FITTING THE FACTS OF LIFE INTO INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY THEORIES: THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN’S POPPIES
Markus Coleman‡
ABSTRACT
This article elucidates the most influential theories of international political economy (IPE) by discussing some of the circumstances and forces affecting contemporary Afghanistan. It focuses on the
issue of poppy cultivation vis-à-vis the international community in order to show how numerous
forces are at work, and none of the theories are able to explain the situation exhaustively. In fact, as
a result of selectivity when substantiating their claims, theorists are merely looking at the same issues from different perspectives. I show that the theories actually highlight distinct variables,
which should all be conceived as fundamental components of our current international system.
Moreover, IPE should acknowledge the complementary character of the foremost theories, namely
liberalism, Marxism and realism. In my view, the energy being wasted on debating the relative
merits of the theories would be better utilised by trying to solve contemporary problems in the international system.
Keywords: Afghanistan; international organisations; international political economy; liberalism; Marxism; poppy cultivation; realism
INTRODUCTION
International political economy (IPE) attempts to theoretically define and explain
how the interconnected and reciprocal relationships between political and economic
forces, affected by domestic and international issues, determine the international system as
a whole. IPE has risen to prominence since the 1970s, when it diverged from international
relations (IR) into a discipline in its own right. Instead of focusing only on state policies
when trying to determine the fundamental dynamics of the international system – as was
mostly the case with IR – IPE theorists advocate that the inextricable relationship between
international politics and economics must be acknowledged and reflected in the academic
discourse on international relations. As a result, IPE theorists claim that their theories are
more able to describe and make normative assumptions about what makes the international system tick.
This article will not, however, be a description of the historical development of international political economy or a detailed analysis of the relative strengths of the theorists’
arguments. Rather, it will attempt to explicate the main characteristics of the discipline of
international political economy by highlighting the actors and forces involved through the
prism of contemporary Afghanistan vis-à-vis the international community. Moreover,
‡
BA History and Philosophy, University College Dublin; MA Legal and Political Theory, University
College London. Author acknowledgements: I would like to thank The Senlis Council for their important
contribution to this issue and for organising the London Conference on “The Afghan Development and Security Crisis.” I would also like to thank all the speakers at the conference, particularly the ones I have noted
in this article.
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5
IPE’s current liberal, Marxist and realist theories can be usefully elucidated through this
case so as to also reflect the emphases of their respective points of view.1 In the process, I
will attempt to highlight fundamental problems affecting these IPE theories, and promote
a type of “academic détente”2 between the major theorists.
AFGHANISTAN
After bearing the hardships of over two decades of seemingly continuous conflict,3
Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries in the world in terms of its economy,
governance, infrastructure, and the rule of law. Furthermore, while some stability has
been achieved due to the efforts of the US-led coalition, corruption is rife and the instability of its southern provinces in particular seems to worsen as time passes.4 As Afghanistan
is now taking its fledgling steps onto the international arena after years of forced seclusion
due to the reign of the Taleban, the seemingly innocuous issue of poppy cultivation has
become a hotly debated issue in the fora of international political and economic organisations.
Why, then, should a remote country like Afghanistan and, more specifically, whether
or not its poppy farmers are allowed to practice their livelihood, be of any consequence to
the international community? First and foremost, there is the issue of what Afghanistan’s
poppies are manufactured into, as the industry does not exist for floral purposes only. In
fact, Afghanistan is responsible for producing most of the world’s heroin,5 and in 2003 the
total income to opium farmers alone was equal to half of the country’s legal gross domestic product.6 Therefore, the issue has become pertinent to global organisations like the
United Nations (UN), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and also to Afghanistan’s neighbouring states – even to far off ones like the
United Kingdom. The restrictions imposed on Afghanistan’s sovereignty – a concept
which should in this instance be viewed with some reservation due to the current role of
the coalition in the country’s government – in issues of domestic industry are thus justified
and legitimised by the internationally defined illegal nature of Afghanistan’s most important cash crop.
1
There are numerous variants of these theories, for example, neoliberalism, Dependency Theory and
neorealism, respectively. While possibly somewhat differently tuned, their subdivisions still focus on and
emphasise essentially the same facets of the international system. Therefore, liberalism, realism and Marxism should hereinafter be understood in this article as umbrella terms denoting only the main thrust of the
different perspectives.
