UCL
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
International
Public Policy
Review
Volume 9,
Number 2
2015
UCL
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
International
Public Policy
Review
Volume 9,
Number 2
2015
K.R.
IPPR 2015
EDITOR’S NOTE
Dear Readers,
You are currently holding the 2014 – 2015 Edition of the International
Public Policy Review, a journal whose aim is to provide academics and scholars with the latest thoughts and advances from upand-coming students of public policy.
I am delighted to have helped construct this year’s Journal,
which showcases the best work that UCL Students have produced. Each paper has been selected and reviewed by their peers,
and highlights some of the major issues of public policy today.
Given the result of the General Election, and an unexpected
majority government, issues of public policy can expect to
come to the fore across a wide variety of areas. As politicians seem
unwilling to commit to substantial research on various aspects
of public policy, there is a mounting need for public policy academics
and students to step up. We hope that the Journal is able to
make a contribution (however modest) to the ongoing public policy
debate.
I would like to thank all the members of the editorial board, without
which this journal would not be possible. I am grateful for
your time, dedication, and support throughout the process of getting
this to print.
My thanks must also go to the members of the department who
offered advice and help throughout the process. Finally, I would
like to thank Apsara Flury, our designer who helped produce the smart
incarnation of the Journal you now hold in your hands.
We know, as ever, there is more that can be done, but we
believe our work this year has laid the foundations for future success
and encouraged the department to invest more resources and
time in the journal to further professionalize it.
We believe that in the coming years the journal can fulfill its
mission and help advance the field of public policy more generally.
Chris Rogers,
Editor In Chief
IPPR
UCL School of Public Policy
5
IPPR 2015
COLOPHON
6
EDITOR IN CHIEF
MANAGING
EDITOR
ONLINE
EDITOR
Chris Rogers
Aliana Greenberg, Sofie van Heijningen
Cherie Koh
DESIGN
Apsara Flury
PRINTING
1st Byte, London
PRESIDENT
Klisman Murati
EDITORIAL
BOARD
CONTACT
N.M.
FOREWORD
Alessandra Bocchi
Kithmina Virochana Hewage
Sahana Kumar
Livio Liechti
School of Public Policy
The Rubin Building
29/31 Tavistock Square
London WC1H 9QU
+44 (0)20 7679 4999
Email: spp@ucl.ac.uk
It is my pleasure, as acting head of the Department of Political Science
and School of Public Policy, to write the forward for this edition
of the International Public Policy Review. The Department began as
Britain’s only department focused on graduate teaching and
research. It has enjoyed a period of rapid growth in recent years and
very much in keeping with UCL’s founding tradition in political
economy retains an explicit focus on public policy, which, as we conceive it brings together the study of all fields of politics, including
international relations, political theory, human rights as well as public
policy-making and administration. And it has brought together
our students with this publication.
Students from across the Masters Programmes offered at SPP
specialize in a range of fields, including the Europe Union, Security,
the Environment, Global Governance and Ethics, Legal and
Political Theory, Human Rights, Democracy and the problems of divided societies, Domestic and International Public policy. Our
students go on to accept jobs in fields as diverse as development
agencies, government advisors and positions within NGO.
The task for research in public policy is to keep pace with the
speed of political change both on a domestic and global level.
Whether in or out of the EU, the world presents opportunities,
constraints, and the enduring challenge of finding ways to cooperate
in addressing our common problems. Our hope is that the department
can equip students with the substantive knowledge and research
methods necessary to join the policy community of tomorrow.
This edition gives a taste of the work that is going on here and
the problems our students are addressing, from how issues
rise on the global agenda to international organisations and regulations
and getting state actors to comply. Antimicrobial resistance, dementia,
terrorism, transparency and foreign direct investment are some
of the issues occupying our students.
I hope that this journal will provide you with some insights into
the work of UCL students but also contribute to your understanding
of some of the wider public policy issues of the day. Finally, let
me offer my thanks to the students. We keep them busy enough with
formal programme requirements. This journal is a testimony to
their energy and motivation.
Neil Mitchell,
IPPR
UCL School of Public Policy
7
IPPR 2015
INDEX
A
10
18
26
Policy Evaluation
ZAZA RINALDI
PAOLA VANEGAS
RODRIGUEZ
How Effective are Training Programmes on Income Generation?
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Colombia
ELAINE SHEN
AND
MIKE SLIWINSKI
A Clear Advantage: The Benefits of Transparency to Foreign Direct
Investment
B
38
Prize Winning
PHILIPP
SCHROEDER
C
64
74
84
92
100
E
119
Making Conditionality Work? Actor Socialisation through Network
Governance in the European Neighbourhood
Analysis
THEO AIOLFI
Is Poststructuralism Just Another Version of Constructivism?
Reconsidering the Way Constructivism Is Taught in IR Theory
SOFIE VAN
HEIJNINGEN
Managing Microbes: Global Public Policy Problems in Combatting
Antimicrobial Resistance
KITHMINA
VIROCHANA
HEWAGE
The Future of Dispute Settlement under International Law in Light of
the US Supreme Court Ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
KATELIN RAW
Why Do States Give International Development Assistance?
RACHEL
POYNOR
What Accounts for the Rise of Dementia on the International Policy
Agenda?
D
108
Food Insecurity: Have “Transnational Advocacy Networks”
Under the Banner of Food Sovereignty Effectively Influenced Policies
to Eradicate Food Insecurity?
Interview
ALESSANDRA
BOCCHI
Interview with Ben Stewart, Greenpeace Activist and Author of the
New Book: Don’t Trust, Don’t Fear, Don’t Beg
Bibliography
Part A
Policy Evaluation
A
10
IPPR 2015
POLICY EVALUATION
Food Insecurity:
Have “Transnational
Advocacy Networks”
Under the Banner of
Food Sovereignty
Effectively Influenced
Policies to Eradicate
Food Insecurity?
ZAZA RINALDI
FOOD INSECURITY:
HAVE “TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS” UNDER THE BANNER OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY EFFECTIVELY
INFLUENCED POLICIES TO ERADICATE FOOD INSECURITY?
Food insecurity pertains to the inability of people to access or
purchase food, this problem is primarily caused by multinational
corporate control of today’s food system (McMichael, 2005,
p. 271; Sen , 1997, p. 23). Understanding corporate control as
playing a causal role in food insecurity, this essay focuses on
non-state actors that seek to influence international policy and limit
corporate domination of the food system. The last 20 years has
seen the emergence of a food sovereignty transnational network on
the global stage that radically seeks to redefine policies around
food (Borras, 2008, p. 260). Drawing upon Margaret Keck and
Kathryn Sikkink’s “transnational advocacy network” framework (1998),
I examine the food sovereignty network through the five stages
of influence offered in Keck and Sikkink’s analytical model (1998, p.
25). These stages are, the ability to set agendas in the international
stage; influence discursive positions; affect institutional procedures; and influence policy (1998). I argue that the food sovereignty
transnational advocacy network has only been effective horizontally in its ability to unify and assert a common language that
champions the principles of food sovereignty across regions.
This network has laid necessary foundations that pre-requisite effective policy change by bringing international attention to the
concept of food sovereignty. What this network lacks however, is the
ability penetrate policy making at the top. By that I mean directly
engage with and influence neoliberal and multilateral corporates that
dominate and define the food system.
Origins of food insecurity:
structural inequalities transcending state borders
We live in a world of food insecurity and widespread chronic hunger.
The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
(FAO) (2014) estimates between 2012 – 14 at least 805 million people
were chronically undernourished. This estimate shoots up and is
more alarming when hunger related to energy deficits “hidden hunger”
(von Grebmer, et al., 2014) is included. Up to 2 billion people
worldwide lack basic vitamins and minerals (FAO, 2013) and are unable to reach adequate development, both physical and cognitive
(Rosamond, 2014, p. 3). Food insecurity does not result from
the world’s inability to produce enough food (Sen, 1997, pp. 20 – 24),
nor primarily the damaging effects climate change has on agriculture (Akram-Lodhi, 2013). Despite climate change affecting food
production, the world today produces more than enough food
to sustain the entire population (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 21).
Food insecurity is a problem without a passport because it is
born out structural imbalances and global relations of inequality in the
world’s food system. Unequal relations that result in a system
that produces enough food, yet the developing world accounts for 98
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percent of the world’s hungry (FAO, 2010) whilst at the same
time producing 70 percent of the world’s food (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 78).
Described as what Philip McMichael (2005, pp. 271 – 273)
calls a “corporate food regime,” the neo-liberal and capitalist nature of
today’s food system leaves farmers “vulnerable to dispossession as a
precondition of the construction of world agriculture” (2005,
p. 271). This food regime progressed in three stages. First, colonialism, which diverted agricultural land into export production and
diminished the self-sustainability in the global South, creating dependence on food imports (McMichael, 2005; Gonzalez, 2011).
Second, was the Green Revolution 1960 – 90, which modernized
agriculture and industrialised high yielding seeds introducing
varieties of maize, rice and wheat (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 79). Though
credited as development, these new seeds not only created dependence on fertilizers and pesticides manufactured by corporations in
the global North, but also displaced small farmers who lacked
resources for high irrigation and synthetic agro-chemicals crucial for
high yield of these seeds (Gonzalez, 2011). The final stage,
were structural adjustment programs in the 1980’s and 90’s, under
the auspices of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Through reductions
of tariff barriers, trade liberalization and free trade agreements
that disproportionately favoured the United States and Europe, the
global South’s food system was left unprotected from foreign
dominance (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 25). Foreign dominance
that today has left world’s smallholder farmers marginalised in
the global market, dependant on imports yet defenceless and disadvantaged by transnational corporate input and output prices of
world agriculture (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 80).
Non-state actors in the global arena: Food
Sovereignty and “Transnational Advocacy Networks”
Introduced in 1996 at the World Food Summit in Rome by the
global peasant movement, La Via Campesina (Akram-Lodhi, 2013,
p. 1), “food sovereignty” is a socio-economic opposition to the
neoliberal corporate food regime. At the heart of this idea pushed by
a transnational network of 200 million farmers, landless, indigenous and agricultural workers across the world, is the demand for
social control of food systems and the right for people to determine their agricultural policies as a precondition for a world without
hunger (Patel, 2009, p. 671; 682). The first step of policymaking
is agenda setting, and collectively food sovereignty advocates have
successfully reframed the agenda on food insecurity (Borras,
2008, p. 270). No longer is food insecurity purely a question of development and food aid from donor countries, but instead the issue of
peasant and smallholder farmer marginalisation is brought to
public debate by this advocacy network. The change in agenda is
FOOD INSECURITY:
HAVE “TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS” UNDER THE BANNER OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY EFFECTIVELY
INFLUENCED POLICIES TO ERADICATE FOOD INSECURITY?
evident when comparing dialogues on food insecurity between
the 2008 Food Crisis that saw record levels of hunger and
present day as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approach
their deadline. In 2008 the World Bank recommended increase
in food aid as the crucial remedy to food insecurity (Holt-Gimenez &
Patel, 2009, pp. 6 – 7), while in 2014 the UN themed “International Year of Family Farming” recognises family and small-scale
farming instead as a determinant for eradicating global hunger
(UN News, 2013). The food crisis made evident that record hunger
occurred hand in hand with record grain harvests (Holt-Gimenez &
Patel, 2009, p. 7), therefore strengthening food sovereignty
advocates opposition to corporatism. The food sovereignty network
has effectively changed what Keck and Sikkink call the “value
context” of political debate (1998, p. 25). Advocates like Via Campesina and the World Farmers Organisation (WFO) for example,
gave speeches reaffirming their principles on a global platform at the
“International Year of Family Farming” closing ceremony. This
highlights the power transnational advocacy networks have in radically shifting the ontology of policy problems. In this case, these
networks have reframed food insecurity to a global discussion about
food sovereignty as opposed to production and donor aid.
The next measure of the effectiveness of transnational
advocacy networks is their ability to produce “discursive change” (Keck
& Sikkink, 1998, p. 25). Discursive change refers to the ability
to commit policy actors, which are states and international organisations, to principles introduced by transnational advocacy networks or that actors refer to these principles when characterizing their
own behaviour or that of others (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 25;
192). Regarding food sovereignty, discursive change in food insecurity would mean actors become critical of corporate agribusiness controlled food systems and view small farmer driven agro-ecological food control in a favourable light. Both the UN year of
family farming and first official discussion at the FAO’s headquarters
in September 2014 on agro-ecology, which involved speakers
from Via Campesina (2014), demonstrate that multilateral organisations now hold small-scale farming as a norm to consider in
order to eradicate hunger. Further UN Special Rapporteur on the
right to food Olivier de Schutter, explicitly draws from lessons
of food sovereignty in his speech at a conference held at Yale University (de Schutter, 2013). Schutter commended efforts of food
sovereignty advocates and highlighted that agribusiness had damaging effects on ecology and impoverished small-scale farmers
(de Schutter, 2013). What further accounts for the discursive change
is the legal framework drawn upon by food sovereignty advocates (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 100). Adopting a universal
language of the right to be free from hunger in Article 25 of the
UN Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948), this network re-empha-
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FOOD INSECURITY:
HAVE “TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS” UNDER THE BANNER OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY EFFECTIVELY
INFLUENCED POLICIES TO ERADICATE FOOD INSECURITY?
sises “the right to feed oneself and his family” into their normative
argument (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009, p. 100). The assertion that
no state or individual should deprive anyone from being
able to feed themselves (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009) can be characterized as “accountability politics” that pressure policy actors
to alter their position in line with ideals pushed forward by transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, p. 24).
Looking at the third and fourth stages of Keck and Sikkink’s
model together, procedural change and policy change, gives
a better picture of the important progression transnational networks
need to fulfil to be effective. Procedural changes without policy
changes are simply talks about rights or talks with action. Food sovereignty advocates have effectively mobilized themselves across
regions onto the international stage and engaged in dialogue
with important global actors. The official collaboration between Via
Campesina and the FAO gives the food sovereignty network
a greater platform for increased contact with key players in the global
arena (FAO, 2013). Consequently this breaks the monopoly of
conservative groups, reaffirming the voice of food sovereignty, and
illustrating what Borras (2008, p. 271) describes as having “politicized the process of interaction.” There however remains a considerable gap between procedural change and influence in policy change
of target actors. For example, although the International Planning Committee for Food sovereignty (IPC) and Via Campesina
became members of the reformed UN Committee of Food Security
(CFS) (Campesina, 2013, pp. 4 – 5), the body responsible for
the monitoring the MDGs achievement in food security, private sector
actors and the WTO remained members of the CFS (2013, p. 5). This
was despite the transnational network’s denunciation of the
WTO as having no legitimacy to preside over the issue of food insecurity (2013, p. 5). The “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests” published by
the CFS indicate the lack of real policy change and intransigence
of the powers that have monopoly over the food system (2013, p. 10).
On the topic of land grabbing, large scale-acquisition for commercial farming was not banned therefore leaving peasants and small
farmers at the mercy of the multinational corporations. The lack
of binding instruments and regulatory power in the voluntary guidelines (2013, pp. 10 – 11) show that transnational networks so far
have failed to counter the hand of multinational domination in agriculture.
This leads to the final stage of influencing state behaviour,
were the food sovereignty network has also been marginal in success.
There has been fragmented success across the world with
some countries adopting food sovereignty into their national policies.
Venezuela, Nepal and Ecuador are amongst countries that are
including peasants in dialogue of how best to implement food sovereignty (Patel, 2009, p. 768) and recently in the Dominican Republic
more than 60 members of parliament called for drafting a law on
food sovereignty (FAO, 2013). Another example is Bolivia,
whose president Eva Morales has adopted food sovereignty and is
very explicit in his views that multinational corporations must
be “eliminated” from the policy arena of food security (Morales, 2014).
These countries however only present a small fraction in the
world and a small fraction of countries that are host to members of
the food sovereignty network. Importantly attitudes of states
in the developed world characterise the resistance of beneficiaries
of an unjust system to lessen their grip on the food system. A
crucial example here is the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and
Nutrition which claimed the initiative would boost agriculture
and reduce poverty in Africa (Provost, et al., 2014). Contrary to what
it claims, the G8 initiative only worsens food insecurity through
the intensification of agribusiness and subsequent marginalisation of
small farmers (2014). More problematic for the food sovereignty
network is the reality that these G8 initiatives are also supported by
states in the Global south, even though their populations are
disproportionately food insecure. The governments of Ethiopia, Ghana
and Malawi for example have welcomed these initiatives putting
aside vast areas of land for commercial farming (2014), therefore exacerbating corporate control and undermining the efforts of
food sovereignty advocates in negating the policies around food
insecurity.
Conclusion: Policy making, advocacy networks,
and reflections on Global Civil Society
Essentially, food sovereignty transnational advocacy networks
have not effectively changed policies geared towards solving food
insecurity. They go as far as changing the nature of the debate,
reframing the value context in which actors operate, and to an extent
securing dialogue with key actors in the international arena.
They do however fall short of achieving policies that limit corporatism and have not altered the behaviour of states as demonstrated by the G8 initiative. The food sovereignty transnational advocacy
network however, does not reach a dead end in the international
arena nor should scholars turn their attention away from these
non-state transnational actors. Their failure at present day does not
render this network as having no capacity to effect policy in the
future. To understand this further it is worth looking at transnational
advocacy networks in a broader framework of global civil society.
The existence of global civil society is not without its contestations in
political science with some scholars who go as far as arguing
that it does not exist (Barterlson, 2006, pp. 271 – 273). I assert however that a network of 200 million peasants that cuts across geographies and cultures under the banner of food sovereignty constitutes to a global civil society. This network fits both Lipshutz
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and Keane’s identification of global civil society as social and political
spaces that are neither bound by the nation state or state boundaries
(Barterlson, 2006, p. 375).
These political spaces shaped by non-state actors are porous,
and are created and re-created as non-state actors shape and
read just themselves in response to the globalising processes (Coleman & Sarah, 2006, p. 246). This bears implications for the
transnational network discussed in this essay, that there is no concrete definition of food sovereignty. The lack of concrete definition, further exacerbated by Via Campesina’s insistence that food
sovereignty should be defined relative to each country (Patel,
2009, pp. 665 – 667), opens the door for critics who see the lack of
definition as a poor starting point for policy implementation. This
ambiguity of food sovereignty however works in favour of a global
civil society (Patel, 2009, p. 665). The fluidity in the idea of
food sovereignty (Patel, 2009, p. 665) means that global civil society
maintains the potential to evolve and restructure its position in
the international arena. Via Campesina’s radical calls to removing the
WTO and private actors from food policies (Campesina, 2013,
p. 5) are unrealistic, as these multinational actors will not just simply
disappear. However, the malleability of food sovereignty within
the global civil society context creates the potential to engage and
compromise with multinational corporations on the issue of
food insecurity in the future.
Global civil society signals that the game of governance
has changed. Away from the state centric view of policymaking, we
see the multiplicity of actors in the international arena who influence the process of globalization from below (Coleman & Sarah,
2006, p. 246). Keohane and Nye observe that today’s politics
are more fragmented and no longer dominated in a top down or hierarchical structure (Coleman & Sarah, 2006, p. 246). The presence of untraditional actors like Via Campesina and the IPC suggest
that international regimes, like the corporate food regime, are
decomposable and penetrable through bottom up activity (2006, p. 246).
Food sovereignty claims to be, and within reason, a process of
democratisation from below (Patel, 2009, p. 669; 667). Transnational
advocacy networks should not be deemed as having no real authority in the global arena. It is important to understand that global
civil society is still evolving and perhaps we should mark the
Food Crisis in 2008 as the starting point of substantial influence of
food sovereignty non-state actors, making it a relatively new
in the global arena and having the potential to evolve and become
increasingly effective with time.
Policy makers in the domain of food insecurity ought to pay
more attention to food sovereignty. The answer to eradication
food insecurity is not in increased aid and multinational large-scale
farming. Food sovereignty advocates powerfully dispel any
FOOD INSECURITY:
HAVE “TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS” UNDER THE BANNER OF FOOD SOVEREIGNTY EFFECTIVELY
INFLUENCED POLICIES TO ERADICATE FOOD INSECURITY?
illusions that agribusiness will benefit the world’s hungry and increase
their access to food. They demonstrate the power of constructivist approaches in shaping the policy, through ideas and normative
principles. Poor agricultural labourers and small farmers at the
heart of food sovereignty cannot go it alone and will need to open up
more dialogue with the state and corporations (Patel, 2009, p. 691).
A top down process where states, especially in the developing
world, start to move towards and support initiatives of small-scale farming is inextricable to solving food insecurity. Food sovereignty activists
will increasingly become a serious social and political force to
contend with in the future of food politics. Perhaps with an extensive
media campaign to raise awareness on the inequalities of the food
system in the average minds of people in the developed world,
food sovereignty advocates can even further politicize their cause. There
remains an even greater potential to mobilizing mass support using
the power and symbolic language of human rights. Incorporating the
right to be free from hunger (Assembly, 1948) is a good foundation for a future legal and regulatory framework that can bind states
and corporations to comply with measures that decrease food
insecurity.
Plaza Mayor León
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How Effective are
Training Programmes
on Income Generation?
Evidence from a
Randomized Experiment
in Colombia
PAOLA VANEGAS
RODRIGUEZ
Nowadays, youth unemployment is an important problem around the
world. In 2005, Attanasio, Kugler & Meghir analyses the impact
of “Youth in Action” program implemented in Colombia to increase the
employability of disadvantaged young people. Using a randomized
experiment, they found positive results of the programme for
women in terms of earnings and employment. The results for men are
not significant. This paper will present an improvement through the
analysis of the results by the type of training that young people
received. The new findings suggest a new field to explore because
the results may be affected by the requirements of the labour
market and the economic activity of the training in addition of gender.
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON INCOME GENERATION?
EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT IN COLOMBIA
Colombia faced a deep economic crisis at the end of nineties with
severe negative social implications, especially, on poor people.
In response, the Colombian government designed and executed
“Youth in Action” programme to increase the employability of
disadvantaged young people.
The paper “Subsidizing vocational training for disadvantaged
youth in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Trial” (Attanasio,
et al., 2011) analyses the impact of this training program in
Colombia in 2005 using a randomized sample. The main findings of
the study suggest that the training programme had positive impacts
on earnings and employment principally for women. This essay
will replicate the main results of the study and will focus on the programme effects for men and women in terms of labour market
variables.
Even though, economic growth and macroeconomic stability are
the key to reactivating the economy and consequently employment,
literature suggests that there is a discrepancy between demand and
supply for youth unemployment. The employer’s requirements differ
from young people’s skills (ILO, 2013). This essay will analyse heterogeneous effects based on the type of training received.
The essay has three main sections. The first section will present the replication exercise of the original article which focuses
on the treatment effects of the programme by gender. The second section will propose an improvement of the study by explaining the
impact of the programme by the type of training. Finally, the third section
will present the conclusions of the analysis.
Original Study: Randomized Trial in Colombia
The Colombian government designed the “Youth in Action” programme
to help vulnerable people to overcome the consequences
of the late nineties recession. The main objective of the programme
was to provide six months training to poor young people and
give a conditional cash transfer in order to facilitate their employability
and access to the labour market.
To evaluate the programme, there was a randomized experiment
in 2005. Training institutions selected 50% more of the applicants than their capacity before the start of the programme. The randomized process selected the people who ultimately received
the training (treatment group) leaving the rest as a control group. To
analyse the impact of the programme in different labour market
variables, the study proposed the following model:
Yij = α Ri + τj + ρ Xi + θij
in which, Yij are variables related to labour market conditions
for the person i in the group j as detailed in Table 1. Ri indicates whether
the person was on the treatment or control group. τj represents
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the site-by-course fixed effects. The study encloses city, training
institution and course in the same groups. Xi shows control variables
such as pre-treatment characteristics and θij is the error.
In order to solve the above equation, the paper ran two models.
The first one (Panel A) does not include control variables (Xi)
and the second one (Panel B) includes control variables as pretreatment characteristics. Both models were run independently for
men and women.
The first model applied seven linear regression to evaluate the
impact on being in the programme for each labour market variables explained in Table 1. The model absorbs city, training institutions
and course. The second model uses a linear regression to explain the impact of the programme in five continuos variables (days
worked, hours per week worked, tenure, wage and salary earnings
and self-employment earnings) and run a logit model to explain
the impact on the two binary variables (employment and paid employment). Figure 1 presents the results of the programme on women and
Figure 2 the results for men.
