Request for New Course
EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
DIVISION OF ACADEMIC AFFAIRS
REQUEST FOR NEW COURSE
DEPARTMENT/SCHOOL: ____HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY___________COLLEGE:
CAS
CONTACT PERSON: ___W. JOHN KOOLAGE________________________________________________________________________
CONTACT PHONE:
734-487-1018
CONTACT EMAIL:
WKOOLAGE@EMICH.EDU
REQUESTED START DATE: TERM__FALL___________YEAR__2013_________
A. Rationale/Justification for the Course
The MA in Philosophy focuses on two streams, social justice and methodology. Philosophy of Science ranks among
the cutting edge explorations of philosophic methodology in its application to knowledge generation; contemporary
disputes play out in the political arena (e.g. the dispute between Intelligent Design and Evolution) as well as at the
foremost edge of science (e.g. is there a single, unified theory of “everything”?). This places Philosophy of Science as
especially relevant to both proposed streams of our MA program.
PHIL 480-W (with which this course will be cross listed) is already a successful undergraduate course in philosophy
here at EMU; an MA level course that is an extension of the existing class will focus on additional, high-level writing
that engages current journal articles (the main method of disseminating creative philosophic output).
B. Course Information
1. Subject Code and Course Number:
PHIL 580 (to be cross listed with 480-W)
2. Course Title: Philosophy of Science
3. Credit Hours:
3
4. Repeatable for Credit? Yes_______
No__x____
If “Yes”, how many total credits may be earned?_______
5. Catalog Description (Limit to approximately 50 words.):
A systematic examination of the main philosophical problems raised by the results and methods of the physical
and social sciences. Topics include the problem of meaning, measurement, the interpretation of probability statements,
the justification of induction, the concept of cause, the laws of nature, description and explanation, determinism and
indeterminism.
6. Method of Delivery (Check all that apply.)
a. Standard (lecture/lab)
On Campus
x
Off Campus
b. Fully Online
c. Hybrid/ Web Enhanced
7. Grading Mode:
Miller, New Course
Sept. 09
Normal (A-E)
x
Credit/No Credit
New Course Form
8. Prerequisites: Courses that MUST be completed before a student can take this course. (List by Subject Code, Number and Title.)
9. Concurrent Prerequisites:
Code, Number and Title.)
Courses listed in #5 that MAY also be taken at the same time as a student is taking this course. (List by Subject
10. Corequisites: Courses that MUST be taken at the same time as a student in taking this course.
(List by Subject Code, Number and
Title.)
11. Equivalent Courses. A student may not earn credit for both a course and its equivalent. A course will count as a repeat if an equivalent
course has already been taken. (List by Subject Code, Number and Title)
12. Course Restrictions:
a. Restriction by College. Is admission to a specific College Required?
College of Business
Yes
No
x
College of Education
Yes
No
x
b. Restriction by Major/Program. Will only students in certain majors/programs be allowed to take this course?
Yes
No
x
If “Yes”, list the majors/programs
c. Restriction by Class Level Check all those who will be allowed to take the course:
Undergraduate
Graduate
All undergraduates_______
All graduate students__x__
Freshperson
Certificate
Sophomore
Masters
Junior
Specialist
Senior
x
Doctoral
Second Bachelor___x_____
UG Degree Pending_____
Post-Bac. Tchr. Cert._____
Low GPA Admit_______
Note: If this is a 400-level course to be offered for graduate credit, attach Approval Form for 400-level Course for Graduate
Credit. Only “Approved for Graduate Credit” undergraduate courses may be included on graduate programs of study.
Note: Only 500-level graduate courses can be taken by undergraduate students. Undergraduate students may not register for
600-level courses
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d. Restriction by Permission. Will Departmental Permission be required?
Yes
No
(Note: Department permission requires the department to enter authorization for every student registering.)
13. Will the course be offered as part of the General Education Program?
Yes
No
x
x
If “Yes”, attach Request for Inclusion of a Course in the General Education Program: Education for Participation in the Global Community
form. Note: All new courses proposed for inclusion in this program will be reviewed by the General Education Advisory Committee. If this
course is NOT approved for inclusion in the General Education program, will it still be offered? Yes
No
C. Relationship to Existing Courses
Within the Department:
14. Will this course will be a requirement or restricted elective in any existing program(s)? Yes
No
x
If “Yes”, list the programs and attach a copy of the programs that clearly shows the place the new course will have in the curriculum.
