June 2010
Authors:
R. Bruce Allensworth bruce.allensworth@klgates.com
+1.617.261.3119
Andrew C. Glass andrew.glass@klgates.com
+1.617.261.3107
Robert W. Sparkes, III robert.sparkes@klgates.com
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Roger L. Smerage roger.smerage@klgates.com
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K&L Gates includes lawyers practicing out of 36 offices located in North America,
Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and represents numerous GLOBAL 500,
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The United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp.
, 559 U.S. ---, No. 08-1198, decided “whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.
” Slip op. at 1. In a five to three decision,
1
the Court held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Id.
at 20 (emphasis in original).
Although the Court found that an agreement which is silent on the issue of class arbitration is not sufficient evidence that the parties intended to submit to class arbitration, the Court is not through examining class arbitration waiver issues. This article discusses Stolt-Nielsen and future developments that are likely to follow.
When AnimalFeeds chartered space on Stolt-Nielsen’s vessel to transport liquid animal food ingredients, AnimalFeeds selected a maritime contract, known as a
“charter party,” to govern the arrangement. Slip op. at 1-2. The charter party agreement contained a mandatory arbitration provision that was silent as to whether the parties could initiate arbitration on behalf of a putative class of individuals. Id. at
2. After a dispute arose between the parties, AnimalFeeds sought to bring a class arbitration against Stolt-Nielsen, asserting antitrust violations premised on allegations of price fixing. Id.
at 2-3. The parties agreed that they must arbitrate their dispute and agreed to submit the issue of the availability of class arbitration to the arbitration panel. Id.
at 3. The panel concluded that the arbitration provision did not preclude class arbitration. Id.
at 4. Stolt-Nielsen sought judicial review of the panel’s ruling in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, which vacated the ruling. Id.
at 4-5. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling, holding that nothing in the
FAA, maritime law, or New York law precluded class arbitration in the absence of an express class arbitration waiver. Id.
at 5-6. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling. Id.
at 6, 23.
On review, the Supreme Court first considered whether the arbitration panel had exceeded its authority in construing the arbitration provision to permit class arbitrations. Slip op. at 7 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)). The Court determined that the panel had done so, despite the “high hurdle” a petitioner bears in establishing a violation of the FAA. Id.
at 7, 12. The Court explained that because the parties had stipulated to the panel that “their agreement was ‘silent’ in the sense that they had not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration,” the only task for the panel was to decide what “rule of law govern[ed] in that situation.” Id.
at 8, 12. The
Court concluded that the panel violated the FAA by substituting its own “policy decision” rather than applying a settled body of law, such as the FAA, maritime law,

or New York law, in construing the arbitration provision. Id. at 8-9 & n.4. The panel did not have the authority “to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied” when the arbitration provision was silent as to the availability of class arbitration.
Id.
at 9.
v. Bazzle
Before turning to the question of what “rule … applie[s] in deciding whether class arbitration is permitted” when an arbitration agreement is silent on the subject, the Court reviewed, and discounted, the parties’ reliance on Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle , 539 U.S. 444 (2003), in presenting their arguments to the Court. Slip op. at 15-17. In
Bazzle , the Supreme Court of South Carolina had found that under South Carolina law, arbitration provisions that are silent with respect to class arbitration implicitly authorize class proceedings.
See 539 U.S. at 450. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider whether that holding was consistent with the FAA. Id.
at 447.
Yet the Court did not reach that question on review because a plurality of the Court found that the arbitrator and not the courts should have decided the question. Id.
at 447. Furthermore, because Bazzle produced only a plurality opinion, it did not establish as a rule that an arbitrator should decide whether class arbitration is permitted. See Stolt-Nielsen , slip op. at 15-16. Nor did the Stolt-Nielsen Court have occasion to resolve the issue insofar as the parties had expressly agreed that their arbitrator should decide the availability of the class device. Id.
at 16.
2
The Stolt-Nielsen Court, however, did have occasion to address another question left unresolved in
Bazzle , namely, the “standard to be applied by a decision maker in determining whether a contract may permissibly be interpreted to allow class arbitration.” Id.
at 16-17.
