Vocabulary for the Study
of Religion
Volume 3
P–Z, Index
Edited by
Robert A. Segal
Kocku von Stuckrad
LEIDEN | BOSTON
2015
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Table of Contents
Volume 1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................ vii
List of Contributors .................................................................................................................................................. viii
List of Articles ............................................................................................................................................................ xvii
Articles A–E ................................................................................................................................................................
1
Volume 2
Articles F–O ................................................................................................................................................................
1
Volume 3
Articles P–Z .................................................................................................................................................................
1
Index ............................................................................................................................................................................. 619
178
Race / Racism
Gilroy, P., Against Race: Imagining Political Culture
beyond the Color Line, Cambridge MA, 2000.
Goodman, A.H. et al., (eds.) (2003) Genetic Nature/
Culture: Anthropology and Science Beyond the TwoCulture Divide, Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Gould, S.J., The Mismeasure of Man, New York, 1996
[1981].
Miles, R., Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or
Necessity? London, 1989.
Morning, A., The Nature of Race: How Scientists Think
and Teach About Human Diffference, Berkeley, 2011.
Myers, K., Racetalk: Racism Hiding in Plain Sight,
Boulder, 2005.
Omi, M., and H. Winant, Racial Formation in the United
States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, New York, 21994.
Picca, L., and J. Feagin, Two-Faced Racism: Whites in the
Backstage and Frontstage, London, 2007.
Amy Ansell
Radicalism
Radicalism is a familiar concept in academic and
popular discourse, a concept that picks out what is
generally regarded as a signifijicant socio-political
and broader cultural phenomenon. However, it is a
concept that is rarely clarifijied. Consequently, much
of the discourse concerning radicalism—whether
encountered in political science departments or
in daily newspapers—is mired in confusion. The
initial problem facing the scholar of radicalism is
therefore conceptual rather than, say, evaluative.
Put simply, the question that faces the scholar in
the fijirst instance is the following: What is radicalism? What is it that, for example, supposed political radicalisms like Marxism and fascism have in
common? In what sense do the supposed religious
radicalisms of Thomas Müntzer and Sayyid Qutb
belong to the same family?
Meaning of the Term
The difffijiculty associated with the conceptual problem in question owes to the largely, though by no
means exclusively, negative connotations of the
term “radicalism.” The principal connotation—at
least, the principal negative connotation—of the
term results from its association with extremism.
Indeed, the terms “radicalism” and “extremism” are
often used interchangeably. But what can we make
of extremism as such? Extremism may be taken to
denote two things: (1) the holding of marginal or
outlandish views (views at the extremes of the relevant spectrum of views) and (2) a willingness to
resort to violence in support of these views. The
marginal views in question may take any number
of forms, but fundamentalist and utopian views
are perhaps the most notable examples in this context. The violence to which the extremist is willing
to resort may also take various forms, but terrorist and revolutionary forms are arguably the most
notable examples here. If the defijinition of extremism above is adequate, then merely (1) holding
outlandish views does not make one an extremist (or, generally, the kind of fijigure others need to
worry too much about). More contentiously, on
this defijinition, merely (2) resorting to violence
in support of one’s views does not make one an
extremist (though it might make one the kind of
fijigure others need to worry about). Resorting to
violence in support of, say, mainstream views may
be problematic, but it is not an example of extremism. Thus, the mere fundamentalist or utopian is
no extremist. Nor is the mere revolutionary or
(perhaps counter-intuitively) terrorist an extremist.
But are radicals necessarily any of these things, that
is, extremists, fundamentalists, utopians, revolutionaries, or terrorists? This remains to be seen.
The principal positive connotation of “radicalism” results from its association with the idea
of progress or with the progressive tradition.
Thus, some think of radicalism as being bound
up with the attempt to achieve change (or fundamental change) for the better in some or even
every socio-political or cultural domain. Radicals,
put crudely, try to make the world a better (or a
fundamentally better) place in some or even
every respect. What is immediately problematic
here, however, is that many radicals resist such a
characterization or deny the association between
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Radicalism
radicalism and progress. That is to say, a non-progressive form of radicalism is apparent. Radical
ecologists and postmoderns, for example, are
highly critical of certain supposed commitments
within the progressive tradition: commitments to
an instrumental conception of reason or an essentialist conception of human nature, for instance.
