J. BONNER
Sr~ITH

Introduction
The speedy trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment apply to military trials and are implemented through Article
10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Pretrial Delay Prior to
United States v. Burton 1
Article 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that when an accused is arrested or confined prior to trial, "immediate steps shall be taken. . to try him or to dismiss the charges and release him." The question of speedy trial depends on the facts in each case. United
States v. Wilson.
2
Where the accused has been deprived of a speedy trial, dismissal of the charges is required. United
States v. LiPovsky.3 The test for denial of a speedy trial was one · of unreasonable delay by the government and prejudice to the accused.
. . L1
United States v. Brow~.-
The time for determining when to measure the delay in Article 10 is from arrest or confinement. In United
States v. Smith,S the Court of Military Appeals held that restriction pending investigation of offenses was restraint and the same as arrest in regard to speedy trial. In United
States v. Williams,6 deprivation of pass was held to be the same as restriction. Time on trial delay does not commence to run while an accused is in the hands of state authorities
1

for another offense; but when he was confined by the state for the military desertion charge, the time began to run even though he was bailed on a state charge. United States v.
K
~ ea~on.
7
The burden is on the government to explain pretrial delays, while the defense must show prejudice to the accused.
8
United States v. Brown. The word s "willful or oppressive delay" by the government were the words of art used to signify prejudice to the ~ccused. Brown, United States v.
Mladjen.
9
In United States v. Bray,
10 i t was stated that
"abuse or oppressive treatment during pretrial confinement in the brig could impede proper preparation of the defense."
Great delays in time were allowed by the Court of
Military Appeals (hereafter referred to as the court). In
United States v. Brown,
11
200 days were allowed, and also in United States v. Wilson.
12
In United States v. Callahan,13 a five month delay was not prejudicial, 106 days in United
States v. Hawes,14 six months in United States v. Mladjen,15 and 117 days in United States v. Przybycien .
16
In some cases, the court would speculate to find reasons not in the record to uphold the delay. United States v.
Davis.
17
In United States v. Tibbs,18 the court inferred a need for police investigation, legal advice, action by the convening authority (CA), and forwarding of papers . In
United States v. Wilson,19 the dissent criticized the majority for using items to justify delay that were not before the
Law Officer at the trial.
2

There were a combination of many factors which the court took into account in allowing for delays. Each case had several, but for illustration and comparison to cases after United States v. Burton,20 individual factors will be illustrated. In United States v. Brown,21 the court held that the 200 day delay was used mainly to correct defects in protection of the accused and also there was trouble in preparing the pretrial transcript. Delay chargeable to the defense was a factor in many cases. Brown, United States v.
Snook,22 United States v. Wilson,23 and United States v.
Callahan.
24
Delays due to an accused or victim being in a hospital were factors in United States v. Jenkins
25 and
United States v. Wilson.
26
A delay of 79 days while trying to locate records was not unreasonable in United States v.
McKenzie,27 and a factor of 47 days of a 124 day delay locating records was not unreasonable in United States v.
W
' l l ' 28
. 29
In ' United States v. Przybycien, 56 of a 117 day delAy resulting from difficulty in obtaining the accused's service records due to an error in reporting his
Service Number was not prejudicial as the government took reasonable steps to locate them even if the go v ernment was solely responsible for the error. A misplaced file due to the tactical operations of the accused's battalion was a factor in there being no denial of speedy trial in United
States v. Hawes.
30
3

Delays due to pretrial investigations were often factors; in United States v. Davis,31 there was no denial of speedy trial when 81 of 144 .
days were required for investigation, 50 of 124 days to investigate in United States v. Williams,32 68 of a 153 day period due to investigation of over 50 possible offenses allover the United States in
United States v. Batson .
33
Delay in a trial of sodomy charges was justified by the need to conduct an extensive investigation due to the seriousness of the charges allegedly involving the appellant, two officers and other soldiers. United States v. Fiske.
34
In United States v. JenkinS,35 a six month delay was allowed where many investigative agencies were involved with two languages, and lab reports which were important to the investigation were slow to be processed. The complexity of the case and the need for depositions were mentioned in
~ .
United States v. Callahan.
36
The Manu al for Courts -Ma rtial paragraph 35h states that, "all cha r ges if tried at all, should be tried at a single trial by the lowest court with power to judge and punish." The desire to try all charges in one trial was a factor in a six month delay being found not oppressive while the accused was being held on one set of charges and his trial dela ye d pending comple t ion of the i nves tigation on the other in United States v. Mladjen .
37
The court in that case also c on s idered manpowe r shortages, huma n error, equ ip men t
4