Program
Required
Restricted Elective
Program
Required
Restricted Elective
15. Will this course replace an existing course? Yes
No
x
16. (Complete only if the answer to #15 is “Yes.”)
a. Subject Code, Number and Title of course to be replaced:
b. Will the course to be replaced be deleted?
Yes
No
17. (Complete only if the answer #16b is “Yes.”) If the replaced course is to be deleted, it is not necessary to submit a Request for
Graduate and Undergraduate Course Deletion.
a. When is the last time it will be offered?
Term
Year
b. Is the course to be deleted required by programs in other departments?
Contact the Course and Program Development Office if necessary.
Yes
No
c. If “Yes”, do the affected departments support this change?
Yes
No
If “Yes”, attach letters of support. If “No”, attach letters from the affected department explaining the lack of support, if available.
Outside the Department: The following information must be provided. Contact the Course and Program Development office for
assistance if necessary.
18. Are there similar courses offered in other University Departments?
If “Yes”, list courses by Subject Code, Number and Title
Yes
No
x
19. If similar courses exist, do the departments in which they are offered support the proposed course?
Yes
No
If “Yes”, attach letters of support from the affected departments. If “No”, attach letters from the affected department explaining the lack of
support, if available.
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D. Course Requirements
20. Attach a detailed Sample Course Syllabus including:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Course goals, objectives and/or student learning outcomes
Outline of the content to be covered
Student assignments including presentations, research papers, exams, etc.
Method of evaluation
Grading scale (if a graduate course, include graduate grading scale)
Special requirements
Bibliography, supplemental reading list
Other pertinent information.
NOTE: COURSES BEING PROPOSED FOR INCLUSION IN THE EDUCATION FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL
COMMUNITY PROGRAM MUST USE THE SYLLABUS TEMPLATE PROVIDED BY THE GENERAL EDUCATION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE. THE TEMPLATE IS ATTACHED TO THE REQUEST FOR INCLUSION OF A COURSE IN THE
GENERAL EDUCATION PROGRAM: EDUCATION FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY FORM.
E. Cost Analysis (Complete only if the course will require additional University resources.
Fill in Estimated Resources for the
sponsoring department(s). Attach separate estimates for other affected departments.)
Estimated Resources:
Year One
Year Two
Year Three
Faculty / Staff
$_________
$_________
$_________
SS&M
$_________
$_________
$_________
Equipment
$_________
$_________
$_________
Total
$_________
$_________
$_________
F. Action of the Department/School and College
1. Department/School
Vote of faculty: For ____6______
Against ____0______
Abstentions _____0_____
(Enter the number of votes cast in each category.)
Richard Nation
Department Head/School Director Signature
10 September 2012
Date
2. College/Graduate School
A. College
College Dean Signature
Date
B. Graduate School (if Graduate Course)
Graduate Dean Signature
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G. Approval
Associate Vice-President for Academic Programming Signature
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Date
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Philosophy of Science – PHIL 580
Professor Koolage
General Course Description
A systematic examination of the main philosophical problems raised by the results and methods of the physical
and social sciences. Topics include the problem of meaning, measurement, the interpretation of probability statements,
the justification of induction, the concept of cause, the laws of nature, description and explanation, determinism and
indeterminism.
This course is a writing intensive course in the philosophy program. Students will write 2 take-home essay
exams and a substantial philosophical paper. The essay exams are devoted to understanding and critiquing arguments
put forward by someone else. The substantial paper is a reasoned defense of a thesis. Students will choose an issue
with serious philosophic considerations form among the methods and concepts of the Life Sciences, formulate a thesis
and defend that thesis.
Course Specific Description
This semester, we will focus on three (related disputes) in contemporary philosophy of science. The main aim
of the class is to answer the question, “what is good science?” The meaning of the term ‘good’ here is expressly not
‘moral goodness’ – it is ‘epistemic goodness’ that is at issue. In order to answer this question, we will look closely at
the dispute between Historicism and Logicism for the purpose of understanding scientific “progress” (or lack thereof).
