CHANGES IN SOCIA L AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE LEGALIZED
BULGARIAN IMMIGRANTS IN GREECE A YEAR FOLLOWING
LEGALIZATION
Eugenia Markova
Research Fellow
Sussex Centre for Migration Research
AFRAS, Arts Building C, Office C209
University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9SJ UK
Introduction and Background
Europe has almost 20 years of experience in regularizing the status of its illegal immigrants, starting with France which applied its first collective regularization program in 1981-82, followed by the countries of the Mediterranean basin recently transformed into immigration destinations: Italy, which first applied a regularization program in 1987-
88 1 , Portugal – in 1992-93, and Spain – in 1985-86. Greece first joined with a
considerable delay in 1998. However, regardless of this large number of “amnesty” programs applied throughout a long time-span in Europe, today, there is still a dearth of knowledge, if any, about their effects. For this reason, I will be talking about the effects
of the first legalization program in Greece of 1998 2 , utilizing an individual data-set for
106 legalized Bulgarian immigrants out of a questionnaire sample of 153 Bulgarian immigrants in the country, surveyed an average of about a year following their initial application for legalization.
The first legalization program granted temporary legal residence status to 373,196 illegal aliens who had begun living in Greece on a continuous basis prior to November
28, 1997. Of them, 64.9 percent were Albanian, 6.5 percent Bulgarian, and 4.5 percent
Romanian, followed by Pakistanis, Ukrainians, Poles, Georgians, and Indians, each constituting between 2 and 3 percent of those registering, and another 10 percent were from other nationalities. About 220,000 of these applicants managed to successfully
1 Italy applied other regularization programmes in 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002; Spain-in 1991, 1996,
2
2000, and 2001; and, Greece –in 2001.
It was based on two Presidential Decrees (358/1997 and 359/1997) that were published in the
Government Gazette in November 1997.
1

complete the program and obtain the so-called Green Card that entitled them to a more permanent stay.
Most Green Cards were valid for one to three-year periods. The duration depended on the kind of work migrants were engaged in, the duration of stay and work in
Greece, the state of the labour market and the general interests of the Greek economy.
The first legalization program, which clearly represented a compromise among the many interests involved, isolated three separate issues - the program sought to (1) reduce the number of aliens illegally residing and/or working in Greece; (2) impede further unlawful entries, and (3) penalize Greek employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens, thus attempting to reduce the “off the books” employment.
The purpose of the present study was to examine any changes in the social and economic status of the Bulgarian illegal immigrants that obtained temporary legal status under the amnesty program of the Greek government initiated on January 2, 1998, an average of about a year following their initial application for legalization. Particularly, the study examined those changes that closely affect migrant sending country such as changes in labour market behaviour and job characteristics (affecting e.g. levels of income and amount of it remitted to Bulgaria/saved in Greece), changes in the family structure (related e.g. to relatives abroad and their intentions to immigrate), and intentions for repatriation.
Methodology Applied in Greece [Modified and Improved Version is Intended to be
Applied in Spain]
A survey of 153 Bulgarian immigrants was conducted in the period March – May
1999, mainly in the Athens area while a small part of it was done on the island of Crete.
The survey was designed, among other reasons, to track first changes in the social and economic status of the legalized Bulgarian immigrants. The first, registration phase, of the regularization program ran between January 2, and May 31, 1998. Illegal immigrants, who registered during the five-month period and submitted the necessary certificates, were issued an Alien’s Temporary Residence Card, the so-called “White Card”, which expired on April 30, 1999. However, only those migrants, who managed to submit the necessary certificates at the second stage, completed successfully the legalization
2

