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Consciousness
and
Cognition
Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 2–17
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www.elsevier.com/locate/concog
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What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used
to study ‘‘False memory,’’ and what are the implications
of these choices?
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Kathy Pezdek *, Shirley Lam
Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA 91711-3955, USA
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Received 25 January 2005
Available online 12 September 2005
Abstract
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This research examines the methodologies employed by cognitive psychologists to study ‘‘false memory,’’ and assesses if these methodologies are likely to facilitate scientific progress or perhaps constrain
the conclusions reached. A PsycINFO search of the empirical publications in cognitive psychology was conducted through January, 2004, using the subject heading, ‘‘false memory.’’ The search produced 198 articles. Although there is an apparent false memory research bandwagon in cognitive psychology, with
increasing numbers of studies published on this topic over the past decade, few researchers (only 13.1%
of the articles) have studied false memory as the term was originally intended—to specifically refer to planting memory for an entirely new event that was never experienced in an individualÕs lifetime. Cognitive psychologists interested in conducting research relevant to assessing the authenticity of memories for child
sexual abuse should consider the generalizability of their research to the planting of entirely new events
in memory.
Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
*
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Keywords: Memory suggestibility; False memory
Corresponding author. Fax: +1 909 621 8905.
E-mail address: Kathy.Pezdek@cgu.edu (K. Pezdek).
1053-8100/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.06.006
K. Pezdek, S. Lam / Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 2–17
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1. Introduction
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One dark night, a drunk man was scurrying around under a street light at the end of an alley.
A man walking by asked him what he was doing. The drunk man explained that he had lost his
keys and was trying to find them. ‘‘Where did you lose your keys?’’ the man asked. ‘‘At the far end
of the alley,’’ he responded. ‘‘So why are you looking at this end of the alley if you lost your keys
down at the other end?’’ asked the man. ‘‘Because itÕs too dark down there to see,’’ he replied.
There are cycles in scientific development. For scientific research to be progressive, the scientific
community in a particular research area must agree on their goals, on the basic characteristics of
the real world that are relevant to their topic of study, and on what the permissible research methods are for studying this topic. Kuhn (1970) called this shared view a paradigm. A shared paradigm allows scientists to analyze their topic from a collective, unified standpoint and an
integrated body of knowledge is more likely to develop. Once established, however, paradigms
can break down and be replaced, and the driving forces here are not always scientific forces. Kuhn
emphasized that the scientific community is, after all, composed of social beings who operate in a
changing historical and social context.
Boring (e.g., 1959/1963b, 1963a) proposed a similar view of scientific development, based on
the concept of Zeitgeist. The Zeitgeist is the total climate in which a scientific idea is developed—the theories, problems, and methods within the scientific community as well as the values
and attitudes of the scientists and the social context in which the work is conducted. The progress
of scientific ideas and methods is both advanced and mired by these forces, producing cyclical
changes in research paradigms.
In the past decade, there has been a veritable explosion of cognitive research on the topic of
false memory. The fact that the research on this topic has been so prolific and has drawn the attention of so many researchers clearly conveys how important this concept is currently considered to
be. The purpose of this study is to examine the research methodologies employed by cognitive
psychologists to study the concept of ‘‘false memory,’’ and to assess if these methodologies are
likely to facilitate scientific progress or perhaps constrain the conclusions reached.
This review is timely because cognitive research on false memory is in its infancy; this term was
first cited in the cognitive research literature in 1994. The fact that false memory research is relatively new and that its emergence in journals produced a veritable explosion, gave us the opportunity to examine the ‘‘first wave’’ of methodological research tools used in this large set of
studies. Although research on false memories will surely evolve in various directions over time,
by looking at the ‘‘first wave’’ of research on this topic we can observe the relatively immediate
methodological reactions that a large number of cognitive psychologists have brought to bare
on the phenomenon of false memory. Specifically, we were interested in the proportion of these
studies that involve planting memories for an entirely new event that was never experienced, as
this was the intended use of the term false memory when it was coined.
The origin of use of the term ‘‘false memory’’ by cognitive psychologists can be traced to a symposium at the 1992 meeting of the American Psychological Society on the topic, ‘‘Remembering
ÔRepressedÕ Abuse: Initial Research, Theoretical Analysis, and Evaluation of the Claims’’ (‘‘Remembering ÔRepressedÕ Abuse’’, 1992). Elizabeth Loftus served as the symposium discussant
and presented her research on planting in adults, false childhood memories for being lost in a
mall. She drew generalizations from this research to the real-world issue of assessing whether
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memories for incidents of childhood sexual abuse may be suggestively planted and thus be ‘‘false
memories.’’ The False Memory Syndrome Foundation, which coined the phrase ‘‘false memory
syndrome,’’ was founded that same year and Loftus and two other members of the APS symposium were members of the FoundationÕs Board of Directors. This symposium was then followed
by a lead article in the American Psychologist by Loftus (1993) entitled, ‘‘The reality of repressed
memory.’’ This is a highly cited article; according to the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI),
there have been 493 published citations of this article. In both the symposium and the subsequent
article, the use of the term ‘‘false memory’’ was specifically intended to refer to memory for an entirely new event, that is, an event or a specific episode of an event that was never experienced by an individual in his or her lifetime, but nonetheless, came to reside in the individualÕs memory.
The data for this study were generated from a review of the published empirical research literature in cognitive psychology journals in which the term ‘‘false memory’’ was indicated as a key
word or key concept, from 1872 to January, 2004. In this search, we identified a total of 198 articles and then categorized these articles based on the principal methodology that was used in each.
We were primarily interested in the percent of these articles that involved planting memories for
entirely new events that were never experienced by participants in their lifetime. (In this work, we
did not distinguish between beliefs and memories although this may prove to be an important distinction. See Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002.)
