RFID Towards Digital Evidence
A discussion on the use of RFID and encryption
to create digital evidence within the scope of
real-world process environments.
Ver 1.0
8 January 2006
Bertus Pretorius
Chief Systems Architect iPico
Chairman: Standards SA – SC71H (EVI)
Chairman: Standards SA – SC71K (AutoID)
Head of Delegation SA: JTC1/SC31
Content
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Definitions
What is Digital Evidence
The Case for Digital Evidence
– Supply Chain
– Vehicles
– Product & Source Authenticity
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The Operational Environment
Privacy
Pro’s and Con’s of RFID
Encryption
Conclusion
Using RFID towards Digital Evidence - January 2006
COPYRIGHT © 2006, iPico
Definitions
These definitions is within the scope of the presentation.
• Risk: the chance of a negative outcome towards a material loss
• Integrity: the assurance towards correctness as presented
• Authenticity: the integrity, as a whole, as issued or created
• Authority: the ultimate legal-person responsible
• Confidentiality: a defined limited
• Item: anything, which can be identified uniquely; people...artefact
• People: all humans
• Artefact: all non-human items
• Set: a grouping, which can be identified uniquely
• Real-world: the tangible 3-D world with live in
• Scrutiny: multiple verifications from a different viewpoint
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Digital Evidence
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Digital recording of an occurrence, which can be held in court
– to a specific risk profile
– to a deterministic integrity profile
Æ Thus the recording and storage method must stand scrutiny
before the data can be analysed
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Digital Evidence proves:
– That a specific Real-World-Occurrence did take place
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Place, which could included the state of the place
Legal entities, both actively participating or not
Date & Time
Items
– That a specific Real-World-Item is what it claims to be
• Integrity of the item
• Integrity of the source of the item Æ trail of accountability
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Demographics of digital evidence
– Usually remote
– Usually off-line
– Usually used in local decision making
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The Trust Gap
Positive identification of items
is the key to digital evidence
Representation
of an item
Identifier (tag)
Real Item
Person, Article
Trust Gap
Systems
DB, Portals
ICT & Marks
Transaction Relationship
Perception Relationship
Value Relationship
Identity Relationship
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Digital Evidence in the Supply Chain
Brand owner requires control over supply chain activities to
• protect brand integrity
• eliminate counterfeit goods
• prevent illegal trade
The focus is:
monitoring the
transfer
of goods
Manufacturing
Distribution
&
Whole Sale
Dealers
Clients
Intelligent end-nodes with appropriate communications
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Digital Evidence in the Supply Chain
Brand user requires reassurance regarding authenticity of goods
- this must be guaranteed by a Trusted Third Party (TTP)
The focus is:
• verification of
authenticity
• transfer
of liability
Manufacturing
Distribution
&
Whole Sale
Dealers
Clients
Intelligent end-nodes with appropriate communications
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Digital Evidence in the Supply Chain
Authenticate the Transaction
When Goods are Transferred
by Capturing Data identifying
Crime
Detection
Digital
Evidence
- Supplier
- Goods
- Receiver
- Time
- Place
- Authenticator
Trend Analysis
TTP
Database
Goods/Products/
Brand
Authentication
Manufacturing
Distribution
&
Whole Sale
Dealers
Clients
Intelligent end-nodes with appropriate communications
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Digital Evidence in the Supply Chain
Crime
Detection
Digital
Evidence
Digital signing
Trend Analysis
Scope
of
SCTS
TTP
Time stamping
Database
Capture Transactions &
Management information
Manufacturing
Distribution
&
Whole Sale
Goods/Products/
Brand
Authentication
Dealers
Intelligent end-nodes with appropriate communications
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Using RFID towards Digital Evidence - January 2006
Public
Key
Infrastructure
People ID &
authentication
Clients
End node ID &
authentication
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Electronic Vehicle Intelligence[EVI]
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Basic premises of EVI
– If all vehicles must carry an Electronic Registration Device [ERD],
– then the following vehicles are assumed to be illegal,
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vehicles that does not read (broken or no ERD)
vehicles with an ERD that does not match
vehicles identified to be illegal (black listed; suspect)
vehicles not spotted according to real-world space-time
These vehicles, in use, will stand out at the roadside!
