NATO
TRANSFORMED
NATO
TRANSFORMED
Note : References in this publication to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
are marked by an asterisk (*) referring to the following footnote:
Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
> CONTENTS
1.
Alliance purpose and fundamental security tasks
2
2.
At the heart of the transatlantic partnership
6
3.
Strengthening defence capabilities
9
4.
The changing role of NATO's forces
12
5.
Extending security through partnership
16
6.
Opening the Alliance to new members
20
7.
Forging new relations with Russia
22
8.
A distinctive partnership with Ukraine
26
9.
Dialogue with Mediterranean countries
28
10.
Peacekeeping and crisis management
30
11.
Responding to civil emergencies
34
12.
Collaborating in science and environment
36
13.
How NATO works
40
14.
Change and continuity
44
1
Alliance purpose and fundamental security tasks
2
>1
The essential purpose of the North Atlantic
Alliance is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members in Europe and North
America in accordance with the principles of
the United Nations Charter. To achieve this, the
Alliance uses both its political influence and its
military capacity, depending on the nature of
the security challenges facing Alliance member
states. As the strategic environment has
changed, so too has the way in which the
Alliance responds to security challenges. It continues to preserve stability throughout the
Euro-Atlantic area and is evolving to meet new
threats such as terrorism and other security
challenges beyond its traditional area of
responsibility.
Collective defence
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
is one of the key structures through which
Alliance members implement their security
goals. It is an intergovernmental organisation in
which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence, and serves as a
forum in which they consult together and take
decisions on matters affecting their security.
NATO's structures facilitate continuous consultation, coordination and cooperation between
members on political, military, economic and
other aspects of security, as well as cooperation in non-military fields such as science, information, the environment and disaster relief.
Each country remains independent and free to
make its own decisions, but by planning together and sharing resources, they can enjoy collectively a level of security far higher than any
could achieve alone. This remains the fundamental principle of security cooperation within
NATO.
After five rounds of enlargement, NATO's 12
founding members – Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
Kingdom and the United States – have been
joined by Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany
(1955), Spain (1982), the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland (1999) and, in the most
recent round of enlargement, Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia (2004).
The Alliance works on the principle that the
security of each member country depends on
the security of them all. If the security of any
one is threatened, all are affected. In signing
the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding charter, every member state makes a commitment
to each other to respect this principle, sharing
the risks and responsibilities as well as the
advantages of collective defence. This also
means that many aspects of the defence planning and preparations that each country had
previously undertaken alone are undertaken
together. The costs of providing the facilities
needed for their military forces to train and work
effectively together are also shared.
Transatlantic link
The signing of the 1949 Washington Treaty was
unprecedented in modern times. It not only
diminished the risk of external aggression but
also gradually brought together major
European countries that had often gone to war
against each other in the past, ensuring that
there could no longer be any risk of military
conflict between them. In fact, they would
become dependent on each other and by sharing in each other’s security, they would be able
to work together effectively in many other fields
to improve their prosperity. The significance of
the Washington Treaty went even further. It
established a security partnership between the
European members of the Alliance and the
United States and Canada, creating a permanent transatlantic link between Europe and
North America.
political and military environment and the emergence of new security threats. In addition, the
concept of defence has been broadened to
include dialogue and practical cooperation with
other countries outside the Alliance as the best
means of reinforcing Euro-Atlantic security.
NATO’s transformation
When the Alliance was founded in 1949, the
Soviet Union was seen as the main threat to the
freedom and independence of Western
Europe. Communist ideology, political aims and
methods and military capacity meant that,
whatever the Soviet Union’s real intentions may
have been, no Western government could
afford to ignore the possibility of conflict. As a
result, from 1949 to the end of the 1980s – the
period known as the Cold War – the Alliance’s
main task was to maintain sufficient military
capabilities to defend its members against any
form of aggression by the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact. The stability provided by NATO
during this period helped Western Europe as a
whole to rebuild its prosperity after the Second
World War, creating the confidence and predictability that are essential for economic
growth.
The policies agreed by NATO member countries have evolved continuously in the light of
the changing strategic environment. Since the
end of the Cold War, Alliance policies and
structures have been fundamentally transformed to reflect the sea change in Europe's
Today, NATO is much more than a defensive
Alliance. Indeed, it has reached out to former
adversaries and is now working to build and
preserve peace and security throughout the
Euro-Atlantic area. To achieve this, the Alliance
is taking on an ever-greater number of tasks
and adopting increasingly flexible, innovative
and pragmatic approaches to resolve what are
inevitably complex issues. In the process,
NATO's central role in guaranteeing the security
of the Euro-Atlantic area has been reinforced
and many Partner countries are seeking future
membership of the Alliance. Three Central and
Eastern European countries – the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland – already
achieved this objective in 1999. Seven more –
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia and Slovenia – did so in 2004.
NATO’s transformation during the past decade
has been characterised by a series of visionary
initiatives, which represent concrete, highly
practical responses to the new security challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War
environment. These include the Partnership for
Peace, special relations with Russia and
Ukraine, a dialogue with Mediterranean countries, the Membership Action Plan to help aspiring countries meet NATO standards, and effective cooperation with the European Union, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe and the United Nations. NATO is also
actively addressing evolving security challenges by leading crisis-management operations in the Balkans and committing itself to
operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism and other new threats beyond the EuroAtlantic area.
3
Moreover, to improve its capacity to take on
new missions, NATO is adapting and strengthening its capabilities. To this end, three key initiatives were launched at the Prague Summit in
November 2002: the creation of a NATO
Response Force; the reform of the military
command structure; and the Prague Capabilities Commitment through which shortfalls
in capabilities are being addressed by
member countries' individual commitments and
cooperative initiatives.
Fundamental security tasks
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, an authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and
fundamental security tasks, provides guidance
on the political and military means to be used in
undertaking them. The publication of this document for the first time in 1991 marked a clear
break with the past. During the Cold War, comparable sensitive strategic-planning documents
had, understandably, been classified.
NATO’s current Strategic Concept, published in
1999, describes the security risks faced by the
Alliance as “multi-directional and difficult to predict”. The Alliance's fundamental security tasks
are defined as:
•
acting as a foundation of stability in the
Euro-Atlantic area;
•
serving as a forum for consultation on
security issues;
•
deterring and defending against any
threat of aggression against any NATO
member state;
•
contributing to effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis management; and
•
promoting wide-ranging partnership,
cooperation and dialogue with other
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.
4
Assessing foreseeable security challenges and
risks, the 1999 Strategic Concept concludes
that the strategic environment is continuing to
change in a generally positive way and
that the Alliance, among other organisations,
has played an essential part in strengthening
Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the
Cold War.
However, although the threat of general war in
Europe has virtually disappeared, Alliance
members and other countries in the
Euro-Atlantic region face other risks and uncertainties, including ethnic conflict, the violation of
human rights, political instability and economic
fragility. In addition, the proliferation of nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons and their
means of delivery is a matter of serious
concern, and the spread of technology could
result in the greater availability of sophisticated
military capabilities to potential adversaries.
Moreover, Alliance security has to take account
of the global context and could be affected by
wider risks, including acts of terrorism, sabotage, organised crime and the disruption of the
flow of vital resources. Since the publication of
the 1999 Strategic Concept and in the wake of
the September 2001 attacks on the United
States, the threat from terrorism and the risk
posed by failed states are being fundamentally
re-evaluated.
The first invocation of Article 5
Article 5 is the core clause of the
Washington Treaty, NATO's founding charter,
which states that an armed attack against
one Ally shall be considered an attack
against them all. In response to an invocation
of Article 5, each Ally determines, in consultation with other Allies, how it can best contribute to any action deemed necessary to
restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area, including the use of
armed force.
Article 5 was first invoked on 12 September
2001 immediately following the 11 September
terrorist attacks against the United States.
The invocation was initially provisional, pending determination that the attacks were
directed from abroad. This was confirmed on
2 October 2001, after US officials presented
findings on investigations into the attacks to
the North Atlantic Council, concluding
that the al-Qaida terrorist network was
responsible.
On 4 October, the Allies agreed a series of
measures to assist the US-led campaign
against terrorism. These include enhanced
intelligence sharing and cooperation, blanket
over-flight clearances and access to ports
and airfields for US and other Allied craft for
operations against terrorism, and the deployment of part of NATO's standing naval forces
to the Eastern Mediterranean and of the
Alliance’s airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft to the United States.
In addition, individual Allies are contributing
according to resources and capabilities, in
response to US requests. Assistance
includes military support, as well as legal
and financial measures to cut the flow of
revenue to terrorist organisations.
5
At the heart of the transatlantic partnership
NATO’s roles in providing for the security of its
members and undertaking new tasks to extend
security and stability further afield are based on
a long-standing partnership between its
European and North American member countries. The devastation in European countries
after the Second World War left them highly
dependent for their security on the United
States and Canada. The North American Allies
deployed large numbers of armed forces on
European soil. Since these early days of the
Alliance, they have continued to play a vital part
in Europe’s security – a role that is central to
the concept of transatlantic security and an
indispensable pillar of the Alliance.
Over the years, the number of North American
forces in Europe has gradually decreased. The
majority of forces available to the Alliance for
the defence of Europe have for many years
been provided by its European Allies.
Moreover, most of the NATO-led peacekeeping
forces in the Balkans, which are also supported
by significant troop contingents from Partner
countries and other non-NATO countries, are
provided by European Allies.
6
Nevertheless, the United States continues to
assume a disproportionate share of the costs
of Alliance security and an inequitable share of
the responsibility for Alliance actions, as a
result of the imbalance between the United
>2
States and other Allies in terms of their military
capabilities. Having benefited from the postCold War peace dividend in the early 1990s, the
European Allies and Canada have not made
the investments needed to adapt their military
capabilities to new security challenges. They
remain dependent on the United States in many
key areas, such as the airlift capabilities
required for rapid deployment of military forces,
satellite communications and other areas of
advanced technological capability.
Shortfalls in European defence capabilities
were first brought into sharp focus during the
Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, which demonstrated that European countries were not in a
position to act without the support of the United
States to prevent conflict from spreading. In the
late 1990s, separate initiatives to strengthen
defence capabilities were launched by NATO
and the European Union (EU). In 1999, the two
organisations agreed to establish a strategic
partnership.
Lessons learned in the Balkans
When Bosnia and Herzegovina descended into
civil war in the early 1990s, the European Union
sent observers to monitor the implementation of
UN resolutions but had neither the political
mandate nor the military forces to do more. The
United Nations deployed forces but these were
better adapted to peacekeeping than peaceenforcement operations – and it soon became
clear that nothing short of force would end the
fighting. The Alliance was, at first, reluctant to
get involved since the implications of deploying
NATO forces outside the traditional NATO area
had not yet been addressed. However, as the
situation deteriorated, NATO became increasingly involved between 1992 and 1995, providing military support for the monitoring and
implementation of UN resolutions and sanctions. Eventually, when a US-brokered peace
agreement was signed at the end of 1995, it
was a NATO-led force of 60,000 troops, with a
20,000-strong US contingent, that supported its
implementation.
Four years later, when violence in Kosovo escalated and the humanitarian crisis worsened, it
was again NATO as a whole that took action,
after the failure of all attempts to negotiate a
solution. This crisis confirmed shortfalls that
had already been identified in European
defence capabilities. During the air campaign,
most of the sorties were undertaken by US aircraft and, when it came to deploying the Kosovo
peacekeeping force, it took several months for
the force to reach full strength.