2
I am grateful to Adam Landsman for this term.
3
Armed struggle began with the Soviet invasion from 1980 to 1989. Repelling the Soviet forces precipitated two years of civil war, until the Mujahedin triumphed in 1991. Rival factions still competed for
local power however, and after a brief hiatus of hostilities, factionalism began to dissipate the Rabbani government’s authority over the country. The Taleban managed to seize de facto control of Afghanistan in 1996,
and by 1997 controlled two-thirds of it. In 1998 the USA launched missile attacks on Afghanistan in efforts
to apprehend or kill the wanted terrorist Osama Bin Laden, and in 1999 the UN imposed an air embargo and
strict sanctions on the Taleban government so as to force them to hand over Bin Laden. After 9/11, the USled Coalition attacked Afghanistan and, after a brief war, forced the Taleban to capitulate. However, the
coalition has proved ineffective in cementing the rule of law over the whole country, and to this day insurgent groups are constantly operating, particularly in southern Afghanistan, and conflagrations are common.
4
R. Barnett Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition From Turmoil to Normalcy, Council of Foreign Relations:
CRS NO. 12, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10273/ (accessed 4 April 2007), p. 7.
5
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes’ (UNODC) Afghanistan Opium Survey
2004, 87% of global opium production in that year took place in Afghanistan. In the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006, the figure for 2005 was 62%, and in 2006 it had risen again to 82%.
6
C. Todd, N. Safi and S. Strathdee, “Drug Use and Harm Reduction in Afghanistan,” Harm Reduction
Journal vol. 2 (2005), http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/2/1/13 (accessed 2 April 2007).
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION
The traffic-warden characteristic of international and regional organisations in directing the political and, in this case also economic, activities of a country can be theoretically explained and justified by liberal assumptions. These underline the necessity, and
hence legitimacy, of some regional and global regulatory mechanisms for resolving problems of collective action, and also to facilitate a free market economy.7 The liberal perspective basically argues that the best way to resolve international disputes is to create
international organisations (IOs), which will replace notions of self-help with those of
“collective security.”8 In effect, self-help policies could be averted by creating a system of
global governance, while still preserving a degree of national sovereignty, in order to resolve disputes among states. Furthermore, in contrast to realist assumptions of relative
gains, an important economic facet of liberalism is the belief that a free market economy
will entail absolute gains for all parties, as it spurs countries and firms to focus on their respective strengths. Hence even economically weak countries would benefit from a free
market system as their resources would be utilised more effectively.9
From this perspective, international organisations and institutions become the means
to harmonise the interests of all states. Crucially, however, these institutions are moulded
by the most powerful states, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by the
United States, or the UN by the Security Council’s Permanent Five (the USA, the UK,
France, Russia, and China). In other words, these powers can force other states to comply
with their interests via IOs, or else risk being liable to punitive measures. In the case of
Afghanistan, this becomes evident in the way such organisations and distant states like the
USA and the UK are effectively dictating Afghanistan’s domestic policies, even though the
country has its own democratically elected government. While seemingly contradictory to
the fundamental concept of international law, namely sovereignty, it is nonetheless justified on the basis of the devastating result heroin has on the citizens and economies of
other countries.
While, in theory, liberals advance the ideology of a free market as being the best solution for world poverty, they do, however, distinguish this attitude from their treatment
of products that may enter said market. Whether or not Afghanistan is allowed to continue its primary industry will therefore be decided by states and institutions other than
Afghanistan. Furthermore, the contemporary strategy of crop eradication shows how international consensus over what counts as a legitimate product and its enforcement override notions of free markets – and even the humanitarian aspect of depriving millions of
people their only means of living. Indeed, if, due to international norms and rules, poppy
cultivation is forcefully terminated, some 13 million Afghanis will face ruin, due to the fact
the replacement cash crops advocated by the US and the UK, like saffron and olives,
would not yield enough produce to adequately replace the minimal profits the average
farmer accrues from his or her poppy fields.10 Thus, if forced eradication continues, it will
plunge the country into a humanitarian crisis.
The Senlis Council has, however, devised a bold policy to license, not legalise, poppy
cultivation in order to make its legal derivative (morphine and codeine) production into a
major industry for Afghanistan.11 This would not only safeguard the currently vulnerable
7
S. Krasner, “International Political Economy: Abiding Discord,” Review of International Political Economy vol. 1, no. 1 (1994), p. 14.