Table 4A. Panel B – Course Fixed Effects and pretreatment characteristics
Select
Observations
(1)
Employment
mfx dydx
(2)
(3)
Paid Employment
mfx dydx
Days / Month
0.043
(0.027)
1,367
0.068**
(0.029)
1,474
1.172*
0.614
1,767
To sum up, the programme had a positive impact on women in
labour market variables such as employment, worked time, and
earnings.
Figure 2 Treatment Effects of Training on Male Employment and Earnings
Table 4B. Panel A – Course Fixed Effects
(1)
Variables
Select
Observations
Employment
(2)
(3)
Paid Employment Days / Month
-0.025
(0.022)
1,468
0.024
(0.027)
1,468
-0.56
(0.62)
1,468
(4)
(5)
Hours /Week
Tenure
-2.37
(1.48)
1,468
-3.18***
(0.91)
1,464
(6)
(7)
Wage and Salary Self-employment
earnings
earnings
15.466
(12,819)
1,468
-11,610*
(5,959)
1,468
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1
Table 4B. Panel B – Course Fixed Effects and pretreatment charcteristics
Variables
Select
Observations
(1)
Employment
mfx dydx
(2)
(3)
Paid Employment
mfx dydx
Days / Month
-0.002
(0.003)
791
0.006
(0.013)
1,037
-0.545
(0.618)
1,464
(4)
(5)
Hours /Week
Tenure
-2.27
(1.471)
1,464
-2.772***
(0.900)
1,460
(6)
(7)
Wage and Salary Self-employment
earnings
earnings
13,691
(12,819)
1,464
-6,731
(5,389)
1,464
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1
Figure 1 Treatment Effects of Training on Female Employment and Earnings
Variables
P.V.R.
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON INCOME GENERATION?
EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT IN COLOMBIA
(4)
(5)
Hours /Week
Tenure
2.856**
(1.398)
1,767
-1.43**
(0.619)
1,756
(6)
(7)
Wage and Salary Self-employment
earnings
earnings
34,668***
(9,743)
1,767
1,950
(3,569)
1,767
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1
Panel A from Figure 1, shows that the probability of having
employment increased for the people who participated in the
programme, 6.1 percentage on employment and 7.1 percentage on
paid employment. Likewise, the number of days and hours worked
increased for the treatment group. The outcomes in terms of
earnings show that the wage and salary of women was 39,369
Colombian pesos higher after the training. The mean of earnings of
women in the control group was 177,160 Colombian pesos,
which means that by being part of the programme income increased
on 22%.
On the other hand, Panel B includes control variables such as
pre-treatment characteristics. The results are similar to the previous
model. The effects on employment are not significant but paid
employment increased by 6.8 percentage points. Days per month and
hours worked per week increased by 1.1 and 2.8 respectively.
The outcome on earnings shows that the income of treatment women
was higher by 19.5% in contrast to control young women. Selfemployment was not significant in the model.
In contrast, the results for men are not as positive as in women.
Figure 2 presents the results of the two models. Panel A shows a
negative relationship with self-employment earnings, which is
significant at 10% level. It seems that being part of the programme
reduced the self-employment earnings by 10.8% for young men.
Panel B does not show any significant relation, except tenure.
Consequently, there is no evidence of potential positive effects of
the programme on labour market conditions of male young persons.
Are the Results Different if the Analysis Includes the
Topic of the Training?
Skills mismatch, defined as the imbalance between the labour supply
and demand, seems to be an issue that affects youth unemployment. The education system needs to focus on the labour market requirements in order to minimize the gap between youth and total
unemployment. For that reason, vocational training has been increasing across countries (Duell & Vogler-Ludwig, 2011) in order to solve
the barriers that youth people faced.
The “Youth in Action” programme could be a good opportunity to
solve these problems. The replication exercise pretends to analyse
the impacts between the different types of courses in the randomized
experiment. The hypothesis is that there are heterogeneous effects depending on the type of training that disadvantaged people
received.
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POLICY EVALUATION
P.V.R.
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON INCOME GENERATION?
EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT IN COLOMBIA
Data
Model
The data available on the original article presents the code of
each course training during the programme. However, for the purpose
of determining the skills mismatch level, it was necessary to know
the name of the course in order to classify them. Looking at the information system of the programme it was possible to create the groups
based on the name and objectives of the training courses.
To classify the courses, the present study uses the International
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)
created by the United Nations. Figure 3 presents the main categories of the ISIC to analyse the performance of an economy.
The present analysis took into account only the first division of the
classification.
The purpose of the research is to determine if the impact of the
programme differs depending on the type of the course. The equation
that the improvement exercise will use is:
Figure 3 International Standard Industrial Classification – ISIC
CATEGORIES
1. Accommodation and Food Service Activities
2. Administrative and Support Service Activities
3. Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing
4. Arts, Entertainment and Recreation
5. Construction
6. Education
7. Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply
8. Human Health and Social Work
9. Information and Communication
10. Manufacturing
11. Other Service Activities
12. Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities
13. Transportation and Storage
14. Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities
15. Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and
Motorcycles
23
Yij = α Ri + δj + ρ Xi + εij
As in the original model, Yij represents a group of the variables related
with labour market (Table 1) for the person i in the group j, Ri
indicates the treatment or control group, δj represents the fixed effects
only with the city and the training institutions. The improvement
exercise does not include the course in the fixed effect. Xi shows pretreatment characteristics. Finally, εij is the error term.
The proposal model estimated 15 regressions (one for each
category) and replicated the exercise for each labour market variable.
Overall, the proposal ran 105 regressions. To explain the main
results of the extension exercise, the analysis presents only for three
categories that were significant for the analysis. Figure 5 exposes the
outcome for construction, manufacturing, and human health
and social work.
Figure 5 Treatment Effects of Training on Employment and Earnings by Economic Activites (1)
1. Construction
There were 206 different courses in the sample. The fifteen
dummy variables to identify each category were established
using ISIC Rev 4. These variables were included in the original article
data to develop the new model.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the categories on the sample.
It is important to notice that some categories do not include a
significant number of observations and hence we must be cautious
with some results.
Select
Observations
-4.898**
(1.915)
104
-9.277*
(4.871)
104
-13.307***
(4.403)
104
37,190
(46,437)
104
-47,019**
(19,473)
104
Select
Observations
0.150**
(0.065)
206
0.071
(0.069)
206
4.841***
(1.616)
206
12.182***
(3.815)
206
-0.162
(1.082)
206
85,743***
(29,067)
206
18,397*
(9,595)
206
0.117**
(0.048)
439
2.719**
(1.132
439
5.663**
(2.632)
439
-0.810
(1.499)
439
49,283***
(18,966)
439
-10,404
(9,266)
439
3. Manufacturing
Select
0.084**
(0.042)
439
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** P<0.05, *P<0.1
Administrative and Support Service Activities
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles
Manufacturing
Transportation and Storage
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities
Human Health and Social Work
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation
Accomodation and Food Service Activities
Information and Communication
Construction
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditionning Supply
Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing
Other Service Activities
Education
Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remedation Activities
0
0.010
(0.089)
104
2. Human Health and Social Work
Observations
Figure 4 Distribution of the sample into the main categories
-0.132**
(0.065)
104
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Construction has a significant and negative relation with
employment. Training on construction decreased the probability of
being employed by 13.2%. At the same time, the time worked
(days and hours) decreased for the young people who were trained
in construction sector.
The tenure decreased and it showed a negative significant
relation. Likewise, the tenure on administrative and support services
diminished. However, it is expected this negative relation with
tenure isdue to the time invested on training. Wage and salary
earnings do not have a significant relation in the model. Nevertheless,
self-employment earnings decreased by $47.019 Colombian pesos
when people work in the construction sector.
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POLICY EVALUATION
Construction sector does not have a positive relation with the
labour market variables. It is important to show that 80% of the
participants of the programme who study construction activities were
men. It is likely, that this outcome affects the effects of training
on male presented in the original article.
On the other hand, human health and social work has a positive
relation with the labour variables. Firstly, people who were trained in
this career had a 15% chanceof being employment. Likewise, the
hours worked per week and the days worked per month were
higher for people who studied this area of knowledge.
The outcomes on earnings are also significant and showed that
the wage and salary were higher by 85,743 Colombian pesos.
The mean for the control group trained on human health and social work
was $161,737. Consequently, the programme increased the
salary earnings by 34%. 73% of the young people who studied this
field were women. This result may bias the original article conclusions
because the results should be biased by the training activity instead by the gender.
In third place, manufacturing has a positive relationship with
the employment. People who work on manufacturing process
have 8.4% higher more probability of being employed and 11.7% of
have paid employment. Days worked per week and hours per
week were higher on 2.7 days and 5.6 hours. Finally, the wage and
salary earnings for these young people increased in 49,283
that represent an increase of 21.6%.
Conclusions
The present essay proposes an extension of the article “Subsidizing
vocational training for disadvantaged youth in Colombia: Evidence
from a Randomized Trial” in order to discuss the type of training
received by young people. Some scholars suggest that there is a
mismatch skill and in many cases, people are not prepared for the
labour market needs. Consequently, the essay proposes an
alternative model analysing the impacts of the programme by economic activities instead of gender using the International Standard Industrial Classification. The results can be summarised as follows:
Construction
There is a negative and significant relation with labour market
variables for people who were trained in this field. The likelihood of
having a job was less, the time worked decreased and selfemployment earnings diminished. In addition, 80% of the people who
studied this field were men.
Human Health and Social Work
There is a positive and significant relation with variables such as
employment, hours worked, days worked, wage and salary earnings and
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON INCOME GENERATION?
EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT IN COLOMBIA
self-employment earnings for people who studied this topic.
73% of the people that were trained in this field were young women.
Manufacturing
There is a positive and significant relation with labour variables such
as employment, paid employment, time worked and wage and
salary earnings. Both men and women studied this field (40.5% and
59.5% respectively).
These new results suggest a possible bias on the conclusions
of the original study because the type of the course may affect
the impact of the programme. It is likely that the programme has a
positive effect on women and men and the difference remains
in the requirements of the labour market.
P.V.R.
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POLICY EVALUATION
A Clear Advantage:
The Benefits of
Transparency to Foreign
Direct Investment
ELAINE SHEN
AND
MIKE SLIWINSKI
Does transparency attract foreign direct investment (FDI)?
Our study takes a new approach, focusing on the dissemination of
economic data as a key facet of transparency. We argue that
the more transparent a government is in terms of the release and dissemination of economic data, the greater FDI that country will
receive. Using the Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (HRV) Index,
which tracks data dissemination to the World Bank over 30 years in
125 countries, we demonstrate through quantitative analysis
that there is a positive correlation between transparency and FDI.
Our findings remain robust after controlling for a wide range
of country-specific economic factors. We conclude that greater transparency does, in fact, correlate with greater FDI.
A CLEAR ADVANTAGE:
THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a critical goal in the growth
and sustainability of a healthy economy. Nations in pursuit of
development can fuel their growth in part by encouraging a steady
flow of outside capital; this can prove particularly important for
nations in which domestic savings and investment capital are scarce.
The availability of capital, the structural ability to direct such capital,
and economic risk factors are common forces which affect the
amount of FDI received by a country. FDI represents a fixed investment, so foreign investors incur special risks when making this kind
of commitment. These investments are typically illiquid and
generate payoffs only with a long-term time horizon. In this setting,
transparency regarding the state of the economy takes on greater
importance.
One particular challenge to the exploration of the relationship
between transparency and FDI is measuring transparency precisely.
Broadly understood, economic transparency refers to the
public availability of accurate aggregate economic data. Even this
broad understanding is bound by a number of conditions that
require clarification and nuance, particularly regarding the access to
and quality of such data. Our study utilizes the HRV Index of
transparency, developed by Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland
(Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 2013), because it takes a multifaceted approach to understanding transparency. By evaluating the
provision of macroeconomic data and controlling for the fixed
differences in data provision, the measure treats both inclusion and
omission of such data as indicative of the overall transparency
of the country. This index is therefore both inclusive of a wide range
of data and tailored in its relevancy to the countries it aims to quantify.1
We contend that as a nation’s transparency increases,
the amount of FDI received will also increase. Governments that
accurately collect and effectively disseminate aggregate economic
data are more likely to see greater inflows of FDI.
Our study differs from the previous literature in both quantitative and substantive ways. By incorporating countries of diverse geography, economy, and political identity, and examining these
countries over three decades, our study takes a more comprehensive approach to evaluating the relationship between transparency and FDI. The utilization of the HRV Index serves as
a more objective measure for the purpose of accurately capturing
transparency in practice. Our analysis takes a broader scope
than previous studies, which are limited by data provision, and tests
the relationship between transparency and FDI for 125 nations
between the years 1980 – 2010. Our findings confirm our hypothesis: we find a positive relationship between transparency and FDI
that is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
1 See Section 4 for a detailed explanation of the HRV Index.
E.S. & M.S.
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POLICY EVALUATION
Ultimately, this study aims to show that increasing transparency does
in fact cause greater amounts of FDI.
Our study proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we explore the
existing literature on transparency and FDI, noting its strengths
and shortcomings. Next, in Section 3, we elaborate on the theoretical underpinning of our study to explain why the value of FDI
increases with greater transparency. Section 4 and Section 5 respectively describe our independent and dependent variables and
our methodological approach to analyzing the data. Our results are
presented in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7 by discussing the implications of our findings, as well as areas for potential
future research.
Existing Measures of Transparency
The research in the field of transparency and its effect on economic
factors often evaluates transparency alongside corruption and
democracy – factors which impede the isolation of the effect of aggregate data dissemination specifically. Furthermore, the studies
analyze a limited set of countries and years, which narrows the scope
of their analysis and its broader significance. Our investigation
addresses conceptual discrepancies and dataset limitations in these
studies in order to make the relationship observed between
transparency and FDI clear. Despite these differences, we draw from
existing studies to form our baseline specifications.
Transparency is often measured in relation to business
practices or government corruption. This association, though theoretically defensible, conflates the identity of transparency with other
institutional and political factors. The inclusion of these factors makes
the measurement of this broader definition of transparency more
difficult. This in turn makes the link between transparency and FDI less
clear. Zhao, Kim, and Du (2003), for example, study the relationship between corruption and FDI. Though their analysis operates on
similar causal grounds as our own assertions, their study’s
primary focus is not on transparency as understood as the provision
of aggregate economic data, but rather on a broader characterization
of a nation as “corrupt” in business practices. They evaluate
corruption by ranking countries based on the competitiveness of businesses domestically and abroad. This study is hindered in its
reliability by the highly subjective nature of its independent variable.
Jensen’s work on regime type and FDI inflows (2003) evaluates
whether or not democracy has a significant effect on economic
variables, including FDI. His findings indicate that regime type,
measured using the Polity III Project dataset, influences the amount
of FDI received by a country, finding specifically that more democratic governments tend to attract more foreign investment.
Jensen’s multi-angled approach to testing the relationship includes
controls for regime type, trade level, and market size as possi-
A CLEAR ADVANTAGE:
THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
E.S. & M.S.
ble influential factors. His study, like that of Zhao, Kim, and Du (2003),
does not objectively define transparency, but rather considers it
indirectly through democratic governance. Our study accounts for the
close relationship between democracy and transparency by controlling for the former.
The existing measures of transparency are flawed by their
subjectivity. While these variables purport to provide a quantifiable
insight into transparency, they fail to do so without introducing
bias. One such variable is the Freedom House ranking of press freedom (Freedom House 2013), which is an annually-published
measure of how free a nation’s press is. This measure is generated by
a group of experts from Freedom House and is based on their
qualitative, subjective analysis of “country narratives”. These narratives include political regime, media, and other social factors.
The measure is flawed since its only quantitative facet is a trichotomous label of “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free”. Additionally,
it does not examine the availability of aggregate economic data.
The Heritage Foundation creates an Index of Economic Freedom, which is a wide-ranging unit that aims to capture everything from individual economic freedoms to property rights and government corruption (Heritage Foundation 2014). Again, this is
compiled by experts at the Heritage Foundation in a largely subjective process. As a result, the scope of the index confounds
the variable of transparency with the other variables it examines. Even
indices that focus directly on the quantitative effect of public
sector corruption in business, such as the Transparency International
Corruption Index (Transparency International 2013), are based
on subjective expert opinion. The Index measures the perceived level
of public sector corruption on a scale from 0 (most corrupt) to
100 (least corrupt), accounting for bribery, scandals, and overall reputation of businesses. In short, measures such as the Freedom
House rankings, the Heritage Foundation Index, and the Transparency International Index may properly examine the quality of economic data provided, but do not fully consider the dissemination of
that data or its objective provision by individual governments.
In contrast, other studies utilize more objective quantitative measures such as newspaper circulation (Adserá, Boix, and Payne
2005). This measure aims to capture not the substantive quality of
information provided, but rather its dissemination. While this
does consider the reach of data, which is not addressed by Freedom
House, the Heritage Foundation, and Transparency International, it
lacks qualitative substance. Newspapers, for example, could
be provided en masse by the government, but may contain inaccurate information. There exists, then, a dilemma between finding
a transparency measure which is both objective and accurately captures the data provision of an entire country.
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Our study utilizes the HRV Index in order to reconcile the disparity between the quality and dissemination of aggregate economic data. The HRV Index, as stated before, looks at the credibility
and provision of data from countries to the World Bank’s WDI
database, and therefore is both objective and pertinent to our study.
Furthermore, while the studies performed by other scholars in
the field (Drabek and Payne 2002; Seyoum and Manyak 2009;
Gelos and Wei 2002) may be similar to our own in vision and theory,
they tend to be limited to a narrow timespan of approximately
three years and about 20 – 50 countries. By limiting the scope of investigation, these studies may miss patterns that are only evident
over longer periods of time, an important consideration when managing investment. A study with so few countries either runs the
risk of focusing too narrowly on a certain subset (i.e. developing nations, as in Seyoum and Manyak 2009) and thereby missing the
experience of different subsets, or not thoroughly investigating each
subset to make credible claims (i.e. only looking at a small number of
countries in Africa, as in Drabek and Payne 2002). Our dataset,
which contains 125 countries over 30 years, addresses the selection
bias found in these studies in order to offer a more comprehensive analysis. This, in turn, informs our theoretical underpinning of the
relationship between transparency and FDI.
Why Transparency Matters for FDI
Investors have a long-run stake in an economy when they undertake
FDI. At lower levels of transparency, where the provision of aggregate economic data by governments is low, we expect to see less
interest by foreign companies to entrust these nations’ economies with their investments. By contrast, countries that provide more
credible information about their economies can attract more
foreign investment. The logic for the relationship we propose is threefold. Greater transparency is advantageous because it 1) reduces detrimental fixed costs associated with opaque regimes, 2) decreases a company’s risk by facilitating the accurate prediction
of returns, and 3) better facilitates a company’s ability to manage the
investment through knowledge of macroeconomic policy.
First, increased transparency is linked with lower costs for companies with foreign investment endeavors (Zhao, Kim and Du
2003). It is not the nature of the data itself that is as influential in the
explanation of this factor, but rather whether aggregate economic data is provided at all: countries which provide less data tend
to do so because of inefficient or ineffective bureaucracies. This
increases the transactions costs of doing business in that country by
adding potential hidden costs such as slow licensing procedures,
unpredictable or unclear changes in regulations on investments, and
even bribes in order to accomplish regular business functions.
It is in the best interest, therefore, of companies seeking to direct their
A CLEAR ADVANTAGE:
THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
E.S. & M.S.
investment capital to do so in transparent regimes, and thereby avoid
the associated structural costs of opaque economic data provision.
Since FDI comes from companies that seek to establish
direct business investments in a country, it is more than merely buying
stock in a foreign company. FDI is the wholesale establishment
of business in a country—be it the building of factories, the opening
of offices or vendors, or the joint ownership of domestic companies. As such, these companies seek, as with any investment, a
degree of certainty in the security of their investment, particularly as FDI has a longer return horizon. If a country provides aggregate economic data, which includes the performance of the
market as a whole, a company can more accurately predict the value
of risk costs for that investment, which translates in turn to their
ability to anticipate returns. While there would still be the normal risk
associated with any business investment, transparency reduces
the additional risk of an unclear economic profile in a country.
Lastly, transparency provides the added benefit of characterizing an economy’s performance over time. This includes the
actions of central banks, fiscal actors, and other macroeconomic forces and their summative effects on companies in that country.
Monetary policy actions, which cause changes in real interest rates,
have a very direct effect on investor decisions, and companies
seeking to invest in foreign countries would benefit from knowledge
of such macroeconomic policy. Additionally, information about
how a certain country reacts to economic fluctuations and crises can
provide illustrative insights into how investments in that country
are affected. The provision of aggregate data would therefore help
companies more accurately predict the stability of their investments
in light of the business cycle.
On short, we contend that transparency has a substantial effect
on increasing FDI because it makes investment less costly,
more predictable, and more secure. These costs are progressively
lower as transparency increases, and it is this fundamental
causal mechanism which leads us to expect greater FDI with increasing transparency. In the next section, we describe how our
measure of transparency demonstrates the benefit that aggregate data
provision has on FDI.
Descriptive Data
We test the relationship between transparency and FDI using the HRV
Index for our independent variable and the net inflows of FDI
in millions of 2005 constant United States dollars (USD) for our dependent variable. These variables are defined in detail herein, as
well as analyzed for their accuracy and precision in measuring our
desired phenomenon.
31
Dependent Variable
For our dependent variable, we focus our examination on the
net inflow of FDI into a country. FDI is the value of direct investments
in production or businesses in a foreign country, and we measure FDI
in net inflows of millions of constant USD (World Bank 2013).
We choose this measure as our dependent variable because among
economic variables, we believe it to be the easiest to isolate
from other influential factors; other possible variables such as foreign
aid are affected by a wide array of economic, political, and social influences (Lawrimore and Varghese 2014, Sielaff and Skillman
2014, Gadea and Gopalkrishnan 2014).
The descriptive statistics of our dataset, at first glance, support
the hypothesis that FDI and transparency are indeed related.
Tables 1a and 1b provide the statistics of our independent and dependent variables. We find that for countries with an HRV Index value
of less than or equal to 0, the mean values of FDI are lower than those
greater than 0. Values less than or equal to 0 have an average
FDI of about $4.9 billion, while those greater than zero have an average
of almost $7.4 billion of FDI. It seems that there is a positive relationship between the level of transparency and the amount of FDI
a country receives. This is shown in Figure 2, which presents a graph
of the relationship between transparency and foreign direct investment (natural log of net inflows, BOP). However, the understanding gained from looking at only the descriptive statistics and
graph leaves out numerous other important considerations, and
ultimately may provide an erroneous analysis of the data. Due to the
problem of multicollinearity, multiple factors may be driving the
relationship between the level of transparency and FDI. It may also
be the case that a limited set of countries is responsible for the
relationship observed. In our Methodology section (Section 5) we describe a more sophisticated analysis, utilizing controls for the
possible mitigating factors and country-specific conditions, which
allows us to assert with greater confidence that there is a statistically significant relationship between transparency and FDI.
5
10
15
Figure 2 This graph demonstrates the relationship between transparency and FDI (net inflows).
0
Independent Variable
We use the HRV Index as our measure of transparency because it
objectively measures the dissemination of credible aggregate
economic information. The HRV Index is a continuous variable scaled
from -10 to 10, with -10 being least transparent and 10 being
most transparent. In this index, a country’s transparency is treated as
a term that predicts the provision or omission of data using a
Bayesian item response theory model. The creators of this Index select
240 economic indicators which aim to capture the transparency
of the countries evaluated. These indicators come from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), a wider set of
1,265 variables which detail a wide range of data across a variety of
topics. The HRV Index pares down the dataset by dropping variables that are not measured in the time frame of the study, which are
1980 – 2010.
Furthermore, HRV drop data that is irrelevant to certain countries (such as development assistance incomes for non-aidreceiving nations); data that is produced by outside agencies and not
directly provided by individual governments; data that is a subset of a larger indicator (such as male labor force participation rate vs.
total labor force participation rate); and data that reports the
same variable in different units (such as measuring GDP in current
USD, current local currency units, constant USD, etc.). The
number of countries evaluated by HRV is limited to 125 because all
microstates and all countries that did not exist, or which were
unified from separate countries, between 1980 – 2010 are dropped.
This leaves, in total, a dataset of 3,875 observations for the 125
countries over 31 years.
E.S. & M.S.