At present, Europe lacks the necessary capabilities to launch and sustain a military operation of the kind that eventually ended both the
Bosnian and the Kosovo conflicts. However, the
European Union is taking serious steps to
strengthen its capabilities and a framework for
EU-NATO cooperation (described below) has
been developed. This allowed NATO to hand
over to the European Union its mission in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*,
where NATO forces had been deployed since
2001, at the request of the country's president,
to overcome the crisis in the country (see chapter 10). In March 2003, the European Union,
using NATO facilities, launched Operation
Concordia to take over from NATO, which provided important planning and logistical support
to the EU-led troops. Moreover, NATO and the
European Union agreed on a joint strategic
approach for the Western Balkans in July 2003,
and options for the European Union assuming
responsibility for security in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, with NATO support, by the end of
2004 are being discussed.
Strengthening European capabilities
Initially, it was the Balkan experiences that galvanised European countries into action. The
European Union stepped up efforts to develop
a European Security and Defence Policy, which
would be matched by the necessary crisisresponse capabilities. At the outset, defence
and security questions were handled on behalf
of the European Union by a separate organisation known as the Western European Union
(WEU)1. However, at its Helsinki summit in
December 1999, the European Union decided
that it would in future develop its own role in
security and defence, and set about creating
the structures needed to do so. It also set itself
the so-called Headline Goal of being able to
deploy and sustain for at least one year a rapid
reaction force of up to 60,000 troops by the
year 2003.
For its part, the Alliance committed itself to reinforcing its European pillar through the development of an effective European Security and
Defence Identity. The aim of this initiative was to
support the European Union in its efforts to
1
The Western European Union: Established under the 1948 Brussels Treaty for Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration
and Collective Self-Defence, signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Subsequently, joined by Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Functions related to crisis management and humanitarian tasks were taken over by the European Union, following decisions taken at the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999.
Commitments under the Brussels Treaty related to collective defence remain unchanged and are safeguarded by a residual
WEU secretariat.
7
develop a credible security role and at the same
time help create a stronger and more balanced
transatlantic relationship by allowing European
Allies to make a more effective and coherent
contribution to Alliance missions and activities.
To this end, NATO embarked on a process during
the 1990s designed to provide a genuine
European crisis-management capability without
unnecessary duplication of the military assets
and capabilities already available within NATO.
Central to this process was the concept of "separable but not separate forces", which would
allow for the use of NATO assets and capabilities
in possible WEU-led crisis-response operations.
In April 1999, recognising that the European
Union intended to become a security actor in
its own right, NATO leaders, meeting in
Washington, expressed their readiness to define
and adopt the necessary arrangements for
essential parts of NATO’s military assets and
capabilities to be made available for EU-led
operations in response to crisis situations in
which NATO as a whole would not be engaged
militarily. Following the EU decisions taken at
Helsinki, NATO began discussions and consultations directly with the EU on collaboration
between them.
8
New forms of cooperation have since been
defined. NATO and the European Union published a joint declaration in December 2002 on
their evolving strategic partnership and in
March 2003 agreed on a series of documents
on cooperation in crisis management , including
arrangements – known as the "Berlin Plus"
arrangements – for the use of NATO assets
and capabilities for EU-led operations, giving
substance to this strategic partnership and
opening the way for coordinated action.
Permanent liaison arrangements will facilitate
greater cooperation and consultation at the
operational level. Agreement has been reached
on providing for an EU cell at NATO's Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
based in Mons, Belgium, and for NATO representation at the EU Military Staff.
NATO and the European Union have also concluded an agreement aimed at ensuring consistency, transparency and mutual reinforcement
in the development of capability requirements
common to the two organisations. In May 2003,
the first meeting of the Joint NATO-EU
Capabilities Group took place. Initiatives taken
to strengthen Alliance defence capabilities (see
Chapter 3) should be coherent with the
European Union's European Capability Action
Plan and the pursuit of its Headline Goal, and
will help achieve much-needed improvements
in the capabilities of European Allies in key
areas.
The Alliance continues to be the means by
which all NATO members assure their collective defence. It remains the cornerstone of
Euro-Atlantic security and maintains its mandate
and capacity to carry out crisis-management,
peace-enforcement and peacekeeping tasks.
The objective of EU-NATO security cooperation
is to increase the options available for dealing
with crisis and conflict, while avoiding duplication. This will strengthen European military
capabilities so that future EU-led operations
could be envisaged to deal with crises when the
Alliance as a whole is not engaged.
>3
Strengthening defence capabilities
The Allies are making a concerted effort to
strengthen their defence capabilities to ensure
that NATO is able to field forces that can move
quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain
operations over distance and time, and achieve
their objectives as quickly and effectively as
possible while minimising unintended harm to
non-combatants. Maintaining adequate military
capabilities and a clear preparedness to act
collectively remain of central relevance in
today's security environment. In the event of
crises that could threaten the security of
Alliance members, NATO forces must be able
to complement and reinforce political actions,
and contribute to the management of such
crises and their peaceful resolution.
The drive to improve capabilities was initiated
when Allied leaders, meeting in Washington in
April 1999, set out their vision of an Alliance for
the 21st century: larger, more capable and flexible, committed to collective defence and able to
undertake new missions, including contributing
to conflict prevention and engaging actively in
crisis-management and crisis-response operations. They launched the Defence Capabilities
Initiative (DCI) to improve NATO's defence
capabilities in key areas.
Over the following three years, the DCI
achieved progress in some areas, notably
those that required fewer resources, but shortfalls remained in critical capabilities and implementation was slow. In the meantime, the
urgency to adapt and modernise has increased
due to dangers from new and asymmetric
threats, that is, threats from opponents who
seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of modern
societies and of militarily superior powers, often
ruthlessly using unconventional means, particularly terrorism. The September 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States brought into sharp
focus the threat posed by terrorism and the
subsequent US-led intervention in Afghanistan
highlighted continuing shortfalls in Allies'
capabilities.
So, at the Prague Summit in November 2002,
Allied leaders committed themselves to a more
focused approach to strengthening NATO's military capabilities, as part of a package of measures to increase the effectiveness of future
operations across the full spectrum of Alliance
missions, including against terrorism. A threepronged approach to improving Alliance
defence capabilities was adopted: a new capabilities initiative, the Prague Capabilities
Commitment; a NATO Response Force; and a
streamlined command structure. Moreover, a
series of defence initiatives were launched
specifically to address new threats.
Improvements in Allied interoperability and critical capabilities will enable European Allies to
make a stronger, more coherent contribution to
NATO's missions by addressing shortfalls in
European defence capabilities. Such improvements should also be mutually reinforcing with
the European Union’s efforts to develop military
capabilities and to achieve its Headline Goal of
creating a deployable corps-sized, rapid
reaction force.
Prague Capabilities Commitment
The DCI targeted capabilities to which the
Alliance as a whole aspired but did not involve
nation-specific commitments. However, under
the Prague Capabilities Commitment, individual
Allies have made firm and public pledges to
make specific improvements to key military
capabilities with specific timelines for delivery
and high-level monitoring of implementation.
Key capability areas include strategic air and
sea lift; air-to-air refuelling, deployable combat
support and combat service units; command,
control and communications; air-to-ground surveillance; intelligence, surveillance and target
acquisition; combat effectiveness, including
precision-guided munitions and suppression of
enemy air defences; and chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear defence capabilities.
9
Strengthening defence capabilities will require
further reprioritisation in many Allies' defence
budgets, for example in reducing force levels
and shifting resources towards equipment modernisation. However, in many cases, smarter
spending will not be enough and additional
financial resources may be required. Costeffective solutions to defence-capability shortfalls are being explored, such as the pooling of
military capabilities, increasing role specialisation, cooperative acquisition of equipment, and
common and multinational funding.
Once implemented, the Prague Capabilities
Commitment will at least quadruple the number
of large transport aircraft in Europe and, by
pooling resources, European Allies will also
boost their air-to-air refuelling capacity. The
stock of non-US, air-delivered, precision-guided
munitions is set to increase by 40 per cent
by 2007.
New command structure
Allied leaders in Prague endorsed the outline of
a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable military command structure under two
strategic commands, one operational and the
other functional. The details of the new command structure were finalised in June 2003. It
reflects the need for smaller, more flexible and
rapidly deployable forces, better suited to
NATO's new missions. The number of commands has been reduced from 20 to 11 and
their responsibilities have been redefined.
The NATO Response Force will provide a hightech, flexible, rapidly deployable, interoperable
and sustainable force, including land, sea, and
air elements, capable of carrying out the full
range of Alliance missions. The development of
this high-readiness force will also serve as a
catalyst for promoting improvements and
greater interoperability in Alliance military capabilities to ensure their continuing transformation
to meet evolving security challenges.
All operational headquarters now come under
the Allied Command Operations at Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
based in Belgium. It is supported by two joint
force commands, able to generate a landbased headquarters for Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTF), and a robust but more limited
standing joint headquarters from which a seabased CJTF headquarters can be drawn.
CJTFs are flexible command structures that let
military commanders draw on services from
various countries to match the specific requirements of a particular military operation.
Following a first force-generation conference in
July 2003, a prototype force was launched in
October 2003. An initial operational capability is
expected to be ready by October 2004 and the
force is due to be fully operational by October
A new Allied Command Transformation (ACT)
oversees the continuing transformation of
NATO's capabilities and promotes the interoperability of its forces. Replacing the previous
Atlantic Command, it is based in Norfolk,
NATO Response Force
10
2006. It will then number some 21,000 troops
and have dedicated cutting-edge fighter
aircraft, ships, army vehicles, combat service
support, logistics, communications, and intelligence. It will be able to deploy to a crisis area
within five days and sustain itself for 30 days.
Virginia, United States, but also has a presence
in Europe. The fact that the Supreme Allied
Commander for Transformation is also
Commander of the US Joint Forces Command,
the internal change engine for US forces, brings
obvious advantages. ACT will play a key role in
adapting capabilities and developing doctrine
for the new NATO Response Force.
Combating new threats
Several initiatives were taken at Prague to
enhance the Alliance's capabilities against terrorism and other new security threats. A military concept for defence against terrorism was
endorsed. Cooperation has also been launched
with Partner countries in the form of an Action
Plan against Terrorism to exchange intelligence
and to improve civil preparedness against possible chemical, biological or radiological attacks
against civilian populations and to help deal
with their consequences.
Five initiatives were launched to strengthen
Alliance capabilities against nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons: a prototype deployable
analytical laboratory; an event response team;
a virtual centre for excellence on defence
against such weapons; a NATO stockpile of
agents for biological and chemical defence; and
a disease surveillance system. Moreover, a
NATO Missile Defence feasibility study is examining options for protecting Alliance territory,
forces and populations against the full range of
missile threats. Capabilities to defend against
cyber attack are also being strengthened.
On 1 December 2003, a new multinational
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) Defence Battalion achieved its initial
operational capability. Based in Liberec in the
northern part of the Czech Republic, the battalion is due to reach final operational capability
for NATO operations in July 2004. At the time of
its launch, 13 countries were participating in the
formation of the battalion: Belgium, Canada,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
11
The changing role of NATO’s forces
Since the establishment of NATO, the fundamental role of Allied forces has been to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of
member states. The task of providing security
through deterrence and collective defence
remains a fundamental responsibility but, since
the end of the Cold War, the role and organisation of NATO's forces have undergone major
changes to adapt to the evolving security environment and to promote military cooperation
with Partner countries.
During the Cold War, NATO's defence planning
was primarily concerned with maintaining the
capabilities needed to defend against possible
aggression by the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact. With the fall of the Berlin Wall,
some suggested that NATO was no longer
needed. However, Euro-Atlantic security, while
less confrontational, had also become more
complex and many new challenges have
emerged from outside Europe, including failed
states, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery, and terrorism. This new security agenda became clear
in the early 1990s with the ethnic conflicts in the
Balkans, where NATO's forces were eventually
called upon to play a peace-support and crisismanagement role.
More recently, the September 2001 terrorist
attacks and the subsequent operations in
Afghanistan to root out al-Qaida, the terrorist
group responsible for the attacks, have led to
growing concerns about the threats posed by
terrorism, failed states and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. NATO forces are
now contributing to defence against terrorism
and playing a wider role in international peacesupport missions, which are taking NATO
beyond the Euro-Atlantic area for the first time
in its history. So, while the threats facing the
Alliance today are less potentially apocalyptic
than during the Cold War, they are very real,
pressing and often unpredictable.