2. Methods
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2.1. Procedures
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A PsycINFO search for the time period from 1872 (the first study identified was, in fact published in 1994) through the first week of January, 2004 was conducted using the subject heading,
‘‘false memory.’’ The resulting citations were then limited to journal articles, empirical study and
the classification codes: cognitive processes, or learning and memory, or developmental psychology, or cognitive and perceptual development. This search produced 188 articles. Ten additional
articles were identified and added to the corpus. These were the most frequently cited articles in
the cognitive research on false memories that had been excluded from the PsycINFO search because they did not specifically use the subject heading ‘‘false memory.’’ These 10 articles were published in the mid-1990s and were likely submitted just before the term false memory appeared in
the published literature. A total of 198 empirical studies was included in the literature search.
The two authors reviewed and categorized all 198 articles. These 198 articles were classified
according to the research task used in each study. The list of the six categories of tasks used is
indicated in Table 1. We were primarily interested in identifying the articles in which the researchers attempted to plant entirely new events in memory. This was the first category.
The articles that did not fit into this first category were sorted into one of five additional categories. These five categories are not entirely mutually exclusive as several studies share methodological characteristics with more than one category. In categorizing each article, the authors
identified the principal methodological task used and sorted the article into this category. As indicated in Table 1, category two included studies in which new or changed memory details (not
memory for entirely new events) resulted from misinformation or suggestive sources. The third
K. Pezdek, S. Lam / Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 2–17
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Table 1
Number of ‘‘False memory’’ articles (and percentage) classified according to each of the six types of tasks
Type of task used
Number of articles
Total
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26
32
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31
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Whole new event planted
New or changed details planted
DRM
General recognition memory
Source monitoring
Other
Percentage (%)
198
13.1
16.2
41.4
15.7
6.1
7.6
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category included studies that employed the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The fourth category included general recognition
memory tasks. These recognition memory studies typically utilized words or study lists of unassociated items in which a false alarm, p(‘‘old’’/new), was described as a ‘‘false memory.’’ The fifth
category included variations of the source monitoring task (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay,
1993). The sixth category was labeled ‘‘other’’ and included procedures such as false fame tasks
and changing social beliefs.
3. Results
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3.1. What research paradigms have cognitive psychologists used to study ‘‘False memory?’’
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The number of false memory articles classified according to each of the six types of tasks is presented in Table 1. Of primary interest is the percentage of the 198 articles in which cognitive psychologists used the term false memory as it was originally intended, that is, to refer to planting
entirely new events in memory. Only 13.1% (N = 26) of these articles fell in this category. The list
of these 26 articles is included in Appendix A.
A separate category included articles in which new or changed memory details resulted from
misinformation or suggestive sources (e.g., suggesting that a stop sign was really a yield sign). This
category accounted for 16.2% (N = 32) of the articles. Much of the research on the suggestibility
of memory is of this type, and after 1992, but not prior to 1992, most of the studies on memory
suggestibility have used ‘‘false memory’’ as a subject heading. However, these articles were included in a separate category in this study because none involved planting an entirely new event in
memory. A list of these articles is included in Appendix B.
The largest category of articles that included ‘‘false memory’’ as a subject heading were those
that used the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure (Deese, 1959; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995). This category accounted for 41.4% (N = 82) of the articles. A list of these articles is included in Appendix C. In this paradigm, participants are typically presented lists of
semantically related words (e.g., bed, rest, and awake), in which one highly associated critical lure
word (e.g., sleep) is excluded. In a subsequent recognition or recall memory test, participants
produce a high rate of false alarms to the critical lure word that was not presented. This result
was first reported by Deese (1959); he referred to this specific type of memory error as ‘‘intrusion
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errors.’’ Thirty-six years later, Roediger and McDermott (1995) rediscovered this finding; they
and subsequent researchers used the term ‘‘false memory’’ to refer to the false alarm rate to
the critical non-presented lure words. Not only do studies of this type dominate the false memory
literature by cognitive psychologists, but the SSCI for the Roediger and McDermott (1995) article
yields 394 published citations, an extremely high number of citations for a study published only
nine years ago.
The fourth category of articles includes general recognition memory studies. This category
accounted for 15.7% (N = 31) of the articles. A list of these articles is included in Appendix D.
These recognition memory studies typically utilized words or study lists of unassociated items in
which a false alarm, p(‘‘old’’/new), was described as a ‘‘false memory.’’ Research on memory
errors has a long tradition in the cognitive psychology literature. (See Roediger & McDermott,
2000 for a review of this literature.) What is new is the labeling of these results as ‘‘false memories.’’
The fifth category of articles includes research on source monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993). This
category accounted for 6.1% (N = 12) of the 198 articles in the corpus. A list of these articles is
included in Appendix E. Although research on reality monitoring is not new in cognitive psychology (Johnson & Raye, 1981), reference to these results as ‘‘false memories’’ has occurred in the
literature only in the past ten years.
The sixth category includes 7.6% (N = 15) of the articles that did not fit any of the above five
categories. A list of these articles is included in Appendix F.
3.2. Trends over time in the publication of articles with a subject heading, ‘‘False memory’’
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The next analysis examined the trends over time in the publication of articles in cognitive psychology with a subject heading, ‘‘false memory.’’ Of interest here is what the trend is (a) for all
Fig. 1. Number of research articles in cognitive psychology journals per year (1994–2003) that used the term ‘‘false
memory’’ (dark bars) compared to the number of articles per year that used the term ‘‘false memory’’ specifically to
refer to planting memories for entirely new events (light bars).
K. Pezdek, S. Lam / Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 2–17
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articles on false memory and (b) for articles that specifically use the term false memory to refer to
planting memories for entirely new events. These data are presented in Fig. 1. These data suggest
that although the number of published articles on false memory has generally increased dramatically from 1994 to 2003, the number of studies that involve planting memories for entirely new
events has varied between zero (for 1994 and 2000) and five (1997) and has generally remained low
and flat.
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4. Discussion
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The results suggests that although there is an apparent false memory research bandwagon in
cognitive psychology, with increasing numbers of studies published on this topic over the past decade, few researchers (only 13.1% of the articles) have studied false memories as the term was originally intended—to specifically refer to planting memory for an entirely new event—and this
pattern has remained relatively unchanged.