Throughout this exploration, we will focus closely on standard ideas about the nature of science, including (but not
limited to) the history and sociology of science, the idea of science as falsification, and several prominent concerns
regarding whether there is scientific progress. In the second section of the class, we will focus on how scientific
reasoning works, including (but not limited to) its limits, the nature of statistical inference, Bayesian Epistemology, and
model selection theories. Finally, we will look at a very traditional dispute, known as the Demarcation Question. Here
philosophers struggle with providing an account of what makes something a science; in fact, they are most centrally
interested in what is exactly not a science. Here we will consider at least two “pseudo sciences” in some detail,
parapsychology and astrology. Our readings will include many “heavy hitters” in contemporary philosophy of science,
including Bas van Fraassen, Elliott Sober, Thomas Kuhn, Gilbert Harman, Karl Popper, W.V.O. Quine, Philip Kitcher,
Deborah Mayo, Helen Longino, and many others.
Contact Information
Email: wkoolage@emich.edu
- This is the best way to reach me
Office Number: 702 M Pray-Harrold - A nice place to visit
Office Phone: (734) 487-1018
- I share a phone, so coming to see me in person is better…
Office Hours:
- I am around a lot more than this; appointments are welcome
Email Policy
Who doesn’t love email? Email is a terrific tool, but it can be a difficult way to do substantial philosophy and
to really learn. Please feel free to email me questions, concerns, etc. I do, however, request that you allow up to 24
hours for a reply, especially if the question or concern is substantial. Also, I may request that you set up an
appointment or come see me during office hours, since this is a much better forum for teaching and learning.
Required Textbooks and Materials
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Book: The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen, Oxford University Press Book: Philosophy of Science and the Occult, Patrick Grim, SUNY Press Optional Book: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn Online: e-­‐reserve – Mayo, Sober, Harman, Frankfurt, Forster, Priest, Popper, Eells Critical Material: One stapler Miller, New Course
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Assignments, Exams, and Whatnot
The class will be graded on the standard EMU grading scale. I do not grade on a curve, though I do sometimes adjust
grades (never down) on the basis of calibration issues. The assessment tools for the class are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Long Paper – worth 30% + 10% (abstract and proposal) Presentations – 20% ((1) group, reading presentation, (2) paper presentation) Midterm Exam – worth 20% Participation – 20% (includes QCCs) Graduate Level Assessment
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Final Paper – worth 30% + 5% (abstract and proposal) Presentations – 20% ((1) group, reading presentation, (2) paper presentation) Midterm Exam – 10% Participation – 20% (includes QCCs) Long paper – 15% All of these will be described in greater detail as their due dates approach. Since the class is student centered, there is a
need for flexibility in the timing and content of these assessment tools. Do not fret; you will be given plenty of lead
time on due dates and plenty of time to complete the paper.
Grading Scale
92-100 A; 89-91 A-; 87-88 B+; 83-86 B; 80-82 B-; 77-79 C+; 73-76 C; 70-72 C-; 67-70 D+; 60-66 D; 59-0 F
It should be noted that for students taking the 580 (graduate) branch of the class, D (including D+) is a failing grade
and it will be converted to an F.
Course Goals
By the end of the course, students in Philosophy of Science should:
1. Be able to understand and critically evaluate several arguments central to philosophy of science, including, but not limited to, the Quine-­‐Duhem problem, the underdetermination argument, the problem of priors, and the raven’s paradox. 2. Have an appreciation of the problems surrounding the application and use of the term science, as well as the difficulties in identifying something as a science. 3. Acquire a conversational knowledge of some ideas central to philosophy of science, including empiricism, probability, and causation. 4. Have a conversational knowledge of several traditional (logicistic) accounts of the epistemology of science, including falsification, abduction, inference to the best explanation, empirical adequacy, and constructivism. As well, students should have a grasp of several less traditional accounts, including contrastive empiricism, AIM, and (possibly) teleo-­‐
explanation. 5. Have a grasp on several “sciences” that display the difficulties in judging something to be non-­‐science, including parapsychology and astrology. 6. For Graduate Level Credit: Graduate students should display mastery of philosophic writing skills, producing a final paper that meets publication level demands, addresses a narrow, defensible, yet interesting thesis. The paper should address a contemporary dispute and reference key articles in the literature. Classroom Etiquette
Of course, it would be nice if everyone hung on my every word. However, since that is not likely to be the
case, I would like to pretend it is a possibility. As a result, please don’t do anything in class that would lead me to
believe it is impossible that you could be interested in what I have spent time preparing for you. That is, don’t answer
your cell phone, don’t read a newspaper, don’t be snoring, etc.