Nevertheless, such radicals still associate radicalism positively with other notions. What these are
is a matter of some conjecture, but one possibility
is the notion of “adequacy,” especially in circumstances of “crisis.” Thus, non-progressive, ecological
radicals think of their brand of radicalism as representing an adequate response to the ecological
crisis. Non-radical environmentalists, by contrast,
are accused of responding inadequately—of not
going far enough (theoretically and practically) in
order to escape the crisis situation.
If we attempt to trace the etymological and
historical development of the term “radicalism”—
as opposed to describing its contemporary connotations in ahistorical isolation—we may be in
a better position to clarify the concept at hand.
Etymologically, “radicalism” derives from the Latin
noun radix, meaning “root” (as in the root of a
plant). Thus, in strict etymological terms, “radicalism” denotes some kind of interest in or orientation towards “roots.” More contentiously, it
denotes an orientation towards “foundations” and
“origins” as well as “roots”—at least, insofar as the
term has developed historically (if not in strict etymological terms).
The word “radicalism” came into use in English
in the early nineteenth century. However, the word
“radical” had been in use for centuries beforehand. As an adjective, its use is recorded from the
end of the fourteenth century. In its early senses,
it described that which pertained to the root,
essence, basis, or foundation of something or
somebody: a vital principle, a defijining attribute,
an original cause, and so on. By the seventeenth
century, the adjective was used to describe change
or action that afffects the foundations or essence
of something or somebody: that is, very basic and
signifijicant change or action. It was only from the
179
eighteenth century that the adjective was used to
describe political or social change or action (and
associated beliefs) of the same kind: originally, in
the late-eighteenth century and early-nineteenth
century, basic and signifijicant political or social
reform; somewhat later, especially from the
mid-nineteenth century, even more fundamental
political or social transformation (or “revolution”).
Such change (and its associated beliefs) was originally understood to be of a democratic and/or a
socialistic nature. Only in the early-twentieth century did “radical” begin to describe the “right-wing”
equivalent as well, though such usage became
more prominent later in the century (especially in
the post-war period).
As a noun, “radical” was fijirst used in a very
obscure anatomical sense in the early-fijifteenth century and later used in a much less obscure linguistic sense by the late-sixteenth century. Politically,
the noun came into use in the early-nineteenth
century to describe supporters of “radical” political and social reform. (It took on its revolutionary
sense somewhat later in the nineteenth century
and its right-wing sense in the twentieth century,
certainly by the 1960s.) The noun “radicalism” was
fijirst used—to refer to the beliefs and practices
of political “radicals”—at around the same time.
Thus, although the meaning of “radical” was not
primarily political, the meaning of “radicalism”
was. At fijirst, it referred to the beliefs and practices
of “radical reformers.” These radical reformers
called for substantive political change, procedural
or even constitutional. As such, they were distinguished from moderate reformers, who only called
for piecemeal procedural or legislative change.
But those radical reformers who later became
known as “philosophical radicals” were eager to
distance themselves from utopian, socialistic,
and revolutionary elements in the emerging tradition of political radicalism. Thus, they declared
that radicalism was in fact “not dangerous” from
the standpoint of the established socio-political
order. By the middle of the nineteenth century,
however, more “dangerous” forms of radicalism—
utopian, socialistic, and revolutionary—did rise to
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180
radicalism
prominence. And these “dangerous” forms were no
longer seen as distinctively left-wing in the twentieth century, but also as nationalistic, religious, and
even reactionary.
Analysis of the Concept
In the etymological sense, as we have seen, radicalism denotes an interest in or orientation
towards roots. Analysis of the concept of “radicalism” typically begins with this etymological
insight and rarely adds anything to it. Thus, Karl
Marx, for example, famously wrote that “To be
radical is to grasp things by the root” (Tucker ed.
1978: 60). Somewhat more precisely, Zygmunt
Bauman recently wrote:
Acts, undertakings, means, and measures
may be called “radical” when they reach
down to the roots: of a problem, a challenge,
a task. Note, however, that the Latin noun
“radix,” to which the metaphorical uses of
“radical” trace their pedigree, refers not only
to roots, but also to foundations and to origins. (Pugh ed. 2009: 25)
According to Bauman, then, radicalism denotes a
practical or theoretical orientation towards the
roots, foundations, or origins of something.