Why should there be one clear definition of false memory among cognitive researchers? We argue
that flawed memories and false memories are not the same thing, nor are identical cognitive processes likely to underlie the two. Prior to 1994, there was a wealth of research on numerous sources
of flawed memory. A flawed memory is one in which the original event is represented in memory but
with one or more details retained incorrectly, or simply any false alarm on a recognition memory
test. Flaws in memory originate, for example, from post-event suggestion, inter-list associations
among items, intrusion errors from related sources, source confusion errors, and social beliefs.
Research on memory flaws has been and will continue to be critical to the development of cognitive theories of memory. However, to apply the same label, ‘‘false memory,’’ to all of these
sources of memory flaws is more likely to confuse than clarify the research. In light of the fact
that the term false memory originated specifically to describe memory for an entirely new event,
we suggest that the term be reserved to describe either research on memory for an entirely new
event that did not occur, or research that has been demonstrated to generalize to memory for
an entirely new event that did not occur. We suggest the continued use of the terms ‘‘flawed memory’’ and ‘‘false alarms’’ to refer to the other types of memory errors discussed above. Using the
term ‘‘false memory’’ to describe all memory flaws would be like using the term ‘‘elements’’ to
describe all types of matter. Yes, all elements are matter, but all chemical principles that describe
elements to not apply to all of the other subtypes of matter (i.e., compounds, mixtures, etc.), and
to assume so would misinform the development of the field.
Another reason to encourage researchers to use a uniform and more precise definition of false
memory is to foster clearer communication between the clinical and experimental communities.
The interest in the cognitive research on false memories is truly interdisciplinary and includes clinical psychologists as well as sociologists, social workers, and others focusing on emotion memory
or traumatic memory. Individuals from these various disciplines might automatically assume that
all cognitive research currently reported as false memory research generalizes to memories for
childhood sexual abuse. The goals of practitioners as well as basic and applied researchers seeking
to understand the constraints on accurate memory for childhood sexual abuse, are likely to be
thwarted if all conclusions from the research on flawed memory is automatically generalized to
false memory for an entirely new event that did not occur.
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At the same time that this study was conducted, an independent but somewhat similar review of
the false memory literature was conducted by DePrince, Allard, Oh, and Freyd (2004), and similar
conclusions were reached. Their study included a review of 397 articles from across all fields of
psychology in which the term false memory was used; 70% of these were empirical articles. The
principle finding in their study was that across all fields of psychology, only 30% of the empirical
articles that were characterized as studies of false memories, were in fact studies that involved
planting memories for entirely new events that were never experienced by participants. The
authors referred to this as the ‘‘precise’’ use of the term, false memory. Thus the large majority
of these studies used the term false memory ‘‘imprecisely.’’ The present study differs from that
of DePrince et al. in several ways. The primary difference is that the study reported here is restricted solely to empirical articles within the field of cognitive psychology, and thus traces a trend in the
use of the term false memory within this specific domain of psychology. A significant number of
the articles in the DePrince review were published in clinical psychology journals.
4.1. What are the implications of these research choices?
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The issue upon which the term false memory originated was an applied issue, that is, the
authenticity of memories of sexual abuse. The results of studies of false memory should be and
often are generalized to this real-world concern. What is the evidence that there are limitations
in the generalization of the false memory research to situations that involve planting entirely
new events in memory? Pezdek and Roe (1997) specifically compared the relative vulnerability
to suggestibility of changed, planted, and erased memories. Four-year-olds and 10-year-olds participated in a study in which they were either touched in a specific way or were not touched at all,
and it was later suggested that a different touch, a completely new touch, or no touch at all had
occurred. Although it was relatively easy to suggest to a child a change in the event that was experienced, it was less likely that the event could be planted in memory if it had not occurred or
erased from memory if it had occurred. These findings suggest that there are clear differences
in the cognitive mechanisms underlying suggestively planting versus changing memories. It is thus
inappropriate to generalize directly from false memory research that did not involve planting
entirely new events in memory to real world situations that do involve planting entirely new events
in memory.
4.2. Why is the DRM task so popular and are these findings likely to generalize to planting false
memories for childhood sexual abuse?
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Why have so many memory researchers interested in false memories selected as a research
paradigm, the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) word-list task? One possibility is that
the theoretical underpinnings of the DRM results are already well developed, and it is relatively
easier to build on an existing theory than to develop a new one. In addition, the DRM procedure is relatively easy to implement. We scientists generally have an aversion to messy problems. Even good scientists often have to make messy problems neat so that they can study
them. The conversion of the messy problem of studying memory for childhood abuse to the
neat problem of studying intrusion errors in memory for lists of words does have methodological appeal.
K. Pezdek, S. Lam / Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 2–17
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Another possible reason why so many cognitive psychologists interested in false memories have
utilized the DRM task stems from personal biases; researchers often seek paradigms that are
likely to produce the effect they desire. If a cognitive psychologist generally questions the validity
of repressed memory, he or she is likely to study false memory issues with a paradigm that is likely
to demonstrate the high prevalence rate for false memories. The DRM task is a fail-safe semantic
priming task that always produces memory intrusion errors. If these memory intrusion errors are
equated with false memories, then these findings can be used as evidence for a high prevalence rate
for false memories. Unfortunately, however, it has not been demonstrated that the mechanisms
that operate to explain the DRM findings apply as well to memory for planting entirely new
events in memory, specifically memory for child sexual abuse.
