Responding to Higher and More Volatile Food Prices Christopher Delgado World Bank/ARD IATRC December 13, 2011 Joint with Rob Townsend, Sergiy Zorya, Iride Ceccacci, and Saswati Bora (all World Bank/ARD) Global Food Price Volatility and its Drivers The context of global grain price volatility 3 • Steadily rising grain demand vs. increasingly uncertain supply • Combined with stock draw-downs and lack of info on new players • Greater links between oil and food markets • Slow down in grain crop yield growth in developing • Increased water scarcity and reached land frontier • Increasingly variable climate • Food price spikes contribute to social tension and provoke aggravating short-run policy responses Long-term commodity prices 1948-2010 Indices, Deflated 2000 = 100 4 350 300 Korean War Oil Crises Agriculture 250 200 150 Metals 100 50 Energy 0 1948 1954 1960 1966 1972 Source: World Bank, DECPG 1978 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 Food demand + production shocks + stocks = food price volatility 5 2,000 1,900 1,800 40 Stock-to-Use Production Consumption 35 30 1,700 25 1,600 20 1,500 15 1,400 10 Percent (Stock-to-Use) Millions MT (Consumption, Production) World Maize, Wheat, Rice Real maize prices vs. stocks-to-use 1960-2011 Source: Sergiy Zorya and Varun Kshirsagar, World Bank, using USDA data Stocks-to-use changes (%) 2009-11 for exporters more pronounced than for world Source: Compiled from USDA WASDE Nov. 2011 The grain growth trends 1960-2011 (average annual growth rates %) 1960-2011 1960-2003 2003-2011 Consumption 2.5 2.5 2.5 Production 2.4 2.3 2.8 (of which Yield) 1.9 1.9 1.7 (of which Area) 0.5 0.4 1.1 Consumption 3.0 2.8 3.8 Production 2.9 2.7 3.7 Rice/Wheat/Maize Maize alone Source: Robert Townsend, World Bank, using USDA data Many factors affecting commodity prices: 2001/05 compared to 2006/10 9 2001-05 2006-10 Change, % Crude oil prices (US$/barrel) 33 75 +130 Exchange rate (US$ against a broad index of currencies) 119 104 -13 Interest rate (10-year US Treasury bills) 4.7 4.1 -14 Funds invested in commodities (US$ billion) 30 250 +730 GDP growth, low and middle income countries, annual 5.0 5.8 +16 Industrial production, low and middle income countries, annual 6.3 7.1 +13 Stocks-to-use ratio of maize, wheat, and rice (months of consumption) 3.2 2.5 -20 Biofuels production (million of barrels per day equivalent) 0.4 1.3 +200 Average yields of wheat, maize and rice (tons/hectare) 3.8 4.0 +7 Growth in yields (percentage change per year) 1.4 1.0 -32 Natural disasters (droughts, floods, and extreme temperatures) 374 441 +18 Source: John Baffes, World Bank A framework for simulating food price behavior 1960-2011 A simulation of world grain supply and demand: Supply: Demand: Market equilibrium: S=D Market price: Market price changes: 10 Actual Simulated Drivers of world food prices 11 Average Food Price Levels Food Price Volatility Dependent on: Dependent on: Long-term change in demand [component of ∆𝛼𝑑 ] Long-term demand responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑑 ] - Population - Income - Biofuels - Share of food in consumption - Biofuels mandates - Oil/maize price ratio Long-term change in supply [component of ∆𝛼𝑠 ] Long-term supply responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑠 ] - Area planted - Yield changes - Output and input market integration - Price risk management Short-term change in demand [component of ∆𝛼𝑑 ] - Oil prices volatility Exchange rate volatility Financial speculation Precautionary hoarding Food reserves Short-term demand responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑑 ] - Stock release policies - Oil/maize price ratio Short-term change in supply [component of ∆𝛼𝑠 ] Short-term supply responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑠 ] - Droughts and floods - Share of production in more volatile production regions - Trade policy responses (export bans and sharp reductions in import tariffs) - Trade openness Preceding Ten Year Growth Rates (% p.a.) in Cereal Yields in Developing Countries 1960-2008 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 Era of High Prices and Green Revolution Era of Declining Real Prices & Benign Neglect Era of ? 1.5 1.0 0.0 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 0.5 Land has become an increasingly limited resource Global land area for 13 major crops increased by 27 million ha in the last 5 years: China, Argentina, India, Brazil, Ukraine, Russia, and SS Africa accounted for 24 million ha 13 Source: USDA Uncultivated land, not much left Source: Fisher and Shah (2010) Tightening links between grain and historically volatile oil prices 14 The link between oil and fertilizer prices has strengthened since 2005 Source: World Bank Ag is more energy intensive Source: GTAP Export Volume Index (1990/91=100) Grain exports from new main exporters are more variable than from traditional exporters Example of Wheat 500 Black Sea region Latin America OECD exporters 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1990/1991 1995/1996 Source: USDA 2000/2001 2005/2006 2010/2011 Outlook Preferred Response 16 World food prices are expected to remain higher and more volatile than their pre2007 levels Short term price volatility is increasingly becoming a long term phenomenon Exploit Opportunities Productivity growth Link farmers to markets Manage risks Improve information and ensure early discussion by policymakers Invest in agricultural resilience Improve safety nets Actual