failures, and being in a foreign country as factors in this delay being allowed.
38
In United States v. Batson, the court held that although one offense (desertion) was ready for trial after apprehension, this did not mean that i t had to be tried then or dismissed before other charges were investigated, especially where other offenses affected proof of intent to desert and all known offenses should be tried at the Same time.
Another factor mentioned to substantiate the validity of a thirteen month delay was in United States v. Pierce.
39
The accused was only restrained 35 days and there was no indication that the delay impaired his ability to defend himself and the delay may have been beneficial in that civilian charges were disposed of in the interim in a manner that might not have been possible had his military trial come first. The results of a prompt military trial could have limited negotiation of the terms of a settlement of the civilian offense.
Other factors mentioned were unavailability of defense counsel in United States v. JenkinS,40 travel and
41 transfers in United States v. Hawe s. Brief periods of inactivity in an otherwise active prosecution are not unreasonable or oppressive. United States v. Thompson.
42
The prosecution should give a detailed accounting of the government's activity during the accused's confinement. United
States v. Turner.
43
5

In United States v. Cummings,44 the court held that i t was contrary to public policy and void to have an accused waive any claim to speedy trial and due process in a guilty plea agreement. In United States v. Tibbs,45 the court held that a guilty plea is no waiver in claiming this right. In
United States v. White,46 the issue of speedy trial was first raised at the Board of Review level and an unexplained five month delay was found prejudicial. The court held that appellate defense counsel could raise the issue on appeal as i t was raised despite lack of objection below from the facts in the records. The accused does not have to demand a speedy trial to preserve the right. United States v. Wilson.
47
But, other cases have held that the right can be waived,
48
United States v. Schalck, and as will be seen later, this is held by the court in cases after United States v. Burton.
49
The right to a speedy trial has increased in importance over the years. In 1966, in United States v . Ewell,
50 the Supreme Court said that the right to a speedy trial was : a safeguard to prevent undue oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize concern and anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and limit the possibility that delay will impair the ability of the accused to defend himself.
In cases following Ewell, there is a hint that speedy trial may hinge on time alone. In United States v. K
.... 51 a guilty plea case, the 90 days of total inactivity by the government to obtain custody of t h e acc u sed from civilian
6

authorities, during which the defense counsel made repeated requests for action, w as held to be in violation of Article
10 and the accused suffered from the delay. In United States v. Goode,
52 an 86 day delay after confinement was held to be too long for the government to correct and get the corrected morning reports due to the go v ernment's errors in making true entries and to serve the charges. The accused had made unsuccessful efforts to see his counsel and the
Chaplain while in confinement. In another case, a five month delay in trial was prejudicial where the accused had confessed on the day he was arrested and there was a 72 day delay in preferring the charges. United States v. weisenmuller.
53
In United States v. Parish,54 a 104 day delay caused by inexperienced junior officers was held to be no excuse. A 318 day delay was denial of speedy trial in United States v.
Williams,55 where there were improper procedures, unexplained
" and unnecessary delays and other errors. Here there was a se v en month delay from the time the offenses were known to preference of charges, and three months until trial referral.
A Board of Review had found the delay wrong, but without legal p r ejudice to the accused, but the court re v ersed them without referring to the old "prejudice" test. In United
56
States v. Lamphere, a five month delay was also found to be a denial of speedy trial without the "prejudice" test being used.
7