Why is it that Roediger and McDermott (1995) were so successful in their rediscovery of the
findings of Deese (1959)? After all, it is at least unusual for a researcher to obtain an SSCI of
394 citations for publishing a replication of a 36-year old study. Bruce and Winograd (1998) offer
an explanation for this based on the operation of the scientific Zeitgeist. According to Bruce and
Winograd, it was the fact that DeeseÕs findings were being revisited in the context of a current social issue—false memories for child sexual abuse—that justified the replication. Without this current social context, the Roediger and McDermott findings would have been ‘‘old news.’’ It is
surprising then that although the issue regarding the incidence of false memories for child sexual
abuse provided the motivation for the popularity of the DRM task, few researchers have questioned the generalizability of the findings using the DRM task to the planting of entirely new
events in memory.
One exception was offered by Freyd and Gleaves (1996), who articulated critical differences between the task used by Roediger and McDermott (1995) and memory for child sexual abuse, and
concluded that these differences were sufficient to limit the generalizability of the findings using
the DRM task to the planting of entirely new events in memory. In particular, Freyd and Gleaves
pointed out that in Roediger and McDermottÕs own study (see Roediger & McDermottÕs Table 1,
p. 806), although lures related to learned words were likely to be erroneously remembered as having been presented, unrelated lures were not. Thus, using the example by Freyd and Gleaves,
although ‘‘shoe’’ in a list of to-be-learned words is likely to prime ‘‘foot,’’ ‘‘shoe’’ is not likely
to prime the unrelated word, ‘‘penis.’’ Similarly, although ‘‘birthday party’’ might semantically
prime ‘‘eating apple pie,’’ ‘‘birthday party’’ is not likely to prime ‘‘sexual abuse.’’ In response,
Roediger and McDermott (1996) acknowledged that their results should not be ‘‘generalize(d)
to the controversy about possible false memories arising from certain therapeutic practices’’
(Roediger & McDermott, 1996, p. 816). Notably, however, the SSCI for the articles by Freyd
and Gleaves (1996) and Roediger and McDermott (1996), published only one year after Roediger
and McDermott (1995), are both quite low (20 and 10 citations, respectively).
The tremendous wave of cognitive research on false memories was motivated by concern for
understanding the conditions under which false memories of child abuse are likely to be planted.
As would be expected in any new area of study, the 26 studies conducted on planting memories for
entirely new events are not all consistent in their findings. Nonetheless, developing theories of the
cognitive dynamics underlying the planting of false events that are based on research involving the
planting of entirely new events in memory (see for example, Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997) are
more likely to generalize to memory for real world cases of child abuse than are theories developed to explain other memory phenomena.
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Cognitive psychologists interested in conducting research that is truly relevant to determining
the authenticity of memories for sexual abuse, should consider the generalizability of their research to the planting of entirely new events in memory. The drunk looking for his keys under
the light would do well to consider where the keys are likely to be rather than where it is easiest
to conduct the search.
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Appendix A. Empirical articles from 1872 through January, 2004 using procedures for planting false memories for entirely
new events
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Bruck, M., Ceci. S. J., & Hembrooke, H. (2002). The nature of childrenÕs true and false narratives. Developmental Review, 22, 520–554.
Candel, I., Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., Rasquin, S., & Bollen, E. (1998). The Dutch version of the Bonn Test of Statement Suggestibility (BTSS), a suggestibility scale for children: A psychodiagnostic instrument. Psycholoog, 33, 554–559.
Ceci, S. J., & Huffman, M. L. C. (1997). How suggestible are preschool children? Cognitive and social factors. Journal of the
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 36, 948–958.
Conway, M. A., Collins, A. F., Gathercole, S. E., & Anderson, S. J. (1996). Recollections of true and false autobiographical
memories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 69–95.
Heaps, C., & Nash, M. (1999). Individual differences in imagination inflation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6, 313–318.
Heaps, C. M., & Nash, M. (2001). Comparing recollective experience in true and false autobiographical memories. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 27, 920–930.
Huffman, M. L., Crossman, A. M., & Ceci, S. J. (1997). ‘‘Are false memories permanent?’’: An investigation of the long-term effects
of source misattributions. Consciousness & Cognition, 6, 482–490.
Hyman, I. E., Jr., & Billings, F. J. (1998). Individual differences and the creation of false childhood memories. Memory, 6, 1–20.
Hyman, I. E., Husband, T. H., & Billings, F. J. (1995). False memories of childhood experiences. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 9,
181–197.
Hyman, I. E., Jr., & Pentland, J. (1996). The role of mental imagery in the creation of false childhood memories. Journal of Memory
& Language, 35, 101–117.
Larsen, S. F., & Conway, M. A. (1997). Reconstructing dates of true and false autobiographical memories. European Journal of
Cognitive Psychology, 9, 259–272.
Loftus, E. F., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720–725.
Mazzoni, G., & Memon, A. (2003). Imagination can create false autobiographical memories. Psychological Science, 14, 186–188.
McBrien, C. M., & Dagenbach, D. (1998). The contributions of source misattributions, acquiescence, and response bias to childrenÕs false memories. American Journal of Psychology, 111, 509–528.
Ost, J., Vrij, A., Costall, A., & Bull, R. (2002). Crashing memories and reality monitoring: Distinguishing between perceptions,
imaginations and Ôfalse memories.Õ Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16, 125–134.
Paddock, J. R., & Terranova, S. (2001). Guided visualization and suggestibility: Effect of perceived authority on recall of autobiographical memories. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 162, 347–356.
Pezdek, K., Finger, K., & Hodge, D. (1997). Planting false childhood memories: The role of event plausibility. Psychological
Science, 8, 437–441.
Pezdek, K., & Hodge, D. (1999). Planting false childhood memories in children: The role of event plausibility. Child Development,
70, 887–895.
Pezdek, K., & Roe, C. (1997). The suggestibility of childrenÕs memory for being touched: Planting, erasing, and changing memories.
Law & Human Behavior, 21, 95–106.
Porter, S., Yuille, J. C., & Lehman, D. R. (1999). The nature of real, implanted, and fabricated memories for emotional childhood
events: Implications for the recovered memory debate. Law & Human Behavior, 23, 517–537.
Quas, J.A., & Schaaf, J. M. (2002). ChildrenÕs memories of experienced and nonexperienced events following repeated interviews.
