party militias
AFL
UNMIL
Poro/Sandee (secret societies)
Other
None
No answer/don’t know
%
59.5
7.9
3.7
2.0
1.9
1.1
0.9
0.4
2.0
4.6
16.0
N = 698
Question: ‘Which group do you feel is the biggest threat to you personally?’
thought they posed a threat, and only 1.9 per cent considered them to be the
biggest threat to security!
In addition to highlighting the significance of the international
intervening actor UNMIL and the state security actors LNP and AFL, Tables
4.6 and 4.7 show that Liberia’s current security architecture comprises three
types of actors: external (such as UNMIL); state (such as the local police
forces or the army); and non-state (such as community-based organisations
or traditional security institutions). This distinction is crucial, as it is the
second type, i.e. state actors, which receive the most attention in the
implementation of reform efforts. Non-state actors, be they international or
domestic, although acknowledged, are not incorporated into any formal
reform framework, leading one to question whether the second criterion for
determining the efficacy of SSR strategies has indeed been fulfilled; in other
words, whether the context-specific characteristics, procedures and
interactions of the security sector have been adequately taken into account
by the implementing agencies.
In addition to highlighting the significance of the international
intervening actor UNMIL and the state security actors LNP and AFL, Tables
4.6 and 4.7 show that Liberia’s current security architecture comprises three
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97
types of actors: external (such as UNMIL); state (such as the local police
forces or the army); and non-state (such as community-based organisations
or traditional security institutions). This distinction is crucial, as it is the
second type, i.e. state actors, which receive the most attention in the
implementation of reform efforts. Non-state actors, be they international or
domestic, although acknowledged, are not incorporated into any formal
reform framework, leading one to question whether the second criterion for
determining the efficacy of SSR strategies has indeed been fulfilled; in other
words, whether the context-specific characteristics, procedures and
interactions of the security sector have been adequately taken into account
by the implementing agencies.
Context-specific characteristics of Liberia’s post-conflict security
environment
Both the focus groups and the expert interviews provide more insights into
the perceived roles and significance of each of the non-state actors
mentioned above.
One of the key findings from the focus groups was that there appeared
to be two levels at which particular actors were expected to provide security,
namely the national and the local. At the national level, UNMIL, the LNP
and other state actors were generally expected to provide for security; at the
local level, many agreed that the individual should provide for his or her
own security: ‘You yourself provide security… if there is small trouble.’88
The extent to which this varied focus is significant for SSR policies will be
dealt with in section 4.3.5.
Results from the focus groups also revealed the importance of
community-based informal actors in the security arena. Figure 4.1 on page
98 depicts one of the mapping exercises which was conducted in each of the
focus groups. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the mapping exercise was one of
the key outcomes of the focus groups. Discussants were asked to identify all
relevant security actors, determine their relative significance and illustrate
the interactions among them within the security arena.
Figure 4.1 confirms the survey poll results, namely that, to ordinary
Liberians, a variety of actors – beyond the state and external ones – play a
role in the security arena in Liberia today. Two informal actors are
particularly noteworthy in this regard: the community watch teams (CWTs)
and the secret societies, known as the Poro and Sandee.
Judy Smith-Höhn
98
Figure 4.1 Liberia today – Security actors and their interactions
EXTERNAL
STATE
NON-STATE
Bureau of
Immigration
and
Naturalisation
Ministry of
National
Security
UNMIL
Community
watch teams
Poro/Sandee
National
Security
Agency
National Bureau
of Investigation
Ministry
of Defence
Excombatants
Liberia
National Police
Action agents
Special
Security
Service
National Fire
Service
Private
security
companies
Legend
positive
cooperation
neutral/disputed
rivalry
negative
rivalry within
Source: FGD1 Liberia, Teachers and Students. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
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99
The secret societies tend to play a negligible role in urban areas, and
to some extent they are viewed as a substantial threat (as shown in Table
4.8); but above all they are decoupled from the other actors. This was found
in all four focus groups conducted in Liberia. Thus, regardless of whether
the perception of the secret societies was favourable, uncertain or
disapproving, they were consistently isolated from all other actors.89
Interviews confirmed this disconnect, with several local experts
acknowledging their importance, yet maintaining their detachment from
other actors.90 Admittedly, rural dwellers assign secret societies a central
role in active conflict resolution, with Poro hierarchies continuing to provide
institutional responses to armed violence in some communities.91 However,
the absence of lines of interaction with other security actors indicates that
their involvement in the development of SSR strategies would very likely be
problematic. Nonetheless, a context-specific SSR strategy must not only
identify those actors that need to be incorporated into reform efforts, but
should also be aware of those that should be excluded, and for what reason.
Interviews with staff from the UN mission in Liberia revealed that
they attach little overall significance to local conditions and actors. Social
and political mechanisms, capacities and conflicts at local level are largely
ignored. Since a temporarily deployed UN mission or the newly trained
national police and armed forces cannot be expected to provide security in
the medium term, SSR can only work effectively if local conditions are
taken into account. An interview conducted with a senior UNMIL staff
member who was partly responsible for regularly assessing the security
situation in the country points to a cause for concern, as the interviewee had
not heard of the community-based secret societies at all.92 Here, clearly,
there is an increased risk of developing inappropriate strategies on the basis
of ill-informed analyses.
The role of CWTs is more ambiguous. According to Table 4.7, more
than half of respondents consider the CWTs to be very or somewhat
important for their security (56 per cent). Similarly, focus group discussants
considered this actor to play a central role in providing security, particularly
at the community level, in areas where UNMIL does not patrol. However,
perceptions weren’t entirely positive, as shown by the 15.5 per cent who
considered CWTs to threaten their security. Again, the focus groups
elucidate this negative result. CWTs were associated with the increased
practice of mob justice, which most discussants did not tolerate and which
called into question the legitimacy of such community-run security
provision. However, the objection to mob justice was not unanimous, as
several informal discussions and interviews revealed.93 That many Liberians
Judy Smith-Höhn
100
considered it the only alternative to dealing with criminal threats illustrates
the lack of trust in state institutions, both the police and the judiciary, to
punish offenders.
The perceived inefficiency of state institutions to perform their given
functions and the continued concern over the activities of former combatants
inevitably lead one to question whether the legacies of the past have indeed
been adequately addressed – the third criterion for measuring effective SSR.
Dealing with legacies of the past?
Although the same survey was not conducted in 2003 prior to the signing of
the CPA, the research team attempted to grasp the dynamics of the security
situation over time by asking respondents to compare the current situation
with the security conditions before the final peace agreement was signed.
The results revealed a significant shift in perceptions of both the country’s
security and the level of personal safety (Table 4.9). However, only 28.4 per
cent of the respondents felt that their personal security situation had
improved significantly since the end of the last war. This certainly falls short
of the expectations that some UN administrators may have about the impact
of the UNMIL mission.
Table 4.9
Changes in general and personal security in urban Liberia –
Past versus present
Much better
Somewhat better
No change
Worse
Much worse
No answer
Don’t know
General security (%)*
33.7
51.3
6.3
4.4
2.6
1.7
0.0
Personal security (%)**
28.4
57.7
5.6
4.6
2.4
1.3
0.0
N = 702
*Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
**Question: ‘How safe do you feel personally in the country today?’
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Focus groups substantiated the generally positive assessment of the
current security situation, both general and personal – certainly an expected
outcome in a country that only recently emerged from a protracted civil war.
More interestingly, discussants pointed out that though the security situation
had improved dramatically, as there were now hardly any reports of
outbreaks of violence, especially in the capital, the basic living conditions
had not changed for many ordinary Liberians. Whereas during the war
individuals could not gain a livelihood due to the constant fighting, they
were now prevented from fending for themselves by to a lack of opportunity.
The issue of socio-economic marginalisation was raised repeatedly in all
focus groups. The marginalisation of one particular group within society,
namely the large group of (mostly male) former combatants, is particularly
worrisome. In this regard, the effective implementation of DDR
programmes, understood as part of the wider SSR agenda, is a key
prerequisite to sustainable reform.
Despite the significance of the DDR programme in stabilising Liberia
after years of civil war, it had some major flaws. Although it claims to have
disarmed 100,000 combatants, less than 28,000 guns were collected.94
Having extended the qualification criteria for admission to the DDR
programme to include not only those who could produce a weapon but also
those who could present 150 rounds of ammunition, many took advantage of
the opportunity. For instance, former commanders provided non-combatants
with ammunition in order to receive a percentage of their stipend. At times,
women and children were not even required to surrender arms or
ammunition, making it easier for rebel commanders to recruit youths from
communities. Some sources rated this ‘commercialisation’ of the DDR
process to have accounted for as much as 60 per cent of the total caseload of
candidates.95 This may mean that officially disbanded factions have retained
arms. In addition, many demobilised fighters have not been given adequate
and timely reintegration opportunities, the lack of which may be an incentive
for some to move to other hotspots in the region (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire) to reenlist.
Despite these shortcomings, there has been a significant alteration in
the security arena since the end of the civil war. The fact that not one of the
former warring factions, for example, was considered a viable security actor
or threat shows that the dominant conflict narrative has at least shifted. As
with the survey respondents, focus group discussants were asked to compare
the current security situation with conditions prior to the end of the civil war
in 2003. In contrast to the survey poll, attention was centred less on an
Judy Smith-Höhn
102
Figure 4.2 Liberia 2003 – Security actors and their interactions
Vigilante
Poro/Sandee
MODEL
LURD
Government of
Liberia/militia
Anti-Terrorist Unit
Special Operations
Division
Legend
positive
neutral/disputed
negative
rivalry
rivalry all around
Source: FGD1 Liberia, Teachers and Students. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
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overall assessment of the security situation and more on identifying the
relevant actors, the objective here being clarifying the dynamics within the
security arena, particularly between the various actors. In all four focus
groups, results were similar. The actors that comprised the so-called security
arena prior to the end of the civil war – in this case, the actors that possessed
the capacity to use (and abuse) force – were, for the most part, no longer part
of the security architecture.96 In Liberia, vigilante is the term generally used
for community-based self-help groups, hence its positive connotations.97
During the Taylor regime, the Anti-Terrorist Unit functioned as Taylor’s
private security guards.
Figure 4.2 on page 102 represents the security arena pre-2003, as
identified by one of the focus groups. When compared with Figure 4.1, it
demonstrates that, although groups of negative actors are currently still
present, the conflict narrative has changed to such an extent that the former
warring factions are no longer organised into distinct groups, but have
mostly been subsumed under the unified heading of ex-combatants.
Yet another legacy of the past – or more precisely, several legacies –
is the continued existence of a large number of state security institutions,
which poses a challenge. In an assessment of these agencies and the existing
legislation that guides their roles and functions, Jaye points to the myriad of
problems faced by this sector. In addition to overlapping responsibilities and
budgetary constraints, this bloated sector struggles with issues of
politicisation, a lack of infrastructure, poor human resource capacity and
skewed civilian oversight, not to mention the struggle for local ownership of
the SSR process.98 Rather than addressing the issue directly, the current SSR
strategy has instead restricted its focus to certain institutions within the state
security sector. As mentioned in section 4.1.2, there has been a narrowed
focus on the AFL, LNP and Special Security Services, while the other
security agencies have to all intents and purposes been sidelined.99 Most of
the agencies were mentioned during the focus groups, yet for the most part
discussants were vague as to the exact role these various institutions
currently played and were expected to play. During one of the focus groups,
for example, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation was initially
noted as being functional, yet in the course of discussion it was acknowledge
that this particular actor was, in fact, not performing its intended role.
Although the actor was formally still operational, it was not providing any
form of security and was therefore rated negatively, with one discussant
justifying the assessment thus: ‘if they were working effectively, the kind of
troublesome people that are allowed in this country would not be allowed to
enter’.100
104
Judy Smith-Höhn
The within-unit comparison of the security arena in Liberia,
particularly the actors involved, can be summarised as follows.
There is currently only one actor that can assure internal security in
Liberia, and that is UNMIL. As this is a key state function, the task will
ultimately be handed over to the newly formed AFL. Another characteristic
feature of this post-conflict phase is the involvement of international actors
in policing, notably in the delivery of training for the LNP. Moreover, since
the police service currently remains ill-equipped and short-staffed, the local
police forces lack the capacity to provide security without external support.
This gap is filled, to a certain extent and only in some districts, by civil
defence forces known as CWTs, which take on the responsibility of
protecting their local community. In addition, citizens with the necessary
financial resources can engage PSCs to protect their property and business
premises. The picture is complicated further by the fact that the UN mission
hires private security services to protect its premises, and these companies
sometimes employ ex-combatants on low wages. On the one hand, this
creates employment opportunities for potential troublemakers which would
not be available if the mission withdrew altogether; on the other hand, it
again reflects the lack of confidence in the state's own security forces.
Although the activities of these companies should not be regarded as entirely
unproblematic or necessarily positive, they are nonetheless a key actor in
providing security in Liberia.
4.3.2
Assessment of SSR: Within-unit comparison of Sierra Leone
The within-unit comparison of issues related to SSR Sierra Leone will
follow the same course as the previous comparison. Thus the section will
draw a binary comparison between Sierra Leone’s security sector just before
the end of the civil war in 2001/2002 and the peacebuilding phase from 2003
to 2006.
This section will first deliberate on the effective provision of security
by the various actors, then focus on the context-specific characteristics of
this particular post-conflict environment. Finally, attention is directed to the
causes of the conflict and whether these have been taken into account by the
various implementing actors.
Security and security actors in Sierra Leone: Changes over time
As in the case of Liberia, the survey conducted in Sierra Leone illustrated
the extent to which the population deemed the general and personal security
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105
situations to be favourable. To ascertain whether there was a variance in the
perceptions of personal versus general security, respondents were asked to
rate their security according to the same four-point ranking as used in
interviews in Liberia. The results revealed that personal security was rated
more positively than general security. In fact, a slight majority of
respondents considered the general security situation to be insecure, with
many regarding the situation to be ‘fairly unsafe’ (37.9 per cent). Personal
security, on the other hand, was rated far more positively, with almost twothirds of respondents answering accordingly (61.6 per cent).
Thus, results show that, although both general and personal security
have improved substantially in Sierra Leone since the peace agreement was
signed in 2002, the security situation remains fragile (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10 General and personal security in urban Sierra Leone
General security (%)*
Personal security (%)**
Very safe
14.7
20.7
It’s okay
32.3
40.9
Fairly unsafe
37.9
27.5
Not safe at all
13.4
10.3
No answer/ don't know
1.7
0.7
N = 702
*Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
**Question: ‘How safe do you feel personally in the country today?’
As in Liberia, there appears to be no significant difference between
the assessment made by men and women as regards both overall and
personal security situations (Table 4.11).
In their overall assessment of the security situation, the focus groups
confirmed the general scepticism among Sierra Leoneans, with discussants
agreeing that although there had been no major incidents of unrest since the
end of the last war, it remained an uneasy peace. The prospect of elections
scheduled for April 2007 was noted as particularly worrisome.101
A cross-tabulation of the results for the question on respondents’
views on public security according to religious affiliation is shown in Table
4.12.
Judy Smith-Höhn
106
Table 4.11 General and personal security in urban Sierra Leone –
Gender
General security (%)
Personal security (%)
Female
Male
Total*
Female
Male
Total*
Very safe
15.2
14.5
14.8
21.4
20.1
20.7
It’s okay
32.1
33.8
33.0
43.7
39.0
41.3
Fairly unsafe
40.5
36.6
38.5
27.3
28.0
27.6
Not safe at all
12.2
15.1
13.7
7.6
13.0
10.4
General security: N = 688 (female 336; male 352)
Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
Personal security: N = 695 (female 342; male 354)
Question: ‘How safe do you feel personally in the country today?’
*No answer/don’t know are not included, therefore figures differ from those in Table 4.8.
Table 4.12 General security in urban Sierra Leone – Religion
General security (%)*
Religion
Christian
Muslim
Traditional
Other
Total*
Count
%
Count
%
Count
%
Count
%
Count
%
Very safe
40
14.2
58
15.1
1
16.7
3
20.0
102
14.9
It’s okay
89
31.7
133
34.7
1
16.7
4
26.7
227
33.1
Fairly unsafe
119
42.3
138
36.0
2
33.3
5
33.3
264
38.5
Not safe
at all
33
11.7
54
14.1
2
33.3
3
20.0
92
13.4
N = 685
Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
*No answer/don’t know not included.
As the total number of respondents who professed to belong to a
traditional or other religion is rather small, the results cannot be considered
as representative of either of these two groups. In the case of the Christian
and Muslim respondents, the figures are substantial enough to be considered
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107
representative. According to Table 4.12, there is insufficient difference
between the ratings given by both groups to presume that there is any
correlation between perceptions of security and religious affiliation.
According to cross-tabulations of the results on the question of
general security in proportion to membership of a particular ethnic group,
one of the two largest groups in the country, namely the Mende, gave a
generally more positive assessment of the current security situation. Half of
all Mende respondents rated public security as okay or very safe, while
around 44 per cent of Temne respondents thought likewise and just over 40
per cent considered the country to be still a fairly unsafe place to live. This
minor deviation notwithstanding, there appears to be no other significant
correlation between perceptions of security and ethnic group; no particular
group within society felt more threatened than another. But as in Liberia, this
inference cannot be verified as the sampled number of members of most of
the groups is simply too small to guarantee that they are representative
(Table 4.13).
Table 4.13 General security in urban Sierra Leone – Ethnic group
Not safe
Fairly
It’s okay
Very safe
Total
at all
unsafe
Tribe
Count % Count % Count % Count % Count %
Temne
31
14.8
85
40.7
70
33.5
23
11.0 209 100
Mende
18
15.8
39
34.2
35
30.7
22
19.3 114 100
Kono
9
13.4
22
32.8
23
34.3
13
19.4
67
100
Creole
6
10.9
18
32.7
22
40.0
9
16.4
55
100
Limba
8
16.0
23
46.0
13
26.0
6
12.0
50
100
Fula
6
12.2
15
30.6
20
40.8
8
16.3
49
100
Mandingo
4
14.3
9
32.1
11
39.3
4
14.3
28
100
Susu
0
0.0
14
50.0
9
32.1
5
17.9
28
100
Sherbro
1
4.5
14
63.6
5
22.7
2
9.1
22
100
Koranko
3
14.3
10
47.6
5
23.8
3
14.3
21
100
Loko
5
25.0
6
30.0
6
30.0
3
16.0
20
100
Other
3
11.1
11
40.7
8
29.6
5
18.6
27
100
Total
94
13.6 266 38.6 227 32.9 103 14.9 690 100
N = 690
Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
108
Judy Smith-Höhn
When categorising the assessment of the security situation according
to the cities in which the survey was conducted, a marked difference is
discernible in Koidu, where respondents were decidedly more optimistic
(Table 4.14).
Table 4.14 General security in three urban centres of Sierra Leone
Very safe
It’s okay
Fairly unsafe
Not safe at all
No answer
Freetown
12.8
32.3
38.3
14.2
2.4
Public security (%)
Makeni
Koidu
12.0
26.7
29.0
35.6
45.0
28.7
14.0
8.9
0.0
0.0
Total
14.7
32.3
37.9
13.4
1.7
N = 702 (Freetown 501; Makeni 100; Koidu 101)
Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
A look at the ratings for personal security produced similar results
(Table 4.15).
Table 4.15 Personal security in three urban centres of Sierra Leone
Very safe
It’s okay
Fairly unsafe
Not safe at all
No answer
Freetown
20.4
39.1
27.5
12.0
1.0
Personal security (%)
Makeni
Koidu
14.0
28.7
50.0
40.6
31.0
23.8
5.0
6.9
0.0
0.0
Total
20.7
40.9
27.5
10.3
0.7
N = 702 (Freetown 501; Makeni 100; Koidu 101)
Question: ‘How safe do you feel personally in the country today?’
In all three cities, personal security is rated more positively than
general security, thus not refuting the overall assessment of personal versus
general security mentioned above (compare Tables 4.15 and 4.16). As with
general security, the citizens of Koidu were more approving of their personal
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security situation, with just over two-thirds considering it to be okay or very
safe. There may be a number of reasons for this disparity, but a
consideration of the context may provide a partial explanation. During the
civil war the area around Koidu was initially worst hit by insurgents,
particularly as the diamond-rich area is the goose that lays Sierra Leone’s
proverbial golden egg. Over the years, however, the conflict moved towards
the capital, Freetown, and in the last phases of the conflict Freetown was the
key target of the RUF fighters and belligerent sobels. Thus the citizens of
Freetown and nearby Makeni have a more recent memory of excessive
fighting, whereas Koidu citizens have perhaps experienced a longer period
of peace and therefore perceive both general and personal security situations
to be more positive than their neighbours. This assumption requires testing.
However, neither focus groups nor the interviews shed light on the reasons
for this discrepancy, which has highlighted a flaw in the research design: in
addition to extending the survey poll to two additional urban areas in each
country under study, focus groups should have been conducted in each of
these other cities as well in order to obtain a more detailed description of the
security arena and perceptions thereof.