Responses to Price Volatility Up to half of the 250% rice price increase in 2008 was due to policy Rice Price 2004-2008 US$/mt 1200 Philippines buying > $1,000/ton 1000 Japan sells 200,000 ton WTO stocks to Philippines; record harvests f orecast 800 Philippines buying > $700/ton 600 Vietnam introduces export restrictions 400 200 Source: Aldaz-Caroll 2008 1-Jul-08 1-Apr-08 1-Jan-08 1-Oct-07 1-Jul-07 1-Apr-07 1-Jan-07 1-Oct-06 1-Jul-06 1-Apr-06 1-Jan-06 1-Oct-05 1-Jul-05 1-Apr-05 1-Jan-05 1-Oct-04 1-Jul-04 1-Apr-04 1-Jan-04 0 India imposes export restrictions Rice price transmission from global market to consumers in 2008 different across asia World price pass-thru (%) between Q207 and Q208 90 81 78 70 54 44 50 30 4 10 -10 Cambodia (June) Thailand (April) Vietnam (May) Philippines (June) China (June) -3 Indonesia (April) Transmission of price peaks limited and uneven Source: Aldaz-Caroll 2008 Reality Check: Countries Facing Food Price Protests And Riots, January 2007- May 2008 Source: USAID Office of Food for Peace Actual country responses to the 2008 food price spike (N=77) 21 Reduce Taxes on Foodgrains Increase supply using foodgrain stocks East Asia Export Restrictions MENA SAR Africa Price Controls/Consumer Subsidies LAC ECA None 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Source: FAO - State of Agricultural Commodity Markets, 2009 More detail on actual country policy responses 2007-2008 (N=81) 22 Source: OECD (2010) Short-term policy responses observed in 2008 affecting long-run outcomes (given in increasing order of possible negative impact on long-run policy options) Good 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Reduce (permanently)Food Grain Taxes/Tariffs Still good, School Feeding Programs but more Cond’nal Cash Transfers to the Poor difficult to avoid Targeted Food Subsidies operational problems or Food for Work negative impact on Food Aid incentives Worse short-run responses observed in 2008 7. 8. 9. 10. 10. 11. (given in increasing order of likely negative impact on long-run policy objectives) Build-up of Gov’t Buffer Stocks for Distribution (governance and cost are issues, but has the fall-back situation in the exporting countries changed?) Food Rationing (not sustainable over time) Price Controls (bad other than in very short term special circumstances) Ad Hoc and Temporary Reductions in Tariffs (the equivalent for net importers of export taxes for net exporters) Export Restrictions/Taxes Not Good Inflexible Export Bans Preferred Responses to Price Volatility Preferred measures to address food price levels & volatility longer-term 26 Measure to Reduce Average Food Price Escalation Measures to Reduce Food Price Volatility Long-term change in supply [component of ∆𝛼𝑠 ] Long-term supply responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑠 ] Short-term change in supply [component of ∆𝛼𝑠 ] Short-term supply responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑠 ] - Raise crop yields - Facilitate land markets - Better use of price risk management tools - Strengthen market integration - Develop more weather tolerant varieties - Trade openness Long-term change in demand [component of ∆𝛼𝑑 ] Long-term demand responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑑 ] Short-term change in demand [component of ∆𝛼𝑑 ] Short-term demand responsiveness to prices [component of 𝛽𝑑 ] - Increase transparency of agricultural markets - Efficient stock management - Shift to market based biofuels policies Reducing levels requires productivity increases in developing countries 27 Raising crop yields and their resilience is the single most important action needed for an enduring solution to global food security Narrow the gap between average farm and experimental yields Generate yield-enhancing and resiliency technologies Improve water management, including irrigation Yield gaps are large in developing countries Country United States France Italy Argentina China Thailand Philippines Indonesia Pakistan Mexico India Test mean yields (bu/ac) 199 221 231 188 153 121 105 107 148 181 142 Test mean yield stdev (bu/ac) 36 31 29 52 30 22 29 32 21 54 35 No. of tests 723 133 76 88 140 184 277 51 50 113 114 Test plot data for maize yields, 2008 to 2010, Monsanto Corp. Source: Abbott at el. (2011) Country average yields (bu/ac) 157 144 147 114 85 66 41 38 46 52 36 Yield gap (bu/ac) 42 78 85 74 68 56 65 69 103 128 106 Yield gap (%) 21% 25% 27% 29% 45% 46% 61% 64% 69% 71% 75% Other measures to address high food price levels 28 Secure land rights for poor farmers Shift to market-based biofuels policies: Improve farmer access to price risk management via financial instruments Improve trade openess, market infrastructure, market information systems, access of producer organizations Improve analysis and outreach on implications of different policy alternatives Improve safety net infrastructure for faster better mitigation of shocks, avoiding more negative alternatives Build capacity for all of above Trust is the scarcest currency in global grain markets Avoid short-term policy responses to short-term food insecurity that have adverse longer-term implications for both food security and market development Decrease the asymmetries of information that create transactions costs in international grain markets Recognize the absolute imperative governments face to provide food security in the face of crisis, including through solidarity from better off neighbors Improve the consistency of market signals