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83, 304–338.
Sheen, M., Kemp, S., & Rubin, D. (2001). Twins dispute memory ownership: A new false memory phenomenon. Memory &
Cognition, 29, 779–788.
Spanos, N. P., Burgess, C. A., Burgess, M. F., Samuels, C., & Blois, W. O. (1999). Creating false memories of infancy with hypnotic
and non-hypnotic procedures. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 13, 201–218.
Strange, D., Garry, M., & Sutherland, R. (2003). Drawing out childrenÕs false memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 607–619.
Thomas, A. K., Bulevich, J. B., & Loftus, E. F. (2003). Exploring the role of repetition and sensory elaboration in the imagination
inflation effect. Memory & Cognition, 31, 630–640.
Wade, K. A., Garry, M., Read, J. D., & Lindsay, S. (2002). A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create
false childhood memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 597–603.
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Appendix B. Empirical articles from 1872 through January, 2004 using procedures for planting new or changed details in
observed events
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Ackil, J. K., & Zaragoza, M. S. (1998). Memorial consequences of forced confabulation: Age differences in susceptibility to false
memories. Developmental Psychology, 34, 1358–1372.
Alexander, K. W., Goodman, G. S., Schaaf, J. M., Edelstein, R. S., Quas, J. A., & Shaver, P. R. (2002). The role of attachment and
cognitive inhibition in childrenÕs memory and suggestibility for a stressful event. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83,
262–290.
Braun, K. A., Ellis, R., & Loftus, E. F. (2002). Make my memory: How advertising can change our memories of the past. Psychology & Marketing, 19, 1–23.
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Garcia-Bajos, E., & Migueles, M. (2003). False memories for script actions in a mugging account. European Journal of Cognitive
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Underwood, J., & Pezdek, K. (1998). Memory suggestibility as an example of the sleeper effect. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5,
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Appendix C. Empirical articles from 1872 through January, 2004 using the Deese, Roediger, McDermott (1995) procedure
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Arndt, J., & Reder, L. M. (2003). The effect of distinctive visual information on false recognition. Journal of Memory & Language,
48, 1–15.
Baird, R. R. (2001). Experts sometimes show more false recall than novices: A cost of knowing too much. Learning & Individual
Differences, 13, 349–355.
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Benjamin, A. S. (2001). On the dual effects of repetition on false recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
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Blair, I. V., Lenton, A. P., & Hastie, R. (2002). The reliability of the DRM paradigm as a measure of individual differences in false
memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 590–596.
Brainerd, C. J., Payne, D. G., Wright, R., & Reyna, V. F. (2003). Phantom recall. Journal of Memory & Language, 48, 445–467.
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1998). When things that were never experienced are easier to ‘‘remember’’ than things that were.
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Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2002). Recollection rejection: How children edit their false memories. Developmental Psychology,
38, 156–172.
Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F., & Forrest, T. J. (2002). Are young children susceptible to the false-memory illusion? Child
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Brainerd, C. J., Wright, R., Reyna, V. F., & Mojardin, A. H. (2001). Conjoint recognition and phantom recollection. Journal of
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Bredart, S. (2000). When false memories do not occur: Not thinking of the lure or remembering that it was not heard? Memory, 8,
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Brown, N. R., Buchanan, L., & Cabeza, R. (2000). Estimating the frequency of nonevents: The role of recollection failure in false
recognition. Psychonomic Bulleting & Review, 7, 684–691.
Clancy, S. A., McNally, R. J., Schacter, D. L., Lenzenweger, M. F., & Pitman, R. K. (2002). Memory distortion in people reporting
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Dodhia, R. M., & Metcalfe, J. (1999). False memories and source monitoring. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 16, 489–508.
Gallo, D. A., McDermott, K. B., Percer, J. M., & Roediger, H. L. III. (2001). Modality effects in false recall and false recognition.
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Gallo, D. A., Roberts, M. J., & Seamon, J. G. (1997). Remembering words not presented in lists: Can we avoid creating false
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Gallo, D. A., & Roediger, H. L. (2002). Variability among word lists in eliciting memory illusions: Evidence for associative
activation and monitoring. Journal of Memory & Language, 47, 469–497.
Gallo, D. A., & Roediger, H. L. III. (2003). The effects of associations and aging on illusory recollection. Memory & Cognition, 31,
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Gallo, D. A., Roediger, H. L., III, & McDermott, K. B. (2001). Associative false recognition occurs without strategic criterion
shifts. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 579–586.
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Ghetti, S., Qin, J., & Goodman, G. S. (2002). False memories in children and adults: Age, distinctiveness, and subjective experience.
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Goodwin, K. A., Meissner, C. A., & Ericsson, K. A. (2001). Toward a model of false recall: Experimental manipulation of encoding
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Hancock, T. W., Hicks, J. L., Marsh, R. L., & Ritschel, L. (2003). Measuring the activation level of critical lures in the Deese–
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He, H., Zhang, J., Zhu, Y. (2001). The effect of dividing attention on false recognition. Acta Psychologica Sinica, 33, 17–23.
Hicks, J. L., & Hancock, T. W. (2002). Backward associative strength determines source attributions given to false memories.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 807–815.
Hicks, J. L., & Marsh, R. L. (1999). Attempts to reduce the incidence of false recall with source monitoring. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 25, 1195–1209.
Hoshino, Y. (2002). False recall created by learning related words: A comparison between blocked presentation and random
presentation of related words. Japanese Journal of Psychonomic Science, 20, 105–114.
Johansson, M., & Sternberg, G. (2002). Inducing and reducing false memories: A Swedish version of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 43, 369–383.
Kellogg, R. T. (2001). Presentation modality and mode of recall in verbal false memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 27, 913–919.
Kimball, D. R., & Bjork, R. A. (2002). Influences of intentional and unintentional forgetting on false memories. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 116–130.
Koustaal, W. (2003). Older adults encode—but do not always use—perceptual details: Intentional versus unintentional effects of
detail on memory judgments. Psychological Science, 14, 189–193.