One other point should be mentioned in the speedy trial area. How short a time may violate due process? In
United States v. vigneault,S7 i t was held that speed alone does not equal prejudice in a murder trial held 24 days after the offense and that this merely was a speedy trial.
But where speed seems to be the essence in a conviction and there is a more than fair risk that the accused is denied a fair trial, there is prejudice. United States v. Parker.
S8
In United States v. McFarlane,
59 the court held that in a capital case, 10 days were inadequate for defense counsel in a foreign trial where the inquiry would extend to the
United States.
United States v. Burton
60
In 1971, the court set new standards for speedy trial in Burton. For offenses occurring after December 17, 1971, there will be a presumption that the accused has been denied his right to a speedy trial in violation of Article 10 whenever pretrial confinement is greater than three months. If there are defense requests for continuances, these will be deducted from the delay period. The government's accountability will begin running from the day the accused is restrained or from the "formal presentment" of charges, wh ichever is earlier. The government, as before, will have the
8

burden of explaining the delays and showing diligence in bringing the accused to trial.
The court held that in some circumstances, the length of confinement will be prejudicial in itself, but that time will be only one of the factors to consider; other factors applied by Article III courts will be examined, such as the reasons for delay, prejudice to the accused, and whether the accused waived his rights. But, the Article 10 requirements will be more rigorous than those of the Article III courts on the 6th Amendment speedy trial guarantee.
When the defense requests a prompt trial, the government must respond to the request by either proceeding immediately or by showing adequate cause for any further delay.
If the government fails to respond or to order a prompt trial, extraordinary relief may be justified.
Pretrial Delay After Burton
As with most new rules, Burton has undergone a great deal of clarification. In United States v. Driver,6l the term "3 months" used in Burton was further defined. Because a 3 month period can be variable, the Burton rule was modified to cover a period of pretrial confinement of 90 days.
62
It w as the case of United States v. Ma rshall, t w o years after Burton, that provided the definitive guidance for the full implementation of the Burton rule. The
9

government must show the delay of greater than 90 days was the result of really extraordinary circumstances beyond such . normal problems as mistakes in drafting, manpower shortages, illnesses, leave, or other diffic~lties encountered in processing the charges for trial. These normal problems and mistakes are included in the circumstances for which allowance was made in establishing the 90 day standard. Operational demands, a combat environment, a complex offense, or conditions beyond the government's control which necessarily cause delay are examples that might allow a departure from the rule.
There have been a number of cases where the circumstances have met this test. The seriousness of the charges of robbery and sodomy, plus the accused's commission of subsequent serious offenses while in pretrial confinement and the relevation of possible additional charges were sufficiently extraordinary circumstances to justify a reasonable delay of 95 days for investigation and processing where the government showed a concern for the accused by diligence in processing the case by the exceptionally speedy conclusion of the investigations and by dismissing some of these charges rather than to cause a further delay to get supporting evidence. United States v. O'Neal.
63
Another situation where the complexity of the case allowed a 125 day delay w as in
United States v. Lovins,64 where new offenses were discovered which involved the mails and checks of persons who took
10

time to locate and laboratory analysis of handwriting examplers and fingerprints which were required to establish the government's case. The repeated unauthorized absences without leave of an essential prosecution witness was held to be an extraordinary circumstance in United States v. Johnson.
65
The court also held in this case that diversion of investigative personnel to a higher priority investigation of possible sabotage aboard an important operational unit of the Navy, was an allowable circumstance to justify a delay in trial. In United States v . Dunn,
66 a trial within
101 days after confinement was not denial of a speedy trial in a prosecution for bad checks which was attributable to the normal administrative impediments of a trial in a foreign country with the parties to the trial and witnesses widely separated and the checks having to be procesied through drawee banks in the United States and back to payees in Turkey.
In Dunn, United States v. O'Neal,67 United States v.
Lovins,68 and United States v. Johnson,69 there was a policy of disposing of all offenses at a single trial in pursuance of the provision of paragraph 3l(g) of the Manu al for Courts-
Martial .
70
In United States v. Ward, the court held that the provision that all known offenses should be tried at a single trial was only a statement of policy which must yield when in conflict with the Congressional mandate for speedy disposition of charges. The addition of a new charge against
11