8
C. Brown, Understanding International Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 22.
9
R. O’Brien and M. Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2004), p. 89.
10
Shukria Barakzai, Member of Parliament, Kabul Province, Afghanistan, speaking at The Senlis
Council’s London conference on “The Afghan Development and Security Crisis” (first session, Royal Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 30 January 2006).
11
Cf. The Senlis Council, Feasibility Study on Opium Licensing in Afghanistan for the
Production of Morphine and Other Essential Medicines (London: MF Publishing, 2005).
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farmers, but Afghanistan could begin to supply the world’s developing countries with affordable morphine and codeine for medicinal purposes. International law and trade policy could also be developed so as to facilitate the export of poppy derivatives from
Afghanistan.12 This would therefore be a realistic win-win programme for both the Afghan people and impoverished peoples all around the world. The only ones to lose would
be the criminal gangs who currently accrue nearly all of the dividends from the poppy
farmers’ labour. This, then, leads us to the next lens for analysing issues in IPE.
PRIVATE INTERESTS AND POWER
While the international system upholds certain norms and rules affecting the activities of states, the power exerted by multinational corporations (MNCs) has also become
increasingly significant. In this context, the effects of licensing poppy cultivation and the
production of its medicinal derivatives in Afghanistan have surely been assessed by the
large pharmaceutical corporations in the USA, Australia, France, Japan, and the UK.13
These corporations have a virtual monopoly on morphine and codeine production, hence,
they control the whole value chain of the opium poppy.14 Moreover, the fact that approximately 77% of the world’s morphine and codeine is consumed by seven of the
world’s richest countries (the USA, UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan) is indicative of the great inequalities the aforementioned international norms and regulations
bring about and perpetuate.15 The WHO has referred to this state of affairs as the “World
Pain Crisis,”16 and while even in the developed Western countries there are insufficient
amounts of these painkillers, the distress developing countries face is especially acute as
they account only for 6% of global morphine consumption.17
Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s conditions are ideal for poppy cultivation, and the necessary skills and infrastructure for providing said painkillers to the vast majority of the
world’s pharmaceutically disenfranchised peoples already exist.18 Therefore, the only real
issue to be resolved before this pain crisis could be considerably alleviated would be the
licensing process. And this again would seemingly only harm the heroin traffickers.
However, perhaps it would also damage the pharmaceutical corporations who amass vast
amounts of money from supplying developed countries with expensive painkillers.
Marxist IPE theorists focus on the role of capitalist elites, and how the international
system is not primarily determined by state policies (as the realist assumes) or by international organisations (as the liberal assumes). Instead, Marxist theory rejects statism and
focuses on the significance of class.19 Whether in Dependency Theory or Centre-Periphery
Analysis, Marxist IPE theorists argue that the paramount determinants of the international
system’s dynamic and structure flow from the self-serving and exploitative policies of
transnational capitalist elites.20 Furthermore, Marxists advocate that that these unjust
structures, which make the poor pay for the ever-expanding benefits of the rich, are being
continuously entrenched. While not quite calling for a proletariat revolution along the
lines of Marx or Lenin, they nonetheless underline the need for a more equitable system.
12
G. Triggs, Director, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, speaking at The Senlis
Council’s London conference on “The Afghan Development and Security Crisis” (second session, House of
Commons, 30 January 2006).
13
The Senlis Council (2005), p. 6.
14
Ibid., p. 21.
15
Ibid., p. 2
16
The Senlis Council, Opium Licensing: A Response to the Afghan Reconstruction Crisis, handout at the
London conference on “The Afghan Development and Security Crisis” (first session, Royal Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 30 January 2006), p. 1.
17
The Senlis Council (2005), p. 6.
18
G. Momand, Deputy Country Manager, speaking at the London conference on “The Afghan Development and Security Crisis” (first session, Royal Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 30 January 2006).
19
O’Brien and Williams, p. 23.
20
Krasner, p. 14.