However, there is an immediate problem with this
defijinition and with etymologically-based defijinitions in general: they are partial, inadequate, and
in need of refijinement. The emphasis of such defijinitions is on radicalism as a mere orientation—
any kind of orientation—towards roots or
fundamental objects. This raises the possibility of
a non-fundamental orientation towards fundamental objects—of, as it were, a “non-radical
radicalism”—such that one might (as a supposed
radical) take a rather superfijicial interest in fundamental matters. (Nevertheless, Marx’s sense of
“grasping” and Bauman’s sense of “reaching down”
may be intended to counter this possibility; a possibility which could, incidentally, dissolve the distinction between fundamentalism and radicalism.)
Of course, an over-emphasis on the fundamental
orientation of radicalism would result in a similarly partial or inadequate defijinition of radicalism
as a fundamental orientation towards some
kind—indeed any kind—of object. This raises the
possibility of a fundamental orientation towards
non-fundamental objects—of, as it were, a “radical non-radicalism”—such that one might (as a
supposed radical) take a fundamental interest in
some rather superfijicial matter.
Moving beyond mere etymology, then, our
analysis suggests that there are two seemingly
necessary conditions for the application of the
term “radicalism”: fundamentality of object and
fundamentality of orientation. Radicalism as such
might therefore be said to consist in a fundamental practical or theoretical orientation towards a
fundamental object. This is a highly abstract defijinition that will only be concretized (to a degree)
when we turn to the specifijic forms of radicalism.
But, even at this level of abstraction, some may
wish to build some more contentious conditions
into the defijinition of radicalism, a defijinition that
they might claim to be too thin as it stands. One
such condition is the motivation condition: some
contend that radicalism is necessarily motivated
by the sense that something is amiss with existing
practice or theory. Another contentious condition
is the conclusion condition: some contend that
radicalism—even in its theoretical form—is necessarily productive of new or at least unorthodox
results. A third contentious condition is the action
conclusion: some contend that radicalism—even
in its theoretical form—necessarily gives rise to
action. A fijinal contentious condition (at least for
present purposes) is the ideology condition: some
contend that radicalism is necessarily identifijiable
with a particular ideology or family of ideologies.
We may grant—as a matter of fact—(1) that radicals are often motivated by the sense that existing
practices are unjust or that existing theory is on
the wrong track, (2) that radical theory often generates unorthodox conclusions, and (3) that radical theory is often tied up with some attempt to
change the world. However, these are contingent
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181
Radicalism
facts about radicalism which should not be built
into its defijinition. There is no reason, in principle,
why radicals should not (1) be motivated by simple curiosity about existing practices or existing
theory (such that they experiment with or inquire
into these in a “radical” fashion), (2) arrive at conventional conclusions (albeit by “radical means”),
or (3) engage in abstract theorizing only. By contrast with the fijirst three contentious conditions,
the attempt to build the ideology condition into a
defijinition of radicalism is not a case of building
contingent facts in, but of defijining radicalism to
ideological taste. This is most (though not solely)
apparent when those who situate themselves on
the ideological left claim a monopoly on radicalism, such that radicalism is seen as a left-wing
phenomenon only. However, there is no reason in
principle why ideological outlook should preclude
the possibility of fundamentally orienting oneself
towards a fundamental object. Even conservatives
(of certain varieties, at least) exhibit radical tendencies in our sense, to say nothing of fascists and
others on the extreme right.
If we return to the connotations of “radicalism”
discussed in the previous section, and question the
justifijication for (as opposed to the explanation of)
the association between radicalism and extremism
or the idea of progress, it becomes readily apparent
that both associations are tenuous. There is nothing about radicalism as such (on our defijinition)
that ties it to either (1) the holding of outlandish
views and willingness to resort to violence in support of these views or (2) the attempt to make the
world a better place in some or even every respect.
Radicals may, of course, hold outlandish views and
be willing to resort to violence in support of these
views: that is to say, radicalism may be extremist.
And radicals may attempt to make the world a
better (or a fundamentally better) place in at least
some respect: that is to say, radicalism may be
progressive. In fact, radicals may hold outlandish
views, be willing to resort to violence in support
of these views, and thereby attempt to make the
world a better place: that is to say, radicalism may
be simultaneously extremist and progressive. But
there are cases of non-progressive radicalism (as
we noted above). And abstract theoretical radicalism, at the very least, is clearly not extremist in
itself (since it does not commit the radical to any
kind of practice, let alone violent practice).
