To:
Colleagues
From: Geoff Thale, Program Director
Washington Office on Latin America
Re:
Potential for enhanced U.S.-Cuban cooperation on drug interdiction and related law
enforcement
Feedback from a delegation visit to Cuba
Date: May 6, 2010
WOLA staff traveled to Cuba from January 15th to 20th, to explore the current status of U.S.-Cuban
cooperation on drug interdiction and related law enforcement, and to examine possibilities for the
expansion of this cooperation. We were accompanied by several Hill staff who follow issues related
to drug control and law enforcement and/or issues related to Cuba policy. A WOLA board member
with experience in Cuba participated as well. This memo reflects the views of the WOLA staff who
participated in the trip (myself, Program Officer Lilia Lopez, Senior Associate and drug policy
specialist John Walsh, and Senior Fellow and security analyst George Withers).
As a general policy matter, WOLA believes that the U.S. embargo on Cuba is a failure, and hinders
the pursuit of real U.S. policy interests. It prevents the kind of long-term critical engagement that
might improve the human rights situation on the island, and it makes it more difficult for the U.S. to
work with Cuba on matters of mutual concern, including security matters. Given this view, WOLA
carries out Cuba-related policy education and advocacy on two levels: we work to end the ban on
travel and the overall embargo; at the same time, we encourage constructive diplomatic engagement
about areas of mutual interest, where bilateral cooperation could be beneficial in itself and could also
help build confidence on both sides for an eventually broader agenda.
Cuba and the United States have had case-by-case cooperation on drug control issues since 1999,
primarily focused on sharing information to enable interdiction of boats and planes carrying drugs in
or near Cuban territorial waters. We wanted to explore how well this cooperation was working,
whether the Cuban government sought to expand this cooperation, and whether it would benefit the
United States to do so.
In order to give appropriate context to our discussions, we also explored the broader state of U.S.Cuban relations and possibilities for progress within the bilateral relationship.
What we did
Our trip focused on learning about Cuban government drug policy and programs, both domestic and
international. In that context we had high-level meetings with the Ministry of the Interior and the
Border Guard, the leadership of the National Commission on Drugs at the Ministry of Justice, the
director of national psychiatric rehabilitation programs for people with drug addictions, the chair of
the National Assembly’s committee on legal affairs, an advisor to the President of the National
Assembly, and senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Relations. We talked as well with the U.S.
Interest Section and the U.S. Coast Guard liaison officer in Havana. Less officially, we had
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discussions with a number of Cuban academics, with three Havana-based foreign correspondents, with
a foreign ambassador, and with a spokesperson for the Cuban Catholic Church.
We had scheduled a briefing with staff at the U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), the Joint InterAgency Task Force (JIATF), and the U.S. Coast Guard in Miami on our way to Havana, but the
earthquake in Haiti forced the postponement of those meetings. While in Miami, we also met with Dr.
Anthony Maingot, a professor emeritus at Florida International University in Miami, and a specialist
on Caribbean affairs.
Conclusions
It seemed clear to us that the Cubans are very intent about their own drug control efforts, including
interdiction. Dating back to the late 1980s, some have argued that the Cuban government permitted
and profited from allowing Cuban soil, waters, or airspace to be used as a transshipment point for
drugs, especially cocaine, destined for the United States. While there is still debate about whether or
not corrupt officials permitted this in the late 1980s, nothing we saw or heard suggested that such
activity occurs today.
The Cuban National Commission on Drugs cited internal polling to argue that levels of illegal drug
use in Cuba today are very low. While our informal conversations with college faculty, students and
the parents of students in Havana suggest that drugs are more available than Cuban government
officials report, the general view of everyone we talked to (Cuban and foreign) was that Cuba does not
have a serious domestic drug problem, and is eager to prevent such a problem from emerging. Cuba is
eager both because the government and the Cuban Communist Party appear to have a strongly
negative attitude toward drug use (an attitude rooted in the early days of the Cuban Revolution, when
drug abuse and drug trafficking were associated with the influence of American gangsters in Cuba),
and because, as several officials argued to us, Cuba has seen what drug trafficking has done in Mexico
and Central America in corrupting the state, and it wishes to avoid that fate. As a result, Cuba is
concerned with preventing domestic production of drugs, preventing foreign tourists from bringing
drugs into the country, preventing traffickers from bringing wholesale quantities of drugs into the
island, and preventing trafficking organizations from using Cuba as a meeting place or safe haven.