12
>4
NATO's conventional forces
Since the end of the Cold War, the overall size
of conventional forces has been significantly
reduced: ground forces committed to the
Alliance by member nations have been cut by
35 per cent; major naval vessels have been
reduced by over 30 per cent and air force combat squadrons by some 40 per cent since the
beginning of the 1990s. Most forces are no
longer maintained at high levels of readiness
and have been restructured to give greater
emphasis to flexibility and mobility, and to
enable them to take on new peace-support
and crisis-management roles as well as to
work effectively with forces from non-NATO
countries.
One example of the way in which new circumstances have led to changes in the way Allied
military forces are organised is the introduction
of the military concept of Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTFs). This concept provides a flexible structure that lets military commanders
draw on services from various countries to
match the specific requirements of a particular
military operation. It also facilitates the integration of non-NATO countries into NATO-led
peace-support operations and allows for possible EU-led military operations using NATO
assets and capabilities.
NATO's new crisis-management and peacesupport roles (described in more detail in
Chapter 10) took on increasing importance
from the mid-1990s. Between 1992 and 1995,
NATO forces became involved in the Bosnian
war in support of the United Nations, helping
monitor and enforce UN sanctions in the
Adriatic as well as the no-fly zone over Bosnia
and Herzegovina and providing close air support to the UN Protection Force on the ground.
Air strikes, launched in August and September
1995 to lift the siege of Sarajevo, helped shift
the balance of power and secure a peace
settlement. NATO subsequently deployed a
UN-mandated, multinational force to implement
the military aspects of the peace agreement,
in December 1995.
In the spring of 1999, NATO's crisismanagement role was reinforced when the
Allies launched an air operation against the
Yugoslav regime to force it to comply with international demands to end political and ethnic
repression in the province of Kosovo. A large
NATO-led multinational force was then sent in
to help restore stability.
Two years later, in early 2001, NATO, in cooperation with the new democratic Yugoslav government, engaged in crisis prevention in
Southern Serbia, an area with a large ethnic
Albanian population. Later in the same year,
NATO together with the European Union
engaged in preventive diplomacy to help avoid
the outbreak of civil war in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia*, by encouraging negotiations on a peace plan. A small NATO force
deployed in the summer to peacefully disarm
the rebels and provide security for international
observers, and stability was soon restored.
The Balkan operations have allowed NATO
forces to build up a great deal of experience in
peace-support and crisis-management operations, and in leading multinational coalitions
also involving non-NATO countries. This makes
NATO an invaluable asset in today's security
environment. Since the 11 September terrorist
attacks, the Alliance is increasingly being called
upon to contribute to building security in zones
of instability beyond its traditional EuroAtlantic area.
In Afghanistan, the Alliance agreed in August
2003 to take on command of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help bring
stability to a failed state, long plagued by civil
war and a safe haven for terrorists. NATO had
previously played a significant planning role in
support of Allies, who had taken on lead roles
in ISAF. The enhanced NATO role ensures continuity and overcomes the problem of having to
find new nations to lead the mission every six
months. NATO personnel operate under the
ISAF banner and continue to work within a UN
mandate, which was expanded in October 2003
to allow for operations beyond the capital,
Kabul.
NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is the
Alliance's first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic
area. It reflects the seminal decision taken by
Allied foreign ministers meeting in Reykjavik in
May 2002, that "NATO must be able to field
forces that can move quickly to wherever they
are needed, sustain operations over distance
and time." Moreover, following the US-led intervention against Saddam Hussein's regime,
NATO has agreed to support the Polish-led
multinational division in central Iraq with force
generation, logistics, communications and intelligence. It is prepared to offer similar support to
other Allies that request it.
The post-September 11 security environment
has also seen the classic use of sea power
against new threats. Since October 2001,
under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO
ships have been patrolling the Eastern
Mediterranean, monitoring shipping to detect
and deter terrorist activity. The mission has
13
since been extended to include escorting nonmilitary shipping, upon request, through the
Straits of Gibraltar, as well as to include the
systematic boarding of suspect ships. In addition to deterring terrorism, the naval operation
has brought some unexpected benefits and has
had a visible effect on security and stability in
the Mediterranean that is beneficial to trade
and economic activity.
NATO's nuclear forces
NATO’s policy towards nuclear weapons is one
of the areas of military policy in which the most
radical changes have taken place over the past
decade. During the Cold War, NATO’s nuclear
forces played a central role in Alliance strategy.
The existence of significant numbers of these
forces and the stated willingness of Allied governments to maintain them and to contemplate
their use, was designed to act as a deterrent –
not just as a deterrent against the use of
nuclear weapons by other countries, but as
an ultimate deterrent against any form of
aggression.
14
In the mid-1950s, a strategy of so-called “massive retaliation” emphasised deterrence based
on the threat that NATO would respond to
aggression against any of its members by
every means at its disposal, specifically including nuclear weapons. In 1967, the strategy of
“flexible response” was introduced, aimed at
deterring aggression by creating uncertainty in
the mind of a potential aggressor as to the
nature of NATO’s response, conventional or
nuclear. This remained NATO’s strategy until
the end of the Cold War.
Nuclear weapons play a much reduced role in
Alliance strategy today. Each of NATO's three
nuclear powers – the United States, the United
Kingdom and France – has greatly reduced the
number of their weapons, in some cases by as
much as 80 per cent. The circumstances in
which the use of these weapons might be contemplated are acknowledged to be extremely
remote and they are no longer targeted against
any country or specific threat.
The fundamental purpose of the remaining
nuclear forces is political: to preserve peace
and prevent coercion by making the risks of
aggression against NATO incalculable and
unacceptable. Together with conventional, nonnuclear capabilities, they create uncertainty for
any country that might contemplate seeking
political or military advantage through the threat
or use of nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons against the Alliance.
At the same time, NATO Allies have a longstanding commitment to nuclear arms control,
disarmament and the prevention of the spread
of nuclear weapons, and NATO supports
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons in a prudent
and progressive manner as well as efforts to
limit the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). A WMD Centre has been
established at NATO to identify requirements
and exchange information in this field.
NATO forces
The term NATO forces can be misleading.
NATO has no standing army. Instead, individual member countries make commitments as
to the types and numbers of forces that will
be made available to the Alliance to carry out
agreed tasks or operations. These forces
remain under national control until called for
and are then placed under the responsibility
of NATO military commanders.
In fact, NATO has few permanent military
forces. Small integrated staffs at various
multinational headquarters make up the
Alliance's integrated military structure. Some
operational forces, such as the NATO
Airborne Early Warning Force, maintain
permanent facilities for communications or air
defence and surveillance. And standing naval
forces, consisting of a small number of ships
and personnel from some Allies' navies, are
deployed on a rotational basis.
While NATO has no standing army, it can
mobilize the forces of 26 Allies. Its integrated
multinational structure has led to a historically
unprecedented level of interoperability
among military forces, equipped and trained
to work together, according to common standards and procedures. This, together with
years of experience of leading multinational
crisis-management and peacekeeping operations, makes NATO an invaluable asset in
today's security environment, where tackling
new threats requires coordinated, international action.
15
Extending security through partnership
The Alliance adapted to the post-Cold War
strategic context by adopting a broader definition of security and launching a broad-based
strategy of partnership and cooperation
throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, which is now
regarded as one of NATO’s fundamental security tasks. The process was initiated in 1990,
when Allied leaders extended a hand of friendship across the former East-West divide, proposing a new cooperative relationship with
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
former Soviet republics.
16
>5
Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia*, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine
and Uzbekistan. Among these, ten have since
become Allies: the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland in 1999, and Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia in 2004.
This set the scene for the creation of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in
December 1991, as a forum for consultation
aimed at building mutual trust. A few years later,
the partnership process took a significant leap
forward with the launch, in 1994, of the
Partnership for Peace (PfP)
– a major
programme of practical bilateral cooperation
between NATO and individual Partners.
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and
Montenegro have also expressed their desire to
join the Partnership for Peace and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO looks
forward to welcoming these two countries into
the Partnership, once they have met the conditions set forth by the Alliance, including full
cooperation with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in particular
to detain and turn over persons indicted for war
crimes to the Tribunal.
Today, NATO and Partner countries regularly
consult on security and defence-related issues
in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC), which succeeded the NACC in 1997.
The forces of NATO and Partner countries
interact frequently and conduct joint exercises,
and their soldiers are deployed alongside each
other in NATO-led peacekeeping operations in
the Balkans. Steps were taken at the Prague
Summit in November 2002 to strengthen cooperation between NATO and Partners and to
better focus partnership activities on addressing 21st century security challenges.
Based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin
the Alliance itself, the purpose of the
Partnership for Peace is to increase stability,
diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual
Partner countries and NATO as well as with
other Partner countries. The essence of the
PfP programme is the partnership formed
individually between each Partner country and
NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly
implemented at the level and pace chosen by
each participating government.
The Partnership for Peace
The formal basis for the Partnership for Peace
is the Framework Document. It sets out specific
undertakings for each Partner country and
enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult
with any Partner country that perceives a direct
threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. Each Partner makes a
number of far-reaching political commitments
to preserve democratic societies; to maintain
the principles of international law; to fulfil
One of the most remarkable international
achievements in the field of security in the last
ten years has been the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) programme. Since its launch in 1994, the
invitation to join the Partnership has been
accepted by 30 countries: Albania, Armenia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia,
obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final
Act2 and international disarmament and arms
control agreements; to refrain from the threat or
use of force against other states; to respect
existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully. Specific commitments are also made to
promote transparency in national defence planning and budgeting to establish democratic
control over armed forces, and to develop the
capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
An Individual Partnership Programme is jointly
developed and agreed between NATO and
each Partner country. Two-year programmes
are drawn up from an extensive menu of activities – the Partnership Work Programme –
according to each country's specific interests
and needs. Cooperation, which focuses in particular on defence-related work, includes practical cooperation that touches on virtually every
field of NATO activity. The Work Programme
offers activities in over twenty areas ranging
from defence policy and planning, civil-military
relations, education and training, to air defence,
communications and information systems, crisis management, and civil emergency planning.
To ensure that Partner forces are better able to
operate with NATO militaries in peacekeeping
operations, guidance on interoperability or
capability requirements is provided under a
PfP Planning and Review Process. This mechanism is modelled on NATO’s own force planning system and offered to Partners on an
optional basis. Planning targets, or Partnership
Goals, are negotiated with each participating
country and
extensive reviews measure
progress. This process has contributed significantly to the close cooperation of Partner countries in the Balkan peace operations.
Over the years, the operational focus of the
Partnership for Peace and the involvement of
Partner countries in PfP decision-making and
planning have been increased. An Operational
Capabilities Concept was introduced to develop
closer and more focused military cooperation,
aimed at improving the military effectiveness of
multinational forces. Moreover, a PoliticalMilitary Framework has been developed to
strengthen consultation with Partner countries
during an escalating crisis, which may require
the deployment of peacekeeping troops, and to
involve them earlier in discussions of the operational plan and the force generation process.
To integrate Partner countries better in the daily
work of the Partnership, PfP Staff Elements,
manned by officers from Partner countries,
have been established at several NATO
headquarters. Moreover, at the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
at Mons in Belgium, a Partnership Coordination
Cell helps coordinate PfP training and
exercises and an International Coordination
Centre provides briefing and planning facilities
for all non-NATO countries contributing troops
to the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in
the Balkans and Afghanistan.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council brings
together NATO members and Partners, currently a total of 46 countries, in a multilateral
forum for regular dialogue and consultation on
political and security-related issues. It also
serves as the political framework for the individual bilateral relationships developed between
NATO and countries participating in the
Partnership for Peace.