Relying on FAA jurisprudence and principles of contract interpretation, the Court held that a party cannot be compelled to participate in a class arbitration unless it has agreed to do so. Slip op. at
18-20. The Court reasoned that “arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’” Id.
at 17 (quoting
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ.
, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
Because arbitration is both consensual and contractual in nature, parties are entitled to decide how to structure an arbitration agreement, including specifying the persons to whom the requirement of arbitration will apply. Id.
at 19-20. Whether any given arbitration provision permits class arbitration is a matter of determining the parties’ intent as expressed through the particular provision and agreement. Id.
An arbitration provision that is silent on the issue of class arbitration is not sufficient evidence that a party intended to submit to class arbitration. Id.
at 21.
In support of its holding, the Court explained that class arbitration “changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it simply by agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.” Slip op. at 21. Such changes include the expansion of the number of disputes to be resolved, the loss of the default presumption of privacy and confidentiality, and the application of the arbitrator’s award to absent parties. Because of these differences, the benefits of arbitration – namely, low cost, greater speed, and freedom to select the decision maker – may be compromised in a class setting. Id.
at 21-22.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the
Second Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion. Id.
at 23.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority, opining that the Court inappropriately
“address[ed] an issue not ripe for judicial review,”
“substitute[d] its judgment for that of the decision makers chosen by the parties,” and ignored the
FAA’s “strict limitations” on judicial review of arbitral awards. Slip op. at 1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
According to the dissent, the arbitration panel’s decision was “highly interlocutory.” Id.
at 3. For instance, the panel had not decided whether the antitrust claims at issue were suitable for class certification, nor had it defined a class or determined the proper procedure for maintaining a class arbitration. Id.
Thus, the dissent criticized the
Court for “not persuasively justify[ing] judicial intervention so early in the game or convincingly reconcil[ing] its adjudication with the firm final-
June 2010 2

judgment rule prevailing in the federal court system.” Id.
In addition, the dissent criticized the majority’s de novo review of the panel’s decision. Slip op. at 6
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent reminded the majority that under the applicable FAA standard of review, “[t]his Court . . . may not disturb the arbitrators’ judgment, even if convinced that ‘serious error’ infected the panel’s award.” Id.
at 10.
Finally, the dissent commented that “[w]hen adjudication is costly and individual claims are no more than modest in size, class proceedings may be
‘the thing,’ i.e.
, without them, potential claimants will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.” Slip op. at 12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). On this basis, the dissent outlined what may be limitations to the majority’s opinion: (1) “the
Court does not insist on express consent to class arbitration,” but merely requires “a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to submit to class arbitration”; and (2) the parties to the subject arbitration provision were each “sophisticated business entities,” and the agreement was not a contract of adhesion. Id.
at 12-13 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, the dissent suggested that a different outcome might pertain where the bargaining power between the parties is not equal or where the subject arbitration provision constitutes a contract of adhesion, “presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.” Id.
at 13. The dissent also raises the question of whether an arbitration provision’s silence as to the availability of class arbitration could constitute an implicit class-action waiver in consumer-based litigation where certain lower courts have found express class-action waivers unenforceable. See slip op. at 11 n.10
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
In Stolt-Nielsen , the Supreme Court established that the class arbitration mechanism is unavailable where a mandatory arbitration provision is silent on the subject. How lower courts will apply this rule in other contexts is likely to be the subject of future litigation. Indeed, in another action taken this term, the Supreme Court itself raised the question of whether Stolt-Nielsen affects arbitration provisions that expressly preclude class arbitrations. On May
3, 2010, the Court granted certiorari in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant , No. 08-
1473, vacated the Second Circuit’s decision in In re
American Express Merchants’ Litigation , 554 F.3d
300 (2d Cir. 2009), and remanded the case “for further consideration in light of [ Stolt-Nielsen ].”
In In re American Express , the Second Circuit had held that an express class arbitration waiver contained in mandatory arbitration agreements between American Express and individual merchants that accepted American Express credit cards was unenforceable under the federal substantive law of arbitrability. 554 F.3d at 319-
20.
