Political Consequences of Increased Long LongTerm Unemployment p y Kenneth Scheve Yale University A il 28 April 28, 2011 U Unemployment l t and dP Public bli O Opinion i i Why might increased long-term unemployment p y matter for the p politics of economic policymaking? Unemployed may have different opinions about policy than other citizens. Mass opinion p about p policy y may y be different in settings when unemployment is high. P li O Policy Opinions i i off th the U Unemployed l d In bad times…January 1939, U.S. Gallup Poll “Do you think government spending should be increased or decreased on the following: unemployment relief (WPA-Home relief)?” upport Increased Spen nding % Su .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 Support for Unemployment Benefits 0 Not Unemployed Unemployed Unemployment rate is 16% Difference is 23 percentage points. i t P li O Policy Opinions i i off th the U Unemployed l d In good times…1996, times 1996 U U.S. S ISSP “Listed Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area area. Remember that if you say “much much more,” it might require a tax increase to pay for it: Unemployment benefits.” Support Increased Spending %S 1 2 3 4 Support for Unemployment Benefits 0 Not Unemployed Unemployed Unemployment rate is 5.4% Difference is essentially between “spend the same as now” and “spend more” Policy Opinions of the Unemployed Differences in policy opinion robust to controlling for observable demographic and political characteristics. Differences in opinion observed in many countries around the world—in 1996 ISSP data the U.S. differences are approximately pp y the same as average difference in twelve other high income countries. S b t ti l significant Substantively i ifi t diff differences iin opinion i i observed for other policies such as relative importance of inflation and unemployment in macroeconomic policymaking. But will these differences matter? Possiblyy for p policy y conflict but unlikely y for p policy y outcomes which are central to current debates. In most countries, the combined magnitude of opinion difference ff and the increased number off unemployed is not enough to influence policy decisions. Opinion differences between unemployed and other citizens do not extend to many of the policy areas that are central to current debates—e.g. taxes and pensions. i But will these differences matter? .25 .2 .15 .1 .05 Differenc ce in Policy Opinions be etween Unemployed a and Not Unemployed Opinion p differences between unemployed p y and not unemployed across issues in the U.S. in 2010 (Lu and Scheve 2010). 0 Unemployment Spending Wealthy Pay Higher Income Share Social Security Spending Support for Trade Protection Does high g unemployment p y influence aggregate policy opinions? 0 2 4 6 Unem mployment Rate Favor G Greater Spending 5 8 7 10 U.S. U S 1982 1982-2008, 2008 NES NES. Support S pport for more government services and greater spending and unemployment. unemployment 3 198219841986 19881990199219941996199820002002200420062008 year Favor Greater Spending Unemployment Rate Does high g unemployment p y influence aggregate policy opinions? 0 2 4 6 Unem mployment Rate 8 Government Jobs and Incom me 5 7 10 U.S. U S 1972 1972-2008, 2008 NES NES. Government Go ernment should sho ld see to it that people have jobs and a good income and unemployment unemployment. 3 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 year Government Jobs and Income 1996 2000 2004 2008 Unemployment Rate Whyy doesn’t high g unemployment p y influence aggregate policy opinions? Self-interest Beliefs about the sources of economic success and failure—the role of effort and luck (Piketty 1995). Inequality, q y, Representation, p , and Policyy Change Even if increases in long-term long term unemployment in the United States had a more substantial impact on the distribution of policy opinion, the experience i off the th last l t three th d decades d with ith rising i i inequality suggests that the impact on policy change might be modest. Why? Bartels (2008) and others have argued that political representatives are more responsive to high-income constituent opinion than low-income constituent p opinion. Dominant role played by interest groups in policy process. Caveat: Heterogeneity g y in Potential Political Consequences