2
Helsinki Final Act: adopted in 1975 by the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) to set standards for international behaviour, introduce confidence-building measures between
East and West, promote respect for human rights, and encourage economic, cultural, scientific and
technical cooperation.
17
The decision, in 1997, to create the EAPC
reflected a desire to move beyond the achievements of the NACC and to build a security forum
that matched the increasingly sophisticated
relationships being developed with Partners
under the Partnership for Peace and in the context of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, where troops from 14
Partners countries had deployed in 1996 to
serve alongside their Alliance counterparts.
The establishment of the EAPC also complemented steps taken in parallel to enhance the
role of the Partnership for Peace by increasing
the involvement of Partner countries in decisionmaking and planning across the entire scope of
partnership activities.
In addition to short-term consultations in the
EAPC on current political and security-related
issues, a two-year EAPC Action Plan provides
for longer-term consultation and cooperation in
a wide range of areas. These may include, but
are not limited to, crisis management and
peace-support operations; regional issues;
arms control and issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism; defence issues such as planning, budgeting, policy and strategy; civil emergency planning and disaster-preparedness;
armaments cooperation; nuclear safety; civilmilitary coordination of air-traffic management;
and scientific cooperation.
Meetings of the EAPC are held monthly at the
level of ambassadors, annually at the level of
foreign and defence ministers and chiefs of
defence, as well as occasionally at summit level.
As of 2005, an annual high-level, stand-alone
meeting will address important policy issues of
concern to the Euro-Atlantic community. Most
Partner countries have established diplomatic
missions at NATO's headquarters in Brussels,
which facilitates regular communications and
enables consultation to take place whenever
there is a need for it. NATO and Partner country
ambassadors were, for example, able to meet at
18
very short notice on 12 September in the immediate aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States. The solidarity
expressed on that day by EAPC members –
stretching from North America and Europe to
Central Asia – and the cooperation that has
since been manifest in the US-led campaign
against international terrorism show how
NATO's partnership initiatives have sown the
seeds of a true Euro-Atlantic security culture.
tailor the Partnership for Peace to tackle key
thematic issues and individual Partners' needs
and capabilities; to promote defence reform
which encourages military transformation and
interoperability; and to enhance regional cooperation and mutual support.
Partnership after Prague
The shared determination to join forces against
the terrorist threat was given concrete expression in the launch of a Partnership Action Plan
against Terrorism, at the Prague Summit. Steps
were also taken to improve cooperation
between NATO and Partner countries. A comprehensive review of the EAPC and the
Partnership for Peace recommended strengthening the political dialogue with Partners and
further enhancing their involvement in the planning, conduct and oversight of activities in
which they participate. Moreover, a new cooperative mechanism was introduced, the
Individual Partnership Action Plan, which,
rather than drawing from a menu of activities,
allows the Alliance to tailor its assistance to
Partner countries which have asked for more
structured support for domestic reforms,
according to specific needs and circumstances.
Building on progress made at Prague, proposals are being developed in time for NATO's next
summit meeting in Istanbul in 2004 to further
19
Opening the Alliance to new members
NATO membership is open to any European
country. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty
allows existing members to invite “any European
State in a position to further the principles of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area” to become a member.
NATO’s 12 founding members have grown to 26
today after five rounds of enlargement.
NATO’s door remains open. After the latest
round of enlargement, which saw Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia become members in 2004, another
three aspirants, Albania, Croatia and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, hope to be
invited in future.
The aim of each round of enlargement has been
to extend Euro-Atlantic security and to increase
NATO's strength, cohesion and vitality, and has
not been directed against the security interests
of any third country. Each round of enlargement
has helped extend security and stability in
Europe and heal the wounds of a continent,
which suffered two wars in the first half of the
20th century and was then divided by an Iron
Curtain for forty years. Greece and Turkey were
admitted in 1952. In 1955, only ten years after
the end of the Second World War, the Federal
Republic of Germany joined, firmly integrating
the country into the West and laying the conditions for ultimate German reunification. After
much heated debate in political circles, Spain
joined in 1982, though it remained outside the
Alliance's integrated military structure until 1998.
The decision taken at the 1997 Madrid Summit
to invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Poland to begin accession talks to join NATO
was a major step towards overcoming Cold War
divisions by paving the way for former Warsaw
Pact adversaries to join the Alliance.
Post-Cold War enlargement
The first post-Cold War round of enlargement
was not a foregone conclusion and the decision
20
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required unanimity among all existing member
countries. Paramount considerations were to
preserve the Alliance's ability to take decisions
based on consensus and to ensure that enlargement would strengthen European security.
A Study on NATO Enlargement, commissioned
in 1994 and published a year later, concluded
that the admission of new members and the
political, military and economic implications of
enlargement would further the Alliance’s basic
goal of enhancing security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. In parallel
with developing the Alliance’s relationships with
Russia, Ukraine and other Partner countries, the
process would serve the interests of the whole of
Europe.
A key issue throughout deliberations about this
first post-Cold War enlargement round was how
to correct Russia's perception of the Alliance as
a military bloc hostile to Russian interests. The
Allies agreed that Russia had an important contribution to make to European stability and security and acknowledged that Russian concerns
with respect to the enlargement process needed
to be addressed. Nevertheless, the right of each
independent European state to seek its own
security arrangements and to belong to international organisations had to be respected, as did
the right of the members of the Alliance to take
their own decisions. Prior to issuing invitations at
the Madrid Summit, NATO sought to consolidate
and institutionalise its dialogue with Russia
through the 1997 Founding Act (see Chapter 7)
and reiterated its commitment not to deploy
nuclear weapons or station foreign troops on the
territory of the new members.
Based on the recommendations of the Study on
NATO Enlargement and following intensified individual dialogue with interested Partner countries
and extensive consultations among Allies, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were
invited to begin accession talks in 1997 and formally became members of the Alliance on
12 March 1999.
Several countries were disappointed not to be
included in the first post-Cold War round of
enlargement, but NATO members emphasised
that the Alliance would remain open to other
countries wishing to join in the future. At the
Washington Summit in April 1999, the Allies
launched a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to
assist candidate countries in preparing for future
Alliance membership (see box). Seven of the
MAP's original participants, namely Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia, were invited to begin accession
talks at the Prague Summit in November 2002.
After an extensive series of consultations with
the seven countries, the Allies signed accession
protocols for the seven invitees in March 2003.
Once these protocols had been ratified in all
member countries, according to their respective
national and parliamentary procedures, the
seven new members were able to accede to
NATO's founding treaty on 29 March 2004. The
new Allies are expected to make further
progress on important reform commitments, in
particular in the area of defence.
NATO is maintaining its open-door policy beyond
this second post-Cold War enlargement round. It
has encouraged the three other countries participating in the MAP – Albania, Croatia and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* – to
continue to pursue their reform efforts, particularly in the defence and security sectors. In the
case of Croatia, full cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia will also be of key importance.
Membership Action Plan
Launched in 1999, based on the experiences
of the first post-Cold War round of enlargement, the Membership Action Plan (MAP),
assists countries aspiring to join the Alliance in
their preparations for NATO membership. Nine
countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and
the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia*
– have participated since its inception. They
were joined by Croatia in May 2002. Seven of
these countries became members in 2004.
To become a member of NATO, aspirants have
to demonstrate a functioning democratic,
political system and market economy; respect
for persons belonging to national minorities
in accordance with OSCE standards; the
resolution of all outstanding disputes with
neighbours and a commitment to the peaceful
settlement of disputes generally; the ability
and willingness to make a military contribution
to the Alliance and achieve interoperability
with other members’ forces; and the proper
functioning of civil-military relations in line with
democratic standards.
Participation in the MAP does not guarantee
future membership. It does, however, enable
all countries concerned to focus their preparations on the goals and priorities set out in the
plan and to receive specialist help and assessments from NATO. These cover all aspects of
membership, including political, economic,
defence, resource, information, security and
legal requirements.
Each participating country chooses the
elements of the MAP which best suit its needs
and establishes its own targets and schedules.
Participation in the Partnership for Peace itself,
and particularly in the PfP Planning and
Review Process, is an integral part of the
process, since it allows candidate countries to
develop forces and force structures which are
better able to operate with Alliance forces.
Regular review meetings with Allies are held
to monitor progress and ensure that advice
and feedback is provided. Implementation of
the MAP is kept under constant review by the
North Atlantic Council.
21
Forging new relations with Russia
NATO has been building bridges and developing cooperation with Russia since the early
1990s. The rationale for cooperation between
NATO countries and Russia is clear: common
security challenges are best tackled through
cooperation and Russia's involvement is
critical for any comprehensive post-Cold War
European security system.
Much progress was made over the next five
years in building mutual confidence and overcoming misperceptions through dialogue. In
1999, despite differences over the Kosovo air
campaign which led to a year-long interruption
in the PJC's meetings, several activities, including peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
continued without interruption.
In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist
attacks, which reinforced the need for coordinated action to respond to common threats, the
NATO-Russia partnership was given new impetus and substance at the Rome Summit in May
2002. A new NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was
created, which brings together the NATO Allies
and Russia as equal partners to identify
and pursue opportunities for joint action.
Cooperation is being intensified in key areas of
mutual interest and concern.
Yet, the ambitions expressed in the Founding
Act were never fully realised under the PJC. Its
“NATO-plus-1” format meant that NATO came
to the table with agreed Alliance positions, and
NATO and Russia exchanged information and
conducted consultations in a more or less
“bilateral” fashion, which proved cumbersome
when the time came to move beyond consultation and to seek more genuine cooperation.
When the need for concerted action to tackle
international terrorism and other new security
threats became urgent in the aftermath of the
11 September attacks, the Allies and Russia
were therefore quick to seize the opportunity to
take their relationship to a higher level by
establishing the NATO-Russia Council to promote cooperation as equal partners (see box).
The decision to deepen their partnership
demonstrates the shared resolve of NATO
countries and Russia to work more closely
together towards the common goal of building a
lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic
area, which was first expressed in the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Security, providing
the basis for the NATO-Russia partnership.
Developing relations
Russia was a founding member of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 and joined
the Partnership for Peace in 1994, and Russian
peacekeepers worked alongside NATO counterparts in the Balkans from 1996 until their
withdrawal in summer 2003 (see box page 25).
However, the true basis for a strong and durable
partnership between NATO and Russia was
provided by the Founding Act, signed in Paris
on 27 May 1997. This led to the creation of the
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a forum for
regular consultation on common security issues
and the development of a programme of consultation and cooperation.
22
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To facilitate cooperation, Russia established
a mission to NATO in 1998. Since then, to
explain the new NATO and promote the
benefits of the NATO-Russia partnership, a
NATO Information Office has been set up in
Moscow. A NATO Military Liaison Mission has
also been established there, which is helping
improve transparency and the development of
practical military cooperation.
Deepening cooperation
The NRC is evolving into a productive mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. Already in
its first 18 months of existence, political consultations were held on the situation in Afghanistan,
Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and practical cooperation was
leading to concrete benefits in many areas.
The NRC has created several working groups
and committees on terrorism, proliferation,
peacekeeping, theatre missile defence,
airspace management cooperation, civil
emergencies, defence reform, scientific cooperation and on the challenges of modern society.
Experts have been tasked to carry forward individual projects in a broad range of other areas.
Hardly a day goes by without an NRC meeting,
at one level or another, leading to an unprecedented intensity of contacts and informal
consultation.