program. They were issued with the Green Card. Social security contributions were the main criterion for obtaining the Green Card.
The sampled Bulgarian immigrants were questioned in detail about their migration history, and their living and working conditions before and after the temporary legalization of their status in Greece. Of the 153 Bulgarians in the sample, 106 applied for legalization. Changes in their social and economic status due to legalization were examined.
A major statistical issue concerning the survey in question involved the representative nature of the sample. Official data were, indeed, available on the number of Bulgarian illegal immigrants that registered in the first phase of the regularization program, and that number pointed to 23,027 Bulgarian immigrants. Information also existed concerning migrants’ residence addresses and some other characteristics as age, gender etc. that could have theoretically allowed the design of a proper random sample.
However, first, at the time of our study such information was not yet disclosed for research purposes. Second, even if available for research purposes, the address information provided by migrants would not be always correct due to migrant fears not to get caught and expelled. Finally, when it comes to talking to immigrants, either illegal or just recently legalized, and thus in a temporary legal residence situation, designing a random sample can not be considered a reasonable solution for obtaining any reliable information. For the reasons stated above, the purposive or ‘expert choice’ method of sampling was employed. Moreover, a similar survey of the Bulgarian immigrants in
Greece was first conducted by the interviewer in 1996, when all immigrants in the country were residing and working illegally, and no legalization was even anticipated.
Then, the survey had an extended and costly preliminary part when the interviewer established close personal contacts with some illegal Bulgarian immigrants. She assisted them throughout their job-searching process or in employment-related problematic situations, being able to communicate with both the immigrants and their potential/current employers. Trust was built with those migrants who were, in fact, the first suppliers of information and guarantors that secured access to migrant locations; subsequently, they introduced the interviewer to other migrants, offering a kind of guarantee that the collected information would be used for research purposes only.
3

The idea in the present survey, as in the one of 1996, was first to locate the major concentrations of illegal/legalized Bulgarians and then, among those identified, a number that in our judgment was thought to be representative, to be interviewed. The acquaintances from the field work in 1996 proved to be very helpful and the survey’s preliminary part for building trust between the interviewer and the immigrants was considerably shortened. However, an additional incentive for the legalized immigrants to talk was also their belief that with the information provided by them the responsible authorities would be better able to address their needs and eventually, they would benefit a great deal from the study.
The interviews were fully in the Bulgarian language and the survey instrument was available in this language. The interviewer was a native Bulgarian, which proved of major importance for accessing Bulgarian immigrants and eventually gaining their trust.
However, the first study in 1996 put the beginning of a very personal involvement of the interviewer with the Bulgarian migrant community in Greece, which further deepened with the study in 1999, namely, through the establishment of a Bulgarian migrant organization and a Sunday school for Bulgarian migrant children. Migrants were no more anonymous subjects to study. There should be no better way to identify, trace and analyze genuine data on migrants’ problems, needs, progress and achievements.
Clearly, the procedure applied could not guarantee to produce an unambiguous random sample. But the chosen strategy should be the most appropriate sample design when studying such issues that involve a great deal of moral ethics questions as the effects of legalization or the labor market performance of illegal aliens from the viewpoint of the immigrants themselves.
Empirical findings from the research work in Greece a) Impact of legalization on migrant labor market performance/ migrant employment patterns
Virtually all interviewed Bulgarian immigrants who applied for legalization under the program of 1998 (97 per cent) had already held jobs in Greece. After legalization, the labor force participation rates for both men and women remained very high, that for women reaching a remarkable 96 percent.
4

Thirteen percent of the legalized immigrants in the sample changed job after filing the application for legalization. Most legalized women changed job because of harsh working conditions or from an au pair to ‘living out’. Legalized men usually changed job because of very low payment or employment on a sporadic/seasonal basis with harsh or even dangerous working conditions. A small fraction of migrants changed job because their employers refused to register them and pay the social security stamps (Table).
Those who had looked for jobs since application for legalization were asked how legal status had affected their ability to get work. Almost half of the respondents (49 percent) considered that legalization made it much harder to find work; on the other hand, the rest of the responses reflected the feeling that legalization made it much easier (38 percent) or somewhat easier to do so (13 percent). The slightly reduced number of women, working as an au pair, twenty-four hours at employer’s disposal, and the slightly increased number of self-employed migrant women characterized the legalized female migrants’ employment pattern. Self-employed female migrants were mainly occupied in cleaning different houses while there were several women who established their own small business (hairdresser’s/cosmetics salons and Bulgarian language newspaper publishing). Few employed legal males were self-employed; they were concentrated in such activities as bricklaying and house-painting. Overall, most legalized Bulgarian migrants in the sample continued working in private households and small-scale businesses. A year after legalization, jobs of the type held prior to legalization, e.g. private household cleaning, elderly care, childcare, gardening, construction works, remained important sources of employment. The incidence of labor violations grows as establishment size drops. Small businesses, operating on tight budgets, often take greater risks in holding down costs. It is almost impossible to enforce labor standards or tax regulations in private households. Hence, the sample’s continuing concentration in private household jobs and small firms was potentially depriving members from worker protections and employment benefits. Legalized Bulgarian workers did, however, enjoy certain employment benefits shared by native workers as well. All of them who were working for a wage had health insurance (the most important prerequisite for legalization) either completely or partially paid for by their employers, some 45 percent received paid vacations and some 17 percent paid sick leave.
5