A comparison of perceptions of the current security situation and that
before the end of the civil war provides no further clues as regards this
discrepancy between the various cities. Consider Tables 4.16 and 4.17.
Respondents were asked to evaluate personal and overall security situations
today in comparison to the wartime situations.
Table 4.16 Changes in general security in urban Sierra Leone:
Past and present compared
Much better
Somewhat better
No change
Somewhat worse
Much worse
No answer
Freetown
34.7
56.7
4.6
2.2
0.2
1.6
General security (%)
Makeni
Koidu
21.0
27.7
71.0
65.3
4.0
5.0
3.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
Total
31.8
60.0
4.6
2.1
0.4
1.1
N = 702 (Freetown 501; Makeni 100; Koidu 101)
Question: ‘In your opinion, compared to before the end of the last war, what is the general
state of security like in the country today?’
110
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table 4.17 Changes in personal security in urban Sierra Leone:
Past and present compared
Much better
Somewhat better
No change
Somewhat worse
Much worse
No answer
Freetown
28.3
61.1
5.0
2.6
2.0
1.0
Personal security (%)
Makeni
Koidu
22.0
27.7
72.0
66.3
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
Total
27.4
63.4
4.4
2.6
1.6
0.7
N = 702 (Freetown 501; Makeni 100; Koidu 101)
Question: ‘Compared to before the end of the last war, how is your personal safety today?’
The ratio of answers is similar in all three cases, thus providing no
further evidence to explain the markedly positive perceptions of security of
Koidu citizens. Fortunately, there is a third set of data, namely the semistructured interviews. Interviews conducted with experts and key
stakeholders in Koidu provide a plausible explanation for the disparity: the
exceedingly efficient work being conducted by the city’s police forces.102
The local SLP unit commander of the security division was a well-respected
member of society. The SLP division responsible for Tonkoro district, of
which Koidu Town forms a part, appears to be better at fulfilling its stated
duties than its counterparts in Freetown and Makeni. Regular night patrols
are conducted, for example, and disciplinary measures are usually taken
against police officers who break the code of conduct (e.g. participating in
extortion or unwarranted assault).
A more comprehensive overview of Sierra Leone’s current security
sector and the relevant actors involved – or expected to be involved – in the
provision of security was gained from other questions posed in the survey.
The data gathered from the fieldwork revealed the existence and relevance
of several actors – particularly of a non-state, informal nature – in providing
(or threatening) security. Since the departure of the last contingent of
UNAMSIL troops, which during their deployment had provided the bulk of
security in urban Sierra Leone, informal actors have come to play a more
significant role in the security arena. Given that the fieldwork was conducted
shortly after UNAMSIL’s withdrawal, the sustainability of the current post-
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111
conflict phase cannot be determined. However, the results reveal the
significant vacuum left by the multinational force and expose the inability of
the national security forces to fill it.
Table 4.18 shows that, here, the external actors – UNAMSIL,
ECOMOG, IMATT – do not play as significant a role in the provision of
Table 4.18 Security actors in urban Sierra Leone: Most important
actors
Actors
RSLAF
Police
UNAMSIL
ECOMOG
Government
Former warring faction 1: CDF
Husband/family/individual
God
Rebel/ex-combatant
President
Youth groups
Foreign troops (general)
Traditional authorities (paramount chief/village authorities)
Private security
SLP Operational Support Division
IMATT
Mende
Former warring faction 2: RUF
Other
None
No answer/don’t know
%
34.5
33.2
10.8
3.0
2.0
1.6
1.0
1.9
0.9
0.9
0.6
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.0
0.7
7.2
N = 702
Question: ‘We have spoken to many Sierra Leoneans and they all have different feelings
about which groups in the country protect them and which are a threat to them. Could you
please tell us which group is the most important one for your personal safety?’
Judy Smith-Höhn
112
security as their Liberian counterparts. The Sierra Leone government and its
security forces, on the other hand, scored high in respondents’ expectations
for the provision of national security. Surprisingly, it was the fact that the
RSLAF stayed out of sight and was confined to barracks that accounts for
the discussants’ favourable assessment.103 This to some extent explains why
more than two-thirds of survey respondents considered the RSLAF as very
important for their personal security, despite the violent, even criminal,
history of the military in the country.
Table 4.19 Security actors in urban Sierra Leone (%)
Types of actors
State
International/
commercial non-state
Domestic non-state
Very/
somewhat
important to
personal
security
SLP
87.8
RSLAF
81.4
Mines monitoring
22.7
officers
Traffic wardens
51.2
Private security
54.6
companies
Secret societies
26.6
Youth wings of
30.6
political parties
Ghetto Boys
4.4
Bike riders
39.1
West Side Boys
2.9
CDF
20.5
RUF
2.3
Does not
affect my
personal
security
Somewhat/
a big threat
to personal
security
3.4
5.0
55.0
8.0
10.0
5.2
34.0
38.6
7.9
1.6
50.9
33.5
19.7
30.3
16.2
30.1
17.0
20.5
16.1
76.8
26.6
74.6
54.1
78.0
N = 700 (out of total sample of 700); percentages of ‘don’t know’ and ‘no answer’ responses
not shown.
Question: ‘Now, I’m going to read out a list of groups that are said to affect security in one
way or another. For each one, could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened by
them?’
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Focus group discussants had a relatively negative opinion of the
SLP.104 This deviates from the positive ratings given to the SLP in the
survey poll, where 87.8 per cent of respondents considered the police to be
very or somewhat important for their personal security (Table 4.19). This
disparity was clarified in interviews conducted with local and international
experts, which revealed that, despite their high expectations concerning the
role of national security forces such as the police, Sierra Leoneans are very
aware of the shortcomings of the SLP in particular. Despite external support
and training received from the Commonwealth Police and the civilian police
section of UNAMSIL, the SLP’s ability to perform its duties is hampered,
among other things, by a lack of equipment and insufficient remuneration,
which partly explains its poor performance.
Both Tables 4.18 and 4.19 reveal the state actors – namely the RSLAF
and the SLP – to be the most important security providers.
In a recent survey of policing agencies in Sierra Leone, Bruce Baker
identified three types of policing structures: those operated by the Sierra
Leonean state, private and community structures that have state approval and
those without state authorisation.105 He found that in contrast to widespread
opinion, citizens do not always choose state policing over the non-state
alternatives; in fact, many consider non-state policing a viable alternative to
the often distant and inefficient state police. Though this may reflect the
current situation – and the survey results confirm the importance of non-state
actors – Sierra Leoneans do indeed expect the state security actors to be in
charge of a properly functioning national security apparatus. Baker’s
mapping of the security environment (Table 4.20) is somewhat different to
the results of the DSF project.
Firstly, Baker identified a number of state actors as being part of the
security environment, such as the mine monitoring officers and traffic
wardens. Secondly, Baker’s list does not reveal the extent to which
particular actors are considered important for the provision of security. The
added value of the DSF project’s approach is that it provided actual figures
as regards the importance of particular actors through the survey as well as
enabling a confirmation of these figures through the focus groups. While
Baker’s research certainly provided useful groundwork in preparation for the
present fieldwork, with all the actors in Table 4.20 having been included in
the survey questionnaire, it is prone to misinterpretation. More precisely,
certain actors mentioned by Baker were, in fact, a much less prominent
feature in the security sector than the table suggests.
The mines monitoring officers, for example, were considered to have
no impact on security by the majority of survey respondents. Whereas the
Judy Smith-Höhn
114
Table 4.20 Current policing structures in Sierra Leone
Policing
body
SLP
Mine
monitoring
officers,
beach and
traffic
wardens
Authoriser
Powers
Key
function
State structures
Central
Standard
Serious
government police
crime
powers
Ministry of Reduced
Supervision
Mines,
police
of mining
Tourist
powers
and
Board,
Freetown
Traffic
beaches and
Authority
traffic
Links with
other policing
bodies
Funding
Work with
partnership
boards
Work with
SLP
State
Volunteers
State
State-approved policing
Local
policing
partnership
boards
Work-based
policing
associations
SLP
Citizen
Provide
intelligence
to police
Work with
SLP
Elected
leaders of
association
Citizen
Security of
workplace
Minimal
Members’
contact with contributions
SLP
Customary
structures
Chiefdoms
Judicial
Civil and
powers in
customary
civil matters arbitration
Minimal
Chiefdoms
contact with and state
SLP
Licensed by Guarding
police
Joint patrols Commercial
with armed
police in
high-risk
situations
Commercial Private
security
companies
groups
Peace
monitors
Community Citizen
groups
Civil
arbitration
Minimal
Volunteers
contact with
police
Unauthorised policing
Youth
groups
Mob justice
Youth
groups
Citizen
Guarding
and rapid
response
Assaults on
alleged
criminals
Source: Bruce Baker (2005), see note 59, p.373
Minimal
Volunteers
contact with
SLP
None
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focus groups and interviews served to strengthen the poll ratings for secret
societies, they merely confirmed the inconclusiveness of the ratings for the
mines monitoring officers. Not one of the focus groups considered this group
of actors to be a relevant security player. Unlike Baker’s list, which does not
elaborate on the relative importance of particular actors, a look at the ratings
for each of the three cities confirms that the mines monitoring officers are
really only visible and relevant in Kono district, where most of the diamond
mining is conducted (Table 4.21). The relatively large percentage of ‘don’t
know’ responses in Freetown and Makeni confirms this inference.
Table 4.21 Mines monitoring officers in three Sierra Leonean cities
compared (%)
Very/
somewhat
important to
City
personal
security
15.2
Freetown
8.0
Makeni
32.7
Koidu Town
12.4
Total
Does not
affect
personal
security
6.0
14.0
27.7
10.3
Somewhat/
a big threat
to personal
security
58.1
64.0
30.7
55.0
Don’t know No answer
18.2
11.0
3.0
15.0
3.0
0.0
1.0
2.3
N = 702 (Freetown 501; Makeni 100; Koidu 101)
Question: ‘Now, I’m going to read out a list of groups that are said to affect security in one
way or another. For each one, could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened by
them?’
Another interesting observation from the survey poll is the generally
positive role of private security companies (PSCs). While a not insignificant
total of 38.6 per cent of respondents said that PSCs had no impact on their
security, quite a number considered them to be ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’
important for their personal security (54.6 per cent).
Secret societies appear to play a significant role in providing security
in Sierra Leone, with almost one-third of respondents considering them to
have a positive role in security provision. That most respondents (around 50
per cent) considered them to be insignificant for their personal security is
certainly partly attributable to the fact that the survey was conducted in three
urban areas.
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Figure 4.3 Sierra Leone today – Security actors and their interactions
EXTERNAL
STATE
Customs and
Excise
UN
NON-STATE
Al Qaeda
connections
Smugglers/
business
people
Prisons
Judiciary
Chiefs
IMATT
Secret
societies
SLP
Community
Yenga border
issue
Dogs
Private
security
companies
Taylor’s
NPFL
Political
parties
RSLAF
Charles
Taylor
Armed
robbers
Pirates
Excombatants
Legend
positive
neutral/disputed
negative
cooperation
rivalry
rivalry/cooperation
cooperation and avoidance
rivalry within
cooperation all around
Source: FGD2 Sierra Leone, Teachers and Students. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
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117
Focus groups and interviews confirmed the increased importance of
such traditional actors in rural Sierra Leone, which brings us to the second
criterion for assessing SSR programmes: the regard for context-specific
characteristics in designing implementation strategies.
Context-specific characteristics of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict security
environment
In Sierra Leone, there was an attempt by the government to formalise policecommunity cooperation through the police partnership boards (PPBs).
Comprising community members, PPBs are intended to give citizens a voice
in security-related matters, allow police officers access to information they
would otherwise not have and help to improve the image of the police
forces. The PPBs received mixed ratings in both the focus groups and the
interviews, pointing to the fact that the success of such initiatives depends
primarily on the commitment of individual police divisions to follow up and
support community policing efforts.
The mapping exercises conducted during the focus groups produced
some striking results and led to the identification of additional actors that
were considered relevant in the security sector; most prominent among these
were the community watch teams (CWTs). They also served to confirm
findings from the survey poll.
By and large, a number of informal, i.e. non-state, security actors
appear to operate in Sierra Leone (Figure 4.3). External actors continue to
play a role, despite the withdrawal of UNAMSIL troops in December 2005.
However, as in the survey poll, they feature less prominently. Whereas
external actors were included in the mapping exercises conducted by the
teachers/students and health workers, the market women and
youth/community leaders considered them irrelevant in terms of providing
security.106 As mentioned above, the traditional actors – secret societies and
chiefs – not only feature prominently, but are also integrated into Sierra
Leone’s security architecture, as shown by the lines of interaction with other
security actors.
Of the actors considered to play a positive role in providing security,
probably the most striking one mentioned in the focus group is the dogs.
Although it may seem odd that a group of animals is considered to play a
significant and active role in the security arena, what it in fact indicates is
that citizens provide for their own security by acquiring watchdogs to protect
themselves and their property. Moreover, it also points to a lack of faith in
other security providers. One focus group discussant maintained that he
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Judy Smith-Höhn
could not rely on the police nor on any PSC to provide effective security to
him personally.107
The integration of secret societies into the security architecture
appears to be a unique feature of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict environment.
In addition to secret societies’ acknowledgement as viable security actors in
their own right, having points of contact with other actors in the country’s
security architecture, they also enjoy hidden representation by other security
actors. The paramount chief, for instance, is usually a member of a secret
society. Furthermore, membership of these societies is widespread – not
least in the police, PSCs and even among youth leaders.
As for other traditionally based actors, the CDF no longer play as
positive a role in the security arena as in early stages of the civil war.
Returning to Table 4.19, more than half of all respondents considered them
to be a threat or a big threat to their security. The focus groups confirmed
their negative status, which is certainly partly attributable to their changing
role during the civil war.
The role of the chiefs, on the other hand, has always been ambiguous
and depended on the chief’s personal ambitions. While some chiefs in rural
areas deserted their people, others played a key role in recruiting and
funding kamajors.
A number of informal actors were revealed to pose a potential security
risk. The Ghetto Boys, for instance, many of whom are ex-combatants, are
considered to be a major threat to security. The West Side Boys – a rogue
army faction that emerged at the end of the 1990s but which has been
officially disbanded – are considered to pose a similar threat. The focus
groups confirmed these views, and discussants agreed that the West Side
Boys still maintained a modicum of organisational capacity, with several
claiming that they were capable of recruiting and reorganising at any time.
Regardless of whether this is true or not, the fact that many former
combatants – whether Ghetto Boys, West Side Boys or RUF rebels – are
unemployed and struggling to make ends meet is cause for concern, for it is
from this group that those wishing to destabilise the security sector for their
own personal gain, for example, would recruit.
Bike riders, many of whom are also ex-combatants, can serve as an
example of the potential to work with such actors. All in all, they received
the most balanced results of all actors, i.e. an almost equal number of
respondents considered them either as important, insignificant or a threat to
their security. In contrast to the Ghetto Boys, this group appears to have a
more positive impact on security (39.1 per cent, see Table 4.22). A third
found that they had no impact on their security, while 26.6 per cent
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119
considered them to be a threat. These results can be explained if one
considers the responses in each of the cities where the survey was
conducted. Following conflicts between bike riders and other transport
stakeholders in Makeni and Koidu Town, civil society groups and the local
police intervened successfully to curb this threat. This led to a rapid decrease
in bike-related unrest and explains the favourable results this group obtained
in these cities, particularly in Makeni, where 79 per cent of respondents
considered them as being important or somewhat important for their security
(Table 4.22). In Koidu, 73.3 per cent of respondents considered them as
positive, whereas only 24 per cent of respondents in Freetown answered
accordingly. In the latter case, most respondents found the bike riders to
have no impact on their security (37.1 per cent).
Table 4.22 Bike riders in three Sierra Leonean cities compared
Very
important to
personal
security
Somewhat
important to
personal
security
Freetown
9.4
14.6
37.1
19.8
13.4
Makeni
33.0
46.0
15.0
3.0
3.0
Koidu
41.6
32.7
9.9
11.9
3.0
City
Does not
affect
personal
security
Somewhat a A big threat
threat to
to personal
personal
security
security
N = 702 (Freetown 501; Makeni 100; Koidu 101); percentages of ‘don’t know’ and ‘no
answer’ responses are not shown.
Question: ‘Now, I’m going to read out a list of groups that are said to affect security in one
way or another. For each one, could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened by
them?’
The mapping exercises conducted during the focus groups not only
produced colourful results, but also enabled a more in-depth analysis of the
actors considered as relevant in the country’s security arena. Table 4.23 on
page 120 encapsulates all the security actors identified by the focus groups,
categorising them according to their average ranking as well as their status
as state, international/commercial non-state or domestic non-state.
In most cases the ranking of the various actors confirms the results
from the quantitative survey, such as the positive ratings of the RSLAF, UN
and IMATT. As noted above, a positive rating does not necessarily imply
that these actors play a proactive role in security provision, as in the case of
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120
Table 4.23 Sierra Leone – Mapping security actors today
Types of actors
State
Positive
- Chiefdom
police
- RSLAF
International /
commercial
non-state
Domestic
non-state
- UN
- IMATT
- Headmen/
headwomen
- Soweis
- Media
- Dogs
Neutral/disputed
- SLP
- SLP
Operational
Support
Division (OSD)
- Customs and
Excise
- Immigration
- Parliament
- Government
- City council
Negative
- Prisons
- Port security
- Judiciary
- Secret societies
(Poro, Ojeh;
hunter militias)
- Chiefs
- Community
watch teams
- Private security
companies
-
Ex-combatants
Doctors
Criminals
Ghetto Boys
Student politics
Political party
militias
Potential threats
- Charles Taylor,
NPFL
- Yenga border
issue
- Businessmen
- Al-Qaeda
connections
Source: FGD1–4, Freetown, April–May 2006
the RSLAF, where the positive ranking was attributable to its invisibility
rather than its capacity to provide for national security. Similarly, a neutral
or disputed ranking requires elaboration. The community watch teams, for
instance, were ranked as neutral/disputed not because discussants disagreed
on whether they had a positive or negative effect on security; rather, there
was unanimous consent that this group had the potential to be a guarantor of
security, but the composition of these self-organised squads was key to
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121
ensuring that they do not pose a threat to security, as was known to have
happened with the CDF in the past.
Finally, if one compares the current security situation with the period
before the end of the war, UNAMSIL’s withdrawal in December 2005 marks
a shift in the constellation of security actors. Table 4.24 reveals that Sierra
Leone’s current security arena contains far more actors than were present
during UNAMSIL’s deployment.
Table 4.24 Sierra Leone – Security actors past and present
Period
Before 2001
External
- ECOMOG
- Executive
Outcomes
-
2001 – December
2005
- UNAMSIL
-
Since January
2006
-
State
OSD
Police
Sierra Leone
Army
City council
police
Chiefdom police
Armed Forces
Revolutionary
Council
Chiefdom police
Sierra Leone
Police
City council
police
OSD
RSLAF
OSD
RSLAF
SLP
Council
Chiefdom police
-
Non-state
PSCs
Civil defence
unit (youth)
CDF
RUF
Gbethis
- PSCs
- Community
night watch
- Community
- Chief
- Headman
- Market women
- Ojeh
- Poro
- Soweis
- Hunter militias
Source: FGD 2, Market Women, Freetown, 28 April 2006
Similarly, more actors were involved in the period before 2001,
prior to the end of the civil war. This implies that with the presence of UN
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Judy Smith-Höhn
troops the need for security was covered. Moreover, the gradual withdrawal
of UNAMSIL troops produced a security vacuum that was filled not by state
actors but rather by private non-state actors. Some of them have only been
established recently (such as the PPBs and the community night watch),
while others have re-emerged (such as the secret societies).
Dealing with legacies of the past?
The fact that many former combatants – whether Ghetto Boys, West Side
Boys or RUF rebels – remain without employment and struggle to make
ends meet poses a major security threat and is an indication that the legacies
of the past may not have been addressed as effectively as they should.
Though officially disbanded, these groups have in the past proven their
ability to recruit and reorganise at any given moment. The need to focus on
social background conditions, e.g. by creating employment opportunities in
order to reintegrate such groups, is therefore crucial in securing a lasting
peace.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the measures taken towards SSR
and the relevant actors mentioned above, transitional justice mechanisms
were also established soon after the cessation of the civil war. Problematic as
the concurrent operation of these may have been, Sierra Leone’s TRC as
well as the UN-backed SCSL constitute formal efforts to address the
legacies of the civil war.108
Sierra Leone has a vibrant civil society, and although the government
tends to ignore civil society actors that are out of line with its own political
and economic interests, local mechanisms for reconciliation have proven
more effective – at least on the community level. Religious groups and
particularly women’s movements, as well as other grassroots organisations,
have often played a key role in reconciling those who had been adversaries
during the war.