Lampinen, J. M., & Schwartz, R. M. (2000). The impersistence of false memory persistence. Memory, 8, 393–400.
Libby, L. K., & Neisser, U. (2001). Structure and strategy in the associative false memory paradigm. Memory, 9, 145–163.
Loevden, M. (2003). The episodic memory and inhibition accounts of age-related increases in false memories: A consistency check.
Journal of Memory & Language, 49, 268–283.
Marmurek, H. H. C., & Hamilton, M. E. (2000). Imagery effects in false recall and false recognition. Journal of Mental Imagery, 24,
83–96.
Marsh, R. L., & Hicks, J. L. (2001). Output monitoring tests reveal false memories of memories that never existed. Memory, 9,
39–51.
Marsh, E. J., McDermott, K. B., Roediger, H. L. III. (2004). Does test-induced priming play a role in the creation of false
memories? Memory, 12, 44–55.
Mather, M., Henkel, L. A., & Johnson, M. K. (1997). Evaluating characteristics of false memories: Remember/know judgments
and memory characteristics questionnaire compared. Memory & Cognition, 25, 826–837.
Maylor, E. A., & Mo, A. (1999). Effects of study-test modality on false recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 90, 477–493.
McCabe, D. P., & Smith, A. D. (2002). The effect of warnings on false memories in young and older adults. Memory & Cognition,
30, 1065–1077.
McDermott, K. B., & Roediger, H. L. III. (1998). Attempting to avoid illusory memories: Robust false recognition of associates
persists under condition of explicit warnings and immediate testing. Journal of Memory & Language, 39, 508–520.
McDermott, K. B., & Watson, J. M. (2001). The rise and fall of false recall: The impact of presentation duration. Journal of
Memory & Language, 45, 160–176.
McEvoy, C. L., Nelson, D. L., & Komatsu, T. (1999). What is the connection between true and false memories? The differential
roles of interitem associations in recall and recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 25,
1177–1194.
McKelvie, S. J. (1999). Effect of retrieval instructions on false recall. Perceptual & Motor Skills, 88, 876–878.
McKone, E., & Murphy, B. (2000). Implicit false memory: Effects of modality and multiple study presentations on long-lived
semantic priming. Journal of Memory & Language, 43, 89–109.
Miller, A. R., Baratta, C., Wynveen, C., & Rosenfeld, J. P. (2001). P300 latency, but not amplitude or topography, distinguishes
between true and false recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 27, 354–361.
Miller, M. B., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (1998). Creating false memories for visual scenes. Neuropsychologia, 36, 513–520.
Multhaup, K. S. & Conner, C. A. (2002). The effects of considering nonlist sources on the Deese–Roediger–McDermott memory
illusion. Journal of Memory & Language, 47, 214–228.
Neuschatz, J. S., Benoit, G. E., & Payne, D. G. (2003). Effective warnings in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott false-memory
paradigm: The role of identifiability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 29, 35–40.
Neuschatz, J. S., Payne, D. G., Lampinen, J. M., & Toglia, M. P. (2001). Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories. Memory, 9, 53–71.
Newstead, B. A., & Newstead, S. E. (1998). False recall and false memory: The effects of instructions on memory errors. Applied
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Norman, K. A., Schacter, D. L. (1997). False recognition in younger and older adults: Exploring the characteristics of illusory
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Perez-Mata, M. N., Read, J. D., & Diges, M. (2002). Effects of divided attention and word concreteness on correct recall and false
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Pesta, B. J., Murphy, M. D., & Sanders, R. E. (2001). Are emotionally charged lures immune to false memory? Journal of
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Pesta, B. J., Sanders, R. E., & Murphy, M. D. (2001). Misguided multiplication: Creating false memories with numbers rather than
words. Memory & Cognition, 29, 478–483.
Rhodes, M. G., & Anastasi, J. S. (2000). The effects of a levels-of-processing manipulation on false recall. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review, 7, 158–162.
Roediger, H. L., III, Watson, J. M., McDermott, K. B., & Gallo, D. A. (2001). Factors that determine false recall: A multiple
regression analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 385–407.
Schacter, D. L., Israel, L., Racine, C. (1999). Suppressing false recognition in younger and older adults: The distinctiveness
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Seamon, J. G., Goodkind, M. S., Dumey, A. D., Dick, E., Aufseeser, M. S., Strickland, S. E., Woulfin, J. R., & Fung, N. S. (2003).
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Cognition, 31, 445–457.
Seamon, J. G., Guerry, J. D., Marsh, G. P., & Tracy, M. C. (2002). Accurate and false recall in the Deese/Roediger and McDermott procedure: A methodological note on sex of participant. Psychological Reports, 91, 423–427.
Seamon, J. G., Lee, I. A., Toner, S. K., Wheeler, R. H., Goodkind, M. S., & Birch, A. D. (2002). Thinking of critical words during
study is unnecessary for false memory in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott procedure. Psychological Science, 13, 526–531.
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., & Gallo, D. A. (1998). Creating false memories of words with or without recognition of list items:
Evidence for nonconscious processes. Psychological Science, 9, 20–26.
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., Kopecky, J. J., Price, C. A., Rothschild, L., Fung, N. S., & Schwartz, M. A. (2002). Are false memories
more difficult to forget than accurate memories? The effect of retention interval on recall and recognition. Memory & Cognition, 30,
1054–1064.
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., Schwartz, M. A., Jones, K. J., Lee, D. M., & Jones, S. J. (2002). Repetition can have similar or different
effects on accurate and false recognition. Journal of Memory & Language, 46, 323–340.
Seamon, J. G., Luo, C. R., Shulman, E. P., Toner, S. K., & Caglar, S. (2002). False memories are hard to inhibit: Differential effects
of directed forgetting on accurate and false recall in the DRM procedure. Memory, 10, 225–238.