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prosecution of the illegals
without harassment of the legals
by identification of the legals
with the illegals paying
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EVI is a trust service
– Providing high integrity vehicle spot-trails
– On road alerts Æ black listing
– Application leverage
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Example of an ERD
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EVI Data Flow
Spot
EVI Info
Spot Trail & Spot Alert
Black/Suspect Listing
Spotting
Station
NaTIS
EVIS
Application
Application
Application
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Digital Evidence Examples
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Face value documents
– Vehicle licenses
– Certificates and legal documents
– Way-bills
Note the use of both 2-D barcodes & RFID is applicable
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Proof of source
– Anti-piracy of products; optical disks, pharmaceuticals, tires, etc.
– Container seals
Note the potential to control issuing and registration fraud
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Proof of delivery
– Digital evidence of the right goods at the right person
Note that both the recipient and items can be digitally linked
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Transfer of liability, thus controlling human processes
Note in all these cases we only require an end-to-end encryption method
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Levels of Scrutiny
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Electronic suspect selection within process free-flow
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Suspect lists
Contradictory information
Real-world anomalies (behavioural scrutiny)
“Civil disobedience” due to a lack of traceability
Physical inspection after suspect selection or ad hoc
– Self inspection
– Cloning detection
– Tamper detection
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Digital data & physical verification in gating scenarios
– Strong digital signatures
– Item “finger prints” or “DNA”
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Forensic level verification
Timely detection of breach of integrity is the important aspect
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Auto-Identification Requirements
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Spotting of processes in operation
– Can not stop the process
– Free-Flow spotting
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Spotting of items, vehicles, people, animals, ect.
– A large variant on the number of tags in the beam
– A large variant on the time tags spend in the beam
– High-speed dynamic populations of tags in the beam
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Deployment cost
– Re-use infrastructure
– Optimise networking and data manipulation costs
Note that spotting points are often off-line
– Minimise requirement to change
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Must be used in anti-crime efforts
– High integrity ChipID for authenticity
– Supports encrypted code structures
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Privacy
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Various active lobby groups
– Need to balance the rights of the individual
• Privacy vs. Protection
– National security risk perception influence
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RFID threat can be limited by passive technologies
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limit in range (max 10 meters)
line of sight (paint the reader yellow)
limit of data transfer (low data rates & storage due to power limit)
physical tamper evident
clone restrictive
Data control
– Effective regulations
– Effective enforcement of regulations
– Limited content within single databases.
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Pro’s and Con’s of RFID
Assume we deal only with an identifier RFID tag
• Tag must have a unique ChipID
– allow for item linking to the tag
– allow for issuing fraud control and detection
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Requires at least 256 bits on tag
– 64 bits for a ChipID – written by the chip manufacturer
• this allows for effective control since there are limited chip manufacturers
• bad chip imitations tend not to work well as passive devices
– 20 bits for source identity index
– 172 bits for a ECC short message signature containing an 96bit “EIC”
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Tag needs to be reliably read in 5ms to allow for effective;
– multi-read
– free-flow at high speeds
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Requires a cost efficient reader
– This is a function of the air-protocol (read-only reader)
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Requires the spectrum to allow for high density free-flow tag scrutiny
– Readers must be co-location & co-channel
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Lifecycle of an Identifier
Trust Service
Domain
Manage the properties of the trust of an identifier
= Active, Noted, Suspended, Revoked, etc.
Issue an identifier
Application
Domain
Link identifier
identifier to
to application
application
Link
Register the identifier
Manage the
identifier
integrity
Expire/revoke the identifier
Authenticate identifier
identifier
Authenticate
Allow level
level of
of use
use of
of application
application
Allow
Application veto-right
veto-right
Application
Proof of
of transaction
transaction for
for parties
parties
Proof
Manage the mechanisms of trust & integrity
Applications for issuing, management & use(verification)
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Conclusion
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It is possible to control human behaviour using digital methods
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It is possible to verify digital evidence in an off-line manner
Integrity of identity is the key & the only prerequisite
RFID can be used to achieve it
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without infringing on privacy
or stopping processes
in creating digital evidence
and accountability
Requires an unique ChipID
Requires short message digital signatures
Requires scrutiny
Requires cost efficient verification tools (RFID Readers)
Requires enough spectrum, which is optimised using Read-Only RFID
with non-modulating or Tag-Talk-Only [TTO] RFID readers
This in all requires a regulatory framework for:
– the public key infrastructure, which includes encryption methods
– remote connectivity & data transfer, storage, manipulation & access
– dedicated spectrum environment
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Using RFID towards Digital Evidence - January 2006
COPYRIGHT © 2006, iPico
Thank You