A CLEAR ADVANTAGE:
THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
-5
32
IPPR 2015
POLICY EVALUATION
-10
A
-10
-5
transparencyindex
0
Inforeigndirect
Fitted values
5
Methodology
Our study uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the relationship between transparency and FDI. We control for a
set of relevant factors discussed below. Additionally, all of our
models control for country fixed effects and year fixed effects in order
to address any unobserved heterogeneity across countries or
over time.
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POLICY EVALUATION
A CLEAR ADVANTAGE:
THE BENEFITS OF TRANSPARENCY TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The control variables are drawn from relevant literature.
Some studies argue that the amount of FDI that a country receives is
impacted by the size of its economy (Drabek and Payne 2001;
Zurawicki 2003; Seyoum and Manyak 2009; Jensen 2003). We thus
control for the natural log of GDP. We also control for the natural log
of GDP per capita and GDP growth rate (Lim 1983). Jensen
(2003) further suggests controlling for export growth rate and trade2,
and argues that it is important to control for natural resource
dependency when looking at FDI inflows to account for the correlation between FDI and natural resource wealth (2008). We control for these variables accordingly in our models.
Controls for democracy and natural resource dependency,
measured by total natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP, are
used to account for the possibility that the political regime of a
country influences its prospective investments. Some studies (Jensen
2003; 2005; 2008) discuss the relationship between democracy
and lower levels of risk, suggesting that this increases the amount of
FDI that a country receives. Russett and Oneal (2001: Chapter 6)
argue that democracies are more likely to trade with other democracies. By controlling for level of democracy, we also control for
political corruption, which is often associated with certain political
regime types (Lederman, Loayza, and Soares 2005). We use
Polity IV’s Polity2 data as our measure of democracy, where democracy is measured on a 0 – 20 scale with 0 representing a low democracy level and 20 representing a high democracy level (Polity IV
2014). In Model 2, level of democracy is statistically significant, but it
does not remain statistically significant as further controls are
introduced.
Finally, we control for other economic factors that might affect
investment in a country. These controls include real interest rate
(in percentage), exchange rate (in average LCU per USD for a given
period of time), and inflation in consumer prices, in annual percent. We base these controls on studies done by Drabek and Payne
(2001) and Zhao, Kim, and Du (2003) that look at the relationship between transparency and FDI. Additionally, Seyoum and
Manyak (2009) use CPI to control for the impact inflation would have
on FDI.3 All three economic variables do not remain statistically
significant or impact the relationship between transparency and FDI.
We recognize the potential endogeneity in the relationship
between FDI and transparency in that there may be other omitted variables or reverse causality. It is possible that there are other
factors driving the relationship, or that FDI causes an increase in transparency. However, we address this by controlling for a wide
range of factors that may influence the relationship. Our findings are
robust, as the relationship remains statistically significant after
applying a number of controls. Furthermore, after controlling for
country fixed effects and year fixed effects, our results remain significant at the 99 percent confidence level, leading us to conclude
that there is a relationship between FDI and transparency and that
our results are not driven by the unique conditions of particular
countries or any other influential factors. In future studies, we plan to
use other methods such as an instrumental variable approach
and the differences in differences method to address endogeneity.
This is discussed further in the Conclusion section (Section 7).
2 Kim, Zhao, and Du (2003) use the export growth rate to quantify trade relations, measuring how a country’s external trade could
affect its foreign direct investment inflows. Jensen uses a trade variable of exports plus imports divided by GDP to measure overall
trade interactions with foreign countries, with respect to the size of the country’s economy. We utilize both measures and find that
after controlling for other factors, neither trade variable is statistically significant.
3 Consumer price index (CPI) is utilized as the measure of inflation in our study because the GDP deflator only accounts for domestically produced goods and excludes price changes in imports
E.S. & M.S.
Results
Transparency and the natural log of FDI are the primary independent
and dependent variables.4 Model 1 presents an OLS regression
of transparency and the natural log of FDI. Controls for variables that
are expected to affect net inflows of FDI are then added in.
These controls include GDP (taken as a natural log), GDP growth
(annual % growth), a trade variable that measures imports and
exports as a percentage of total GDP (Jensen 2003), and democracy
(measured with Polity2).
Model 3 utilizes the same controls as Model 2, but adds
additional controls for GDP per capita (taken as a natural log), exports
(annual % growth), real interest rate, exchange rate, inflation
(CPI, annual %), and natural resource dependency (resource rents
as a % of GDP). Finally, in Model 4 the statistically insignificant
controls are dropped, leaving the controls of GDP, GDP growth, GDP
per capita, exchange rate, and natural resource dependency.
Our results demonstrate that there is a statistically significant
correlation between transparency and FDI. Even after controlling for the wide variety of factors, our results remain statistically
significant at the 99% confidence level.5
Conclusion
The relationship between our variables empirically demonstrates
that as a nation’s transparency increases, the amount of FDI it
receives also increases. The provision of aggregate economic data is
therefore clearly linked to inflows of investment from abroad.
The causal logic states that due to the lower cost of business in transparent regimes, the increased ability to predict returns, and the added
stability of investments through traceable economic policy, foreign
investments are more favorable in transparent countries. Our data
confirms this relationship, which remains robust when controlling for
mitigating economic factors that could otherwise influence FDI.
4 In our appendix, we include Table 4, a comprehensive table of the bivariate regression between the independent variable (transparency, HRV index) and depending variable (natural log FDI, net inflows), including all the controls that were used.
5 The Regression table for the data is available upon request.
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Our finding has pragmatic implications for both economic and
political actions in nations evaluating future policy. Given the interplay
between transparency and FDI, nations seeking to improve the
attractiveness of their economies to foreign investors can improve their
provision of accurate and accessible aggregate data. By doing
so, they can demonstrate to investors the quality of their investment
by presenting their economy candidly. Transparency serves as
a benchmark of reliability. Greater FDI can serve as a source of capital
in savings-strapped economies, which can facilitate greater
production activity.
Further studies into the relationship between transparency and
other economic variables could provide interesting insights into
ways that transparency helps growth as a whole. While we narrowed
our study to FDI, other influential growth factors like foreign aid,
trade activity, and GDP growth rate could also be affected by transparency. These factors may contribute to a more complete picture of
economic growth theory and the factors that affect it.
We recognize that our own study does not completely account
for endogeneity in the relationship between transparency and
FDI. Nonetheless, we begin to address this through our control variables, lagging the dependent variable, and country fixed effects.
Further utilization of techniques such as an instrumental variable approach or the differences-in-differences method would enhance our
ability to argue a causal link. A measure of countries providing
funding to other countries for the express purpose of encouraging
them to release economic data could be used as such an instrumental variable, while the differences-in-differences method would
utilize a natural experiment to isolate our independent variable.
A transparent economic profile presents a country with an opportunity to increase its FDI. Our study lends strength to the
notion that FDI is affected by investor pragmatism, and that if a more
complete economic picture is provided, a country can increase
investor confidence and thereby capital. When it comes to investment,
the ready provision of aggregate economic data provides a
clear advantage.
Part B
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Making Conditionality
Work?
Actor Socialisation
through Network
Governance in the
European
Neighbourhood
PHILIPP
SCHROEDER
This study seeks to explain variation in compliance with European
Union (EU) rules among the EU’s neighbouring countries comprised by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Assuming that
the application of conditionality, offering third countries political and
material rewards in return for compliance with the EU’s policy
objectives, is unlikely to succeed in its own, this study argues that
functional cooperation through networks between EU officials
and actors in ENP countries’ administrations can socialise the latter
into embracing the EU’s norms and values. Cooperation through
functional networks thus in turn enhances the prospects for compliance with EU rules in ENP countries. A new panel dataset providing
information on variation in the features of network cooperation
between the EU and ENP countries was compiled to conduct regression analyses examining the effects from variation in the novelty
of institutional structures in ENP countries, the intensity of cooperation between EU officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations, the coherence of the EU’s approach in promoting its rules,
and policy areas’ varying degrees of politicisation, on compliance
prospects for EU rules in ENP countries.
In its 2014 progress report on the implementation of the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Commission notes that
the success of political and economic reform efforts of ENP
countries in line with the European Union’s (EU) objectives has been
largely uneven (European Commission 2014). While some of
the EU’s ENP partner countries showed remarkable progress in complying with EU policy objectives, implementation prospects for
EU rules seemed a lot less favourable in others (European Commission 2014).
This assessment leaves researchers interested in the expansion of the EU’s rules beyond its borders with a puzzle. Which
factors can explain why some of the EU’s neighbours fare better in
complying with its rules than others? Arguing that the application of conditionality, offering third countries political and material
rewards in return for compliance with the EU’s policy objectives, is
unlikely to succeed in its own, this study assumes that functional
cooperation through networks between EU officials and actors in ENP
countries’ administrations can socialise the latter into embracing
the EU’s norms and values, in turn enhancing the prospects for compliance with EU rules in ENP countries.
In order to test the plausibility of this argument, a new
panel dataset providing information on variation in the features of
network cooperation between the EU and ENP countries was
compiled, providing researchers with a better understanding of how
cooperation in the context of the ENP looks like on the ground, going
beyond the analysis of formally agreed upon policy objectives.
Fixed and random effects regression analyses are used to analyse the
effects from variation in the novelty of institutional structures in
ENP countries, the intensity of cooperation between EU officials and
actors in ENP countries’ administrations, the coherence of the
EU’s approach in promoting its rules, and policy areas’ varying degrees of politicisation.
This study is organized as follows: first, the theoretical foundations to analyse the EU’s rule expansion beyond its border are
outlined, highlighting the effects of network governance in the context
of the ENP. Then, a set of hypotheses detailing the causal pattern
between compliance with EU rules in third countries and features of
network cooperation between the EU and ENP partners is developed, drawing on insights from the socialisation literature. Thereupon, the study’s research design is described and the results
of the regression analyses presented. Finally, the findings of this study
are discussed, followed by a concluding summary.
Expanding EU Rules Beyond EU Borders
Recent academic literature examining the effectiveness of EU
foreign policy in influencing policy arrangements in third countries,
particularly within the EU’s neighbourhood, has produced a wide
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array of factors affecting compliance prospects for EU rules beyond
its borders. Among the most prominent factors are the reinforcement of compliance with EU rules through political and material
rewards (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2008: 190), the provision
of advice on how to adapt to EU models of policy-making through
transnational expert networks (Börzel & Risse 2012: 197), the degree
of preferential fit between the political agenda of elites in third
countries and EU rule objectives (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 581), and
the EU’s coherence in the use of its foreign policy instruments
(Thomas 2012: 457). Comparable to the mixture of factors affecting
EU Member States’ compliance with supranational legislation
within the EU (Toshkov 2010), the largely inconclusive results produced
by the academic literature suggest that there is no single factor
accounting for compliance with EU rules in third countries in its own.
Instead, it is more likely that variation in the EU’s success of expanding its rules beyond its borders can be attributed to an interplay
between several factors, leaving researchers with the question which
of these factors predominantly drives compliance with EU rules
in third countries, and under which conditions.
Modes of EU External Governance
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 796) note that the institutional
forms through which the EU seeks to promote its rules beyond
its borders vary between different policy areas and regions, which in
turn has repercussions on the mechanisms of EU rule expansion.
Understanding governance as institutionalised forms of co-ordinated
actions that aim at the production of collectively binding agreements, they draw on the concept of external governance modes, which
serve as heuristic devices to distinguish between these different
institutional forms characterising EU-third country relations (Lavenex &
Schimmelfennig 2009: 795 – 796).
EU external governance modes display variation on two
dimensions: the regulatory level of rule expansion and the organizational
level of rule-making (Lavenex et al. 2009: 815). The regulatory
dimension is based on the concept of legalization (Abbott et al. 2000:
403 – 404), with rules displaying variation in their degree of obligation (i.e. whether rules are legally binding), their degree of flexibility
(i.e. whether there is room for rule interpretation), and their degree of
delegation (i.e. whether compliance with a rule is subject to
judicial or political control). On the other hand, according to Lavenex
et al. (2009: 815), the organizational dimension refers to the
institutionalisation of EU-third country relations, asking whether coordination is characterised by formal and centralized macroinstitutional structures (centralization), whether interactions occur on
a pre-set and frequent basis or in an ad-hoc fashion (density),
and whether the subject of co-ordination is confined to rules predetermined by the EU or characterised by a common agenda (exclusive-
ness). Based on variation on the regulatory and organizational
dimensions, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 796 – 800) differentiate between three different types of external governance modes:
hierarchical governance, network governance, and market governance.
On the regulatory dimension, hierarchical governance is
defined by a strong role of European law, predetermined obligations
for third countries set by the EU’s acquis communautaire and
independent judicial review of third countries’ conduct, while its organizational dimension is characterised by a profound asymmetry between the EU (the ruler) and third countries (the ruled), formal
and centralized macro-institutions, and little room for third countries
to negotiate on their commitments (Lavenex et al. 2009: 815).
Thus, hierarchy can be described as “a relationship of superiority and
subordination in which one party unilaterally expands predetermined parts of its regulative boundary to the other without, however,
allowing for the latter’s participation in the determination of
these obligations or organizational inclusion in the policy frameworks
where these obligations are shaped” (Lavenex 2008: 941).
Network governance, on the other hand, describes a relationship in which actors are formally equal, with third countries
jointly agreeing with the EU on the focus of their policy cooperation,
enabling the former to bring in their own priorities (Lavenex &
Schimmelfennig 2009: 797 – 798). Furthermore, in a network framework, central co-ordination structures go along with decentralized interactions, which are dealing with international law and
voluntary agreements that are inspired but not predetermined
by the EU’s acquis, and are not subject to judicial but political monitoring (Lavenex et al. 2009: 815 – 816). Accordingly, Lavenex
(2008: 943) notes that in contrast to hierarchy, “[t]he process-oriented,
horizontal, voluntaristic and inclusionary attributes of network
governance allow for the extension of norms and rules that goes along
with participatory openness in decision-making processes and practices”.
Finally, similar to network governance, market governance
is characterised by a formal equality between the EU and third
countries, yet “outcomes are the result of competition between formally autonomous actors rather than the result of hierarchical harmonization or networked co-ordination” (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig
2009: 799 – 800).
Knill and Tosun (2009: 875) emphasize that the concept of
external governance modes helps to understand the causal relationship between (non-)compliance with EU rules in third countries
and the myriad of factors, which are assumed to influence the
EU’s effectiveness in promoting its rules beyond its borders, overcoming the black box problem that arises in all modes of causal inference.
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Rule Expansion in the EU’s Neighbourhood:
Challenging Hierarchy and Conditionality
Among scholars seeking to explain (non-)compliance with EU rules in
third countries, the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
has received special attention (Kelley 2006; Youngs 2009; Langbein
& Börzel 2013). In the light of an increasingly complex interdependence between the EU and its neighbouring countries, the European Commission issued a strategy paper in May 2004, initiating
the ENP as a basis to develop new policies towards the EU’s Mediterranean and East European neighbours (European Commission 2004). The ENP comprises 16 of the EU’s regional neighbouring
countries – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine,
Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine – offering them a privileged relationship
based on a mutual commitment to common values, and covering a broad range of sector policies reaching from employment and
social policy, to agriculture and rural development, climate
change and energy security, as well as support to health, education,
culture and youth (European External Action Service 2014).
While the ENP was modelled on the EU’s enlargement process, it
specifically refrains from offering ENP countries a membership
perspective (Kelley 2006: 30).
In the recent academic literature, specific attention has been
devoted to the contrast between expanding EU rules to ENP
countries through horizontal network governance and hierarchical EU
policy transfer through conditionality (Lavenex 2008: 941). Several
scholars have highlighted the positive effects of conditionality – a “bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the
EU provides external incentives for a target government to
comply with its conditions” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004:
662) – on compliance with EU rules in third countries (Sedelmeier 2012: 36; Trauner 2009: 775). For instance, analysing the
effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion in its Eastern
and Mediterranean neighbourhood between 1988 and 2004, Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008: 188) assume that political accession
conditionality, defined as the credible perspective of becoming
an EU member after thorough reform, is a necessary condition and
instrumental in overcoming domestic obstacles to institutional
and policy reform in third countries. Their results show that EU political
accession conditionality is indeed a robustly significant, strong
and positive correlate of democratization in the European neighbourhood (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2008: 207 – 211). Taking into
account that political accession conditionality is less likely to provide
credible incentives for ENP countries lacking a formal membership perspective, Trauner (2009: 775 – 776) argues that the EU managed to fill its conditionality approach under the ENP with more
substance by offering policy related incentives, i.e. through relaxing
EU-third country visa regimes in exchange for reform of domestic
justice and home affairs.
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the potential success of
policy-specific conditionality, several scholars question the transformative power of the ENP in the EU’s neighbourhood, as implementation costs for EU rules are likely to be too high for third country
governments in the absence of a credible membership perspective (Gould 2004: 195 – 196; Schimmelfennig 2005: 835;
Schimmelfennig 2009: 20 – 21). Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008:
21 – 212) assume that the ENP will have at best uncertain and
inconsistent effects, as it in addition to the lack of a membership perspective does not set high political standards for participation.
This assumption appears to be justified given the largely successful
transfer of EU rules to enlargement countries (Sedelmeier 2012: 35),
contrasted by a relatively lower success of the EU’s promotion
of its acquis in ENP countries (Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 582).
However, given that policy-specific compliance exists side by side with
resistance against EU demands for change in ENP countries
(Ademmer & Börzel 2013: 581), it is possible that the features of conditionality might be complemented by other mechanisms, leading to the expansion of EU rules beyond its borders (Schimmelfennig
& Sedelmeier 2004: 662). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier
(2004: 662) note that the mechanism through which third countries
comply with EU rules might relate to processes of persuasion
and learning, assuming that EU officials can socialise actors in third
countries into changing their preference and beliefs in line with
EU objectives. A focus on ENP country actors’ preferences and beliefs
appears promising, as Ademmer and Börzel (2013: 581) argue
that in the absence of a credible membership perspective, policy-specific
conditionality will only be successful if it goes hand in hand with
the +preferential fit between an EU policy and the political agenda
of incumbent elites.
Network Cooperation in ENP Countries
Referring back to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s (2009: 798) heuristic device of external governance modes to describe institutional forms
of EU-third country relations, the ENP appears to resemble the
features of network governance, rather than hierarchy. Within the framework of the ENP, third countries define priority areas for their
co-ordination with the EU, which are then codified in mutually
agreed upon ENP Action Plans (Youngs 2009: 897). The policy priorities
outlined in these Action Plans are then translated into multiannual National Indicative Programmes for each ENP country, detailing
the specific actions to be taken to implement the envisioned
aims and objectives (European Commission 2004: 24 – 25). These
actions, providing sectoral technical assistance to ENP countries in
the defined priority policy areas, are financed by the European
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Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which was
designed to assist the implementation of the ENP through a single
policy-driven instrument, and replaced a number of existing instruments under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of
Independent States (TACIS) and European-Mediterranean
partnership (MEDA) programmes prior to the ENP (Official Journal of
the European Union 2006).
Furthermore, within the National Indicative Programmes particular attention was devoted to institution building in partner
countries through the instrument of Twinning (European Commission
2004: 25). Twinning was made available for the EU’s Mediterranean ENP partner countries in 2004 and its Eastern neighbours in
2005, and is defined as a tool for cooperation between a subunit of the public administration in a neighbouring country and the
equivalent institution in an EU member state (Freyburg 2011:
1009 – 1010). In the context of a Twinning project, a team of European experts relocates its offices to ENP country administrations
in order to assist the beneficiary departments in seeking an effective
response to policy problems through training and reorganization as
well as by drafting laws and regulations modelled after the EU’s
acquis (Freyburg 2011: 1009 – 1010).
Accordingly, the involvement of ENP countries in the formulation of their commitments under the ENP and the fact that the
speed of the envisioned harmonisation is determined by political elites
in ENP countries, indicates an at least formal equality between
the co-ordination parties (Youngs 2009: 897). Furthermore, the joint
elaboration of ENP Action Plans, the joint evaluation of progress in
Association Councils, as well as attempts to establish stable
communication between sectoral experts in the framework of the ENP,
represent elements of network governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 798). Emphasizing especially the importance of
technical cooperation between EU and third country experts, Wolczuk
(2009: 191) notes that “the enactment of EU-defined polity
and policy changes requires not only consistent, visible commitment
and support from the highest state authorities, but it also needs
to be institutionalised in an appropriate coordinating framework and
accompanied by the development of considerable administrative
capacity”. Analysing the ENP’s impact on policy changes in
Ukraine between 2005 and 2007, she concludes that, although the
overall implementation of Ukraine’s Action Plan was slow and
incomplete, the ENP had a tangible effect on actors within the state
administration (Wolczuk 2009: 208). This assessment falls in
line with findings highlighting that transnational expert networks established through the ENP foster interaction between EU and third country
actors on a technical level, exposing elites in third countries to
the EU’s acquis and administrative policy-making on the level of administrative experts (Freyburg et al. 2009: 918), and changing domestic
elites’ dispositions to EU rules through communication and personal
experiences (Freyburg 2011: 1005).
Overcoming Reform Obstacles through Network Governance
Based on the observations outlined above, this study argues
that although the application of conditionality – particularly policyspecific conditionality – is not absent in the EU’s attempts to expand
its rules to ENP countries, it is eventually the interaction between
state actors in ENP countries and EU officials through network cooperation, which induces the former to lower their reservations
against domestic reform along the EU’s objectives. Offering policyspecific rewards in exchange for the implementation of EU rules
in ENP countries is unlikely to succeed on its own, given that political
elites in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes in ENP are
unwilling to bear the political and material costs of democratic reform
in the absence of a credible membership perspective (Schimmelfennig 2005: 835). However, arguing that political elites’ preferences and beliefs are not static but subject to potential change, close
and frequent interactions between state actors in ENP countries
and EU officials through network cooperation, can initiate processes
of socialisation and social learning, changing the formers’ preferences and interests along EU objectives, in turn increasing the
likelihood for ENP countries to positively respond to policy-specific
rewards and comply with EU rules (Börzel & Risse 2012: 195;
Freyburg et al. 2009: 918; Freyburg 2011: 1004, Youngs 2009: 897).
Yet, as researchers are still faced with variation in compliance
with EU rules across policy areas and ENP countries, the following
section will combine findings from the literature on socialisation and
the EU’s external governance in order to develop testable hypothesis to assess the plausibility of the argument outlined above.
Causal Patterns of EU Rule Expansion through
Network Governance
The notion that technical cooperation and interpersonal communication between actors can serve as the vehicle to affect changes
in preferences and beliefs reinvigorates a neo-functionalist line of
reasoning (Checkel 2005: 802). Beyers (2005: 908) notes that
socialisation is a crucial component in neo-functionalist definitions of
European regional integration, arguing that “interactions cutting
across national borders gradually socialize actors, supranational and
domestic elites, into adopting pro-European norms and practices”.
Hooghe (2005: 858) defines this process of socialisation as
“the process of inducting individuals into the norms and rules of a given
community”. Actors are assumed to switch from choosing between different policy options based on a conscious instrumental
calculation of costs and benefits, to behaving in line with new,
external norms by learning a role, or even adopt interests and beliefs
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of the community they become part of, because they perceive these
new norms as the right thing to do (Checkel 2005: 804). Thus, actors
gradually switch from a logic of consequences, basing their
behaviour on cost-benefit calculations, to a logic of appropriateness,
embracing and eventually internalizing previously foreign norms
(Checkel 2005: 804).
The EU’s socialising potential has been highlighted by a
number of scholars (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005; Kerr 1973; Johnston
2005). While the exposure of actors in ENP countries to EU
affairs is a necessary condition for socialisation processes to take
effect, variation in the nature of the institutions involved in EU-third
country cooperation, the intensity of the cooperation, features
of different policy areas, and the EU’s coherence in promoting its
rules beyond its borders are assumed to account for varying
compliance patterns across policy areas and countries in the framework of the ENP.
Novelty and Uncertainty
Wolczuk’s (2009: 208) analysis of the ENP’s success in inducing
policy reform in Ukraine revealed that the domestic institutional
context in ENP countries matters in overcoming obstacles to policy
reform along the EU’s aims and objectives. She observes that
following an intensification of cooperation with the EU, new administrative structures were created within Ukraine’s bureacracy,
which acquired the necessary expertise and competences to align
Ukraine with the provisions of EU cooperation, and subsequently “became key agents for Europeanisation of Ukraine within the
ENP” (Wolczuk 2009: 195). Thus, her observations warrant a
closer look at ENP countries’ administrative structures responsible
for handling EU cooperation.