For some, legalization appears to have been a turning point. Immediately after filing for legalization, a few immigrants (5.7 percent) started investing in Greek language skills, education and training. A brief note on the profile of those who applied for legalization: more than half of the registered immigrants (60 percent) had completed high school; another 34 percent had partial or completed higher education. Most of the legalized immigrants first entered the Greek labor market by way of construction, private household jobs or restaurants/taverns, which were recognized as common entry points for undocumented workers.
Legalized migrants’ wage-rates directly relate to the amount they remit to
Bulgaria /save in Greece. Our survey collected information on applicants’ wage rates during their final month of illegal residence in Greece and again during their first year of legalization. The results showed that their mean hourly wages slightly rose with legalization in 1998/1999, when compared to a month before legalization in 1998, i.e.
DRH 1,350 versus DRH 1,500, an increase of 11 percent. There were no indications, however, that the anticipation of legalization has altered their prior wages. This gain notwithstanding, legalized workers still earned substantially less than the native workers when doing the same job. The latest statistics issued by the largest social security fund in
Greece (IKA) also revealed that even those immigrants who were registered and insured earn roughly between 60% to 80% what Greeks made at the same job
3 i.e. an unskilled
immigrant is paid on average 24 euros a day while Greeks earn 39 euros; immigrant construction workers earn 39 euros per day while their Greek co-workers make up to 50 euros. Similar results were confirmed by the newly legalized Bulgarian immigrants interviewed in the sample of 1999, who estimated that, on average, Greeks made at least as much as 40 percent more than foreigners did. If relying entirely on immigrants’ estimations, one could conclude that both legalized and illegal immigrant earnings result from discrimination since it is quite difficult, even in the case of recently achieved legality, that such differences could be explained by competitive theory. Of course, the differences may be explained by the low rate of transferability of education and training between Bulgaria and Greece, or by asymmetric information.
3 “Athens News”, 19-25 September, 2003.
6

Not only did legalized migrant incomes a short of the national average but they helped support family members living in Bulgaria. Because 86 percent of all legalized
Bulgarian immigrants had immediate relatives living outside Greece, remittance behavior was widespread and at a year after legalization no changes were registered due to legalization.
Legalization and Family Structure
At the time of the survey, “legalization households” included a mixture of never married applicants, nuclear family members, more distant relatives, and totally unrelated or just friendly-related individuals. By offering hopes for greater security and prosperity, legalization started altering some of those living arrangements. Even during the first year following initial registration some interviewed migrants reported entering first marriages and/or became parents. Almost all of them traveled to Bulgaria to visit family members left there and some finally brought their minor children to live with them in Greece. Most of the interviewed legal Bulgarians saw the legalization as a way of strengthening their bonds with the home country, which was made possible by introducing the freedom of travel, promoting legal channels for remitting and supporting relatives abroad, and eventually enabling the Green Card holders to apply for the immigration of these relatives, who would have also the right to work in Greece. Freedom of movement was probably one of the strongest motives to legalize (selected by 73 percent of the interviewed legalized immigrants) given that most of the interviewed Bulgarian immigrants were maintaining families in Bulgaria, to which they could return, as legalized, by law, for no more than 2 months each year. Therefore, legalization was actually encouraging more permanent stay, depriving the migrants from playing an active role in their home labor market as well. Legalization was also encouraging family reunification in the host country of Greece.
Relatives abroad and migrant intentions to reunite with them
Families separated between two countries are inherently unstable. In the long-run, such families would either reunify on the one or the other side of the border or separate.
Both scenarios are of major policy importance, especially the first one regarding the country of family reunification. According to our survey, the ability to apply for the entry of relatives ranked a close third Bulgarian migrant motive for legalization, behind the
7