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Accordingly, it is unsurprising how the pharmaceutical lobby has been unwilling to
back a poppy-licensing programme for Afghanistan, as the potential output of medicinal
painkillers from Afghanistan would be so significant that it could have considerable effects on the vested interests of the existing producers. However, the proposed Afghan
painkiller industry would not even compete for the same markets as these companies. In
fact, according to The Senlis Council’s recommendations, Afghanistan would provide
morphine only to countries that cannot currently afford painkillers as a result of their exorbitant price. The pharmaceutical corporations have, however, only voiced concerns over
the proposed plan, emphasising the fear of subsequent illegal conversion of opium into
heroin. Yet surely the pharmaceutical corporations could help to lobby national and international organisations for implementing this plan rather than ruthlessly buttress their
own pain relief empires. After all, this would be in the interest of millions of sick people
who needlessly suffer and die in pain, and pharmaceutical corporations are in the business
of curing and alleviating suffering.
STATE POWER
After focusing on the problems of inequalities in the global distribution of wealth so
validly highlighted by Marxists, it is necessary to turn to the realist IPE theorists. They
would essentially argue that, in reality, the only obstacle to Afghanistan’s implementation
of such a plan is its relative, and at the moment absolute, weakness on the international
playing field. The realist would offer Afghanistan as the quintessential example of how
the only reason a state has to tolerate the views of other actors is its own lack of power. If
it were politically and economically as powerful as, say, the USA, Afghanistan could grow
whatever it wanted.
Realism thus asserts that the paramount variable determining the political and economic policies of states, and by extension the international system in general, is their
strength relative to other states.21 By conceiving of the international system’s most definitive characteristic as the lack of any overarching authority, hence it being an anarchic
realm, the most influential realist, Kenneth Waltz, came to the conclusion that the system’s
dynamic was necessarily one of self-help. Indeed, echoing the thoughts of Thomas Hobbes, Waltz proclaimed that “[s]tates in the world are like individuals in a state of nature.”22
While multinational and transnational corporations, along with IOs and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), affect the international system, they are of secondary
importance to IPE in the realist vein; here, it is states wielding armies that are paramount.
While this overly ardent emphasis on states is its foremost shortcoming, realism does
initially seem to offer the best lens for analysing this example. This is simply due to the
fact that, as alluded to earlier, Afghanistan’s specific circumstances are peculiar; it is an
infant state, and de facto authority does not lie with the elected government but with the
coalition. Therefore, while entrenched autocratic regimes, such as are found in North Korea and Zimbabwe, can effectively turn a blind eye to whatever parlance the international
community directs at them (if they can bear the consequent sanctions), a state like Afghanistan can do little but flutter about like a feather when caught in the whirlwinds of
international relations. Furthermore, the Afghan government has itself deemed The Senlis
Council’s recommendation as being unviable at present.23 This is the biggest handicap
facing The Senlis Counil’s lobbying, and it is due to the absence of governmental authority, making the implementation and enforcement of poppy licensing problematic. This
lack of power and the consequent ineptitude of the government would, then, further seem
to substantiate the realist case.
21
Ibid., p. 4.
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 163.
23
S. Seddiq, Member of Parliament, Nangahar Province, Afghanistan, speaking at the London conference on “The Afghan Development and Security Crisis” (first session, Royal Institute of Mechanical Engineers, 30 January 2006).
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ANSWERS AND PROBLEMS
Thus the answers vary as to why this innovative plan – which would profit some of
the most vulnerable people in our world while harming only the criminal gangs whose
products wreak havoc on individuals and societies – will most likely never see the light of
day. The liberal IPE theorist would quite correctly retort that the constraints of international rules and norms necessitate the elimination of poppy cultivation because of the
harmful global effects of heroin. The Marxist would lay the burden of guilt squarely on
the pharmaceutical corporations and their politically influential cronies, which is surely a
valid observation regarding the intertwined relationship of political power and its economic underpinnings. The realist, on the other hand, would simply rebuff the above and
argue that, because Afghanistan does not have sufficient national power, hence international clout, to do so, it cannot implement the plan independently. And again, there is
some truth in this argument as well.
In the end, however, these answers all share the same strength and the same deficit:
they all pick out a valid factual variable and respective theorists then elevate that variable
to the supreme place in the “determinants of the international system” Pantheon. Admittedly, due to the futility of trying to encapsulate all the mechanisms and variables of the
international system into one self-sufficient theory, this tendency is somewhat inescapable.
Therefore, the theories’ insights should certainly be noted and utilised, yet only in tandem
with recognising their limitations.