The struggle against terrorism and new security
threats are key areas of cooperation that are
generating some of the first tangible results of
the reinforced NATO-Russia relationship. Joint
assessments of specific terrorist threats in the
Euro-Atlantic area are being developed and
kept under review and the military's role in combating terrorism is being explored. Cooperation
against proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons and the spread of ballistic
missile technology has intensified: a joint
assessment of global trends in the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction is being prepared and cooperation in theatre missile
defence is addressing the unprecedented danger posed by the increasing availability of ever
more accurate ballistic missiles. A Cooperative
Airspace Initiative is seeking to foster cooperation on air-traffic management and air surveillance, which will enhance air safety and transparency and will also help counter the threat of
the potential use of civilian aircraft for terrorist
purposes.
A key objective of military cooperation is to
improve interoperability, since, modern militaries
must be able to operate within multinational
command and force structures, when called
upon to work together in peace-support or crisismanagement operations. A substantial exercise
and training programme is being implemented
The NATO-Russia Council
The 2002 Rome Declaration, which builds
on the goals and principles of the 1997
Founding Act, established the NATORussia Council (NRC) as a mechanism for
consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action, in
which the individual Allies and Russia work
as equal partners on a wide spectrum of
Euro-Atlantic security issues of common
interest. Continuous political dialogue on
security issues enables the early identification of emerging problems, the determination of common approaches and the
conduct of joint actions, as appropriate.
The new Council, replacing the PJC, works
on the principle of consensus. It is chaired
by NATO's Secretary General. Meetings
are held at least monthly at the level of
ambassadors and military representatives;
twice yearly at the level of foreign and
defence ministers and chiefs of staff; and
occasionally at summit level. An important
innovation is the NRC Preparatory
Committee, which meets at least twice a
month to prepare ambassadorial discussions and to oversee all experts' activities
under the auspices of the NRC.
Work under the NRC focuses on all areas
of mutual interest identified in the
Founding Act. Cooperation is being intensified in a number of key areas, which
include the fight against terrorism, crisis
management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures,
theatre missile defence, logistics, militaryto-military cooperation, defence reform
and civil emergencies. New areas may be
added to the NRC’s agenda by the mutual
consent of its members.
23
under the NRC. Logistics, including interoperability tests for equipment and procedures in
areas such as air transport and air-to-air refuelling, are another focus of activities. Intensified
cooperation in search and rescue at sea was
initiated after the August 2000 sinking of the
Russian nuclear submarine, Kursk, and the loss
of its 118 crewmen. A framework agreement
between NATO and Russia on submarine crew
escape and rescue was signed in February
2003.
Defence reform is another area of shared interest. Russia and NATO countries need armed
forces that are appropriately sized, trained and
equipped to deal with the full spectrum of 21st
century threats. While there is no blueprint for
military reform, Russia could benefit from the
experience of NATO countries, many of which
have introduced fundamental reforms over the
past decade to adapt their armed forces to
today's requirements. Following an initial brainstorming in October 2002, cooperation has
been launched on different aspects of defence
reform, such as the management of human
and financial resources; macro-economic,
financial and social issues; and force-planning.
The activities of a successful joint project for
the retraining of retired Russian military personnel, set up in Moscow in July 2002, are
being expanded. Moreover, the NATO Defense
College in Rome set up two fellowships in 2003
for Russian scholars to promote research on
defence reform.
24
Russia and NATO have been cooperating since
1996 to develop a capacity for joint action in
response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and floods, and coordinate detection
and prevention of disasters before they occur.
And it was a Russian proposal that led to the
establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Centre in 1998 (see
box page 35). Various disaster-relief exercises
and seminars, often including participants from
other Partner countries, help develop civilmilitary cooperation. Under the NRC, work in
this area is concentrating initially on improving
interoperability, procedures and the exchange
of information and experience.
Scientific and technological cooperation with
Russia, launched in 1998, focused on three
specific areas of particular interest to Russia,
namely plasma physics, plant biotechnology
and the forecasting and prevention of natural
and industrial catastrophes. Under the NRC
Science Committee, however, a new focus of
cooperation is the application of civil science to
defence against terrorism and new threats,
such as in explosives detection or in examining
the social and psychological impact of terrorism. Environmental protection problems arising
from civilian and military activities are a further
new area of cooperation, under a Committee
on the Challenges of Modern Society set up
under the NRC in 2003.
Peacekeeping
For over seven years (until their withdrawal
from SFOR and KFOR in summer 2003),
Russia contributed the largest non-NATO
contingent to the UN-mandated, NATO-led
peacekeeping forces in the Balkans. Russian
soldiers worked alongside NATO and Partner
counterparts to support the international
community's efforts to build lasting security
and stability in the region.
Russian peacekeepers first deployed to
Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1996,
where they were part of a multinational
brigade in a northern sector, responsible for
an extensive area, conducting daily patrols,
security checks, assisting with reconstruction
and performing humanitarian tasks, such as
helping refugees and displaced people return
to their homes.
Russia played a vital diplomatic role in securing an end to the Kosovo conflict, despite
political differences over NATO's 1999
Kosovo air campaign. Its troops, originally
deployed in June 1999, played an integral
part in the Kosovo Force until their withdrawal, working to maintain security in multinational brigades in sectors in the east, north
and south of the province; exercising joint
responsibility for running the Pristina airfield,
alongside a NATO contingent with responsibility for air movement; and providing medical
facilities and services in Kosovo Polje.
Close cooperation between NATO and
Russia in the Balkans has been critical in
improving relations and building trust
between the Russian and Allied militaries.
The mutual confidence gained should provide a solid basis for further expanding military-to-military cooperation. Moreover, under
the NRC, a generic concept for joint peacekeeping operations has been agreed, which
develops common approaches, establishes a
framework for consultation, planning and
decision-making during an emerging crisis,
and defines issues related to joint training
and exercises.
25
A distinctive partnership with Ukraine
NATO's relationship with Ukraine recognises the
importance of an independent, stable and
democratic Ukraine and the country's declared
intention to increase its integration in European
and Euro-Atlantic structures. This was expressed
in the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership,
which provides the formal basis for consultations
with NATO on Euro-Atlantic security issues and
established the NATO-Ukraine Commission
(NUC) to direct cooperative activities.
NATO-Ukraine relations date back to 1991,
when Ukraine joined the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council, immediately upon achieving independence with the break-up of the
Soviet Union. The country's aspirations towards
Euro-Atlantic integration were also later
reflected in 1994, when it became the first of the
Commonwealth of Independent States to join
the Partnership for Peace. Ukraine’s commitment to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security has
since been demonstrated in its support for
NATO and its Allies in peacekeeping and crisismanagement operations.
To facilitate cooperation, Ukraine established a
mission to NATO in 1997 and a NATO Information and Documentation Centre was set up in
Kyiv in the same year to help explain the new
NATO and promote the benefits of the NATOUkraine partnership. In 1999, a NATO Liaison
Office was also set up in Kyiv to support
Ukraine's defence reform efforts and its participation in the Partnership for Peace.
Steps were taken in Prague in November 2002
to deepen and broaden the NATO-Ukraine relationship significantly with the adoption of the
NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (see box).
Security cooperation
26
NATO and Ukraine actively cooperate in maintaining security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic
area. In the Balkans, Ukraine has over the years
contributed an infantry battalion, a mechanised
infantry battalion and a helicopter squadron to
>8
the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and deployments to the operation
in Kosovo have included a helicopter squadron
as well as a substantial contribution to the joint
Polish-Ukrainian battalion. Further testifying to
the country's determination to contribute to
international stability, Ukraine is providing overflight clearance for coalition forces deployed as
part of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, in which lead roles
are being played by individual Allies and where
NATO took command in August 2003. Ukraine
has also deployed 1,800 troops as part of a
Polish-led multinational force in one of the sectors of the international stabilisation force in
Iraq, which includes peacekeepers from several
NATO and Partner countries.
Support for reform
Through advice and practical assistance, NATO
and individual Allies are supporting Ukraine’s
efforts to achieve the ambitious reform agenda
set out in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan and its
related Annual Target Plans. While much
remains to be done, progress is being made.
Legislative initiatives are helping lay the foundations for political, economic and defence reform,
and several governmental structures have been
put in place to oversee the implementation and
coordination of reform efforts.
A key priority is defence reform, an area in
which Ukraine can draw on the experience and
expertise of NATO countries. Current Ukrainian
priorities are to develop a new security concept
and military doctrine and to complete a comprehensive defence review. NATO-Ukraine cooperation focuses on strengthening democratic and
civilian control of the armed forces, improving
interoperability with NATO forces and helping
Ukraine transform its post-Soviet legacy of a
large, top-heavy, ill-equipped force structure,
into a smaller, modern and more efficient force,
capable of meeting its security needs as well as
contributing actively to European stability and
security.
A Joint Working Group on Defence Reform
(JWGDR) facilitates consultation and practical
cooperation on issues such as defence budgeting and planning, military downsizing and conversion, the transition from conscript to volunteer
forces, and civil-military relations. NATO also
promotes the training of senior officers to
support the defence transformation process and
helps organise retraining programmes to ease
the transition to civilian life of discharged
Ukrainian military personnel. The Military
Committee with Ukraines complements the
work of the JWGDR by providing expertise in
various areas that support military-to-military
cooperation with Ukraine in the framework of the
NATO-Ukraine Military Work Plan. Assistance by
individual Allies for demilitarisation projects for
the safe destruction of Ukraine’s stockpiles
of surplus and obsolete landmines has been
channelled through a PfP Trust Fund.
Ukraine’s drive to improve interoperability also
benefits from participation in the Partnership for
Peace. The PfP Planning and Review Process
identifies key requirements for defence planning
purposes, and a wide range of PfP activities and
military exercises allow Ukrainian military personnel to gain hands-on experience of working
with NATO forces.
Wider cooperation
Cooperation in civil emergency planning and
disaster preparedness brings direct practical
benefits for Ukraine. A key focus has been to
help Ukraine, whose western parts are prone to
heavy flooding, to prepare better for such emergencies and to manage their consequences
more effectively. PfP exercises, including one
held in Ukraine's Trans-Carpathia region in
September 2000, help test disaster-relief procedures. Moreover, NATO countries and other
Partners have assisted Ukraine after severe
floods in 1995, 1998 and 2001.
Scientific cooperation with Ukraine started in
1991. Since then, Ukraine's participation in
NATO science programmes has been second
only to Russia. Cooperation has been boosted
under the direction of a Joint Working Group on
Scientific and Environmental Cooperation. In
addition to applying science to defence against
terrorism and new threats, in line with the new
direction of NATO's science programme,
Ukraine's current priorities for cooperation in
science and technology include information
technologies, cell biology and biotechnology,
new materials and the rational use of natural
resources.
NATO-Ukraine Action Plan
The 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan builds
on the Charter, which remains the basic foundation of relations. It provides a strategic
framework for intensified consultations on
political, economic and defence issues and
sets out Ukraine's strategic objectives and
priorities on the road towards full integration
in Euro-Atlantic security structures. It sets out
agreed principles and objectives, covering
political and economic issues; information
issues; security, defence and military issues;
information protection and security; and legal
issues.
NATO countries support reforms through
assistance and advice. However, the burden
for implementation falls primarily on Ukraine,
which is being urged to take the reform
process forward vigorously in order to
strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and the market economy. Particular
emphasis is required to achieve a farreaching transformation of the defence and
security sectors.
Annual Target Plans, including specific
Ukrainian measures as well as joint NATOUkraine actions, support the implementation
of the objectives set out in the Action Plan.
Assessment meetings take place twice a year
and a progress report is prepared annually.
27
Dialogue with Mediterranean countries
Several of NATO's southern European
members border the Mediterranean and security and stability in the Mediterranean area are
therefore of major importance to the Alliance.
Indeed, the security of the whole of Europe is
closely linked to security and stability in the
Mediterranean region.
For these reasons, in 1995, NATO launched a
new dialogue with six countries in the southern
part of the Mediterranean region, namely
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and
Tunisia. Algeria became a participant in
February 2000. The Mediterranean Dialogue,
which is an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security, aims to contribute
to security and stability in the region, to achieve
better mutual understanding and to correct misperceptions about NATO in Dialogue countries.