Forms of Radicalism
If we attempt to develop a taxonomy of
radicalism(s), we need to begin by clarifying a
basic distinction that has been employed above:
that is, the distinction between practical radicalism (or radicalism as a mode of action, a specifijic
way of acting on a specifijic kind of thing) and
theoretical radicalism (or radicalism as a mode of
thought, a specifijic way of thinking about a specifijic
kind of thing). We may then further develop our
taxonomy by distinguishing the cultural domains
within which radicalism—whether practical or
theoretical (or, indeed, both)—is evident. The
principal domains in question are seemingly the
political, the religious, and the aesthetic, though
there is no reason to suppose that radicalism must
be limited to these domains.
Radicalism as a mode of action may be defijined
as a fundamental practical orientation towards (or
fundamental action on) a fundamental object in a
given domain. The fundamental object in question
is a defijining feature of the relevant domain: that is
to say, in the absence of this feature, the domain
would be fundamentally diffferent and would
have to be redefijined. The fundamental orientation in question represents a practical challenge
to that domain or, rather, a practical challenge to
the same fundamental object (or defijining feature)
within it. The (radical) practical challenge is such
that it may lead to the abolition of this object or
the transformation of the relevant domain.
Radicalism as a mode of thought may be
defijined as a fundamental theoretical orientation
towards (or fundamental inquiry into) a fundamental object in a given domain. The fundamental
object in question is, once again, a defijining feature
of the relevant domain. The fundamental orientation in question represents a theoretical challenge
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182
to that domain or, rather, a theoretical challenge
to the same fundamental object (or defijining feature) within it. The (radical) theoretical challenge
is such that it may undermine this object or destabilize the relevant domain.
Fundamental objects vary across cultural
domains. Indeed, these defijining objects distinguish the diffferent cultural domains. Fundamental
approaches, by contrast, may be less domain-specifijic; they may not distinguish cultural domains
to the same extent. But what are the fundamental
objects in the principal domains in which radicalism is apparent? In the political domain, they
include fundamental socio-political norms, practices, relations, and institutions. At the institutional
level, then, political radicals are fundamentally
oriented—both practically and theoretically—
towards the polity and/or the socio-economic
order. Modern political radicals (of the institutional variety) therefore present a fundamental
challenge to the state and/or capitalism, which
most take to be the defijining institutions of modernity. (In their absence, modernity would have to
be socio-politically redefijined.) In the religious
domain, the fundamental objects include defijining
objects of belief and veneration, whether these are
characterized as divine, spiritual, transcendental,
sacred, or supernatural. Gods and religious institutions such as churches are both examples of such
objects. Religious radicals present a fundamental
practical or theoretical challenge to objects of this
kind, efffectively challenging us to redefijine the religious domain. In the aesthetic domain, fijinally, the
fundamental objects may be seen to include works
of art, artifacts in general, that which is sensible,
or only that which is beautiful. Aesthetic radicals
present a fundamental challenge to such objects,
either theoretically challenging our very conception of the beautiful or practically challenging
existing modes of creation, for example.
We have spoken of radicals of the political, religious, and aesthetic varieties as presenting fundamental challenges to fundamental objects in their
respective domains. But the question remains:
What constitutes a fundamental challenge? What
radicalism
constitutes a fundamental approach? In answering this question, we can generalize to some extent
across cultural domains. While fundamental
objects difffer in diffferent domains, fundamental
approaches are similar (or similarly characterizable) in these domains. In the case of radicalism
as a mode of action (whether political, religious,
or aesthetic), fundamental approaches may be
reformist or revolutionary. In either case, they
constitute practical attempts to transform the fundamental object(s) of the relevant domain (and
thus to redefijine that domain)—gradually, in the
reformist case, or immediately, in the revolutionary case. The historical notion of “radical reform”
is therefore coherent on the account offfered here.
In the case of radicalism as a mode of thought
(whether political, religious, or aesthetic), fundamental approaches are more difffijicult to specify.