University policy prohibits firearms, explosives, alcoholic beverages, controlled substances, and behavior intended to threaten or intimidate others; consequently, you should avoid such practices that may lead to a violation Miller, New Course
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of this policy. Do not engage in any behavior that could be construed as offensive or threatening to a reasonable human being. As in all matters, we are all expected to uphold codes of conduct as determined by EMU. See www.emich.edu/student conduct/ for regarding the student code of conduct. Written Work
All outlines, drafts, and manuscripts must be typed in a standard 11 or 12 point font, double spaced, with
standard margins on all sides, and stapled; only homework assignments may be hand written. Always hand in two copies of all assignments (except homework). Type your name, section number, assignment description, and date in the upper right corner. For example: William Van Orman Quine
Lecture 3 Introduction to Philosophy September 15, 1945
Late assignments will not be accepted. Assignment due dates will be given in class at least two weeks prior; therefore, there is no need for an assignment to be late. Please print, finish, and staple your work with a mind to the fact that problems can arise in printing, saving, or even completing your work.
QCCs
Part of your participation grade will be determined by a short written feedback device, known as the QCC.
QCC stands for Question, Comment, or Criticism. You will be expected to turn in a QCC at the end of every class.
While this is helpful in evaluating participation for more reserved students and bolstering the participation grades of
those who are more outspoken, the main purpose of the QCC is to help guide lectures by identifying topics of interest
and of difficulty. To complete a QCC, a student must turn in a sheet (or piece of paper sizable enough to not be easily
lost in a stack) that has at least two, two sentence questions, comments, or criticisms (in any combination); of course, if
you write longer QCCs, you will get more credit toward your participation grade.
Accommodations It is my goal that this class be an accessible and welcoming experience for all students, including those with
disabilities that may impact their learning in this class. If anyone believes they may have trouble participating or
effectively demonstrating learning in this course, please meet with me (with or without a Disability Resource Center
(DRC) accommodation letter) to discuss reasonable options or adjustments. During our discussion, I may suggest the
possibility/necessity of your contacting the DRC (240 Student Center; 734-487-2470 ; swd_office@emich.edu ) to talk
about academic accommodations. You are welcome to talk to me at any point in the semester about such issues, but it
is always best if we can talk at least one week prior to the need for any modifications. No retroactive accommodations are possible. Problem Solving
I’m certain that during the course of this semester you will have questions and problems – both ones that have to do with the class material and ones that have to do with the everyday mechanics of the class. You should feel free to get a hold of me to help you answer these questions, and if we put our heads together most problems can be resolved. I am available for you during office hours, by appointment, and by email (which I check almost every day).
Take advantage of this fact!