Furthermore, the present government remains supportive of the
chieftaincy system, which is viewed by some as one of the main causes of
the war. Colonial indirect rule has a particularly strong legacy in Sierra
Leone, and the chiefs continue to be closely involved in almost all aspects of
everyday governance in rural areas. This has bred animosity due to the fact
that chiefs, as heads of the local judicial system, regularly handed down
fines that were grossly disproportionate to the offences committed, as well as
obliging their subjects to work for them without payment. During the civil
war, however, chieftaincy was also used an instrument of civil-military
liaison in northern areas.
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Notwithstanding the major role played by the 17,300-strong
UNAMSIL force in maintaining a stable security environment during its
deployment from 2001 to 2005, British involvement in Sierra Leone has had
a significant, if not the most significant, impact on stabilisation and
peacebuilding processes in the country. And although the last UNAMSIL
troops withdrew in December 2005, leaving only a small contingent of 250
Mongolian troops to guard the UN-backed SCSL, the Sierra Leonean state
still relies heavily on external support for security, conflict management and
effective governance of its institutions.
Indeed, the massive influx of external funding may have weakened the
motivation to deploy the country’s own capacities effectively. Far-reaching
structural change can only evolve out of leaders’ and individuals’ sense of
political responsibility and ownership; external actors can at best support this
process.
Moreover, the newly (re-)established security forces have yet to prove
their ability to deal with potential security threats. There have been no
reports of major incidents of unrest in 2006, with the extradition of Charles
Taylor from his exile in Nigeria to the SCSL in March 2006 viewed by many
as the major security challenge that year. The court promptly requested the
relocation of Taylor’s trial to The Hague, citing security concerns. This is
certainly an indication that Sierra Leone’s national security apparatus is still
not fully functional and is likely to remain reliant on external support for
some time to come.
The within-unit comparison of the security arena in Sierra Leone can
thus be summarised as follows.
State actors are expected to play a leading role in security provision,
despite awareness of their shortcomings in terms of capacity, skills and
resources. This poses a challenge in that the state institutions – the SLP and
the RSLAF, for example – will not be able to fulfil this function exclusively
for some time yet. This jeopardises the potential for successful reform, in
that there is then a risk of disengagement from the state in this particular
arena. If citizens rely increasingly on alternative means of security provision,
and these become entrenched in the security architecture not as subordinate
and complementary to state institutions but as substitutes for services the
latter are expected to provide, the context for effectively reforming the
security sector becomes progressively more difficult.
The comparison revealed the positive and immediate effect of efforts
to tackle security threats on the ground, as was demonstrated by the
activities of the local unit commander and his team in Koidu, as well as the
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124
Figure 4.4 Sierra Leone 2002–2005 – Security actors and their
interactions
EXTERNAL
STATE
NON-STATE
Chiefdom
police
UNAMSIL
Police
Private
security
companies
City council
police
Operational
Security
Division
Sierra
Leone
Army
Legend
positive
neutral/disputed
cooperation
Cooperates with all
Source: FGD1, Sierra Leone, Market Women. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
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125
efforts to curb violence related to the bike riders in both Makeni and Koidu.
It also reveals, however, that positive change depends heavily on the
integrity and efforts of individuals. A formalised approach to dealing with
security threats is not functional. Thus if the police officers of a particular
division are not personally committed to performing their duties, and nor are
those responsible for ensuring that disciplinary measures be taken against
such officers, then the citizens are effectively left to provide for their own
security.
Finally, the incorporation of traditional, non-state actors in the
security arena appears to be a unique feature of Sierra Leone’s post-conflict
environment. In terms of SSR, this indicates that it should be easier to
acknowledge and integrate such actors in the reform process.
4.3.3
Diachronic-binary comparison
This section explores the conditions of the immediate post-war security
sector as it was at different times in both countries.
As the wider DSF-funded research project necessitated that the same
questions be posed for both countries, the comparison across units is
unproblematic. However, the field research was not conducted in the
immediate post-war period of both countries – research was undertaken
within a time frame of six months from November 2005 till June 2006, and
in the case of Sierra Leone this was nearly four years after the formal end to
its civil war. Therefore, as noted in Chapter 3, the information on Sierra
Leone as it emerged from civil war is based on the focus groups and semistructured interviews only. The survey was not designed to explore this
dimension of the country’s progress in terms of security and SSR.
For the purposes of this study, Liberia is considered to have just
emerged from civil war at the time the field research was undertaken.
Therefore all findings on the security situation in Liberia today are
equivalent to the findings on this situation in Liberia in the immediate postwar phase.
Given that the international peacekeeping force, UNMIL, plays such a
decisive role in Liberia’s security arena, it is necessary to ask the same about
Sierra Leone: what was the significance of the international peacekeeping
force during its deployment?
In one of the focus groups discussants were asked to compare the
security arena across time, not only the present and the period prior to the
cessation of the civil war, but also the period of the UNAMSIL deployment
between 2002 and 2005. Figure 4.4 on page 124 depicts the status and
Judy Smith-Höhn
126
Figure 4.5 Sierra Leone today – Security actors and their interactions
STATE
NON-STATE
Operational
Support
Division
Community
night watch
Army
Police
Market
women
Chief
Headman
Ojeh
Council
Market
women
Poro
Chiefdom
police
Hunter
militias
Legend
positive
cooperation
neutral/disputed
rivalry
negative
rivalry/cooperation
rivalry within
Source: FGD1, Sierra Leone, Market Women. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
Soweis
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interactions among the various security actors in Sierra Leone in the
immediate post-conflict phase.
Judging by this scenario, during the period of UNAMSIL’s
deployment a decidedly lesser number of security actors were considered
relevant for security provision. Moreover, the relationships among the
various actors were all cooperative. Although the retrospective viewpoint
taken by the focus group may be distorted, it does reveal that the security
situation was considered to be more positive during the deployment of the
UN peacekeeping force. Certainly, some actors threatened security in the
post-conflict phase: the ex-combatants are the first set to come to mind. Yet
again, what this particular mapping exercise reveals is the perception that
security was provided adequately during the massive deployment of
international force. Interviews with local and international experts confirmed
that, from 2001 to 2004, the United Nations and the British troops were the
most important security providers.109 Interviews generally confirmed the
positive impact of the UN force despite its difficult beginnings,110 though all
considered the involvement of the UK to have been equally decisive.
When one compares Figure 4.4 with the results from the mapping
exercises depicting the security situation today and the security arena just
before the end of the civil war, both suggest that during the UNAMSIL
deployment the security needs of citizens were covered. Figure 4.5 on page
126 demonstrates that a significantly larger number of actors are considered
to play a role in the security arena.
As noted in section 4.3.2, it appears that the gradual withdrawal of UN
troops created a security vacuum that was filled not by state actors but by
informal, non-state actors (compare Figures 4.4 and 4.5). Figure 4.4
depicting the security situation during UNAMSIL deployment has a total of
only seven actors, most of which were state actors. However, this does not
imply that they played the most important role, especially when one
considers the rating awarded to them. Most were neutral or disputed,
indicating their ambiguous role during this phase. This comes as no surprise,
since the state actors were in the early stages of the restructuring and reform
process. More importantly, Figure 4.4 shows that one particular actor –
UNAMSIL – had cooperative relationships with all actors in the arena.
In fact, focus group discussants were clear as to the central role
played by UNAMSIL in providing security. In other words, were one to
visualise this in the figure, the block of the international peacekeeping force
would have to be relatively larger than all others to illustrate the scope of its
role. Only one group of non-state actors, the PSCs, was considered in this
Judy Smith-Höhn
128
Figure 4.6 Sierra Leone in 2001 – Security actors and their
interactions
EXTERNAL
STATE
NON-STATE
Civil defence unit
(youth)
SLP
Operational
Support
Division
ECOMOG
Executive
Outcomes
Private security
companies
Revolutionary
United Front
Police
Civil defence
forces
Sierra Leone
Army
City council
police
Chiefdom
police
Gbethis
Armed Forces
Revolutionary
Council
Legend
positive
cooperation
neutral/disputed
rivalry
negative
rivalry/cooperation
Source: FGD1, Sierra Leone, Market Women. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
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129
retrospective exercise. A review of the literature shows that other actors,
particularly traditional, were present throughout this period.111 The fact that
these were not included points to the perception that they were not
considered to be important in security provision. Security needs of urban
citizens were thus considered covered by the actors identified above. A map
for market women from rural areas would certainly have produced different
results. Figure 4.5, representing the security arena today, is much more
diverse. Having omitted the international actor, several non-state actors –
community watch teams and particularly some traditional actors (Ojeh, Poro,
Soweis, hunter militia, headman, chief) – have now been included in the
arena.
In this particular focus group (market women), it is noteworthy that
the traditional actors were awarded a central role in the security arena
following UNAMSIL’s withdrawal. Whereas some actors were considered
wholly positive (the headman, the chief and the female secret society known
as the Soweis), others played a more ambiguous role (the secret societies of
the Poro, Ojeh and hunting militia). State actors’ rankings were even more
diverse; the SLP was considered to have deteriorated, while the RSLAF has
improved its reputation since UNAMSIL’s withdrawal.
Consider for a moment the constellation of security actors in Sierra
Leone in the period just before the end of the civil war (Figure 4.6). Again,
numbers of non-state security actors were present in the period prior to the
end of the civil war – the civil defence units, PSCs, CDF, RUF and the
gbethis (a traditional society similar to the kamajors). Aside from the RUF
and the CDF, which by that time had forfeited their good reputation due to
the actions of some of their men, all other non-state actors were considered
to play a positive role in security provision. Many young men who had
protected their communities through the civil defence units are now active
members of self-help community watch teams.112 The external actor
Executive Outcomes was ranked neutral/disputed, to indicate that it had both
a positive and a negative role in providing security. As mentioned above, of
the state actors, both the police and the army were deemed to play both
positive and negative roles. In the case of the army, it was the sobels –
soldiers by day, rebels by night – who threatened security. The military has
improved its reputation and is now considered to be a positive force – if only
because soldiers are confined to their barracks and no longer actively
threaten security.113
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130
Figure 4.7 Liberia today – Security actors and their interactions
EXTERNAL
STATE
NON-STATE
National Bureau of
Investigation
Bureau of
Immigration and
Naturalisation
Market
supervisor
National Security
Agency
UNMIL
Special Security
Service
Liberia National
Police
Street
boys
Excombatants
Monrovia City
Police
Political party
militias
Politicians
Warlords
Legend
positive
neutral/disputed
cooperation
negative
rivalry
rivalry within
Source: FGD1 Liberia, Teachers and Students. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
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131
The CDF in fact comprised different militia groups previously
referred to by ethnically coded titles, such as the gbethis (Temne), kamajors
(Mende), tamaboros (Kuranko) and donsos (from Kono).114 The CDF were
considered a threat to security while the gbethis were deemed as providing
security (Figure 4.6); this is partly because the CDF were not a military
organisation, but should be understood as the militarisation of a social
network. By the mid-1990s this network had become the symbolic and
material focal point for community defence mobilisation after the realisation
that the state military was by and large unable or unwilling to defeat the
RUF.115 Thus various groups were subsumed under one umbrella term, and
later a number of Liberians and mixed-parentage youths with combat
experience in Liberia also joined the CDF, changing the dynamic within the
network. A roaming population of combatants such as these youths, many of
whom began fighting as children during Charles Taylor’s insurgency against
the Doe regime, pledge allegiance to local warlords in exchange for
payment, logistic support and the prospect of self-enrichment. They do not
adhere to a centralised command structure and are usually better trained and
more violent than their allies in the various factions.116
The immediate post-conflict period in Liberia indicates that there
may be a different dynamic than in Sierra Leone. Figure 4.7 on page 130
illustrates the security arena in Liberia as it is perceived today.
The most palpable observation that can be drawn from the comparison
of Figures 4.7 and 4.4 (security in Sierra Leone in the immediate postconflict phase) is that in Liberia, aside from the central role played by the
international peacekeepers, more actors – both state and non-state – are
considered to comprise the security arena. In Sierra Leone, fewer actors
were identified as significant during the same time period. This may lead to
a number of inferences, e.g. that the UN mission in Sierra Leone was more
important in security provision and thus covered a wide range of the security
needs of citizens, or that the state security actors in Liberia are more
established than those in Sierra Leone, given that several state agencies were
identified in the mapping exercise in Figure 4.7. However, two factors play a
role here.
Since only one mapping exercise was conducted in Sierra Leone that
can give an impression of the characteristics of the security arena during the
UNAMSIL deployment, it can hardly serve as substantial evidence.
Moreover, as noted above, the lack of survey data regarding this particular
question makes it even more difficult to draw sound conclusions on the
issue. Interviews suggest that non-state actors have played a role in security
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Judy Smith-Höhn
provision for quite some time. And although the presence of UN troops
ensured stability during the immediate post-war phase, UNAMSIL was not
the only player.117
Secondly, some of the state actors identified in Figure 4.7 were, at the
time of questioning, not fully functional. Though this focus group did not
explicitly note this during the exercise, the three other focus groups
acknowledged the fact that, although formally existent, these actors were
effectively not able to provide any security.118
Given the limitations of the data collected, one particular conclusion
can be drawn: the significant role played by UNAMSIL during its
deployment between 2001 and 2005. Its positive effect is certainly
comparable to the equally (though not exclusively) positive role currently
being played by UNMIL in Liberia. This raises the question of the possible
impact of an UNMIL withdrawal. Would non-state actors (re-)emerge to fill
the security vacuum?
4.3.4
Synchronic comparison
This final synchronic comparison is the more detailed of the cross-unit
comparisons since the data gathered from the survey poll, focus groups and
interviews provide extensive information on the conditions within which
SSR efforts are currently being undertaken (Cases 2 and 5 in Figure 3.2).
Security and security actors in Liberia and Sierra Leone: Changes over time
Using the criteria for measuring SSR elaborated in Chapter 2, one would
again first enquire into the state of security and the presence of viable
security actors. The cross-unit comparison enables a more concise analysis
of the conditions in both countries, in that the ratings can be compared
systematically.
Table 4.25 reveals that overall there has been a predictably dramatic
shift in security perceptions of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans compared to
the period prior to the end of their respective civil wars. Here too, a
significant number of respondents considered their personal security
situation to be ‘somewhat’ or ‘much’ better (90.8 per cent in total, 86.1 per
cent total in Liberia). Similar results were obtained for public security.
A noteworthy result from the survey is that Liberians have a more
favourable perception of their country’s general security situation than their
neighbours, although Sierra Leone has enjoyed a longer post-conflict phase.
Only 47 per cent of Sierra Leonean respondents rated the security situation
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in the country as ‘okay’ or ‘very safe’, compared to 60.4 per cent in Liberia,
and they have a much more negative perception of the overall security
situation (Table 4.25). A majority of respondents in both countries – 61.6 per
cent in Sierra Leone and 69.3 per cent in Liberia – felt personally ‘very safe’
or ‘okay’, although Sierra Leoneans appear to be more sceptical about their
personal safety than Liberians (37.8 per cent compared to 29.7 per cent).
Table 4.25 General and personal security in urban Liberia and Sierra
Leone compared
General security (%)*
Personal security (%)**
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Very safe
20.3
14.7
25.6
20.7
It’s okay
40.1
32.3
43.7
40.9
Fairly unsafe
26.9
37.9
23.5
27.5
Not safe at all
10.5
13.4
6.2
10.3
No answer/
don't know
2.2
1.7
1.0
0.7
N Liberia = 698; N Sierra Leone = 702
*Question: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’
**Question: ‘How safe do you feel personally in the country today?’
Although this discrepancy may contradict initial expectations, a
consideration of the prevailing context in each country at the time of the
survey provides some answers. In Liberia, UNMIL was still ever-present;
and a fairly free and fair, and most importantly peaceful, election produced
the first female African president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. The survey in
Sierra Leone was carried out against the backdrop of UNAMSIL’s
withdrawal only a few months earlier, as well as the extradition of Charles
Taylor to the UN-backed SCSL.
Aside from these context conditions, it is precisely the fact that Sierra
Leone’s post-conflict phase is older that accounts for the less favourable
assessment of the security situation. The initial euphoria that ensued after the
end of the civil war had over the years given way to the realisation that
socio-economic conditions for the poor had yet to improve. The focus
groups confirmed this line of reasoning, as all discussants agreed that the
Judy Smith-Höhn
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Table 4.26 Mapping security actors – Liberia and Sierra Leone today
Country
Positive
Neutral / disputed
Liberia -
Market superintendent
CWTs
PSCs
National Fire Service
LNP
Ministry of Defence
Agents Against Rape
Community chairman
- UNMIL
- Special Security
Service
- National Security
Agency
- National Bureau of
Investigation
- Ministry of National
Security
- Bureau of Immigration
and Naturalisation
- Town chief
- Poro/Sandee
- Kenewo/Senewo/Bodio
- Monrovia City Police
- Press union
- Drivers union/ car
loaders/ wheelbarrow
boys
- Liberian Marketing
Association/ pedicuremanicure boys/ Yanna
boys/ shoeshine boys/
money changers
-
-
Headmen/headwomen
Soweis
Chiefdom police
UN
IMATT
Dogs
RSLAF
Media
- Secret societies (Poro,
Ojeh; hunter militias)
- Chiefs
- City council
- CWTs
- OSD
- PSCs
- Customs and Excise
- SLP
- Immigration
- Parliament
- Government
-
Sierra
Leone
Negative
Ex-combatants
Street boys
Politicians
Political party militia
Warlords
Action agents
Prisons
Ex-combatants
Doctors
Port security
Ex-combatants
Criminals (armed
robbers, drug addicts)
- Ghetto youths
- Judiciary
- Student politics
- Political party militia
- Port security
Potential threats
- Charles Taylor; NPFL
- Yenga border issue
- Businessmen
- Al Qaeda connections
Source: FGD1–4, Monrovia and Freetown, December 2005–May 2006
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lack of employment opportunities was a potential threat to security and
deplored the SLPP government’s failure to address this issue.
The government’s performance in other sectors was also criticised,
e.g. its failure to improve the working conditions of the SLP, with the result
that some police officers are compelled to resort to extortion as a result of
long-overdue salary arrears, was identified as a further threat to overall
security. Discussants clearly indicated that the primary responsibility for the
rebuilding of Sierra Leone’s institutions rested with the government; the
external donors were acknowledged as key facilitators for these processes.
Consider Table 4.26, which represents a classification of all the actors
noted as playing a role in the respective country’s security sector. For each
country, the various actors identified as operating in the security arena are
grouped into three categories: those considered to have a wholly positive
impact on security; those considered to have a negative impact; and finally
those that were either considered to be neutral (i.e. to have neither a positive
nor a negative impact on security) or where discussants disagreed on the
rating to be given (e.g. one discussant may have considered an actor to be
positive while another considered it to be negative; or one focus group rated
a particular actor as neutral while another rated it as positive). Thus the third
category subsumes two types of actors.119 Note that the table does not reflect
the relative importance of each actor; in other words, whether a particular
actor or set of actors was mentioned in all or merely one of the FGDs is not
shown.
As far as the security arena is concerned, Liberia and Sierra Leone
exhibit the following key similarities.
Firstly, and not surprisingly, there is overwhelming evidence that
security conditions have improved dramatically in both countries since the
end of their civil wars.
Secondly, state security actors – both police and military forces –
received remarkably positive ratings despite obvious shortcomings in terms
of equipment and training as well as their general history of violence and
oppression. These perceptions are less a reflection of these actors’ actual
performance, but can be interpreted as an indication of the high expectations
regarding this. There is little doubt that there is a pronounced preference for
state agencies to provide for security in both countries.
A third similarity is the significance of non-state informal actors in
providing security. This needs some qualification as regards different
groups: in both countries non-state groups such as community watch teams
were identified which – though not as prominent as state actors – were
viewed overwhelmingly positively. Others, particularly secret societies,
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Judy Smith-Höhn
received mixed results, though they were deemed irrelevant for the personal
safety of larger parts of the urban population. This is also true for the –
generally rather favourably assessed – PSCs.
Probably the most clear-cut parallel between the two countries in
terms of non-state actors can be drawn with regard to informal groups of
young men – such as ex-combatants, street boys and Ghetto Boys – who
were undoubtedly considered the most serious threats. This finding points to
the urgent need to (re-)integrate them into society by creating job
opportunities, and it is nothing short of obvious that Liberia and Sierra
Leone face very similar social and economic challenges if they are to
eradicate the social roots of violent conflict.
Though DDR processes were carried out in both Sierra Leone and
Liberia, they were marred by lack of funds to provide sufficient training and
difficulties in finding employment pending training. The problem is
compounded by the regional dimensions of past and present conflict in this
part of the world. In the past, Liberia and its neighbours – Sierra Leone,
Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire – have been involved in each other’s conflicts. Not
only local but also international ‘violence actors’ (e.g. armed refugees) hired
by the warring parties have been involved in the civil wars of the region.
With Côte d’Ivoire having only recently signed a peace agreement in
Ouagadougou in 2007, the future of Guinea being clouded by rumours of an
impending coup and the failing health of Guinea’s Lansana Conté, there is
still a formidable level of insecurity in region. If the need arises, this group
of disgruntled youths, all with combat skills, can be lured back into militias,
particularly in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.