The Dialogue complements other related but
distinct international initiatives, such as those
undertaken by the European Union and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
Political dialogue and practical
cooperation
28
>9
These provide an opportunity to exchange
views on a range of issues relevant to security
in the Mediterranean, as well as on the future
development of the Dialogue. Multilateral meetings of the North Atlantic Council with the seven
Dialogue countries are also held to provide
briefings on NATO's activities and to exchange
views on topical events. Such meetings are
usually held after each NATO ministerial and
summit meeting, or when exceptional circumstances arise. On 23 October 2001, for example, a meeting was held with the Mediterranean
partners about NATO's response to the
11 September terrorist attacks.
Practical cooperation is organised through an
annual work programme. This includes invitations to officials from Dialogue countries to participate in courses at the NATO School in
Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO
Defense College in Rome, Italy. Such courses
cover peacekeeping issues, arms control,
efforts against the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, environmental protection,
civil-military cooperation in civil emergencies,
and European security cooperation.
The Dialogue provides for political dialogue and
practical cooperation with participating countries. All Mediterranean partners are offered the
same basis for discussion and joint activities,
but the level of participation varies from country
to country according to their wishes.
Other activities include visits of opinion leaders,
academics, journalists, and parliamentarians
from Dialogue countries to NATO. In addition,
the Dialogue promotes scientific cooperation
through NATO's science programme. Since
2000, more than 800 scientists from Dialogue
countries have participated in NATO-sponsored
scientific activities.
The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions at ambassadorial level.
More operational aspects of the programme's
military dimension provide opportunities for
officials from Dialogue countries to observe PfP
exercises, attend seminars and workshops
organised by the Strategic Commands, and visit
NATO military headquarters. In addition,
NATO's Standing Naval Forces in the
Mediterranean visit ports in Dialogue countries.
In 2002, 300 officials from Dialogue countries
participated in over fifty different activities
organised under the military programme offered
by NATO.
Three of the Mediterranean partners – Egypt,
Jordan and Morocco – have in the past
contributed to the NATO-led peacekeeping
missions in the Balkans. By May 2002, only
Morocco still had soldiers serving in SFOR and
KFOR.
An evolving process
The Dialogue is progressive in terms of participation and substance. This flexibility allows its
content to evolve and the number of Dialogue
partners to grow with time. Over the years, political discussions have become more frequent
and intense. The practical dimension has
expanded significantly since the Dialogue was
launched and now covers most activities in
which other Partner countries participate.
The establishment of a Mediterranean Cooperation Group in 1997 gave the Dialogue a new
and more dynamic direction. It provides a forum
in which views can be exchanged between
NATO member states and Dialogue countries
on the security situation in the Mediterranean
and on the further development of the Dialogue.
At the Washington Summit in 1999, further
steps were taken to enhance both the political
and practical dimensions of the Dialogue,
increasing opportunities to strengthen cooperation in areas where NATO can bring added
value, particularly in the military field, and in
other areas where Dialogue countries have
expressed interest.
In the wake of 11 September, NATO and the
Dialogue countries have met more frequently for
consultations with the North Atlantic Council,
both individually and as a group. An upgrade of
the initiative was announced at the Prague
Summit in November 2002. Alliance leaders
agreed a package of measures to increase the
political and practical dimensions of the
Dialogue, making the strengthening and deepening of this relationship an Alliance priority.
These measures included a more regular and
effective consultation process, the identification
of more focused activities and a tailored
approach to cooperation. As well as deepening
existing areas of cooperation, new ones were
suggested. These include specially selected
activities to improve the ability of Dialogue countries to contribute to NATO-led non-Article 5
crisis-response operations, defence reform and
defence economics, consultation on terrorism
and on border security, as well as disaster
management. The implementation of these
measures will help transform the nature of the
relationship between NATO and Dialogue
countries. Moreover, options for a more ambitious and expanded framework for the
Mediterranean Dialogue are being generated for
consideration in time for NATO's next summit
meeting in Istanbul in 2004.
29
Peacekeeping and crisis management
> 10
One of the most significant aspects of NATO's
transformation has been the decision to
undertake
peace-support
and
crisismanagement operations in the Euro-Atlantic
area and further afield. In the Balkans, where
NATO first committed itself in 1995, instability
and conflict posed direct challenges to the
security interests of its members as well as to
wider European peace and stability. More
recently, with its commitment to peacekeeping
in Afghanistan, the Alliance has demonstrated
that it is prepared to address security
challenges beyond its traditional area of
responsibility.
In addition to deterring a resumption of hostilities and promoting a climate in which the
peace process could move forward, SFOR's
mission was extended to include support for
civilian agencies involved in the international
community's efforts to build a lasting peace in
the country. The peacekeeping troops help
refugees and displaced persons return to their
homes and contribute to reforming the
Bosnian military forces. Moreover, SFOR is
active in apprehending indicted war criminals
and transferring them to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in
The Hague.
Moreover, NATO's involvement in such operations has called for increased contacts and
cooperation with non-NATO troop-contributing
countries as well as with other organisations.
This exemplifies the kind of security cooperation needed today, when close working
relationships with international and nongovernmental organisations and with nonNATO member countries, such as those
participating in the Partnership for Peace,
are key.
As the security situation has improved, the
number of troops has been progressively
reduced. By spring 2004, SFOR consisted of
some 7,000 troops, a significant reduction on
the 60,000 that were deployed under IFOR,
reflecting the progress Bosnia and
Herzegovina has made towards selfsustaining peace. Options for the future size
and structure of SFOR are being assessed,
including a possible termination of the operation by the end of 2004 with a transition possibly to an EU-led force, though NATO will
maintain a presence in the country.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Kosovo
Having supported UN efforts to end the
Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995 (see also
Chapter 4), NATO deployed a UN-mandated
multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, six days after the
signing of the Dayton Peace Accord on 14
December
1995,
to
implement
the
military aspects of the peace agreement. Its
mission was to secure an end to hostilities; to
separate the armed forces of the war-torn
country's newly created entities, the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika
Srpska; and to transfer territory between the
two entities. IFOR completed its work within a
year and was replaced by a smaller
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in December 1996.
30
During 1998, open conflict in the Yugoslav
province of Kosovo, which is predominantly
populated by ethnic Albanians, forced more
than 300,000 people to flee their homes.
Belgrade ignored repeated international
demands for the withdrawal of Serbian forces
and for cooperation in bringing an end to the
violence and allowing refugees to return.
When NATO threatened the use of air
strikes in October 1998, Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic agreed to comply and the
air strikes were called off. The Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
sent in observers, while NATO undertook aerial surveillance and deployed a military task
force to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia*, ready to evacuate OSCE
observers should renewed conflict put them
at risk.
Violence flared up again at the beginning of
1999. Serbian forces intensified their operations. Intensive and concerted international
diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict failed;
the OSCE observer mission withdrew in
March. A few days after the OSCE's withdrawal, as a last resort, an Allied air campaign
was launched against targets in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. It took 78 days of air
strikes to force the Milosevic regime to end its
repression and agree to the international community's demands. NATO held together, seeking only to strike the regime and military targets and taking care to minimise civilian casualties. At the same time, Allied forces helped
alleviate the refugee crisis in neighbouring
Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,* where, at their peak, the figures
for ethnic Albanian refugees reached 445,000
and 330,000, respectively. Moreover, some
400,000 were believed to have been displaced
inside Kosovo.
Following the conclusion of a Military
Technical Agreement between NATO and
Yugoslav commanders, a NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR) deployed to the province under
a UN mandate. Its mission was to deter
renewed hostility, establish a secure environment and demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation
Army, as well as to support the international
humanitarian effort and the work of the UN
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK).
At full strength, KFOR's initial deployment
numbered some 43,000 troops. Progressive
troop reductions have more than halved this
figure. In June 2003, KFOR comprised troops
from most NATO member states, 15 Partner
countries and three other countries, namely
Argentina, Morocco and New Zealand.
Following the Kosovo Liberation Army's undertaking to disband, KFOR has collected and
destroyed a significant number of small arms
and helped to build the Kosovo Protection
Corps, a local civil-emergency force, which
operates under UNMIK's authority and
KFOR's day-to-day supervision. KFOR troops
also patrol Kosovo’s borders and man crossing points and guard key sites. Considerable
manpower is engaged in protecting Serb
inhabitants, who have returned to the
province.
In close cooperation with UNMIK, KFOR is
helping build a secure environment in which all
citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins,
can live in peace and in which the growth of
democracy can be fostered with international
aid. This will be a difficult and long-term task.
But civil reconstruction is underway and
a measure of security and normal life has now
been re-established for the local inhabitants.
Southern Serbia
In early 2001, NATO, the European Union and
the OSCE pursued a concerted conflictprevention strategy to help bring about the
peaceful resolution of an armed conflict in
Southern Serbia, which threatened the
31
stability of the region. Trouble had broken out
in late 2000 in the Presevo Valley, where a
large ethnic Albanian community remained
under Serbian direct rule, lacking adequate
political and social rights. Lightly armed ethnic
Albanian fighters launched a series of attacks
on Serbian security forces in the Ground
Safety Zone – a five-kilometre-wide buffer
zone along Kosovo's internal boundary with
Serbia, off-limits to the Yugoslav Army, which
was supervised by the NATO-led Kosovo
Force under the terms of a Military Technical
Agreement between the Alliance and the
Yugoslav Army.
The rapidly escalating conflict presented a
serious security risk with immediate implications for Kosovo. A political solution was
needed both to guarantee enhanced rights for
ethnic Albanians in Southern Serbia and to
uphold the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
32
During spring 2001, a series of high-level contacts between NATO and the new Yugoslav
government in Belgrade led NATO to agree to
a gradual and progressive reduction of the
Ground Safety Zone to allow the Yugoslav
Army to re-establish control over the area. In
return, the Belgrade government was required
to introduce a number of confidence-building
measures, which eventually persuaded the
ethnic Albanian fighters to lay down their arms
in May. A NATO team accompanied by an EU
representative helped negotiate cease-fires
and establish direct channels of communication between Serbian authorities and ethnic
Albanian armed groups.
A broad set of measures was agreed to facilitate the speedy integration of ethnic Albanians
into political and administrative structures in
the region and the return of refugees. The
international community monitored and assisted in implementation. The OSCE set up a
programme to train a multi-ethnic police force
for deployment in the mostly Albanian villages
formerly held by the rebels and helped organise local elections, held in August 2002, to
ensure more fair and equal representation of
ethnic groups.
The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia*
NATO forces took on clearly defined crisismanagement missions in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia* from 2001 at the
Afghanistan
request of the government. Internal unrest
erupted in spring 2001, as ethnic Albanian
armed groups challenged the authorities.
NATO condemned the armed attacks and
tightened controls along the border with
Kosovo, while urging the government to pursue constitutional reforms to address ethnic
Albanian grievances, with NATO’s Secretary
General playing a key role.
In June, NATO agreed to a formal request for
military assistance in demilitarising the ethnic
Albanian so-called National Liberation Army,
on condition that a cease-fire was implemented and that a peace plan was agreed. A
framework agreement was in place in August,
which opened the way for NATO to send in
3,500 troops on a 30-day mission to disarm
the ethnic Albanian armed groups.
At the end of September, following on from
this mission, NATO was requested to keep a
small force in the country to contribute to the
protection of EU and OSCE observers, who
were monitoring the implementation of the
framework agreement. Some 700 NATO
troops were deployed to participate in this
operation, joining a small contingent of NATO
troops, already based in the country to assure
KFOR's lines of communication and logistics.
This NATO operation was terminated in March
2003, when responsibility for the mission was
handed over to the European Union, thanks to
EU-NATO agreements allowing for the use of
NATO military assets and capabilities for
EU-led operations (see Chapter 2). As of
15 December 2003, thanks to success
achieved in stabilising the situation, the
EU-led military operation was terminated and
replaced by an EU civilian police operation.