Based on our conversations, there is little evidence of domestic production of illegal drugs of any
kind; small quantities of what is said to be low-quality marijuana grow on the island, but there don’t
appear to be illegal drug labs or production facilities. Much of the drugs that are domestically
available appear to come from “wash ups,” drugs washed ashore when traffickers throw them
overboard in attempts to avoid capture by the Cuban government or U.S. Coast Guard. The National
Commission on Drugs told us that it is a priority for local police to find and confiscate “wash ups,”
and that the criminal penalties for failing to report a wash up, or for taking it into one’s own
possession, are severe.
Cuban Customs appears to be active and committed to preventing foreign tourists from bringing drugs
into the island (we saw a demonstration of the use of drug-sniffing dogs at the cruise ship terminal,
and heard presentations about other efforts by customs officials.)
The Cuban Border Guard, though it has limited resources, appears to be active in seeking to prevent
drug trafficking ships from passing through Cuban territorial waters, or from discarding drugs in
Cuban waters when under pursuit. We visited a Cuban Border Guard cutter, and talked with senior
Border Guard officials and with crew on the cutter. The number of cutters is limited, and the Border
Guard cannot effectively patrol all of Cuba’s extensive coastline; however, given their resources, they
patrol frequently, and dispatch cutters when potential smugglers are identified in Cuban waters.
The Cuban Armed Forces monitor traffic in Cuban airspace, and seek to identify likely flights by
small planes carrying drugs.
The Ministry of Justice appears eager to prevent traffickers from laundering money in Cuba, or from
using Cuba as a meeting place. Cuba has ratified the UN Convention on Corruption and other
international instruments related to money laundering, and Cuban law enforcement officials are in
regular contact with counterparts in Colombia and other countries (Cuba has bilateral counter-drug
cooperation agreements with 34 countries) to identify traffickers who may be traveling to Cuba.
From the point of view of the United States, Cuba is of interest because drug traffickers (principally
marijuana smugglers coming from Jamaica) sail by eastern Cuba on their way to the Bahamas, or fly
over Cuba heading north. (We were told repeatedly, by both Cuban and non-Cuban sources, that the
principal drug being smuggled through the region was marijuana, and therefore marijuana smuggling
was the major concern of the Cuban government.) Most of that marijuana is ultimately destined for
the United States, so the U.S. government has an interest in working with the Cubans to successfully
interdict traffickers.
Because the domestic market for illicit drugs in Cuba is relatively small, any increase in international
cooperation on drug interdiction has a real impact, and is of great interest to the Cuban government.
On the other side, the huge scale of the U.S. illicit drug market means that cooperation with Cuba,
however desirable and constructive, is unlikely to make a major difference in the flow of drugs into
the United States. (Indeed, as mentioned below, interdiction success in one place tends to shift
trafficking activities to different routes or modes, without durably reducing the overall flow of drugs.)
Nonetheless, if the intelligence and evidence gained from interdiction operations can be used to
apprehend the leadership of especially noxious trafficking and organized crime organizations, the
benefits can extend beyond the seizures of drug themselves.
As interdiction and other drug enforcement efforts succeed in disrupting current trafficking routes
(e.g., cocaine from the Colombian and Venezuelan coastlines through Mexico) some of the trafficking
is likely to be displaced to the Caribbean, and Cuba is likely to be among the countries whose
territorial waters and air space are used by drug traffickers. The U.S government has an interest in
working to prevent Cuban airspace and waters from being used by drug traffickers seeking new routes
into the United States.
Finally, Cuba is of interest to the United States because, like most Caribbean countries, it is a place
traffickers might seek to use as a logistical base, and a site for money laundering. The U.S.
government has an interest in working with Cuba on criminal investigation and intelligence sharing to
identify and arrest traffickers and money launderers who base themselves in or pass through Cuba but
ultimately seek to bring drugs into the United States.