Hooghe (2005: 866) emphasizes that socialising effects in
international institutions largely depend on actors’ experiences
within these institutional contexts. Arguing that initial experiences are
more influential than subsequent ones, she assumes that actors
in novel institutional contexts are more likely to be disoriented
and eager to conform with new norms and perceptions, and thus more
susceptible to persuasion efforts and more disposed to copy
what others do (Hooghe 2005: 866). Furthermore, Checkel (2001:
562) assumes that argumentative persuasion is more likely to
be effective when actors are in novel and uncertain institutional environments, as they are more cognitively motivated to analyse
new information. Promoting argumentative and deliberative behaviour
in novel institutional contexts in turn goes hand in hand with a
greater likelihood of actors changing their interests, beliefs and
perceptions, as actors’ goals switch from attaining their fixed preferences to seeking reasoned consensus (Risse 2000: 7).
Combining Wolczuk’s (2009: 195) observations and the assumptions of the socialisation literature on actors’ behaviour in novel
institutional contexts suggests that newly established administrative
structures in ENP countries responsible for co-ordinating EU
support (institutional novelty) provide a favourable institutional context
for changes in third country elites’ preferences and beliefs
along the objectives of the ENP. Based on this assumption, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
H1: Greater institutional novelty increases the likelihood for
compliance with EU rules in third countries.
Given that EU-third country cooperation within the ENP
generally does not run through a single institution but usually involves
a wide variety of stakeholders in third countries, the specific
assumption of this study based on H1 is that newly established structures in ENP countries’ state administrations dominating EU
cooperation are more likely to promote compliance with EU rules in
third countries, than if they take up subordinate roles, or if no specific
structures for EU cooperation are established at all.
Intensity
Freyburg (2011: 1009 – 1010) notes the importance of the depth and
frequency of EU-third country cooperation within the ENP, particularly
highlighting the effects of Twinning projects, as they “are based
on intensive working relations on a day-to-day basis between European
and neighbourhood country officials for a considerable period
of time”. Analysing two EU-Moroccan Twinning projects, her study
showed that despite a seemingly stable authoritarian regime in
Morocco, close technical cooperation between EU and ENP country
officials did not only leave its imprint in domestic law codes,
but also positively shaped the attitudes of state officials towards democratic governance (Freyburg 2011: 1017).
Her findings echo arguments brought forward by the literature
on socialisation in international institutions. Building upon the
necessary condition of actors’ exposure to EU affairs for the transfer
of European values, Beyers (2005: 911) argues that especially
time-demanding and intense interactions induce actors exposed to
EU affairs to change their interests and beliefs along EU objectives
and norms. Essentially, it is assumed that a frequent and close
contact within an institutional context between actors promoting a
particular norm and actors exposed to this – to them foreign – norm allows the latter to better understand how to behave appropriately in this context, and eventually internalize this new norm
through social learning and normative suasion (Checkel 2005:
810 – 811).
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Again, combining the findings highlighted by Freyburg (2011: 1017)
and the assumptions of the socialisation literature suggests that
particularly time-consuming and intense interactions between EU and
third country officials (intensity) induces the latter to depart from
a strict adherence to the norms and values prevalent in their domestic
context and more closely align their behaviour to European norms and
values. Thereupon, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
H2: Greater intensity of cooperation increases the likelihood
for compliance with EU rules in third countries.
Within the context of this study, given that all ENP countries are
subject to cooperation projects financed by the ENPI, while the
use of Twinning projects intensifying interactions between specific administrative units in ENP countries with their counterpart from
an EU Member State varies across countries (Freyburg 2011:
1009 – 1010), it is assumed that actors in ENP country administrations
benefitting from Twinning projects are more likely to promote
domestic compliance with EU rules, than actors experiencing less
intense interactions with EU officials.
Coherence
Within the academic literature seeking to explain the (in-)effectiveness
of EU foreign policy, variation in the degree of coherence among
EU Member States in employing the EU’s foreign policy instruments is
frequently cited as one of the most decisive factors (Smith 2006;
Groenleer & Van Schaik 2007; Thomas 2012). Defining policy coherence as the adoption and pursuit of determinate common policies by
EU Member States, Thomas (2012: 458 – 459) notes that for
the success of EU foreign policy it is essential that EU Member States
commonly agree on well-defined policy objectives and in turn
fully support whatever policy has been agreed upon. This assumption
resonates with findings regarding the expansion of EU rules
beyond its borders, highlighting that the more a rule is supported from
within the EU, the more likely it is that third countries will accept
this rule as the basis of negotiations, adopt it, and apply it (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 19).
Inter alia examining socialisation effects of coherence in
international institutions, Hooghe (2005: 865) notes that the socialisation literature predicts that cohesive organizations are better
at socialising agents than fragmented organizations. It is assumed that
actors fashioning a coherent approach in promoting their norms
and values can act as authoritative figures of a group, enhancing their
prospects of changing others’ interests and perceptions through
arguing and persuasion (Checkel 2005: 812 – 813).
In the context of the ENP, it can thus be assumed that EU
officials who can build on well-defined policy objectives and unequiv-
ocal support from EU institutions and Member States for these objectives
(coherence), are better at socialising actors in ENP countries
into conforming to the EU’s norms and values, in turn enhancing the
prospects for compliance with EU rules. Thus, the following
hypothesis can be formulated:
H3: Greater coherence increases the likelihood for compliance
with EU rules in third countries.
As this study covers the period from 2006 until 2013, cooperation projects between the EU and third countries agreed upon
and financed in the context of the TACIS and MEDA programmes are
included in the analysis. Based upon H3, this study specifically
expects that projects implemented in the context of the ENP are more
likely to increase compliance with EU rules in third countries
than TACIS and MEDA projects, as they can build upon well-defined
policy objectives outlined in the National Indicative Programmes, which
in turn reflect objectives for all 16 ENP countries commonly
agreed upon by EU Member States, and are financed through a single
instrument, the ENPI.
Politicisation
The effects of different policy areas on the prospects of success of
foreign policy have long been debated in the academic literature
(Potter 1980: 406). Inter alia examining the effects of variation in the
degree of ENP policy areas’ politicisation, Freyburg (2011:1010)
argues that “if inter-administrative cooperation occurs in less politicized
settings, interaction among the participants is more intense and
trustworthy, which, in turn, makes attitude change towards democratic governance more likely”. Similar effects can be expected
from the publicity of a policy area, as the stakes in a policy issue are
increasing with the publicity of negotiations, making reasonable
deliberation less likely and actors more resistant to others argumentative influences (Chambers 2004: 399). Yet, given that the degree of
publicity of transnational cooperation through expert networks
such as in the ENP is generally low (Freyburg 2011: 1010), a focus on
the politicisation of policy issues appears justified.
Analysing the effects of political deliberation in the EU’s Council of Ministers, Naurin (2010: 33) observes that deliberation
between actors is more likely to take hold in less politically heated
conditions, specifically non-politicised, technical issues and
soft law, than under more demanding political circumstances. He
argues that actors’ high stakes in a particular policy issue increase the pressure on negotiators, in turn restricting their thinking
and making them “more defensive, more focused on protecting
their own interests, less prepared to reach out to others and to open
their minds for the arguments and perspectives of others” (Naurin
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2010: 34). Thus, high politicisation of a policy issue leads to bargaining
among actors, involving a greater focus on rational calculation
rather than openness to others’ perceptions, and diminishing the prospects for socialisation effects (Naurin 2010: 34).
Accordingly, in the context of the ENP it can be expected that
policy areas in which actors in ENP countries have relatively
low stakes and little to lose in the face of reform, are more likely to
set the stage for argumentative deliberation and a change in
actors preferences and interests, than reform in policy areas which
touch upon the political and material power bases of domestic
elites in third countries (politicisation). Thus, the following hypothesis
can be formulated:
measures to translate EU rules into domestic legislation (Langbein &
Börzel 2013: 572). Yet, rhetorical commitment to EU rules and
formal adoption do not necessarily result in rule application, which asks
whether EU rules are in fact acted upon in political and administrative
practices in third countries, thus constituting the deepest impact of EU external governance (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009:
801). Freyburg et al. (2009: 928 – 929) observe that although
the EU’s ENP has had an impact on legislation in third countries, the
application of these legislative measures has been considerably
weaker. Despite the higher obstacles to rule application, as this study
neither focuses on the negotiations on the contents of ENP
Action Plans nor political processes in ENP countries leading to the
adoption of EU-conform legislative measure, but the actual effects of
EU-third country cooperation through network cooperation,
the definition of compliance with EU rules here follows the logic of
rule application.
To measure compliance with EU rules, two policy areas
of EU-third country cooperation were selected, which both represent
key cornerstones of the ENP framework and provide indicators,
which allow the assessment of changes in third countries’ actual policy
practices: the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and measures to support the development of diversified energy
sources in ENP countries.
A commonly used indicator assessing countries’ compliance with
internationally accepted human rights standards is Freedom
House’s Freedom in the World index. Building on survey ratings and
narrative reports, the index provides an assessment of the application
of political rights and civil liberties in 195 countries, ranking
them on a scale from 1 (free country) to 7 (not free country) in 0.5
intervals (Freedom House 2014). Data providing information
on the selected 15 ENP countries’ human rights performances is
available for the period between 2006 and 2013. To make the
interpretation of the analyses’ results more straightforward, the index
is recoded into a 13-point scale, with lower scores indicating weaker
compliance and higher scores indicating stronger compliance
with international human rights standards.
An indicator allowing for the assessment of third countries’ success in
promoting the diversification of energy sources is provided by the
World Data Bank’s Alternative and Nuclear Energy
Use index, which measures the percentage of a countries’ non-carbohydrate energy use of their total energy use (World Data Bank
2014).2 As ENP countries’ percentage scores theoretically range from
0 (no use of alternative energy sources at all) to 100 (only use
of alternative energy sources), higher scores on the index indicate a
greater diversification of energy sources. The World Data Bank’s
H4: Greater politicisation decreases the likelihood for compliance
with EU rules in third countries.
Comparing compliance with EU rules in ENP countries in two
policy areas with varying degrees of politicisation, this study
specifically expects that the analysis of the policy area with a lower
level of politicisation is more likely to produce statistically significant
effects, as well as stronger effects of the independent variables
included in H1 – H3 (institutional novelty, intensity, and coherence),
than the policy area with a relatively higher level of politicisation.
Research Design
In order to test the hypotheses outlined above, a new dataset
providing a closer insight into network cooperation between the EU
and all but one of the ENP countries during the period from
2006 until 2013 was compiled. 1 The following sections provide an
overview over the operationalization of the independent and
dependent variables, introduce a number of control variables included
in the analysis, and specify the method of data analysis.
The Dependent Variable
Seeking to clarify the different stages of compliance with EU rules in
third countries, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009: 800) differentiate between rule selection, rule adoption and rule application.
Rule selection measures whether and to what extent EU rules
constitute the normative reference point of EU–third-country relations,
while rule adoption refers to whether EU rules selected for international negotiations and agreements are then also transposed
into third country’s domestic legislation (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 800 – 801). Essentially, these two stages focus on third
countries’ level of rhetorical commitment and pledges to reform
policy arrangements in line with EU objectives, as well as formal
1 Due to data scarcity across several of the examined variables, Palestine was excluded from the analysis.
2 Non-carbohydrate energy here refers to energy sources, which do not produce carbon dioxide when generated, and inter alia include hydropower and
nuclear, geothermal, and solar power (World Data Bank 2014).
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Alternative and Nuclear Energy Use index does not provide data
on the selected ENP countries for every single time period, thus to
ensure a balanced panel dataset, missing data for single years
was replaced by countries’ average percentage score of the previous
and subsequent years, or the equivalent of the previous year if
the missing data occurred in the final time period of this study.
The Independent Variables
As this study is interested in examining the effects of variation in the
features of cooperation networks involving EU officials and third country actors in the framework of the ENP, the analysis of publicly
available Action Fiches for EU cooperation projects in its neighbouring countries, ENP Country Progress Reports and additional
sources of information published by the EU, build the backbone of
the ENP Network Cooperation Dataset compiled for this study.
Especially the EU’s Action Fiches provide ample information on the
actors involved and actual procedures of cooperation between
the EU and third countries, both for the TACIS and MEDA programmes as well as the ENP. Outlining detailed objectives of individual cooperation projects, describing stakeholders and institutions
involved in the projects in ENP countries, providing information
on complementary actions as well as detailing implementation calendars, these documents allow researchers to gain a better understanding of how cooperation between the EU and ENP countries looks
like on the ground, going beyond the analysis of formally agreed
upon policy objectives contained in the ENP’s Action Plans. Where
possible, the rather technical information contained in these
documents was supported by a more narrative context provided by
ENP Country Progress Reports, press releases and ENP
memos, which were largely used to cross-verify the assessments
made based on the information contained in the Action Fiches.
For those years where Action Fiche documents were not available for
individual countries, complementary information contained in
subsequent years’ documents was used to reconstruct and appropriately code EU-ENP cooperation. An overview over all documents
used to compile the panel dataset for this study is provided in Annex 1.
In order to measure three of the four independent variables
outlined above – institutional novelty, intensity and coherence
– a qualitative content analysis of these documents was conducted.
The variables’ categories were refined during a pre-test of the
documents including four countries from the EU’s Southern and Eastern neighbourhood: Armenia, Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine. The coding
manual providing specific information on recording units and
the coding protocol is included in Annex 2. For every single year it
was analysed whether an ENP country benefitted from a cooperation
project relating to the promotion of human rights and fundamental
freedoms as well as the diversification of energy sources. Thereupon,
individualvalues for the independent variables institutional novelty,
intensity and coherence were coded for these projects. Furthermore,
given that the actual implementation of cooperation projects
did not start before the signing of a financing agreement between the
EU and the respective ENP country, which was generally completed
before the end of the year the project was agreed upon, the
variable’s values were coded starting in the following year.
Based upon insights from the pre-test of the qualitative content
analysis instrument, the independent variable institutional novelty was
measured on a 4-point scale. If no cooperation project relating
to either human rights or energy policy was implemented in an ENP
country during a specific year, this country received the value 0
(no cooperation). Years in which a human rights or energy policy cooperation project was implemented, yet lacked an involvement
of newly established administrative structures in ENP countries, were
coded as 1 (low institutional novelty). If new administrative structures
were involved in the implementation of a cooperation project,
yet played a subordinate role to other parts of an ENP country’s
bureaucracy, the value 2 was assigned (medium institutional novelty)
for this particular year. Finally, if an ENP country established a
new administrative unit responsible for co-ordinating EU support, which
took up a leading role in the implementation of an ENP cooperation project, the value 3 (high institutional novelty) was assigned
for this year.
Basing the understanding of the intensity of cooperation
on Freyburg’s (2011: 1009 – 1010) assessment that EU-ENP country
cooperation building upon a Twinning project constitutes a particularly intensive type of interaction, the independent variable intensity was measured via individual dummy variables for both policy
areas. ENP countries were assigned with the value 1 (high intensity) for
years in which a Twinning project relating to the promotion of
human rights and the diversification of energy sources was implemented, and the value 0 (low intensity) for years in which no such
project was implemented.
In order to measure the effects of varying coherence in the EU’s
approach to promoting its rules in third countries, this study
compares the effects of actions financed under the TACIS and MEDA
programmes, and actions financed in the context of the ENP
through the ENPI. In adopting the ENPI as its single instrument to finance the promotion of EU rules in third countries replacing a
number of previously existing instruments, the EU attempted to enhance
the coherence of its approach (Official Journal of the European
Union 2006: 2). In addition, given that the ENP brings the EU’s
Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours into a single policy framework
building on common overall aims, it is assumed that the ENP also exemplifies a more coherent approach in terms of its policy objectives, compared to the EU’s TACIS and MEDA programmes. Thus,
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coherence is measured via a dummy variable, with ENP countries
assigned with value 1 (higher coherence) for years in which a
cooperation project financed by the ENPI in the context of the ENP
was implemented, and the value 0 (lower coherence) for years
in which a project financed in the context of the TACIS or MEDA
programmes was implemented.
Finally, in order to measure the independent variable politicisation,
Freyburg’s (2011: 1010) insights on the classification of the
politicisation of policy issues in the context of the ENP as low, medium
or high derived from interviews with third country state officials,
journalists, and non-governmental activists as well as representatives
of international organizations, EU Member States and European
Commission delegations, are used. Here findings show that policy
issues touching upon internally sensitive issue and material
and political power bases of incumbent elites in third countries can
be regarded as highly politicised, whereas issues impeded by
lesser political considerations display lower degrees of politicisation
(Freyburg 2011: 1010 – 1011). Specifically, pitting economic
development objectives against political power interests of elites in third
countries, it can be assumed that the latter shows a higher degree of
politicisation than the former. (Freyburg 2011: 1010 – 1011).
Relating these observations to the two policy fields selected for this
study, it can be assumed that cooperation projects relating to
the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms are impeded
by a higher degree of politicisation than projects promoting the
diversification of energy sources: while the latter are likely to pit business interests in third countries against policy objectives outlined in EU cooperation projects, making the implementation of EU rules
more costly for third countries, it can be assumed that these
costs are still lower for political elites in ENP countries than those connected to the implementation of EU rules on human rights, as restrictions on media freedom, political opposition and the rule of law
are likely to be closely linked to the survival of incumbent authoritarian
and semi-authoritarian regimes in ENP countries. In order to
measure the effects of politicisation, the results of the analysis of the
effects of the independent variables institutional novelty, intensity and
coherence are compared for the two policy areas, expecting
in line with H4 that substantive effects of cooperation in energy policy
are likely to be higher than in human rights policy.3
Control Variables
As it cannot be assumed that (non-)compliance with EU rules in third
countries can be entirely explained through variation in the features of network cooperation between EU and ENP officials, several
additional factors need to be controlled for in the context of this
3 A more detailed analysis of the variables is available upon request & online
study. While Freyburg et al. (2011: 1043) found that EU membership
aspirations of ENP countries, which can be assumed to increase third
countries’ expected rewards from EU cooperation despite the
lack of a formal membership perspective offered through the ENP, did
not have an effect on compliance prospects with EU rules, other
scholars highlighted that a high capacity of third countries’ bureaucracies increases the prospects for their compliance with EU
rules (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig 2009: 805). Here, capacity is defined
as a state’s ability to act based the sum of its legal authority as
well as its financial and human resources (Börzel et al. 2010: 1369).
An indicator commonly used to measure state capacity is the
Worldwide Governance Indicators project’s Government Effectiveness
index (World Bank Group 2013). Based on 32 data sources,
the index provides information on the perceptions of the quality of
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al. 2010: 4). The
index provides data up until 2012, thus to ensure a balanced panel
dataset, values for the year 2013 were based on countries’ values
from the preceding year.
In addition, influences from other international and transnational
actors are likely to affect compliance prospects with EU rules
in third countries (Langbein & Börzel 2013: 577). Although the EU is
often portrayed as a key promoter of convergence with EU
policies, Langbein and Börzel (2013: 577) argue that “the EU is far
from being the only, and not necessarily even the most important,
external actor that shapes policy change”. In order to control for
projects from other international actors such as the United Nations
Development Programme and the World Bank, as well as transnational actors such as the United States’ Agency for International
Development, which are assumed to reinforce compliance with
the EU’s aims and objectives (external support), a dummy variable is
created, with the value 1 assigned for ENP countries in years in
which EU cooperation projects were complemented by support from
other international and transnational actors, and the value 0, if
EU projects lacked this support.
Simultaneously, particularly in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood
influences from the Russian Federation, which seeks to establish a common economic space among the Commonwealth of Independent States, compete with EU efforts to promote compliance with
its rules (Langbein & Börzel 2013: 577 – 558). Assuming that
Russian influences on the EU’s Eastern neighbours are constant over
the time period covered by this study, again a dummy variable
(regional competition) was created with the value 1 assigned for ENP
coun countries in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood and the value 0 for
Mediterranean ENP countries.
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Method of Data Analysis
Table 2 and Table 3 show the transition probabilities for values of the
independent variable institutional novelty in the context of EUENP country cooperation in the two policy areas selected for this study.4
The results displayed in Table 2 show that in the field of
human rights policy, years in which a particular ENP country did not
benefit from an EU cooperation project where followed with a
probability of 14.3 percent by a year in which this country implemented a cooperation project without the involvement of new administrative structures, and with a probability of 7.1 percent by a year
in which an EU cooperation project was implemented with the help of
new administrative structures, playing a subordinate role. Furthermore,
years in which newly established administrative structures
played a subordinate role where followed with a probability of 12.5
percent by a year in which they were upgraded into a leading role.
Somewhat similar – yet overall weaker – patterns can be
observed in Table 3 for the field of energy policy. Years of no cooperation between the EU and ENP countries were followed with a
probability of 2.9 percent by years in which a cooperation project not
involving new administrative structures was implemented, with a
probability of 5.9 percent by years with projects implemented through
new administrative structures playing a subordinate role, and
with a probability of 1.5 percent by years in which new administrative
structures played a leading role in the co-ordination of EU affairs.
However, the results show that no transitions from the values low and
medium (and logically high) institutional novelty can be observed,
indicating a greater continuity in the set-up of ENP countries administrative structures responsible for handling EU cooperation in the field
of energy policy, than in the field of human rights policy.
The conclusion that values of the independent variable institutional novelty increase over time (although in a weaker fashion
in energy policy than in human rights policy), appears to also hold for
the independent variable intensity. Figure 1 shows the number
of Twinning projects implemented in human rights and energy policy
between 2006 and 2013. The displayed results indicate that
the number of implemented Twinning projects increased over time, with
the values of the independent variable intensity being more stable in
the field of energy policy, than in human rights policy.
4 All statistical analyses were conducted using STATA 12. The complete log-file for the analyses is provided if requested. All subsequent tables appear in the appendix and are available upon request
Figure 1: Number of Twinning Projects in ENP countries in Human Rights and Energy Policy Values on x-axis display years
(2006 – 2013); values on y-axis display absolute frequencies
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2006
2007
2008
Twinning Projects in Human Rights Policy
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Twinning Projects in Energy Rights Policy
Data source: ENP Network Cooperation Dataset
Panel data in which values of independent variables change over
time can be analysed via fixed-effects and random-effects regression models. The fundamental difference between the two models
is that for random-effects models variation between the analysed
entities (here the 15 ENP countries) is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the included variables, allowing time-invariant
variables to play a role as explanatory factors, while fixed-effects models
allow unobserved individual effects from different entities to be
correlated with included variables and remove effects from time-invariant characteristics of these entities (Greene 2012: 410 – 411).
In order to determine which of the two models is appropriate for the
analysis of panel data, Hausman’s specification test was conducted, testing the null hypothesis that unique errors are un-correlated
with the included regressors (Greene 2012: 419). Hausman’s
specification test for panel data on EU-ENP cooperation in human
rights policy shows that the null hypothesis can be rejected (p < .05),
thus a fixed-effects regression model is appropriate to analyse
the effects of the included variables on ENP countries’ human rights
performance (Model 1). For panel data on EU-ENP country cooperation in energy policy, Hausman’s specification test fails to reject
the null hypothesis (p > .05), indicating a random-effects regression model is appropriate to analyse the effects of the variables
effect on ENP countries’ use of alternative energy sources (Model 2).
Thus, in Model 2 effects of the time-invariant variable regional
competition need to be included, which are absorbed in the fixedeffects regression of Model 1.
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Results
Table 4 reports the regression results of Model 1. Due to heteroskedasticity in the panel data, the fixed-effects model uses clustered standard errors and includes effects of a lagged version
of the dependent variable with a lag length of one year, to try to control
for auto-correlation in the dependent variable. The lagged version of
the dependent variable has a highly statistically significant effect
on the dependent variable (p < .001), indicating a high likelihood that
the dependent variable’s value in a given year can be explained
by its value in the previous year, which is however a pervasive characteristic of panel data (Stock & Watson 2012: 405).
The results of Model 1 show that of the included independent
variables only effects of institutional novelty are statistically significant
at p < .05. Based on the results, we can be 95 percent confident that for a given ENP country, as institutional novelty increases
over time by one unit, its recoded Freedom in the World index
score increases by 0.64 units. As the coefficient for institutional novelty
is both statistically significant and positive, Model 1 provides
tentative support for H1. However, it needs to be noted that the
observed effect from institutional novelty is relatively small, given that
the dependent variable is measured on a 13-point scale. As effects
from the independent variables intensity and coherence are
both negative and not statistically significant at p < 0.05, Model 1 fails
to provide support for H2 and H3.