In August 2003, NATO took over responsibility
for the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) IV in Afghanistan to assist the Afghan
Transitional Authority in creating a safe environment for the citizens of Kabul and the surrounding area. The country is trying to recover
from two decades of civil war and, more
recently, the destructive rule of the Taliban,
who harboured terrorists.
ISAF is a UN-mandated international force
that was put into place at the end of 2001. The
first mission was led by the United Kingdom
and consisted of forces from other countries,
most of which were NATO member countries.
ISAF II was then led by Turkey, and ISAF III
jointly by Germany and the Netherlands. The
original mandate limited ISAF operations to
Kabul and the surrounding areas, however, in
October 2003, a UN Security Council resolution authorised the expansion of operations
beyond Kabul.
NATO has agreed to expand its mission more
widely within Afghanistan, especially through
temporary deployments outside Kabul and
assuming military command of a substantial
number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs), which are helping to stabilise the
regions. Beginning with support to the
German-led PRT in Kunduz, ISAF will progressively expand its role to support other
PRTs. Many serious challenges are being
faced in Afghanistan, as the international community works to help Afghans rebuild their
country. NATO has committed itself to remaining in Afghanistan as long as it is needed
there. A comprehensive strategy for NATO's
engagement in Afghanistan is to be developed
in time for NATO's next summit meeting in
Istanbul in 2004, in close consultation with
other international organisations and the
Afghan Transitional Authority.
33
Responding to civil emergencies
> 11
All countries are responsible for ensuring that
plans are in place at the national level for dealing with emergencies such as accidents involving chemicals or toxic spills, avalanches, floods
and earthquakes, or managing the consequences of terrorist attacks. But disasters,
whether man-made or natural, do not recognise
international borders, so cooperation and planning at the international level is indispensable.
Cooperation between NATO countries has
been taking place in the field of civil emergency
planning for many years. More recently, this
cooperation has been extended to include
Partner countries. Major advances have been
made in the way resources are organised to
deal with civil emergencies in the Euro-Atlantic
area.
Coordination within NATO
Effective responses to disasters call for the
coordination of transport facilities, medical
resources, communications, disaster-response
capabilities and other civil resources. NATO has
played a vital role in harmonising planning
among its member countries, ensuring that the
plans will work when required and making sure
that the resources on which they depend are
available.
Within NATO, the mechanism used for coordinating planning in this field consists of a series
of technical planning boards and committees,
working under the overall direction of a Senior
Civil Emergency Planning Committee. These
bodies regularly bring together experts from
national governments, industry and the military
to coordinate planning in relation to European
inland surface transport, ocean shipping, civil
aviation, food and agriculture, industrial production and supply, post and telecommunications,
medical matters, civil protection, and petroleum
production and supply.
34
Wider cooperation
Today, NATO experience and expertise in civil
emergency planning is being made more
widely available and is simultaneously drawing
on the knowledge and capabilities of other
countries participating in the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council. Increasingly, NATO’s
Partner countries are becoming actively
involved in concrete forms of cooperation
in the work of the planning boards and
committees and, in 1998, a Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Coordination Centre was
established (see box).
Civil emergency planning is also an important
aspect of overall cooperation programmes with
Partner countries and now makes up the
largest non-military component of activities
under the Partnership for Peace. Such activities
include seminars, workshops, exercises and
training courses, which bring together civil and
military personnel from different levels of local,
regional and national governments. Other international organisations, such as the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
the International Atomic Energy Agency and
the European Union, are also important
participants, as are non-governmental relief
organisations.
The events of 11 September 2001 brought
home the urgency of cooperation in preparing
for possible terrorist attacks on civilian populations using chemical, biological, radiological or
nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The Partnership
Action Plan against Terrorism, issued at the
Prague Summit in November 2002, encourages
the sharing of related information and the participation in civil emergency planning to assess
risks and reduce the vulnerability of civilian
populations to terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. NATO and its Partner countries are
working on an inventory of national capabilities
that would be available in the event of such an
attack. Moreover, a Civil Emergency Planning
Action Plan has been agreed to assist national
authorities in improving their civil preparedness
for possible terrorist attacks with CBRN
weapons. Discussions on the respective roles
and capabilities of NATO and the European
Union in the field of civil emergency planning
have also been launched.
A Euro-Atlantic disaster-response capability
The need for a more coordinated EuroAtlantic disaster-response capability led to
the establishment at NATO headquarters, in
June 1999, of a Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC),
based on a proposal made by Russia. The
Centre acts as a focal point for information
sharing and coordinates responses among
NATO and Partner countries to disasters in
the Euro-Atlantic area. It also organises
major civil emergency exercises which practice responses to simulated natural and manmade disaster situations.
The EADRCC contributed to humanitarian
relief operations during the Kosovo refugee
crisis and has done valuable work in
response to major floods in Ukraine,
Romania, Hungary, Albania and the Czech
Republic; the Turkish earthquake in 1999;
forest fires in the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia* and Portugal; and extreme
weather in Ukraine and Moldova.
The Centre works closely with the UN agencies that play a leading role in responding to
international disasters – the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the
Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees – and other organisations.
Countries are encouraged to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements to address
issues such as visa regulations, bordercrossing arrangements, transit agreements,
customs clearance and status of personnel.
Such measures avoid bureaucratic delays in
the deployment of relief items and teams to
an actual disaster location.
Arrangements have also been made for a
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, made
up of a mix of national elements, to be
established when required and dispatched to
emergency locations.
35
Collaborating in science and environment
36
> 12
Two distinct NATO programmes bring together
scientists and experts on a regular basis to
work on problems of common interest – the civil
science programme of the NATO Science
Committee and the environment and society
programme of the Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). The
networks created through collaboration, which
is a tradition among scientists and a requirement for scientific progress, also fulfil a political
goal of building understanding and confidence
between communities from different cultures
and traditions.
areas. It has recently defined a number of
security-related key objectives to guide its
future work. The programme enhances cooperation between NATO and Partner countries in
addressing problems of common concern.
The science programme, which has been in
existence for more than 45 years, has recently
been reoriented to focus exclusively on priority
research topics in defence against terrorism or
countering other threats to security. In line with
Alliance initiatives in countering new threats,
NATO's civil science programme now concentrates its support for collaboration on topics in
these areas. To reflect this fundamental
change a new name has been selected for the
programme, which is now known as the NATO
programme for "Security Through Science".
Science for security, stability
and solidarity
The CCMS deals with problems of the environment and society by bringing together national
agencies to collaborate on pilot studies in these
From the early 1990s, after the end of the Cold
War, the programme was gradually opened up
to participation from non-NATO countries, until
As well as promoting core cooperative activities
between scientists and experts from NATO and
Partner countries, special initiatives of both
committees foster increased cooperation with
the scientific and environmental communities in
Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean
Dialogue countries.
The origins of the NATO Science Programme
go back to the 1950s, when progress in science
and technology was considered to be of great
importance to the future of the Atlantic community. A programme to promote scientific collaboration was therefore established, and for the
next 40 years, collaboration between scientists
in NATO countries was supported, setting high
standards of scientific excellence.
Virtual Silk Highway
in 1999 it was completely converted to provide
support for collaboration between scientists in
NATO countries and those in Partner countries
or countries participating in the Mediterranean
Dialogue. The clear focus has been on promoting progress and peace by creating links
between scientists in these formerly separated
communities.
From 2004, a further fundamental change has
been introduced to the programme following
the new threat of terrorism as well as other
threats to the security of the modern world. The
programme will in future offer support for collaboration only in priority research topics in the
two areas of "Defence Against Terrorism" and
"Countering Other Threats to Security".
The aim of the new "Security Through Science"
programme is to contribute to security, stability
and solidarity among nations, by applying science to problem solving. Collaboration, networking and capacity-building are means used
to accomplish this end. Different types of grants
are offered to working scientists in NATO,
Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries
to collaborate on the priority research topics.
Grants are also offered to assist partner countries in setting up basic computer networking
infrastructure.
The largest and most ambitious project to be
sponsored by the NATO Science Programme
was launched in October 2001. Called the
Virtual Silk Highway – a reference to the Great
Silk Road which used to link Europe to the Far
East, promoting the exchange of goods and of
knowledge and ideas – the project has provided computer networking and internet
access for the academic and scientific communities of eight countries in the Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan lie on the fringes of the
European internet arena and their level of
development is such that they will not be able
to afford fibre-optic connection in the foreseeable future.
Through this NATO project, cost-effective,
state-of-the-art satellite technology now connects the scientific and academic communities
of participating countries to the internet, via a
common satellite beam. The NATO grant has
financed satellite bandwidth and the installation of nine satellite dishes – eight small ones
in the countries linked to a large dish in
Hamburg, Germany, which serves as the
European hub. Other co-sponsors are contributing in kind.
A decision was taken in 2003 to extend the
Virtual Silk Highway network to Afghanistan by
installing a satellite ground station in Kabul.
37
Civil science has proved to be a highly effective
vehicle for international dialogue, due to its universality and its ability to create new and highly
effective international networks. The talent garnered in these scientific networks can be
applied to the emerging threats to the Alliance.
Science is both a means of finding answers to
critical questions and a way of connecting
nations.
Tackling the challenges of
modern society
The CCMS was created in 1969 to respond to
concerns about environmental issues. It provides a forum for experts in different national
agencies to share knowledge and experiences
on technical, scientific and policy aspects of
social and environmental matters, both in the
civilian and military sectors.
Projects undertaken under the auspices of the
CCMS promote cooperation in tackling problems affecting the environment and quality of
life, such as environmental and noise pollution,
urban problems, energy, human health, and
38
defence-related environmental problems. In the
latter sphere, typical areas of investigation are
issues such as the re-use of land formerly used
for military purposes, clean-up methodology,
and environmental security, for example, with
regard to oil pipelines.
The CCMS works on a decentralised basis,
encompassing activities such as pilot studies,
projects, workshops and seminars, all of which
are funded nationally. One or more nations
assume a lead role and take on responsibility
for planning and coordinating the work.
In recent years, activities have been broadened
to include workshops and new studies on topics
of particular interest to Partner countries.
The CCMS has also defined a number of key
objectives to guide its future work, which are:
reducing the environmental impact of military
activities; conducting regional studies including
cross-border activities; preventing conflicts in
relation to scarcity of resources; addressing
emerging risks to the environment and society
that could cause economic, cultural and political instability; and addressing non-traditional
threats to security.
The vulnerability of interconnected society
Today's society is more vulnerable than it
used to be due to ever-increasing interconnectivity at all levels. A more open global
community, more complex technological systems, increased dependency on electronic
information and communications systems,
intertwined food-production and delivery systems, interconnected and increasingly dense
transportation systems – all these give rise to
new and changing manifestations of vulnerability. The loss of telecommunications and
power supply for an extended period of time,
for example, could cause major disruption.
And, in the wake of 11 September 2001, concerns about non-traditional terrorist threats,
such as biological attacks or cyber warfare,
have risen.
Preserving security and protecting society
from a broad spectrum of challenges requires cooperation and coordination between
different agencies in many areas, at both the
national and international level. This has
been seen in the US-led campaign against
terrorism, which has involved not only military
cooperation but also diplomatic, financial,
economic, intelligence, customs and police
cooperation.
A short-term project was launched in March
2001, under the auspices of the CCMS, to
review common challenges and identify
areas for greater international cooperation to
reduce the vulnerability of complex, interdependent systems, which are vital to the functioning of modern society. Norway has taken
the lead on this project, which involves
Denmark, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
39
How NATO works
NATO is not a supranational but an intergovernmental organisation. It is an alliance of
independent sovereign states, which have
come together in the interests of joint security
and the defence of common values. Decisions
are reached on the basis of consensus.