Notwithstanding many similarities, there are two major differences
between the two countries, at least regarding the actors. The first concerns
the involvement of international actors, particularly the UN peacekeeping
missions. In Sierra Leone, the external actors – UNAMSIL, ECOMOG and
IMATT – do not play as significant a role in the provision of security as
their Liberian counterpart, UNMIL. With its troop strength of more than
15,000 soldiers, UNMIL is the key provider of security. In Sierra Leone, UN
peacekeepers, who during their deployment had most probably played an
equally significant role, withdrew in December 2005, and the subsequent
security vacuum was only partly filled by state and non-state actors.
The second difference relates to the varying importance of secret
societies and their ability to have a hand in SSR efforts. The Liberian study
revealed that although such groups are acknowledged as security actors,
their role is negligible; moreover, they appear to be ‘decoupled’ from the
rest of the security arena. In Sierra Leone such traditional actors are much
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more relevant, as they are integrated into the security architecture.
Comparing the maps from the focus groups conducted in the two countries,
it becomes apparent that in Sierra Leone the traditional structures such as the
chiefs are more integrated into the overall system (Figure 4.8 on page 138).
While the Poro in Liberia is a security-relevant but nonetheless
decoupled actor, the secret societies in Sierra Leone (Poro, Sowei, Ojeh)
have points of contact with the other actors. They are also represented by
other actors in the security apparatus, for instance through the function of the
paramount chief, the police and the youth leaders (as mentioned in section
4.3.2). Figure 4.8 compares the focus groups conducted with health workers
in both countries. The three other Sierra Leonean focus groups attributed
much more significance to the secret societies. Thus a comparison across
countries and focus groups would produce more striking results than are
visible here.
The survey polls confirmed this notable difference. Whereas in
Liberia very few respondents considered secret societies as important
security actors (15.7 per cent), almost one-third of Sierra Leonean
respondents considered them to play a positive role in security provision.
That most respondents (around 50 per cent) considered them to be
insignificant for their personal security is certainly partly attributable to the
fact that the survey was conducted in urban areas. Interviews confirmed the
increased importance of such traditional actors in rural Sierra Leone.120
As indicated earlier, both countries continue to rely heavily on
external support for security, conflict management and effective governance
of institutions. In both instances, the fact that the police services are illequipped and short-staffed has produced a security vacuum that has been
filled, to a certain extent and only in some areas, by CWTs, which have
taken on the responsibility of protecting their local community. In addition,
citizens with the necessary financial resources engage private security firms
to protect their property and business premises. Although the activities of
these companies should not be regarded as entirely unproblematic or
necessarily positive, they should nonetheless be taken into account when
considering strategies to promote security.
Finally, civil society movements should not be ignored. During the
wars in both countries, women’s movements in particular were instrumental
in bringing the conflicting parties to the negotiating table. This points to the
significance of such actors and the need to consider them as valuable assets
in any peacebuilding strategy.
positive
neutral/disputed
negative
Special
Security
Service
Liberia
National
Police
STATE
Charles
Taylor
Guinea
Kenewo/
Senewo/
Bodio
Private
security
companies
RSLAF
influences
rivalry within
rivalry/cooperation
cooperation and avoidance
Private security
companies
Media
Community
Chiefs
Political
parties
Ghetto youth
Armed
robbers
NON-STATE
rivalry
Fire service
Prisons
Judiciary
Police
Immigration
STATE
cooperation
Car loaders
Street
peddlers
UN
IMATT
EXTERNAL
Community
chairman
Community
watch teams
Poro/Sandee
NON-STATE
Source: FGDs Liberia and Sierra Leone, Health Workers. Copyright: Judy Smith-Höhn
Legend
UNMIL
EXTERNAL
Figure 4.8 Liberia and Sierra Leone today – Security actors and their interactions
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The survey polls and focus groups conducted in both countries
revealed that the constellation of security actors, and hence the context for
SSR, differs in these two post-conflict societies. Thus, from the onset, one
should expect that the SSR strategies implemented reflect this difference.
Although this is indeed the case, the differences in the approaches
adopted by the various implementing actors are less an acknowledgement of
the need for context-specific SSR strategies, and more a consequence of the
division of labour between the various international actors. Liberia, in
particular, has not benefited from the concurrent involvement of
international actors in reforming its dilapidated security sector: the US
government outsourced the programme to reconstruct the AFL to Dyncorp, a
company with somewhat controversial involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan,
while the UN focused on DDR and the training of the local police through
CIVPOL.
In addition, there are the justified concerns voiced by several CSOs as
regards the suitability of private military companies to train the national
army, such as the lack of transparency in the training procedure and issues of
accountability. Although the UN’s non-commercial efforts are preferable,
attempts to coordinate the efforts undertaken by the various UN agencies
active in the country are still under way. The general lack of coordination is
a serious concern. Interviews conducted with UN staff revealed that it was
only in January 2006 that the international implementing agencies working
to reform the country’s security sector began considering the need for a
comprehensive approach that coordinates the activities of the various
agencies. Until that point, the external implementing agencies had divided
the tasks of reforming the various security institutions among themselves –
most notably UNMIL, which had taken on the task of training the Liberian
National Police, while the US seconded the task of training, or more
precisely building from scratch, the AFL – with the result that neither knew
what the other was doing.
In comparison, the SSR efforts under way in Sierra Leone appear to
be more coordinated. The fact that the reconstruction is being carried out
bilaterally through various UK agencies has facilitated such synchronisation.
As noted in section 4.2.2, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool was initiated
as early as 2001, in an effort to consolidate the conflict prevention activities
of the FCO, DFID and the MoD.
A key difference in the reform efforts of both countries is the early
establishment in 2002 of the Office of National Security (ONS) in Sierra
Leone. The ONS is a post-conflict innovation that receives technical
assistance from the UK and is responsible for coordinating the activities of
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Judy Smith-Höhn
Sierra Leone’s security agencies, and in the process for developing joint
sectoral assessments on a regular basis. It functions as the coordinating body
of Sierra Leone’s security agencies and serves as the secretariat of the
National Security Council. Liberia’s Governance Reform Commission
(GRC) could either duplicate the role of the ONS or establish a similar body
to perform this key function.
As noted in section 4.1.2, Liberia’s SSR process has had a narrowed
focus on the AFL, the LNP and the SSS, while the other security agencies
received little or no attention by the implementing actors. In light of the
bloated nature of the country’s security sector, there should be a more
concentrated focus on the other state agencies to address the problem of the
overlapping responsibilities and duties of certain institutions.
Four key lessons can generally be considered when designing security
sector reform and reconstruction strategies in other post-conflict societies.
First, the success of the reform of the Sierra Leonean army is a good
example of the merits of non-commercial forms of external intervention, as
opposed to the employment of private military companies. The findings
from the fieldwork reveal that the image of the RSLAF has improved
substantially, and the training it received through the British-led IMATT
team has certainly played a part in this respect. Those in charge of SSR in
Liberia should reconsider the continued involvement of the commercial PSC
Dyncorp to train the new national army, particularly given the concerns
involving transparency and accountability deficits.
Second, results from the Sierra Leone case study underscore the
importance of non-state actors in this sector. Since the national security
apparatus is still not fully functional, citizens will turn to alternative informal
actors for security provision for some time to come. Hence this is not a
short-term phenomenon and should be taken into account when designing
SSR strategies.
Third, the concerns voiced by focus group discussants regarding
groups of unemployed youth – mostly former combatants – and their
negative assessment in the survey polls underline the need to focus on social
background conditions. The creation of employment opportunities other than
those derived from engaging in combat would serve to reintegrate such
groups. This is particularly important in the run-up to elections, when such
groups would be vulnerable to manipulation by political leaders.
Finally, local ownership of the transformation process in post-conflict
societies is crucial if it is to succeed. Two examples from Sierra Leone
suggest a direction for Liberia: the ONS and the community-based PPBs.
There are obvious benefits in having one overriding national body such as
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the ONS to coordinate all security agencies, as opposed to several
autonomously functioning bodies with possibly duplicating roles,
particularly in terms of promoting effective security threat assessments.
As in Sierra Leone, with the rise in crime and the lack of adequate
state-led responses to the problem, community-based neighbourhood watch
teams have become more prevalent in Liberia. The fact that such
community-based responses are (re-)emerging points to similarities with
Sierra Leone’s experiences after the civil war. However, unlike in Sierra
Leone, where there was an attempt by the government to formalise policecommunity cooperation through the PPBs, those in charge in Liberia have
hitherto limited their strategies to publicly calling for increased community
action. Justice Minister Cllr Frances Johnson-Morris called on citizens to
organise vigilante groups to protect themselves, citing the police’s inability
to deal with all crime-related incidents due to their composition and a lack of
equipment. Other public figures criticised this call for self-organisation,
among them former speaker of the House of Representatives Edwin Snowe,
stating that the government was thereby abdicating its duties.121
Focus groups revealed that, as in Liberia, Sierra Leoneans ideally
prefer state actors to non-state actors. Though this is no indication of their
actual performance, state security forces are expected to provide security,
particularly at the national level. Citizens resort to privately produced
security mostly by way of communal self-help organisations, and to a lesser
extent from commercial actors, for lack of a state-produced alternative.
In addition to the aforementioned PPBs, the data gathered from the
fieldwork in Sierra Leone revealed the existence and relevance of several
actors – particularly of a non-state, informal nature – in providing or
threatening security, with the constellation of security actors being
somewhat different than that of Liberia’s security arena.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that efforts to improve the
performance of the security sector in both countries must continue. Foreign
troops can and should not stay forever and, in the long run, there can be no
alternative to a locally owned security sector in post-conflict societies.
Although I shall refrain from drawing too far-reaching conclusions, the
results suggest that in Liberia and Sierra Leone a strong state security sector
that incorporates non-state actors as partners will work best. Given the fairly
divergent perceptions of the different groups, there can be no simple
blueprint for the treatment of these sets of actors. It may be worthwhile
considering some form of cooperation with the more positively rated actors
– at least from a mid-term perspective – while other groups may warrant a
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Judy Smith-Höhn
more robust approach, in case the improvement of their social background
conditions should not suffice to reduce the threat emanating from them.
The development of a promising strategy on dealing with non-state
security actors will require more positive knowledge about them, particularly
as regards the various roles of different groups of actors, their relations and
interactions with each other and their impact in rural areas. In short, further
research into all aspects of an oligopoly of force is of the essence.
4.4
Multilevel comparison: A synopsis
The brief historical review in sections 4.1 and 4.2 illustrated the following
key similarities between the two country case studies.




In both countries, many different security actors have vied for control
and influence over several decades.
The national army and police were never able to establish or maintain
a state monopoly on the use of force for any significant period of time.
In the hinterland, local civil defence forces, rebel groups and secret
societies have dominated the security sector. For citizens, these
various actors could act as protectors but could also pose a threat to
individual security.
Actors from neighbouring countries have played a major role during
periods of conflict escalation.
While the intentions and achievements of the intervention troops
(especially ECOMOG) remain open to argument, the peacekeeping troops
were ultimately able to impose a much-needed peace, largely through the use
of force.
The previous sections have shown that the context for reforming
security institutions in post-conflict environments is particularly challenging.
Having analysed the efficacy of current SSR strategies within and across the
two units under study, the fulfilment of the four criteria identified as
benchmarks for measuring the success of SSR strategies adopted in the two
post-conflict societies of Liberia and Sierra Leone will be summarised under
four headings: security actors; context sensitivity; local ownership; and root
causes of conflict.
The first heading covers the impact and efficacy of all the security
actors identified as relevant in both post-conflict environments. Particular
attention is given to the impact of external involvement in view of the
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multiplicity of external actors and the overlapping of duties. The second
issue is simply an assessment of whether the reform strategies undertaken in
both cases were indeed context-specific, which leads to the third issue of
formulating strategies that can foster local ownership of reform efforts in
order to ensure their sustainability. The final issue summarises whether the
root causes of the violence have been adequately addressed by those
implementing and overseeing SSR to avoid a relapse into conflict.
4.4.1
A multitude of actors: Many hands make light work or too many
cooks spoil the broth?
The synchronic comparison proved particularly useful for an assessment of
the impact of external involvement. The Sierra Leonean case, for instance,
provides some insights into what happens to a post-conflict society
following the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops and the cessation of longterm intrusive intervention. Secondly, the comparison of both countries and
identification of key similarities between the two post-conflict environments
allow a prognosis regarding the possible implications and consequences of
international involvement for Liberia.
A striking similarity was the insufficient level of coordination of the
activities of the numerous agencies involved in SSR. This was evident
during the examination of the legal frameworks for reform. The fieldwork
not only confirmed this shortcoming, but also enabled an assessment of the
impact of uncoordinated activity on the environment.
Moreover, it became apparent that reform policies of the lead agencies
involved in SSR attached little overall significance to local conditions and
actors. Social and political mechanisms, capacities and conflicts at local
level were largely ignored. Since it cannot be expected of a temporarily
deployed UN mission or the newly trained national police and armed forces
to provide security in the medium term, SSR can only work effectively if
local conditions are taken into account.
Evaluation of the research undertaken in Liberia revealed that the
residents of Monrovia regard UNMIL in particular as playing a crucial role
in assuring security. The fact that an external actor was named as the key
guarantor of security raises a number of serious questions. How long must
the UN mission remain on the ground? When and how should responsibility
for national security be transferred to local security agencies? How certain
can the country’s citizens and donors be that the newly trained police and
soldiers genuinely have the capacity and the will to fulfil their functions
properly? Interviews with local and international observers revealed that it
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Judy Smith-Höhn
was far too early even to consider a withdrawal of the UN mission at this
stage; in many experts’ view, the security situation remains volatile.
Dyncorp’s involvement in the Liberian SSR programme through the
reconstruction of the AFL and the UN’s training activities with the LNP
through its CIVPOL unit are an example of the lack of coordination.
Moreover, CSOs have raised concerns about employing PSCs in this way,
citing problems of transparency and accountability. Non-commercial efforts
may thus be preferable: UNMIL’s training of local police recruits is in full
swing and some are already deployed. The work of the GRC, charged with
setting up a ‘national integrity framework to promote transparency,
accountability and the rule of law’, may successfully foster a dialogue that
takes into account security concerns of both state and non-state local actors.
The commission recently initiated nationwide consultations with key
players, including district commissioners, chiefs, representatives of county
security agencies, UNMIL and CSOs.
The withdrawal of UNAMSIL international peacekeeping forces from
Sierra Leone after five years of deployment had a significant impact on the
security environment. The fact that several non-state, informal security
actors re-emerged or were established subsequent to UNAMSIL’s
withdrawal highlights the fact that a security vacuum was created that could
not be, or was not, filled by state actors. That non-state actors such as CWTs
became increasingly important points to the need to incorporate them in SSR
designs during the planning and implementing phases to ensure that they
gain the relevant knowledge and skills to perform a particular function
should the need arise. This does not discount the primacy of state actors in
their role as the key providers of security, but it does acknowledge the reality
of post-conflict environments in which the state actors, due to financial and
other restraints, are not in a position to hold the monopoly on the use of
force.
4.4.2
Context-sensitive security sector reform: The case for second-best
solutions
In January–March 2005 Tufts University’s Humanitarianism and War
Project conducted a study on security perceptions among three sets of actors
– the military contingents of peace support operations, international
assistance agencies and local populations – in countries in or recovering
from crisis.122 Among the countries studied was Sierra Leone, where key
findings were that perceptions differed not only between the three sets of
actors but also within each group, and that perceptions evolved over time.
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This also applied in the other two country case studies, Afghanistan and
Kosovo. Although the study offered no details about the interactions
between the relevant security actors, it highlighted a key issue that guided
the DSF project’s research in Liberia and Sierra Leone: policy-makers,
international donors and NGOs must take into account local perceptions of
security, be it physical, human or other security. This not only increases the
acceptability of these actors, but is crucial if any strategy for peacebuilding
and development is to be sustainable.
However, context-specific conditions can only be identified through
accurate and timely groundwork. In the period following the cessation of
war in any given post-conflict setting, the immediate objective is
maintenance of peace and stability – and well-planned strategies cannot be
implemented partly because there is simply no time for preparation. Thus
policy-makers resort to blueprint strategies designed without prior
knowledge of the context within which such assistance is to take place. Once
under way, these processes are not easily altered. Moreover, as mentioned in
Chapter 2, reform policies are more often than not shaped by the domestic
arrangements of the external actors, rather than by the conditions prevalent
in the host country. Since these ideas differ among major international
actors, a lack of policy coherence can be expected.
During wartime, the images associated with security (or lack thereof)
were of child soldiers, warlords, rebels – even the external actors like
ECOMOG in Liberia had negative connotations. The results from the
fieldwork show a remarkable shift in these perceptions, particularly of the
state security actors. In both post-conflict reform contexts, state actors were
granted a central role as security providers; that is, citizens expected them
ideally to hold the monopoly on the use of force, despite their current
reorganisation and history of violence against their own people. Although
citizens are well aware of the all-too-blatant shortcomings of this set of
actors, they have a remarkable level of confidence in their potential.
Regardless of whether this perception is donor-driven, Westernised or
inherently African, the fact remains that not only have governments adopted
the notion of a democratically elected state with accountable institutions that
are there to serve the people, but the population has internalised this notion
of a modern state. Whether it is mere rhetoric or reflected in the policies and
actions of the state, the change in the population’s perception points to
opportunities for change which those implementing SSR programmes can
capitalise upon, on the condition that the respective governments are willing
and able to take on this responsibility. This development bodes well for the
future, as it indicates that trust in state institutions can be developed. Hence
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the state can indeed hold the monopoly on the use of force, or at least be at
the top of a hierarchy that delegates roles and duties within a new security
architecture.
Despite the obvious preference for the state to hold the monopoly on
the use of force, there is a marked discrepancy between the expectations of
citizens for the state security actors to reassert their monopoly on the use of
force and the realities on the ground. This reaffirms the analysis of several
observers that, in both contexts, the state will not be able to fulfil this role
for some time. Both Liberian and Sierra Leonean governments remain
heavily dependent on external support, and the (re-)emergence of non-state
security actors such as neighbourhood watch teams and traditional security
institutions following the withdrawal of international peacekeeping troops in
Sierra Leone, as highlighted above, underscores this fact.
A context-sensitive approach calls for a move away from a sole focus
on idealised, far-reaching and long-term SSR programmes towards more
realistic mid-term strategies. In other words, in light of the improbability of
restoration of a state monopoly on the use of force in the near future, a
second-best alternative is required. Phrased differently, there is a need for
mid-term strategies within SSR frameworks.
The findings suggest that in Liberia and Sierra Leone a strong state
security sector embedded in sound socio-economic development that takes
into consideration the role of non-state actors will work best. Given the
fairly divergent perceptions on the ground, there can be no simple blueprint
for the treatment of these security actors. Some form of cooperation with the
more positively rated actors could be considered – at least from a mid-term
perspective – while other groups (e.g. ex-combatants) may warrant a tougher
approach in case their fortunes do not improve sufficiently to reduce the
threat they pose.
Moreover, the incorporation of local mechanisms into SSR measures
would enable the implementing actors to address another problematic
context-specific characteristic, namely the prevalence of mob justice, which
is widely practised in both countries. Research showed that mob justice is
widely accepted at all levels of society. As the worrying statement of one
Liberia expert reveals: ‘You may call it mob justice, but in real life it’s just
getting rid of pests.’123
4.4.3
Whither local ownership: The dilemma of external involvement
There is now a widespread recognition of the importance of local ownership
of transformation processes in post-conflict societies. Only by building
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147
reliable and trusted national security institutions through strategies that take
into account local needs and perceptions will there be long-term and
effective security provision.
However, as highlighted by Nathan, for local ownership not to be
treated as an idealistic, romantic notion, ‘the reform of security policies,
institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and
implemented by local actors rather than external actors’.124 The principle of
local ownership thus does not entail domestic support for donor activities,
but rather donor support for programmes initiated by local actors. Moreover,
the range of local owners should not be restricted to the executive, but
should include parliament and civil society.
If understood as national rather than government ownership, civil
society can play a key role in fostering local ownership of reform efforts.125
Although Liberia has a less vibrant civil society than Sierra Leone, a number
of NGOs exist that could foster ownership of the reform process in both
countries.126 Note that the role of civil society is not to undertake SSR, but to
support and lobby for particular reforms. This is the case of Liberia’s TRC
process, for example, where several international and local CSOs – Amnesty
International plus a steering group of local organisations – are involved in
monitoring the commission’s work on a regular basis.
In general, current post-conflict transitional arrangements seldom use
both formal and informal (traditional) justice mechanisms for sustainable
reconciliation. More support should be given to such informal mechanisms
and the actors involved in implementing them, as it is they who understand
the needs of their communities and can develop adequate strategies for
reconciliation.