Somewhat relaxing the requirements for statistical significance,
Model 1 also shows that effects from the control variable capacity are statistically significant at p < .10. However its negative coefficient runs counter to the expectation that a higher administrative capacity facilitates the implementation of EU rules in third countries. Instead, the results show that we can be 90 percent confident
that for a given ENP country, as capacity increases over time
by one unit, its recoded Freedom in the World index score decreases
by 1.42 units.
Table 5 reports the regression results of Model 2. Again, due to
heteroskedasticity in the panel data, the random-effects model uses
clustered standard errors and includes effects of a lagged version of the dependent variable with a lag length of one year, which are
statistically significant at p <.001. Unlike in Model 1, the results
from Model 2 show that none of the effects from the included independent variables is statistically significant at p < .05.
Although the coefficient signs for the independent variables
institutional novelty and intensity are positive and point in the direction
hypothesised by H1 and H2, the lack of statistically significant
effects from the included independent variables in Model 2 leads to
the conclusion that Model 2 fails to provide support for H1, H2 and H3.
Of the included control variables, only regional competition is statistically significant at p < .05. Regression coefficients of
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random-effects models are somewhat more difficult to interpret than
fixed-effects regression results, as they include both within- and
between-entity effects. A possible interpretation here is that the coefficient represents the average effect of regional competition
over the dependent variable, when regional competition changes over
time and between countries by one unit. However, the positive
sign of the coefficient again runs counter to the expectation of the effects of regional competition, given that influences from Russia
in the Eastern neighbourhood rivalling EU influences can be expected
to hold the percentage of alternative energy use of ENP countries’
total energy use constant or even decrease this percentage, instead of increasing it.
Turning to compare the results from Model 1 and Model 2, the
results fail to evidence support for H4. Given that none of the
effects from the independent variables institutional novelty, intensity
and coherence had a statistically significant influence on the
dependent variable in Model 2, while at least institutional novelty displayed statistically significant effects in Model 1, it can be concluded that the assumed lower degree of politicisation of EU cooperation projects aiming at a diversification of energy sources in
ENP countries did not increase the prospects for compliance with EU
rules in ENP countries.
Discussion
The results outlined above show that this study fails to provide support for hypotheses H2, H3 and H4, while only tentative support
can be provided for hypothesis H1. This study’s findings suggest that
when EU officials interact with their counterparts from ENP
countries in the context of cooperation projects aiming to promote the
application of EU rules on human rights and fundamental freedoms, they are more successful in fostering compliance with the EU’s
rules, if ENP actors are employed in novel administrative structures established by ENP countries to handle EU affairs. It is assumed
that the underlying mechanism of this effect is that ENP actors
in novel institutional context are less subject to entrenched norms and
values prevalent in stable administrative structures of their semidemocratic and authoritarian regime, and in turn more open to new
perspectives and beliefs conveyed by EU officials.
Particularly surprising is that no statistically significant effects
of the included independent variables can be observed in the context
of EU-ENP country cooperation on energy policy, as it was assumed that actors in ENP countries’ state administrations would be
more inclined to embrace the EU’s norms and values in policy
areas with lower degrees of politicisation. However, notwithstanding
the possibility that H2 and H3 simply find no support in the context of
the ENP, there are several methodological and data limitations
which presumably affect the results of the regression analyses in this
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study. First, the overall number of observations for both regression
models (n = 120) is relatively small, potentially increasing the
size of standard errors and making it more difficult to observe statistically
significant results. Secondly, two reservations need to be made
with regard to the data used for Model 2. On the one hand, particularly
high outliers in the dependent variable in Model 2 are likely to
bias the model’s regression estimates, while on the other hand,
a Variation Inflation Factor (VIF) test shows that the VIF for Model 2 is
higher than 2.0, indicating multicollinearity among the independent variables included in Model 2. This finding can be largely attributed to the inclusion of several dummy variables in the model,
and the fact that the values for the independent variable institutional
novelty in the field of energy policy are relatively stable over time and
are mostly concentrated in the categories no cooperation and
low institutional novelty (see Table 3). Finally, as the assumed mechanism underlying the logic for the inclusion of the selected independent variables is socialisation, it is possible that effects cannot
be expected in the same year an ENP cooperation project is implemented, but rather occur at a later point in time. Thus, it would
be appropriate to correlate the independent variables for one
year (for any given country) with the values of the dependent variable
one or more years later. However, in the context of this study
this option is hardly feasible, given that it would further reduce the
number of observations below n =120.
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the limitations
outlined above is that in order to achieve tangible findings on
the effects from variation in the factors surrounding network governance in the context of the ENP, the number of observations needs to
be increased and policy areas included which display a greater
variation in the included variables, both between countries and over
time.
Conclusion
This study sought to explain why some of the EU’s neighbouring
countries included in its ENP framework comply with EU rules, while
compliance prospects are less favourable in others. Arguing that the
application of conditionality, offering third countries political and
material rewards in return for compliance with the EU’s policy objectives, is unlikely to succeed in its own, following from the lack
of a membership perspective for ENP countries, it is assumed that
interactions and functional cooperation between EU officials
and actors in ENP countries’ administrations can socialise the latter
into embracing the EU’s norms and values. This in turn is assumed to
increase the likelihood that ENP countries positively respond
to EU conditionality, as the perceived costs for compliance with EU
rules are mitigated.
Focusing on effects from variation in the novelty of administrative
structures in ENP countries, the intensity of cooperation between EU
officials and actors in ENP countries’ administrations, the coherence of the EU’s approach in promoting its rules beyond its borders,
and variation in the politicisation of the policy areas cooperation
projects are implemented in, a newly compiled panel dataset was used
to conduct regression analyses in order to explain variation in
the application of EU rules in ENP countries. The results of the analyses indicate that of all the included independent variables, only
variation in the administrative structures of ENP countries involved in
implementing the EU’s cooperation projects matters. It appears that
actors employed in administrative structures established in ENP
countries to handle EU cooperation can act as key agents in promoting the application of EU rules in their domestic context, as it
can be assumed that they are more open to socialising influences from
EU officials.
However, methodological and data limitations warrant an
increase of the number of observations and the inclusion of policy
areas displaying a greater variation on the values of the independent variables, in order to achieve more tangible results of the
analyses. Furthermore, qualitative analyses can be conducted
in order to more closely examine the mechanisms of socialisation in
the context of the ENP, outlined in this study.
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Part C
Analysis
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ANALYSIS
Is Poststructuralism
Just Another Version of
Constructivism?
Reconsidering the Way
Constructivism Is Taught
in IR Theory
THEO AIOLFI
The scholarly discipline of International Relations (IR) was deeply
shaped by the “Fourth Great Debate” which opposed neo-positivist
approaches, firmly rooted within a “scientific” conception of
analyzing global politics, and post-positivist approaches, that challenged the very notion of science and the possibility to reach
objectivity in international studies. At the conclusion of this debate,
social constructivism emerged as a powerful tradition of thought,
now occupying a significant place in the syllabus of every IR
theory class. Poststructuralism, typically taught after constructivism,
did not receive the same level of attention and its radical premises
may make it seem like nothing more than an “extremist” take
on constructivist ideas. This article argues against the position that
poststructuralism is just another version of constructivism and
its argument is two-fold. Firstly, it builds a historiographical account
of IR to remind that poststructuralism precedes constructivism,
which itself owes a significant share of its intellectual roots to
poststructuralism. Secondly, using the distinction between conventional and critical constructivism, the article highlights that the
dividing lines between constructivism and poststructuralism are not
clearly defined but have been blurred by the emergence of critical
constructivism.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, in the context of the end of the Cold
War, International Relations scholarship was shaped by the so-called
“Fourth Great Debate” 1 . This debate arose after the “interparadigm debate” (Wæver 1996) of the 1980s, in which neorealist
and neoliberal scholars, who shared a rationalist and positivist
epistemology, argued on the outcome of international cooperation
(Reus-Smit 2013, 217), eventually reaching what became known as
the “neo-neo” synthesis or consensus (Nye 2008, 653). The
“Fourth Great Debate” was divided on the lines of positivism and
post-positivism, a division acknowledged by Robert Keohane
in his 1988 presidential address to the International Studies Association (Keohane 1988) where he respectively labeled these two
positions as “rationalism” and “reflectivism”. Within this broad
umbrella, many traditions of thought developed and contributed to the
scholarly literature in International Relations, loosely united by
a rejection of the main tenets of rationalism. Among these, poststructuralism and constructivism deserve specific attention. Both are
recent theoretical approaches which developed as coherent traditions
of thought during the “Fourth Great Debate” and share an important
number of theoretical connections.
And while social constructivism acquired a mainstream status
in IR scholarship, notably through Wendt’s seminal works
(Wendt 1992, 1999) which received significant attention from proponents of rationalist approaches, poststructuralism remains
out of the mainstream scholarly debates. Indeed, its propositions
and intellectual stance, often categorized as anti-scientific by
positivist scholars (Keohane 1998), may be considered as nothing
more than a radical extension, a more “extremist” take on constructivist ideas. However, claiming that poststructuralism is “just
another version of constructivism” with a more radical outlook,
a stance that students may adopt following IR theory classes where
social constructivism typically precedes poststructuralism and
receives more attention, is both a misleading statement and an oversimplification.
In this article, I will elaborate on the links between poststructuralism and constructivism by showcasing some of their similarities and,
more importantly, their differences. My analysis will be based
firstly on a historiographical discussion, in which I seek to demonstrate
that poststructuralism cannot be “another version” of constructivism because not only poststructuralism formed as a coherent approach in International Relations before constructivism (ReusSmit, 2013), but also because constructivism finds a significant part
of its intellectual roots in poststructuralist works (Price & Reus1 There is disagreement on whether there is three or four “Great Debates”. Some scholars divide neatly the inter-paradigm debate
and the debate between positivists and post-positivists as respectively the Third and Fourth Great Debates (Wæver 1996, De
Carvalho et al. 2011). Others only focus on the positivism/post-positivism debate, describing it as the Third Great Debate (Lapid
1989, Price & Reus-Smit 1998). In this essay, I choose to follow the former interpretation.
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Smit, 1998). Following this historiographical argument, I will engage
in a more thorough discussion of the differences between constructivism and poststructuralism.
In order to do that, it is necessary to elaborate on the distinction
within the constructivist literature between conventional/“thin”
constructivism, and critical/“thick” constructivism (Katzenstein 1996,
Adler 1997), which allows for a more nuanced analysis. After
establishing this important divide in the constructivist tradition, I will
then explore the major differences between mainstream constructivism and poststructuralism, and then dedicate another part of
my analysis to the more subtle differences between critical constructivism and poststructuralism. Finally, I will synthesize the
argument of this essay in a brief conclusion detailing the main points
of my argumentation.
Historiographical Argument
While acknowledging Schmidt’s thoughtful criticism of the mythological
dimension of the “Great Debates” and his doubts about their
actual relevance (2002), I will nonetheless engage with the Fourth
Great Debate as the basis for my historical analysis of the literature
in International Relations. During the inter-paradigm debate,
the proponents of neorealism and neoliberalism, originally divided on
the results of cooperation within an anarchic international system,
agreed on a consensus regarding rationalist epistemology, based on
the “choice-theoretic assumptions of microeconomic theory”
(Reus-Smit 2013, 220). Three salient points of agreement are highlighted by Reus-Smit: 1) “political actors [...] are assumed to
be atomistic, self-interested and rational”; 2) “actor’s interests are
assumed to be exogenous to social interaction”; 3) “society is
[...] a strategic realm in which individuals or states come together to
pursue their predefined interests” (ibid.).
In reaction to this “neo-neo” consensus, the Fourth Great Debate
was the opportunity for critical theorists to deeply and strongly
challenge neorealist and neoliberal thinkers. Despite strong differences
within critical international theory, Price & Reus-Smit mention
“four common intellectual orientations”: 1) “Epistemologically, critical
theorists question positivist approaches to knowledge, criticizing
attempts to formulate objective, empirically verifiable truth statements”, 2)
“Methodologically, they reject the hegemony of a single scientific
method”, 3) “Ontologically, they [stress] the social construction of
actors’ identities, and the importance of identity in the constitution of
interests and action”, 4) “Normatively, they condemn value neutral
theorizing, denying its very possibility” (Price & Reus-Smit 1998, 261),
a position also expressed in Cox’s famous aphorism: “Theory
is always for someone, and for some purpose” (Cox 1981, 128).
Within the broad spectrum of post-positivist scholars, we can
distinguish between modernist scholars, “inspired by the writings of
Frankfurt School theorists such as Jürgen Habermas” (ReusSmit 2013, 221) and post-modernist, or poststructuralist scholars,
“drawing on the French social theorists, particularly Jacques
Derrida and Michel Foucault, [who] adopted a stance of ‘radical interpretivism’ [opposing] all attempts to assess empirical and ethical
claims by any single criterion of validity” (ibid.), a position Hoffman characterized as “anti-foundationalism” (1991, 170).
Despite the strong challenges it opposed to rationalist approaches, Reus-Smit argues that “the first wave of critical theory had
a distinctive meta-theoretical or quasi-philosophical character” (2013,
221) and many of the opponents of critical theory denounced its
relative lack of substantive input. Mearsheimer for instance, claimed
that “critical theorists have offered little empirical support for
their theory” (1994, 44), while Keohane argued that their “greatest
weakness [lay] not in deficiencies of their critical arguments
but in the lack of a clear reflective research programme” (1988, 392).
Authors from a poststructuralist background claimed that these
criticisms were misguided attempts to force poststructuralism to fit
within a narrow rationalist epistemology (Hansen 2006, 25;
Walker 1989), the mere demonstration of a “hegemonic discourse”
seeking to “define what counts as legitimate knowledge in the
field of International Relations” (Reus-Smit 2013, 222).
However, a shift occurred within the Fourth Great Debate in the
beginning of the 1990s, described as the “constructivist turn”
(Price & Reus-Smit 1998, 263). It was characterized by its clear emphasis on empirical analysis, a move prompted by the rationalist
challenge described above to move beyond theoretical critique
toward substantive analysis. Indeed, some constructivist scholars used
this opportunity to “demonstrate the heuristic power of nonrationalist perspectives” (Reus-Smit 2013, 223). This “constructivist
turn” can also be explained by the socio-political context of the
end of the Cold War, which both “undermined the explanatory hegemony of the dominant rationalist theories” and “the critical theorists” assumption that theory drove practice in any narrow and direct
fashion” (ibid.). This led to the emergence of a new generation
of scholars who “embraced the propositions of critical international
theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically informed theoretical development” (ibid.).
While keeping in mind its strong intellectual ties with sociology (Palan
2000; Finnemore 1996; Wendt 1994, 394), social constructivism thus draws on “ontological propositions, analytical strategies and
methodological approaches contained within critical social
theory” (Price & Reus-Smit 1998, 261), including notably poststructuralism to a large extent.
This brief summary of the historiography of International Relations during the Fourth Great Debate demonstrates that it is
anachronistic to claim that poststructuralism could be another version
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of constructivism. Indeed, although both approaches emerged
coherently in the scholarly literature of International Relations during
this Debate, poststructuralism precedes constructivism, which
itself finds its raison d’être and intellectual roots in poststructuralism.
On the contrary, if I had wanted to build an elegant but simplistic answer to the problematic developed above, I could have provocatively advocated that it is actually constructivism which is “just
another version” of post-structuralism with a less theoretical and more
empirical outlook, and not the other way around.
Conventional Constructivism and Critical Constructivism
However, such an argument would be underestimating the differences
between both approaches and would not do justice to their
theoretical subtleties. Therefore, it is important to build on this historiographic account of the emergence of poststructuralism and
constructivism to explore the deeper but fundamental differences between them. It is particularly hard to find a consensual and unequivocal definition of poststructuralism, mainly because “over the
years, very little work had declared itself to be postmodernist
or poststructuralist”, an absence of self-declaration which meant that
most attempts to describe and present poststructuralism as
a unified tradition of thought were carried out by its opponents and
critics. (Hansen 2006, 4).
In opposition with poststructuralist scholars, constructivists have
been “willing – or perhaps even [saw as a] strategic advantage
– to embrace a disciplinary label” (Hansen 2006, 4). This was maybe
encouraged by the fact that “constructivism is a social theory
and not a substantive theory of international politics” (Barnett 2013,
157), which means constructivism can be seen as a broad
theoretical umbrella which accommodates an impressive number of
different approaches (Palan 2000, 576). Reus-Smit argues that
they all share “three core ontological propositions”: 1) “the importance
of normative or ideational structures as well as material structures”; 2) the assertion that “identities constitute interests and actions”;
3) the claim that “agents and structures are mutually constituted”
(2013, 224 – 225).
Before engaging any further on this issue, I believe that,
because of the great variety of works labeling themselves as constructivist, which often vary dramatically in terms of epistemological
and methodological commitments, it is necessary to use a fundamental distinction to clarify any further analysis: the division between
“conventional” and “critical” constructivism (Hopf 1998, 181 – 185). This distinction, which will be detailed in the following paragraphs, is widely acknowledged in the scholarly literature, though the
labels may change: “thin” and “thick” for Katzenstein (1996),
“mainstream/dominant” and “critical” for Macleod2 (2004, 15),
“soft” and “hard” for Palan (2000, 576), “modernist” and “postmodernist” for Price & Reus-Smit (1998, 267 – 268) or Klotz & Lynch
(1999, 55). It is important to stress that the distinction I make,
following Macleod (2004), is a departure from Hopf’s which equates
“critical constructivism” to “critical theory” (Hopf 1998, 185),
therefore neglecting the specificities of the critical strand of constructivism.
Poststructuralism and Conventional Constructivism
For Palan, “soft constructivists are an eclectic lot consisting of
practically anyone who shows interest in culture, identity, norms
and accept the notion that ‘actors’ interests are not fixed but change
and arise out of a social context” (2000, 576). This extremely
broad and provocative description calls for more details. Conventional and critical constructivism are divided along many lines, and
share some of these lines of divisions with poststructuralism. Indeed,
as critical constructivism and poststructuralism share many
similar tenets, it is hardly surprising to find common theoretical grounds
between both approaches. Thus, I will first detail the differences
between conventional constructivism and both critical constructivism
and poststructuralism in this part of my essay. Then, I will distinguish
critical constructivism from poststructuralism in the following part.
The first difference between these approaches lie in the
famous distinction made by Cox (2014, 158) dividing problem-solving
theories, like conventional constructivism, and critical theories, like
poststructuralism and critical constructivism. On the one hand,
problem-solving theories ask “why-questions”, they “take the world
as [they] find it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized as the given
framework for analysis” (ibid.) and try to explain the underlying
patterns or causal relations behind a given issue, wondering why does
a certain phenomena take place in a a-historical world. On the
other hand, critical theories ask “how-questions”, they are “critical in
the sense that [they] stand apart from the prevailing order of
the world and ask how that order came about” (ibid. Emphasis added).
Going back to Keohane’s categorization evoked previously,
another difference is that critical constructivism and poststructuralism
can be described as “reflectivist” (Keohane 1988) and postpositivist approaches when conventional constructivism is closer to a
form of, arguably transformed but nonetheless positivist epistemology. Alexander Wendt, undoubtedly the most prominent conventional constructivist3, claimed boldly that “when it comes to the epistemology of social inquiry, I am strong believer in science – a
2 Some articles were originally written in French, like Macleod’s (2004) or Klotz & Lynch’s (1999). All translations are mine and are
as faithful as possible to the original text.
3 Macleod argues notably that “dominant constructivism is largely inspired by Wendt’s works” (2004, 15)
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pluralistic science to be sure, in which there is a significant role for
‘Understanding’, but science just the same. I am a ‘positivist’”
(1999, 39). Hopf also points to this fact claiming that “where constructivism is most conventional is in the area of methodology and
epistemology” (1998, 182), quoting Katzenstein when he denies that
he uses “any special interpretivist methodology”, claiming instead that
his position does not depart from “normal science” (1996, 67).
Adler and Barnett believe that (their strand of) constructivism
should “clearly distinguish itself from poststructuralism and
other non-scientific approaches” (1998, 12), while it should aim to
reach what Adler famously called the “middle ground” (1997)
between rationalist approaches and critical theory. This vision of
constructivism is also shared by Wendt who hopes “to find a philosophically principled middle way” (1999, 2) in this approach.
Macleod points to the fact that conventional constructivists “use their
proximity with positivism on an epistemological ground and their
ontological innovations” (2004, 17) to dialogue and elaborate a link of
complementarity with the “neo-neo” approaches. Smith argues
strongly that there is a major flaw in Wendt’s aspiration: “Centrally,
there is the difficulty that he is not really a reflectivist at all, but,
rather, is a rationalist (and a statist and a realist!), and thus his
attempt to bridge the gap is always going to be unsuccessful because
he is actually not sitting between the two positions, but instead is on
one side.” (Smith 2001, 188).
Smith’s criticism also highlights another difference between
Wendt’s constructivism and both poststructuralism and critical
constructivism: its statism and its reproduction of the dichotomy between the “inside” and the “outside” of global politics, e.g. the
domestic/national sphere and the foreign/international sphere, a position vehemently rejected by poststructuralists (Campbell 1998) and
critical constructivists (Bigo 1998, 56).
Poststructuralism and Critical Constructivism
In the words of Hansen, “as the presentation of poststructuralism is
misleading, so too is the one of critical constructivism and the
ostensible boundary between them.” (2006, 221). Macleod argues
that “if we cannot talk about a proper critical constructivist
project, most of its proponents would easily agree on the three principles suggested by Weldes et al.” (2004, 18). These principles
are: 1) “What we understand as reality is a social construct.”; 2) “The
constructions of reality mirror, enact or reify power relationships.
In turn, some actors or group of actors play a privileged role in the production and reproduction of these realities.”, 3) “A critical constructivist approach denaturalizes dominant constructions, offer indications on the transformation of common sense, and facilitate
the imagination of alternative ways of living and thinking. It problema-
tizes the conditions of what it claims; in other words, critical
constructivism is reflexive.” (Weldes et al. 1999, 13).
The differences between critical constructivism and poststructuralism are much more subtle than the ones between conventional
constructivism and poststructuralism, but they can be divided
in two dimensions. Firstly, there are purely theoretical differences,
regarding mostly epistemology. Secondly, there are metatheoretical differences, concerned with the strategic choice of the label
“constructivism” which determines the position of critical constructivists within the academic field.
On the theoretical side, although critical constructivists often use
poststructuralist concepts and thinkers, like Foucault and Derrida,
“they accept implicitly or explicitly a form of foundationalism”
(Macleod 2004, 19) in opposition with poststructuralism’s categorical
anti- foundationalism. However, when conventional constructivist
like Wendt accept explicitly a foundationalist framework (1999, 39),
critical constructivist are closer to the form of “minimal foundationalism” that Hoffman (1991, 169 – 185) contrasted with anti-foundationalism. It implies that “while they recognize the contingent
nature of all knowledge, the inherent subjectivity of all claims and the
connection between knowledge and power”, they believe “some
criteria [are] needed to distinguish plausible from implausible knowledge claims.” (Reus-Smit 2013, 221).
On the meta-theoretical side, critical constructivists “seek
to remain within the constructivist tradition because they share its general
vision of a socially constructed world, while being on a position
to criticize the dominant stream of constructivism on the grounds of its
epistemological and ontological conservatism.” Macleod 2004,
18). As described with genuine honesty by Marcus, despite critical
constructivists are “strongly allied intellectually to the poststructuralist critics”, “they clearly do not want to be ignored by the mainstream to the same extent” (Marcus 1999, x). Hence, one can
argue that labeling oneself as a “constructivist” is a strategic choice to
obtain more visibility and recognition within the epistemic community, which also allows, on a more positive note, critical constructivists to be in the best position “not to occupy an delusional ‘middle way’,
[but] to maintain the dialogue between post-positivists and positivists” (Macleod 2004, 19), a position acknowledged by David Campbell in the epilogue of his second edition of Writing Security
(1998, 222 – 225).
Conclusion
Throughout this article, I aimed to demonstrate that beyond some clear
similarities between eachother, it is misleading and simplistic
to argue that poststructuralism is just another version of constructivism.
A brief summary of the history of the discipline showcased that
poststructuralism emerged prior to constructivism as well as the theo-
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retical reasons, notably the relative absence of empirical work
from poststructuralist writers, leading many scholars during the
Fourth Debate to adopt a distinctively constructivist approach. Building
on the distinction between conventional and critical constructivism, a
more detailed theoretical discussion highlighted the deep differences that oppose poststructuralism and conventional constructivism, as well as the more nuanced elements that distinguish poststructuralism and critical constructivism. The position of the latter,
which Fierke (2001, 122) argues is “at the boundary” between empirical and critical scholarship, offers promising insights for
future research.