Of course, none of this makes sense unless the Cubans are serious about cooperation. Our meetings
on this trip convinced us that they are. Cuba wants, for its own reasons, to prevent a significant
domestic drug market from developing. Cuba wants, for its own reasons, to prevent drug traffickers
and money launderers from corrupting Cuban government officials, and undermining the authority of
the state. Cuba considers itself threatened by international drug trafficking and does not want Cuban
territory used to further its ends, and, to the extent possible within its resources, Cuba wants to
contribute to international efforts against drug trafficking.
Our discussions with U.S. officials, foreign diplomats, and others reinforced this sense that Cuba is
intent about fighting drug trafficking and collaborating with other governments in doing so. Cuban
cooperation with Colombia, for example, with whom they are ideologically at odds, has been
productive. Cuba has found clandestine drug transshipments from Colombia, and shared intelligence
information with Colombian authorities. Cuba and Jamaica collaborate regularly. Cuba has received
training from, and worked closely with, a number of European countries.
Collaboration between Cuban authorities and the U.S. Coast Guard appears to be constructive, as well.
The collaboration is on a case-by-case basis, in which the Cuban Border Guard reaches out to the U.S.
Coast Guard, or vice versa, about specific smuggler activity; both sides report that the cooperation is
regular and serious.
Recommendations
It seems clear to us that both sides would like to see more cooperation on drug interdiction and related
law enforcement cooperation. Yet, at one time or another in our trip, both sides suggested to us that
they were waiting for the other party to take the initiative in making a new proposal, or moving
cooperation forward. Clearly the atmosphere of mistrust and the limited diplomatic contact between
the U.S. and Cuba in the last few years have made it difficult to move forward even on issues where
both parties appear to want progress.
Cuba is clearly interested in a formal bilateral drug cooperation agreement with the United States.
According to Cuban officials, Cuba proposed such an agreement in 2002, and has thus far received no
formal response from the United States. We were told that Cuba is preparing a new bilateral
cooperation proposal, to be presented to the United States shortly.
Our view is that the Unites States should take such a proposal seriously, and negotiate in good faith
over it. Even if no formal proposal is forthcoming, the U.S. should, in its own interest, pursue greater
cooperation on drug interdiction and law enforcement issues. Increased cooperation could disrupt
patterns of drug trafficking and contribute information that would make possible more effective
investigation of organized crime groups, while building confidence between U.S. and Cuban
authorities that could be useful in other areas.
There is no question that more systematic information sharing and communication between the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard would be in the interest of both countries. In addition, more
regular collaboration between Cuban authorities and other U.S. law enforcement agencies (in
particular, the FBI and the DEA) could help build more effective investigations against drug
traffickers, money launderers, and those who corrupt government officials.
As we seek to negotiate a serious bilateral agreement with Cuba, we ought to take concrete steps to
build collaboration. These could include:
1) More fully developed and formalized communication between the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Cuban Border Guard. A regular communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and
the Coast Guard Seventh District in Miami, and a channel that does not depend on case-bycase agreement between the U.S. Coast Guard liaison in Havana and Cuban authorities would
make collaboration more agile.
2) Other measures to improve Coast Guard-Border Guard collaboration. For instance,
establishing protocols for working together, and establishing the capacity for direct ship-to-
ship radio interoperability would make real-time joint operations during an "end-game" in
Cuban or international waters possible. This would be crucial for not only drug interdiction,
but for search-and-rescue operations as well. The fact that we don't do this together already is
regrettable.
3) An agreement to make information sharing regular and systematic, rather than case-by-case.
4) Systematic exchanges between the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Interest Section in
Havana and Cuban Justice Ministry and police authorities about specific suspected drug
traffickers, money launderers, or other law enforcement concerns.
5) Formalized and regular contact between FBI and DEA officials and Cuban government
officials at the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice about drug traffickers,
money launderers, or others who engage in organized crime that may impact both Cuba and
the United States. This might begin with contact between DEA regional offices in the
Caribbean and their Cuban counterparts.
