Unit 4 Rule-governed behavior Performance Diagnostic Checklist 1

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Unit 4
Rule-governed behavior
Performance Diagnostic Checklist
1
Unit 4: Introduction & Schedule
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Unit exam over study objectives (27 points),
Wednesday, 10/17
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Michael: Indirect acting contingencies
Malott: Rule governed behavior
Gaetani et al: Applied study on self monitoring
Exercise: PDC analysis and interventions (8
points), due this Wednesday
PM project proposal due, Monday, 10/15
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One week from tonight
2
PDC Exercise for Wednesday
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Use the PDC from the Pampino et al. article from
U2 to conduct a functional assessment for:
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1-2 pinpoints you identified in U2 for a job you have had or
Interview another member of the class and do an
assessment for 1-2 pinpoints they identified
This will work best if you identify a pinpoint that
represents a performance problem, but you can
also do it on a pinpoint that is being performed
well
3
PDC exercise, cont.
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State the job title and measures, indicating
whether this is for a job you have had or if you
interviewed another class member
Provide a graph similar to the ones on page 11 of
the U2 Pampino et al. article
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Bar graph showing the % of questions that identify a
problem in each of the four areas of analysis
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Antecedents
Equipment and processes
Knowledge and training
Consequences
(note that most of the questions “No” represents a problem, but not always)
4
PDC exercise, cont.
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Identify (just using bullets):
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2-3 major problems (no training, no feedback, no conseq)
Or for good performance, 2-3 things mgt is doing that helps
sustain/maintain that good performance
Based on the preceding step:
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list/state 2-3 possible interventions that could potentially improve
performance - in some detail, in other words, don’t just say, “add
feedback” rather be a bit more specific (posted task clarification,
private graphic feedback once a week, posted group feedback, etc.)
Or for good performance, 2-3 things that mgt could do in addition to
what they are doing to improve performance even more
Your recommended intervention must be based on your PDC
analysis - that is the point of doing the PDC analysis
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You will lose points if you do not do this
5
Introduction to rule governed behavior
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When dealing with changing the behavior of human adults,
certainly workers, we are usually dealing with indirect
acting contingencies, not direct acting contingencies.
In order for consequences to affect behavior directly, they
must occur within 60 seconds or so after the behavior
(molecular perspective)
You often hear:
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If workers go on strike and management gives in, management
has reinforced workers for going on strike
The sales commission that sales rep receive once a month
reinforces their sales behaviors
Both Michael and Malott would say: Well, Malott would, jack would be likely to say something stronger)
6
SO2: Michael on indirect contingencies
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Michael makes a very complex argument with
respect to the example he analyzes about grant
writing.
Example
A person applies for a research grant and then 6
months later gets a letter in the mail informing him
he has gotten the grant. And then the person
writes more grants. Many would call getting the
grant money reinforcement for writing the grant.
But Michael says, “NO! It is no, even though grant
writing may increase.”
(not going to talk about SO1)
7
SO2, cont.
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I want to go through his argument carefully and head off
a problem
Michael is NOT arguing that the delay is the main
problem. Many Malottians say that - and while that is a
problem, it is not Michael’s main argument. (he wants to
convince molar folk as well, so he is not arguing the
point simply on the delay issue)
Rather, Michael is basing his argument on the
“automaticity of reinforcement.”
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That is, that operant conditioning is automatic - if a particular
reinforcer follows a behavior, that behavior will increase in the
future.
8
Michael’s example again
A researcher writes a research grant and 6 months
later receives a letter indicating he received the
money. As a result, he writes more grants.
Now assume the researcher writes a research
grant and 6 months later receives a letter telling
him he has received the same amount of money
as an inheritance.
9
Michael’s argument
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I think we would all agree (as would Michael) that the inheritance
money would not increase grant writing
But, Michael’s point is if operant reinforcement was at work, that
is, if we were dealing with direct acting contingencies, then both
the grant money and the inheritance money should increase
grant writing
If money is a reinforcer, then it should increase grant writing
regardless of whether it was money from a granting agency or an
inheritance
Why? Because of the automaticity of reinforcement. A reinforcer
will increase any behavior it follows - the organism doesn’t have
to understand “why” he/she is getting it - all that is important is
that the Sr follows behavior
10
SO2, cont.
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Others would say:
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(the molar perspective)
Those situations are very different!
Receiving grant money is causally related to writing the
grant while the inheritance money is not.
Therefore, it IS simple reinforcement
How does a person “know” the money is causally
related to the grant?