Indeed, critical constructivism is often hardly mentioned, if at
all, in IR theory classes, which can be partly explained by the
lack of unity within the main proponents of this approach. However,
as the paradigmatic lines of division in IR are getting blurred,
critical constructivism occupies a bridging position between not only
conventional constructivism and poststructuralism, but also more
generally between neo-positivism and post-positivism. In IR
theory classes, it could become the missing link between the “tamed”
version of critical theory that constructivism became with the
rise of its main proponent, Wendt, and more radical approaches.
In the broader scholarly debate, critical constructivism’s location at
paradigmatic crossroads could contribute to a richer complementary dialogue, thus diminishing the parochialism in IR heavily
criticized by Lake (2011). Both of these elements make for a
convincing case to reconsider the way constructivism is taught and
canonically descibed in the literature, both externally in relation
to poststructuralism and internally in relation to its more critical wing.
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GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS IN COMBATTING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE
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THEORY ESSAYS
Managing Microbes:
Global Public Policy
Problems in Combatting
Antimicrobial Resistance
SOFIE VAN
HEIJNINGEN
Could theoretical models from public policy and IR theory help
us understand why global cooperation in developing and implementing policy on AMR has been reasonably successful in some
cases, but very difficult in others?
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is one of the most, if not the most,
pressing global health challenges of our time. In June 2013,
the Science ministers of the G8 declared that antimicrobial drug
resistance is the “major health security challenge of the twenty
first century”. AMR is a true “problem without a passport”; it affects
the populations of states across the world and cannot be combatted without a collaborative global strategy. If global public policy
problems impeding the implementation of this strategy are not
overcome, the increasing economic and health burden and future
threats caused of AMR are predicted to be immense. , In the face of
a this growing global public health burden and significant future threat,
the continuing absence of globally implemented policy on combatting AMR is problematic.
As most of the existing academic research on global public
policy regarding AMR has been undertaken by clinical specialists and
global health professionals, it is interesting to explore how theoretical perspectives from public policy studies and IR could support
our understanding of the problem. In the essay, two theoretical
approaches, John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) and
liberal institutionalist theories of collective action problems , will be
adopted. These theoretical models will be applied to two case
studies; one drawn from successful global policy coordination
on AMR, the other from failed global implementation of policy proposals. Through investigating the reasons behind respective success and
failure in these cases of successful, the explanatory power of
these theoretical models will be assessed.
AMR:
History, Causes and (Potential) Consequences
AMR, including (but not limited to) multi-drug resistance (MDR) and
antibacterial/antibiotic resistance (ABR), is the consequence
of the natural adaptation of microorganisms to selective pressures
caused by the overuse of antimicrobial drugs. Most notably,
resistance of microorganisms to antimicrobial drugs have been observed in cases of tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS and various
usually hospital-borne pathogens such as MRSA. AMR is prevalent
all over the world and thus has associated costs in both the
developed as well as the developing world.
The first warnings of the dangers of AMR were issued as early
as 1945 by Alexander Flemming and Howard Walter Florey on
acceptance of the Nobel Prize for their discovery of penicillin. However, it was not until the 1980s until organizations and professionals began to recognize AMR as a global problem. While between
1930s and 1960s the discovery of antibiotics and other antimicrobials had spurred research into new effective agents in the first half
of the 20th century, from the 1960s development of new antimicrobials had slowed down. Faced with the high costs of developing
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approved new drugs and several large-scale failures to find
fundamentally different new antimicrobials, pharmaceutical research
and development became increasingly dedicated to more lucrative
drugs targeted at chronic diseases faced by the developed
world. This decline and continuing lack of investment in research into
novel antimicrobials has resulted in the current situation, in which the
“research and development (R&D) pipelines are nearly dry.”
Apart from a nearly empty bank of ready-to-use new antimicrobials, the current global threat and health burden of AMR is the
product of the cumulative interaction of several other causal factors,
as set out in Table 1. Some of these causal factors, such as the
(over)prescription of antimicrobials and the (over)use of antimicrobials in farmed animals can be considered as a negative externalities of clinical and veterinary health care. The fact that in many
countries the use of existing antimicrobial drugs has been and
still is only minimally regulated contributes to the large effects of these
negative externalities. The development of new antimicrobials is
ineffective unless combined with globally implanted surveillance and
antimicrobial stewardship policies to limit these causal factors
behind AMR.
Table 1. Causal factors in AMR based on the WHO Global Strategy for Containment of Antimicrobial Resistance
Use of first-line
antimicrobicals
instead of
advanced/combined
therapies
Incorrect use of
antimicrobials by
patients
(Over)prescription
of antimicrobials by
prescribers
Use of less effective
counterfeit
antimicrobial drugs
Antimicrobial
Resistance
(AMR)
(Over)use of
antimicrobials in
farmed animals,
aquaculture etc.
Lack of R&D into
new antimicrobials
The potential global consequences of increasing, unchecked
AMR are frightening. Already, 23 000 people die each year
due to MDR pathogens in the U.S. alone. Similar rates can be observed in the European Union (EU) and the associated costs
of the infections with resistant microorganisms within the EU have been
estimated at a yearly 1.5 billion euros. However, AMR does not
only bring about increased morbidity and economic costs, widespread
AMR would also bring about a return to pre-anti-microbial health
care.
AMR as a Global Public Policy Problem
The policy problems associated with AMR fit conceptual criteria of
global public policy problems as proposed by Marvin Soroos;
AMR has raised serious concern throughout the world (1) and has
been taken up by multiple international organizations, of which
several (including the WHO and the EIO) have open membership to
all states (2).
In some ways, AMR is very similar to climate change as a global
public policy problem; in both cases potential long-term costs
are extremely serious and the causes can be (at least partly) found in
negative externalities of common practices across the world.
As the WHO declared in 2001, “[n]o single nation, however effective
it is at containing resistance within its boundaries, can protect
itself from the importation of resistant pathogens through travel and
trade.” Policy solutions combatting AMR can be implemented
on a national level, but they must be adopted worldwide in other to be
effective. Containing AMR and the availability of effective antimicrobials can thus be seen as global public goods, from which all
states can benefit.
The global public policy problem of AMR suffers from an extra
complicating factor in the sense that, in many areas, effective
global policy will require the cooperation of all states. The reason for
this is that the lowest common denominator, or “weakest link”,
determines actual global AMR policy outcomes; whether this concerns controlling the international transmission of resistant microbes or slowing the emergence of resistant microbes through antimicrobial stewardship. This further complicates the development and implementation of global public policy, as the policy baseline must be achievable by all states to have significant effects.
Theoretical Models
The requirement for full compliance in many AMR policy areas makes
it likely that global policy iteration and implementation will suffer
from severe collective action problems. Within the IR school of liberal
institutionalism much work has been done on developing theoretical frameworks for understanding these collective action problems and how to overcome them. Collective action problems
considered by liberal institutionalist theorists include free-riding and
the prisoners’ dilemma and strategies to overcome these problems often involve information/preference sharing and routinized
interaction through international institutions. In order for this theoretical model to “fit” and hold significant explanatory power, a case
must satisfy the following conditions:
(C1) States are the primary agents involved in developing and
implementing policy.
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(C2) The development and implementation of policy is affected by
collective action problems, and
(C3) these collective action problems can be/are overcome through
collaboration in international institutions.
The latency between official warning of the dangers of AMR in
the 1980s and actual policy development and implementation
in the 1990s gives rise to the idea that other factors might affect global
and national agenda-setting as well. John Kingdon’s acclaimed
theoretical framework of Multiple Stream Analysis (MSA) could potentially shed some light on the uptake of AMR as a policy issue by
national governments and international institutions. The core assumption behind the MSA model is that there are three “streams” that
affect actual (incremental) policy change: a policy problem (problem
stream), available policy solutions (policy stream) and political
will (politics stream). When these streams come together, a policy
“window of opportunity” opens and there is a possibility for the
policy issue to rise on the policy agenda or even for existing policy
solutions to be implemented. MSA has been previously successfully
applied to global public policy problems by various scholars,
including those considering problems affecting global health. In order
to test the explanatory validity in the case-studies, findings must
affirm the following conditional hypotheses:
(C4) Policy change happens at key moments, during which the three
(problem, policy, politics) streams intersect and a policy window
opens.
(C5) Policy entrepreneurs take advantage of these policy windows
and affect incremental policy change by putting the issue on the
agenda/affecting implementation progress.
Case Study I: EU and TATFAR
The most notable cases of cooperation in the coordination and
implementation of policy to combat AMR can be found in the inter-EU
collaboration and the EU – U.S. AMR taskforce. As early as
2001, the European Commission presented a global strategy for the
containment of AMR. This strategy was translated into actual
(EU-level) policy four years later and became one of the major policy
programmes for the European Centre for Disease Prevention
and Control (ECDC), established in 2005. In pursuit of a mutual goal
to increase international cooperation on AMR, the U.S. and EU
launched official collaborative efforts in 2009. The Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) was established following the November 2009 US – EU Summit Declaration.
The fact that cooperation has been particularly successful within
the EU as an international organisation provides significant evidence
for C1 – C3. Collective action problems are overcome in this
case by building on existing partnerships and exchanges through
international institutions, so that previous cooperation in other areas
benefits collaboration on AMR. One could even argue that this
occurs through a process of functional spill over, which has been
theoretically developed in context of EU integration by liberal
insitutionalist theorists such as David Mitrany.
The timing of the launching of both the inter-EU strategy as well
as TATFAR, confirms that policy change has happened at key
moments when problem, policy and politics intersected (C4). Policy
proposals on AMR were developed in the WHO in the late
1990s, but both the European Commission and the WHO only proposed official global strategies in 2001. In this year, partly
thanks to efforts of WHO officials and (non)governmental advocates,
the policy issue of AMR “heated up” through warnings from IOs,
researchers and medical specialists. The role of policy entrepreneurialism within the political stream (C5) can also be recognized,
especially in the case of TATFAR. Both President Obama US President Obama and then-President of the EU, Prime Minister
Fredrik Reinfeldt from Sweden, were instrumental in directing policy
attention towards the problem of AMR and setting up the taskforce.
While the application of these theoretical frameworks in
this case of AMR policy seems relatively fruitful, it must be noted that
both the EU programmes as well as TATFAR focus heavily on
the area of research funding and research coordination. In these policy
areas, not only is full compliance not a requirement, but problems are
not mainly caused by negative externalities of common state
practice. Collective action problems might thus actually be not as
severe, which is supported by the fact that most international,
public-private and/or inter-sectoral partnerships on AMR have been
successful formed with a research focus. This counts for government-led programmes as discussed above, but also for programmes
without the direct involvement of states. The Asian Network for
Surveillance of Resistant Pathogens (ANSORP), a nongovernmental,
international research group on AMR in Asia is a good example
of such collaboration.
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Case Study II: Implementation of WHO
policy suggestions in developing countries
While a significant number of developed countries have taken up and
implemented the policy packages proposed by the WHO in
2001 through a national task force and strategy, this is not the case in
the rest of the world. Admittedly, there are some exceptions,
such as the strategy proposals in the Chennai Declaration by India,
but these initiatives are still to be widely reproduced elsewhere.
World Health Organization
The main problem with applying MSA to this case is that there
simply are not enough findings of successful global incremental
policy changes to go on. It is more complicated to convincingly demonstrate how policy streams have not intersected yet, compared to demonstrating when they do so. Still, on a global level, some
policy entrepreneurialism can be recognized (C5), especially
when it comes to disease specific programmes. A good example of
this can be found in the advocacy for MDR tuberculosis by Bill Gates.
Still, it would be interesting to re-apply this model if more cases
of successful implementation can be observed.
Still, it is clear that many of the problems which has hampered
significant progress in policy adoption come from areas which
are not directly covered by these theoretical models. The most obvious of these problems is perhaps the fact that many countries
lack the strong health care systems or resources to effectively implement policy on AMR. A different problem is that most policy
requires significant inter-sectoral cooperation, which is complicated
logistically because of the large numbers of institutions that
need to work together (often for the first time). Both of these barriers
do not fit within a traditional collective action problem or MSA
framework.
Policy recommendations and conclusions
Based on the insights that the theoretical models yield in the above
case studies, the following policy recommendation s can be
formulated:
As the implementation responsibility of these policies relies primarily on national governments (C1), collective action problems
are likely to have hampered significant progress (C2). In contrast to
the focus research which was demonstrated to be prevalent
in EU and TATFAR collaboration, the 2001 WHO policy package was
largely dedicated to precisely those policy areas that impinge
upon negative externalities. However, states might be reluctant to
combat these externalities without the insurance that other
states will do this as well. The reasons for this is that short-term
losses will be encountered, while a prisoners’ dilemma arises
at the same time. For cooperating states, the publication data on
national AMR surveillance could give them a competitive disadvantage (and absolute losses) when compared to states who do
not do so. Still, surveillance of resistant pathogens is essential
if tailored, disease-specific strategies to combat AMR are to be implemented successfully at local level. The latest WHO report on
AMR surveillance confirms that collective action problems remain and
that too little has been undertaken unilaterally or collaboratively
by states thus far and there is still an “urgent need” for global AMR
surveillance data.
1. Bilateral and multilateral partnerships should be encouraged by
the WHO, as building on pre-existing relationships has proved
beneficial as seen in case study I.
2. Collective action problems prevalent especially in case study
II show that policy suggestions from above are not enough to compel
states to undertake action and combat the negative externalities
causing AMR. Policy suggestions must become enshrined in international law, thus I propose
i. The extension of the WHO International Health Regulations (IHRs)
to create a legal obligation for signatories to set up an intersectoral task force charged with the monitoring and surveillance of
antimicrobial resistance in humans and animals.
3. The establishment of a global fund, coordinated by the WHO and
the UN Development Programme, to support resource-poor
countries in setting up the inter-sectoral task forces required by the
new IHRs.
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4. IOs, national governments and NGOs should focus to increase
awareness of AMR not just among clinical professionals, but
also among the general public. This would increase the likelihood of
policy windows to open as the problem stream will become
more obvious, and policy entrepreneurs are more likely to respond to
public demands.
These recommendations extend beyond the recommendations
of others, especially in the case of recommendation (2). The
incorporation of previous WHO policy suggestions into international
law will certainly be difficult. However, when combined with
policy recommendation (3), signatories would be more likely to see
the goals set as achievable, while at the same time benefiting
from the short- and long-term benefits of developmental aid. The application of theoretical frameworks from public policy
(MSA) and IR theory to AMR as a global public policy problem
yields mixed results based on the discussed case studies. While both
theoretical frameworks largely fit the case of successful cooperation within the EU and between the EU – U.S., we should be sceptical
about the validity of these frameworks when it comes to wider
global policy problems in AMR. The second case study shows that
when the global policy implementation considers areas corresponding to the elements of AMR caused by negative externalities, a
wide and complex range of problems arise. These include but
also extend beyond collective action problems or non-intersecting policy streams (such as difficulties with inter-sectoral cooperation
and lack of resources).
The example of AMR as a global public policy problem is
demonstrative of the heterogeneity of policy areas (and thus potential
for global solutions) within a single policy problem. The most
important conclusion we can draw from this is twofold. Firstly, from
an academic perspective, there is a clear need for a variety of
theoretical frameworks and methodological tools to understand failings or successes within single global public policy problems.
IR theory and public policy theories certainly have a role to play here,
but their limitations must be critically appreciated. However, especially when considering AMR (perhaps less so in areas such as
climate change, or conflict), more scholarly analysis from IR or public
policy perspectives could be valuable. Furthermore, a greater
variety of academic perspectives would certainly also be conducive to
more effective policy recommendations for combatting AMR
and other global problems. The huge challenges faced in the case of
AMR as a global public policy problem are daunting, but because of
these difficult conditions, any (if incremental) successful progress could serve as indications for potential policy opportunities in
other global public policy areas.
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THE FUTURE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IN LIGHT OF THE US SUPREME COURT RULING IN
KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM
The Future of Dispute
Settlement under
International Law in Light
of the US Supreme
Court Ruling in
Kiobel
v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum
Dispute settlement in the present day is much more complex than what
it was several decades ago. The most frequent disputes in contemporary international politics are not necessarily between states,
but rather a state and individuals and/or non-state actors. With
such developments, the matter of dispute settlement has brought about
a separate dimension, especially regarding corporations. The
US Supreme Court recently decided in Kiobel, that there is a broad
presumption that congressional statutes are not meant to regulate extra-territorial activity unless there is a clear statement in the
statutory text.1 In doing so, the courts opted against expanding
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). It is argued
by many that such a decision severely impedes the progress
of international human rights, especially in concern to establishing corporate responsibility. This paper will argue against this position
and posit that the decision in fact opens up several other means for
expanding international law with respect to corporate responsibility, liability and accountability as well as state obligations to their
citizens under custom and treaty law. It would be further argued that
such alternative means provide a more sustainable path towards
the establishment of corporate accountability whereby regional legal
structures provide credence to a universal platform. Furthermore, the future of the ATS and the ramifications of this decision on
the Respondents in Kiobel will be discussed briefly as well.
KITHMINA
VIROCHANA
HEWAGE
The growing influence of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) has
necessitated an evolution of international law to deal with complex legal
disputes. The decision by the United States Supreme Court against
expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was deemed to have impeded
progress towards establishing comprehensive international norms and
laws regarding corporate responsibility. This essay contests that claim
and argues that the apparent defeat opens up several alternative
methods that provide more sustainable and inclusive means that
expand corporate responsibility, liability, and accountability as well as
state obligations to their citizens under custom and treaty law.
Emergence of Regional Courts
As of today, very few international instruments exist to provide
remedies to international human rights violations, barring domestic
legal structures. Therefore the ATS was a crucial component in
providing an additional source of providing remedial jurisdiction. Thus
far three regional, treaty based bodies for the adjudication and
reparation of human rights violations committed against individuals
exist under the auspices of the Organization of American States
(OAS), Council of Europe, and the African Union. The current
standing of courts under these regional bodies though can only hold
States accountable for human rights abuses. 2 However, with
the growth of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and the increasing
frequency of alleged human rights abuses that occur in many
developing nations, the necessity for an institutional framework that is
given jurisdiction over non-state entities and persons, similar
to corporations, have become even more prominent.
The emergence of regional courts with jurisdiction over
persons is the logical progression in the evolution of international law.
The advent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) followed
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) marked the jurisprudential
evolution of international law in holding states and individuals
1 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 US (2010)
2 International Justice Resource Center (Web). http://www.ijrcenter.org/ihr-reading-room/regional/
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respectively. It should be noted that both institutions were reactive in
nature towards developments in international affairs. Therefore,
in the face of greater corporate influence, courts with jurisdiction over
non-state entities such as corporations would fulfill the evolutionary expectations of international law. Given the Kiobel decision and
the resulting absence of any international mechanism, such
bodies are, arguably, a manifestation by necessity rather than
mere choice. The proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights
(ACJHR) can be noted as the first of many regional courts to be
created in the future under this rationale. Interestingly, “the proposed
expansion of the court would create the world’s first combined
state-level and individual-level criminal accountability mechanism for
human rights violations on an international scale.”3
The structure of regional courts
Under contemporary international law there is no significant jurisdiction
beyond a set scope such as jus cogens violations, outside domestic courts when it concerns individuals. The emergence of regional courts, however, is likely to address this weakness, as it would have
the ability to tailor its jurisdiction to a broader theme of violations
such as corruption, trafficking, illegal exploitation of natural resources
and offences committed by corporations. For example, an Ecuadorian judge ordered Chevron to pay a compensation package of
$9 billion after being found responsible for polluting remote
tracts of Ecuadorian jungle in 2011. 4 This is one of many examples
where courts have expanded jurisdiction signaling a growing
trend in the potential expansion of international law as well. Therefore
it is not inconceivable that the international community starts
expanding international jurisdiction to similar crimes. Though some
argue that such expansions may infringe on national sovereignty,
it is important to note that regional courts would work along the principles of complementarity. Moreover, similar to the limitations
posed under Filartiga with the ATS, it would be necessary that domestic remedies be exhausted and it is likely that we see analogous courts
being established in regions such as Africa, Latin America,
South Asia and South-East Asia.
The establishment of regional courts of this nature would
circumvent the limitation of extra-territoriality that most victims of human
rights violations in the present day face. As seen in Kiobel, foreign courts
are hesitant to expand its jurisdiction to cases that originate
outside its borders with a lack of territorial nexus and limited connection to the national interests of the respective state. Regional courts
however would not have to face the issue of extra-territoriality
since firstly, they will be working under the auspices of consent
3 Rau, Kristen, Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability Avoidance? http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=10594686-95f5-4c73-80a5-39c8ccc41980%40sessionmgr14&vid=2&hid=101
4 The New York Times, Ecuador Judge Orders Chevron to Pay $9 Billion (2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html?_r=0
by members to the regional body, and secondly, the origins of the
alleged crime would have occurred in the said region.
State Obligations and Duties to its Citizens
The question of state-to-citizen obligations is one that has arisen
frequently over the past few years in political discourse. The
international community has, in general, accepted that states have
certain fundamental obligations towards its own citizens such
as protecting it from mass atrocities and have therefore concluded
that sovereignty is in essence, a responsibility. Such a position
is crystalized through the passing of the doctrine of Responsibility to
Protect (R2P) through UN General Assembly Resolutions as
well as the invocation of the doctrine when discussing matters pertaining to international peace and security such as the UN sanctioned invasion of Libya. Therefore given the establishment of such a
doctrine in common practice, international law is likely to integrate state-to-citizen obligations within its sphere of jurisdiction more
directly.
Furthermore, international law has also evolved to an extent where
states are responsible for the protection of its citizens from harm
from third parties, also known as the horizontal effects doctrine. For
example, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) article 2(1) states that, “each state party… undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
covenant.”5 Essentially, this demonstrates that a state has a positive
duty to ensure that, under domestic law, there exist obligations
to protect against human rights violations by non-state actors that harm
the rights of third parties.6
That said it would be interesting to note if judicial frameworks proposed would establish what can be termed as a dual mandate to bring both states and individuals within the jurisdiction
of the same court. The proposed ACJHR, for example, has created
such a dual mandate within its court structure. However upon
close inspection, it should be noted that to mitigate potential conflicts
of interests, it would be best that separate courts be created
to deal with state responsibilities and individual accountability. Many
allegations that are brought forth to international tribunals of
this nature would undoubtedly address situations where there is at
least some complicit involvement of state actors. Therefore, if
both state and individual considerations were to be made through the
same court, political considerations are likely to influence proceedings. Moreover, it should be noted that international structures
such as the ICC have already been established to deal with state
5 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
6 Muchlinski, Peter, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance
and Regulation. Business Ethics Quarterly, 151 (2012)
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actors responsible for violations of international human rights. As such,
there is potential for jurisdictional overlap between regional
courts and the ICC. Therefore, given these complications, the model
of a dual mandate of jurisdiction would be counter-intuitive to
the objectives of regional bodies that wish to expand the scope of
international humanitarian law.
Corporate Responsibility, Liability and Accountability
Technological changes and the resulting evolution of the world
economy have granted greater prominence to Multi National Corporations. These entities carry significant clout in terms of capital
and therefore have a major say in the inner workings of nations, especially in developing countries. Though there is no explicit treaty
agreed upon by the international community regarding corporate responsibility, liability and accountability, recent trends in legislature on
the domestic and regional scale are good indicators about the
future of corporate responsibility in international law. Many nations
have begun to create domestic legislature concerning corporate
practices similar to those of the Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights approved by the UN Human Rights Council. As
a result, “corporate responsibility in the area of international human
rights has ceased to be a matter of voluntary policy and has become
a matter of legal accountability.”7 These individual state actions
are likely to translate into regional legal structures as is seen with the
ACJHR, which would establish a consensus towards a new
form of international customary law. Considering the renewed advocacy of Non-Governmental Organizations and other human
rights advocates regarding corporate legal accountability along with
recent state practices, it is very likely that an international treaty
is created through the United Nations as well.
One of the most daring proposals through the draft protocol of
the ACJHR is the matter of criminal jurisdiction over corporations.