one already in confinement on other charges does not automatically authorize deferment of the trial on the original charges. When 90 days have elapsed before the accused is tried on the original charges and he did not request delays and there are no extraordinary reasons to justify a delay, the Burton presumption will become operative and the original charges should be dismissed. I t would appear that the previously mentioned cases would still be sufficient extraordinary circumstances to allow delay and to not dismiss the original charges.
Circumstances which have failed the test have been many. In United States v. Johnson,
71 claims of lack of adequate personnel and administrative convenience were insufficient. The court held in United States v. O'Nea1
72 that normal delays from personnel shortages, injuries, illnesses, leave plans, training of a new court reporter and case backlogs .res~lting from these causes would not be sufficient.
Also,there was nothing to indicate any special problems arising from this case being tried in a foreign country such as foreign national witnesses, investigation by foreign police or jurisdictional problems. A crowded trial docket was held to be no excuse in United States v. Ellison,73 where there was no showing that there were no other judges available or that changing the docket was not feasible. Docket delays were held to not be extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the prosecution in United States v.
12

Wolzok,
74 because docket delays in the military result from the Convening Authority 's failure to convene sufficient courts-martial to handle cases referred to trial. In United
States v. Reitz,75 lack of clerical staff causing delay in the Pretrial Advice and need to complete the pretrial investigation due to delays until the Criminal Investigative
Division submitted its report were not adequate excuses.
The court dismissed the charges in United States v. Durr,
76 where the government's justification for delay was only a generalized assertion of prosecution and personnel management problems. In United States v. Pyburn,77 the court held that the delay in preference of charges against an accused in pretrial confinement due to an increased workload of forty to fifty drug cases in addition to the normal workload was not a really extraordinary circumstance because that legal office had been augmented by four or five TDY legal officers who were sent to assist in these extra cases. The court also held that a delay in the pretrial investigation while waiting for laboratory reports from another government agency wa s not a good excuse because there wa s other strong evidence of guilt sufficient enough to complete the investigation.
The duty of speedily trying the accused cannot be set asid e by the unexplained slowness of another agency . The court
78 held in United States v. Jordan, that unavailability of military witnesses who had been transfered was not a good excuse where i t could have bee n anticipated and the government
13

waited too long to attempt to get them due to a lack of foresight by the government. In United States v. Toliver,79 the delay was not justified on one basis of the priority of another investigation where the Trial Counsel was temporarily sent to i t , but he had instructed an assistant to proceed with the case in his absence. In United States v. Young,
80 a 149 day delay was not justified where three months of i t was spent waiting to see whether or not the Japanese authorities would exercise their rights of primary jurisdiction over three of the offenses charged when the treaty required thirty days for them to notify of their intentions and the government was not precluded from preparing for trial pending the expiration of the thirty day period.
As before United States v. Burton,
81 speedy trial issues will vary and each case will have to be determined by its facts. In United States v. Reitz,82 the court asserted that if there are extraordinary circumstances or unusual difficulties in prosecuting a case, that the government should make them a matter of record in replying to a defense motion for dismissal of the charges. Also, if there is a defense agreement to delay the prosecution, i t should be in the record. Only then can the court of appeal be able to resolve the issue as appellate argument cannot be substituted for the facts. The court appears to be allowing no more inferences for the government as i t did several times in the years before Burton.
14

The accused may waive his right to a speedy trial.
In United States v. Sloan,
83 the court held that the accused had two opportunities to challenge the time required to bring him to trial. He can challenge before the trial, or wait until the trial. Not challenging before the trial will not bar the raising of the matter at trial, but if he is in confinement over 90 days and does not object at trial, he will be precluded from raising the issue at the appellate level in the absence of evidence in the record indicating a denial of military due process or manifest injustice. In
United States v. Delee,
84 the defense counsel on entering the plea of guilty to all charges and specifications, stated that i t was entered after due consideration of all facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the possibility of making a speedy trial motion. The accused effectively waived his right to complain of a denial of a speedy trial
, and was precluded from raising i t for the first time onappeal. The accused and his counsel need not do anything to speed his case to trial. In United States v. McClain ,85 the government was held accountable for delay even though the defense did not request the Trial Counsel to obtain another judge as had been offered to the defense when the primary judge was unavailable.
In United States v. OIBrien,86 the court held that a request for an administrative discharge was not an extraordinary circumstance, that this was a normal event and no
15

