When Winning is Not Fighting
October 5, 2001
Jeffrey W. Legro
Associate Professor, University of Virginia
(804-924-3958, legro@virginia.edu)
The United States has declared war on terrorist groups of global reach and every
government that supports them. We aim to win. But what does “winning” mean? The
theory and history of war suggests four answers.
The first is that war is won only if its outcome enhances a broader strategy. As
Clausewitz rightly pointed out, war is only a continuation of politics not an end in itself.
In this case we must ask whether the campaign to defeat terrorism will thwart our
ultimate objectives: the preservation of national security, the health of the economy, the
maintenance of our values, and an international system that sustains those goals.
Seen in broad terms, the main strategy and challenge of the United States before
September 11 was how to employ its immense power to achieve its ultimate objectives
without provoking a reaction that would defeat such an effort. We worried that such a
reaction could come from our European allies, Russia, China, rogue states, or terrorists.
That it came, in fact, from the last group does not mean we can forget the others who are
more important.
With NATO, Russia, and China on board, the crisis has opened new possibilities.
Consider how that might change, even in the positive scenario of an invasion of
Afghanistan – i.e. one where we are overwhelmingly militarily successful. Countries will
begin to worry that they will be next, a perception that may lead to powers balancing
against, not with, American efforts. How might China react once the Taliban is subdued
and American forces control territory on its border? What about Iran and Russia?
Invading Iraq and Iran is even more problematic and could well challenge our
relationship with even the Europeans. If we lose sight of our broader goals in this new
war on terror, we lose.
The second lesson follows. Winning wars, at least wars of global reach, is like
winning an election. At the end of the day, and even during the day, you win if you
maximize those on your side, minimize those against you, and neutralize the rest.
Winning means uniting allies and dividing opponents.
America has done better in wars – especially those outside its hemisphere – when
it has had united multilateral coalitions. Compare the results of World War I, World War
II, and the Gulf War with Korea, Viet Nam, and Somalia.
Dividing the potential opposition is just as important. Terrorism, David Fromkin
wrote 25 years ago, achieves its goals not through its acts but through the response to its
acts. It creates fear to get somebody – not the terrorist – to do something that helps the
terrorist.
In this case our opponents are not united. The wellspring of resentment of
possible terrorists -- from Palestinians to Pushtuns -- has different sources. In some
instances it is about Israel, in others U.S. support of despised domestic regimes, or
American culture, and in some instances it is geopolitical. Striking out at terrorism as if it
is a uniform threat, especially in terms of the countries or groups that support it (i.e. those
who are uniformly Muslim), risks inducing a far greater challenge than we face now.
Imagine a collective consciousness opposed to us that reaches from Algeria to Indonesia.
That is the reaction to terror that achieves terror’s goals.
The third lesson is that winning wars is not simply about military power.
Information has historically been as important as force in victory. Think about the
massive role of codebreaking in World War II. The impact of Ultra and Magic and the
contribution of human agents on the ground were critical in the decisive battles. In this
new war, information is even more important. It is the single decisive key to any sort of
effective retaliation and future prevention. Winning therefore means foregoing actions
that seem to show progress but that impair the collection of vital information for future
engagements. Fighting terrorism, like fighting crime, is a process, not a result.
Finally, winning wars is not just about winning the war; it is about winning the
peace--a truth that brings us back to the question of a broader strategy. Winning militarily
is only one part of the picture, and perhaps in this conflict, not even a necessary part.
The United States intervened in World War I, helping to defeat Germany. But
then it withdrew from the world arena and the seeds of the Great Depression and World
War II were sown. It achieved military victory but lost the aim that justified entering the
war – “A World Made Safe For Democracy” as Woodrow Wilson put it. After World
War II, America did just the opposite, building pillars of post-war stability and prosperity
in Europe and Asia. To put it mildly, nation building in the middle of an impoverished,
non-democratic Central Asia is a daunting challenge at best.
If these four lessons encompass what winning means, how do we do it? Most
important is what we do not do. What the United States should not do is militarily invade
countries. Such a reaction to September's terrorist attacks is likely to lead to resistance to
America’s efforts by neutral parties, diminish our allied support, decrease the flow of
information that we need to fight terrorism, and leave a virtually hopeless job of nationbuilding in its wake.
Winning means we emphasize the defensive and diplomatic aspects of our
response. We strengthen our intelligence capabilities, our immigration controls and
tracking, and our civil defense readiness. Diplomatically we must use the emerging
international Concert Against Terror for information and to establish new international
regimes that aid the longer-term struggle.
This battleplan denies terrorists the outward reaction they desperately want, it
keeps allies and world sympathies with us, it does not unite our opponents or threaten
those who are neutral. It would increase the chances that we will receive the critical
intelligence we need to successfully attack the terrorists’ political, financial, and military
networks. Above all it will help us to sustain and enlarge the international system that
served America’s national security interests, economy, and values over the last decade.
The difference is we would be safer, even while aware that our safety is not absolute.
In this new war, politics and patience, not force, makes winning possible.