Though such a measure demonstrates a firm willingness on part of
the African Union to regulate corporate actions, imposing criminal
jurisdiction over corporations is likely to diminish the practical
advocacy of international law. Whereas in a criminal case the proof
has to be “beyond a reasonable doubt”, the standard for a civil
case is relatively lower and requires a standard pertaining to the “preponderance of evidence”. Given the complex nature by which
MNCs are formed and operate around the world, it would be near
impossible to meet the standard of a criminal case. These allocations of blame become even more complex with the implicit nature
of actions carried out by individuals violating international human
right, opening up the possibility for heads of corporations to invoke
ultra vires and thereby abdicate themselves from blame. Moreover,
7 McBarnet, Doreen; Schmidt, Patrick, Corporate Accountability through creative enforcement: human rights, the Alien Tort Claims
Act and the limits of legal impunity. The New Corporate Accountability, 142 (2007)
failure on part of criminal prosecution is likely to impede the success
of civil cases as well. A similar structure of delineating between
civil and criminal jurisdiction can be observed through the framework
of international law in concern of states. Whereas the state, as
an entity, is not subject to criminal jurisdiction, the actions of a state
are actionable to civil jurisdiction. Therefor, it would be best to
follow a similar structure in terms of corporations, whereby the entity
is not bound by criminal jurisdiction.
Future of the ATS and the perspective of
the respondents
With the decision in Kiobel, it is widely believed that the influence of
the ATS has diminished considerably. One of the highlights of
the Kiobel decision was regarding extra-territorial jurisdiction. Given
that many cases brought under the ATS are regarding foreign
conduct, and often through actions of foreign subsidiaries, and rarely
with any action by corporate actors based in the United States,
the ATS will inevitably lose its significance as an alternative international court. However, given the wording of the decision, including the concurring opinion, the ATS’ future will continue to be
significant in concern towards American actors. This is even
more evident given that the court refrained from overturning Sosa or
Filartiga. Moreover, with developments around the world regarding such matters, it is also likely that the ATS acts as the basic
framework for any domestic developments.
From the perspective of the respondents in Kiobel, the decision
marks a significant victory. However, this victory would have
positive consequences to the respondents only in the short term. The
Kiobel decision has resulted in the international community,
through the leadership of developing countries and NGOs, taking
more proactive measures to address corporate responsibility. In
essence, the Kiobel decision can be considered the catalyst towards
substantive changes that are likely to occur in international law
in the foreseeable future. Moreover, with the advent of regional courts,
corporations similar to that of the respondents, have opened
themselves up to even more severe penalties that what it would have
under the ATS, especially if the ACJHR approves of criminal jurisdiction over corporations.
Conclusion
A movement towards expanding international human rights over the
past few years, coupled with the Kiobel decision, has led to two major
outcomes. Firstly, the international community has now been
granted an opportunity to take up proactive measures to initiate the
expansions in human rights law that it desires. In order to do
so, the actions of individual states, and eventually, regions will be crucial
in establishing a universal norm. As has been stated before, in
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the absence of treaty law, international norms are capable of redefining the boundaries of international law. Furthermore, with an
increase in lobbying efforts by advocates, it is probable that corporate legal accountability is codified in an international treaty.
As such, expansions of international law would essentially take a
“bottom-up” approach whereby the limits of dispute settlement
get defined an aggregate of individual state action, rather than any
direct imposition.
United States Supreme Court
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Why Do States
Give International
Development
Assistance?
KATELIN RAW
Statistical analyses on global aid have shown that donors’ motives are
primarily driven by self-interest. This sharply contrasts with the
EU’s self-image as a Normative Power Europe. This essay illustrates
how EU development policy, despite its formal primary objective
being poverty eradication, is not an altruistic exception to the
self-interested rule. Firstly, the EU has historically favoured countries
based on its strategic interests in a given global structure. Differences
in aid allocation can be noticed between the Cold War era, the
nineties and post-9/11. Secondly, aid has been increasingly aimed at
security objectives rather than development objectives. 9/11 and the
European Security Strategy have been a catalyst in this respect,
which influenced the first revision of the Cotonou Agreement. Moreover, the new European External Action Service has institutionally taken
over (parts of) the decision-making processes regarding aid
from the Development Directorate General. This essay concludes that
the securitization of aid does not only influence the budget, the aims,
the channels and the institutional autonomy of EU development
policy, but also negatively impacts the EU’s international legitimacy as
a normative power.
In this essay I argue that although the EU prides itself on being a
normative world power and the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) defines poverty eradication as the EU’s
primary objective when allocating aid, development policy has
always been aimed at strategically interesting countries. Moreover,
recent substantive and institutional changes to EU development policy
uncover a specific strategic objective, namely security.
Extensive quantitative research has been carried out on finding
what determines aid allocation on a global scale statistically.
Altruistic donors allocate aid independently of their relationship with
developing countries and focus on a country’s need and merit
(Berthélemy, 2006, p. 189), whereas egotistical donors are drawn to
countries that may be of a strategic interest to them. The vast
majority of donors belong to the latter group (Alesina & Dollar, 2000).
To narrow down the scope for this essay, I focus on the paradox
between this finding and Europe’s self-image as a normative power,
which would pay more attention to recipient need and merit to
create a better world. In discussing this I will pay less attention to facts
and figures, as these data are widely and readily available, and
more to discourse and substance with the intention of presenting a
critical picture of the EU as a normative power. The EU serves
as a justified case study for several reasons. Development cooperation is one of the few policies where the EU can draw on the
power of the purse instead of just relying on its regulatory capacity
(Orbie & Versluys, 2009, pp.75 – 76); its development budget
is larger than any of its member states’ and accounts for 10% of the
world’s official development assistance (ODA). Furthermore,
the EU has a coordinating role to ensure complementarity between
EU aid and member states’ aid and thus has an impact on the
development policies of the national governments as well. Finally, article 208 of the TFEU puts economic need first: “Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty.” By deduction we can assume that if the EU proves to be mainly driven by strategic self-interest, altruistic aid donors may not exist.
This essay is structured as follows. First it gives a short overview of existing quantitative research on motives of global aid.
The consensus is that strategic interests drive aid. Next I discuss the
concept of Europe as a normative power, which is the prevailing
self-image of the EU. The logical assumption then is that the EU is a
more altruistic donor. I go on to uncover this is not the case.
I do this first by looking at which countries have received EU aid since
the beginning of European integration, namely (former) colonies
during the Cold War and neighbouring states to the EU during the
nineties. Secondly, I show how 9/11 and the European Security Strategy (ESS) that followed have influenced development policy
substantively, using the Cotonou Agreement as an example. Security
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WHY DO STATES GIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE?
seems to have become the specific kind of strategic interest that
shapes European development policy. Institutionally this has also surfaced. The creation of the European External Action Service
(EEAS) erodes EU development policy. I conclude that this “securitization of aid” has a negative effect not only on EU aid, but also
on its normative power.
point to be better today is called “temporal othering”, a process that
Diez (2004) believes is applicable to Europe’s identity as a
civilian power.
Duchêne’s CPE concept was never really developed into a
comprehensive scheme. Ian Manners (2008) uses CPE as the
foundation for his more refined concept of a Normative Power Europe
(NPE), which is focussed on Europe’s normative means rather
than its civilian ends. NPE describes Europe as a new kind of power
that does not draw strength from its military capacity like traditional
powers, but from its normativity.
The sense of NPE is widespread in Brussels. European
politicians experience the EU as a force for good, especially in contrast
with the US (Orbie, 2009, p.3). Diez (2004; 2005) is worried
this is a sign that what used to be temporal othering by the EU has since
the end of the Cold War turned into geographic and cultural
othering1. He urges for more reflexivity before Europe falls back into
the trap of traditional geopolitics.
Official discourse shows signs of NPE too. The Laeken Declaration on Europe’s new role in a globalised world (2001) – to
give just one example – calls the EU a “power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development”. Former European Commission
President Barroso believes in NPE as well and uses the abolition of
the death penalty as an example of how other countries follow
in the EU’s footsteps (Peterson, 2007). Apparently the belief in NPE
is not constricted to European borders: the EU was rewarded
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its “successful struggle for peace
and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights.”
Motives Behind Global Aid
Research has shown a consensus on the effectiveness of development
aid, in the sense that without it, growth would be slower (McGillivray
et al., 2005; Feeny & McGillivray, 2008). However, developing
countries are still accused of wasting aid (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p. 33).
In a widely cited and influential paper, Alesina & Dollar (2000)
research whether this “wastefulness” can at least partly be attributed
to the donor countries: is aid allocated to countries that (donors
hope) can effectively translate assistance into poverty reduction
through sound policies? Or is aid allocated to countries that might be
of a different “strategic interest” to the donors? The authors
look for the relative importance of both dimensions – recipient need
and merit versus strategic interest – and nuance past research
rejecting altruistic foreign aid altogether (Schraeder, Taylor & Hook,
1998; Feeny & McGillivray, 2008). Their paper concludes that
strategic interests such as a former colonial relationship (e.g. France,
the UK) or UN voting patterns (e.g. Japan) more than recipient
need and merit determine which country receives aid thus undermining aid efficiency. In the margin, democratization is rewarded.
The result is that there is only a weak association between aid
allocation and poverty, democracy and good policy (Alesina & Dollar,
2000; Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Berthélemy, 2006). Surprisingly, research by Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Thiele (2011) shows that
on average, new donors like China and Brazil care even less
for recipient need and merit than old donors.
A different type of research looks at trends in aid allocation over
longer periods of time. It shows global political structures are
important. The impact of former colonial ties on aid flows is still strong,
but has decreased since the end of the Cold War in favour of a
different strategic interest: trade, and the competition for export markets.
This is especially true for smaller donors (e.g. Belgium, Italy)
who need to spend their limited aid budget effectively (Berthélemy &
Tichit, 2004; Barthel et al. 2014).
Normative Power Europe
These generalizations contradict the EU’s supposed role in global
politics. An influential role concept is Duchêne’s Civilian Power
Europe (CPE), which describes Europe as the continent of a very amilitary people since the Second World War (Orbie, 2009).
This psychological process of using one’s own history as a reference
EU, the Ever-changing Donor
Europe as a normative power sharply contrasts with the self-interested motives of aid donors. Surely an expressly normative institution like the EU would be a more altruistic donor, taking into account
the other’s need over its own interest? A short history of European
development cooperation suffices to determine the opposite
is true.
During the Cold War the EU nourished its (former) colonial ties
with the group of African, Pacific and Caribbean states (ACP)
through special association agreements. The EU was driven by an
altruistic sense of historical obligation towards these countries,
but also by the need to ensure the ongoing supply of raw materials to
Europe and opening up these countries to more European trade and
investment (Carbone, 2011). In this particular geopolitical context of bipolarity aid was also used to buy influence away from communism (Faust & Messner, 2005; Woods, 2005).
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9E2B_yI8jrI. This is a remarkable example of cultural othering. NB: the ad was pulled by DG
Enlargement.
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This “EurAfrica” relationship (Carbone, 2011, p. 2) gradually
normalized after the Cold War. The changed political context
forced the EU to rethink its foreign strategy. EU aid to the ACP
declined from 66.3% in 1989/90 to 42.8% in 1996/97. By contrast,
aid to other areas grew from 33.7% to 57.2% during the same
period (Olsen, 2004, p. 85). Primary beneficiaries of this change were
EU neighbours and in some cases future member states: the
former communist and Soviet states in Central and Eastern Europe
and North African and Middle Eastern countries (Appendix 1).
These numbers prove international development interests cannot be
seen separately from foreign policy.
EU development policy has also gone through changes on an
institutional level. The Maastricht Treaty entered into force in
1993, creating a (albeit shared) EU competence for development policy with the goal of “campaigning against poverty” (art. 130(1)).
However, problems of coordination and coherence and severe staffing
shortages rendered EU development aid slow and ineffective.
Consecutive Commissions have tried to remedy these issues through
institutional reforms aimed at increasing coherence between
governments (vertically) and EU policies (horizontally) (Orbie &
Versluys, 2009, pp.68 – 72).
The most important change for EU development policy was the
Lisbon Treaty2 (2009). Encouraged by the successful discourse
of “euro strategists” for a more strategic and assertive international
Europe, the Treaty created a single institutional framework for
EU international relations, development and foreign policy with
a simplified chain of command: a High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) backed by a EEAS.
These institutions’ main aim is to ensure the consistency of EU’s external action (Hadeshian, 2010; Zwolski 2012). The Treaty defines
EU development aid’s “primary objective the reduction and, in the long
term, the eradication of poverty” (TFEU, art. 208). We will look
into the EEAS more critically below, when assessing the significant
consequences for development policy these institutional changes have.
Trends in aid allocation show the EU might not be as
normative as it would like to be, or at least not in the area of development policy. The EU chooses recipients of its aid based on
strategic interests in a given global structure. If egotistical motives
have the upper hand in aid allocation, does the EU at least uphold its primary objective of development aid as adopted in the TFEU:
poverty eradication? Again, NPE falls short.
Securitization of EU Aid
The New York terrorist attacks of 2001 ushered in a new age for EU
development policy. Responding to the specific security threat
2 The Lisbon Treaty amends the two core treaties of the EU : the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the TFEU.
of terrorism, the European Council adopted the ESS in 2003.
It acknowledges the two-way relationship between development and
security, but also recognizes a dominance of the latter by claiming, “security is a precondition of development” (p. 2). The ESS argues
for the integration of EU external instruments and policies to
achieve an “extended security”, based on military and civil instruments
(Faust & Messner, 2005, p. 425).
The Cotonou Agreement was up for its first revision in 2005,
an opportunity to put the new security-development nexus into
practice. The Agreement between the EU and the ACP encapsulates
the most comprehensive cooperation relationship the EU has, aimed
at poverty eradication in the region (art. 1). Mackie (2008, pp.
149 – 151) identifies important changes to Article 11 (“Peace
Building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution”) that reflect the post9/11 security concerns. For example it includes new articles
on the fight against terrorism and on co-operation on non-proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, the latter stressed as being
“an essential element of this agreement” (art. 11B(1)). Furthermore,
the African Peace Facility is used for peacekeeping and peace enforcement with money from the European Development Fund (EDF),
the budget used for ACP development cooperation. Peace missions
do not count as ODA; this means part of the EDF is not used
for development goals, but for security goals, and this is not compensated by additional budgets for development (Orbie & Versluys,
2009, p. 82).
Institutionally the influence of security concerns has also
surfaced, primarily through the new EEAS. EU development policy
finds itself affected in different ways: overall ODA strategies
will be mapped out by the EEAS, the EEAS’ core competency will be
the management of delicate linkages between security and development and the country and regional desks formerly at the Development Directorate General will be moved to the EEAS, to name but
a few changes (Furness, 2010).
Closer cooperation between development and security policies
is necessary for the EU to be a more coherent international
actor. However, relevant actors have expressed their concern that development will become subservient to strategic security concerns in
the EU’s post-Cold War desire to be a significant international
player (Olsen, 2004; Woods, 2005).
The phenomenon of security concerns influencing development
aid is called the “securitization of aid”. For Buzan & Hansen
(2009) securitization refers to “the process of presenting an issue in
security terms” (p. 214). The 2011 Concord & AidWatch report
defines it more critically: “the blending of defence and development
objectives and the allocation of aid according to perceived security
threats and challenges, rather than according to poverty eradication goals” (p. 8).
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NPE No More?
Conclusion
To sum up, aid securitization is worrying for development policy in four
ways – its money, its aims, its channels and its institutional autonomy:
After 9/11 the world shifted into a structure constantly
seeking security from terrorism. The EU followed suit. The new ESSinfluenced agenda of state failure prevention in development
policy is concentrating funds on 20 – 30 states with limited reference
to development, away from other agendas like the Millennium
Development Goals and climate change (Faust & Messner, 2005; Concord & AidWath, 2011).
Secondly, most EU aid goes to Afghanistan, Iraq and its
neighbouring states, instead of the least developed countries (Orbie,
2012). This means money is going to less poor, but more unsecure regions, disregarding of the “poverty eradication” goal institutionalized in the TFEU.
Woods (2005) articulates a third relevant issue that has not been
discussed yet. In pursuit of their own strategic goals, aid is increasingly unique to the donors’ interests. Multilateral institutions are
less called upon to coordinate aid in a coherent manner across
the world. This results in competition amongst priorities and aid chaos
in recipient countries.
Finally and most worryingly, EU development policy is being
eroded institutionally. The abolition of the Development Council
in 2002 was a first major modification. Development issues have since
then been discussed in the General Affairs and External Relations
Council (Orbie & Versluys, 2009, p. 82). As discussed, the EEAS took
over a substantial part of development policy competency. Today aid
is being allocated by an institution primarily concerned with foreign policy, with limited involvement of development experts and actors
(AidWatch & Concord, 2011, p. 8).
I have argued that the securitization of aid has a considerable
impact on development policy, but it has threatened – and maybe even
damaged – the EU at a more fundamental level: its identity as
a NPE. The EU used to be considered a new kind of superpower that
was not based on power politics. Orbie (2012) argues that this
is no longer the case; it has succumbed to “superpower temptation”.
In its never-ending quest for coherence between policies with
a view to assert itself as a more robust international actor, the EU might
have lost the very thing that made it such an effectively legitimate
international actor in the first place: its normativity. However,
as much as it is true that aid securitization has negative consequences for EU development policy and NPE, the development community
cannot escape the fact that security issues and development
aid have a very complex, interdependent relationship and that these
policies cannot be seen separate from each other.
In this essay I answered the question why states give international
development assistance. Rather than focusing on just hard
numbers3, I have looked at historical changes in aid allocation and
institutional structures and have based my argument on logic
and deduction, using the EU as a justified case study. I have done this
primarily to make the most use out of limited space, but also to
look at the process of securitization in a more comprehensive way to
present the reader with a holistic understanding of EU development
policy.
A lot of research has been done on the motives steering
aid allocation worldwide, and the general message is clear. Donors
give aid primarily for their own strategic interests, undermining
recipient need and merit. The paradox between global aid motives and
NPE is scrutinized in this essay and two dimensions are uncovered.
First, a short history of EU aid allocation shows that receiving
countries have always had a special relationship with the EU, situated
within a global structure. Second, NPE becomes even more
dubious when we look at the institutional changes EU development
policy has gone through over time. After the Cold War the EU
tried to break free from bipolarity and secure its own powerful place
in world politics. Plagued by the lack of coherence between different
policies on the one hand and between development policies at
national levels and EU level on the other, the Lisbon Treaty sought to
satisfy the euro-strategists’ call for more international credibility,
catalyzed by 9/11 and the ESS. It established a position for a HR and
the EEAS. The securitization of aid in its allocation and its policy
has enhanced the effectiveness of EU external policy, but not in favor
of EU development aid. More reflexivity and a better balancing
act are needed.
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What Accounts for the
Rise of Dementia on
the International Policy
Agenda?
RACHEL
POYNOR
This article seeks to make sense of the rise of dementia on the
international policy agenda. Using existing theoretical approaches to
agenda-setting I consider why a domestic public health problem
has recently come to be framed as a global public policy problem
requiring a coordinated international response. I conclude that policy
entrepreneurs are crucial in framing domestic issues as global
ones and in moving these issues onto international agendas. In light
of the policy challenges which aging societies will continue to
pose in the future, I recommend treating “global action on dementia”
as a blueprint for other kinds of “simultaneous” policy problems
(Stone: 2008) and further embedding the World Dementia Council in
an international organisation such as the World Health Organisation.
In his role as G8 president, the UK prime minister David Cameron
coordinated the first dementia summit on 11th December 2013. The
summit was significant to the extent that it may here be taken as
symbolic of the moment when, on a global level, dementia’s “time [had]
come” (Kingdon 2003: 1). Since, to my knowledge, this is not
a case which has been examined within existing policy literature, I base
my analysis of the summit on the declaration signed following
the event, as well as on speeches from G8 ministers made available on
government and NGO websites.
Although generally acknowledged as a growing problem, before
December 2013 dementia was not prominent on the agendas of the
international policy community. Unlike other global disease pandemics to date, dementia is non-communicable and the presence
of the disease in one state does not have a palpable impact on another. At the same time that G7/8 leaders met to discuss strategies
for coping with dementia, the international community grappled with
devising an adequate response to Ebola which appeared dramatically
more in need of coordinated international action. Nonetheless,
estimates suggest that the cost of dementia to the global economy is
over $604 billion a year and rising1, meaning that affected states cannot
ignore the need to rapidly develop policies which will address
the enormous burden the disease places on society.
Dementia falls into the category of policy problems which
by their nature are internal to states, and yet succeed at appearing on
the international policy agendas because their consequences
are experienced almost universally (Soroos, 1990: 311). These kinds
of simultaneous problems are just one classification of policy
problem which has led to the emergence of global public policy processes (Stone, 2008: 25) but which could, in theory, be tackled purely
through domestic policymaking. Although the economic and
societal threats posed by dementia are shared by almost all states, it
does not necessarily follow that international policy coordination
is required.
Although there were some precedents to the G8 dementia
summit,2 dementia has not historically appeared high on the agendas
of international organisations. This summit was novel in bringing together health ministers, pharmaceutical companies, researchers,
charities and representatives from the WHO and OECD with the aim
of discussing “how to shape an effective international response
to dementia”.3 Leaders from G7/8 member states are ideally placed to
build political and personal relationships, share policy knowledge, and
encourage action from the IMF and World Bank ( Karns and
1 WHO (2012) Dementia: a public health priority, p. 90.
2 For example, the 2012 WHO report declared that ‘coordinating and direction is required nationally and internationally in view
of the global nature of the coming epidemic and its profound fiscal and societal impacts’ (p.90). A passing reference is also
made to dementia in the 2013 Report of the Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations (p.29).
3 G8 Dementia Summit Declaration.
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Mingst 2010: 421). Since dementia is currently felt most acutely in
more economically developed states and its impacts are economic, the G8 appears an obvious forum for addressing the issue.
The challenges posed by dementia are not however limited to
wealthier states. The World Health Organisation predicts that
by 2050 71% of the 150 million people projected to have dementia will
live in low and medium income countries.4 The G7/8 health ministers have therefore acknowledged that “the economic challenge will
intensify as life expectancy increases across the globe” and
consequently “also want to engage other countries with a similarly
strong interest in dementia”.5 At the summit they committed to
“the ambition to identify a cure or a disease-modifying therapy for dementia by 2025 and to increase collectively and significantly
the amount of funding for dementia research to reach that goal”. 6
One outcome of the summit was the creation of the World Dementia Council, composed of pharmaceutical company representatives, civil society groups, public health professionals and government ministers. The Council is designed to encourage innovation
in dementia research and attract international investment and
is headed by the World Dementia Envoy. Creation of the Council is
significant because it ensures that even if dementia loses its
high agenda status, and the issue enters a “post-problem stage” (Downs
1972: 40), that a setting exists for sustained global action.
Various theories exist as to why some issues receive attention
at any given time. Particularly within technical areas, “epistemic
communities” may be seen to have a role in raising the profile of
certain issues. Haas (1992) has shown how epistemic communities
(made up of professional experts with authority on a particular
issue) are successful in exerting influence over decision makers in times
of uncertainty and are therefore “significant actors in shaping
patterns of international policy coordination” (Ibid.: 35). According to
Haas, collaboration between states which are not materially
dependent on one another usually indicates the existence of an transnational epistemic community (Ibid.: 17). The ideas of these communities may be taken up by international organizations (such as
the World Health Organisation) and in turn “diffused” to decision makers
in other states (Ibid.). Since the scale of the future impact of
dementia is uncertain, policymakers’ understanding of the problem
must be due to medical experts from within these epistemic
communities. Their influence may help to explain why policymakers
across states are aware of dementia as a problem and are therefore receptive to proposals of international cooperation on the issue.
However, the existence of epistemic communities is not alone
4 WHO (2012) Dementia: a public health priority, p. 90.
5 G8 Dementia Summit Declaration.
6 Ibid.
sufficient to explain why dementia would shift from “systemic”
to “formal” agendas (Kingdon 2003: 16) or to account for the occurrence of the dementia summit.
By assessing the numerous actors and processes which lead
to problems receiving attention at any given time, Kingdon’s
multiple streams model offers a more nuanced approach. Although
Kingdon’s insights into the agenda-setting process are discussed at the domestic level, many of the central concepts can be
applied at the global level. Fundamental to the multiple streams
model is the notion that the separate “streams” of politics, policies
and problems run through the policymaking process and that
when these streams converge an item is likely to receive attention on
a governmental agenda. The model also employs the concept
of the policy entrepreneur and it is this aspect of the model which I
consider most significant in accounting for the rise of dementia
on the international policy agenda.