What does it mean to fundamentally inquire into
fundamental objects like states, churches, and
artworks? We might say—with Charles Fourier
(1996: 8)—that it entails employing (or attempting
to employ) a method of “absolute doubt” and “absolute separation.” The former essentially involves
calling (or being willing to call) the “necessity,
excellence, and permanence” of the fundamental
object(s) into question. The latter involves taking
(or attempting to take) nothing for granted with
respect to the object(s), especially on the basis
of received wisdom. Thus, the theoretical radical
adopts (or attempts to adopt) a position of what
we might call non-presumptive criticism with
respect to a fundamental object in some cultural
domain.
Bibliography
Baylor, M.G. (ed.), The Radical Reformation, Cambridge
UK, 1991.
Edwards, J., The Radical Attitude and Modern Political
Theory, Basingstoke, 2007.
Egbert, D.D., Social Radicalism and the Arts: Western
Europe, London, 1970.
Fourier, C., The Theory of the Four Movements, eds,
G. Stedman Jones and I. Patterson, Cambridge UK,
1996.
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Rapture
Gottlieb, R.S. (ed.), Radical Philosophy: Tradition,
Counter-Tradition, Politics, Philadelphia, 1993.
McLaughlin, P., Radicalism: A Philosophical Study,
Basingstoke, 2012.
Pugh, J. (ed.), What is Radical Politics Today? Basingstoke,
2009.
Tucker, R.C. (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, New York,
1978.
Paul McLaughlin
Rapture
The “rapture” is an eschatological concept, paralleling the Christian doctrine of resurrection, that
has evolved from its origins in the established
churches of early nineteenth-century Britain and
Ireland to dominate large and influential sections
of contemporary American evangelicalism. Toward
the end of the twentieth century, the theology of
the rapture found frequent iteration in popular
culture, providing critical narrative background
in Michael Tolkin’s controversial fijilm The Rapture
(1991), being parodied in the Simpsons cartoon
series (2005), and being sympathetically expounded
in the Left Behind novels (1995–2007), which sold
over 65 million copies and repeatedly topped the
New York Times bestseller list. By the end of the
twentieth century, the doctrine of the rapture had
moved from its sectarian origins into the American
cultural mainstream. This movement of the cultural position of the rapture has impacted upon its
articulation while confijirming its connotation of
cultural and political despair—a despair made all
the more ironic by the rising political influence of
a number of its key advocates and by the extraordinary sales of the Left Behind novels.
The etymology of “rapture” derives from rapere,
a term used in the Vulgate translation of 1 Thessalonians 4:17 to describe the “catching away” of
Christians at the parousia of Jesus Christ. Although
it is difffijicult to trace the fijirst modern usage of
the term, it is possible to identify its circulation
in English and American Protestant discourse
from the late seventeenth century. Until the mid-
nineteenth century, the term functioned as a
broadly equivalent descriptor of the resurrection
of the dead, which, in traditional orthodoxy, was
believed to occur simultaneously with the second
coming of Jesus Christ. Throughout this period,
“rapture” tended to be used as a verb, describing
the experience of resurrection, rather than as a
noun, describing the resurrection as an event.
This shift toward the usage of “rapture” as a
noun occurred as the term was invested with specifijic meaning in the 1820s and 1830s, when the
members of a Protestant, conservative and socially
elite circle initially associated with Trinity College
Dublin and the University of Oxford read 1 Thessalonians 4:17 and similar passages to suggest that
true Christians would be suddenly and could be
imminently taken to heaven by Jesus Christ (“the
rapture”). These believers came to argue that this
event would be followed by seven years of tribulation, in which the Antichrist would rise to power
and wield his formidable resources to efffect the
extinction of Jews and those Gentiles who would
convert to authentic Christianity after the rapture;
and that this tribulation would be followed by
the second coming, a series of fijinal judgements,
the millennium and the inauguration of the new
heavens and earth. This emerging eschatological
system, later described as “dispensational premillennialism,” reflected the particular cultural and
political anxieties of its early adopters, narrating
an historiography of despair in which the future
of the established churches looked bleak and the
developing democratic impulse of post-revolution
Europe looked menacing. One of the system’s best
advocates was an Anglican priest named John
Nelson Darby (1800–1882), who in the late 1820s
seceded from the Church of Ireland to lead the
“Plymouth Brethren,” and whose influence on
the eschatological thought of evangelicals was
“both profound and pivotal, more so perhaps than
any other Christian leader for the last 200 years”
(Sizer 2004: 96). Darby’s frequent travels in North
America helped to facilitate the widespread circulation of the new theology and its elevation
to near-creedal status through the influence of
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