excuse. In United States v. Fernandez,
87
, the delay caused by the accused's application for an undesireable discharge in lieu of trial was not an excuse to halt the pretrial processing where the accused was in confinement, as this is only incident to the normal processes of military justice.
This is different from the situation in United States v.
Parker,
88 where a defense request that the trial be delayed until disposition of the request for discharge would be justification for delay. Time attributable to defense requests for delays and continuances is not chargeable to the government. United States v. Anderson.
89
In United States v. O'Neal,90 the Defense Counsel's concurrence in the trial date that was to accomodate the Trial Counsel's work schedule and leave plans was in effect a defense request for delay as the defense must share in the responsibility for this delay.
The government's accountability runs from the date of formal presentment of the charges or from the date the accused is restrained, whichever is earlier . United States v. Clay.91 The defense in this case cited a 1971 United
States Supreme Court case, United States v . Marion,92 which said:
Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bailor not, and that may disrupt his employment , drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him, his family and friends.
16

The defense was trying to show that the "legal hold" status of the accused due to hot check charges was a form of pretrial restraint. The court found only his security access had . been revoked, and that there was therefore no restraint to cause the 90 day standard to apply. In United States v.
Anundsen,
93 the court held that a legal hold status on the accused after his enlistment had expired was not equivalent to confinement, arrest, or restriction. The test for speedy trial when there is no restraint will not be the special rule of the measure of time but the general rule which entails an analysis of the facts in each case to determine whether the government proceeded with reasonable diligence and without deliberate oppression of the accused. This is the rule prior to United States v. Burton
94 and whether its standards of diligence would still apply seems doubtful in such areas as personnel problems, administrative delays, and the like.
The court in United States v. Hayns,
95 recognized that restriction to certain narrow limits is in fact arrest.
As previously mentioned, in United States v. Smith
96 restriction pending investigation of offenses is equivalent to t d " nl e W"ll" 97 d " t "
0 f pass privileges was restriction. In United States v. Owes,98 the court held that the limits of any restriction need to be precisely stated in the record of the trial, even though i t is yet to be determined whether restriction to a broad
17

area is tantamount to arrest. In United States v. Molina,99 the Army court held that the restriction in that case was not confinement and would not extend United States v. Burton
100 beyond its plain meaning of confinement.
In United States v. Swartz,
101 the military had released the accused to civilian authorities, which caused an unnecessary three month delay in disposition of the charges, which was held to be oppressive and the delay was charged to the government because i t was a discretionary action. The court said that i t was not unmindful of United
St ates v. P ' 102 h' h t ' d ' t t d ' , in military trial where the results may complicate or limit the negotiations for terms of settlement of the civilian offense, as here there was no evidence to indicate that the military authorities were confronted with such matters in their decision. In United States v. Emmons,103 time the accused was held by Federal Civilian authorities for a nonmilitary offense was not chargeable to the government until he was turned over to their hands for an AWOL charge. When he told them that he was AWOL from the Marines, he did not divest the Federal civilian authorities of primary jurisdiction and make the military primarily responsible. Also, when the United States Marshall put a detainer on him for the
Armed Forces Police, this did not convert the U.S. Marshall or arresting officers into agents of the military as he was not arrested for the military offense.
18

When an accused is released from confinement during processing of the charges against him, and absents without authority, the government is not accountable for the period of his absence in determining the speedy trial issue. United
States v. O'Brien.
104
In United States v. Rodgers,
105 the court held that AWOL is not a continuing offense and is complete when the accused first absents himself, and therefore the Burton rule does not apply to an offense commencing prior to the date of that decision and terminating after i t . De-
. sertion is also not a continuing offense. United States v.
Mallard.
106
That the offense must occur after December 17, 1971, was construed strictly in United States v. Mosley.
107
The court found a pretrial confinement of 124 days not satisfactorily explained and dismissed those charges based on offenses committed after that date and reassessed the sentence on those ' which predated United States v. B
~ ur~on.
108
The government has a reasonable time after notice of an accused's apprehension at one station where he will be tried for another station to inform that station of additional charges. In United States v. O'Brien l09 there was an excessive one month delay which was part of a 94 day delay where there was a failure by the government to show any extraordinary circumstances in justification.
The failure of the government to forward charges together with the in v estigation and allied papers to the
19