Plagiarism & Other Critical Academic Policies It is important for you to note that plagiarism is a very serious offense that will not be tolerated – the penalty for plagiarism can include expulsion from the university. Expect no sympathy if you commit plagiarism. You are expected to know what plagiarism is and take all required steps to avoid it. If you need a refresher on this sort of Miller, New Course
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thing, please consult this excellent webpage, where you will find pretty much everything you need regarding plagiarism: http://www.emich.edu/library/help/integratingsources.php. Academic policies can be found in the University Catalogues available through the Office of the Registrar and online at: http://catalog.emich.edu/. Be sure to review the University’s policy on academic dishonesty if you have not already. Academic dishonesty may result in an ‘E’ in the course and referral to Student Judicial Services. The policy can be found at the Office of Student Conduct and Community Standards web site at: http://www.emich.edu/sjs/. In addition to plagiarism as defined by University guidelines, work used or created for other classes will not be counted towards your grade. In Class Discussion My teaching style is discussion based; thus, the class will be made up of some short lectures by me and a lot of discussion by you. You should come to class ready to exercise your considerable philosophical muscle and be prepared to listen to your classmates. Philosophy is generally done by dialectic method, which we will pursue vigorously; the truth can be gleaned from cooperative but difficult discussion, belief revision, and theory generation. Keep this in mind. Student and Exchange Visitor Statement The Student exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) requires F and J students to report the following to the Office of International Students 244 EMU Student Center within ten (10) days of the event: -­‐
Changes in your name, local address, major filed of study, or source of funding; changes in your degree-­‐completion date; changes in your degree-­‐level; intent to transfer to another school Prior permission from OIS is needed for the following: -­‐
Dropping ALL courses as well as carrying or dropping BELOW minimum credit hours; employment on or off campus; registering for more than one ONLINE course per term (F visa only); endorsing I-­‐20 or DS-­‐2019 for re-­‐entry into the USA Failure to report may result in the termination of your SEVIS record and even arrest and deportation. If you have questions or concerns, contact the Office of International Students, not the course instructor. FERPA The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act is a federal law designated to protect the privacy of a student’s education records and academic work. All files, records, and academic work completed within this course are considered educational records and are protected under FERPA. Exceptions will only be given when there is explicit, written, and signed consent. Verbal consent or email is insufficient. Syllabus Subject to Change
With the exception of the grade, attendance, and academic policies, parts of this syllabus are subject to change
with advance notice, as deemed appropriate by the instructor.
Topics and Readings Outline This is an overview of what I think we should cover in this class. It is unlikely that we will cover it all. Philosophy of science is a broad and deep area of study. Thus, we should not be too upset about how far we get; as the old adage goes, it is the journey and not the destination that matters. As for reading, I suggest you read the required stuff right before we start in on that topic. Of course, you will probably have to read this stuff more than once (even the best of us must do that), so read it again after we’ve talked about the material in lecture and/or discussion. This way you’ll be prepared to ask questions that will help you learn.
1. Realism and Anti-­‐Realism – Van Fraassen, ch. 1, 2, and 4 2. Scientific Epistemology – Popper, Frankfurt, Harman, Hempel, Mayo, Sober (x3), Forster, Kuhn 3. Causation -­‐ Eells (this topic is covered only if there is enough time) Miller, New Course
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4. Demarcation – Popper, Sober, Grimm ch. 1, 2, and 3 A Final Word
My classes are based almost entirely on lecture and your thinking on your own. Lectures are not a fixed thing –
they are fluid. As a result, class attendance is essential (participation is also quite valuable) to success in the course.
While the basic structure laid out in this syllabus will always remain, many other things can change as a result of my
spiral teaching strategy.
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Philosophy of Science – Bibliography
Realism, Anti-Realism, and other Epistemologies
Alcoff, L. & E. Potter (eds.), 1993, Feminist Epistemologies, London: Routledge.
Aronson, J. L., R. Harré, & E. C. Way, 1994, Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible, London:
Duckworth.
Barnes, B., B. Bloor & J. Henry, 1996, Scientific Knowledge, London: Athlone.
Barnes, E. C., 2002, ‘The Miraculous Choice Argument for Realism’, Philosophical Studies, 111: 97–120.
Bird, A., 2000, Thomas Kuhn, Chesham: Acumen.
Blackburn, S., 2002, ‘Realism: Deconstructing the Debate’, Ratio, 15: 111–133.
Boyd, R. N., 1983, ‘On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism’, Erkenntnis, 19: 45–90.
–––, 1989, ‘What Realism Implies and What it Does Not’, Dialectica, 43: 5–29.
–––, 1990, ‘Realism, Approximate Truth and Philosophical Method’, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories,
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
–––, 1999, ‘Kinds as the ‘Workmanship of Men’: Realism, Constructivism, and Natural Kinds’, in J. Nida-Rümelin
(ed.), Rationalität, Realismus, Revision: Proceedings of the Third International Congress, Gesellschaft für Analytische
Philosophie, Berlin: de Gruyter.
Brown, J. R., 1982, ‘The Miracle of Science’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 232–244.
Busch, J., 2008, ‘No New Miracles, Same Old Tricks’, Theoria, 74: 102–114.
Carnap, R., 1950, ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’, Revue Intérnationale de Philosophie, 4: 20–40. Reprinted in
Carnap, R. 1956: Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Cartwright, N., 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon.