The problem of local ownership is further compounded by the
dilemma faced by international actors in such contexts: the longer and more
intense their involvement, the more efficient transformation processes
appear in the short term, yet the more difficult disengagement becomes in
the long term. The incorporation of hitherto-disregarded actors into SSR
strategies could contribute towards local ownership.
4.4.4
Addressing the root causes of conflict – Who is responsible?
The need to address the root causes of a given conflict in order to ensure
effective and sustainable SSR is closely linked to the imperative of local
ownership.
To prevent any relapse into old patterns of violence, the former
conflict parties, which to some extent still enjoy considerable support and
148
Judy Smith-Höhn
legitimacy in post-conflict settings, must be integrated into the process to
ensure that ownership is not restricted to a new elite which currently cannot
guarantee proper representativity or performance. The exclusion of these
actors could itself pose a threat to security. It is vital to shift their loyalty
away from individuals and towards the democratic state, but this process is
likely to be fraught with problems.
There is a need to focus on the broader social background conditions
in order to address the root causes of the civil war and enable the state and
society to resolve conflicts that may arise in the future without resorting to
violence. The fact that informal groups of young men – such as excombatants, street boys and Ghetto Boys – were repeatedly mentioned as
key threats to security in both country case studies points to the unresolved
issues of reintegration and the unemployment of young males. The structural
bases of armed conflict will most likely remain intact as long as there are
insufficient employment opportunities for this demographic group. The
creation of alternative sources of income to that derived from engaging in
combat would serve to reintegrate such groups. Efforts to address this
problem are under way, e.g. employment of ex-combatants in donor-funded
government road construction and other labour-intensive projects. However,
overall economic take-off is imperative and will require the rehabilitation of
businesses and the effective management of state resources (e.g. those
stemming from the export of resources such as timber and diamonds).
Undoubtedly, it is essential that the legacies of the past be addressed
to ensure the sustainability of reform efforts: there is a need to consider and
avoid a repetition of the events and circumstances that led to the conflict in
the first place. However, such issues are complex, and it is often difficult to
determine where to begin. Moreover, as with putting in place effective
oversight mechanisms, addressing and eradicating the causes of conflict are
a timely endeavour. That they are crucial for sustainable peace is beyond
doubt, but it is doubtful that these issues can be addressed comprehensively
and speedily. Furthermore, one needs to question whether the issues can be
addressed by the external implementing actor or whether it is a matter for the
local leaders, who have yet to perform their functions without the aid of
external actors.
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Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
See e.g. Andreas Mehler (2005) ‘Major flaws in conflict prevention policies towards
Africa: The conceptual deficits of international actors’ approaches and how to overcome
them’, GIGA Working Paper Series No. 4; available at www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/
download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp04_mehler.pdf (accessed 12 November
2005).
Data in this chapter are taken from the following key sources: Elwood Dunn, Amos J.
Beyan and Carl Patrick Burrowes (2001) Historical Dictionary of Liberia, 2nd edn,
African Historical Dictionaries. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press; Stephen Ellis (2005)
‘Liberia’, in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van Walraven (eds) Africa
Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2004. Leiden: Brill, pp.
96–104; Stephen Ellis (2006) ‘Liberia’, in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas
van Walraven (eds) Africa Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara
in 2005. Leiden: Brill, pp. 81-87; Peter Körner (2003) ‘Liberia 2002’, in Rolf Hofmeier
and Andreas Mehler (eds) Afrika-Jahrbuch 2002: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in
Afrika Südlich der Sahara. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, pp. 138–141; Andreas Mehler
and Judy Smith-Höhn (2006) ‘Liberia: Ellen in Wonderland?’, GIGA Focus Afrika No. 5;
available at www.giga-hamburg.de/dlcounter/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/
pdf/gf_afrika_0605.pdf; Judy Smith-Höhn and Verena Wiesmann (2003) ‘Krieg Kennt
Keine Grenzen: Die Regionale Tragweite Des Konfliktes in Liberia. Eine
Hintergrundanalyse’, Afrika im Blickpunkt 3; available at www.giga-hamburg.de/
dlcounter/download.php?d=/content/iaa/archiv/aib/AiB3-03.pdf; Bertelsmann Stiftung
(2005) BTI 2006 – Liberia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung; EIU
(various dates) reports and country profiles for Liberia. London: Economist Intelligence
Unit.
UN Mission in Liberia (undated) ‘UNMIL Facts and Figures’; available at www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/facts.html (accessed 5 August 2007).
See e.g. Wolf-Christian Paes (2005) ‘Eyewitness: The challenges of disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration in Liberia’, International Peacekeeping, 12(2): 97.
The CPA also stipulated that the executive branch of government be maintained; thus the
newly elected National Transitional Legislative Assembly assumed power from the
former legislative bodies, the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the 76 seats
were divided among the warring factions and other groups. Another key goal of the
NTGL was the organisation of the elections, which took place on 11 October 2005. See
e.g. EIU (2004) Country Profile 2004: Liberia. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, p.
4; EIU (2006) Country Profile 2006: Liberia. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 6.
The finer points of the CPA will be elaborated in more detail in section 4.1.2.
See Adedeji Ebo (2005) ‘The challenges and opportunities of security sector reform in
post-conflict Liberia’, DCAF Occasional Paper No. 9, p. 6; available at http://se2.dcaf.ch/
serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=DCAF&fileid=154D8391-8666-9EB5-64DDEC9C9DEA3446&lng=en (accessed 10 January 2006); EIU (2007) Country Report, June
2007: Liberia. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 12.
Ebo, ibid., p. 6.
Ibid., p. 1.
J. ’Kayode Fayemi (2004) ‘Governing insecurity in post-conflict states: The case of Sierra
Leone and Liberia’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds) Reform and Reconstruction
of the Security Sector. Münster: LIT, p. 179.
150
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Judy Smith-Höhn
Ebo, note 7 above, p. 1.
Ibid., p. ii.
Government of Liberia.
Articles VII–VIII of the 2003 CPA.
Thomas Jaye (2006) An Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia.
Monrovia: Governance Reform Commission of Liberia, p. 4; available at
www.kaiptc.org/_upload/general/Lib_Assess_Rep_on_SSR.pdf (accessed 3 November
2006).
CPA 2003, Article XXXV, s. 1(b–e).
Constitution of the Republic of Liberia, 1986, Article 54(e).
Ibid., Article 34(b)–(c).
UN Security Council (2003) Resolution 1509, 19 December, UN Doc. S/RES/1509, para
3(n). A full list of UNSC resolutions is available at www.un.org/documents/scres.htm.
Ibid.
Jaye, note 15 above, p. 5.
Ibid.
Aside from those institutions whose name basically indicates their key roles (e.g. Bureau
of Customs and Excise, National Fire Service), others such as the NSA require some
elaboration. The NSA was created in 1974 as the national body with the ‘sole authority to
coordinate the activities of all national intelligence collecting services’. The National
Bureau of Investigation was established in 1998, and its duties are to investigate ‘major
crimes including homicide… illegal entries into the country, robbery, arson, rape, grand
larceny, kidnapping, burglary, embezzlement, forgery, smuggling, violation of the
narcotics law, counterfeiting, [and] theft of government property’. Its functions thus
overlap with those of the police, Ministry of National Security, NSA and Bureau of
Naturalisation and Immigration. The SSS was created in 1966 as a special unit to provide
for all the security needs of the incumbent president. These include, for example, the
physical protection of the president, his/her immediate family and certain officials and
visiting dignitaries as well as protection of the executive mansion. The SSS also has law
enforcement powers, as it is authorised to ‘arrest or cause to be arrested any person or
persons committing a crime flagrant delicto, or aiding and abetting any crime or violation,
or who may reasonably be suspected of the commission of a crime’. The Monrovia City
Police was created to enforce municipal and city ordinances and regulations, assist in the
collection of real estate tax and provide security to the city mayor and visiting dignitaries.
Many of these functions are also provided by the LNP. See Jaye, ibid., pp. 6ff.
For more on CIVPOL see the UNMIL website, www.unmil.org/content.asp?ccat=civpol.
See e.g. Jaye, note 15 above, p. 12.
UNMIL (2006) press release, 13 October; available at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/
unmil/pr119.pdf.
Various interviews, Monrovia, November 2005–February 2006.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in
Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Accra, Ghana, 18 August 2003, Article 6.
See e.g. Paes, note 4 above, p. 1; Festus Aboagye and Alhaji M. S. Bah (2004) ‘Liberia at
a crossroads: A preliminary look at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and
the protection of civilians’, ISS Occasional Paper No. 95, Pretoria: ISS, p. 7; UNMIL
website, note 24 above.
Paes, ibid., pp. 1ff.
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35
36
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38
39
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43
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See e.g. Ebo, note 7 above, p. 6; International Crisis Group (2004) Rebuilding Liberia:
Prospects and Perils, Africa Report No. 75. Freetown and Brussels: ICG, p. 9.
Data in this section are taken from the following key sources: Krijn Peters (2005) ‘Sierra
Leone’, in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van Walraven (eds) Africa
Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in 2004. Leiden: Brill;
Krijn Peters (2006) ‘Sierra Leone’, in Andreas Mehler, Henning Melber and Klaas van
Walraven (eds) Africa Yearbook. Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara in
2005. Leiden: Brill; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2007) BTI 2008 – Sierra Leone Country
Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2005) BTI 2006 – Sierra
Leone Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung; Peter Körner (2003) ‘Sierra
Leone 2002’, in Rolf Hofmeier and Andreas Mehler (eds) Afrika-Jahrbuch 2002: Politik,
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Afrika Südlich der Sahara. Opladen: Leske und Budrich;
EIU (various dates) reports and country profiles for Sierra Leone. London: Economist
Intelligence Unit.
Term used to refer to Africans from regions such as Nigeria, Congo and Angola who were
captured as slaves but released before undertaking the Atlantic crossing See e.g. EIU
(2007) Country Profile 2007: Sierra Leone. London: Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 4.
Also known as a crown colony. The crown colony system was developed in the latter part
of the eighteenth century to enable the British government to govern territories with large
indigenous populations. At the head of such colonies stood a British governor, who
nominated most of the consultative councils; these, in turn, often delegated considerable
powers of local government to local rulers. Hong Kong was one of the most enduring
examples of a crown colony. See The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th edn. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 7167.
See e.g. David Keen (2005) Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. Oxford and New
York: James Currey/Palgrave, p. 14.
Caspar Fithen and Paul Richards (2005) ‘Making war, crafting peace: Militia solidarities
and demobilisation in Sierra Leone’, in Paul Richards and Bernhard Helander (eds) No
Peace, No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Oxford and Athens,
OH: James Currey/Ohio University Press, p. 119.
Amos Sawyer (2004) ‘Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: The
case of the Mano River Basin area’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 42(3): 442.
Fithen and Richards, note 36 above, p. 122.
See e.g. Keen, note 35 above.
Ibid., pp. 94ff.
The term is a combination of the words soldier and rebel; Sierra Leoneans described these
soldiers as being ‘soldiers by day, rebels by night’. See ibid., p. 109.
The term is generally translated as ‘traditional hunter’. Traditionally, the kamajors were
responsible for hunting game and protecting the community from danger (both human and
animal) with their weapons. In the Koranko-dominated areas of the north the huntermilitiamen were known as tamaboros, while the gbethis were associated with the Temne
and the donsos with the Kono. See e.g. Mariane C. Ferme and Danny Hoffman (2004)
‘Hunter militias and the international human rights discourse in Sierra Leone and
beyond’, Africa Today, 50(4): 74ff.
On 3 May 2000 some 500 UN peacekeepers from Kenya, Zambia and India were taken
hostage by loyalists of Sankoh, who at the time held a post in the transitional government.
The Abidjan Peace Agreement of 1996, the ECOWAS Peace Plan of 1997, the Lomé
Peace Agreement of 1999 and the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement of 2000.
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2005), note 32 above, p. 5.
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53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
Judy Smith-Höhn
Ebo, note 7 above, p. 483.
See e.g. ibid., p. 484; Fayemi, note 10 above, p. 181.
Ibid.
Fayemi, note 10 above, p. 182.
Ebo, note 7 above, p. 484.
Osman Gbla (2006) ‘Security sector reform under international tutelage in Sierra Leone’,
International Peacekeeping, 13(1): 79.
DFID’s country programme focuses on post-conflict reconstruction and involves security
and justice sector reform, rebuilding the civil service, putting in place sound public
financial management systems and tackling corruption through support to the AntiCorruption Commission. Other elements include support for decentralisation and private
sector development. The UK’s strategy for conflict prevention in Sierra Leone has been
summarised under three main objectives: ‘effective, affordable and democraticallyaccountable security agencies that are able to counter internal or external threats without
significant external military presence; reconciliation and justice and the reintegration of
ex-combatants into society; and reducing the external threats to Sierra Leone from the
region’. Jeremy Ginifer (2004) ‘Evaluation of the conflict prevention tools: Sierra Leone’,
DFID Evaluation Report EV 647, p. 1; available at www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutDFID/
performance/files/ev647sleone.pdf (accessed 2 October 2006).
Gbla, note 51 above, p. 82.
Peter Albrecht and Mark Malan (2006) ‘Post-conflict peacebuilding and national
ownership: Meeting the challenges of Sierra Leone’, paper presented at international
seminar of the Center for International Peace Cooperation (ZIF) and the Kofi Annan
International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana, p. 116.
Ibid.
Ibid.
PRIDE (2004) ‘Improving the development response in difficult environments: Lessons
from DFID experience’, PRIDE Working Paper 4, pp. 39ff; available at
www.dfid.gov.uk/search/proxy/cs.html?url=http%3A//www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/fragile
-states/lessons.pdf&qt=SILSEP&col=dfid&n=3 (accessed 10 March 2006).
Nicole Ball, Piet Biesheuvel, Tom Hamilton-Baillie and ‘Funmi Olonisakin (2007)
‘Security and justice sector reform programming in Africa’, DFID Evaluation Working
Paper 23, p. 32; George Klay Kieh Jr (2005) ‘State-building in post-civil war Sierra
Leone’, African and Asian Studies, 4(1/2): 171.
See e.g. Ball et al., ibid., p. 32; Bruce Baker (2005) ‘Who do people turn to for policing in
Sierra Leone?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 23(3): 377.
Ginifer, note 52 above, p. 11.
Ibid.
Ebo, note 7 above, pp. 485ff.
Ibid., p. 486.
Ibid.
DFID (undated) ‘Terms of reference: Advice on security sector reform – Senior security
sector coordinator Sierra Leone’, p. 2; available at www.dfid.gov.uk/search/proxy/
cs.html?url=http%3A//www.dfid.gov.uk/procurement/files/ojec8332tor.pdf&qt=SILSEP
&col=dfid&n=1 (accessed 8 March 2008).
For a detailed review of the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool see DFID (2004) ‘The
African Conflict Prevention Pool: A joint UK government approach to preventing and
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reducing conflict in sub-Saharan Africa’; available at www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/
acppinfodoc.pdf (accessed 25 July 2006).
At the ceremony marking the official dissolution of the National Committee for
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, World Bank representative Eileen
Murray noted that the country’s programme ‘is considered as the best practice example
throughout the world of a successful disarmament demobilization reintegration
programme’. See UNOCHA (2004) ‘Sierra Leone: Disarmament and rehabilitation
completed after five years’, IRIN News Brief, 4 February.
Quotes in UNOCHA, ibid.
International Crisis Group (2003) Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance,
Africa Report No. 67. Freetown and Brussels: ICG, p. 1.
Interviews, Freetown, April–June 2006.
See e.g. J. Andrew Grant (2005) ‘Diamonds, foreign aid, and the uncertain prospects for
post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone’, WIDER Research Paper 2005/49, p. 2;
available at www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2005/
en_GB/rp2005-49/_files/78091760714974671/default/rp2005-49.pdf (accessed 2 October
2006).
Article XXVI of Sierra Leone’s Lomé Peace Agreement.
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002), Article 1.
See e.g. Rosalind Shaw (2005) ‘Rethinking truth and reconciliation commissions. Lessons
from Sierra Leone’, US Institute for Peace Special Report No. 130, p. 3; available at
www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr130.pdf (accessed 2 October 2006).
IRIN (2005) ‘Civil society criticises “vague” government plan for post-war reform’, IRIN
News Brief, 13 July 2005.
Hans Nichols (2005) ‘Truth challenges justice in Freetown’, Washington Times, 5
January.
Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004) Witness to Truth: Report of
the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. 1; available at
www.trcsierraleone.org/pdf/start.html (accessed 2 October 2006).
The question read: ‘In your opinion, how safe is the country today?’ See Table 4.1.
Note that the percentages in the cross-tabulations comprise only the valid number of
respondents, therefore ‘no answer’ and ‘don’t know’ options are not valued into the
relative percentages as was done in Table 4.1.
Nicole Itano (2003) ‘Liberating Liberia: Charles Taylor and the rebels who unseated
him’, ISS Paper No. 82, November, Pretoria: ISS.
Ibid., p. 8.
FGD1, Monrovia, 2 December 2005.
The author acknowledges that there can be a number of reasons for the negative
perceptions of individual respondents, such as an increase in the crime rate, a lack of
international peacekeeping presence in their area of residence, experience of domestic
violence and so on.
Interview with Gray-Johnson, Monrovia, 10 February 2006.
Ibid.
This was an open-ended question; no multiple-choice options were offered.
FGD4, Monrovia, 21 December 2005.
FGD3, Monrovia, 19 December 2005.
FGD1–4, Monrovia, December 2005.
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See e.g. interviews with Tornolah Varpilah, Monrovia, 6 February 2006 and Commany
Wesseh, Monrovia, 14 February 2006.
See interview with Commany Wesseh, ibid. See also Amos Sawyer (2005) ‘Social
Capital, Survival Strategies, and their Potential for Post-Conflict Governance in Liberia’,
WIDER Research Paper 2005/15, p. 6; available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/
publications/rps/rps2005/rp2005-15.pdf (accessed 15 October 2005).
Interview, Monrovia, 17 February 2006.
See interviews, Annex III.
Paes, note 4 above, p. 4.
Ibid., p. 5.
Compare FGD1–4, Monrovia and Freetown, December 2005–May 2006.
During the war, the vigilantes were the only actors Liberians could rely upon to protect
their lives and property. Having lost their relevance after the end of the war and also
being infiltrated by ex-combatants with bad intentions, the vigilantes as a group are no
longer viewed so positively. Compare FGD1–4, Monrovia, December 2005.
Jaye, note 15 above, p. 9.
See e.g. ibid., p. 12.
FGD3, Monrovia, 19 December 2005.
See FGD1–4, Freetown, April–May 2006.
See e.g. interview with Joseph Kabia, Freetown, 21 April 2006.
FGD1–4, Freetown, April–May 2006.
Ibid.
Baker, note 59 above.
FGD1–4, Freetown, April–May 2006.
‘I do not trust the police or the private security companies. I have six dogs in my
compound. In fact, the way I train them, I give them codes’; FGD2, Sierra Leone, 1 May
2006.
See Article XXVI of Sierra Leone’s Lomé Peace Agreement.
Interview, Freetown, 22 April 2006.
In the early phases of deployment RUF rebels had managed to kidnap 250 UN
peacekeepers, who were later released as a result of the intervention of British troops.
See e.g. Baker, note 59 above.
Interviews, Sierra Leone, April–June 2006.
FGD1–4, Sierra Leone, April–June 2006.
Danny Hoffman (2007) ‘The meaning of a militia: Understanding the civil defence forces
in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, 106/425: 642.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 657ff.
Interviews, Freetown, April–June 2006.
Compare FGD1–4, Monrovia, December 2006.
For a comprehensive outline of the assessment made by each focus group, see Annex II.
Interviews, Freetown, April–June 2006.
George D. Kennedy (2006) ‘Speaker Snowe condems Issakaba boys’, Liberian Observer,
12 September.
Antonio Donini, Larry Minear, Ian Smillie, Ted van Baarda and Anthony C. Welch
(2005) Mapping the Security Environment: Understanding the Perceptions of Local
Communities, Peace Support Operations and Assistance Agencies, report commissioned
by UK NGO-Military Contact Group. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Famine
Center, Tufts University.
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Interview with Rufus Kaine, 16 December 2005.
Laurie Nathan (2007) No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of
Security Sector Reform. Birmingham: University of Birmingham, p. 4.
Ibid., p. 5.
Such as the West African Network for Peacebuilding, the Women in Peacebuilding
Network and the Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This study aimed at analysing the efficacy of SSR efforts in post-conflict
societies by means of two case studies, with a view to amending previous
approaches and contributing to the knowledge base on this issue through the
analysis of unique empirical data.
It has been shown that, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the violent
conflicts of the past emerged and persisted because those responsible for
preventing or managing conflicts lacked the political will and resources to
do so. In fact, they were often part of the problem.
Emphasis has been put on the need for appropriate governance
strategies devised in a collaborative effort by both government and civil
society, with support from external actors, to deliver collective solutions to
reforming the security sector.
To substantiate the analytical approach, it was necessary to draw
attention to the policy-driven nature of SSR programmes in general.