Kingdon notes that in most case studies of agenda-setting
there will be one or more individual who played a key role in
raising the profile of a particular agenda item (Ibid.: 180). These
individuals often have a combination of a “claim to a hearing”,
“political connections” and “persistence” (Ibid.: 181) and, while pursuing a particular goal, have a role in “coupling” the streams,
often taking advantage of policy windows which may appear in the
political or problems streams (Ibid.: 203). Below I set out how
each of the streams may be identified at a global level when assessing dementia as an agenda item and highlight the role that Cameron
had in joining them when coordinating the dementia summit.
The “problems” stream refers to the way in which some issues come
to occupy the attention of policymakers. “Focusing events” provide one means by which conditions become defined as problems
(Ibid.: 197), but in the case of dementia, “indicators” of the growing
scale of the problem, in the form of rates of incidence of the
disease and care costs highlighted by epistemic communities including the WHO, are more likely to have drawn attention to the
issue. The “politics” stream contains the political developments which
make both agenda and policy change more likely (Ibid.: 20).
At the global level, continuing fears of both economic instability and
population aging may have helped to ensure that G8 member
states were receptive to a proposal of joint action on dementia. Finally,
the “policies” stream contains the possible solutions generated
by policy communities which, to be seriously considered, must fit with
a number of criteria including “technical feasibility”, “fit with
dominant values and the current national mood” and “budget workability” (Ibid.: 19 – 20). Cameron’s proposed solution during the
summit of commitment to sustained international collaboration and
investment ostensibly met these criteria and was therefore unlikely to
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be rejected by other leaders. Kingdon notes that the streams meet at
critical moments when “a problem is recognized, a solution is
developed and available in the policy community, a political change
makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are
not severe” (Ibid.: 165). Policy entrepreneurs are often responsible for “coupling” these streams, particularly during an opening of
the “policy window” (Ibid.: 203). Such a window of opportunity
may be seen in the form of Cameron’s G8 presidency which he took
advantage of to push for action on an issue of personal concern.
While a single actor cannot be alone responsible for directing
the debates which lead to the emergence of policy problems, the role
of policy entrepreneurs in agenda-setting should not be underestimated (Nay 2012: 68).
The G8 dementia summit signified the first time that a prime
minister used his G8 presidency to initiate action on one particular disease.7 As such, Cameron’s leadership appears as a crucial
factor in the rise of dementia on the international policy agenda.
Change cannot always be attributed to policy entrepreneurs but, in
cases where change necessarily involves disturbing the status
quo, successful policy entrepreneurship is likely to have been a cause
(Mintrom and Norman 2009: 650). Policy entrepreneurs are
often seen to guard against opposition to their proposals by building
“coalitions” which can demonstrate broader support (Ibid.: 653).
Such a motivation might be seen in the way that Cameron assigned some of his agency to Dr Dennis Gillings (also born and educated in the UK) when appointing him as World Dementia Envoy.
Equally, by committing to doubling UK funding for dementia,
Cameron also appears to be “leading by example” (Ibid.) and encouraging other states to do the same.8
At the global level there is no single authoritative decision maker who
can dictate international agendas (Stone, 2008: 26). However,
status such as G8 presidency does afford leaders the opportunity to
focus attention on issues of collective concern. Although Kingdon’s
multiple streams model addresses domestic policy agendas,
his conception of “streams” can help to explain how leaders take advantage of both global economic conditions in the politics stream and
of globally relevant ideas moving in the problems and policies
streams in order to push for certain kinds of action. I would argue that
the concept of the policy entrepreneur can be extended to heads of
government who see international cooperation on an issue as
beneficial to their national interests. This also explains why, when a
policy entrepreneur is successful in highlighting the benefits of
global cooperation, a domestic issue might move onto an international policy agenda.
7 The Guardian, 11 December 2013.
8 Announced at the Global Dementia Legacy Event in London on 19 June 2014.
Where the multiple streams model and the role it ascribes
to policy entrepreneurs may fall short in addressing this case study is
its application to a prime minister. Kingdon characterises typical
policy entrepreneurs as individuals who strive to get the attention of
decision-makers (journalists, lobbyists, civil servants and academics, for example) and who invest considerable time and effort in
pushing forward their proposals (Kingdon 2003: 204). As a
decision-maker himself, Cameron initially appears not to fit this description. However, as Ackrill notes, Kingdon’s distinction between
policy entrepreneurs and decision-makers is perhaps overly
blunt. By distinguishing between Kingdon’s description of policy entrepreneurs and the concept of policy entrepreneurship in general
(2011: 74), Ackrill argues for seeing policymakers as “commissioners
of ideas and proposals in response to policy windows” (Ibid.: 75)
who select from available ideas produced by their agents. This
modification of the concept of policy entrepreneurship helps to explain
Cameron’s delegation of authority to the World Dementia Council.
Since a solution to dementia does not yet exist, Cameron (or
another policy entrepreneur) can select from any future proposals
generated by the Council and in so doing defer to specialists
in the face of uncertain conditions (Haas 1992: 14).
Central to policymaking is the process of defining certain
conditions as problems requiring action (Anderson 1978: 20). These
problems, as defined by the actors involved in agenda-setting,
can be employed in the pursuit of political power and resources in
addition to specific policy goals (Peters 1994: 10). The role of policy
entrepreneurs within the multiple streams model acknowledges
the importance of political self-interest (Zahariadis 1999: 78). While it
is not possible to identify Cameron’s exact motivation for moving
dementia onto the G8’s agenda, it is quite possible that he considered such a move beneficial to his own national political interests.
The case of the G8 dementia summit therefore also raises
questions about the distinction often made between domestic and
international policy agendas. Even when pursuing domestic
goals, policy coordination between states is increasingly vital due to
economic interdependence (Haas, 1992: 13). When viewed
as an economic rather than a health issue alone, the rise of dementia
on the international policy agenda constitutes less of a puzzle,
since economic threats may serve as key drivers to action. I would
argue that domestic policy problems are more likely to feature
on international agendas when problem definition is not contentious
and collaboration is in the economic interests of multiple states.
The challenge now is of maintaining dementia’s position on the
international policy agenda and ensuring that the commitments made
in the declaration are observed. The “legacy events” which have taken
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place in Canada9 and Japan10 during 2014 (both long after the
end of Cameron’s G8 presidency) suggest that broad commitment to
continued action on dementia has been achieved at least in the
short term. However, if dementia is to be fully recognised as an issue
for global public policy, with the resources and backing of the
entire international policy community, expansion of the World Dementia Council to the level of an international bureaucracy such as UNAIDS
may be required in order to generate a more expansive international response. 11 With the 2008 financial crisis undermining the
G7/8 member states’ dominance in the world economy (Karns
and Mingst 2010: 422), alongside the widespread acknowledgement
that dementia will increasingly affect developing countries, dementia equally warrants a place on broader international agendas such
as that of the G20. Civil society groups have already had a role
in applying this kind of pressure, and may continue to do so.12
Global public policy relating to health issues has traditionally
focused on managing and preventing communicable diseases
such as HIV/AIDS. The G8 summit on dementia is therefore in some
ways unprecedented and unique, and it must be acknowledged
that a single case study cannot generally offer any new theoretical
generalisations (George and Bennett 2005: 111). However, the
scale of the challenges posed by an aging global population13 means
that we may increasingly see states defining other domestic
problems (such as, perhaps, high dependency ratios) as global problems requiring a coordinated international response. Since “destabilizing trends” in global health require increasingly innovative responses in order to protect human security (Benatar 2012: 129),
global cooperation is not only likely but essential. It is reasonable to
assume that international policy coordination on dementia and
other issues related to aging (or, indeed, other non-communicable
diseases) is more likely to be successful than on many other
policy areas since states have more to gain in collaborating than they
have to lose. As such the action the G8 has taken thus far on
dementia may serve as a useful blueprint for future efforts to collaboratively tackle domestic problems which are experienced by
numerous states simultaneously.
9 See Canadian Institutes of Health Research (2014) Summary Report: Second Global Dementia Legacy Event.
10 See Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare, Japan (no date) Global Dementia Legacy Event Japan.
11 See Nay (2012) for details of UNAIDS’s bureaucratic influence with the UN.
12 See Alzheimer’s Disease International (2014, 13 March) Sign the petition: ‘Make dementia a priority agenda item at the G20’.
13 See UNFPA and HelpAge International (2012) Aging in the Twenty-First Century.
Part D
Interview
D
108
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INTERVIEW
Interview with
Ben Stewart,
Greenpeace Activist and
Author of the New Book:
Don’t Trust,
Don’t Fear,
Don’t Beg
INTERVIEW WITH BEN STEWART,
GREENPEACE ACTIVIST AND AUTHOR OF THE NEW BOOK: DON’T TRUST, DON’T FEAR, DON’T BEG
How did you first get interested in environmental activism?
I got interested in the environment a few years before
the issue exploded, in around 2000/2001. I read a lot about it and saw
there was a job at Greenpeace. At the time I was working at
Amnesty International and I decided that I would go for it, and I think
if Greenpeace wouldn’t have worked on climate change I wouldn’t
have been so interested. And weirdly, when I joined, as a Press
Officer the working on the climate change campaign was like the bum
deal – no one wanted to do it. It was considered the boring campaign
that didn’t get a lot of media. But I was really excited to work on
climate and I’ve been there for thirteen years now. Its weird, the
climate story gets some people onboard and turns other people off, and
part of my job is to work out how we get the world turned on the climate
change story.
ALESSANDRA BOCCHI
BEN STEWART
Were you aware of the risks involved before leaving for missions in
the Arctic?
B.S. I have been in other missions in the Arctic and there’s always a
briefing before people leave. One has to educate oneself to a
certain extent about what is going on, but Greenpeace always gives a
briefing about the risks and the dangers. There was a lot of
controversy after the one where activists went to jail in Russia – about
whether they were told enough and whether Greenpeace was
naïve, and when I wrote this book about it I brought this question up
by putting both points of view forward.
A.B.
ALESSANDRA
BOCCHI
What were the biggest struggles you had to face as an activist?
The feeling that you don’t make any difference. I’ve done some big
direct action that took us a lot of time and effort and emotional
energy to organise and then you do it and nothing happens as a
result – no media coverage and the government doesn’t change anything. It is that feeling of profound impotence that really kills you, combined with a vague hope that this time it will be different. I was
once part of a group of people that tried to organise the shut down of
a power station, and we got a hundred and fourteen people together
to do this under extreme secrecy. We were preparing to go in
at 3 am and then two hundred riot police came in through the windows
and arrested us all, and it turns out that one of our numbers – one of the hundred and fourteen that was working for six months on
this, was actually an under cover cop and had been one for seven
years. Some of my friends had known this guy for seven years,
as a very close friend, and then found out he was an under cover
police man, and that was quite crushing for all of us. We were convicted in court and it was overturned later because of the corruption
this undercover agent had engaged in, but that was probably
my most difficult moment of activism; that action being blown, and then
discovering later that a friend was an undercover policeman.
A.B.
B.S.
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Can you explain a bit more about your sense of impotence – that
there’s no significant public reaction to the issues you are raising?
B.S. I gave a large part of my life to this cause – I have spent a
lot of time away, I have made relationships difficult and spent a lot of
time in court and given so much time to it in general, and there’s a
debate as to whether we’ve actually gone anywhereforward
than we were a decade ago. I would make a strong argument for us
having made progress but sometimes it’s difficult to see.
A.B.
One way to challenge that would be to have more Russian people
involved?
B.S. Yes, we have a Russian office and we try to put them front and
centre and we try to avoid having westerners be interviewed
on Russian TV – we put Russians up instead. However, this was very
difficult, Russian media always tried to accuse us and we had
a tough time getting our story out to them.
A.B.
Do you think NGOs make a big impact on international environmental policy, or do you think governmental organisations (as
the UN) are more effective in rendering states environmentally active?
If not, why do you think NGO’s are more effective?
B.S. I think they play very different roles. Often the role of NGOs
is to get an issue on the political agenda. NGOs create public concern,
which in turn creates political pressure to make leaders do
something. Organisations like the UN are often the body that facilitates
a deal. I think that direct action and general campaigning is
what speeds up the international organisation. However, if you have
an issue like the ozone layer which is profoundly concerning to
a large number of people, it’s still quite difficult to get stories like that
on the agenda, they just don’t fit a normal framework of story
telling in the media because they are often seen as remote from us – as if they were part of a distant future. To make climate a big issue
activists have brought it alive, injecting life into the story, and
I think that’s a really important process – to move climate into the centre
of the global conversation. We are criticised a lot for it – for trivialising these kind of issues – what people say is that you shouldn’t
protest or get involved in direct action but just put the science in front
of leaders and they will do the right thing. However, I think that
view is naïve and doesn’t appreciate how power operates in the world;
leaders will generally only do something when they know they
will pay a political price if they don’t. Our job as NGOs is to make sure
that leaders suffer by doing the wrong thing and benefit from
doing the right thing. The UN doesn’t do that, it’s not its job to and it’s
not in a position to. The UN won’t put pressure on David Cameron for
putting a regressive policy on solar – those kinds of things have
to come from below. When I went to Copenhagen in 2009 I was really
struck by this dynamic; there was this idea that everyone was
going to be talking about climate change and that the meeting
in Copenhagen would require leaders to get something done. It did
not turn out that way at all. None of those leaders were feeling
the political pressure from the public to strike a deal. Obama arrived
and made a really disappointing speech, and I remember thinking that
moment, that there was a really powerful movement in the US
that made him give that speech – the Tea party. They mobilised and
ensured that if Obama did what we wanted him to do he would
pay a price for it.
A.B.
Your book has received significant media attention. Do you think it
will contribute to increase some tensions between Russia and
the West?
B.S. I hope not. I think to be honest Putin doesn’t really know or cares
about a book, but other officials might not. However, there are
Russian heroes that I talk about in the story. Many Russian people
went to go protest to have them released. There were about thirty-five
thousand Russian members of the public that wrote to the ministry of home affairs to write a petition calling for their release, showing
general public dissidence in Russia. There were many Russian heroes
here. There is going to be a film of the book. I think the Russian
state will notice it, but I hope it won’t be seen as an anti-Russian film;
it will hopefully be about people that are willing to risk their liberty
for a cause they believe in.
A.B.
Do you think Russia views Greenpeace as an extension of
Western power?
B.S. I’m not sure if the Russian people do or even if the Russian state
does, but it declares that it does. Now that might be paranoia
or a strategy. When we were running this campaign to get our friends
out of jail, we were accused of being CIA agents or working for western oil companies, we were perceived as being biased against
Russia and targeting Russia specifically. There was a film in Russia
about how Greenpeace was part of western oil companies,
when Putin eventually announced an amnesty for the activists, he said
they were allowed to go home but that in his opinion they were acting on
behalf of western oil companies – which is absurd, western oil
companies hate us! They have jailed us; they target us. So I don’t know
whether the Russian state genuinely believes that, or whether
they were trying to facilitate their strategy against us but it was very
important that we challenged that, and we tried very hard to
do so. Part of our strategy was to make sure people in Russia perceived us as an independent organisation, not an extension of
western power and governments.
A.B.
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A.B.
Do you think making leaders pay a reputational cost is the only
way to achieve something from them?
B.S. To some extent. Campaigning groups aren’t good enough
at patting leaders on the back when they do the right thing. When they
do though, no one notices. Greenpeace is often accused of
doing only “stunts”, and hammering corporations and leaders.
The fact is – we do a lot more. But there’s a media filter where all the
press releases, that I sent out, about solutions to climate change and
congratulating leaders that I might have just burned instead.
The media is just not interested. We play this interesting game where
we want to raise the issue onto the agenda and so we have to
be confrontational, the media is not interested in what we have to say
unless we play this part for them. We try to break out that script to try
to have a more nuanced and subtle conversation and its not
always easy – we are often ignored. If you look at NGOs that are purely
policy based you probably haven’t heard of most of them, because
nobody cares, but they should. It’s just a better story to portray
NGOs as extreme and confrontational. If you want to raise public and
political consciousness in the right way you have to use different
tools.
challenging adherence to consumer culture feels quite impossible.
I feel that we will have to work within that framework.
A positive effect of operational work is that through direct action it
tries to solve the issue directly rather than trying to raise awareness when there’s general public apathy. However, a big cause of this
apathy is that most people don’t know what they could do; so
operational work could reduce this effect by offering opportunities in
terms of tackling the issue at grassroots levels. What do you
thing regular people could do to help the environment in their everyday life?
B.S. That’s very true, that most people don’t know what they could do.
However, in your every day life people have two powerful moments.
One happens every day. Every day they make consumer choices
and the global consumer can change the direction that governments
take. If you make decisions about refusing to buy things from
unsustainable sources, corporations and governments react to that
pressure. The second thing is to choose whom to vote for – using their vote to punish leaders who are environmentally regressive.
If you look at the last UK general election the issues that we’re
trying to raise weren’t discussed. Cameron was able to say he run the
greenest government ever and then call all the green agenda
green crap and seemingly not pay a price for it. So people should demand this kind of stuff. But I don’t think voting is the only thing
people can do – people can mobilise to pressure politicians and corporations to do the right thing. Its easier than ever to lend your
name and your time to a cause, and only by mobilising and having
millions of us pushing against really profound forces we can get a
change. This is not a static situation where we’re pushing into
a void – there are well-organised groups pushing against the green
agenda. The profit motive for many companies is a huge push
back and so we need to be much stronger. Any profound change is
never given to; you have to demand it.
A.B.
In terms of using these tools, what advocacy or operational
difficulties do NGOs, like Greenpeace, usually face in advancing
their causes?
B.S. Apathy is the main issue. Climate is a bad issue because its
happening very slowly and all the of the dynamics that exist in making
an issue have some success don’t exist in climate debate. It’s slow
process that requires faith in complex science to believe in it.
Also, there’s a perception that if you get involved for the environment
it has a negative effect on your life – for example, you have to
stop flying etc. Lots of that isn’t true but that’s the easiest story to tell.
Most people have aspirations to have a completely unrestricted
consumer lifestyle – that is the dominant ideology of our time.
A.B.
So isn’t this the consumerist ideology the main cause of public
apathy towards issues like climate change?
B.S. It’s a huge issue, yes. Naomi Klein talks a lot about it in her book
This Changes Everything; it’s a great book. I buy into a lot of
it although not all of it. But that’s what she would say – action on
climate change and the neoliberal economic model are at odds
with each other. I guess we’re talking about something slightly
different – the attitude that people have about wanting material wealth
is the prison through which people see the climate issue. But,
with climate change we haven’t got time for an anti-capitalist revolution. I’m not saying that’s necessarily what we want to see but
we have to get real action on this in ten or twenty years time and
A.B.
Why do you think the Russian state views environmental activism
as such a threat?
B.S. Two things. Firstly the Russian state at the moment is unnaturally
dependant on oil and gas. I can’t remember the exact figures
but about fifty per cent of state revenues come from fossil fuels right
now. We’re an organisation that wants to challenge this and
there is obviously going to be a tension there. Also, at the moment
there’s a suspicion about any organised protest movement – environmental protest movements have been percussive to a wider
movement. If you look at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster where
the soviet regime was untruthful, that caused a huge uptake in activism
in the Soviet Union. So the government is trying to pass a bill
A.B.
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to make it more difficult for all NGOs to operate there. Also, there is
hardly any parliamentary opposition in Russia at the moment,
so they see NGOs as the main opposition.
that the Iraq war was primarily driven by power and oil interests.
The influence of oil in foreign policy will only change when we don’t
need oil anymore. There are many reasons why a solar revolution
will be a fine and beautiful thing for the planet.
Where do you see the future of the Arctic?
Well, the main thing happening in the arctic is that the ice
is melting. The cap is going to be gone in some months. You have this
supreme irony – these huge oil companies are following the ice
melting routes to drill for the same fuels that caused the melting in the
first place. This is insane. The political impunity that oil companies have is absurd. There is also a militarisation of the artic – Russia,
the US and Canada are seeing a lot of hope in projecting military forces
in the area, so there is a lot going on in the arctic.
A.B.
What countries, in your opinion, are the biggest threats to the
environment in the future?
B.S. India at the moment, it is exploding in terms of the resources it is
consuming, it has a huge population that it is trying to take out
of poverty and it’s in the danger of taking the decisions that China made
as well. The Indian government needs to alleviate the profoundly
big issue of poverty that people suffer from, but it has to do so in an
environmental sustainable way as well.
B.S.
Why do you think many states are so passive in tackling global
warming, despite so much scientific evidence?
B.S. I don’t think our brains are well wired to deal with it. If there’s
an abstract threat we are slow in tackling it. If you’re house is burning
down you’ll do something to stop it. If you have a small problem
that is accumulating then our mechanisms don’t kick in because
there’s no sense of an emergency. We don’t like changes as human
beings, for many people things are just fine the way they are,
even if they know with scientific evidence what is happening. And this
is an issue of intergenerational justice as well. We are probably
going to be ok, but our kids probably not, and their kids most probably
not. Many psychologies on climate change state the difficulty
of tackling this issue.
A.B.
What is your opinion on nuclear energy as being the new
alternative for cleaner energy in the future?
B.S. I see the solution in solar. I’m not one of those environmentalists
that are completely against nuclear power, but I don’t think it
will solve the problem because it is too slow, expensive and risky in
countries where there are no regulatory safeguards that ensure that
things can be done safely. However, I see things in a hierarchy
of bad things. The first thing I would shut down is coal fired power
stations which are the most carbon intensive way of generating
electricity, then after that we need to get off gas, and then nuclear,
and after that aim for a renewable network. It will take a long
time to get there and a lot of money.
A.B.
The main argument, however, of emerging economies like India
and China, is that Western countries have already developed
and have caused to a great extent problems such as pollution and
climate change, so now they have a right to this. What do you
think about this argument?
B.S. It’s a valid argument. I think to solve it we need to try and help
these countries pay to develop in a clean way. Because CO2
knows no borders, we have to work together. We have gotten pretty
rich by adopting this energy model. It seems hypocritical and
that’s why we need to help them develop in a way that doesn’t harm
the environment, or else we will trash the environment three
hundred and sixty degrees. The best compromise is a deal where we
help those countries pay for this possibility.
A.B.
How can governments, in your opinion, increase incentives to
invest in renewable energy?
B.S. I think this development requires subsidy from governments.
The British government said it would remove its subsidies now – the
Chinese government has instead invested hugely in solar, they
are going to outplay us in terms of the energy and technologies of the
21st century.
A.B.
Do you think power interests primarily dictate environmental
foreign policy?
B.S. Yes largely. On the one hand British governments say that
they are committed to giving up coal in Britain. But if you look at their
foreign policy they are happy to support other states in using
coal. I know this is cliché view, but it is also held by Alan Greenspan –
A.B.
A.B.
What do you think underdeveloped countries, struggling
from corruption, warfare and poverty should do to resolve energy
vast energy inefficiencies, which don’t seem to be a priority?
B.S. It’s difficult, I don’t want to be the typical white western campaigner
and say – “start being energy efficient.” People are trying to survive so it’s not a priority for them. The countries that have gotten rich
running fossil fuels should pay at least some of the costs for other
countries and help them develop cleaner technologies. The richer world
has to start giving.
A.B.
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Do you think economic growth and environmental preservation are
mutually exclusive? If not, how do you see the two coming together?
B.S. This is the one of the main things – to de-couple economic
growth from carbon emissions. In China CO2 emissions are completely decoupled now from economic growth – so this feeling
isn’t there anymore. The way to do this if government’s aren’t doing it
already is to force them to take up cleaner technology. A deal
at the UN could to so effectively.
A.B.
What do you mean by “force”?
By demanding new alternatives, we have to intervene in
the market. The ultra free market fundamentalist will decide that the
market will decide the best thing for us but I don’t think that’s
the case. We have to intervene in the market very aggressively,
individual countries have to be forced as well but we also need a global
multi-lateral deal. Sounds like a cliché but the world does need
to come together. Part of the role of NGOs, going back to the start of
the conversation, is to force that dynamic.
A.B.
B.S.
Where do you see global warming and the environment ten years
from now, if things continue to unfold this way?
B.S. Copenhagen was five years ago and the last chance for a deal, but
it didn’t turn out the way we thought it would. What I fear is that
in time it will be a lot clearer that climate change is a big deal, but people
will still be sceptic, so we might make progress in cleaner energy
but not maybe not enough because of this scepticism. Climate change
is this very slowly unfolding story; I feel that it will unfold some
way but that it will only take a profoundly huge global disaster to wake
people up. I hope it won’t get to that.
A.B.
A.B.
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Part E
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E
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A
8
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