Smith, S. M., Gerkens, D. R., Pierce, B. H., & Choi, H. (2002). The roles of associative responses at study and semantically guided
recollection at test in false memory: The Kirkpatrick and Deese hypotheses. Journal of Memory & Language, 47, 436–447.
Smith, S. M., Gleaves, D. H., Pierce, B. H., Williams, T. L., Gilliland, T. R., & Gerkens, D. R. (2003). Eliciting and comparing false
and recovered memories: An experimental approach. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 251–279.
Smith, R. E., & Hunt, R. R. (1998). Presentation modality affects false memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5, 710–715.
Smith, S. M., Ward, T. B., Tindell, D. R., Sifonis, C. M., & Wilkenfeld, M. J. (2000). Category structure and created memories.
Memory & Cognition, 28, 386–395.
Sommers, M. S., & Lewis, B. P. (1999). Who really lives next door: Creating false memories with phonological neighbors. Journal of
Memory & Language, 40, 83–108.
Soraci, S. A., Carlin, M. T., Toglia, M. P., Chechile, R. A., & Neuschatz, J. S. (2003). Generative processing and false memories:
When there is no cost. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 29, 511–523.
Stein, L. M., & Pergher, G. K. (2001). Creating false memories in adults using associated word lists. Psicologia: Reflexao e Critica,
14, 353–366.
Tajika, H., & Hamajima, H. (2002). Effects of imagery instructions on false memories produced on implicit and explicit memory
tests. Shinrigaku Kenkyu Japanese Journal of Psychology, 73, 324–331.
Toglia, M. P., Neuschatz, J. S., & Goodwin, K. A. (1999). Recall accuracy and illusory memories: When more is less. Memory, 7,
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Tun, P. A., Wingfield, A., Rosen, M. J., & Blanchard, L. (1998). Response latencies for false memories: Gist-based processes in
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Wallace, W. P., Malone, C. P., Swiergosz, M. J., Amberg, M. D. (2000). On the generality of false recognition reversal. Journal of
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Watson, J. M., Balota, D. A., & Roediger Iii, H. L. (2003). Creating false memories with hybrid lists of semantic and phonological
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Westerberg, C. E., Marsolek, C. J. (2003). Hemisphere asymmetries in memory processes as measured in a false recognition
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Westerberg, C. E., Marsolek, C. J. (2003). Sensitivity reductions in false recognition: A measure of false memories with stronger
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Appendix D. Empirical articles from 1872 through January, 2004 using general recognition tasks
Arndt, J., & Hirshman, E. (1998). True and false recognition in MINERVA2: Explanations from a global matching perspective.
Journal of Memory & Language, 39, 371–391.
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Brainerd, C. J., & Mojardin, A. H. (1998). ChildrenÕs and adultsÕ spontaneous false memories: Long-term persistence and meretesting effects. Child Development, 69, 1361–1377.
Buchanan, L., Brown, N. R., Cabeza, R., & Maitson, C. (1999). False memories and semantic lexicon arrangement. Brain &
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Busey, T. A., & Tunnicliff, J. L. (1999). Accounts of blending, distinctiveness, and typicality in the false recognition of faces. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 25, 1210–1235.
Dewhurst, S. A. (2001). Category repetition and false recognition: Effects of instance frequency and category size. Journal of
Memory & Language, 44, 153–167.
Dewhurst, S. A., & Anderson, S. J. (1999). Effects of exact and category repetition in true and false recognition memory. Memory &
Cognition, 27, 664–673.
Dodson, C. S., & Schacter, D. L. (2001). ‘‘If I had said it I would have remembered it’’: Reducing false memories with a distinctiveness heuristic. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 155–161.
Dodson, C. S., & Schacter, D. L. (2002). Aging and strategic retrieval processes: Reducing false memories with a distinctiveness
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Intons-Peterson, M. J., Rocchi, P., West, T., McLellan, K., & Hackney, A. (1999). Age, testing at preferred or nonpreferred times
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Jacoby, L. L. (1999). Deceiving the elderly: Effects of accessibility bias in cued-recall performance. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 16,
417–436.
Jones, T. C., & Jacoby, L. L. (2001). Feature conjunction errors in recognition memory: Evidence for dual-process theory. Journal
of Memory & Language, 45, 82–102.
Jones, T. C., & Jacoby, L. L., Gellis, L. A. (2001). Cross-modal feature and conjunction errors in recognition memory. Journal of
Memory & Language, 44, 131–152.
Kensinger, E. A., & Schacter, D. L. (1999). When true memories suppress false memories: Effects of ageing. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 16, 399–415.
Klinger, M. R. (2001). The roles of attention and awareness in the false recognition effect. American Journal of Psychology, 114, 93–114.
Koustaal, W., Reddy, C., Jackson, E. M., Prince, S., Cendan, D. L., & Schacter, D. L. (2003). False recognition of abstract versus
common objects in older and younger adults: Testing the semantic categorization account. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 29, 499–510.
Koustaal, W., Schacter, D. L., & Brenner, C. (2001). Dual task demands and gist-based false recognition of pictures in younger and
older adults. Journal of Memory & Language, 44, 399–426.
Koustaal, W., Schacter, D. L., Galluccio, L., & Stofer, K. A. (1999). Reducing gist-based false recognition in older adults: Encoding and retrieval manipulations. Psychology & Aging, 14, 220–237.
La Voie, D. J., & Faulkner, K. (2000). Age differences in false recognition using a forced choice paradigm. Experimental Aging
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Ochsner, K. N., Schacter, D. L., & Edwards, K. (1997). Memory, 5, 433–455.
Reysen, M. B., & Nairne, J. S. (2002). Part-set cuing of false memories. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 389–393.
Rhodes, M. G., & Kelley, C. M. (2003). The ring of familiarity: False familiarity due to rhyming primes in item and associative
recognition. Journal of Memory & Language, 48, 581–595.
Roberts, P. (2002). Vulnerability to false memory: The effects of stress, imagery, trait anxiety, and depression. Current Psychology:
Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 21, 240–252.