Notwithstanding the need for a general understanding of effective SSR, the
analysis of approaches adopted by the various donors has shown that a
contextual perspective is required. In other words, notions of what comprises
the security sector that are restricted to a state-centred focus confine the
analysis from the outset and result in the neglect of other possible actors that
may have the potential to contribute to (re)construction of a viable security
sector in a given environment. Thus a wide-ranging definition of the security
sector was devised which could be utilised for a comprehensive and wellstructured analysis of any particular post-conflict reform setting.
Chapter 2 illustrated that what was needed was not yet another SSR
approach, perhaps fed with new terminology or redefinitions, but empirical
evidence of a given security situation on the ground. The study thereby
contributes to narrowing the gap between the list of general
recommendations for SSR and concrete suggestions based on empirical
evidence gathered in specific post-conflict settings. The assessment of the
SSR policies of the lead agencies involved led to the identification of four
key criteria that can be used as a guideline to determine whether efforts to
reform a security sector in societies emerging from civil war are effective:
158
Judy Smith-Höhn
the existence of security actors and their future potential for providing
security; the adequate consideration of context-specific characteristics,
procedures and interactions of the security sector by the international
implementing agencies; a focus on legacies of the past in order to avoid a
relapse into conflict; and the confidence of the population in the ability of
security actors to provide security.
The first criterion centres on the competence of security actors; that is,
whether actors exist that can provide for the security of citizens and the
sustainability of their role as security providers. The fourth criterion, the
population’s level of confidence in the ability of these actors to perform this
function – in other words, whether citizens perceived actors to be effective –
was a key benchmark for testing the validity of the first criterion. The second
criterion was more widely focused on the context within which reform
efforts take place, questioning whether the context-specific characteristics,
procedures and interactions within the security sector of a particular postconflict environment were adequately addressed by the agents implementing
reform. The third criterion focused on the legacies of the past conflict and
examined whether the causes of a given conflict had been adequately
addressed and the lessons learnt from this exercise incorporated into SSR
strategies.
Having identified the four key criteria for assessing the efficacy of
SSR programmes, the methodology for conducting the analysis was
elaborated. In recognition of the fact that a study can only be as good as its
research design, this was given particular attention. The chapter started by
highlighting the advantages of the comparative method vis-à-vis other
methods of enquiry, such as the experimental method or statistical analysis.
It was proven that the comparative method was uniquely suited for analysing
complex causality: it acknowledges that a particular phenomenon – such as
the efficacy of SSR – is affected by several factors. In addition, it was shown
that because a case study analysis pays particular attention to historical
context, and as such facilitates an understanding of the change in a particular
phenomenon under scrutiny, a case study approach would be beneficial for
the analysis of SSR strategies. The research design was therefore one of
comparative case studies that used a mixed-methods approach to data
gathering combining both quantitative and qualitative tools. The merging of
quantitative and qualitative findings offered insights that could otherwise not
be gained. By drawing from the two sets of findings, one could consider
whether the results suggested interesting contrasts or helped to clarify or
confirm each other.
Conclusion
159
Due to their comparability, the post-conflict societies of Liberia and
Sierra Leone were chosen as case studies. Both West African countries
witnessed protracted phases of violence during the 1990s; in both instances
there was extensive involvement of international and regional actors such as
the UN and ECOWAS during the post-conflict phases; the socio-economic
conditions are similar; and there appeared to be a number of different (types
of) security actors in both cases.
The case studies complemented the general insights gained from the
literature on SSR. A synopsis of the various case comparisons highlighted
three overarching issues: the first is directly related to the impact of external
involvement and the overlapping responsibilities of the various
implementing agencies, the second is the issue of context and, finally, there
is the perpetual problem of instilling local ownership. These issues can be
formulated into the following three questions.
1.
2.
3.
What has been the impact of the international involvement in postconflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes? Are the reform
strategies of these external actors – for it is they that initiate and guide
these processes – effective and, most of all, have they managed to
maintain the peace?
Considering the fact that the state security actors have, in the past,
proven incapable of dealing effectively with threats, in some cases
having even been instrumental in perpetuating violence, is there any
likelihood that state actors can be incorporated into a security sector
institution that is accepted, trusted and deemed legitimate by the
general population?
Finally, in the wake of calls for ‘African solutions to African
problems’, to what extent must local conditions be taken into account?
Given relevant actors in a well-functioning security sector, what role
can traditional actors – such as the secret societies often found in the
African context – play? And to what extent can SSR strategies be
owned by local actors?
Firstly, the empirical data confirmed the crucial role of the
international peacekeepers in maintaining the peace, which is a prerequisite
for developing and improving strategies to rebuild security institutions so
greatly damaged, if not destroyed, by the conflicts in the past. However,
despite positive results regarding their general peacekeeping efforts,
evidence gathered on the ground revealed that their presence, and thus
impact, was felt mainly in the urban centres. Not only was there an urban-
160
Judy Smith-Höhn
rural dichotomy, but there was also a discrepancy in the intensity of
peacekeeping efforts depending on which parts of the city one happens to
survey. This is understandable considering the limited capacity of such
forces with regards to the availability of human resources, logistics and so
on. Given the fact that these forces are temporary, the need to focus on
strengthening those actors that would later have to provide the public good
of security is imperative. Calls for local ownership can be overheard but, in
certain cases, may be mere rhetoric. No matter how often it is reiterated in
government and research papers as well as UNSC reports, the actual
challenge of transferring power and responsibility to a local authority that
may have had little or nothing to do with designing programmes, projects or
processes that are imposed from ‘above’ has not been met with promising
new approaches.
Secondly, as far as the potential role of the state security actors is
concerned – and here I refer to the a priori notion that the state should hold
the monopoly on the use of force – the data reveal that citizens consider the
state, ideally, to be the key provider of security. Though citizens are well
aware of the all-too-blatant shortcomings of this set of actors, they have a
remarkable level of confidence in their potential. This bodes well for the
future, in that it indicates that trust in state institutions can be established.
Hence the state can, indeed, hold some sort of monopoly on the use of force,
or at least be at the top of a hierarchy that delegates roles and duties in a new
security architecture.
The people of Liberia and Sierra Leone have high expectations of a
well-functioning state security apparatus, but these expectations cannot be
fulfilled in the foreseeable future. A one-sided approach in which the
international actors foster these countries’ newly emerging state security
apparatus without consolidating democracy and recognising local self-help
mechanisms is almost certainly doomed to failure.
Thirdly, the issues of context specificity and local ownership are
interrelated. The solutions to African problems may well need to be
Africanised, but they are not necessarily exclusively African, and lessons can
be learnt from the experiences of other countries in this field. As far as the
incorporation of African elements into an African SSR strategy is concerned,
those that can be considered African are, in fact, difficult to incorporate. The
secret societies in Liberia, for example, cannot be incorporated into a
security sector because they are what one could call a parallel society with
its own set of rules, norms and objectives. This does not mean, however, that
they are irrelevant. They are significant to some members of Liberian
society, yet they are insignificant or even pose a threat to quite a number of
Conclusion
161
other members of society. Unlike Liberia, Sierra Leoneans afford secret
societies much more importance.
Solutions must therefore be Africanised to the extent that they need to
acknowledge such entities and the role they play in society, but without
abandoning so-called modern strategies. In short, solutions and reform
strategies must always be context specific; the relative significance of a
particular variable cannot simply be inferred, but should be determined
through well-grounded empirical analyses. It is a well-known fact that
empirical data on Africa are rare and, if available, often unreliable,
particularly in the interest areas of political scientists.
Finally, the massive influx of external funding may have weakened
the motivation to deploy the countries’ own capacities effectively. Farreaching structural change can only evolve out of leaders’ and individuals’
sense of political responsibility and ownership; external actors can at best
support this process.
In both Sierra Leone and Liberia the operational checklist for
international interventions included the deployment of peacekeepers;
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former fighters;
repatriation of refugees; judicial and security sector reform and, finally,
elections. Yet many observers agree that the time frame for these
interventions, set at two to five years, was far too short to ensure sustained
peace and effective transformation in both countries.
A final challenge to reforming the security sector in post-conflict
societies such as Liberia and Sierra Leone centres on the need to
acknowledge the regional dimensions of conflict and hence the development
of regional solutions to SSR. When assessing the potential threat of conflict
in Liberia, for example, it is imperative that one considers the fact that Sierra
Leone, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire were involved in the conflict. Hence it is
not only the local non-state actors that influence the security sector, but also
international ‘violence actors’ such as armed refugees hired by the parties in
conflict. As noted above, there is still a high level of insecurity in the region.
If the need arises, groups of disgruntled youths, all with combat skills, can
be lured back into militias, particularly in Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.
The level of security in both Liberia and Sierra Leone is certainly a far
cry from what it was at the turn of the century. In both instances, the
international community acknowledged its responsibility to protect, as
stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1647 on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict, by intervening and – with the help of local civil
society actors – eventually facilitated resolution of the conflict through the
signing of a peace agreement.
162
Judy Smith-Höhn
There is no doubt that efforts to improve the performance of the
security sector in both countries must continue. Foreign troops cannot and
should not stay forever; and in the long run there can be no alternative to a
locally owned security sector in post-conflict societies. As noted above, the
findings suggest that in Liberia and Sierra Leone the best approach would
entail the establishment of a strong state security sector that collaborates
with non-state actors within an overall framework of sustainable socioeconomic development. These sets of security actors may need to be handled
differently: perhaps some form of cooperation with the more positively rated
actors, while others may warrant a tougher approach in case their fortunes do
not improve sufficiently to reduce the threat they pose.
Developing a promising strategy to deal with non-state security actors
requires deeper knowledge, particularly about the roles of different groups,
their relations and interactions and their impact in rural areas. Further
research is essential to ensure the development of effective and sustainable
reform programmes.
Much has improved in both countries, where less than a decade ago
people lived in fear and uncertainty. If one is to ensure the long-term
sustainability of any reform efforts that will institutionalise professionalism
in the security sector, those involved on the ground must endeavour to
appreciate the context within which they operate. The now commonly
accepted postulate of local ownership must go beyond mere rhetoric to
acknowledge the heterogeneity of local actors, and the externally-driven
reform strategies must be developed through a partnership with the societies
in which they operate in order to ensure that institutions are built on a solid
foundation that is cognisant of local conditions.
Annexes
Annex I: Survey Poll
i. Questionnaire: Liberia
Questionnaire
Perceptions of Security in Liberia
Oligopolies of Violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone
Institute of African Affairs (Hamburg, Germany)
Field Number [supervisor use only]:
Respondent Number [office use only]:
Questionnaire back-checked by:
[supervisor use only]
……
[Interviewer: Fill in boxes]
District
Area
……………
…………………
Coding checked by:
[office use only]
Enumeration Area
………………
……..
Street
………………
A. Social background
Let us start with a few questions about yourself.
Male
1. [Do not read out] Interviewer:
What is the respondent’s gender?
2. How old were you at your last birthday?
Could not determine age
Age [office use only]
Female
164
Judy Smith-Höhn
3. What is your marital status?
Married
Unmarried
Divorced
Widowed
No answer
4. How many children do you have staying with you at home?
5. What is your county of origin?
Bomi
Margibi
Bong
Maryland
Gbarpolu
Montserrado/Monrovia
Grand Bassa
Nimba
Grand Cape Mount
River Cess
Grand Gedeh
River Gee
Grand Kru
Sinoe
Lofa
Other: …………………………………………………………………
No answer
6. What is your tribe?
Kpelle
Loma
Bassa
Kissi
Gio
Vai
Kru
Dei
Grebo
Bella
Mano
Mandingo
Krahn
Mende
Gola
Americo-Liberians
Gbandi
Congo
Other: …………………………………………………………………..
None
No answer
……
none
Annexes
7. Have you spent more years of your life in a village or in a town?
Village
Town
About equally
Don’t know
No answer
8. What is your current occupation?
Teacher
Office clerk
Artisan
Housewife
Student/pupil
Fisherman/fish trader
Farm worker/tenant
Businessman/woman
Farmer
Trader (street vendor)
Government employee
Unemployed
Employee (private business)
Other: …………………………………………………………………
No answer
9. What is your religion/denomination, if any?
Roman Catholic
African Methodist Episcopal Church
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church
Baptist Church
Methodist Episcopal Church
Presbyterian Church
Episcopal Church
Pentecostal Church
Islam (Sunni)
Islam (other)
Traditional religion
None
Other [specify] ……………………………………
No answer
10. In what grade did you leave school?
No schooling
Grade 11–12
Grade 1–2
College/university
Grade 3–4
Grade 5–6
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
Grade 7–8
No answer
Grade 9–10
165
166
Judy Smith-Höhn
B. Perceptions of personal safety/security
11. In your opinion, how safe is the country today?
Not safe at all
Fairly unsafe
It’s okay
Very safe
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
12. In your opinion, compared to before the end of the last war, what is the
general state of security like in the country today?
Much worse
Worse
No change
Somewhat better
Much better
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
13. How safe do you feel personally in the country today?
Not safe at all
Fairly unsafe
It’s okay
Very safe
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
14. Compared to before the end of the last war, how is your personal safety
today?
Very much worse
Somewhat worse
No change
Somewhat better
Very much better
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
Annexes
167
15. We have spoken to many Liberians and they all have different feelings
about which groups in the country protect them and which are a threat to
them. Could you please tell us which group is the most important one for your
personal safety?
[Interviewer: Enter respondent’s exact response, in English, in the line below]
…………………………….………………………………………
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
16. Which group do you feel is the biggest threat to you personally?
[Interviewer: Enter respondent’s exact response, in English, in the line below]
………………………………………………
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
168
Judy Smith-Höhn
17. Now, I’m going to read out a list of groups which are said to affect security
in one way or another. For each one, could you tell me whether you feel
protected or threatened by them or not?
Is very Is some- Does Is some- Is a big [Do
No
import- what
what a threat not answer
not
ant for import- affect
threat for my read]
my
ant for
for my personal Don’t
my
personal
my personal personal security know
security personal security security
security at all
A. Liberian
National Police
B. Armed Forces
of Liberia
C. UN
peacekeepers
(UNMIL)
D. Poro/Sandee
(secret societies)
E. Private security
companies (e.g.
Dyncorp Intl, InterCom Security)
F. Ex-combatants
(MODEL, LURD,
Taylor
government)
G. Political Party
Militias
H. Vigilantes/area
teams/
neighbourhood
watch
J. Street boys
K. Other (specify)
………….……
Thank you very much!
Annexes
169
ii. Questionnaire: Sierra Leone
Questionnaire
Perceptions of Security in Sierra Leone
Oligopolies of Violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone
Institute of African Affairs (Hamburg, Germany)
Field Number [supervisor use only]:
Respondent Number [office use only]:
Questionnaire back-checked by:
[supervisor use only]
……
[Interviewer: Fill in boxes]
District
Area
……………
…………………
Coding checked by:
[office use only]
Enumeration Area
………………
……..
Street
………………
A. Social background
Let us start with a few questions about yourself.
Male
Female
1. [Do not read out] Interviewer:
What is the respondent’s gender?
2. How old did you turn at your last birthday?
Could not determine age
Age [office use only]
3. What is your marital status?
Married
Unmarried
Divorced
Widowed
No answer
4. How many children do you have staying with you at home?
……
none
170
Judy Smith-Höhn
5. What is your district of origin?
Bo
Kono
Bombali
Port Loko
Bonthe
Pujehun
Kailahun
Tonkolili
Kambia
Western Area rural
Kenema
Western Area urban
Koinadugu
Other: …………………………………………………………………
No answer
6. Which tribe do you belong to?
Creole
Mandingo
Fula
Mende
Gola
Sape
Kissi
Sherbro
Kono
Susu
Koranko
Temne
Krim
Vai
Limba
Yalunka
Loko
Other: …………………………………………………………………
No answer
7. Have you spent more years of your life in a village or in a town?
Village
Town
About equally
Don’t know
No answer
Annexes
8. What is your current occupation?
Teacher
Office clerk
Artisan
Housewife
Student/pupil
Fisherman/fish trader
Farm worker/tenant
Businessman/woman
Farmer
Trader (street vendor)
Government employee
Unemployed
Employee (private business)
Other [specify]:…………………………………………………………..
No answer
9. What, if any, is your religious denomination?
African Methodist Episcopal Church
Baptist Church
Christ Apostolic Church
Evangelical Lutheran Church
Freetown Anglican Diocese
Islam
Methodist Church
Pentecostal Church
Roman Catholic
Traditional religion
None
Other [specify]…………………………………………………………
No answer
10. In what grade did you leave school?
No schooling
Class 1–2
Class 3–4
Class 5–6
Junior secondary 1–3
Senior secondary 1–3
College/university
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
171
172
Judy Smith-Höhn
B. Perceptions of personal safety/security
11. In your opinion, how safe is the country today?
Not safe at all
Fairly unsafe
It’s okay
Very safe
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
12. In your opinion, compared to before the end of the war, what is the
general state of security like in the country today?
Much worse
Worse
No change
Somewhat better
Much better
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
13. How safe do you feel personally in the country today?
Not safe at all
Fairly unsafe
It’s okay
Very safe
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
14. Compared to before the end of the war, how is your personal safety
today?
Very much worse
Somewhat worse
No change
Somewhat better
Very much better
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
Annexes
173
15. We have spoken to many Sierra Leoneans and they all have different
feelings about which groups in the country protect them and which are a
threat to them. Could you please tell us which group is the most important one
for your personal safety?
[Interviewer: Enter respondent’s exact response, in English, in the line below]
………………………………………………………………………………………
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
16. Which group do you feel is the biggest threat to you personally?
[Interviewer: Enter respondent’s exact response, in English, in the line below]
…………………………………………………………………………………
[Interviewer: Do not read] Don’t know
No answer
174
Judy Smith-Höhn
17. Now I’m going to read out a list of groups that are said to affect security in
one way or another. For each one, could you tell me whether you feel protected
or threatened by them?
Is very
Is
Does not
Is
Is a big
important somewhat affect somewhat threat for
for my important
my
a threat
my
personal for my personal for my personal
security personal security personal security
security
at all
security
A. Sierra Leone
Police
B. Republic of
Sierra Leone
Armed Forces
C. Mines
monitoring officers
D. Traffic wardens
E. Secret societies
(Poro/Bondo, Ojeh)
F. Private security
companies
G. National Union
of Sierra Leonean
Students
H. Youth wings of
political parties
I. Ghetto Boys
J. Bike riders
Ex-combatants
K. West Side Boys
L. Civil defence
forces (CDF)
M. Revolutionary
United Front (RUF)
N. Other (specify)
…………………
Thank you very much!
No
[Do
not answer
read]
Don’t
know
Annexes
175
iii. Data analysis – Frequencies Liberia
Table A1:
District
Count
Valid %
%
Buchanan
100
14.33
14.33
Monrovia
498
71.35
71.35
Tubmanburg
100
14.33
14.33
Valid N
698
100.00
100.00
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Table A2:
Survey area
Count
Valid %
%
Buchanan
100
14.33
14.33
Central Monrovia
100
14.33
14.33
Gardnersville
99
14.18
14.18
Gorblah
34
4.87
4.87
Joseph Street
25
3.58
3.58
New Kru Town
99
14.18
14.18
Paynesville
100
14.33
14.33
Rock Town
25
3.58
3.58
Vai Town
41
5.87
5.87
Water Side
51
7.31
7.31
West Point
24
3.44
3.44
Valid N
698
100.00
100.00
Total
698
100.00
100.00
176
Table A3:
Judy Smith-Höhn
Q1: Sex
Count
Valid %
%
Male
327
47.60
46.85
Female
360
52.40
51.58
Valid N
687
100.00
98.42
Missing
11
0.00
1.58
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Mean
Valid N
Maximum
Minimum
32.7
690
78
16
Table A4:
Q2: Age
Annexes
Table A5:
177
Q2_Kat: Age group
Count
Valid %
%
Up to 20 years
88
12.75
12.61
21–30 years
263
38.12
37.68
31–40 years
195
28.26
27.94
41–50 years
90
13.04
12.89
51–60 years
40
5.80
5.73
61 years and older
14
2.03
2.01
Valid N
690
100.00
98.85
No answer
8
0.00
1.15
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
698
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A6:
Q3: Marital status
Count
Valid %
%
Married
312
45.81
44.70
Unmarried
311
45.67
44.56
Divorced
27
3.96
3.87
Widowed
31
4.55
4.44
Valid N
681
100.00
97.56
No answer
17
0.00
2.44
Total
698
100.00
100.00
178
Table A7:
Judy Smith-Höhn
Q4: How many children do you have staying with you at home?
Count
Valid %
%
None
176
26.15
25.21
1
75
11.14
10.74
2
111
16.49
15.90
3
76
11.29
10.89
4
64
9.51
9.17
5
61
9.06
8.74
6
35
5.20
5.01
7
22
3.27
3.15
8
15
2.23
2.15
9
7
1.04
1.00
10
14
2.08
2.01
11
5
0.74
0.72
12
5
0.74
0.72
13
2
0.30
0.29
14
1
0.15
0.14
15
1
0.15
0.14
16
1
0.15
0.14
17
1
0.15
0.14
25
1
0.15
0.14
Valid N
673
100.00
96.42
No answer
25
0.00
3.58
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Annexes
Table A8:
179
Q5: What is your county of origin?