Additional Areas of Potential Collaboration
WOLA staff went to Cuba at a moment of serious tension between the two countries. President
Obama had taken steps in the spring and summer of 2009 to relax U.S.-Cuban tensions, including
turning off the electronic billboard in front of the U.S. Interest Section in Havana, seeking the reopening of migration talks that had been suspended six years ago, and ending restrictions on travel and
remittances from Cuban-Americans to relatives in Cuba. But frustration built over the course of the
fall, with Cuba criticizing the U.S. for not taking larger and more substantive steps, and the U.S.
criticizing Cuba for not responding to its initial steps by releasing prisoners, or taking other measures.
In December, Cuba arrested a U.S. citizen working as a contractor for a USAID-funded program to
promote democracy in Cuba, charging that he was working clandestinely to promote anti-government
views in Cuba. Though he has not yet been formally charged, his detention raised U.S.-Cuban
tensions to a higher level.
We went expecting the atmosphere to be poisoned. We thought both U.S. and Cuban officials would
express skepticism about the possibilities of dialogue, and we worried that our counterparts in the
academic and organizational sectors would not want to take risks in building relationships with the
U.S.
We were pleasantly surprised. Cuban authorities emphasized repeatedly their interest in exploring
areas of mutual interest, including greater and more formalized cooperation on drug interdiction and
law enforcement, work on environmental and scientific issues, and possible academic exchange and
collaboration. While the Cubans were disappointed with what they saw as the slow pace of change by
the Obama Administration, they were clearly interested in building relations on issues like drugs, law
enforcement cooperation, marine science issues, and others. Most interestingly, we did a seminar on
U.S. policy toward Latin America in the Obama Administration; about two dozen Cuban scholars
from four different Cuban research centers attended. There was real interest in expanding academic
and research-oriented exchange. (We were invited back to a conference sponsored by a Cuban military
research institute, among other things!)
At the same time, it seemed clear to us that U.S. officials were interested in pursuing a quiet expansion
of cultural, scientific and academic exchange, as well as exploring cooperation with Cuba in several
other areas. On February 19th, U.S. and Cuban officials held their second round of migration talks in
Havana.. From what we understand from U.S. and Cuban officials, the talks continue to be a useful
exercise.
U.S. officials have indicated that since postal talks were held in September 2009, there has been
information sharing and working level cooperation on the issue, and that while new talks have not yet
been scheduled, they would happen. Other potential areas of cooperation mentioned were
environmental conservation and hurricane assistance.
The death of Cuban dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo in late February (a tragedy that WOLA
condemned in a public statement) has complicated the path to cooperation. A critical but measured
U.S. statement was followed by harsh condemnations from some in the Cuban exile community, and
by a tough and unhelpful response from the Cuban government. Harassment by Cuban government
supporters of the weekly demonstrations of the Ladies in White have fed into this difficult situation.
Nonetheless, there continue to be reasons to pursue cooperation on matters of mutual interest, and
there appear to continue to be openings to move forward on these issues.
In response to the January earthquake in Haiti, informal U.S.-Cuba cooperation, while limited in
scope, is worth noting. The emergency prompted an unprecedented degree of high-level
communication between U.S. and Cuban diplomats in Washington, and Cuban approval of a U.S.
request for fly-over rights in Cuban airspace to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies to Haiti. In
addition, quiet collaboration appears to have facilitated the delivery of supplies to hospitals where
doctors, including Cuban medical teams, were working to respond to the health care emergency after
the earthquake.
This exercise takes on particular importance in light of the massive environmental disaster currently
unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico due to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in late April
2010. Cuba’s oil exploration efforts have long been public; but with the recent announced that drilling
could begin as early as fall 2010, the implications for U.S.-Cuba relations take on much greater
significance A scenario in which Cuba is faced with a drilling-related disaster like the one the U.S. is
battling now, but with no means of coordinating with U.S officials, would simply be disastrous.
In our view, the political and diplomatic openings we have with Cuba at this moment are extremely
important. In many ways, making effective use of this opportunity by pursuing new initiatives vis-àvis Cuba is in fact, vital to U.S. interests. (We have been pleased to see movement on both sides to
facilitate humanitarian activity in Haiti, and hope that both sides can build on this collaboration.)