freedom of travel, ranked first, and the possibility for work in Greece, without fears of expulsion, ranked second. Respondents were asked to enumerate their spouses, unmarried and married children, dependent parents and siblings living outside Greece. At the time
of the survey, however, none of the legalized immigrants could have applied 4 for his/her
immediate family members (spouses or unmarried minor offspring) to immigrate in
Greece. A year-period was not enough to examine gross changes in household composition following legalization. Our survey queried respondents about various types of relatives they might eventually petition for reunification in Greece, and the migratory intentions of those relatives abroad. Unfortunately, this information has quickly become outdated.
Migrant saving and remitting behavior
Because 56 percent of the interviewed legalized immigrants reported immediate relatives living in Bulgaria, they were regularly sending money back to Bulgaria. Those not remitting at all were mainly single or married, with spouse and children in Greece.
Within a year period after legalization, however, no significant changes, in terms of frequency of remitting, were observed. However, changes were observed in terms of the amount remitted. W hen illegal, immigrants avoided keeping money in Greece and almost 60 percent of the sample reported sending more than half of their earnings to support family and children in Bulgaria. When legalized, their number reduced: forty five of the interviewed (42 percent) reported remitting more than half of their earnings to
Bulgaria. If families managed to reconfigure in Greece then remittances should have dropped considerably. The legalization of some immigrants started to alter also their saving behavior, given their newly acquired possibility to save in banks in Greece.
Almost half of the legalized respondents (48 percent) started saving from 5 to 35 per cent of their earnings in Greece.
Almost 60 per cent of the legalized respondents, anticipating increased security and prosperity in Greece due to legalization, were planning to remain in the country in the long-run. They were mainly young families, with children newly-born or already studying in Greece who wanted to settle more permanently in the host country. The remaining 40 percent intended to repatriate in a few years to come. In the former case
4 It could have been done only three years following legalization.
8

legalization may be hypothesized to speed up repatriation, in a sense that it makes it easier and faster for formerly illegal immigrants to achieve their income objectives from immigration. On the other hand, it may encourage others to emigrate, or those that stay for a long period to openly press for a more permanent stay in the country. Thus, it is not clear if legalization on the whole is helpful towards stemming the immigration flow or not. This, however, is among the subjects for further research in Spain.
Conclusions - What remains to be done?
Such a sample design as the one applied in Greece is usually criticized for providing data that are questionable and that no statistical conclusions can be drawn from such a study. However, the experience gained in the data collection process in Greece suggested that all the obtained information was true and reliable. Moreover, it is generally recognized that for the case of Europe we are in great need of generating more empirical evidence on such important questions of migration research as changes in labor market behavior, including remitting/ saving behavior and family structure, following legalization. Clearly, a year-period was not sufficient time for such changes to be tracked, thoroughly analysed, and measured. For this reason, the research is expanding to another
Mediterranean country, Spain, which has immigration experience similar to Greece, has also a large Bulgarian migrant community and a long-time experience in regulating the status of illegal aliens. Bulgarian immigrants that took part in the legalization programs of the Spanish government of 1996 and 2000 respectively will be sampled.
Our research in Spain will focus on the aforementioned questions. It will be conducted in the region of Canal de Navarres (Comunidad Valenciana Spain), which is a community of villages in the heartland of rural Valencia. The method will be improved by the availability of official data on the number of legalized Bulgarians in the area (in
1996 and in 2000 respectively) together with other migrant characteristics such as sex and date of birth that would allow us to determine the sampling frame. It might be even plausible to attempt for a probability sampling procedure after an initial phase of the interviewer’s integration into the rural community where all the inhabitants know each other and almost all children go to the same school. The Municipal register (December
2002) of Canal de Navarres points to 917 legalized Bulgarian immigrants residing only in
9

the central settlement of the county, the town of Enguera (total population of about 5,000 inhabitants), and there is an officially registered significant “spillover” across the surrounding villages, including 500 in Canals and about 100 in numerous other villages.
Researchers will hardly be able to complete their task of quantifying the effects of migrant host countries’ polices such as the legalization of the status of illegal immigrants on migrant home countries without access to such individual-based data material. In light of the topic’s importance to aid in understanding the interplay between immigrant economic attainment in the rich countries and the development/impoverishment of the immigrant origin poor countries, it is hoped that any initiative to collect such data should be funded generously, and that policy-makers and administrators alike should support such an endeavor.
10

Table. Distribution of migrants by their change of job after filing an application for legalization
Number of migrants Migrants’ old job Migrants’ new job
Migrants that changed job after filing an application for legalization
14 Housework Office administrator 1
Housework, elderly care, live-in
Housework, live-out 1
1 care, live-in
2
3 care Bulgarian language newspaper publishing)
2 payment ,better working conditions
Housework, 1 sitting
2
Total
Migrants that did not change
Job after legalization
Total
TOTAL
Source: Survey 1999 results willing to register them register them and pay soc. and pay soc. insurance insurance stamps stamps
1
92
92 shop for hunting equipment
14
Their future intentions to do so:
No
Yes
14
57
26
Do not know/Not sure 1
No, because I am handicapped 1
Yes, but not because
Of legalization
6
92
106 106
11