Count
Valid %
%
Bomi
65
9.31
9.31
Bong
56
8.02
8.02
Gbarpolu
24
3.44
3.44
Grand Bassa
86
12.32
12.32
Grand Cape Mount
43
6.16
6.16
Grand Gedeh
28
4.01
4.01
Grand Kru
46
6.59
6.59
Lofa
93
13.32
13.32
Margibi
28
4.01
4.01
Maryland
56
8.02
8.02
Montserrado/Monrovia
54
7.74
7.74
Nimba
39
5.59
5.59
River Cess
27
3.87
3.87
River Gee
9
1.29
1.29
Sinoe
44
6.30
6.30
Other
0
0.00
0.00
698
100.00
100.00
0
0.00
0.00
698
100.00
100.00
Valid N
No answer
Total
Table A9:
Total
Q5_other: Other county of origin?
Count
Valid %
%
698
100.00
100.00
698
100.00
100.00
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Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A10: Q6: What is your tribe?
Count
Valid %
%
Kpelle
86
12.34
12.32
Bassa
98
14.06
14.04
Gio
27
3.87
3.87
Kru
83
11.91
11.89
Grebo
73
10.47
10.46
Mano
29
4.16
4.15
Krahn
27
3.87
3.87
Gola
51
7.32
7.31
Gbandi
37
5.31
5.30
Loma
36
5.16
5.16
Kissi
41
5.88
5.87
Vai
42
6.03
6.02
Dei
5
0.72
0.72
Bella
11
1.58
1.58
Mandingo
11
1.58
1.58
Mende
10
1.43
1.43
Americo-Liberian
4
0.57
0.57
Congo
21
3.01
3.01
Other
5
0.72
0.72
None
Valid N
No answer
Total
0
0.00
0.00
697
100.00
99.86
1
0.00
0.14
698
100.00
100.00
Annexes
181
Table A11: Q6_other: Other tribe?
Count
Valid %
%
693
99.28
99.28
Fula
1
0.14
0.14
Gbarpor
1
0.14
0.14
Gbee
1
0.14
0.14
Naturalised Liberian
1
0.14
0.14
Zaibor
1
0.14
0.14
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Table A12: Q7: Have you spent more years of your life in a village or in a town?
Count
Valid %
%
Village
112
16.42
16.05
Town
486
71.26
69.63
About equally
84
12.32
12.03
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
Valid N
682
100.00
97.71
No answer
16
0.00
2.29
Total
698
100.00
100.00
182
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A13: Q8_rec: What is your current occupation?
Count
Valid %
%
Teacher; student/pupil
218
31.50
31.23
Government employee
53
7.66
7.59
Artisan
8
1.16
1.15
Fisherman; fish trader; farm worker/tenant; farmer
53
7.66
7.59
Housewife
60
8.67
8.60
Businessman/woman; trader (street vendor)
143
20.66
20.49
Office clerk; employee (private business)
82
11.85
11.75
Unemployed
57
8.24
8.17
Other
18
2.60
2.58
Valid N
692
100.00
99.14
6
0.00
0.86
698
100.00
100.00
No answer
Total
Table A14: Q8_other: Other occupation?
Count
Valid %
%
683
97.85
97.85
Carpenter
2
0.29
0.29
Domestic work
1
0.14
0.14
Driver
1
0.14
0.14
Footballer
1
0.14
0.14
Nurse
1
0.14
0.14
Operator
2
0.29
0.29
Pastor/administrator
1
0.14
0.14
Private security
2
0.29
0.29
Reception
1
0.14
0.14
Social worker
1
0.14
0.14
Tailor
2
0.29
0.29
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Annexes
183
Table A15: Q9_rec: What is your religious denomination, if any?
Count
Valid %
%
Christian
532
76.55
76.22
Muslim
91
13.09
13.04
Traditional religion
6
0.86
0.86
Other
55
7.91
7.88
None
11
1.58
1.58
Valid N
695
100.00
99.57
3
0.00
0.43
698
100.00
100.00
No answer
Total
184
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A16: Q9_other: Other religious denomination, if any?
Count
Valid %
%
645
92.41
92.41
Church of God
1
0.14
0.14
Dominion Christian Fellowship
1
0.14
0.14
First Assembly of God Church
8
1.15
1.15
Glory of Church
1
0.14
0.14
Greater Grace Church
1
0.14
0.14
Jehovahs Witness
1
0.14
0.14
Kingdom Assembly
2
0.29
0.29
Liberia Open Bible Church
1
0.14
0.14
Lutheran Church
12
1.72
1.72
New Apostolic
1
0.14
0.14
Poutal House Church
1
0.14
0.14
Repentance Baptist Church
1
0.14
0.14
Salvation Army
8
1.14
1.14
Seventh Day Adventist
6
0.86
0.86
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
1
0.14
0.14
United Liberian Inland Church
5
0.72
0.72
United Methodist Church
1
0.14
0.14
Victory Chapel
1
0.14
0.14
698
100.00
100.00
Total
Annexes
185
Table A17: Q10: In what grade did you leave school?
Count
Valid %
%
No schooling
75
11.76
10.74
Grade 1–2
3
0.47
0.43
Grade 3–4
16
2.51
2.29
Grade 5–6
37
5.80
5.30
Grade 7–8
72
11.29
10.32
Grade 9–10
95
14.89
13.61
Grade 11–12
265
41.54
37.97
College/university
75
11.76
10.74
Valid N
638
100.00
91.40
No answer
34
0.00
4.87
Don’t know
26
0.00
3.72
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Table A18: Q11: In your opinion, how safe is the country today?
Count
Valid %
%
Not safe at all
73
10.69
10.46
Fairly unsafe
188
27.53
26.93
It’s okay
280
41.00
40.11
Very safe
142
20.79
20.34
Valid N
683
100.00
97.85
No answer
15
0.00
2.15
Don’t know
Total
0
0.00
0.00
698
100.00
100.00
186
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A19: Q12: In your opinion, compared to before the end of the last war,
what is the general state of security like in the country today?
Count
Valid %
%
18
2.62
2.58
Much worse
Worse
31
4.52
4.44
No change
44
6.41
6.30
Somewhat better
358
52.19
51.29
Much better
235
34.26
33.67
Valid N
686
100.00
98.28
No answer
12
0.00
1.72
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
698
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A20: Q13: How safe do you feel personally in the country today?
Count
Valid %
%
Not safe at all
43
6.22
6.16
Fairly unsafe
164
23.73
23.50
It’s okay
305
44.14
43.70
Very safe
179
25.90
25.64
Valid N
691
100.00
99.00
No answer
7
0.00
1.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
698
100.00
100.00
Total
Annexes
187
Table A21: Q14: Compared to before the end of the last war, how is your
personal safety today?
Very much worse
Count
Valid %
%
17
2.47
2.44
Somewhat worse
32
4.64
4.58
No change
39
5.66
5.59
Somewhat better
403
58.49
57.74
Very much better
198
28.74
28.37
Valid N
689
100.00
98.71
No answer
9
0.00
1.29
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
698
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A22: Q15_rec: Which group is the most important one for your
personal safety?
UNMIL
Count
Valid %
%
530
78.64
75.93
Armed Forces of Liberia
14
2.08
2.01
Liberia National Police
125
18.55
17.91
1
0.15
0.14
Ex-combatants
ECOWAS
1
0.15
0.14
Poro/Sandee
1
0.15
0.14
Vigilante teams
1
0.15
0.14
Family
1
0.15
0.14
Valid N
674
100.00
96.56
No answer
14
0.00
2.01
Don’t know
10
0.00
1.43
Total
698
100.00
100.00
188
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A23: Q16_rec: Which group do you feel is the biggest threat to you
personally?
Count
Valid %
%
Armed Forces of Liberia
8
1.15
1.15
Armed robbers and criminals
26
3.72
3.72
Congress for Democratic Change
3
0.43
0.43
Demonstrators
1
0.14
0.14
Ex-combatants
415
59.46
59.46
Liberia National Police
14
2.01
2.01
Militias
2
0.29
0.29
Political party militias
10
1.43
1.43
Poro/Sandee (secret societies)
3
0.43
0.43
Private security companies
1
0.14
0.14
Street boys
55
7.88
7.88
UNMIL
6
0.86
0.86
Vigilantes
1
0.14
0.14
None
32
4.58
4.58
Former warring faction 1: Taylor government
2
0.29
0.29
Former warring faction 2: MODEL
3
0.43
0.43
Former warring faction 3: LURD
4
0.57
0.57
Valid N
586
83.95
83.95
No answer
35
5.01
5.01
Don’t know
77
11.03
11.03
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Annexes
189
Table A24: Q17_A: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Liberia National Police?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
5
0.72
0.72
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
15
2.16
2.15
Does not affect my personal security at all
32
4.62
4.58
Is somewhat important for my personal security
223
32.18
31.95
Is very important for my personal security
418
60.32
59.89
Valid N
693
100.00
99.28
No answer
3
0.00
0.43
Don’t know
2
0.00
0.29
698
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A25: Q17_B: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Armed Forces of Liberia?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
30
4.39
4.30
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
35
5.12
5.01
Does not affect my personal security at all
166
24.30
23.78
Is somewhat important for my personal security
281
41.14
40.26
Is very important for my personal security
171
25.04
24.50
Valid N
683
100.00
97.85
No answer
11
0.00
1.58
Don’t know
4
0.00
0.57
698
100.00
100.00
Total
190
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A26: Q17_C: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: UN peacekeepers (UNMIL)?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
5
0.73
0.72
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
5
0.73
0.72
Does not affect my personal security at all
14
2.04
2.01
Is somewhat important for my personal security
52
7.58
7.45
Is very important for my personal security
610
88.92
87.39
Valid N
686
100.00
98.28
No answer
11
0.00
1.58
Don’t know
1
0.00
0.14
698
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A27: Q17_D: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Poro (secret societies)?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
129
20.94
18.48
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
53
8.60
7.59
Does not affect my personal security at all
324
52.60
46.42
Is somewhat important for my personal security
56
9.09
8.02
Is very important for my personal security
54
8.77
7.74
Valid N
616
100.00
88.25
No answer
47
0.00
6.73
Don’t know
35
0.00
5.01
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Annexes
191
Table A28: Q17_E: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Private security companies (e.g.
Dyncorp Intl, Inter-Com Security)?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
6
0.91
0.86
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
20
3.04
2.87
Does not affect my personal security at all
364
55.40
52.15
Is somewhat important for my personal security
147
22.37
21.06
Is very important for my personal security
120
18.26
17.19
Valid N
657
100.00
94.13
No answer
23
0.00
3.30
Don’t know
18
0.00
2.58
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Table A29: Q17_F: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Ex-combatants (MODEL, LURD,
Taylor government)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
491
72.53
70.34
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
115
16.99
16.48
Does not affect my personal security at all
48
7.09
6.88
Is somewhat important for my personal security
9
1.33
1.29
Is very important for my personal security
14
2.07
2.01
Valid N
677
100.00
96.99
No answer
10
0.00
1.43
Don’t know
11
0.00
1.58
Total
698
100.00
100.00
192
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A30: Q17_G: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Political party militias?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
172
28.57
24.64
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
127
21.10
18.19
Does not affect my personal security at all
253
42.03
36.25
Is somewhat important for my personal security
32
5.32
4.58
Is very important for my personal security
18
2.99
2.58
Valid N
602
100.00
86.25
No answer
63
0.00
9.03
Don’t know
33
0.00
4.73
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Table A31: Q17_H: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: Vigilantes/ area teams/ neighbourhood watch?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
39
6.21
5.59
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
69
10.99
9.89
Does not affect my personal security at all
125
19.90
17.91
Is somewhat important for my personal security
221
35.19
31.66
Is very important for my personal security
174
27.71
24.93
Valid N
628
100.00
89.97
No answer
29
0.00
4.15
Don’t know
41
0.00
5.87
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Annexes
193
Table A32: Q17_J: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Street boys?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
438
73.61
62.75
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
110
18.49
15.76
Does not affect my personal security at all
44
7.39
6.30
Is somewhat important for my personal security
1
0.17
0.14
Is very important for my personal security
2
0.34
0.29
Valid N
595
100.00
85.24
No answer
85
0.00
12.18
Don’t know
18
0.00
2.58
Total
698
100.00
100.00
Table A33: Q17_rA: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Liberia National Police?
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
641
92.50
92.50
Does not affect my personal security at all
32
4.62
4.62
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
20
2.89
2.89
Valid N
693
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
693
100.00
100.00
Total
194
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A34: Q17_rB: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Armed Forces of Liberia?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
452
66.18
66.18
Does not affect my personal security at all
166
24.30
24.30
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
65
9.52
9.52
Valid N
683
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
683
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A35:
Q17_rC: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: UN peacekeepers (UNMIL)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
662
96.50
96.50
Does not affect my personal security at all
14
2.04
2.04
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
10
1.46
1.46
Valid N
686
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
686
100.00
100.00
Total
Annexes
195
Table A36: Q17_rD: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Poro (secret societies)?
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
110
17.86
17.86
Does not affect my personal security at all
324
52.60
52.60
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
182
29.55
29.55
Valid N
616
100.00
100.00
0
0.00
0.00
No answer
Don’t know
Total
0
0.00
0.00
616
100.00
100.00
Table A37: Q17_rE: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Private security companies (e.g.
Dyncorp Intl, Inter-Com Security)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
267
40.64
40.64
Does not affect my personal security at all
364
55.40
55.40
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
26
3.96
3.96
Valid N
657
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
657
100.00
100.00
Total
196
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A38: Q17_rF: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Ex-combatants (MODEL, LURD,
Taylor government)?
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
23
3.40
3.40
Does not affect my personal security at all
48
7.09
7.09
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
606
89.51
89.51
Valid N
677
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
677
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A39: Q17_rG: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Political party militias?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
50
8.31
8.31
Does not affect my personal security at all
253
42.03
42.03
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
299
49.67
49.67
Valid N
602
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
602
100.00
100.00
Total
Annexes
197
Table A40: Q17_rH: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: Vigilantes/area teams/ neighbourhood watch?
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
395
62.90
62.90
Does not affect my personal security at all
125
19.90
19.90
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
108
17.20
17.20
Valid N
628
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
628
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A41: Q17_rJ: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: Street boys?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
3
0.50
0.50
Does not affect my personal security at all
44
7.39
7.39
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
548
92.10
92.10
Valid N
595
100.00
100.00
No answer
0
0.00
0.00
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
595
100.00
100.00
Total
198
Judy Smith-Höhn
iv. Data analysis – Frequencies Sierra Leone
Table A42: District
Count
Valid %
%
Freetown
501
71.37
71.37
Makeni
100
14.25
14.25
Koidu
101
14.39
14.39
Valid N
702
100.00
100.00
Total
702
100.00
100.00
Table A43: Survey area
Count
Valid %
%
Freetown: Central
100
14.25
14.25
Freetown: East 1
100
14.25
14.25
Freetown: East 2
100
14.25
14.25
Freetown: West 1
100
14.25
14.25
Freetown: West 2
101
14.39
14.39
Makeni: Zone 1
25
3.56
3.56
Makeni: Zone 2
25
3.56
3.56
Makeni: Zone 3
25
3.56
3.56
Makeni: Zone 4
25
3.56
3.56
Koidu: Central
25
3.56
3.56
Koidu: Bungalow
26
3.70
3.70
Koidu: Hill station
25
3.56
3.56
Koidu: Tankoro
25
3.56
3.56
Valid N
702
100.00
100.00
Total
702
100.00
100.00
Annexes
199
Table A44: Q1: Sex
Count
Valid %
%
Male
355
50.71
50.57
Female
345
49.29
49.15
Valid N
700
100.00
99.72
Missing
2
0.00
0.28
702
100.00
100.00
Mean
Valid N
Maximum
Minimum
34.1
641
85
18
Total
Table A45: Q2: Age
200
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A46: Q2_Kat: Age group
Count
Valid %
%
Up to 20 years
74
11.54
10.54
21–30 years
255
39.78
36.32
31–40 years
152
23.71
21.65
41–50 years
77
12.01
10.97
51–60 years
49
7.64
6.98
61 years and older
34
5.30
4.84
Valid N
641
100.00
91.31
No answer
61
0.00
8.69
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
702
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A47: Q3: Marital status
Count
Valid %
%
Married
363
51.86
51.71
Unmarried
264
37.71
37.61
Divorced
36
5.14
5.13
Widowed
37
5.29
5.27
Valid N
700
100.00
99.72
2
0.00
0.28
702
100.00
100.00
No answer
Total
Annexes
201
Table A48: Q4: How many children do you have staying with you at home?
Count
Valid %
%
None
203
29.38
28.92
1
99
14.33
14.10
2
109
15.77
15.53
3
92
13.31
13.11
4
63
9.12
8.97
5
36
5.21
5.13
6
27
3.91
3.85
7
18
2.60
2.56
8
13
1.88
1.85
9
6
0.87
0.85
10
4
0.58
0.57
11
7
1.01
1.00
12
4
0.58
0.57
13
2
0.29
0.28
14
2
0.29
0.28
15
3
0.43
0.43
16
1
0.14
0.14
17
1
0.14
0.14
18
1
0.14
0.14
Valid N
691
100.00
98.43
No answer
11
0.00
1.57
Total
702
100.00
100.00
202
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A49: Q5: What is your county of origin?
Count
Valid %
%
Bo
34
4.86
4.84
Bombali
121
17.29
17.24
Bonthe
10
1.43
1.42
Kailahun
19
2.71
2.71
Kambia
47
6.71
6.70
Kenema
30
4.29
4.27
Koinadugu
39
5.57
5.56
Kono
87
12.43
12.39
Port Loko
69
9.86
9.83
Pujehun
20
2.86
2.85
Tonkolili
44
6.29
6.27
Western Area rural
34
4.86
4.84
Western Area urban
104
14.86
14.81
Moyamba
40
5.71
5.70
Other
2
0.29
0.28
700
100.00
99.72
Valid N
No answer
Total
2
0.00
0.28
702
100.00
100.00
Table A50: Q5_other: Other county of origin?
Count
Valid %
%
700
99.72
99.72
Liberian
1
0.14
0.14
Makeni
1
0.14
0.14
702
100.00
100.00
Total
Annexes
203
Table A51: Q6: What is your tribe?
Count
Valid %
%
Creole
56
7.98
7.98
Fula
51
7.26
7.26
Gola
1
0.14
0.14
Kissi
14
1.99
1.99
Kono
67
9.54
9.54
Koranko
21
2.99
2.99
Krim
3
0.43
0.43
Limba
53
7.55
7.55
Loko
21
2.99
2.99
Mandingo
28
3.99
3.99
Mende
117
16.67
16.67
Sape
3
0.43
0.43
Sherbro
23
3.28
3.28
Susu
28
3.99
3.99
Temne
210
29.91
29.91
2
0.28
0.28
Vai
Yalunka
1
0.14
0.14
Other
3
0.43
0.43
None
0
0.00
0.00
702
100.00
100.00
0
0.00
0.00
702
100.00
100.00
Valid N
No answer
Total
Table A52: Q6_other: Other tribe?
Count
Valid %
%
699
99.57
99.57
Bassa (Liberia)
1
0.14
0.14
Kru
2
0.29
0.29
Total
702
100.00
100.00
204
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A53: Q7: Have you spent more years of your life in a village or in a town?
Count
Valid %
%
Village
97
13.90
13.82
Town
556
79.66
79.20
About equally
45
6.45
6.41
Valid N
698
100.00
99.43
No answer
1
0.00
0.14
Don’t know
3
0.00
0.43
702
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A54: Q8_rec: What is your current occupation?
Teacher; student/pupil
Count
Valid %
%
181
25.86
25.78
Government employee
55
7.86
7.83
Artisan
27
3.86
3.85
Fisherman; fish trader; farm worker/tenant; farmer
37
5.29
5.27
Housewife
45
6.43
6.41
Businessman/woman; trader (street vendor)
159
22.71
22.65
Office clerk; employee (private business)
107
15.29
15.24
Unemployed
62
8.86
8.83
Other
27
3.86
3.85
Valid N
700
100.00
99.72
2
0.00
0.28
702
100.00
100.00
No answer
Total
Annexes
205
Table A55: Q8_other: Other occupation?
Count
Valid %
%
676
96.30
96.30
Computer instructor
1
0.14
0.14
Diamond digger
4
0.57
0.57
Driver (commercial)
2
0.28
0.28
Footballer
2
0.28
0.28
Hairdresser
5
0.71
0.71
Labourer
1
0.14
0.14
Legal researcher
1
0.14
0.14
Librarian
1
0.14
0.14
Miner
1
0.14
0.14
Photographer
1
0.14
0.14
Retired
1
0.14
0.14
Seamstress
1
0.14
0.14
Security officer
2
0.28
0.28
Soldier
1
0.14
0.14
Solicitor’s secretary
1
0.14
0.14
Traditional leader
Total
1
0.14
0.14
702
100.00
100.00
Table A56: Q9_rec: What is your religious denomination, if any?