officer exercising General Courts-Martial jurisdiction within eight days after the accused is ordered into confinement under Article 33, standing alone, does not warrant dismissal of charges, but i t does weigh against the government in showing due diligence in complying with the speedy trial mandate of Article 10. United States v. Mason.
110
In United States v. Brooks,
I I I the court held that the 90 days does not have to be in continuous confinement for the Burton presumption to apply. The period of confinement here totaled 100 days, and the accused was released several times, but was not absent from government control.
There was no reason to slow the pretrial processing of his case, and he in no sense contributed to the delay, even though his reconfinement after he had been released twice may have been justified by his misconduct.
Pretrial confinement time will be reduced by the
~ amount of time spent as a " sen~enced prisoner. In United
States v. Harmash,
112 the a~cused w as confined more than 90 days, but more than one-third of that was as a sentenced prisoner, thereby reducing the pretrial confinement to less an ays. n nl e tates v. G " 113"t "d that the time confined for a previously adjudged sentence is not confin e ment awaiting trial and not chargeable to the government.
In a case where robbery charges were joined with other charges on w hich the accused had been previously
20

confined, the government's accountability on the robbery charges began on the date the government had in its possession substantial information on which to base preference of the robbery charges. This time was 83 days and less than the 90 day limit, therefore there was no denial of a speedy trial on the robbery charges, although the accused had been confined for a total of 111 days. United States v. Johnson.
114
The test for a speedy trial where the pretrial confinement is less than 90 days is whether the government has proceeded with reasonable diligence in bringing the accused to trial, and there is no evidence of a purposeful or oppressive design to delay the trial. United States v. Gatson,115 citing United States v. Parish.
116
In United States v.
Harness,117 i t was held that there was no prejudicial delay to the accused where there was a 77 day delay between his confinement and trial including a two month delay before he
, was able to see nis Defense Counsel. The main reason for the delay being the operating schedule of his ship which made the assembling of the necessary parties and witnesses in one place at one time difficult.
An accused in pretrial confinement awaiting trial on five charges entered a plea of guilty to two of these at an Article 39(a) session held within the 90 day limit. The pleas were accepted and findings entered, at that time, in regard to these charges, the trial was timely regardless of the fact that trial on the other charges was not begun until
21

after 90 days. The court held that the presumption of innocence had disappeared when these guilty findings were entered and whatever the label of the proceedings at which they are entered, they satisfied the purposes of the Articles and
United States v. Burton.
llB
United States v. Marell.
119
The right to a speedy trial is important and the court has set a strict standard to be complied with. But there are many details as to the application of this rule and as can be seen from the preceding cases, they are at times complex and changing. This is by no means an exhaustive coverage of this right, but i t is hoped to have given an insight into its reason, complexities, and development.
Post-Trial Delay
The United States Court of Military Appeals held that i t would not ~llow unexplained delays in the appellate process, where a one year delay was one reason" for' the setting aside of a conviction in United States v. Tucker.
120
The court allowed a ten month delay for one CA to act, saying i t was unusual but there was no prejudice to the accused in a complex case. The court held that the right to speedy trial only refers to trial and not to appellate delays, and that relief from delays at the appellate level, would be granted only for flagrant disregard of rights. United States v. h d 121
In another case, the court held that mere
22

delay in appellate review will not normally justify reversal, but the CA should act as soon as possible consistent with justice. Here allowing a 76 day delay. United States v.
Moore.
122
The court reversed and dismissed for a three year delay in the serving of a Board Review decision on an accused
" U" d S " v. rVln, 123 h ld" th t "th er goo d faith nor inadvertent negligence can excuse such inordinant delay.
In Dunlap v. Convening Authority,124 the court set a standard for the Convening Authority similar to that in
United States v. Burton.
125
After sentencing and the accused is continuously under restraint, the Convening Authority has
90 days to make a decision, or a presumption of denial of a speedy disposition of his case will arise and the case should be dismissed unless the government can show due diligence.
This case does not apply beyond the Convening Authority and therefore the prior holdings and standards of the court will still apply. Only the future will show if any standards will be placed on others in the appellate system.
23