To facilitate consultation, each member country
is represented by a permanent delegation at
NATO's political headquarters in Brussels, consisting of a Permanent Representative, who is
the head of the delegation, and a Military
Representative. Each of them is supported by a
staff of civilian and military advisors, who represent their countries on different NATO
committees.
Separate civilian and military structures have
been established within NATO to deal with the
political and military dimensions of Alliance
work. Both structures support the North Atlantic
Council, NATO's highest decision-making body.
Consensus and common consent
The Alliance is based on a shared commitment
to practical, mutual cooperation on defence and
security issues. There are no voting procedures
in NATO and decisions are reached on the
basis of consensus or common consent.
This means that political consultation is a vital
part of the decision-making process. All NATO
bodies are made up of representatives of the
member countries, whose role is to represent
their country’s point of view to their Allies and to
report back to their own governments on the
positions of other Allies.
40
While political consultation in NATO is an
essential component of crisis management and
is therefore often associated with periods of
tension and difficulty, it is just as much an
everyday activity, which enables member countries to explore the scope for reaching agreement and formulating long-term policies.
Consultation takes many forms. It can involve
simply sharing or exchanging information and
opinions; communicating actions or decisions
> 13
that governments have taken, or may be about
to take, which could have a bearing on the
interests of their Allies; providing advance
warning of government actions or decisions
and an opportunity for others to comment upon
or endorse them; discussion with the aim of
reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted
or actions to be taken in parallel; or consultation
designed to enable member countries to agree
on collective decisions or joint action.
The consultation process is a continuous one.
Since member state representatives are
co-located within the same headquarters in
Brussels, consultation between Allies can take
place at the request of any of them, or on the
initiative of NATO’s Secretary General, at short
notice. The machinery for consultation ensures
that there is a permanent dialogue and plenty of
opportunity to discuss and explain concerns.
Sometimes member countries find themselves
in complete agreement and taking decisions
poses no problem. Sometimes there is a majority view but one or more countries have a different opinion, in which case efforts are made
to narrow the gap and, if necessary, reach a
compromise. It is, of course, possible that differences may not be reconciled. In that case,
individual member countries are free to pursue
their preferred course of action. No member
country is forced to take actions or to make
decisions against its will. In general, however, a
spirit of compromise and a sense of shared
interests and objectives ensures that despite
differences of opinion enough common ground
for agreement can usually be found. Once
taken, Alliance decisions represent the common determination of all the countries involved.
NATO's civilian structure
The most important decision-making body is the
North Atlantic Council. Responsible for all NATO
decisions, it is the only body established by the
North Atlantic Treaty. The Council is, first and
foremost, a political forum that brings together
representatives of all member countries to
discuss policy or operational questions. It can
meet at different levels, usually at least once a
week with the ambassadors of each country, at
least twice a year with foreign or defence ministers, and occasionally with heads of state or
government. At whatever level it meets, its
decisions have the same authority and reflect
the views of each government. Normally, it
meets to discuss issues of common concern or
issues requiring collective decisions but there
are no restrictions on subjects that the Council
may discuss.
The Defence Planning Committee deals with
most defence matters and subjects related to
collective defence planning. It provides guidance to NATO's military authorities and has the
same authority as the Council on matters within
its competence. Like the Council, it normally
meets at ambassadorial level but, at least twice
a year, it meets at the level of defence ministers.
Defence ministers also meet regularly in the
Nuclear Planning Group, which keeps the
Alliance's nuclear policy under review and
discusses a broad range of specific policy
issues associated with nuclear forces and wider
concerns such as nuclear arms control and
proliferation. France, which is not part of
NATO's integrated military structure, does not
participate in either the Defence Planning
Committee or the Nuclear Planning Group.
Responsible to the Council and to the Defence
Planning Committee are many subordinate
committees, which discuss specialised aspects
of policy and make recommendations for final
decisions. Every member country is represented on each of these committees. One
example is the Political Committee, which meets
regularly, at different levels of seniority, to advise
the Council on the main political questions of
the day that have a bearing on Alliance policy.
Another is the Defence Review Committee,
which oversees the process of consultation
leading to decisions on the level of military
forces which member countries will make
available to NATO’s integrated military structure
during the next planning period. NATO’s
Infrastructure Committee examines proposals
for the common funding of facilities for use by
NATO forces. The Economic Committee
focuses on economic developments with a
direct bearing on security policy. Budget
Committees submit proposals to the Council for
the management of the civilian and military
budgets to which each nation contributes.
Consultation takes place across the entire spectrum of Alliance activities. A Conference of
National Armaments Directors comes together
regularly to consider political, economic and
technical aspects of the development and
procurement of equipment for NATO forces. In
the field of information, a NATO committee on
public diplomacy focuses on activities aimed at
improving knowledge and understanding of
NATO and its policies in both NATO and Partner
countries. Issues concerning the Alliance’s
scientific activities and environmental programmes
are discussed by the Science Committee and
the Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society. Other committees and groups, such as
the Political-Military Steering Committee on
Partnership for Peace, help develop and
oversee cooperation with Partner countries.
Alliance activities which involve Partner countries, such as peacekeeping or the PfP programme, are discussed with the governments
concerned. Consultations are undertaken in the
appropriate forums such as the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council
and the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Similarly,
Mediterranean Dialogue activities are discussed
with participating countries in the Mediterranean
Cooperation Group. NATO attaches fundamental importance to the continuing work of these
bodies. They provide useful fora, particularly in
times of crisis, where differences can be discussed and views exchanged.
41
NATO's military structure
NATO’s military structure is overseen by the
Military Committee, which is the highest military
authority in the Alliance but remains under the
political authority of the North Atlantic Council.
The Committee provides military advice to the
Alliance. At its highest level, it gathers the Chiefs
of Staff but, on a day-to-day basis, member
countries are represented by their Military
Representatives.
The Military Committee also provides guidance
to the NATO Strategic Commanders. There are
two such commanders, namely the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), whose
headquarters – the Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) – are at Mons in
Belgium, and the Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation (SACT), who is based at
Norfolk, Virginia, in the United States.
SACEUR is at the head of Allied Command
Operations, which commands military forces
members have agreed to make available to
NATO. He is therefore responsible for all NATO
operations, regardless of their location, and is
dual-hatted as Commander, US European
Command.
SACT has a functional role. As head of Allied
Command Transformation, he is responsible for
promoting and overseeing the continuous transformation of Alliance forces and capabilities. He
is also dual-hatted as Commander US Joint
Forces Command.
The division of responsibilities of the two commanders was previously geographical with
SACEUR at the head of NATO operations in
Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic (SACLANT) responsible for operations
over the Atlantic Ocean. The streamlining of the
military command structure was put forward and
approved at the Prague Summit in November
2002. It reflected NATO's commitment to
42
develop the capabilities and maintain the force
readiness needed for crisis-management,
peace-support and humanitarian tasks within
and beyond its traditional area of responsibility.
It was complemented by the creation of a
NATO Response Force and the launching of
the Prague Capabilities Commitment (see
Chapter 3).
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly
The Alliance is an intergovernmental organisation, each member government being responsible to its own parliament. The support of the
democratically elected parliamentary representatives for the goals of the Alliance is therefore
important. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly
is the inter-parliamentary forum of NATO member countries, bringing together European and
North American legislators to discuss issues of
common interest and concern.
The Assembly is completely independent of
NATO but constitutes a link between national
parliaments and the Alliance that encourages
governments to take Alliance concerns into
account when framing national legislation. It
also acts as a permanent reminder that intergovernmental decisions reached within NATO
are ultimately dependent on political endorsement by national democratic processes.
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly also has
extensive contacts with parliaments in Partner
countries, which send representatives to participate in its discussions and deliberations.
throughout the Alliance. He is Chairman of the
North Atlantic Council and of other senior committees and has considerable influence on the
decision-making process. He may propose subjects for discussion and can use his position as
an independent and impartial chairman to steer
the discussion towards consensus in the interests of the Alliance as a whole. However, the
Secretary General does not have the power to
take policy decisions himself and can act on
behalf of NATO only to the extent that the
member governments agree that he should
do so.
The role of NATO's Secretary General
The Secretary General promotes and directs the
process of consultation and decision-making
Who pays for NATO?
Contributions to NATO budgets are calculated
according to agreed cost-sharing formulae and
represent only a small proportion of NATO
countries’ overall defence budgets.
Common-funded budgets are managed
through separate civil and military budgets and
a security investment programme.
• The Civil Budget covers operating costs
of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters; civilian programmes and activities;
and construction, running and maintenance
costs of facilities such as conference services for meetings of committees and working groups.
• The Military Budget covers operating and
maintenance costs of the integrated military
structure, including the Military Committee;
the International Military Staff and associated agencies; the two Strategic Commands;
He is also the main spokesman for the Alliance
and is at the head of the International Staff,
which supports the work of the member countries at different committee levels.
and associated command, control and information systems, research, development,
procurement and logistics agencies; and
the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force.
• The Security Investment Programme
finances installations and facilities needed
by NATO over and above those built for their
own national security purposes by individual
member nations, for example, communications and information systems, radars, military headquarters, airfields, fuel pipelines,
storage, harbours and navigational aids.
These budgets are supervised by Civil and
Military Budget Committees and by an
Infrastructure Committee, which is responsible
for financing common-funded facilities that
support NATO forces. A Senior Resource
Board oversees policy on military common
funding. Each member country is represented
on these bodies. All NATO budgets are also
subject to external controls.
43
Change and continuity
NATO today is a very different institution to that
created in 1949. Both it and the wider world have
evolved in ways which the Alliance’s founders
could hardly have imagined. NATO is a different
institution to that which defended Western
Europe for four decades during the Cold War or
even that which oversaw Europe’s post-Cold
War transition in the 1990s. In a few years time,
it will no doubt have transformed itself again as it
develops coordinated responses to the security
challenges facing member states in the early 21st
century. Indeed, as the strategic environment
changes, NATO will likely have to evolve increasingly rapidly to meet new threats to its member
states. However, the basic tenets of cooperation
within the Alliance, namely shared values and
interests, remain true to the principles of its
founding treaty.
In the wake of the September 2001 attacks
against the United States and the invocation of
Article 5 for the first time in its history, NATO is
engaged in a fundamental re-examination of the
way in which it operates in order to address the
threat posed by terrorism. Even before the terrorist attacks, the Alliance was committed to an
extremely intensive programme of activities, running three crisis-management operations in the
former Yugoslavia, preparing the ground to bring
in new members and forging ever-deeper partnerships with countries and organisations in both
the Euro-Atlantic area and the wider world.
44
> 14
Today, as the task of providing security becomes
ever more complex, NATO has become involved
in too many areas for its activities to be reduced
to a single slogan or a sound bite.
NATO tomorrow
As the Alliance continues to enlarge, NATO will
have to accommodate the interests of an
increasing number of countries trying to act in
unison. At the same time, the zone of stability
within Europe will likely have grown and with it
prospects of economic prosperity. Indeed, as the
Alliance forges closer relations with Russia,
Ukraine and other European countries, Europe is
putting its divided past behind it and becoming
an increasingly stable continent. These positive
trends will have to be carefully nurtured.
While the nature of the threats faced by member
states and the way in which NATO organises
itself to deal with them are changing, the fundamental underpinning of the Alliance remains the
same as it always has been. NATO provides a
transatlantic political-military framework for managing security challenges. The Alliance couples
Europe and North America, and balances a multitude of national interests. Moreover, as NATO
evolves from a collective defence shield into a
security manager in the broadest sense, it has
come to represent a community of values, such
as democracy and human rights, as much as
a community of interests.
© NATO - 2004
Photo credits: Photos in this publication
are either © NATO or have been provided
courtesy of the US Department of Defense
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
Public Diplomacy Division
1110 Brussels - Belgium
Web site: www.nato.int
E-mail: natodoc@hq.nato.int
NATOTRAENG0604