Count
Valid %
%
Christian
287
41.24
40.88
Muslim
388
55.75
55.27
Traditional religion
6
0.86
0.85
Other
15
2.16
2.14
None
0
0.00
0.00
696
100.00
99.15
6
0.00
0.85
702
100.00
100.00
Valid N
No answer
Total
206
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A57: Q9_other: Other religious denomination, if any?
Count
Valid %t
%
687
97.86
97.86
Assemblies of God
1
0.14
0.14
Christian Ministry Church
1
0.14
0.14
Faith Healing Bible Church
1
0.14
0.14
Grace Assembly of God Church
1
0.14
0.14
Holy Ghost Bible Church
1
0.14
0.14
Holy Trinity Church
1
0.14
0.14
International Church of Christ
1
0.14
0.14
Jehovahs Witness
1
0.14
0.14
Joint Ministry Church
1
0.14
0.14
Rastafarian
1
0.14
0.14
Salvation Spiritual Church
1
0.14
0.14
Seventh Day Adventist
2
0.28
0.28
Waeslan Church
1
0.14
0.14
Winners Chapel International
Total
1
0.14
0.14
702
100.00
100.00
Table A58: Q10: In what grade did you leave school?
Count
Valid %
%
148
21.26
21.08
Class 1–2
4
0.57
0.57
Class 3–4
17
2.44
2.42
No schooling
Class 5–6
38
5.46
5.41
Junior secondary 1–3
119
17.10
16.95
Senior secondary 1–3
256
36.78
36.47
College/university
114
16.38
16.24
Valid N
696
100.00
99.15
No answer
5
0.00
0.71
Don’t know
1
0.00
0.14
702
100.00
100.00
Total
Annexes
207
Table A59: Q11: In your opinion, how safe is the country today?
Count
Valid %
%
Not safe at all
94
13.62
13.39
Fairly unsafe
266
38.55
37.89
It’s okay
227
32.90
32.34
Very safe
103
14.93
14.67
Valid N
690
100.00
98.29
No answer
12
0.00
1.71
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
702
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A60: Q12: In your opinion, compared to before the end of the last war,
what is the general state of security like in the country today?
Count
Valid %
%
Much worse
3
0.43
0.43
Worse
15
2.16
2.14
No change
32
4.61
4.56
Somewhat better
421
60.66
59.97
Much better
223
32.13
31.77
Valid N
694
100.00
98.86
8
0.00
1.14
No answer
Don’t know
Total
0
0.00
0.00
702
100.00
100.00
208
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A61: Q13: How safe do you feel personally in the country today?
Count
Valid %
%
Not safe at all
72
10.33
10.26
Fairly unsafe
193
27.69
27.49
It’s okay
287
41.18
40.88
Very safe
145
20.80
20.66
Valid N
697
100.00
99.29
No answer
5
0.00
0.71
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
702
100.00
100.00
Total
Table A62: Q14: Compared to before the end of the last war, how is your
personal safety today?
Count
Valid %
%
Very much worse
11
1.58
1.57
Somewhat worse
18
2.58
2.56
No change
31
4.45
4.42
Somewhat better
445
63.85
63.39
Very much better
192
27.55
27.35
Valid N
697
100.00
99.29
No answer
5
0.00
0.71
Don’t know
0
0.00
0.00
702
100.00
100.00
Total
Annexes
209
Table A63: Q15_rec: Which group is the most important one for your
personal safety?
Count
Valid %
%
All People’s Congress
Armed forces
Civil society
ECOMOG
Ex-combatans
Foreign fighters, foreign troops
Free Force
God
Government
Husband/my family
IMATT
Individuals
International community
Mende
National Social Security Information Trust of Sierra
Leone
Private security
Former warring faction 1: CDF
Former warring faction 2: RUF
Former warring faction 3: West Side Boys
None
SLP Operational Support Division
President
Paramount chief
Petty Traders Association
Sierra Leone Police
Rebels
SOD
UNAMSIL
Village authorities
Youth groups
Valid N
No answer
Don’t know
1
242
1
21
1
3
1
7
14
6
1
1
1
1
0.15
37.17
0.15
3.23
0.15
0.46
0.15
1.08
2.15
0.92
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.14
34.47
0.14
2.99
0.14
0.43
0.14
1.00
1.99
0.85
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
1
0.15
0.14
2
11
1
0
5
2
6
1
1
233
5
1
76
1
4
651
24
27
0.31
1.69
0.15
0.00
0.77
0.31
0.92
0.15
0.15
35.79
0.77
0.15
11.67
0.15
0.61
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.28
1.57
0.14
0.00
0.71
0.28
0.85
0.14
0.14
33.19
0.71
0.14
10.83
0.14
0.57
92.74
3.42
3.85
Total
702
100.00
100.00
210
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A64: Q16_rec: Which group do you feel is the biggest threat to you
personally?
Count
Valid %
%
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
Armed forces/army/military/RSLAF
Armed persons
Armed rebels
Armed robbers/bandits/criminal gangs/gangsters/thieves
Bike riders
Boboh belle* politicians (*Krio term for big belly, meaning greedy)
Charles Taylor
City council
Disgruntled citizens
ECOMOG
Enemies
Ex-combatants/ex-rebels
Ex-Sierra Leone Army/retired soldiers
Armed men
Free-flow police
Ghetto Boys
Government
In-laws
Intruders
Junta
Land thieves
Inmates
Neighbours
Nigerians
None
Parents
Police
Political parties/politicans/SLPP
Secret societies
Special Court for Sierra Leone
Temne
Traffic wardens
Youth
Witches
Former warring faction 1: CDF
Former warring faction 2: RUF
Former warring faction 3: West Side Boys
Valid N
No answer
Don’t know
4
90
5
68
89
1
1
3
1
1
3
2
48
5
1
3
7
3
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
30
2
65
13
1
2
2
2
14
2
46
60
9
593
29
70
0.67
15.18
0.84
11.47
15.01
0.17
0.17
0.51
0.17
0.17
0.51
0.34
8.09
0.84
0.17
0.51
1.18
0.51
0.17
0.34
0.34
0.17
0.17
0.34
0.17
5.06
0.34
10.96
2.19
0.17
0.34
0.34
0.34
2.36
0.34
7.76
10.12
1.52
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.58
13.01
0.72
9.83
12.86
0.14
0.14
0.43
0.14
0.14
0.43
0.29
6.94
0.72
0.14
0.43
1.01
0.43
0.14
0.29
0.29
0.14
0.14
0.29
0.14
4.34
0.29
9.39
1.88
0.14
0.29
0.29
0.29
2.02
0.29
6.65
8.67
1.30
85.69
4.19
10.12
Total
692
100.00
100.00
Annexes
211
Table A65: Q17_A: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: A: Sierra Leone Police?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
23
3.3
3.3
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
33
4.7
4.7
Does not affect my personal security at all
24
3.4
3.4
Is somewhat important for my personal security
117
16.8
16.7
Is very important for my personal security
499
71.7
71.1
Valid N
696
100.0
99.1
No answer
1
0.0
0.1
Don’t know
5
0.0
0.7
702
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A66: Q17_B: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: B: Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
31
4.5
4.4
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
39
5.6
5.6
Does not affect my personal security at all
35
5.0
5.0
Is somewhat important for my personal security
134
19.3
19.1
Is very important for my personal security
456
65.6
65.0
Valid N
695
100.0
99.0
No answer
1
0.0
0.1
Don’t know
6
0.0
0.9
702
100.0
100.0
Total
212
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A67: Q17_C: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: C: Mines monitoring officers?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
11
1.9
1.6
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
25
4.3
3.6
Does not affect my personal security at all
386
66.4
55.0
Is somewhat important for my personal security
72
12.4
10.3
Is very important for my personal security
87
15.0
12.4
Valid N
581
100.0
82.8
No answer
16
0.0
2.3
Don’t know
105
0.0
15.0
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Table A68: Q17_D: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: D: Traffic wardens?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
20
3.0
2.8
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
36
5.5
5.1
Does not affect my personal security at all
239
36.3
34.0
Is somewhat important for my personal security
214
32.5
30.5
Is very important for my personal security
149
22.6
21.2
Valid N
658
100.0
93.7
No answer
13
0.0
1.9
Don’t know
31
0.0
4.4
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Annexes
213
Table A69: Q17_E: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: E: Secret societies (Poro/Bondo, Ojeh)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
72
10.6
10.3
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
66
9.7
9.4
Does not affect my personal security at all
357
52.3
50.9
Is somewhat important for my personal security
78
11.4
11.1
Is very important for my personal security
109
16.0
15.5
Valid N
682
100.0
97.2
No answer
4
0.0
0.6
Don’t know
16
0.0
2.3
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Table A70: Q17_F: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: F: Private security companies?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
5
0.8
0.7
6
0.9
0.9
Does not affect my personal security at all
271
40.8
38.6
Is somewhat important for my personal security
244
36.7
34.8
Is very important for my personal security
139
20.9
19.8
Valid N
665
100.0
94.7
No answer
6
0.0
0.9
Don’t know
31
0.0
4.4
Total
702
100.0
100.0
214
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A71: Q17_G: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: G: National Union of Sierra Leonean Students?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
4
0.6
0.6
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
28
4.5
4.0
Does not affect my personal security at all
253
40.9
36.0
Is somewhat important for my personal security
133
21.5
18.9
Is very important for my personal security
201
32.5
28.6
Valid N
619
100.0
88.2
No answer
12
0.0
1.7
Don’t know
71
0.0
10.1
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Table A72: Q17_H: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: H: Youth wings of political parties?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
60
9.0
8.5
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
153
23.1
21.8
Does not affect my personal security at all
235
35.4
33.5
Is somewhat important for my personal security
118
17.8
16.8
Is very important for my personal security
97
14.6
13.8
Valid N
663
100.0
94.4
No answer
5
0.0
0.7
Don’t know
34
0.0
4.8
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Annexes
215
Table A73: Q17_I: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: I: Ghetto Boys?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
370
54.1
52.7
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
169
24.7
24.1
Does not affect my personal security at all
114
16.7
16.2
Is somewhat important for my personal security
19
2.8
2.7
Is very important for my personal security
12
1.8
1.7
Valid N
684
100.0
97.4
No answer
5
0.0
0.7
Don’t know
13
0.0
1.9
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Table A74: Q17_J: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: J: Bike riders?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
73
10.9
10.4
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
114
17.0
16.2
Does not affect my personal security at all
211
31.4
30.1
Is somewhat important for my personal security
152
22.6
21.7
Is very important for my personal security
122
18.2
17.4
Valid N
672
100.0
95.7
No answer
13
0.0
1.9
Don’t know
17
0.0
2.4
Total
702
100.0
100.0
216
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A75: Q17_K: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: K: West Side Boys?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
392
59.1
55.8
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
132
19.9
18.8
Does not affect my personal security at all
119
17.9
17.0
Is somewhat important for my personal security
7
1.1
1.0
Is very important for my personal security
13
2.0
1.9
Valid N
663
100.0
94.4
No answer
8
0.0
1.1
Don’t know
31
0.0
4.4
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Table A76: Q17_L: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: L: Civil defence forces (CDF)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
243
36.4
34.6
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
137
20.5
19.5
Does not affect my personal security at all
144
21.6
20.5
Is somewhat important for my personal security
90
13.5
12.8
Is very important for my personal security
54
8.1
7.7
Valid N
668
100.0
95.2
No answer
8
0.0
1.1
Don’t know
26
0.0
3.7
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Annexes
217
Table A77: Q17_M: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: M: Revolutionary United Front (RUF)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is a big threat for my personal security
458
67.7
65.2
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
90
13.3
12.8
Does not affect my personal security at all
113
16.7
16.1
Is somewhat important for my personal security
9
1.3
1.3
Is very important for my personal security
7
1.0
1.0
Valid N
677
100.0
96.4
No answer
10
0.0
1.4
Don’t know
15
0.0
2.1
Total
702
100.0
100.0
Table A78: Q17_N: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: N: Other?
Is a big threat for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
36
75.0
5.1
Is somewhat a threat for my personal security
1
2.1
0.1
Does not affect my personal security at all
0
0.0
0.0
Is somewhat important for my personal security
2
4.2
0.3
Is very important for my personal security
9
18.8
1.3
Valid N
48
100.0
6.8
No answer
654
0.0
93.2
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
702
100.0
100.0
Total
218
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A79: Q17_n_ot: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: N: Other (strings)?
Area groups
Count
Valid %
%
656
93.4
93.4
1
0.1
0.1
Armed robbers
7
1.0
1.0
House burglars
1
0.1
0.1
Council chiefs
1
0.1
0.1
Councillors
1
0.1
0.1
Drivers’ union
1
0.1
0.1
Drug addicts
1
0.1
0.1
Ex-combatants
5
0.7
0.7
Foreign troops
2
0.3
0.3
Gang robbers
1
0.1
0.1
Justice system
1
0.1
0.1
Kamajors
2
0.3
0.3
Kidnappers
1
0.1
0.1
Police SSD
1
0.1
0.1
Political parties’ supporters
1
0.1
0.1
Rebels
1
0.1
0.1
Retired soldiers
2
0.3
0.3
Robbers
4
0.6
0.6
Thieves
5
0.7
0.7
Traditional rulers
1
0.1
0.1
UN mission
2
0.3
0.3
UNAMSIL
1
0.1
0.1
Youths
1
0.1
0.1
Youth groups
1
0.1
0.1
702
100.0
100.0
Total
Annexes
219
Table A80: Q17_rA: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: A: Sierra Leone Police?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
616
88.5
88.5
Does not affect my personal security at all
24
3.4
3.4
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
56
8.0
8.0
Valid N
696
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
696
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A81: Q17_rB: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: B: Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
590
84.9
84.9
Does not affect my personal security at all
35
5.0
5.0
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
70
10.1
10.1
Valid N
695
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
695
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A82: Q17_rC: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: C: Mines monitoring officers?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
159
27.4
27.4
Does not affect my personal security at all
386
66.4
66.4
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
36
6.2
6.2
Valid N
581
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
581
100.0
100.0
Total
220
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A83: Q17_rD: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: D: Traffic wardens?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
363
55.2
55.2
Does not affect my personal security at all
239
36.3
36.3
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
56
8.5
8.5
Valid N
658
100.0
100.0
0
0.0
0.0
No answer
Don’t know
Total
0
0.0
0.0
658
100.0
100.0
Table A84: Q17_rE: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: E: Secret societies (Poro/Bondo, Ojeh)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
187
27.4
27.4
Does not affect my personal security at all
357
52.3
52.3
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
138
20.2
20.2
Valid N
682
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
682
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A85: Q17_rF: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: F: Private security companies?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
383
57.6
57.6
Does not affect my personal security at all
271
40.8
40.8
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
11
1.7
1.7
Valid N
665
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don't know
0
0.0
0.0
665
100.0
100.0
Total
Annexes
221
Table A86: Q17_rG: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: G: National Union of Sierra Leonean Students?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
334
54.0
54.0
Does not affect my personal security at all
253
40.9
40.9
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
32
5.2
5.2
Valid N
619
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
619
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A87: Q17_rH: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: H: Youth wings of political parties?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
215
32.4
32.4
Does not affect my personal security at all
235
35.4
35.4
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
213
32.1
32.1
Valid N
663
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
663
100.0
100.0
Total
222
Judy Smith-Höhn
Table A88: Q17_rI: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: I: Ghetto Boys?
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
Count
Valid %
%
31
4.5
4.5
Does not affect my personal security at all
114
16.7
16.7
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
539
78.8
78.8
Valid N
684
100.0
100.0
0
0.0
0.0
No answer
Don’t know
Total
0
0.0
0.0
684
100.0
100.0
Table A89: Q17_rJ: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: J: Bike riders?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
274
40.8
40.8
Does not affect my personal security at all
211
31.4
31.4
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
187
27.8
27.8
Valid N
672
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
672
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A90: Q17_rK: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: K: West Side Boys?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
20
3.0
3.0
Does not affect my personal security at all
119
17.9
17.9
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
524
79.0
79.0
Valid N
663
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
663
100.0
100.0
Total
Annexes
223
Table A91: Q17_rL: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: L: Civil defence forces (CDF)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
144
21.6
21.6
Does not affect my personal security at all
144
21.6
21.6
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
380
56.9
56.9
Valid N
668
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
668
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A92: Q17_rM: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or threatened
by them or not: M: Revolutionary United Front (RUF)?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
16
2.4
2.4
Does not affect my personal security at all
113
16.7
16.7
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
548
80.9
80.9
Valid N
677
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
677
100.0
100.0
Total
Table A93: Q17_rN: Could you tell me whether you feel protected or
threatened by them or not: N: Other?
Count
Valid %
%
Is very/somewhat important for my personal security
11
22.9
22.9
Does not affect my personal security at all
0
0.0
0.0
Is a big/somewhat a threat for my personal security
37
77.1
77.1
Valid N
48
100.0
100.0
No answer
0
0.0
0.0
Don’t know
0
0.0
0.0
Total
48
100.0
100.0
224
Judy Smith-Höhn
Annex II: Guidelines for Focus Group Discussion (excerpt)
Questions for opening the discussion



What is security all about?
Which groups provide security (or consent to violence and crime) in
this area?
Mapping of various actors that are involved – general.
Topics for discussion
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Understanding of security (protection from harm, use of force).
Identification of security providers (names, state or non-state,
authorised by the state or not, external).
Cooperation and rivalries between these groups, if at all.
Expectations from security providers. (Who provides what for whom?
Does the situation determine the security provider chosen?)
Citizens’ needs met by such groups. (All the time? Some of the time?
Never?)
Are their actions viewed as justified and righteous (i.e. legitimate) by
the discussants? (Would you turn to these people again? Motives for
turning to these providers; payment for security?)
Need for such groups, i.e. their importance. (Which are indispensible
and which should rather be disbanded? Are they a real alternative to
state-provided security?)
Mapping of various actors – specific: threat; neither/nor; no threat,
important or not, relationship among each other, comparison to the
past (five years ago).
Discussants’ closing remarks (additional points that weren’t raised in
the discussion).
How to moderate a discussion successfully
When moderating a focus group discussion, please comply with the
following instructions.
1)
2)
Start each discussion with the introduction. Do not cut it short and
refrain from interjecting personal comments.
Introduce the topic in an honest and fairly general fashion.
Annexes
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
225
State the ground rules for the discussion: mobiles off, only one person
speaks at a time, no conversations with your neighbour, etc.
Emphasise that you want as many different points of view as possible.
Emphasise that there are no right or wrong answers.
Begin the discussion by letting each discussant introduce him/herself.
Dealing with latecomers: do not include anyone who arrives after the
opening statements have ended and the discussion has begun.
Often, discussants tend to make general remarks; to avoid them
drifting off into generalities, stress that their personal experience is
what is of interest.
Interview content: maintain the focus and do not explore too many
topics.
The guideline for the focus group discussions is there to assist the
moderator in ensuring that the discussions follow in more or less the
same order from group to group. These should not be followed
rigorously, i.e. do not adhere to a fixed set of questions. It is therefore
best to memorise these topics of discussion; if the moderator
constantly refers to a printed list of topics, the discussants will hang
back in their discussions, waiting to hear what the next topic for
discussion is.
The role of the moderator is to guide someone else’s discussion. Do
not dominate the discussion. A moderator who appears to be an expert
on the topic will shut off many lines of discussion.
At the end of the discussion, allow each person to give a final
summary statement. Asking each person to give a final statement is
not only a useful technique that signifies the end of the discussion, but
it also allows participants to make a contribution that they have been
holding back from the open discussion.
Finally, fill out the questionnaire for each of the participants. Stress
that the data will remain anonymous.
About the Author
Judy Smith-Höhn is a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies
in Pretoria, South Africa. Prior to her present position she was a research
fellow at the GIGA Institute of African Affairs in Hamburg, Germany and
later a senior researcher at the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town
in South Africa. Her thematic emphases lie in the areas of violent conflict
and its prevention, and security sector reform within a regional focus on
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe. She has published nationally
and internationally on topics ranging from security sector reform and postconflict peacebuilding to democratic transformation in South Africa. She
holds a PhD from the University of Leipzig, Germany, and a Diplom (masters degree) in Political Science from the University of Hamburg, Germany.
About the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF)
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is
an international foundation whose mission is to assist the international
community in pursuing good governance and reform of the security sector.
To this end, the Centre develops and promotes appropriate norms at the
international and national levels, determines good practices and relevant
policy recommendations for effective governance of the security sector, and
provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes to
all interested actors.
Detailed information is available at www.dcaf.ch
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Rue de Chantepoulet 11, PO Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 741 77 00; fax: + 41 22 741 77 05; e-mail: info@dcaf.ch