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A lot of other behaviors occurred in between
Without a complex verbal repertoire (indirect acting cntg),
the grant money would not increase grant writing
11
Michael’s unstated underlying argument
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Reinforcement increases behavior when consequences
are causally related to the behavior, when there is an ifthen relationship between behavior and the
consequence
However, we also know that “adventitious” reinforcement
also increases behavior
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Reinforcement that just “happens” to follow a behavior will
increase that behavior as well
That is, behavior can be accidentally or “adventitiously”
reinforced
SO2B: Why/how is the following example related to
Michael’s argument about grant writing?
12
Contingent Reinforcement: FR1 Reinforcement Schedule
From lecture
Adventitious Reinforcement: FT20” Reinforcement Schedule
From lecture
13
SO2C: Analogous contingencies, from lecture
Contingent reinforcement: (assume FR1 for pigeon)
Adventitious Reinforcement: (assume FT for pigeon)
14
SO3: Direct and indirect effects
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Michael then provides examples from OBM where
procedures are likely to influence behavior, but
consequences are too remote to be “simple”
reinforcement/punishment
Makes the point that the indirect effects are the ones we
are interested in - the direct effects are not very
interesting
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Monetary bonus for sales reps for meeting quota, and checks
are placed in the mailboxes on Friday afternoon
 Direct effect, increase sales
 Indirect effect, look in mailbox more frequently on Friday
afternoons, or walks more quickly to the mailbox on Friday
afternoon
(picked on OBM because of me!)
15
SO3: More examples: Direct and indirect effects
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A wrestler who is too heavy and needs to make weight
for a meet eats small meals one day. The next morning
he steps on the scales and sees he has lost weight.
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Direct effect?
Indirect effect?
Weekly lottery for attendance. When workers arrive on
time to work, they receive a “lottery ticket” that is placed
in a hat and the drawing is held at the end of the week.
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Direct effects?
Indirect effect?
(picked on OBM because of me!)
16
SO4: 3 clues that an effect is indirect (briefly)
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Delay - if the consequence is delayed by more than 60
seconds
Preconsequence increase in behavior
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Tell workers in advance that we are going to implement a
feedback program and they increase performance before getting
the feedback
Ask a worker to stay late and finish a project and that you will
take the worker to lunch the next day if he/she stays - and the
worker stays late.
17
SO4: 3 clues, cont.
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Large change in behavior as a result of a single delivery
of a consequence: direct effects tend to occur gradually
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Praise a worker for mopping up oil spills on the floor, and the
worker then does it from then on
Criticize a worker for smoking near flammable material - he
never does it again
(I am not going to talk about SO5 - straightforward)
18
SO6: Three reasons why are we successful even if we
talk about indirect effects as direct effects
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Some OBM interventions do involve direct acting
contingencies
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Praise that immediately follows behavior
On-line feedback/measurement in mfg
“We don’t get distracted by by inner directedness, rather
we look to the environment for causal variables and
manipulate those variables.”
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Examples - related to SO6B
In BBS, we don’t try to change “attitudes” by only posting signs
about how important safety is. Consequate performance.
We don’t try to change “satisfaction” in order to increase
productivity
(1st and 3rd are quite straightforward - students have trouble with the second)
19
SO6: Third reason why are we successful even if we
talk about indirect effects as direct effects
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Our methdology and empiricism: may be the most
important reason
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Objective measurement of performance/behavior
Record/measure behavior over time as it occurs in the workplace
As a result, we constantly assess whether our interventions are
actually working
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Daniels, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.”
50% of experimental articles in JAP used self-report measures to
assess the effects of their interventions - we know how unreliable
verbal reports are
20
Malott’s definition of a rule
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A rule is a verbal description of a behavioral
contingency, where a contingency consists
of:
SD: R ––––
> Sc (consequence)
21
SO7: Malott on rule-governed behavior
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7A: Biggest problem with respect to selfcontrol for humans?
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Not the delay, which is a problem with nonhuman
animals
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Nonhuman animals, smaller, more immediate
consequences control behavior much more
effectively than smaller, long delayed conseq.
Delay is not a problem with humans as evidenced
by the large number of indirect acting
contingencies (interventions) that have significantly
affected behavior/performance
22
SO7A cont.