Indeed, the intertwined relationships between the political and economic, also between the domestic and international, and the profound implications one can have on another, manifest themselves clearly in even such a seemingly trivial matter as flower
cultivation in Central Asia. The particular theoretical frameworks bequeathed to IPE,
namely liberalism, Marxism and realism, however, still share the same myopic nature as
their IR ancestors. In the words of Susan Strange, IPE theorists would often “rather fit the
facts of life into international relations theories than question the validity of the theories to
explain the nature, and the causes and consequences of change in the world.”24 Indeed, a
recurrent problem in the field is that theorists often appear to “talk past” each other rather
than engage in productive dialogue.25
Furthermore, when substantiating their claims with empirical evidence, the theorists
are effectively given free reigns to find what they want, as the material on which their
theories are “tested” on is the inexhaustible source of our cultural record and current affairs. Postmodern critiques of historiography are therefore also relevant to IPE and IR as
the application of historical facts for substantiating theories is an inherently selective, biased, and fictive process. Indeed, at times both IPE and IR seem more like what Karl Popper identified as pseudo-science in that there is no way to conclusively falsify their claims:
the proponents of a theory can circumvent any counterargument by creating, or in this
case “quarrying” from history, a suitable response.26 While the historian only purports to
be describing historical events and epochs by constructing narratives, the IR and IPE theorists’ endeavour is inherently normative, and substantiating such prescriptive claims with
selective, and hence manipulative, readings of history is therefore suspect to say the least,
and even morally dubious. Theoretical clarity should not be sought at the price of ignoring important facets of the international system, and all the discussed theories share this
fault.
24
S. Strange, “Wake up Krasner! The world has changed,” Review of International Political Economy vol.
1, no. 2 (1994) p. 209.
25
S. Burchill, et al. Theories of International Relations. 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2005), p. 1.
26
The notion of “quarrying” history in order to substantiate claims in IR is credited to S. Hobden and
J. Hobson in N. Vaughan-Williams, “International Relations and the Problem of History,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies vol. 34, no. 1 (2005).
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COMPLEMENTARITY
While selectivity may be a natural limitation of political science, a new paradigm for
IPE should attempt to synthesize the discussed perspectives into a more holistic and flexible theory. The first step would be to acknowledge the complementary character of the
theories, as they all have valid points – and when utilised in unison, as was made clear
when dissecting Afghanistan’s poppy industry vis-à-vis the international community –
they give a more multifaceted, and hence superior, picture than when used individually.
From poppies in Afghanistan to political problems concerning Iraq, from human rights
issues in Zimbabwe to debating the rights and duties of transnational corporations, all the
aforementioned theories have valuable insights and lessons that could be utilised in solving such political and economic problems. The efforts of IPE theorists should therefore
not be lost in individual system-building and academic nitpicking but be located in collective problem-solving. Ideally, each camp would then analyse and give expert advice to
policy makers on issues within their forte – power politics for the realists, transnational
corporations and inequality for the Marxist, and institution-building for the liberals – in
order to arrive at as specific and accurate policy recommendations as possible.
As for the poppies in Afghanistan, the future is not clear. The US and UK governments have already categorically rejected The Senlis Council’s proposals.27 The Afghan
government has neither expressed much interest in a plan that they perceive as too much
too soon. Nonetheless, if the current momentum for eradication persists, Afghan farmers
will pay dearly for the hedonistic and destructive inclinations of a marginal group of individuals in the developed world. Hopefully, however, the international community will
recognise the potential benefits of The Senlis Council’s plan, which could substantially alleviate suffering amidst the poor in Afghanistan and around the world. This would be
necessary so as to develop the Afghan government’s confidence, and also assist it to make
the recommendations reality.
In the end, the onus lies not only with the international community to recognize the
distinctive circumstances affecting Afghanistan, but the pharmaceutical companies must
also be willing to loosen their grip on the production of painkillers in order to help the
sick, and finally, the coalition must prevail in cementing the rule of law to, in effect, pave
the road for Afghanistan’s journey toward proper statehood, with all its rights and duties.
Is it not more important that such problems of the international system are addressed and
resolved, rather than academics perpetuating theoretical disagreements arising from such
an unavoidable source as difference of perspective? If so, IPE theorists should work together and define their perspectives, not as mutually exclusive but as complementary.
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27
A. Rassa, Chairman, Afghan Human Rights Organisation, speaking at the London conference on
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VOL. 3, NO. 1 – JUNE 2007
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