FOOTNOTES l. 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971).
2. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 27 C.M.R. 411 (1959) .
3. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 510, 38 C.M.R. 308 (1968) .
4. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64 (1959).
5. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 38 C.M.R. 225 (1968) .
6. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 37 C.M.R. 209 (1967).
7. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 500, 40 C.M.R. 212 (1969).
8. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64 (1959) .
9. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 159, 41 C.M.R. 159 (1969) .
10. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 419, 34 C.M.R. 199 (1964) .
1l. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64 (1959) .
12. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 398, 27 C.M.R. 472 (1959).
13. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 27 C.M.R. 230 (1959).
14. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 464, 40 C.M.R. 176 (1969).
, ,
15. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 159, 41 C.M.R. 159 (1969).
16. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 120, 41 C.M.R. 120 (1969) .
17. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 29 C.M.R. 226 (1960) .
18. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 35 C.M.R. 322 (1965) .
19. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 398, 27 C.M.R. 472 (1959).
20. 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971) .
2l. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 498, 28 C.M.R. 64 (1959).
22. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 613, 31 C.M.R. 199 (1962) .
23. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 27 C.M.R. 411 (1959).
24. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 27 C.M.R. 230 (1959) .
24

25. 40 C.M.R. 916 (NCMR 1968).
26. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 39B, 27 C.M.R. 472 (1959) .
27. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 361, 34 C.M.R. 141 (1964) .
28. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 30 C.M.R. Bl (1961) .
29. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 120, 41 C.M.R. 120 (1969) .
30. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 27 C.M.R. 230 (1959).
3l. 11 U.S.C.M.A. 410, 29 C.M.R. 226 (1960).
32. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 30 C.M.R. 81 (1961) •
33. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 30 C.M.R. 48 (1960) .
34. 40 C.M.R. 691, petition for review denied, 40 C.M.R. 327
(1969) .
35. 40 C.M.R. 916 (NCMR 1968) •
36. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 156, 27 C.M.R. 230 (1959).
37. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 159, 41 C.M.R. 159 (1969) .
3B. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 30 C.M.R. 48 (1960) •
39. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 225, 41 C.M.R. 225 (1970).
40. 40 C.M.R. ' 916 (NCMR 1968) .
4l. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 464 , 40 C.M.R. 176 (1969) .
42. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 436, 40 C.M.R. 148 (1969).
43. 40 C.M.R.
, petition for review denied, 39 C.M.R.
44. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 38 C.M.R. 174 (1968) .
45. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 35 C.M.R. 322 (1965) .
46. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 462, 38 C.M.R. 260 (1968) .
47. 10 U.S.C.M.A. 337, 27 C.M.R. 411 (1959).
4B. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34 C.M.R. 151 (1964) .
49. 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971).
25

50. 383 U.S. 116, 120, 15 L.Ed.2d 627, 86 S.Ct. 773 (1 966 ).
51. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 500, 40 C.M.R. 212 (1969).
52. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 584, 38 C.M.R. 382 (1968).
53. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 636, 38 C.M.R. 434 (1968).
54. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 411, 38 C.M.R. 209 (1968).
55. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 37 C.M.R. 209 (1967).
56. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 580, 37 C.M.R. 200 (1967).
57. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 12 C.M.R. 3 (1953).
58. 6 U.S.C.M.A. 75, 19 C.M.R. 201 (1955).
59. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 23 C.M.R. 320 (1957).
60. 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971).
61. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 243, 49 C.M.R. 376 (1974).
62. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 47 C.M.R. 409 (1973).
63. 48 C.M.R. 89, petition for review denied, 48 C.M.R.
1000 (1974).
64. 48 C.M.R. 160, petition for review denied, 48 C.M.R.
1000 (19741.
65. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 91, 48 C.M.R. 599 (1974).
66. 44 C.M.R. 929, petition for review denied, 44 C.M.R.
939 (1972).
67. 48 C.M.R. 89, petition for review denied, 48 C.M.R.
1000 (1974).
68. 48 C.M.R. 160, petition for review denied, 48 C.M.R.
1000 (1974).
69. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 91, 48 C.M.R. 599 (1974).
70. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 391, 50 C.M.R. 273 (1975).
71. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 524, 48 C.M.R. 9 (1973).
72. 48 C.M.R. 89, petition for review denied, 48 C.M.R.
1000 (1974).
26