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So, the biggest problem is not the delay, but
the fact that consequences are often:
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Too small to reinforce or punish the response
even though the cumulative impact may be
crucial for the individual
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Immediate punishers of smoking are too small to
affect smoking, even though cancer is likely
Immediate effects of exercise are too small to
maintain exercise program to maintain weight and
health
23
SO7B: Confound in analysis of example:
Wittkopp, Rowan, & Poling
The example:
 Performance Issue: Machine set-up times in
a manufacturing environment
 Feedback intervention significantly
decreased set-up times and increased
annual gross profits of the company by 10%
24
Malott’s analysis
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Initial problem:
Long set-up times were due to small, cumulative outcomes. That is,
each single instance of off-task behavior had minimal adverse
impact on the company’s profit, and short set-up times had minimal
positive effect
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Malott says if the following rule existed, workers would
not have a problem following it (even though consequence is
long-delayed, it is now sufficiently big to affect performance):
A single unauthorized coffee break will reduce your machine’s gross
profit by 10% for the year, but will not take effect until exactly one
year after the illegal coffee break.
25
Malott’s analysis: A confound according to
Dickinson
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A single unauthorized coffee break will reduce your machine’s gross
profit by 10% for the year, but will not take effect until exactly one
year after the illegal coffee break.
Do you buy Malott’s analysis that “any operator who was planning
on staying with the company for the next year should have no
problem complying with such an easy-to-follow rule, though the
outcome would be delayed.”
Do you think a set-up mechanic would follow that rule?
Why or why not?
26
The confound--- from lecture
27
Example: Forklift driver loading boxcar
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Check the boxcar to insure that cases of the
product were not damaged in shipping
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No nails, straps or metal boards that would
damage cases
No contamination such as grain, chemical
powder, liquids
No holes in sides, floor or ceiling of the boxcar
that would expose cases to weather and
contamination
28
Some consequences:
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Fewer customer complaints
Gets praise from supervisor
Takes longer to load boxcar
Must work harder due to physical effort
Increase number of cases not damaged or
contaminated
Costs related to damaged goods reduced
Customers will order more products because they
arrive in good condition
29
So Dickinson’s addition: from lecture
30
SO9A: Back to Malott, the 2nd problem that
makes rules hard to follow for humans
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Improbable/uncertain consequences
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Safety: workers can perform unsafely many, many times
and never get hurt
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No safety goggles - usually no eye damage
Don’t mop up oil spills - no falls
Poor lifting techniques - no back strains
Walk under or jump over moving conveyer belt - no falls,
clothing or body parts don’t get caught in belt
Change light bulb using chair rather than step ladder?
When pealing potatoes or fruit, cut toward yourself with blade
rather than away (trimming/flashing plastic parts in mfg)
(first - consequences are too small and only “matter” as they “cumulatively” add up)
31
SO9B
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If a person has a “close call,” he or she will usually
perform safely for a while, but then stops
performing safely. Why, from a behavioral
perspective?
R (perform safely) ––> Sr- (avoids injury)
Avoidance - no salient, obvious consequence, so
the behavior will extinguish
Particularly a problem if the unsafe behavior is
followed by immediate positive reinforcers, such
as less effortful, takes less time
32
Avoidance behavior is hard to maintain
Even in the operant laboratory with nonhumans
and “tight” control, avoidance behavior (analogous
to performing safely) is very difficult to maintain.
Eventually the organism will not engage in the
behavior and come into contact with the aversive
consequence. Only then will the organism start
responding again.
R (avoidance behavior) ––> Sr- (avoids aversive)
No R (no avoidance beh) ––> Sp (aversive)
33
SO10: Easy and hard to follow rules
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Easy to follow rules, outcomes are
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Hard to follow rules, outcomes are
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Sizeable
Probable
Too small (but may have cumulative large effect) and/or
Improbable
Delay is irrelevant
From lecture
34
SO11: Same confound in Malott’s analysis
Personal vs. organizational outcome: Wilk & Redmon
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For exam
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What was Malott’s analysis in terms of the change from the
hard to follow rule to an easy to follow rule - that is, what
was changed to make it an “easy to follow” rule according
to Malott
What is the confound in Malott’s analysis according to
Dickinson?
From lecture
From lecture
(not going to over this or talk about it - but I do want to add the third and fourth parts I want in your answers - I could
not give them to you in the SOs without giving away the answers to earlier SOs.)
35
SO12: Procrastination - why isn’t the rule an
SD? Add for the exam: Explain your answer
A person has four hours to finish a project
before the deadline.
The rule?
If I do not get to work right now, I will miss
the deadline and look bad.
Why isn’t the rule an SD?
36
SO12: from lecture- explain!
37
SO13: Even when the rule describes an indirect
contingency, what controls rgb? Explain.