Churchland, P., 1985, ‘The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues, in Churchland
& Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, (with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen),
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Clarke, S., 2001, ‘Defensible Territory for Entity Realism’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52: 701–722.
Cruse, P. & D. Papineau, 2002, ‘Scientific Realism Without Reference’, in M. Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism,
London: Ashgate.
Day, M. & G. Botterill, 2008, ‘Contrast, Inference and Scientific Realism’, Synthese, 160: 249–267.
Day, T. & H. Kincaid, 1994, ‘Putting Inference to the Best Explanation in its Place’, Synthese, 98: 271–295.
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Devitt, M., 1991, Realism and Truth, Oxford: Blackwell.
–––, 2005, ‘Scientific Realism’, in F. Jackson & M. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Doppelt, G., 2007, ‘Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction’, Philosophy of Science,
74: 96-118.
Duhem, P. M. M., 1954 (1906), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, P. P. Wiener (tr.), Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
van Dyck, M., 2007, ‘Constructive Empiricism and the Argument from Underdetermination’, in B. Monton (ed.),
Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply From Bas C. Van Fraassen, Oxford University
Press; 2007.
Earman, J., 1993, ‘Underdetermination, Realism, and Reason’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18: 19–38.
Ellis, B., 1988, ‘Internal Realism’, Synthese, 76: 409–434.
Elsamahi, M., 1994, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1: 173–180.
–––, 2005, ‘A Critique of Localised Realism’, Philosophy of Science, 72: 1350–1360.
Fine, A., 1986, ‘Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and Antirealist Attachments to Science’, Mind, 95: 149–177.
–––, 1990, ‘Piecemeal Realism’, Philosophical Studies, 61: 79–96.
–––, 1993, ‘Fictionalism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18: 1–18.
Franklin, A., 1986, The Neglect of Experiment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1990, Experiment, Right or Wrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
French, S., 1998, ‘On the Withering Away of Physical Objects’, in E. Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical
and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, pp. 93–113. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
–––, 2006, ‘Structure as a Weapon of the Realist’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106: 1–19.
French, S. & H. Kamminga (eds.), 1993, Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Friedman, M., 1999, Reconsidering Logical Positivism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frost-Arnold, G., 2010, ‘The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation’,
Philosophy of Science, 77: 35–58.
Giere, R. N., 1988, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giere, R. N. & A. W. Richardson, 1997, Origins of Logical Empiricism (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Volume 16), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
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Godfrey-Smith, P., 2008, ‘Recurrent Transient Underdetermination and the Glass Half Full, Philosophical Studies, 137:
141–148.
Hacking, I., 1982, ‘Experimentation and Scientific Realism’, Philosophical Topics, 13: 71–87.
–––, 1983, Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1985, ‘Do We See Through a Microscope?’, in Churchland & Hooker (eds.), Images of Science: Essays on
Realism and Empiricism, (with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Harding, S., 1986, The Science Question in Feminism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hardin, C. L. & A. Rosenberg, 1982, ‘In Defence of Convergent Realism’, Philosophy of Science, 49: 604–615.
Harker, D., 2008, ‘On the Predilections for Predictions’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59: 429–453.
–––, 2010, ‘Two Arguments for Scientific Realism Unified’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 41: 192–
202.
Harman, G., 1965, ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’,Philosophical Review, 74: 88–95.
Haraway, D., 1988, ‘Situated Knowledges’, Feminist Studies, 14: 575–600.
Hitchcock, C. & E. Sober, 2004, ‘Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting’, British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 55: 1–34.
Horwich, P. (ed.), 1993, World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hoyningen-Huene, P. , 1993, Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: The Philosophy of Science of Thomas S. Kuhn,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Howson, C., 2000, Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Humphreys, P., 2004, Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
James, W., 1979 (1907), Pragmatism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jones, R., 1991, ‘Realism About What?’, Philosophy of Science, 58: 185–202.
Keller, E. F., 1985, Reflections on Gender and Science, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Kitcher, P., 1993, The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Knorr-Cetina, K., 1981, The Manufacture of Knowledge, Oxford: Pergamon.
Kripke, S. A., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Kuhn, T.S., 1970 (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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–––, 1983, ‘Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability’, Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science
Association, 1982: 669–688.
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