Rubin, S. R., Van Petten, C., Glisky, E. L., & Newberg, W. M. (1999). Memory conjunction errors in younger and older adult:
Event-related potential and neuropsychological data. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 16, 459–488.
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Searcy, J. H., Bartlett, J. C., Memon, A., & Swanson, K. (2001). Aging and lineup performance at long retention intervals: Effects
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Walla, P., Endl, W., Lindinger, G., Deecke, L., & Lang, W. (2000). False recognition in a verbal memory task: An event-related
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Wallace, W. P., Malone, C. P. & Spoo, A. D. (2000). Implicit word activation during prerecognition processing: False recognition
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Westbury, C., Buchanan, L., & Brown, N. R. (2002). Sounds of the neighborhood: False memories and the structure of the
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Whittlesea, B. W. A. (2002). False memory and the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: The prototype-familiarity illusion. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 96–115.
Zeelenberg, R., & Pecher, D. (2002). False memories and lexical decision: Even twelve primes do not cause long-term semantic
priming. Acta Psychologica, 109, 269–284.
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Appendix E. Empirical articles from 1872 through January, 2004 using source monitoring tasks
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Anastasi, J. S., Rhodes, M. G., & Burns, M. C. (2000). Distinguishing between memory illusions and actual memories using
phenomenological measurements and explicit warnings. American Journal of Psychology, 113, 1–26.
Ceci, S. J., Huffman, M. L. C., Smith, E., & Loftus, E. F. (1994). Repeatedly thinking about a non-event: Source misattributions
among preschoolers. Consciousness & Cognition, 3, 338–407.
Hicks, J. L., & Marsh, R. L. (2001). False recognition occurs more frequently during source identification than during old-new
recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 27, 375–383.
Lampinen, J. M., Neuschatz, J. S., & Payne, D. G. (1999). Source attributions and false memories: A test of the demand characteristics account. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6, 130–135.
MacRae, C. N., Schloerscheidt, A. M., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Milne, A. B. (2002). Creating memory illusions: Expectancy-based
processing and the generation of false memories. Memory, 10, 63–80.
Manning, C. G., Loftus, E. F. (1996). Eyewitness testimony and memory distortion. Japanese Psychological Research, 38,
5–13.
Mather, M., Johnson, M. K., & De Leonardis, D. M. (1999). Stereotype reliance in source monitoring: Age differences and
neuropsychological test correlates. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 16, 437–458.
Parks, T. E. (1997). False memories of having said the unsaid: Some new demonstrations. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 11,
485–494.
Poole, D. A., & Lindsay, D. S. (2002). Reducing child witnessesÕ false reports of misinformation from parents. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 81, 117–140.
Roediger, H. L., III, Meade, M. L., & Bergman, E. T. (2001). Social contagion of memory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8,
365–371.
Ruffman, T., Rustin, C., Garnham, W., & Parkin, A. J. (2001). Source monitoring and false memories in children: Relation to
certainty and executive functioning. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 80, 95–111.
Thomas, A. K., & Loftus, E. F. (2002). Creating bizarre false memories through imagination. Memory & Cognition, 30, 423–431.
pe
Appendix F. Empirical articles from 1872 through January, 2004 using procedures other than those previously
mentioned
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Araya, T. (2003). Stereotypes: Suppression, forgetting, and false memory. Nordic Journal of Psychiatry, 57, 394.
Assefi, S. L., & Garry, M. (2003). Absolut memory distortions: Alcohol placebos influence the misinformation effect. Psychological
Science, 14, 77–80.
Belli, R. F., Winkielman, P., Read, J. D., Schwarz, N., & Lynn, S. J. (1998). Recalling more childhood events leads to judgments of
poorer memory: Implications for the recovered/false memory debate. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 5, 318–323.
Bjork, E. L., & Bjork, R. A. (2003). Intentional forgetting can increase, not decrease, residual influences of to-be-forgotten
information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 29, 524–531.
Camparo, L. B., Wagner, J. T., & Saywitz, K. J. (2001). Interviewing children about real and fictitious events: Revisiting the
narrative elaboration procedure. Law & Human Behavior, 25, 63–80.
Chen, Y. (2002). Unwanted beliefs: Age differences in beliefs of false information. Aging Neuropsychology & Cognition, 9,
217–228.
Howard, C., & Tuffin, K. (2002). Repression in retrospect: Constructing history in the Ômemory debate.Õ History of Human Sciences,
15, 75–93.
Lindberg, M. A., Chapman, M. T., Samsock, D., Thomas, S. W., & Lindberg, A. W. (2003). Journal of Genetic Psychology, 164, 5–28.
Lindsay, D. S., Wade, K. A., Hunter, M. A., & Read, J. D. (2004). AdultsÕ memories of childhood: Affect, knowing, and remembering. Memory, 12, 27–43.
Marsh, E. J., Meade, M. L., & Roediger, H. L. III. (2003). Learning facts from fiction. Journal of Memory & Language, 49,
519–536.
Meade, M. L., & Roediger, H. L. (2002). Explorations in the social contagion of memory. Memory & Cognition, 30, 995–1009.
Merckelbach, H., Muris, P., Horselenberg, R., & Stougie, S. (2000). Dissociative experiences, response bias, and fantasy proneness
in college students. Personality & Individual Differences, 28, 49–58.
Read, J. D., & Lindsay, D. S. (2000). ‘‘Amnesia’’ for summer camps and high school graduation: Memory work increases reports of
prior periods of remembering less. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 13, 129–147.
Sjoeberg, R. L. (2001). Pre-school children remembering unpleasant events: Complying with the unwritten rules of an invisible
game. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 15, 687–691.
Welch-Ross, M. K. (1999). Interviewer knowledge and preschoolersÕ reasoning about knowledge states moderate suggestibility.
Cognitive Development, 14, 423–442.
K. Pezdek, S. Lam / Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 2–17
17
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