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Direct acting contingencies, specifically direct acting
escape* contingencies
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That is, molecular contingencies are responsible for rgb
The statement of the rule is an MO that:
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Establishes noncompliance as a learned aversive condition,
thus
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Increasing the reinforcing value of the termination of the
aversive condition and
Evoking behaviors that have, in the past, terminated the
aversive condition (escape contingency because of the
immediate reduction in the aversiveness of the situation)
Thorny issue, NFE. Is the rule an MO or is the learned
aversive condition it generates the MO, or are both
MOs?
(note escape, not avoidance!)
38
What’s missing from the analysis, but assumed?
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Add to SOs: According to Dickinson, when will a
rule establish noncompliance as a learned
aversive condition and when won’t it?
Noncompliance with the rule will only be truly
aversive if the outcome/consequence stated in
the rule is valuable (reinforcing) to the individual.
If “not looking bad” to the supervisor is not
valuable for the individual, then the rule
statement would not be expected to generate a
learned aversive condition
(next slide - Malott’s counter argument?)
39
Would Malott counter with the following? NFE
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There is such a thing as “generalized rule
following” that may make noncompliance with any
rule somewhat aversive depending upon one’s
learning history
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Malott’s “Jewish mother” metaphor
In other words, there are rule followers and people
who are not rule followers and the extent to which
you are a rule follower depends upon your
reinforcement history
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Do you obey written signs?
Do you “follow rules” when there is no one there to
consequate that behavior?
(well, enough - onto SO 15)
40
SO14: What causes a person to state a rule, for
example when facing a deadline?
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Malott is providing a complete analysis of
the sequence of behaviors
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If we are to completely explain/analyze rgb, not
only do we have to analyze how rules govern
behavior, but we have to analyze why a person
states a rule to begin with
41
SO14, cont.
1.
2.
Simple situation where someone prompts
you. “Don’t you have something to do right
now?” “Aren’t you supposed to be
working?”
More interesting analysis is when
someone doesn’t prompt you -
42
SO14, cont: No prompt from someone else
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Observing yourself being unproductive (or not doing what you are
supposed to be doing) generates a learned aversive condition
 You observe your own behavior and the visual and other stimuli
from that observation are the causal stimuli
Stating the rule decreases the learned aversive condition of
observing yourself being unproductive
R –––––––>MO:
R ––––––––> Srobserve
stimuli/not working state rule
decrease aversive
yourself
aversive cond
stimuli & condition
43
SO14, cont: Complicated! (NFE)
R –––––––>MO:
R ––––––––> Srobserve
stimuli/not working state rule
decrease aversive
yourself
aversive cond
stimuli & condition
MO
noncompliance with rule
another av. condition
MO:
noncompliance with rule
aversive condition
R –––––––––> Srcomply with
decrease in aversive
rule
condition caused by
noncompliance
44
SO15: Malott’s analyses of organizational culture
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15A. For cultural practices to deal effectively with
contingencies that are not direct acting…
Leaders must be able to describe organizational
contingencies and rules that are related to the survival of
the organization/culture (from context, not directly stated
this way in the article)
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15B&C. The important role of leaders is to…
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Describe the contingencies related to organizational survival
Develop rules that will effectively influence worker behavior with
respect to the contingencies related to survival
Explicitly state the rules to workers, especially the management
team, and monitor compliance with those rules
(Agnew & Redmon)
45
Gaetani et al. self-monitoring study
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Nice article that demonstrates the importance of
personal consequences and the necessity to be
very obvious and explicit about how the targeted
performance will affect the individual
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Small business owner (machine shop) who often came to
work late - an average of 3 hours and 45 minutes during
baseline!
First had him self-record “lateness” but it wasn’t until the
researchers had him record the number of potential lost
customers that his behavior was consistently affected over
time
(am not going to go over many of these study objectives)
46
SO21: Not answered in text
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Based on the graph, do you buy the authors’
conclusion that the addition of data plotting
(following self-logging) decreased tardiness
further? Why or why not?
47
SO24: Two excellent points
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The two points may seem redundant to you - they
are very similar, however:
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24A. The first relates to all types of consequences (not just
consequences associated with self-monitoring) and relates
to the fact that a consequence must be specific and
personally relevant
24B. The second point relates specifically to selfmonitoring: Self-management and self-monitoring may
have limited impact if the value of the target behavior is not
explicitly clarified (in this case, tardiness = loss of potential
customers and business)
48
Questions??
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On to PDC project
49
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