3
The Second Circuit had found that the class arbitration waiver at issue effectively precluded the plaintiffs from vindicating their substantive, statutorily-protected rights under the Sherman
Antitrust Act. The court had reasoned that the costs of a successful antitrust litigation would exceed any potential individual recovery should the plaintiffs be limited to bringing suit on an individual basis. Id.
Thus, the Second Circuit had concluded that to enforce the express class arbitration waiver “would grant Amex de facto immunity from antitrust liability by removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery.” Id.
at 320.
On remand, the Second Circuit will again confront the issue of whether an arbitration provision that expressly waives class arbitration is valid and enforceable under the FAA. Specifically, the court will have to address whether under Stolt-Nielsen , the parties’ intent controls, and thus, parties cannot be “compelled” to defend a class arbitration where they expressly agreed to waive that right, or whether
Stolt-Nielsen is inapplicable because the waiver provision precludes enforcement of the parties’ substantive rights.
In another recent development, on May 24, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , No. 09-893, to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Laster v. AT&T
Mobility LLC , 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), concerning the enforceability of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts. The Ninth Circuit had ruled that the subject class arbitration waiver was unenforceable under the three-prong test articulated by the California Supreme Court in
Discover Bank v. Superior Ct.
, 113 P.3d 1100
(2005). See Laster , 584 F.3d at 854-55.
June 2010 3

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the class arbitration waiver met all three criteria of the
Discover Bank three-prong test and was unconscionable under California law because (1) the agreement was a contract of adhesion, (2) the plaintiffs’ claims were small, and (3) the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant engaged in fraud. Id.
Nor could the presence of a “premium” provision in the arbitration agreement defeat the second prong of the
Discover Bank test. Id.
at 855-56. That “provision provide[d] for a contractual payment of $7,500 if a customer receive[d] an arbitration award greater than the amount of AT&T’s last written settlement offer, made before an arbitrator was chosen.” Id.
at
855 n.6. The Ninth Circuit found, however, that because the defendant could avoid paying the premium by settling the claim for its face value prior to the selection of an arbitrator, “the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22.” Id.
at 856.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the FAA did not expressly or impliedly preempt application of
Discover Bank ; the three-prong test was not a “new rule” specifically applied to arbitration agreements and thus did not conflict with the FAA’s purposes.
Laster , 584 F.3d at 856-59 (noting that Shroyer v.
New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.
, 498 F.3d 976
(9th Cir. 2007), controlled FAA preemption questions in the Ninth Circuit). Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit found that the Discover Bank test was
1
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer joined, dissented. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision.
2
The United States Supreme Court recently heard argument in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson , No. 09-
497 (argued April 26, 2010), a matter which presents the issue of whether a court or an arbitrator should determine whether an arbitration agreement, or any portion thereof, is unconscionable and unenforceable.
3
Justice Sotomayor was a member of the three-judge panel of the Second Circuit that decided In re American
Express .
4
For more information regarding mandatory arbitration agreements and class action waivers, see R. Bruce
Allensworth, et al., That’s Unconscionable: An Update
Regarding the Enforceability of Arbitration Provisions in
“simply a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in
California” and thus was a rule of general applicability not subject to preemption under the
FAA. Id.
at 857 (internal quotation omitted); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (providing that agreements to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
On review, the Supreme Court may address substantial unresolved questions concerning class arbitration waivers, including (1) whether the rule in
Stolt-Nielsen that a court must give effect to the parties’ intent regarding class arbitration applies to express class action waivers in consumer contracts,
(2) whether California’s Discover Bank test is directed only to arbitration agreements and thus whether it is inconsistent with the FAA, (3) if the
Discover Bank test is preempted by the FAA, what rule of law should apply in determining whether class arbitration is available, and (4) if the Discover
Bank test is not preempted, whether the defendant’s class arbitration waiver is unconscionable under the test.
The In re American Express and Laster matters are likely to be but the first of further significant developments in the law of class arbitration.
4
Form Contracts , Uniform Commercial Code Journal, Vol. 42,
No. 1, Nov. 2009.
June 2010 4

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