73. 48 C.M.R. 858 (ACMR 1974) .
74. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 492, 50 C.M.R. 572 (1975) •
75. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 584, 48 C.M.R. 178 (1974) .
76. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 562, 48 C.M.R. 47 (1973) .
77. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 179, 48 C .M.R. 795 (1974) •
78. 48 C.M.R. 841 (NCMR 1974).
79. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 197, 48 C.M.R. 949 (1974) .
80. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 471, 50 C.M.R. 491 (1975) .
81. 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971).
82. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 584, 48 C.M.R. 178 (1974) .
83. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 587, 48 C.M.R. 211 (1974) .
84. 48 C.M.R. 418 (NCMR 1973) .
85. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 543, 50 C.M.R. 473 (1975).
86. 22 U.S.C.M.A. 557, 48 C.M.R. 42 (1973).
87. 48 C.M.R. 460 (NCMR 1974).
88. 48 C.M.R. 241 (ACMR 1973).
89. 48 C.M.R. 647, Eetition for review denied, 48 C.M.R.
9 99 (1973).
90. 48 C.M.R. 89; Eetition for review denied, 48 C.M.R.
1000 (1974) .
91. 48 C.M.R. 334 (NCMR 1973) .
92. 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455 (1971).
93. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 308, 49 C.M.R. 598 (1975).
94. 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971) •
95. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 122, 35 C.M.R. 94 (1964) .
96. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 427, 38 C.M.R. 225 (1968) .
97. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 37 C.
M .R. 209 (1967).
27

98 . 44 C.M
.
R. 591, Eetition for review denied, 44 C.M
.
R .
940 ( 19 7 1 ).
99 . 47 C.M.R. 752 (ACMR 1973 ) .
100 . 21 U.S.C
.
M .
A. 112 , 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971) .
10 l. 44 C.M
.
R . 403 (ACMR 1971) .
102 . 19 U.S
.
C.M
.
A. 225, 41 C .
M .
R . 225 (1970) .
103 . 48 C.M
.
R. 373 ( NCMR 1973 ) .
104 . 22 U .
S .
C.M
.
A . 55 7, 48 C .
M .
R . 42 (1973 ).
105 . 23 U .
S.
C.
M.A
. 389, 50 C .
M .
R. 271 (1975 ) .
106 . 19 U .
S.C
.
M .
A. 4 57 , 42 C .
M.R
. 59 (1 970 ) .
107 . 22 U .
S.C
.
M .
A . 515, 4 7 C .
M .
R . 932 ( 1973).
108 . 21 U.S
.
C .
M .
A . 11 2, 44 C .
M .
R . 166 ( 1971) .
109 . 22 U .
S.C.M.A
. 557 , 48 C.M
.
R. 42 (1973) .
11 0. 21 U.S
.
C .
M .
A . 389, 4 5 C .
M.R
. 163 (19 7 2 ).
11 1. 23 U.S.C
.
M .
A . 1, 48 C .
M .
R . 257 (1974 ) .
112 . 48 C .
M.R
. 809 (ACMR 1974 ) •
113 . 48 C.M.R
. 620 ( NCMR 1973 ) .
114 . 23 U.S.C
.
M .
A. 91, 48 C.M.R
. 599 (1974) .
115 . 48 C.M
.
R . 440 (NCMR 1974) .
116. 17 U .
S.C.M
.
A . 411, 38 C .
M.R
. 209 (1968) .
11 7. 48 C .
M .
R . 846 ( NCMR 1974 ).
118. 21 U .
S.C
.
M.A
. 112 , 44 C .
M .
R . 166 (1971 ).
119 . 23 U.S
.
C.
M .
A . 24 0, 49 C .
M .
R . 373 (1 974 ).
120 . 9 U.S.C.M.A. 587, 26 C.M
.
R . 367 (1958 ).
12l. 11 U.S
.
C .
M.A
. 1 42 , 28 C .
M. R . 366 (1960) .
122 . 19 U.S
.
C.M.A
. 2 7 4, 41 C.M
.
R . 274 (1970 ) .
28

123. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 97, 42 C.M.R. 289 (1970).
124. 23 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 48 C.M.R. 751 (1974).
125. 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 44 C.M.R. 166 (1971).
29